NEUTRAL STATES AND WARTIME JAPAN:
THE DIPLOMACY OF SWEDEN, SPAIN, AND SWITZERLAND
TOWARD THE EMPIRE

A Dissertation
Submitted to the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Ph.D. in International Relations

by

Pascal Lottaz

November 2018
Abstract

This dissertation analyzes and compares Swedish–Japanese, Spanish–Japanese, and Swiss–Japanese diplomatic relations during the Empire’s wartime period, from 1931 to 1945. It contrasts the experiences of the three neutrals with each other and embeds them in an IR framework for the analysis of neutrality during WWII. The dissertation argues that it is imperative to distinguish between great and small Power neutrals and to consider the different stages of Japan’s wartime period. Great Power neutrals tipped the war in one or the other direction by giving up their neutrality. Small Power neutrals like Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, on the other hand, had no such influence. Their role in the Pacific was that of diplomatic service providers of last resort—not mediating but interfacing belligerents. Both sides of the war chose the neutrals that seemed the most reliable for their purposes. Sweden and Switzerland proved to be mostly impartial, whereas Francoist Spain first tilted toward supporting Japan beyond the scope of lawful neutral acts but then shifted its favors to the Allied Powers as the fortunes of war changed, withdrawing even its diplomatic support for Tokyo. In the end, only the Swiss and the Swedes remained to act as protecting Powers for Japan, which they fulfilled dutifully in return for the prospects of future trade relations with all belligerents.
Foreword

This thesis would not have been possible, had it not been for the help and support of amazing people who encouraged and helped me along the way. First and foremost, I want to thank my family, Susanne, Raphael, and Alexander Lottaz without whom I would not have been able to complete this journey. Equally, I want to thank my academic advisors Professor Shinichi Kitaoka, Professor Yoko Iwama, and Professor Yusuke Takagi. They guided me, supported me, and helped me grow intellectually on this challenge. I also want to acknowledge the support of the Japanese Ministry of Education (MEXT) for the three-year stipend to realize the dissertation. Many thanks as well to the Swiss Study Foundation who also supported me for in my studies and research trips.

There are three more families on whose support I could always count: My Tokyo Family Laura Alvarez, Rashid Khashy, and Andres Molina helped me with the trickiest of sources, studied their meaning with me and helped me to get my hands on them in the first place. My family in Wakayama, Kazumi, Hideki, and Mari Hirata, too supported me for the last fourteen years and made me fall in love with Japan. And, of course, my Swiss Rudel, who built me up when I was low on spirits and kept me going with their unconditional love; Samantha Florinett, Michelle Glauser, Dorothea Portmann, Alain Wider, Michael Bigler, and Jason Aebischer, I owe you so much. In the same sense, I want to thank Regula Schaller and the many other friends who kept encouraging me. I am especially grateful for the friendly reality checks from my most pragmatic friend; thank you, Kenwin Maung, for keeping me on track!

During the four years of this research project, I also learned how invaluable the feedback and criticism of experts in the field is. I bothered many academics, and all of them were unbelievably kind and helpful: Florentino Rodao helped me with all my Spain questions, while Ingemar Ottosson gave me most valuable advice on Sweden, and Claude Hauser gave me access to the unpublished memoirs of Camille Gorgé—an invaluable source. I am especially grateful to Herbert Reginbogin, with whom I worked many days and nights on questions of neutrality and without whom my thinking on the concept would not be where it is today. I am happy and honored to count all of them to my friends today.

I also want to mention Bert Edström, Gerhard Krebs, Maartje Abbenhuis, and Gian Trepp who, among others, answered questions of mine via email or met with me. Equally important, I received assistance from two people I never met; Ronny Andersson and Path Truong Van. They both helped me work through the Swedish sources which I only imperfectly grasped. Thank you all indeed!

Last but not least, I thank my ever positive and supportive partner Kenny Lee Iwata. He knows this dissertation forward and backward because he had to listen to every paragraph, helping me to think it all through. Thank you for never giving up on me!

Thank you all, from the bottom of my heart.
Statement of Originality and Copyright

I certify that this thesis and all its content is, to the best of my knowledge, my own, original work. No parts of it have been illegitimately copied and all sources, primary and secondary, are duly referenced. This work is the sole property of the author, with the following qualifications: Selected parts of chapter 4 (Spain) and 5 (Switzerland) were published as an independent article in the October 2017 issue of the *New Global Studies* journal and are under the copyright of the Walter De Gruyter GmbH.\(^1\) The parts are reproduced in this dissertation with their kind permission. In addition to that, sections of chapter 2 and chapter 6 are, at the time of writing, under consideration for publication in an edited volume on the *Notions of Neutralities* by Lexington Books.\(^2\) The pictures and graphics used in this work are either without copyright or are in the public domain, made available for redistribution under open access licenses. I would like to thankfully acknowledge the following creators or publishers for their work: The Wikimedia Foundation for the World Map of 1942, used in chapter 2 and freepick.com for the country flags used on the same pages.


\(^2\) Pascal Lottaz and Herbert Reginbogin, eds., *Notions of Neutralities* (USA: Lexington, 2018).
# Table of Contents

## Front Matter

- **Abstract** ................................................................. i
- **Foreword** ..................................................................... ii
- **Statement of Originality and Copyright** .................. iii
  - **Table of Contents** ................................................. iv
  - **List of Abbreviations** ............................................. vii
  - **List of Tables and Figures** ................................. viii

## 1. Introduction .............................................................. 1
  1-1. **Methods and Limitations** .................................. 10
    - 1-1-1. The Comparison ........................................... 11
    - 1-1-2. Limitations and Contributions ........................ 17
    - 1-1-3. The Archives .............................................. 18
  1-2. **Definitions** ..................................................... 23
    - 1-2-1. Neutrality in International Law ....................... 24
    - 1-2-2. Impartiality (vs. Apathy) .............................. 31
    - 1-2-3. Diplomacy vs. Foreign Policy ........................ 38
    - 1-2-4. Protecting Power ......................................... 39
    - 1-2-5. Wartime Japan ........................................... 47
  1-3. **Neutrality Research—Literature Review** ............... 49
    - 1-3-1. National Historiographies ............................. 49
    - 1-3-2. Works on Neutrality during WWII and the Demons of the 1990s .... 54
    - 1-3-3. Neutrality in IL, IR, and Diplomacy Studies ......... 59
  1-4. **Chapter Summary & Conclusion** ......................... 66

## 2. Neutrality—A Framework .......................................... 69
  2-1. **Neutrality in International Relations until WWII** ...... 70
    - 2-1-1. The Philosophy of Neutrality ........................ 73
    - 2-1-2. The Nineteenth Century .............................. 77
    - 2-1-3. The Impact of WWI ..................................... 84
  2-2. **The Interwar Period: Rise and Fall of Collective Security** ........... 92
    - 2-2-1. A New Security Architecture ........................ 92
    - 2-2-3. Back to Neutrality ...................................... 110
  2-3. **Size Matters: The Difference between Great and Small Power Neutrals** .... 123
    - 2-3-1. Great Power Neutrals: Decisive Forces ............ 124
    - 2-3-2. Small Power Neutrals: Diplomatic Service Providers of Last Resort .... 134
  2-4. **Chapter Summary & Conclusion** .......................... 144

## 3. Sweden ........................................................................ 147
3-1. Early Modern Swedish-Japanese Relations .......................................................148
  3-1-1. Trade and Diplomacy .............................................................................152

3-2. Diplomacy and Foreign Policy 1931–1937 .......................................................157
  3-2-1. Trade ........................................................................................................157
  3-2-2. Diplomacy ...............................................................................................159
  3-2-3. Manchukuo and the Beans ......................................................................163

  3-3-1. The Swedish Minister to Japan ..............................................................171
  3-3-2. The Swedish Mission ...............................................................................175
  3-3-3. Keeping Trade Alive ...............................................................................179
  3-3-4. Keeping Relations Alive ..........................................................................185

3-4. After Pearl Harbor: Relations 1941–1945 .........................................................189
  3-4-1. New Jobs for Swedish Diplomats .............................................................189
  3-4-2. New Diplomats for Swedish Jobs ............................................................201
  3-4-3. New Times, Old Issues: Trade and Diplomacy ......................................204
  3-4-4. Swedish-Swiss Collaboration and the Neutral Committee of the YMCA 214
  3-4-5. Spying in Stockholm ...............................................................................222

3-5. The End of the War .............................................................................................227
  3-5-1. Worsening of Diplomatic Relations ......................................................227
  3-5-2. The ‘Bagge Maneuver’ and Peace Feelers through Sweden ...................231

3-6. Chapter Summary & Conclusion ....................................................................237

4. Spain ..................................................................................................................242
  4-1. Early Modern Spanish-Japanese Relations .......................................................243
    4-1-1. Spanish Diplomacy and the Role of the Philippines .........................245
    4-1-2. The Domestic Background: National Turmoil ....................................253

4-2. Diplomacy and Foreign Policy 1931–1937 .......................................................258
    4-2-1. The Spanish Minister to Japan .............................................................259
    4-2-2. The Spanish Mission ............................................................................264
    4-2-4. The Civil War Years ...............................................................................270
    4-2-5. All is Fair in Love and War—A Rebellion Extends to Tokyo .............273

4-3. The Impact of the Second Sino-Japanese War: Relations 1937–1941 .............279
    4-3-1. The Recognition Bargain .......................................................................280
    4-3-2. A New Era for Economic Relations? ....................................................284

4-4. After Pearl Harbor: Relations 1941–1945 .........................................................286
    4-4-1. Protecting Power for (but not in) Japan ..................................................288
    4-4-2. The Sideline Legation in Tokyo .............................................................290
    4-4-3. Of Spies and Magic ...............................................................................293
    4-4-4. Mood Swing against Japan ....................................................................296

4-5. The End of the War .............................................................................................301
    4-5-1. The Laurel Incident ...............................................................................301
List of Abbreviations

Institutions

FO Foreign Office (of the United Kingdom)
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
KUD Kungl. Utrikesdepartementet [Royal Swedish Foreign Ministry]
MAE Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de España [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]
OSS Office of Strategic Services (of the United States)
PCIJ Permanent Court of International Justice
PD Eidgenössisches Politisches Departement [Federal Swiss Foreign Ministry]
POW Prisoner of War
SNB Swiss National Bank
UN United Nations
YSB Yokohama Specie Bank
YMCA Young Men’s Christian Association

Terms & Countries

IL International Law
IR International Relations
MP Member of Parliament
U.K. United Kingdom
U.S. United States (of America)
U.S.S.R. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Currencies

CHF Swiss Franc
ESP Spanish Peseta
JPY Japanese Yen
SEK Swedish Crown
USD U.S. Dollar

