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Little Green Lies : Optimal environmental regulation with partially verifiable information
https://doi.org/10.24545/00001514
https://doi.org/10.24545/000015149af5a13a-6258-47f9-b4f9-00456523d6f8
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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DP16-16.pdf (369.0 kB)
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Item type | ディスカッションペーパー / Discussion Paper(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2016-09-29 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
言語 | en | |||||
タイトル | Little Green Lies : Optimal environmental regulation with partially verifiable information | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | optimal incentives | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | hiding | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | pollution | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | adverse selection | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源タイプ | technical report | |||||
ID登録 | ||||||
ID登録 (DOI) | 10.24545/00001514 | |||||
ID登録タイプ | JaLC | |||||
著者 |
MUNRO Alistair
× MUNRO Alistair |
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著者所属 | ||||||
政策研究大学院大学 / National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies | ||||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | When the set of possible messages depends on the actual state of the world, optimal incentive schemes to control environmental problems may not always satisfy the revelation principle. As a result, in equilibrium some agents may send false messages, particularly when the information rents in the truth- telling scheme are high. I characterise optimal pollution regulation schemes and produce some numerical examples to show mechanisms which allow some dishonesty in equilibrium may frequently outperform truth-telling schemes. | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | JEL Classification Codes: D82, Q58, H23 | |||||
発行年 | ||||||
2016-09 | ||||||
書誌情報 |
en : GRIPS Discussion Papers Report No. DP16-16, 発行日 2016-09-29 |
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出版者 | ||||||
言語 | en | |||||
出版者 | GRIPS Policy Research Center | |||||
関連サイト | ||||||
関連タイプ | isIdenticalTo | |||||
識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
関連識別子 | https://ideas.repec.org/p/ngi/dpaper/16-16.html | |||||
著者情報 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | https://www.grips.ac.jp/list/jp/facultyinfo/munro_alistair/ | |||||
著者版フラグ | ||||||
出版タイプ | AM | |||||
出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa |