Deliberations on Japanese Nuclear Policy
During the Sato Administration:
Studies by the Cabinet Research Office

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Abstract

During the Sato Administration period, the Cabinet Research Office, which was an intelligence agency directly under the Cabinet office, commissioned many studies regarding the nuclear policy of Japan. This chapter introduces seventeen of them with emphasis on three of them which seems to have influenced the development of non-nuclear policy of the Sato Administration. Scholars and intellectuals like Kei Wakaizumi, Teiji Yabe, Kiichi Saeki, Yonosuke Nagai, and Michio Royama were involved in these studies.

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Introduction

The Cabinet Research Office (hereafter CRO) was an intelligence agency directly under the Cabinet Office. It was established on April 9, 1952—on short notice before Japan’s independence. It was originally established as a research office for the Prime Minister’s Secretariat. It had a cooperative relationship with the US’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Right from its founding, the CRO took considerable interest in political developments in Communist China. Although it has been known for a while that the office conducted research into nuclear problems, its details remain largely unknown. In addition to research concerning Japan’s possible possession of nuclear weapons, which was conducted by political scientists
such as Yonosuke Nagai and has been examined by previous research in Japan and abroad, this author has confirmed that at least 17 reports on nuclear policies were created between 1963 and 1970. The list of 17 reports are provided at the end of this chapter. Among these reports, three are particularly important.

The first is a report by international politics scholar Kei Wakaizumi, which was compiled immediately after China’s nuclear test in 1964. In January 1965, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and President Lyndon B. Johnson held a meeting of the heads of states. On this occasion, Sato assured that Japan would not nuclearize, and Johnson gave assurances concerning the American extended deterrence for Japan. It is possible that Wakaizumi’s report created an impetus towards this arrangement.

The second report was compiled by political scientist Teiji Yabe in collaboration with Kiichi Saeki, former President, National Defense College. This report appears to convey the content of the two’s presentation regarding Japan’s nuclear policy during their meeting with Prime Minister Sato in March 1967. The report could have become the theoretical basis for the Sato administration's development of a non-nuclear policy, including its so-called Four Pillars of the Nuclear Policy.²

The third was a study on possible nuclear weapons development by Japan compiled just before the signing of the NPT. The report was compiled by a group of scholars led by Yonosuke Nagai and Michio Royama. This could be described as a rounding up of the CRO’s work on nuclear weapons. The report was probably compiled to consider how best to appeal to Japanese public opinion to support the government’s non-nuclear policy.

By focusing on these three commissioned studies, this paper attempts to reinterpret the CRO’s work on nuclear weaponry. Among other things, it relies on an extensive interview with Minro Shigaki, former head of the various divisions of the CRO.³
The Seventeen Nuclear Weapons Policy Reports

The CRO began to commission studies on nuclear armament in 1963, during the Ikeda administration. The office’s focus on nuclear armament gathered momentum following China’s nuclear test in 1964. Seventeen reports—counting only the reports compiled between 1963 and 1970—were kept privately by Minro Shigaki, the head of the various divisions of the CRO, and others (Table 1).

Three reports were compiled after January 1963, when US Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer attempted to sound out Foreign Minister Ohira about nuclear submarines making port calls in Japan. These reports dealt with the anti-nuclear submarine port call movement. They were titled ‘The Background to the Anti-Nuclear Submarine Port Call Movement’, ‘Scholars and Cultural Figures in the Anti-Nuclear Submarine Port Call Movement’ and ‘The Post-War Science Movement and Progressive Scientists’ (Table 1: ①②③). Following China’s nuclear test in October 1964, the report entitled ‘The People’s Republic of China’s Nuclear Test and Japan’s Security’ (④) was also quickly put together by Wakaizumi. From 1965 onwards, the CRO turned its attention towards Japan's nuclear policy, given the changes in the international environment. ‘Various Issues Related to Nuclear Policy’ (⑤) and ‘Japan’s Nuclear Policy and Diplomacy: Preconditions’ (⑧) were compiled during this transitional period, and these reports explored the various possibilities for Japan’s nuclear policy. The office turned its focus towards the NPT when the latter emerged as a key political issue; consequently, research was focused on the peaceful use of nuclear power and the handling of the NPT.

According to Shigaki, the CRO commissioned research by selecting a topic and covertly seeking the most appropriate specialist for the topic. It was operating completely independently of the Prime Minister’s Office. The selection of topics and researchers was done secretively and without any input from the Prime Minister’s Office. Indeed, the CRO
took pride in not meeting politicians and in conducting research independently of any political influence.