Translation indications

OFrTA Original in French, Translated by Author
ODeTA Original in German, Translated by Author
OEsTA Original in Spanish, Translated by Author
OSvTA Original in Swedish, Translated by Author
OJaTA Original in Japanese, Translated by Author
List of Tables and Figures

Figures

Figure 1: Comparative Trade Volume of Sweden, Spain, and Switzerland before WWII (aggregated yearly imports and exports in percent of total trade) ................................................................. 5
Figure 2: Japan on the Mind of the Swiss Government: Number of Times the Federal Council Referred to Selected Belligerents in Annual Reports 1939–1945 .................................................................................. 7
Figure 3: Swedish Imports & Exports to Japan 1908–1912, in million SEK ........................................................................................................ 153
Figure 4: Swedish Imports & Exports to Japan 1914–1930, in million SEK .............................................................. 154
Figure 5: Swedish Imports and Exports from/to Japan 1931–1939, in million SEK .............................................................. 158
Figure 6: Growth of Soybean Import from Manchukuo to Sweden in million JPY (1932–1936) ........................................................................... 164
Figure 7: Spanish Imports & Exports to Japan 1911–1930, in million ESP .......................................................... 253
Figure 8: Spanish Imports & Exports to Japan 1931–1937, in million ESP .......................................................... 258
Figure 9: Swiss Imports & Exports to Japan 1901–1914, in million CHF .......................................................... 330
Figure 10: Swiss Imports & Exports to Japan 1915–1930, in million CHF .......................................................... 331
Figure 11: Swiss Trade with Japan in Comparison to Other Asian Market for the 1920s, in million CHF ........................................................................ 332
Figure 12: Swiss Trade with Japan in Comparison to Other Asian Markets for the 1920s, in Million CHF ........................................................................ 333
Figure 13: Swiss Imports & Exports to Japan 1930–1940, in million CHF .......................................................... 349
Figure 14: Swiss Imports & Exports to Japan 1938–1945 ........................................................................ 352

Maps

Map 1: Representation of Japanese Interests in Enemy Countries and Territories (as of mid-1942) .............................................................. 138
Map 2: Representation of Foreign Interests in Japan (as of mid-1942) ...................................................... 139
Map 3: Representation of Japanese Interests in Enemy Countries and Territories (as of August 1945) .............................................................. 140
Map 4: Representation of Foreign Interests in Japan (as of late August 1945) .............................................................. 140

Pictures

Picture 1: Apathetic Neutrals: An anachronistic view of Neutrality .................................................. 33
Picture 2: Matsuoka Yosuke throwing around a representative of Small States. The caption reads: “Poor guy being thrown around; Although a small country, it had the nerve to bite.” ........................................ 109
Picture 3: Picture in the Yomiuri Shimbun, March 12, 1944, under the heading; “Foreign Minister invites diplomatic corps of neutral countries to banquet,” showing from left to right Mamoru Shigemitsu (host), U.S.S.R. Ambassador Maliki, Swedish Minister Bagge and Swiss Minister Gorgé ............................................131

Picture 4: Gustaf Oscar Wallenberg, first Swedish Minister to Japan .......................152

Picture 5: Widar Bagge in 1936, when announced Envoy to Japan ................................174

Picture 6: Widar Bagge (left) in 1945 with Joen Lagerberg, the Swedish Minister to Italy ..................................................................................................................174

Picture 7: Photograph of the ‘Nagasaki Club’ with Frederik Edward Erasmus Ringer, later Swedish vice consul in Nagasaki, sitting in the middle of the front row (number 3). Dated 1910........................................177

Picture 8: Ernest William James. Despite his British Nationality, he served as Consul of Sweden in Kobe .................................................................178

Picture 9: Japan Times notice posted on May 25, 1942 by the Swedish legation to alert potential evacuees ................................................................193

Picture 10: The Gripsholm anchoring in Spain after various trips to Lorenço Marques ..............................................................................................................194

Picture 11: José Heriberto Garcia de Quevedo. First Spanish Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Japan ........................................................................248

Picture 12: Santiago Méndez de Vigo with his wife after presenting his credentials to the Emperor ..................................................................................................261

Picture 13: Castillo (left), Molina (center), and Mendez de Vigo (sitting) meet the Japanese press on the afternoon of August 26, 1936 to announce their adherence to Franco's rebellion .............................................274

Picture 14: Santiago Méndez de Vigo hands statement of separation from the Republic of Spain to Undersecretary Hirouchi .................................................................275

Picture 15: Foreign Minister Koki Hirota (left) with Del Castillo (right) on December 2, 1937 ..............................................................................................................283

Picture 16: Aimé Humbert painted by Jules Hébert in 1875 .................................................................................................................................321

Picture 17: Dr. Paul Ritter, first permanent Swiss Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Japan ..................................................................................................327

Picture 18: Camille Gorgé, Swiss Minister to Japan 1939–1945 ..............................................................................................................................................361

Picture 19: Camille Gorgé with wife Rose in the Japanese Alps with driver ........................................364

Picture 20: The third exchange ship. The ‘Teia Maru’ with large signs painted and illuminated to indicated its special status as a diplomatic vessel ..................................................................................................389

Picture 21: Two delegates of the ICRC together with the President of the Japanese Committee of the Red Cross at the visit of a civilian internment camp in Tokyo .................................................................................................391

Tables

Table 1: All Mandates of protecting Power during WWII as of December 31, 1943 ...........................................................................................................................................44

Table 2: Swedish Representatives in Japan 1871–1945 ..........................................................................................149
Table 3: Personnel of the Swedish Mission to the Empire of Japan (at beginning of Bagge’s term) .........................176
Table 4: Japanese Diplomats in Sweden 1942 .......................................................... 186
Table 5: Japanese Diplomats in Sweden 1945 .......................................................... 206
Table 6: Composition of the Neutral Committee of the YMCA ......................... 218
Table 7: List of Spanish Heads of Mission to Japan ............................................. 249
Table 8: Spanish Imports & Exports to Japan 1879–1883, in ESP ...................... 252
Table 9: Personnel of the Spanish Mission to the Empire of Japan (during key moment of Wartime Period) ........................................................ 265
Table 10: Swiss Representatives in Japan 1863–1945 ........................................... 325
Table 11: Three Main Import Categories from Japan 1928 ................................... 348
Table 12: Three Main Export Categories to Japan 1938 ....................................... 348
Table 13: Three Main Import Categories from Japan 1938 ................................... 350
Table 14: Three Main Export Categories to Japan 1928 ....................................... 350
Table 15: Personnel of the Swiss Mission to the Empire of Japan (at beginning of Gorgé’s term) ........................................................ 366
Table 16: Development of the Swiss Colony in Japan, 1939–1945 ....................... 395
Table 17: Swiss Exports to Japan 1942–1943 ......................................................... 402

Documents in Annex

Annex 1: Number of references to respective country in the Annual Report of the Swiss Federal Council (references to capital city in brackets) .......................................................... 462
Annex 3: Draft text of Japanese treaty proposal for a Non-Aggression Pact with the U.S.S.R. .......................................................... 463
Annex 4: Final text of the “Neutrality Pact between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan.” .......................................................... 463
Annex 5: Draft Resolution Proposed by the Delegations of Czechoslovakia, the Irish Free State, Spain, and Sweden. ................. 464
Annex 6: Draft Resolution Proposed by the Czechoslovak and Swiss Delegations .......................................................... 465
Annex 7: “Geneva Declaration of July 1, 1936” by Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland on their application of Article 16 of the Covenant .......................................................... 466
Annex 8: Widar Bagge in 1928 .......................................................... 466
Annex 9: Japanese Regulations pertaining the functions of protecting Powers in the Empire .......................................................... 467
Annex 10: Aggregated Import & Export Data for Sweden (1908–1939) .............. 469
Annex 11: Aggregated Import & Export Data for Spain (1911–1943) .................. 470
Annex 12: Aggregated Import & Export Data for Switzerland (1901–1946) ...... 472
Annex 13: Data Set Trade Volume Comparison for Switzerland ...................... 473
Annex 14: Neutral State’s Representation of Foreign Interests in and for Japan .......................................................... 474
1. **Introduction**

Many studies on neutral states in general— and the neutrals during WWII in particular—ask why and how these states avoided the horrors of the battlefield or why they failed? This dissertation does not follow in their footsteps. Instead, it will focus on what can be learned about neutrality in the 1930s and 1940s from the diplomacy of Sweden, Spain, and Switzerland toward the most remote belligerent—the Empire of Japan.

On the one hand, the diplomatic relations between neutral countries and Japan have not received a lot of attention by diplomatic historians. Only a few and selected episodes about the affairs of European neutrals with Japan have been studied for the WWII period. Many of them were written in the respective national languages as individual case studies (see 1-3). That by itself warrants an inclusive historic investigation. It is, for example, not clear what neutral legations did in Japan and what their home governments’ underlying foreign policies were that guided the diplomats on the ground.

This dissertation, therefore, asks many questions of diplomatic history: What happened in the Swedish, the Spanish and the Swiss legations respectively? What were their

---


5 All three countries had not “Embassies” in Tokyo but “Legations.” That had to do with the status of their head of mission, which, in all three cases, was that of an “Envoy extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary,” not that of an “Ambassador.” Before the 1950s, only great Powers would exchange Ambassadors. Having foreign relations on ambassadorial level was a privilege to which both nations had to agree. It signified mutual recognition of each other’s international status. A minister plenipotentiary was a lesser rank. Nevertheless, a Minister had all powers necessary to negotiate on behalf of his home
tasks, how did they carry them out and what enabled their work? Japan was far away, and telephone, telegraph, and postal connections were difficult to establish or dangerous to use. How did the decision-making work and what role had the leaders of the legations to play? How far did their diplomacy correspond with the foreign policy of their governments?

For the three neutrals in this study, such questions have been continuously overshadowed by the much larger foreign policy crisis of the days—the war in Europe. They themselves have not seen many comprehensive studies on their role in the international system during WWII. *Not* being at war naturally sparked less interest among historians than being at war. There are some studies on Neutrality during WWII, but in those Japan is consistently missing from the picture, which is also understandable, since not being at war with a country far away seems even less insightful than not being at war with the belligerents at your doorstep. No research has yet focused on Japan as a case of a host country for neutral diplomacy to gain knowledge about country neutrality during WWII. We do not know if the neutrals all acted similarly regarding Japan or if there were significant differences and what would explain those. That is the second field of this dissertation. The comparative approach allows us to ask what the Japanese case can tell us about the state of neutrality, in general, during that period. How was neutrality as a foreign policy used in the Asian theater of the war? Did all three neutrals behave in the same way or not? Were their legations charged with similar responsibilities or not and why was that? After all, Japan was one of the major nations and conclude binding treaties. See on this issue: Kishan S Rana, *The 21st Century Ambassador: Plenipotentiary to Chief Executive* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Geoffrey Berridge and Lorna Lloyd, *The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Diplomacy* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
belligerents in the period from 1941 to 1945 and together with Germany, the founding member of the ‘Axis.’ Modern Euro-centric historiography often overlooks the simple fact that the Second World War only ended with the capitulation of the Tenno’s Empire in September 1945 and not with the Soviet victory over besieged Berlin in May. Japan was a major belligerent of the global war, and as such, it had its allies, it had its enemies, and it had its neutrals.

