Summary

This dissertation explores the role of central banking in the political economy of East Asian regionalism by means of empirical quantitative and institutional qualitative analyses. The first section studies the interest rate policies and balance sheet policies of East Asian central banks, demonstrating how regional monetary authorities manage to isolate domestic monetary policy from the impact of international financial flows and retain their policy autonomy even under non-floating regimes. Building upon this, the second section presents an in-depth study of Chinese monetary policy operations, including a text-based analysis of ”window guidance” policies, and illustrates how quantity-based policy tools affect and distort price-based policy tools, the very instruments which Chinese monetary authorities currently aim to establish as the primary policy lever. Finally, the third section conducts an institutional political economic analysis of currency internationalisation against the background of the internationalisation of the Chinese yuan and the Japanese yen, arguing that the internationalisation of both currencies requires internal rebalancing towards greater domestic consumption and external rebalancing towards higher imports. The thesis concludes by reflecting upon these findings in the context of East Asian regionalism and by drawing comparisons to European regionalism. It is argued that current political economic conditions in East Asia neither suit nor require formal coordination of monetary policies and associated sovereignty pooling. Instead, existing integration would benefit from institution building, capacity building and the diversification of exchange rate policies.