The First Report: The Wakaizumi Report Following China’s Nuclear Test

On the night of October 16, 1964, the Chinese government announced that it had successfully tested an atomic bomb. It was the seventh day of the Tokyo Olympic Games, which had commenced on October 10. The Soviet Union’s Premier Nikita Khrushchev resigned from his position as premier, and a new administration took power in the United Kingdom. In this way domestic and international circumstances became fluid all of a sudden. As China became the fifth nuclear-armed state (the other four being the US, the Soviet Union, the UK and France), Prime Minister Ikeda remarked, ‘From a military perspective, this is not a big deal. Rather, the extent of the political and psychological influence in Asia is the problem’. Ikeda had ‘kept a cool eye on the situation, seeing it as ‘a matter of time’ because he had independently gathered ‘very trustworthy information’ about the likelihood of Chinese experiment through ‘a certain special channel’.5

The CRO began to commission studies immediately following China’s nuclear experiment. One of those chosen by Shigaki was Kei Wakaizumi, a scholar in international politics. Shigaki had kept an eye on Wakaizumi ever since Wakaizumi was a student at the Faculty of Law at the University of Tokyo and an active member of Doyokai, a study group of concerned students. The entries in Shigaki’s diary immediately before the nuclear test indicate that the CRO was aware of the imminence of the nuclear test and had begun preparations.6

Wakaizumi’s report entitled ‘The People’s Republic of China’s Nuclear Test and Japan’s Security: The Basic Policy Direction that Should be Taken by Our Country’ was dated 2 December 1964, six weeks after China’s nuclear test. The research was not carried
out under the instruction of the Prime Minister’s Office but by the sole discretion of the CRO. On the front page, the author Wakaizumi’s name does not appear and one finds a stamp ‘secret’ indicating its confidential nature. The CRO had printed two hundred copies of this report under the name of International Affairs Research Group (Kokusai Josei Kenkyukai), an incorporated association to which the CRO had commissioned research. The copies were distributed to the Prime Minister’s Office, among others.

The report consisted of four parts: an introduction entitled ‘Taking the security of one’s country more seriously,’ ‘A criticism of unarmed neutrality and Japan’s independent argument on nuclear armament,’ ‘Policy direction that should be taken by our country with adherence to the Japan–US Security Alliance as a precondition,’ and a conclusion. In the introduction, the author views the advanced level of China’s nuclear test as a serious problem for Japan. He expresses hope that Japan would not merely condemn China’s test but also seriously consider its own security. It urges reflection on the ‘economy first’ attitude of post-war Japanese political trend and asks whether something more essential and important has not been missing. Borrowing the words of an American journalist, he criticises it as ‘prosperity without a soul.’ Wakaizumi later commented in his memoirs, The Best Course Available: A Personal Account of the Secret US–Japan Okinawa Reversion Negotiations, that Japan, during the latter half of the twentieth century, was a ‘fools’ paradise’ absorbed in the materialist worship of money.7

The report then discusses some concrete measures, critically examining both the Socialist Party of Japan’s argument on demilitarized neutrality. Demilitarized neutrality policies and the abandonment of the US–Japan Security Treaty are referred to as an irresponsible abstract argument, absolutely non-executable under the fluid, deteriorating international situation surrounding Japan. Furthermore, it rejects the possibility of establishing a US–USSR–China–Japan security treaty, as well as the possibility of
establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Asia-Pacific that would include these four countries; it regards these as unrealistic, empty slogans. The report anticipates that mental intimidation will increase with the advancement of China’s nuclear armament and that those feeling insecure will become proponents of the abrogation of Japan’s security treaty with the US and to get rid of US military bases in Japan because they would invite Chinese hostility. The report expects these people to call for the early restoration of Japan–China diplomatic relations as well as China’s entry into the UN. The report argues that what is necessary for Japan at this stage is to have a realistic and critical perception about the state of things in China. It explains that China is a latent threat to Japan and other neighbouring countries, and against claims that Japan would be safe if it merely gave up its security alliance with the US in favour of a neutral policy, it points out that India, which had adopted a non-alignment policy and had been in a friendly relationship with China, was nonetheless invaded by China in 1962.

The report then admits that there are views in Japan that it should arm itself with nuclear weapons, now that China has its own nuclear weapons. The report attributes this argument to concerns about the reliability of security assurances of the Japan–US Security Treaty (the nuclear umbrella) when China pursues nuclear armament by developing hydrogen bombs and the rockets to carry them. Wakaizumi expresses his agreement by making reference to General Pierre Marie Gallois of France who stated something similar in an interview with a Japanese journalist. Wakaizumi recognised the logical validity of calling for Japan’s nuclear armament; however, he maintained that in purely military and strategic terms, to counter China and the USSR on its own, Japan would have to acquire a massive, effective and invulnerable nuclear armament, which, from a financial perspective, was impossible.

Wakaizumi also argued that the nuclear armament of Japan may not be feasible as a
policy, given the majority national sentiment, Japan’s political situation and its constitution and the terms of the Atomic Energy Basic Act. He concluded that if Japan were to push forward on its own nuclear armament plan, it would meet strong opposition from the US, and it was also undesirable from a non-proliferation perspective.