Regarding the timeframe of the analysis, it is important to keep in mind that the period of WWII related armed conflicts in Asia was much longer than that in Europe. It ranged from 1931 to 1945 and was diverse from a diplomatic point of view. For example, in contrast to how Japanese hostilities in China were carried out—without an official declaration of war—the Japanese government formally declared war on the U.S. after the attack on Pearl Harbor. In this sense, the Japanese leaders started a war against the U.S. that adhered to the diplomatic practices of the days. The formalities of war were fulfilled toward the Allies but not toward the Chinese. For this period of armed conflict, Japan behaved diplomatically as a classic great Power belligerent. Albeit, to the European neutrals Japan was a particular case. Among all major powers, it was neither militarily nor economically ever a threat to them. The other belligerents were. Sweden found itself in an uncomfortable position not only vis-à-vis German pressure to use its territory for military purposes, but also by the Soviet Union’s occupation of Finland and the British demands to halt economic interactions with the Third Reich. Similarly, the Spanish leadership, although supportive of the Axis, was always worried about its

---

6 That stands in contrast to the neutral Asian countries like Siam which the Japanese army invaded on its campaign in South East Asia. On Siam’s role in the war and a discussion if it was invaded or collaborated out of free will see: Bruce E. Reynolds, *Thailand’s Secret War OSS, SOE and the Free Thai Underground During World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). See especially: ibid., 8.
eastern border with German-occupied France and saw its interests in the Atlantic and North Africa under threat by the Americans and the British simultaneously. Switzerland first had to fear an invasion from either belligerent side, when it still was sandwiched between Germany, France, and Italy in 1939, and later came under economic pressure from Germany, the U.K., and the United States alike when it became the last nation in central Europe, not under Axis control. In short, all the major belligerents of WWII, at one time or another, posed a direct economic and military threat to the neutral states in this study—all except Japan. Economically, for example, the empire was, on the one hand, a trading partner for each neutral but it never was a significant market. Just consider the following graph comparing the trade volumes of the neutral with Japan and with that of the other major belligerents for the years before WWII in Europe. Less than half of a percent of Spain’s total trade (aggregated imports and exports) came or went to Japan. For Sweden, it was 1% and for Switzerland 1½%.

---

7 For Sweden and Switzerland, this counts for the year 1938. For Spain, the data from 1935 was used because no official trade statistics are available for the years of the Civil War between 1936—1939.
Clearly, trade with Japan was not a matter of life or death for the three neutrals. Their immediate neighbors and the U.S. always played a much more critical role for their military and economic survival. The Geographic remoteness of Japan excluded it even theoretically from ever becoming a threat to their national security. Neither Switzerland nor Sweden ever had colonies in the east and Spain, by the time of the Second World War, had long lost its main possession in Asia—the Philippines—to the U.S. Although the Philippines would prove to become a point of intense contention for Japanese-Spanish relations during the war, the Japanese threat to Spain was directed against its (anachronistic) colonial ambitions and not against its national security. Even culturally Japan was far removed and not one of the powers any of the neutrals would easily identify with. Especially toward the end of the war, the Spanish regime viewed the

---

world order in explicitly racist tones⁹ and what historian Ingemar Ottosson writes about 1930s Sweden holds true for the other neutrals as well: “(…) in contrast to Nazi Germany, expansionist Japan never had more than an insignificant number of active Swedish advocates. The Cultural distance was simply too remote.”¹⁰ Japan was the only non-threatening great Power belligerent to the European neutrals. That makes it unique for a study like this because it allows for the testing of some assumptions about neutral behavior during a war and it generates new questions that need to be answered. On the part of the premises, the most prevalent one is that neutrals ‘balanced’ their way through the war among the belligerents;¹¹ giving in to some demands of either side, but not to all, to delicately avoid being seen as un-neutral and not to provoke an attack on itself. All in all, the Japanese case confronts us with some interesting puzzles: Why did the neutrals not just leave their legations and consulates in Tokyo when Japan joined the war on the side of Germany and Italy? Why did they stay despite a reportedly hostile and dangerous environment? Some neutral citizens and even diplomats died in the Empire during that period.

Nevertheless, while neutral legations organized the repatriation of thousands of enemy nationals to their home countries, they themselves stayed behind. Why not just leave as well and use these resources at home where the situation was precarious enough? That would have been an option in December 1941 right after Pearl Harbor. From the reports

---

⁹ Florentino Rodao, Franco y el Imperio Japonés, (Barcelona: Plaza & Janés, 2002).
¹¹ Various authors who have analyzed the neutrals in Europe argue in this direction. Especially realist interpretations of neutral behavior during WWII often draw this conclusion. See, for example, Joseph Kruzel and Michael H. Haltzel, Between the Blocs: Problems and Prospects for Europe's Neutral and Nonaligned States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). For an economic realist argument, see Eric Bernard Golson, "The Economics of Neutrality: Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland in the Second World War" (2011).
of the Swiss legation, we know that its minister considered evacuating all Swiss nationals from Japan, including the diplomats. The Swiss government however repeatedly communicated the view that not only the legation but also the rest of the Swiss colony should stay in Japan—which most of them did.

To illustrate this point, a quick look at the Swiss case is instructive. The start of the Pacific War led to a paradoxical situation for its government. Although the lines of communication and commerce worsened, Japan had never taken such a prominent spot in the considerations of the Federal Council (Swiss cabinet). In its yearly reports, Japan started appearing by far more often with the onset of the war. The below chart shows a word count in the six reports 1939–1945, indicating how many times they reference to Japan, to the U.S., to Germany, and to Italy.

![Federal Council References to Belligerents 1939–1945](image)

Figure 2: Japan on the Mind of the Swiss Government: Number of Times the Federal Council Referred to Selected Belligerents in Annual Reports 1939–1945

---

12 Detailed table in Annex 1.
The chart reveals two critical aspects of this thesis. Firstly, at no point was Japan as important a consideration to the neutrals as any of the other belligerent parties. At the same time, however, for no other belligerent did considerations grow as strongly as for Japan. The country went from almost non-existent (three times mentioned in 1939) in the reports to more than fifty appearances. In the case of the Swiss, two factors led to this increased importance. On the one hand, there was the worsening situation of the Swiss colony in Japan. Many Swiss in the Empire had lost their jobs, and some were harassed or incarcerated. More importantly, however, was Switzerland’s role as protecting Power for and in Japan. Not only did the Swiss represent Japan’s interests in dozens of its enemy countries but the Swiss legation in Tokyo also became responsible for the representation of the interests of twenty-three enemy nation’s in Japan.

Again; why the trouble? Would it not have made much more sense for the neutrals to just leave Japan in 1942? The situation furthermore begs the question if it was the circumstances of the war that kept the Spanish, the Swedes, and the Swiss in Japan or whether there was a strategic calculation behind that decision? Or was it purely for diplomatic etiquette? Then again, operating a legation in a belligerent country was not only dangerous but also costly, especially considering that they all assumed the role of protecting Power in and for Japan. On the other hand, does maybe the question not make sense? Were the small neutral Powers already heavily invested in Japan before Pearl Harbor? Japan had been in an armed conflict with China since 1931. So maybe, from the perspective of the neutrals, the local theater of war did not change that much in 1941 when just a few belligerents joined the drama? Is there a clear difference before 1941 and after? The gist of this work was written to answer these questions and
illuminate the relations of Sweden, Spain, and Switzerland with Japan as a comparative study in diplomatic history.
1-1. Methods and Limitations

This dissertation is mainly a study in Diplomatic History. The core chapters 3, 4, and 5 unearth the stories of the relations of the three European neutrals and Japan with a special focus on their diplomatic interactions. On the other hand, the thesis also attempts to add to the understanding of neutrality as a concept in International Relations through chapters 2 and 6.

There is a tension between these two fields. Historians tend to be interested in narratives, developments, and strings of events, especially at those crucial junctures where history could have gone another way. Social scientists, on the other hand, are more concerned with variables and the analysis of their interplay to explain societal developments from a birds-eye perspective, with the goal of formulating hypotheses and generate theories. Although in the end historians and social scientists strive for the same goal—understanding developments—their approaches differ. Luckily, Elman and Elman have explained brilliantly that they are not mutually exclusive and that bridges amongst the two can benefit both disciplines.13 The rigor of historical work, basing research on primary sources makes for a robust empirical fundament and the interpretation thereof through a step back, and a comparison of cases renders the material to build hypotheses. This research is playing on both turfs, combining the digging for historical facts with the benefits of a comparative analysis. Its design is close to the lines of what Peter

---

Burke described as the bridging of the dichotomy between narrative and structural history.\textsuperscript{14}

To put it in a figure of speech, this research starts in a ‘zoomed-out’ position in chapter 1 and 2, describing trends surrounding neutrality in International Relations toward WWII. It then ‘zooms-in’ to focus on the details of the foreign policy and especially the diplomacy on the ground of the three small Power neutrals toward Japan in chapters 3, 4, and 5. In the end, chapter six will ‘zoom-out’ again to combine the three cases to a comparison in the concluding chapter 6. The perspective shift—from Telescope to Microscope to Telescope—will give the chance to connect the particular with the general, because the details of what neutrals did in and around Japan, and the international development of neutrality itself go hand in hand. This dissertation is an approach to working out that relationship. It strives to embed the narrative of the particular in an analysis of the systemic.