Wakaizumi asserts that it was impossible for a country to protect itself on its own in the nuclear age and that regional collective defence was the most common practice. In Japan’s case, this meant strengthening and developing national policy based on the Japan–US Security Treaty. It was important to communicate to the public that the Treaty serves as the basis for Japan’s defence precisely because the values and the objectives of Japan and the US were fundamentally identical. In comparison, the values and the objectives of Communist China were fundamentally different from those of Japan.

Wakaizumi proposes a division of roles with the US. That is, he proposes that Japan rely on the US for nuclear deterrence and at the same time increase its conventional armament for self-defence purposes, thereby reducing the burden on the US. He emphasises that it is important for Japan to acquire secure confirmation of the US’s nuclear umbrella to protect itself from China’s nuclear threat. While he regards President Johnson’s promise of security in case of threat by nuclear weapons as authentic, he nonetheless notes that it might be necessary to arrive at a more concrete agreement in the future. Wakaizumi also states that it is only natural for Japan to perform its duties as an ally, such as allowing nuclear submarines to make port calls in Japan. In the future, other measures to gain American commitment of retaliatory power to Japan’s defence may become necessary, such as the port calls of the Polaris nuclear submarines.

Wakaizumi concludes that while Japan should not consider nuclear armament to be a national policy, it should nonetheless retain the latent ability for a time when nuclear armament becomes unavoidable. In other words, Japan should always retain higher standards
when compared with China in terms of scientific and technical standards, as well as industrial infrastructure and other national potentials concerning these aspects. To demonstrate Japan’s capacity, Wakaizumi proposes to prioritise measures such as the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the launching of satellites via domestically made rockets and so on.

Wakaizumi’s report was given in early December of 1964. In January 1965, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato visited the US and met President Johnson for the first time. One of the first things that President Johnson did was to reconfirm the American commitment for the security of Japan—with nuclear weapons, if necessary. It is hard to think that Sato’s views were not influenced by reading Wakaizumi’s report. 9

The Second Document: Yabe and Saeki’s Advice for the Prime Minister (Table 1-⑦)

In February 1966, the CRO requested Teiji Yabe to assume leadership of the International Affairs Research Group, which Yabe gladly accepted. Yabe was a political scientist, who, before World War II, was involved in Fumimaro Konoe’s national policy research organisation called ‘Showa Kenkyukai.’ After the war, Yabe had served as the President of Takushoku University. Yabe was among those who had maintained a close relationship with the CRO since its founding. It is also worth mentioning that Wakaizumi, as a young student, was strongly influenced by Yabe and that the two had remained in close contact ever since. 10

According to Shigaki’s diary, Yabe, Kiichi Saeki (the former President, National Defense College) and Hideo Otsu (head of the CRO) went to meet Prime Minister Sato in his office on 8 March 1967. They are supposed to have made propositions about Japan’s nuclear policies. 11 They explained the findings of the research they had conducted in the previous year. The report entitled ‘Issues Concerning Our Country’s Nuclear Policy’ appears to be the report that was handed to Sato on this day. In December 1967, Prime Minister Sato addressed a Lower
House Budget Committee meeting of the Diet on the matter of Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Shigaki thinks that this March 8 meeting greatly influenced Sato’s thinking on nuclear policy.

The report entitled ‘Issues concerning Our Country’s Nuclear Policy’ (23 February 1967) was compiled by the International Issues Research Group (Kokusai Mondai Kenkyukai), an incorporated association linked to the CRO. Concerning the influence of China’s development of nuclear weapons, the report said that ‘insofar as can be foreseen, the overall influence on the strategic regime of the Far East is minimal’. However, China’s nuclear development could pave the way to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which in turn could heighten the possibility of nuclear weapons being used through accident or mistakes. This prospect had indeed shocked the world. The most imminent issues under such circumstances were as follows: (1) what approach Japan should take regarding the early conclusion of the NPT and the complete banning of nuclear tests; and (2) the security measures that Japan should adopt regarding the fact that psychologically, politically and militarily, Japan was directly affected by China’s nuclear armament.

Although the report states that nuclear energy ought to be used primarily for peaceful purposes since nuclear weapons can destroy humanity, it nonetheless acknowledges that nuclear weapons ‘are very important for a country’s security and are deeply related to a state’s authority and the weight of its voice.’ In particular, possessing an invulnerable nuclear capability was a means of ‘deterring a nuclear war’. The report also highlights the urgent need for international measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ban their testing to reduce the risks of nuclear war because the more the countries that own nuclear weapons the more likely the danger of nuclear war. At the same time, the report also acknowledges the importance of fully considering that ‘the status of non-nuclear states does not remain powerless and such legitimate right of self-defence not be neglected’.
Concerning the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the report expresses the stance that Japan should ‘approach the signing of the treaty aiming to prevent nuclear proliferation with a cooperative attitude’. The report also states that the following points should be taken into consideration, given that the treaty may have a long-lasting impact on the country’s security. First, the treaty should not prevent the signatories from taking necessary measures for their security following bilateral or multilateral agreements in response to nuclear attacks or threats by nuclear weapons. Second, efforts should be made to ensure the fair distribution of duties and responsibilities between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. Disarmament should be carried out gradually so that it does not affect the mutual balance. Third, non-nuclear weapon states should also be allowed to engage in research and development for peaceful use of nuclear energy. Fourth, follow-up meetings should be convened periodically to examine the provisions and the implementation of the treaty.

Regarding the banning of nuclear testing, the report suggests that Japan should ‘continue to seek the complete banning of nuclear weapons tests’ and that the ban should be accompanied by ‘international control including on-the-spot inspections’.

Regarding Japan’s defence, it expresses the view that first, it would be impossible for Japan to counter the nuclear arsenals of superpowers such as the Soviet Union by its own nuclear arsenal and that ‘it is imperative that we rely on the nuclear deterrence capabilities of the US’. Second, it predicts that China ‘will complete in two to three years the deployment of intermediate-range ballistic missiles that could launch effective nuclear attacks’ on its neighbouring countries and that ‘the intercontinental ballistic missiles will be deployed in seven or eight years’. In any case, it was necessary to respond to the progress of Chinese nuclear armament step by step. It was primarily necessary not to give in to China’s threats and maintain the national power to stand up to China and be counted as an equal. The report proposes the following as prospective security measures:
First, it calls for the prolongation of the Japan–US security regime, and it also highlights the need to make full use of US nuclear deterrence. More accurately, the report states the following: (a) Make communication between the Japanese and American heads of state more effective, (b) participate in discussions regarding the deployment and management of the US nuclear force and (c) review former policies in order to prepare for the need for the introduction of US nuclear weapons. Second, it highlights the importance of addressing the Japanese public’s aversion to nuclear weapons. Third, it suggests that Japan should not engage in nuclear armament independently; doing so, the report argues, might be interpreted as an expression of lack of trust towards US deterrence capability vis-à-vis China, and lead to the undermining of US-Japan Security Treaty.

Unfortunately, this author has not been able to acquire all the pages of this report. Only the first seven pages were left in the holdings of Mr. Yoshihara. It is also difficult to prove that this meeting on 8 March 1967 between PM Sato, Yabe and Saeki led directly to the development of the three non-nuclear principles nine months later. However, this report can nonetheless be viewed as representing the views of a large number of experts who had close ties with the administration. And Yabe and Saeki were very important figures in the surroundings of Prime Minister Sato.

*The Third Report: The Nuclear Development Research of Nagai and Royama* (Table 1-11, 15)

In January 1968, the CRO embarked on full-fledged research about nuclear policy. Yonosuke Nagai, Professor, Tokyo Institute of Technology, and a political science scholar, played a central role in this context. Nagai had first engaged in research on political awareness and behaviour. However, during his tenure as Visiting Professor at Harvard University, the Cuban Missile Crisis escalated (October 1962), and Nagai turned his focus towards international politics consequently. A study group was formed in Japan following Nagai’s return to the
country. As per Shigaki’s account, Nagai had first approached Kakihana Hidetake, Professor, Tokyo Institute of Technology, and a nuclear chemist, who would later serve as the IAEA’s Deputy Director General. Kakihana, in turn, was believed to have invited Maeda Hisashi, a journalist well-versed in disarmament issues, to the study group. Following these developments, Nagai invited Royama Michio to the study group as well. Royama was a scholar of international politics and the youngest of the four; he would later serve as a representative of the National Council for the Normalisation of Japan–China Diplomatic Relations (Nicchu Koko Seijoka Kokumin Kyogi-kai). Their research group was named ‘Ka-na-ma-ro Society’ (Kanamaro-kai)—a combination of the first characters of the family name of each of them- Kakihana, Nagai, Maeda, and Royama. The study group held its first meeting on January 30, 1968. This also happened to be an important day for the Sato administration. In a party discussion involving its representatives in the Lower House, Sato elaborated on the four pillars of Japan's nuclear policy (the three non-nuclear principles, the promotion of nuclear disarmament, reliance on the US’s nuclear deterrence capabilities and the peaceful use of nuclear power). Following discussions about the three non-nuclear principles at a Lower House Budget Committee meeting in December of the previous year, the Sato administration's non-nuclear policy was extensively debated in the Diet.