\textit{1-1-1. The Comparison}

There were five small European states that remained neutral during the entire period of WWII; Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Three micro-states also remained neutral and unoccupied; Andorra, Lichtenstein, and the Vatican.\textsuperscript{15} In addition, several non-European states remained neutral for a long time, like Argentina and Turkey. Why does this study use the cases of Sweden, Spain, and Switzerland to


\textsuperscript{15} Two micro-states, Monaco and San Mariano, also remained neutral but both experienced occupation. Monaco between 1942–1944 and San Mariano briefly in 1944.
analyze the relations of neutral states with Japan? The choice of countries was made on
the grounds of three criteria:

1) Countries that did not become belligerents
2) Countries that remained sovereign
3) Countries that had diplomatic significance to Japan

Criteria 1 and 2 are essential for an analysis of neutral actors because to qualify as 1, a
state needed to be both; non-belligerent and sovereignly governed. The 3rd condition,
on the other hand, is a normative restriction because this thesis concerns itself with the
International Relations and Diplomatic History of neutral states and Japan. ‘Diplomatic
significance’ was used as a cut-off line to limit the scope of the analysis. This does not
mean, however, that some of the countries excluded in the core of the study can be
ignored entirely. Chapter 2 will outline the rationale for the choice in more detail—
especially for the case of the great Power neutrals like the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.—but it
is worth mentioning already that the pool of neutrals steadily decreased during WWII.
Luxemburg, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Iceland, Norway, Finland, Estonia,
Lithuania, and Latvia all started out as neutrals but were invaded and occupied either by
Axis or Allied powers. The Gaimusho let the representatives of these countries stay in
Tokyo for a certain time after their occupation and with some, like the Dutch
representatives, Tokyo even continued official relations—much to the annoyance of
Berlin.\textsuperscript{16} As long as the occupied European powers still had independently acting
colonial governments, with which Japan wished to trade, the diplomatic connections

\textsuperscript{16} Report Bagge to KUD, dated February 10, 1940. In: RA, Utrikesdepartement 1920 Ars dossiersystem,
and their goodwill were necessary. There was in this sense no way around Dutch diplomats, even in September of 1940—four months after Germany had occupied the Dutch motherland—when the Ministry of Trade and Industry under Minister Kobayashi wanted to ensure continued deliveries of raw materials from the Dutch East Indies.\footnote{Annual report of the Swedish legation, fourth quarter 1940, dated January 15, 1941. In: ibid.} Negotiations with Batavia (Jakarta) had to be held, and the easiest way to do so was by keeping the local diplomats in Tokyo on their posts. That attitude changed after the outbreak of the War in the Pacific. With the new strategy to eliminate any European colonies in Southeast Asia, the need to negotiate with their (unofficial) governments was gone. From then on, the loss of sovereignty would also mean the loss of diplomatic representation with Japan. The diplomats of occupied nations had either to leave Tokyo when that was still possible, or they were put under quasi-imprisonment in their legations.\footnote{GORGÉ DIARY, "Débacle au Soleil-Levant: Journal d'un Témoin", 1939–1945. Entry dated March 5 1942.}

The only two European Powers that remained sovereign and did not enter the war with Japan for the entire time of WWII were the Irish Free State and Portugal. They would have been potential candidates to include in the thesis, but the weakness of their diplomatic network disqualifies them. The Irish Free State only became fully sovereign with the Statue of Westminster in 1931 and had no significant diplomatic representation in Asia during the timeframe of this study. Portugal, on the other hand, had a well established diplomatic corps—even with a Minister Plenipotentiary in Japan since 1866. However, by the time of WWII, Portuguese diplomacy was mostly concerned with its possessions in East Asia—Macau and Portuguese Timor. The later had first been
occupied by Allied Forces of the Dutch and Australians in December 1941 but was later invaded by Japan in February 1942. Officially, the Japanese granted the Portuguese Governor the right to remain in office and formally rule over the territory. In practice, however, the military took control of Timor entirely, with little regard for Portugal’s wishes. Although some might argue that this arrangement suited both parties, the Timor case clouded relations between Japan and Portugal heavily for the time of the war. In addition to that, as will be shown in chapter 2, Portugal only held very few mandates of protecting Power in or for Japan, which made them diplomatically less critical than the other neutrals in this study.

Lastly, there were the European micro-states of Andorra and Lichtenstein who remained unoccupied and neutral during the war (San Marino and Monaco both experienced episodes of occupation). Their size and the resulting lack of diplomatic capacity, however, precluded them from being of any substantial importance to Japan. The only exception to this was the Vatican. For historical reasons, the Holy See, despite its size, had a sizeable foreign service and due to its ties to Catholic nations Japanese strategists in the government considered it to be a potential link to negotiate a beneficial peace with western countries. The Japanese efforts were successful in as far as that Pius XII agreed to establish de facto relations with it shortly after the beginning of Japan’s expansions in the Pacific. In February 1942, Ken Harada, a diplomat formerly

---

accredited to the Japanese embassy of Vichy-France arrived at the Vatican as an ‘Extraordinary Representative’ of the Japanese Empire.21 The Vatican, however, played a completely different role in Japan’s international relations from the larger European neutrals and did not carry out mandates of protecting power. Furthermore, its ties to Japan, China, and Korea have already been comprehensively studied (in French) by Olivier Sibre.22

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are the core of the thesis, designed to make the Swedish, the Spanish, and the Swiss experiences of Wartime Japan comparable. They follow the major political, diplomatic, and economic events in the respective bilateral relations chronologically with similar cornerstones in the narrative. The subtitles represent those cornerstones and are therefore the same for each chapter. They are defined by the common denominator of the three cases which was—of course—Japan. The breaking points were provided by the Empire’s international politics which Sweden, Spain, and Switzerland naturally had to follow:

1) Each case starts with an introduction of their early modern bilateral relations with Japan after it’s re-opening to the world in 1854. The analysis of this period matters because it sets the stage for the main narratives that follow later—none of the three cases is understandable in a temporal void. When Japan’s belligerency started in 1931, Sweden, Spain, and Switzerland all had had a long relationship with Japan.

2) Thereafter, the diplomacy and foreign policy of the three countries with Japan 1931–1937 will be explained. This was the period after the Mukden incident and the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War after the Marco Polo Bridge incident.

3) Thirdly, 1937–1941 were four years during which bilateral relations with Japan changed due to the Empire’s drastic measures to reorganizing its trade relations according to the needs of the war economy. Sweden, Spain, and Switzerland were impacted by that change.

4) The next and most potent caesura is the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. It marks the moment when the neutrality of the three countries played most significant role because they continued their relations with Japan while also providing their Good Offices.

5) The last breaking point is the end of the war because it marks another significant shift in the way that Sweden, Spain, and Switzerland interacted with Japan. It is the only moment when this thesis uses an external event as a divider for the narratives—namely Franco’s decision to break relations with Japan and give up all the Good Offices that Spain held for the Empire. This event impacted not only Spain but also the other two neutrals.

Since the concrete experiences of what happened during those periods were different for each neutral, the lowest level of description (third-level subchapters) remain unique as well. The three core chapters have a similar flow to make them comparable, but sometimes priority had to be given to the chronology of experiences over comparability. It seemed, for example, more advisable to include the explanation about the Spanish Minister and his legation in the subchapter dealing with the 1931–1937 period because
he arrived in Japan in those years. For the other two cases, the chapters about the Ministers are incorporated in the 1937–1942 sub-chapters.

1-1-2. Limitations and Contributions

Comparing the three cases to each other will render an analysis of small Power neutrality in the Pacific theater of WWII. In contrast, framing the three cases under the International Relations aspects of chapter 2 will produce a fuller picture of the global aspects of neutrality. There are, however, important limitations to this approach.

Firstly, it is a form of teleological arbitrariness to exclude cases based on the successfulness of the foreign policy which is itself a subject of the study. It applies post-facto reasoning to a contingent process. The cost of the exclusion of other cases of neutrality toward Japan is that potentially important and insightful patterns will not come to light. For example, what was the role of the Baltic States to Japan? There used to be an important diplomatic outpost in Latvia, where Makoto Onodera, a prominent figure for the Swedish case, had served for a few years before WWII. 23 Was their neutrality before the occupation by Soviet Russia important to Japan’s diplomacy toward the U.S.S.R., or did it not matter? Since these countries are not part of the investigation, further research is needed to clarify questions of this kind. This dissertation cannot claim to be a comprehensive analysis of all forms of neutrality in the context of the Japanese experience of WWII. It is but a slice of the whole story—the piece that focuses on the neutrality of those states that were willing and able to use their

diplomatic power and networks in and for Japan. It compares them with each other and asks whether we observe similar behavior or significant differences and if yes, then why?

Another limitation is that the thesis focuses mainly on the diplomatic side of Spanish, Swedish, and Swiss relations with Japan, and less on their foreign policies. Although the thesis also works with sources and topics of foreign policy, it mostly engages with neutral diplomats and their work in Japan. This is a trade-off from the conceptual decision to concentrate on the ‘experience on the ground,’ for the reconstruction of the historical part of this work.

Thirdly, despite the engagement with Neutrality in International Relations to frame the historical experiences of the three neutrals, this thesis is not aimed toward creating new theory in International Relations. Instead, it draws upon existing interpretations of neutrality in the international system and extrapolates those to the period under study to contextualize the experience of the neutral states and their diplomats.

With these limitations in mind, the thesis contributes to the historical knowledge about Japan’s bilateral relations with neutral states during WWII and to the understanding of structural aspects of neutrality in the international system that Wartime Japan engaged in.

1-1-3. The Archives

This research is multi-archival and multi-lingual. Primary and secondary sources were obtained from archives in Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Japan the U.K., and the U.S. Their documents come in English, German, Spanish, Italian, French, Swedish, and Japanese. All information was unified in English, but since it would be a pity to lose the
voices of the diplomats and politicians who did not communicate in that language, some quoted materials were translated. I hope that this will give an adequate impression of the thoughts and arguments of the historical characters. All translations are either my own or made in consultation with the native speakers mentioned in the foreword. Wherever I translated a quote from a foreign language source, I marked it in the according footnote as ‘Author's Translation.’ I tried to stay as faithful as possible to the original text, including punctuation and sentence structure. Since some sources are telegrams that come in a cryptic, abbreviated language, the translations, too, reflect that style.

National archives hold many of the primary sources on the legations activities in the form of telegrams, notes, letters, and reports. For Spain, it is the Archivo General de la Administración (AGA) in Alcalá de Henares (next to Madrid) that keeps these documents. In Switzerland, the Federal Archive (CH-BAR) in Berne holds similar collections. For the Swedish case, their documents can be found in two locations of their national archive, the Riksarkivet (RA). Documents from and to the Foreign Ministry (Utrikesdepartementet) are stored in the main Building in Marienberg, in the center of Stockholm. The legation documents, on the other hand, are kept in Arninge (a town adjacent to Stockholm), in the so-called ‘missions archive’ (Beskickningsarkiv). Both locations have important holdings but the one in Arninge stores all the correspondence from and to the Swedish legation in Tokyo and has therefore been more yielding to this study. Unfortunately, some of the diplomatic correspondence was lost when the legation caught fire during an air raid and partially burned down on May 26,
1945.24 Not all records are therefore preserved. Most saddening is the complete loss of the quarterly reports of the legation for the year 1940 (Q1&Q2) and the years 1944 and 1945 (Q1–Q4).25

AGA, RA, and CH-BAR are the three most important institutions regarding original sources for this research. In addition, some information was obtained from the archive of the MAGIC summaries at Kings College in London. Those are the messages that Japanese government agencies (including the military and the navy) sent back and forth to their Ambassadors, Military Attachés, or Navy Attachés. U.S. code breakers around the cryptanalyst William F. Friedman intercepted, deciphered, and translated those messages into English as early as September 1940. The summaries detail the internal Japanese communication as well as the discussions between Japan and the Axis powers and even Japan and neutral nations from an early moment.26 They are a valuable source of information for the internal considerations of the Japanese side, especially the Gaimusho. However, they also come with a crucial flaw which is the translation. Keiichiro Komatsu has proven that some of the intercepted messages have been translated into English only insufficiently and at times even wrongly.27 The MAGIC summaries can therefore not stand on their own but only serve as indications for developments in Japan.