The Kanamaro Society met every month, sometimes more frequently, until 21 February 1969; members usually met at the International House of Japan in Roppongi, in which Royama was the head of the research office. Based on Shigaki's journal entries, the group met approximately 16 times, including a field seminar in the mountain resort of Karuizawa from 12 to 13 July 1968. There were many distinguished guests at their meetings, including Okamoto Tetsushi, a pioneer in Japanese rocket engineering; Imai Ryukichi, who was involved with the Japan Atomic Power Company before serving as the ambassador of Japan’s delegation to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament; Sekino Hideo, a military
affairs commentator; Kosaka Masataka, an international politics scholar; and Suzuki Tatsuzo, who was from The Institute of Statistical Mathematics.

Following discussions that spanned eight months, the group authored a report entitled ‘Basic Research on Japan’s Nuclear Policy (Part 1): The Technological, Organizational, and Financial Possibilities of Establishing an Independent Nuclear Force’ in September 1968. ‘Basic Research on Japan’s Nuclear Policy (Part 2): The Strategic, Diplomatic, and Political Issues of an Independent Nuclear Force’ was completed in January 1970. According to Shigaki, the first volume was authored primarily by Kakihana and the second by Royama.

In the Foreword to the first volume, the following are listed as the aims of the research:

(1) To provide basic data and analyses to help establish a comprehensive nuclear policy for Japan

(2) To establish the current state of nuclear related capabilities of Japan (including the situation in the near future) in order to think about the hypothetical nuclear weapons capability of Japan

(3) Given the fact that Japan is prohibited from engaging in nuclear experiments, including underground ones, by the Partial Test Ban Treaty, and by participating in the NPT, Japan will definitely go the road of a non-nuclear state

(4) To facilitate the independent development of peaceful use of nuclear power and to prevent nuclear power from being used for military purposes

In other words, with the NPT negotiations in mind, the Kanamaro Society aimed to create a report to help establish Japan’s nuclear policy. The existence of this report was revealed to the wider public in November 1994 by Asahi Shimbun. The report was also cited in a couple of academic articles, and even overseas, it came to be known as a major
work of Japanese research on nuclear armament.\textsuperscript{14}

Part I (Table 1–11)

The main text of Part I of the report is divided thematically into six chapters: the problems associated with the manufacture of nuclear bombs, the manufacture of fissile material, the state of rocket technology development, the state of the development of guidance systems, human/organisation-related aspects, and financial issues. Following is the summary of its contents:

(A) Problems associated with the manufacture of the nuclear bombs

To manufacture nuclear bombs, Japan would have to rely on plutonium as the country lacked the capacity to produce enriched uranium. Approximately 100 kilograms of plutonium were potentially accumulated in the nuclear waste on an annual basis in the nuclear reactors in the villages of Tokai; the reactors, however, were under the regulations of IAEA. Japan, therefore, did not have unfettered access to the raw materials or the devices necessary to manufacture nuclear weapons. Even if Japan ignored the terms and restrictions imposed by the IAEA, it would have had to reprocess plutonium so that it could be used in the manufacture of nuclear bombs. There were plans to construct a reprocessing plant by 1972, but currently Japan would not be able to possess the capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons with plutonium. A plutonium bomb, moreover, required that it be triggered via implosion, and it was necessary to conduct at least four experiments before the bomb could be developed for use. Based on the rate at which other developed nuclear states manufactured their nuclear weapons, it was estimated that Japan would require 6 years to manufacture a bomb.

(B) Problems related to the manufacture of fissile materials
It was expected that by mid to late-1970s, nuclear power would contribute substantially to the world’s energy production. A light-water reactor using enriched uranium was the best choice both from technological and economical point of view. The US and the Soviet Union maintained a monopoly over the production of enriched uranium, and there was danger that Japan would have to import uranium from the US. Japan, therefore, needed to consider methods of producing its own enriched uranium even if only in small amounts. Seen from a nuclear energy business point of view, it was also desirable to possess capability to produce enriched uranium. It was expected that by 1975, the market for enriched uranium would change from a buyers’ market to a sellers’ market. Therefore, Japan intended to initiate basic research on enriched uranium by 1975 to be able to construct enriched uranium manufacturing plants by the mid-1980s. There were three ways to manufacture enriched uranium: gaseous diffusion, centrifugal separation and development of new technology. The gaseous diffusion method was not suitable to Japan given the high electricity costs involved in the production. Centrifugal separation was facing technological problems. But new technological developments were possible. The construction of an enriched uranium manufacturing plant was regarded as an ‘issue that the country should seriously address from the perspective of ‘economic national defence’.

(C) Problems related to the propulsion and guidance of missiles

Solid fuel of the level of those used by the Polaris missile is technologically feasible for Japan. However, the manufacture of Polaris-level rockets was difficult due to the high costs of production. Substantial time would be needed to establish a high-volume production system to operate at low costs. In addition, without a development of a guidance system, a military rocket with a nuclear warhead would not be completed. It was impossible to know how much time would be needed to develop a guidance system for medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) and IRBMs. With the small number of engineers available and very little
basic knowledge, this would most probably require at least 8 years.