25 Personal communication with Örjan Romefors, specialist archivist at the Swedish National Archive (August 31, 2016) and Bert Edström (June 15, 2016).
Finally, there are three online resources for the primary material used in this research; the Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (JACAR)\(^{28}\) and the Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland (DDS)\(^{29}\) in conjunction with the digitized official publications of the Swiss Federal Government (CH-BAR ONLINE).\(^{30}\) All three databases are online archives, providing access to historical diplomatic documents. They are a selected subset of the many more documents that can be found at the respective mother institutions, the Diplomatic Archives of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Gaikoushiryoukan) in Tokyo and the above mentioned Swiss Federal Archive in Berne. For the case of the Japanese documents, the online documentation of JACAR represents the full record of diplomatic correspondence that there is at the Gaikoushiryoukan. The Swiss DDS, on the other hand, is only a selection of documents published online. This difference is critical to keep in mind as this means that for the DDS there is no guarantee that relevant data might not be missing. In general, the documentation of the DDS is extensive and of high quality.\(^{31}\) But for a full account about the Swiss legation in Tokyo, it is, for example, important to pair the DDS documents with the rest of the unpublished documents in the Federal Archives.

The easiest archives to operate are understandably the DDS, CH-BAR ONLINE, and JACAR, as they offer splendid online search tools. All their documents are scanned and made instantly available as PDFs. The Swiss Federal Archive, the Riksarkivet, and the Kings College Archive allow for direct access to the original documents in their study.

\(^{28}\) https://www.jacar.go.jp/english
\(^{29}\) http://dodis.ch
\(^{30}\) https://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch
rooms. The first two even offer an online catalog to search their holdings before going there, and all three allow self-digitization of documents by use of digital cameras. All the digitized primary sources obtained from these five institutions I processed with software for Optical Character Recognition (OCR) to make the text machine-readable. That proved to be a big help as it made the collection of pictures searchable for keywords.

The most challenging institution to work with was the Spanish Archivo General de la Administración, as it neither has an online catalog with the box names of their holdings nor does it allow researchers to make digital copies of the documents in the archive. I am deeply indebted to my friends David del Castillo Jiménez and Laura Alvarez in dealing with these archives. David provided me with a list of the archives holdings (available physically in the archive) regarding the Spanish legation and Laura spend many days there to scan through the boxes and copy documents by hand for this research.
1-2. Definitions

The most important concepts for this work are ‘neutrality,’ ‘diplomacy,’ ‘impartiality,’ ‘protecting Power,’ and ‘wartime Japan.’ Some of them are more straightforward than others. The institution of protecting Power, for example, is a simple custom in diplomacy that developed historically and was normatively defined through international treaties.\(^{32}\) However, all five concepts need a short discussion because they are central to the understanding of the workings of the neutral legations in Japan and its enemy states. The most central term is, of course, that of ‘neutrality,’ which is highly ambiguous and charged with stereotypes. In this work, the concept will appear in two contexts; International Law (IL) and International Relations (IR).

Regarding the way in which neutrality impacted the dealings of states in the international community—the IR aspect—the thesis will distinguish between great and small Power neutrals. Chapter 2 will discuss this framework and how the analysis of Sweden, Spain, and Switzerland fits into it. The distinction emerged from this comparative study of WWII neutrality and Japan. It is not commonly found in the literature on neutral states and does not follow the research of previous studies. It is a genuine contribution of this thesis with the claim of having explanatory power for the analysis of the international system of the 1930s and 1940s.

The other context, International Law, on the other hand, is the most crucial starting point of any study on neutrality because anything that is ‘concrete’ about the concept emerged from it. In fact, by the twentieth century, the custom and law of neutrality had evolved so much that historian Stephen Neff says about it that “[t]he result, over time,  

was the evolution of one of the most intricate and detailed bodies of law in the history of the law of nations.”33 IL contains not only definitions of neutrality but is the basis for crucial distinctions of different forms of the concept, that are fundamental to the framework and the choice of cases in this work.

1-2-1. Neutrality in International Law

Historians usually create between two and four different categories to differentiate between distinctive kinds of neutral countries.34 The most important distinction for this study is one that emerged in the nineteenth century; that of ‘perpetual’ (or ‘permanent’) neutrality, as exhibited in the foreign policy strategies of states like Switzerland and Sweden, and ‘occasional’ (or ‘ad-hoc’) neutrality, which is the situational choice of non-engagement in an armed conflict.35 In the context of WWII, Spain was a typical representative of the second group. Spain’s fascist leader Francisco Franco did not keep Spain out of the war because of a deeply felt obligation toward the duties of neutrality but because of a simple situational cost-benefit analysis. Non-experts on WWII issues are often surprised to hear that Spain, too, was neutral because they confuse these two forms of neutrality. The common stereotype of it as meaning perpetual neutrality is the cause for that. However, historically the non-permanent variant used to be the norm, not

---

35 In addition, one might want to distinguish permanent neutrals according to whether their neutrality has been agreed upon internationally or if they only follow a long-established policy of neutrality. Abbenhuis counts in this sense Switzerland and Belgium to the first sub-division while the Netherlands, the United States and Denmark would count as examples of the second category. See: Maartje M. Abbenhuis, The Art of Staying Neutral: The Netherlands in the First World War, 1914-1918 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 16.
the perpetual one.\textsuperscript{36} This was well understood, until shortly after WWII. “When speaking of neutrality, one generally thinks of occasional neutrality (…)”\textsuperscript{37} observed Camille Gorgé still in 1948. This understanding of neutrality faded into the current stereotype of permanent neutrality only with the onset of the Cold War.

Maartje Abbenhuis in her seminal work on the development of neutrality after 1815 (discussed under 2-1), proves that situational neutrality was, in fact, a fundamental component of the logic of limited warfare during the long nineteenth century in the European balance of power system.\textsuperscript{38} Most rules and common practices that guided diplomats of neutral states in the twentieth century stem from the International Law of the nineteenth. The different treaties of the European powers ever since the Congress of Vienna in 1815 were the sources of that. For diplomats and statesmen on the eve of WWII, those were the guidelines available when judging the rights and duties of neutral Powers. The post-WWII era, in contrast, was not built around a multipolar balance of power system anymore, the principal importance of the institution of neutrality was lost—albeit not revoked.\textsuperscript{39} There have not been any major additions to the legal definition of neutrality since the end of the First World War, but at the same time, no principle emerged that would have outlawed the practice of neutrality altogether. That is why the closest thing to a comprehensive definition of neutrality stems from the works of IL scholars at the turn of the last century. Prominent among them was Lassa Francis

\textsuperscript{37} Camille Gorgé, \textit{La Neutralité Helvétique: Son Évolution Politique et Juridique des Origines à la Seconde Guerre Mondiale} (Zürich: Ed. polygraphiques, 1947), 16. [OFrTA].
\textsuperscript{38} Abbenhuis, \textit{An Age of Neutrals: Great Power Politics, 1815-1914.}
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 3.
Lawrence Oppenheim who, in his 1912 Magnum Opus on Peace, War, and Neutrality, defined it negatively in its relation to the status of war:

When war breaks out, even if it be limited to only two members of the Family of Nations, nevertheless the whole Family of Nations is thereby affected, since the rights and duties of neutrality devolve upon such States as are not parties to the war.40

Under this definition, no nation can remain unaffected by a war between two states as any not involved third-party automatically becomes a neutral. This is called neutrality by the application of law.41 Two aspects to this definition are important to point out. First, a consideration of diplomatic etiquette; even though neutrality under International Law applies automatically to states who are not in military alliances with belligerent states, in practice governments used to issue official declarations of their neutrality at the outbreak of armed hostilities during most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Secondly, neutrality in this sense is a mode for a state to exist, which depends upon the presence of the other mode—that of war. In this sense, the defining element of neutrality is the absence of a state of war between the neutral party and the belligerents, while those are at war with each other. A state of war is required for a state of neutrality to exist logically. Only in times of war can a nation be neutral—there needs to be something to be neutral toward.42

Perpetual or permanent neutrality, in contrast, is of a different nature. It can be bestowed upon a state only by multi-lateral agreements that must be underwritten by relevant powers who recognize and demand that states’ mandatory non-interference in

41 Personal communication with Stephen Neff. October 27, 2017.
case of external, third-party conflicts. It is in this sense that the term ‘neutralization’ is used. Whether that is an active or a passive affair, remains disputed. Some authors tend to stress that at the 1815 Congress of Vienna, that decided on many aspects of post-Napoleonic Europe, representatives of the Swiss cantons actively sought the recognition of the Helvetic confederation’s permanent neutrality as a way to shelter it from territorial ambitions of their great Power neighbors.43 Others stress that neutralization is rather an assertion from the outside, something imposed upon the neutralized state to influence the international balance of power.44 Both interpretations certainly hold some validity and perceptions on the desirability of neutralization might vary not only depending on ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ viewpoints, but also over time. In the early 1990s, for example, a new post-Soviet state, Turkmenistan, sought with a proactive diplomacy to have its permanent neutrality recognized by the United Nations (UN). The Turkmens did not only succeed in this endeavor in 1995,45 but they became the primary driver behind a 2017 UN Assembly resolution recognizing December 12 as the ‘International Day of Neutrality.’46 However, neutralization was certainly not the fashion of the day a century earlier. Even the Swedish crown prince rejected the idea of seeking guarantees for his country’s permanent neutrality by other states after Norway left the Swedish-Norwegian union in 1905. He argued that, in the words of Mikael af Malmborg, “it

would be tantamount to reducing Sweden to the status of ‘Belgium and Switzerland’, something that was obviously not his preferred vision for his country’s future.”47

Being neutralized through international treaties comes with the duty to behave impartially at times when other states are at war with each other and to not give up on that commitment in favor of either party. The implications at times of peace are essentially an attitude toward the international system that rules out any potential violation of neutral duties in the hypothetical case of war. Military treaty alliances were therefore clearly off the table for states who claimed perpetual neutrality. Likewise, any international agreement that could potentially infringe upon the former’s duty of impartiality would be highly problematic. 48 However, in the words of Oppenheim; “Apart from duties arising from the fact of their neutralization which are to be performed in time of peace as well as in time of war, the duties and rights of neutrality are the same for neutralized as for other States.”49