(D) Human, organisational and financial aspects

Building national consensus for the establishment of a nuclear force was a very difficult task. Even if the government decides on the establishment of a nuclear force, it would be very difficult to achieve a consensus of the engineers related for the project. Moreover, state-level projects of this scale would put huge financial pressure on the state budget. The costs of securing the ‘modest nuclear force’ (using UN Secretary General U Thant’s classification) were estimated to average 61.2 billion yen per year for 10 years. In contrast, the costs of securing a ‘small-scale, high-performance nuclear force’ were estimated to average 201.6 billion yen per year for 10 years.

(E) Conclusion

Simply manufacturing a small number of plutonium bombs would be possible and relatively easy. But establishing a meaningful nuclear force faces the above-mentioned mountains of problems. It was not possible at this time to give a final answer to whether Japan should or should not establish its independent nuclear force. It required further strategic, national-psychological and diplomatic consideration.

Part 2 (Table 1-16)

The report’s second part covers the following problems;

(A) The nuclear threat posed by China

Given China’s alleged progress in its efforts to develop a compact and light hydrogen bomb as well as a long-range missile, it was highly likely that China would have the capacity to directly attack the US in the 1970s. China would be capable of attacking Japan even earlier. China's possible aims for continuing the development of ICBM were: (1) obtain capacity to deter the US, the Soviet Union, or both; (2) gain the ability to conduct
nuclear attacks on surrounding regions (including Japan) using IRBMs and thereby limit the possibility military interventions of the US and the Soviet Union in these regions; (3) acquire the ability to threaten neighbouring countries with nuclear weapons to carry out people’s liberation war, while deterring nuclear attacks from the US and the Soviet Union; (4) use the development to heighten national prestige and inspire the people of China and the allies of China; (5) to entangle Soviet Union in its defensive war against the US.

From the perspective of Japan's security and nuclear policy, (2) was regarded as the most dangerous. “Nuclear blackmail” from the Chinese side may lead to the loss of credibility of the American ‘nuclear umbrella. In Europe, concerns emerged about the effectiveness of the US’s nuclear umbrella when the Soviet Union developed nuclear missiles with the range to target the US mainland. Consequently, France militarily withdrew from the NATO and established its own nuclear force. China probably decided to develop its independent nuclear force for the same reason. Should Japan also decide to acquire nuclear weapons by the time Chinese nuclear missiles reaches American mainland?

(B) The nuclear strategy-related issues faced by Japan

Given that Japan’s population was 3.6 times more concentrated than that of China, and that 50.1% of Japan’s population and major industrial facilities were concentrated in the Tokaido megalopolis region (as of October 1968), Japan cannot tolerate even a single hydrogen bomb to reach this territory. Even the US has not succeeded in developing an effective antiballistic missile (ABM) system, so this was also not reliable.

(C) Nuclear armament and political/diplomatic issues

France seemed to offer one example to consider the choices before Japan. But it was also necessary to evaluate France’s nuclear armament from multiple perspectives. In considering Japan’s nuclear armament, it must be taken into account that unlike Europe, Asia was not comprised of homogeneous countries (homogeneity in terms of culture,
history, or economy). Furthermore, unlike France, for whom it was only the Soviet Union that posed a nuclear threat, Japan had two nuclear threats (the Soviet Union and China). Moreover, the situation in Asia was such that the Korean War and the Vietnam War could not be prevented despite American nuclear deterrence efforts. Furthermore, while France’s nuclear armament did not threaten the NATO member states, Japan’s nuclear armament would certainly alert China and raise the suspicions of both US and Soviet Union. An indispensable condition for stable nuclear deterrence is the maintenance of channels of communication between enemies. The ‘hotline’ between the US and the Soviet Union following the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis is an example in this regard. However, there were no diplomatic relations between Japan and China, and the dispute between Japan and the Soviet Union regarding the Northern Territories (Kuril Islands) did not appear to be resolvable. Diplomatic conditions surrounding Japan were so unfavourable that it is not hard to imagine that Japan’s decision to arm itself with nuclear force would heighten political instability in and out of the country.

(D) Conclusion

Based on the above analysis, it can be said that Japan’s nuclear armament would not heighten its security. Since Japan had also joined the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, its efforts at developing nuclear warheads had to be based solely on underground tests. At the moment, even this seemed unlikely. Japan’s withdrawal from the treaty would aggravate international tension. Given also the NPT’s formation and Japan’s participation in it, Japan could not acquire nuclear warheads from other countries. In other words, Japan could not possess nuclear weapons given the difficulties it faced on the technological, diplomatic and political fronts. However, the fact that Japan cannot arm itself with nuclear weapons did not necessarily mean diminishing Japanese security. Nationalist sentiments may be temporarily satisfied by the attainment of nuclear weapons, but this effect would not last
The possession of these weapons would probably place Japan in an even more difficult situation. The time when the possession of nuclear weapons was a condition for a Great Power was passed. Japan's security issues needed to be solved from a completely new and multidimensional perspective.