Both understandings of neutrality, be it perpetual or situational, posed essential problems in theory and practice. What to do, for example, when the legal requirements for a state of war were not met but large-scale violence still occurred? In civil wars, for instance, some parties might lack statehood. It is a defining element of such conflicts that the governing party tries to deny its adversary the status of a nation-state, as that would imply accepting the legitimacy of its existence. But there are also international conflicts during which one or both sides tried to deny the other’s statehood. Most important for this study is the Sino-Japanese conflict that started with the Manchurian

---

incident in 1931. Defenders of Japan’s position and advocates for Manchukuo’s independence (from China) initially tried to deny that the fighting that broke out with Chinese military forces constituted a state of war between the two governments, because, there was no central power in China that could have claimed to be a national government.\textsuperscript{50}

The internationally recognized Chinese Government and their representatives, of course, denied the Japanese allegations and requested a League of Nations’ special session in 1931–32 to receive help from the international community on the attack on their sovereignty. During the League’s meetings, Japanese diplomats took yet another approach to delegitimize any international sanctions in favor of the Chinese. They simply refused to use the word ‘war,’ claiming the right and duty of legitimate self-defense of their subjects and interests on the Asian mainland.\textsuperscript{51} In fact, Japan had never issued a formal declaration of war and used that situation to claim that the usual provisions for belligerency did not apply. The dubious strategy was successful to some degree. There were, for example, frequently used expressions by western diplomats and newspapers that attest to this. They described the situation in Manchuria as ‘a war in all but name’ or a ‘war in disguise.’ The lack of a declaration of war did change the way that the League and its diplomats approached the situation.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{52} Especially Japan’s Small State adversaries at the League of Nation like Sweden criticized Japan often in this language, but also representatives of the U.K. used the term in the Lytton report and even Japanese diplomats like Toshikazu Kase described Japanese actions on Mainland Japan later on as such. See: Comment of O. Unden in ibid., III: 38., Comment of M. Yen in League of Nations Official Journal. \textit{Records of the Special Session of the Assembly: Convened in Virtue of Article 15 of the Covenant at the Request of the Chinese Government}, Vol. II, Geneva: 1932, 13., and the final verdict of the Lytton report:
For this reason, it would not be entirely corrected to depart on the analysis of neutral state’s diplomacy and just assume that the same rules and concepts applied to the war-like situation in China as to the declared war with the Allied Powers after Pearl Harbor. However, Geoffrey Berridge’s observation also holds true that although neutrality in the strict sense applies only when a formal state of war exists between belligerents, the diplomatic missions of neutrals can face various extraordinary challenges also when war has not been declared, but armed conflict still occurs. It is essential to be aware that Spanish, Swedish, and Swiss diplomacy toward Japan were impacted not by one but by three different violent conflicts; Japan’s undeclared war with China (starting in 1931), the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) and Japan’s belligerency against the allied powers after Pearl Harbor (1941–1945). The first and the second incident are better called armed conflicts, as they lacked the official declarations of war and the classic attributes of interstate army-against-army warfare. It is for this reason that the thesis discusses not only WW II but the whole of Japan’s wartime period, ranging from the Manchurian incident on September 18, 1931, to its surrender on September 2, 1945. The interesting question is how significant the impact of the war-like situation in China and the Spanish Civil War was on the relations between the neutrals and Japan and if the Pacific War changed much for their diplomacy or if it was just one more complication on the road?


1-2-2. Impartiality (vs. Apathy)

Probably the most prevalent anachronistic reading of the meaning of neutrality is that ‘true neutrality’ meant to abstain from any public or private interactions. There is a common stereotype that neutrals during WWII should not have interacted with belligerents (especially not with the Axis) and that any trade or other forms of helpful relation was an infringement of neutrality.\(^{54}\) This vision of neutrality was heavily perpetuated in the 1990s, but its underlying notion is not new. It can be traced back to Just War theories of pre-medieval ages and the tenants of a school of thought that Stephen Neff named the ‘community-interest school.’\(^{55}\) The stereotype invoked in such arguments is that of an apathetic state, self-reliant and self-serving, cocooning inside its borders, in order not to get hurt by the raging war outside.\(^{56}\) For those whose image of neutrality is this sort of ‘staying aloof’ of the international developments, neutral trade with belligerents, financial interactions, weapon deliveries and all other sorts of material exchange immediately appears like a breach of neutral behavior. Especially historians in the 1990s, when WWII neutrality suddenly became a hot topic again (in conjunction with U.S. investigations into the dealings of neutral states with Jewish assets), were prone to that reading of neutrality. Christian Leitz, for example, concludes his book on the dealings of neutral states with Nazi Germany as follows:


\(^{56}\) For several examples see Abbenhuis, *An Age of Neutrals: Great Power Politics, 1815-1914*, 9-12. For the case of the ‘community-interest school,’ non-participation in any act that could potentially prolong the war or be of benefit to one or both sides, was to be abstained from strictly as a moral imperative. Neff, *The Rights and Duties of Neutrals: A General History*, 51-52.
Strict neutrality, it may be argued, was not adhered to for reasons of self-preservation, yet its abandonment continued after the survival of each neutral was already assured. Ultimately, Antonio de Oliveira Salazar’s conclusion applied to all five neutral countries: “The desire for neutrality cannot be superior to the interests of the nation.”

In this kind of understanding, ‘strict neutrality’ would have meant not to be engaged economically with Nazi Germany. The fact that perpetual and occasional neutrals dealt with Axis powers is proof to authors like him that those states did not truly adhere to their declarations of neutrality. Discussing the multilateral treaties, especially The Hague conventions, that were the backbone of neutrality law, the same author precludes in the introduction of his book that “not only did the Conventions not set strict parameters for the economic aspect of war, they provided, in fact, a major loophole to any neutral state intent on giving a helping hand to Nazi Germany’s (and indeed the Allied) war effort.” Here the premise is that neutrals were not supposed to interact at all with belligerents. Previsions in International Law that provided for such interactions are therefore judged as ‘loopholes’ that could be exploited by the neutrals for their own economic benefit. Nothing is further from the truth. Such interpretations of neutrality stem from a lack of understanding for its historical development through International Law. They even play with the stereotype that being neutral was a passive affair and that active involvement in (economic) affairs of belligerents was a breach of ‘neutral behavior.’ The cartoonist, Leslie Gilbert Illingworth, captured parts of this sentiment in the below picture, where he depicted neutrals as fearful creatures in a racist way.

57 Leitz, *Nazi Germany and Neutral Europe during the Second World War*, 189.
58 Ibid., 5.
The view of neutrals, as morally disengaged or falsely aloof of international affairs, does not reflect the contemporary use of neutrality as a foreign policy. Its practice before and during WWII resembled much more the traditional nineteenth century use of it as an inherently active concept, allowing world trade to remain as untouched by warfare as logistically possible. The law of neutrality came into being, mostly, to protect neutral trade with all sides, not to lock neutrals out on an island of isolation. Chapter 2 will focus on the development of Neutrality more closely and make this point clear. The abstention from trade or international apathy was not a predicament of neutrality at all and was not perceived as such by the politicians, diplomats, and thinkers of the period that will be studied.

---

59 The author does not share the views expressed in the picture and condemns the heavily racist undertones. Picture by Leslie Gilbert Illingworth, *Neutrality* (London: Daily Mail, 1940).

60 Abbenhuis, *An Age of Neutrals: Great Power Politics, 1815-1914*. 
To neutrals, the most crucial question was not whether or not to abstain from economic activities with belligerents. The real issue that was discussed centered around another concept—impartiality. Should belligerents be treated equally by neutrals or was it justifiable to discriminate between a favored and non-favored side? Was it, for example, legitimate for a neutral to trade only with one side of a conflict and not with the other? Answers to such questions have been formulated for at least a century before WWII and there existed clear legal interpretations of impartiality when it came to military affairs:

§ 294. Since neutrality is an attitude of impartiality, it excludes such assistance and succour to one of the belligerents as is detrimental to the other, and, further, such injuries to the one as benefit the other. But it requires, on the other hand, active measures from neutral States. For neutrals must prevent belligerents from making use of their neutral territories and of their resources for military and naval purposes during the war. This concerns not only actual fighting on neutral territories, but also transport of troops, war materials, and provisions for the troops, the fitting out of men-of-war and privateers, the activity of Prize Courts, and the like.

The centrality of ‘impartiality’ to an IL understanding of neutrality cannot be stressed enough. It goes so far that Oppenheim, in a different passage, even assures that it would not be a contradiction in terms if neutrals collectively started defending the predicaments of IL. Collective neutral action was explicitly allowed under The Hague Convention to punish illegitimate warfare by any belligerent—as long as it was administered impartially in accordance with the law.

Two aspects are central to this understanding of impartiality: Firstly, it is the pro-active endeavor not to favor either side of a war and not to grant them advantages over the

63 Ibid., Para 246.
other, neither by positive action (granting rights) nor through negative restrictions (keeping one side from certain benefits). Secondly, however, the duty of impartiality is confined to the realm of military actions. A neutral state had the obligation not to favor either side’s troops or let them make use of its territory or ports. However, this duty did not extend into the sphere of economic interactions with belligerents. When it came to trade, neutrals retained the right to choose whom they wanted to deal with and who not. Since neutrals were, by definition, not at war with either belligerent, the normal predicaments of international life apply to their relations with either side, which were grounded in voluntary engagement. The usual rules of trade and commerce with either side applied.

Even the trade of arms fell under this category of economic interaction, not military assistance. Like most other rules by which WWII neutrals evaluated their actions, the 1907 “Convention relative to the rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in case of War on Land” (part of the second Hague Convention) regulated this aspect. In the 1930s and 40s, this convention was barely thirty years old, and the decision makers in charge of Foreign Affairs were well aware of it. In June 1943, for example, Dr. Walter Schiess, a prominent Swiss lawyer in the city of Basel, set up a letter to his personal friend, legation councilor Dr. Jean Frédéric Wagnière at the Political Department (the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs), with the following question:

I recently had a meeting with Mr. MacKittrick (sic.), the President of the Bank for International Settlements, (…). We discussed the question of

---

64 dodis.ch/P2068
65 dodis.ch/P146
66 dodis.ch/P1259
what provisions of International Law Switzerland based its current exclusive war material exports to Germany on? Since I would like to unambiguously clarify the Swiss position with Mr. MacKittrick, regarding the international treaties, I would like to kindly ask you if you possess any materials about this question.68

Three weeks later, Wagnière replied to his friend as follows:

I have received your letter of June 22. My delayed response is due to my absence and not to the difficulty of your question, which is quite simple. For all I know, the only stipulations to which Switzerland is a party of, regarding the matter of arms in times of war are the articles 7 and 9 of the Convention relative to the rights and duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in case of War on Land, concluded on October 18, 1907 at The Hague.