Kanamaro Society’s Report can be seen as a grand compilation of the various nuclear policies that the CRO had considered. As mentioned earlier, the existence of the report gained fame after the report of Asahi Shimbun on November 13, 1994. Ever since, there have been an assumption that this report was an indication of the Japanese government’s ‘secret’ research on nuclear armament. But this author believes that this was a very misleading impression given by the Asahi Shimbun, and that in reality the report was not secret at all.

Shigaki Minro, who was in charge of the CRO, has stated in an interview that ‘the existence of the research group was not communicated to any agency or ministry besides the CRO, and no information was shared with the likes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’. He also said, ‘There was no idea of releasing the findings of the research to the public’. Shigaki also informed me that ‘Two hundred copies were printed and submitted to Prime Minister Sato and others through Secretary Kusuda’.

In contrast, Royama’s account is slightly different; Royama says, ‘While I did not have any awareness that this research project was a top-secret project, the decision of the CRO not to release the part 1 and part 2 of the report publicly was probably because, at the time, it was unable to predict whether the conclusions of the research would end up supporting or rejecting the acquisition of a nuclear force. They refrained from publication out of caution.’

The cover of the report that does not indicate its confidentiality—it does not bear ‘secret’ or ‘handle with care’ stamps. There are several facts which contradict these claims of
secrecy. The second part of the report was published in Issue 173 (May 1970) of *Monthly Research Report* (an organ of the CRO); it was entitled ‘A Discussion of Japan’s Nuclear Policy’. In the article, one can find the following explanatory sentence at the very beginning: ‘This paper is an introduction of a commissioned research report’. While in the main text one finds some minimal additions and modifications, overall, it covers the same content, including the conclusion. At the end of the article, one finds the initials of the author, ‘MR’ (Michio Royama). It is only natural that some researcher have come to the conclusion that they ‘have doubts regarding calling this a “secret report”’. *Monthly Research Report* was a journal that aimed to create positive publicity about the CRO within the government, and Shigaki had been involved with the journal since its inception. It is hard to imagine that Shigaki would have been completely unaware of the publication of the ‘secret’ research he was in charge of.

Furthermore, part II of the report was also subsequently published as a chapter under the title ‘China’s Nuclear Threat and Japan’ as part of Royama’s book in the same year. The content is unaltered, barring a few additions and corrections to the main text. It was published in March 1970, only 2 months after the second volume was put together. This means that he must have immediately begun the preparation for the publication of the book after the completion of the report. The ‘secret research’ was released simultaneously in three forms: as a report of the CRO submitted to the Sato administration, in the CRO’s organ *Monthly Research Report*, as well as a part of a major publishing company’s book.

Part of the purpose of the CRO was to guide public opinion in accordance with the government’s views. The publication of the report seems to have been intentional, the purpose of which was to popularise a non-nuclear stance of Japan towards the general public by explaining the realities of Japan’s security environment.
Conclusion

In the 7 years and 8 months that the Sato administration was in power, during which negotiations about reversion of Okinawa to Japan were ongoing, the country’s non-nuclear policy was being drawn up. At first, it was discussed in response to changes in the international political climate and in the context of the US’s demands. During the Ikeda administration, the US had sounded out Japan about its nuclear submarines making port calls in the country. Three days after the Sato administration took power on 9 November 1964, the Seadragon became the first submarine to make a port call in Sasebo City. The Americans had already been informed during the Ikeda administration that there would be no objections to normal nuclear submarines (excluding Polaris-type ones) making port calls.

Sato was forced to fully address the nuclear issue because of China’s nuclear test. During the Sato administration, the CRO examined the pros and cons of nuclear armament. Between 1963 and 1970, at least 17 reports were compiled as a result of commissioned research on this topic. The works commissioned by the CRO were authored by top experts in the fields of political science, international politics, nuclear chemistry and others. They probably had considerable influence upon Sato’s nuclear policy of this period.

The involvement of scholars in nuclear policy research started during the Ikeda administration, and gained significant momentum during the Sato administration. The role played by Sato's Chief Secretary Kusuda Minoru, who, inspired by President John F. Kennedy’s close association with intellectuals, worked to strengthen the administration’s relationship with intellectuals, was significant. Sato’s trusted confidant Toshio Kimura, who was in charge of negotiations involving the return of Okinawa and the country’s non-nuclear policy, also played a significant role as an intermediary between the CRO and Sato. In the Cabinet, an information channel was established that stretched from Shigaki to Kusuda, Kimura and finally to Sato himself. In response to Sato and Kusuda’s requests, Wakaizumi
also agreed to be closely involved with the government. Wakaizumi prepared the administrative policy speech during the Diet’s fifty-eighth session, which addressed life in the nuclear age. He also played the role of secret emissary during negotiations involving the reversion of Okinawa.

Under pressure from Chinese nuclear weapons development during the 1960s, Japan found its path as a non-nuclear state. Although limited by its anti-communist, pro-US framework, the CRO served as a hub for a group of scholars and served as an intermediary between the government and intellectuals by way of commissioned research. Sato administration’s non-nuclear policy is inherited in Japanese society and is well alive in the twenty-first century today.

<p>| Table 1. List of Commissioned Nuclear Policy Research Reports (Created by the Author) |
|-----------------------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| Title                                          | Date Created  | Author          | Creating Organisation | No. of Pages |
| ① ‘The Background to the Anti-Nuclear Submarine Port Call Movement: Specifically Regarding the Opposition Movement by Scientists’ | May 1963     | Unknown         | Kokumin Shuppan Kyokai | 76              |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Publisher</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>‘Scholars and Cultural Figures in the Anti-Nuclear Submarine Port Call Movement’</td>
<td>July 1963</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The Post-War Science Movement and Progressive ‘Scientists’</td>
<td>December 1963</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Kokumin Shuppan Kyokai</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>‘People’s Republic of China’s Nuclear Test and Japan’s Security: The Basic Policy Direction that Should be Taken by Our Country’</td>
<td>December 2, 1964</td>
<td>Kei Wakaizumi</td>
<td>Kokusai Josei Kenkyukai</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>‘Various Issues Related to Nuclear Policy’</td>
<td>May 26, 1965</td>
<td>Kusumi Tadao</td>
<td>Kokusai Josei Kenkyukai</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>‘Our Country’s Nuclear Development Abilities’</td>
<td>February 1967</td>
<td>Kishida Junnosuke (Lecture)</td>
<td>Kokusai Josei Kenkyukai</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>⑦</td>
<td>‘Issues Concerning Our Country’s Nuclear Policy’</td>
<td>February 23, 1967</td>
<td>Unknown Kokusai Josei Kenkyukai</td>
<td>Only the first 7 pages intact, the rest missing</td>
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<tr>
<td>⑧</td>
<td>Japan’s Nuclear Policy and Diplomacy: Preconditions’</td>
<td>December 1967</td>
<td>Unknown Unknown Unknown</td>
<td>152</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Institution</td>
<td>Page</td>
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<tr>
<td>⑪</td>
<td>Technological, Organizational, and Financial Possibilities of Establishing an Independent Nuclear Force</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hidetake</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⑫</td>
<td>‘A Study of Changes in Nuclear Strategy and Japan’s Security’</td>
<td>January 1969</td>
<td>Sugihara Masami</td>
<td>Minshushugi Kenkyukai</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⑬</td>
<td>‘Uranium Enrichment in Our Country’</td>
<td>July 1969</td>
<td>Kakihana Hidetake</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>45</td>
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<tr>
<td>⑭</td>
<td>‘Major International Issues in Nuclear Energy Development’</td>
<td>July 1969</td>
<td>Uematsu Kunihiko</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>⑮</td>
<td>‘Opinions of Scholars Regarding the Handling of the NPT’</td>
<td>November 4, 1969</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
an Independent Nuclear Force’

| Date       | Changes in China’s Nuclear Development and Future Predictions’ | February 1970 | Miyawaki Mineo | Unknown | 62 |


2 The author would like to thank journalist Koichiro Yoshihara for making this report available.

3 The author would like to thank Shigaki Minro for his cooperation.


6 The related passages from Shigaki’s entries during this period are as follows:
‘Moderated the group leaders’ meeting from 10:30. Oshida [Toshikazu; employee in charge of the situation in China from the early days of the CRO] spoke about the basics of the People’s Republic of China’s nuclear test, such as factory location. Have Kusumi [Tadao; military commentator] compare the ChiCom’s nuclear detonation abilities with those of France.’ (1 October 1964)
‘Discussions with Oshida, the People’s Republic of China’s nuclear test is imminent.’ (15 October 1964)
‘Hearing that the People’s Republic of China’s nuclear test is imminent, prepared the press release of Chief Cabinet Secretary in advance, decided to take into account public opinion surveys, etc. At 12:30 at night, phone call from Oshida saying ChiCom had carried out nuclear test.’ (15 October 1964)


9 The record of the meeting is in the Foreign Relations of the Unites States, 1964–1968.
XXIV, Part 2, Doc. 41.


12 Saeki’s views are also reflected in the book he wrote in the same year. Kiichi Saeki, Nihon no Anzenhosho, Tokyo: Kokusaimondaikenkyuusho, 1966.


14 See footnote 1 for previous studies.