Art. 7: A neutral Power is not called upon to prevent the export or transport, on behalf of one or other of the belligerents, of arms, munitions of war, or, in general, of anything which can be of use to an army or a fleet.

Art. 9: Every measure of restriction or prohibition taken by a neutral Power in regard to the matters referred to in Articles 7 and 8 must be impartially applied by it to both belligerents. If, at the moment, our exports are going only to one belligerent camp, that is due to circumstances which we cannot help.69

This is an important argument coming from a high-ranking official at the Foreign Ministry because it shows how prominent the Second Hague convention was for Swiss policymakers and how the interpretation thereof justified its 'business as usual' approach even regarding arms.


The last sentence is quite crucial. It reads in the original as follows: “Si, actuellement, notre exportation ne va qu’à un seul des camps belligérants, cela est dû à des circonstances auxquelles nous ne pouvons rien.”
Wagnière’s reply might seem overly cold and legalistic, but of course, the political elite was well aware of the explosiveness of questions regarding war material exports. Already in 1939, the Federal Council deliberated on the issue:

During the [first] World War deliveries of weapons to both groups of belligerent states was fashioned in a way that both parties obtained war materials to approximately equal amounts from Switzerland. This ensured, on the one hand, that no criticisms of partisan treatment could be voiced toward Switzerland and, on the other hand, these exports signified a not unimportant factor for the Swiss national economy (…). We cannot know if the circumstances in a future war will remain the same. Considering the modern ways of total warfare, we have to expect, however, that the supply of war material to one state will be regarded as a hostile act by its adversary. The Federal Council will, in this case, have to take the necessary actions. Also, the question arises if precautionary measures have to be taken already now to counteract the accusation of favoritism of individual power-groups.70

What this example shows is that especially the permanent neutrals did indeed reflect on the implications of their neutrality on several levels; legal and political aspects were both taken into account. It would be a wrong start to expect that small neutral Powers saw their position in the international community as that of hermits, condemned to apathetic disengagement. The legal framework of International Law as well as political pragmatism provided for engagement in the international community during times of war. Withdrawal from international life never was a goal nor an option. The analysis of Neutral-Japanese relations will start from this vantage point.

---

1-2-3. Diplomacy vs. Foreign Policy

This thesis distinguishes between the concepts of ‘diplomacy’ and ‘foreign policy.’ The important argument that the two concepts should be differentiated was first made by Harold Nicolson in his 1939 work on diplomacy. His main concern was that in democratic societies laymen, did not differentiate between the act of deciding on their country’s approach toward foreign affairs—the formulation of foreign policy—and the execution thereof—its diplomacy: “(…) and the failure to acquire this habit is largely due to the continuous misuse of this word ‘diplomacy’ as implying both the framing of foreign policy and its execution.”71 Unfortunately, not much has changed since the days of his publication. The word ‘diplomacy’ is still often used synonymously with ‘foreign policy’ as a quick search of book titles reveals: Thatcher's Diplomacy: The Revival of British Foreign Policy,72 Does America Need a Foreign Policy?—Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century,73 Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890-1951.74 It might not be a crime in everyday parlance to use the two terms interchangeably, but for a work on the relations of states and the underlying rationale that guided their diplomats, it is essential to understand the difference. Diplomats (usually) do not set foreign policy themselves. There are exceptions to this rule, as will be seen in the case of Spanish-Japanese relations during the Spanish Civil War. In general, however, diplomats are only the executive officers of the decisions taken by

---

their governments, who, in democratic societies are bound to the general public through systems of elections and referenda that define the directions of their foreign policies. Diplomacy, in this sense, is the act of carrying out foreign policy objectives through means of negotiation and concrete deeds ‘on the ground.’

1-2-4. Protecting Power

The most critical diplomatic function that neutrals can carry out for belligerents is to become a protecting Power to them. The term ‘protecting Power’ refers to a state which lends its diplomatic services—the so-called ‘Good Offices’—to represent and protect the interests of the client state on the soil of its adversary once relations between them have been cut-off or, worse, the state of war has been declared.\textsuperscript{75} In the words of Charles Henn: “A protecting Power is a neutral state which has been appointed by a belligerent to protect its interests in the territory of the opposing belligerent during the period when the belligerents entertain no diplomatic relations.”\textsuperscript{76} The protecting Power becomes in that situation the diplomatic representor of the protected client, fulfilling most duties that were typically assigned to the legation or embassy of the client, but without becoming diplomatic agents of the client itself. The diplomats who execute protecting Power mandates will never be diplomats of the power they protect they only act in its best interest as diplomats of their home country.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{75} The terms “protecting Power”, “Good Office” and “representation of interests” will be used largely interchangeably in this thesis. That is not entirely faithful to the meaning of the three concepts which have clear cut definitions

\textsuperscript{76} Charles Henn, "The Origins and Early Development of the Idea of Protecting Power" (University of Cambridge, 1986), xi.

\textsuperscript{77} See on this issue: Rana, \textit{The 21st Century Ambassador: Plenipotentiary to Chief Executive}; Berridge, \textit{Embassies in Armed Conflict}. 
The concept of protecting Power received formal treaty status only through the Geneva Convention of 1929 but had been common practice around the mid-nineteenth century already. It went hand in hand with the legal codification of war under International Law and was a logical derivative thereof. Once treaties had been signed that guaranteed the legal status of enemies toward each other, it only made sense that for the proper conduct, belligerents needed the help of third parties to advocate in their names for these rights. Besides the caretaking capital and property, especially diplomats, civilians, and prisoners of war needed help to be granted their legal international rights when trapped on enemy soil. Their home state would, therefore, name a protecting Power to look after their interests and assure functioning lines of communication with the enemy for those moments when negotiations were needed.78

Declarations of surrender, for example, or truce negotiations needed intermediaries to function as mailmen for their communications. Relevant to this study, for example, was that Japan’s military strategists never envisioned a war victory that would include the occupation of the U.S. On the contrary, the goal was from the beginning to win victories in the Pacific and then negotiate a beneficial end of the war through the Good Offices of neutral states.79 Even toward the end of the war, the Japanese Government kept hoping for the Soviet’s Good Office to negotiate a conditional surrender (see chapter 2-3-1). Besides ending a war, there were also various moments during a conflict when enemy governments might have wanted to be in touch. Most obviously when there were issues of common interest as, for example, the civilized exchange of their diplomats, civilians,

and prisoners of war. Furthermore, having a protecting Power also meant being able to protest against infringements of International Law which, after all, was supposed to regulate the conduct of warfare.

Being a protecting Power is not always a question of war and peace. Switzerland, for example, represents at the moment (2018) U.S. interests in Iran because the two do not maintain regular diplomatic contact but still need a way to contact the other side officially. For the WWII period, this was a diplomatic practice that was not precisely codified but had a century-old tradition and was well understood by all belligerents. Swiss diplomats argued that the practice had by that time already become customary International Law.  

That usually only neutral states can function as protecting Powers is self-evident since the premise for the protection of a belligerent on its enemy’s soil is the latter’s acceptance thereof. No nation that breaks diplomatic relations with another state can possibly serve as a protecting Power for a third party in that state. Therefore, only neutral countries are possible providers of such services. The protecting Power itself needs to be on good diplomatic terms with both sides of the conflict. From this requirement emanates, for example, that a client state cannot ask its’ protecting Power for any services which would endanger its relations with the enemy state. In such cases, the protecting Power has the responsibility to decline the requests of its client in the best interest of all parties.

---

There are, however, a few noticeable exceptions to the rule that only neutral states can function as protecting Powers. The most important one is the case when the protection of foreign interests happens not on enemy soil but on the territory of a neutral state where, due to the lack of capacity, a belligerent might not have the personnel to organize its own diplomatic representation. Such was the case on the Island of Macau during WWII. Macau was a Portuguese colony and thereby neutral territory. Contrary to its sibling, Hong Kong, Macau was never attacked by the Japanese, remaining free and neutral for the entirety of the war. The U.S. did not have a diplomat in Macau, which was not because the Island administration would not allow it but because it was physically impossible for the U.S. to reach the territory and station someone there. In this situation, the State Department asked the British Foreign Office to protect their interests through the U.K. Consulate. This was probably the most interesting anomaly of a protecting Power during WWII, during which one Allied nation protected another one.81

However, the great majority of all protecting Power mandates during WWII was held by neutrals. That also included the U.S. during the first two years of the war in Europe. They served as protecting Power in various states. Most importantly, the U.S. held all of the mandates for the U.K. in its enemy nations. Once the War in the Pacific started and the U.S. renounced its neutrality, all the British mandates were transferred to Switzerland. That was the moment when the three small Power neutrals in this study became the most prominent protecting Powers of WWII. They all remained neutral,

81 John Pownall Reeves et al., The Lone Flag: Memoir of the British Consul in Macao during World War II (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2015).
fulfilled their duties until 1945 and only Spain ever gave up some of its mandates for Japan (see chapter 4-5-2).

In terms of the number of mandates, Switzerland was most often chosen as protecting Power, followed by Sweden and Spain. The exact number of representations is not easy to determine because representations varied by time and the sources from the different neutrals and belligerents are at times inconsistent. The documents of the Japanese Gaimusho have slightly different information from those found in Sweden, Spain, and Switzerland and those in the U.S. or the U.K. The reason for that is the inclusion of colonies and oversee territories which one government might list separately as a representation, and another might just subsume under a more global category. The most comprehensive list that was available for this research is the annex of the final report that the Swiss Division of Foreign Interests published in 1946. It lists the following numbers of representations as of December 31, 1943.82

82 The report of the Division of Foreign Interests (a) contains the representations of other powers as of December 31, 1943, but mentions the mandates of Switzerland separately for the entire time of the war. That includes some of the representations which had been carried out by Spain, Turkey and Argentina as of 1943. To correct for this inconsistency, the Swiss number of 120 de jure representations was taken from the Federal Council report for that year (b). The two reports are the following:

b) CH-BAR ONLINE, Geschäftsberichte des Bundesrates, 50000305, 50000303, "Bericht des Schweizerischen Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung uber seine Geschäftsführung im Jahre 1943", 1944.
The difference between *de jure* and *de facto* representations stems from the legal status of some of the representations. There were cases in which a belligerent power did not recognize a protecting Power as the official representative of an enemy state but still tolerated it when the protecting Power executed the mandate to help enemy nationals with diplomatic services (welfare payments, e.g., or the issuing of legal documents and the handling of repatriation issues). This was most often the case in occupied territories as, for example, various Swedish protecting Power mandates in Japanese occupied China or Switzerland’s mandates for different countries in German-occupied Czechoslovakia.

Regarding who represented whom, the situation was difficult because the choice of a protecting Power did not follow the dictate of efficiency but that of politics and pragmatism. The most expedient and convenient way of having one’s affairs handled would, of course, have been if the same neutral was made protecting Power in both states and represented interests vice versa. But that was not often the case. Each belligerent chose freely which neutral it wanted as its representative. Diplomatic practice (and common sense) required that the belligerent host country accepted the choice. Japan, for example, refused some of the appointments by its enemies, such as the request by the Netherlands that Switzerland represented its interests in the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protecting Power</th>
<th>De Jure</th>
<th>De Facto</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: All Mandates of protecting Power during WWII as of December 31, 1943
Philippines and Hong Kong. The Gaimusho insisted that it must be the Swedes doing that representation in its colonies and the occupied territories because Sweden was also the accredited power for the Netherland’s interests in mainland Japan.83

The problems that followed from this arbitrary patchwork of protecting Powers were manifold. Communication, for example, became extremely indirect because the belligerents naturally forbade any direct contact from their soil to the enemy nation. Protecting powers were only allowed to communicate with their home governments who then had to forward messages to the concerned belligerent. In conjunction with the representation of belligerent interests by different neutrals that meant a burdensome complexity for negotiations because to connect two belligerents at least two (sometimes three) neutrals were involved in delicate negotiations.

Here is a short example of how complex a simple line of communication between the U.S. and Japan was even when only one protecting Power was involved. The following is an extract of a U.S. press release of summer 1945, describing Switzerland’s demands toward Japan in return for their agreement to protect also Japan’s interests in the U.S.:84

The Swiss Legation at Washington told the Department of State that the Swiss Government would not agree to represent Japanese interests in the United States until it had received from the Japanese Government agreement in principle to permit Swiss representatives to visit all camps where American nationals are held in Japan and areas now occupied by the Japanese armed forces. These conditions were presented to the Japanese, and the Japanese War Ministry told the Swiss Government that

84 Until April 1945 Spain had represented Japan’s interests in the U.S., but they gave that responsibility up after the Japanese massacre on Spanish citizens in Manila in February 1945. In this situation, the Japanese asked Switzerland to take over from the Spanish.
it agreed in principle to permit the Swiss Minister in Japan to visit
prisoner-of-war camps in Japan and Japanese occupied territories.85

The complexity for the diplomats involved in these issues was that the line was not as
simple as U.S.–Switzerland–Japan but that on all sides different government agencies
were involved that did not necessarily talk to each other. The Japanese War Ministry
and the Gaimusho were not the same thing, and they were different again from the
actual military authorities who ran prisoner of war camps and took many decisions
regarding access of Swedish or Swiss representatives to the people under their
protection. All of this caused heavy complications for the neutrals tasked with
negotiating with all these stake-holders.

The costs for the protecting Power services were mostly carried by the client state.
Protecting Powers used to keep accounts for their clients which they credited and
debited to handle the financial aspects of their services. Especially all forms of financial
support for enemy nationals, like money payments to civilians or prisoners of war, were
documented and had to be reimbursed by the belligerent for whom they were expensed.
Also, the costs of personnel were often invoiced to the beneficiary state. Protecting
Powers did however not make any profit from their services. Most of their diplomatic
engagement was made free of charge (salaries, rent, telegraphing costs, etc.). In addition,
the situation of the war required the availability of funds in an environment of heavily
impeded international transfers. In the case of the Swiss, for example, the Federal

85 CH-BAR, E2200.172-02#1000/262#5*, 12, "Japan interests (general)", 1939-1948.
Council had to finance the Division of Foreign Affairs with over 60 million CHF of special credits.\textsuperscript{86}

1-2-5. \textit{Wartime Japan}

The expression ‘Wartime Japan’ was chosen for the lack of a better, more commonly accepted term to describe the entire period of Japan’s experience of armed conflict on the Asian mainland and in the Pacific. None of the commonly used terms fits this period well. Either they are too Euro- or American centric, as, for example, ‘World War II’ or ‘War in the Pacific,’ or they only refer to particular aspects of Japan’s aggressions like the ‘Second Sino-Japanese War.’\textsuperscript{87} The term ‘Wartime Japan’ shall, therefore, be defined normatively for the sake of the research in this thesis as the time between the Mukden Incident on September 18, 1931, and Japan’s official capitulation fourteen years later on the USS Missouri on September 2, 1945.

One word on territorial names; whenever possible, this thesis uses the historical names for territories and political entities. In case of linguistic or political ambiguities, the internationally most commonly used names or the Japanese name versions in their English notation, are used. For example, the thesis talks about the port city of ‘Dairen’ in the ‘Kwantung leased territory,’ which are the historical Japanese names for what today is the Chinese city of ‘Dalian’ in the ‘Liaoning Province,’ the tip of the ‘Liaodong’ peninsula. Regarding the northern part of China, which was occupied by Japanese

\textsuperscript{86} CH-BAR, J1.17\#1990/98\#179*, "Abteilung für Fremde Interessen: Notiz "financement des intérêts étrangers"; Korrespondenz mit Dr. Stampfli; Räumliche Unterbringung der Abteilung für Fremde Interessen; Danksgagung von ausländischen Staatsregierungen; Personelles und Notizen; Befreiung vom Militärdienst; Aufgaben und Tätigkeiten der Abteilung für Fremde Interessen", 1941-1944, 10.

forces and split from the rest of the mainland to become Japan’s puppet state of ‘Manchukuo,’ the latter name shall designate the political entity whereas the name ‘Manchuria’ will be used to describe the geographic territory that it encompassed.
1-3. Neutrality Research—Literature Review

Literature that connects to the topic of this thesis exists in three categories. On the one hand, there are the accounts of national histories, mostly written by local historians, in their languages, who first had access to the declassified materials in their respective national archives or of those who worked on the WWII relations of their countries and Japan. Secondly, there is crucial comparative literature on European neutrality during WWII, compiled by scholars who were either interested in the foreign policy of the neutrals or authors who criticized them for collaborating with Nazi Germany—accusing them of not being genuinely neutral. The third category is the domain of International Law, International Relations, and Diplomacy Studies, where a wide variety of literature exists, from research on ancient forms of neutrality, all the way to social scientists who researched neutral embassies and legations.

1-3-1. National Historiographies

On the one hand, there are many monographs that analyze the WWII histories of Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Japan but a few particularly stand out. For the

89 Berridge, Embassies in Armed Conflict.
92 Kreis, Switzerland and the Second World War; Neville Wylie, Britain, Switzerland, and the Second World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Hugo Büttler and Kenneth Angst, eds., Der Zweite
case of Switzerland, the most influential and profound work on national history was written by Edgar Bonjour. His study was mandated by the Swiss Government who, in 1962, commissioned a report on all aspects of the time between 1939 and 1945. Bonjour received special permissions to work with still restricted sources. His account amounts to an extensive volume. It was published in several versions and is until today the beginning for any student of Switzerland during WWII. Sweden found a similar assessment of its foreign policy during WWII by Wilhelm Carlgren. In Spain, the historical work on WWII is inseparably connected with the dictatorship of Francisco Franco and the Spanish Civil War. The country’s national historiographies of the 1960s and 1970s are inextricably tainted by Francoism. In this regard, the relatively recent work by Professor Angel Viñas is noteworthy, in which he criticizes Franco friendly assessments of Spain’s Foreign Policy during the War and offers his own account on Pre-Franco Spanish foreign policy. He edited and authored two important books on this; *Al Servicio de la Republica* and *Francisco Serrat Bonastre. Salamanca, 1936. Memorias del primer “ministro” de Asuntos Exteriores de Franco*. The former

---


represents a detailed assessment on the Spanish foreign service whose diplomats were among the first to desert their own democratically elected Republican Government when Franco started the Civil War. The second monograph is an account of the beginning of the new regime’s foreign policy under Franco’s first foreign ministers, Francisco Serrat Bonastre, who was the first one in charge of coordinating the defected Spanish diplomats and build foreign relations for the new regime.

On the other hand, only little has been written about the relations of Sweden, Spain, and Switzerland with Japan during this period. The Swiss Bonjour, for example, in his work of 820 pages, mentions Japan only on 5 of them. Carlgren provides six pages and Viñas thirteen (in ‘Al Servicio de la Republica’). Only for the case of Spain, a dedicated in-depth study of its WWII relations with Japan exists thanks to the outstanding work of Dr. Florentino Rodao, Professor at Complutense University, Madrid. He wrote two highly relevant works on Spain and Japan. The first one is his Doctoral Thesis of 1993 “Relaciones Hispano-Japonesas, 1937–1945,”\(^97\) in which he painstakingly traces not only diplomatic actions of the Spanish and Japanese legations but also the rationale of both governments in dealing with each other. He published many of his findings in a book in 2002, *Franco y el imperio japonés.*\(^98\) There focuses more abstractly on the shifts in mutual perceptions. In combination, these two skillfully crafted works are without doubt the most complete and detailed account of Spanish-Japanese relations in the 1930s and 1940s. During my own work with the sources from the Archivo General de la Administración, I succeeded only marginally in adding historical facts to Professor


\(^{98}\) Rodao, *Franco y el Imperio Japonés.*
Rodao’s books, mostly only minor details. On the other hand, the account of this dissertation would be much poorer, if it was not for Professor Rodao’s great work.

The only other relevant studies on Japanese-Spanish relations during WWII were written either by one of Florentino Rodao’s mentors, the formerly mentioned German Professor Gerhard Krebs, by a closely related colleague, Javier Noya, or his students like David del Castillo Jiménez. Except for Gerhard Krebs’ contributions, all of this research has been conducted in Spanish.

Sweden and Switzerland have not seen a similarly profound analysis of their WWII relations with Japan. For Switzerland, two master theses have been written in French. One by Luc Humbert at the University of Fribourg in 1998 and one by Sébastien Nanchen at the University of Lausanne in the year 2000. Humbert’s thesis is unpublished (but available at the cantonal library in Fribourg) whereas Nenchen’s account was partially published in Patrick Ziltner’s handbook on Swiss-Japanese relations—a collection of papers and primary sources about the two countries.

---

100 Javier Noya, La imagen de España en Japón, ed. Real Instituto Elcano (Instituto Cervantes, ICEX, SEEI, 2004).
102 Florentino Rodao plans to publish an English language version of his book.
interactions since the Meiji period. Both are well-researched works, making use of the primary sources in the Swiss National Archive, but they are accounts of events at the Swiss legation in Tokyo and not profound historical analyses of Swiss–Japanese diplomatic relations. Other historians have written about individual instances when the Swiss connection with Japan became important to war-related issues. For example, the involvement of the Red Cross in the war in the east, the repatriation of official and civilian personnel after the outbreak of the war, the involvement of Switzerland in the development of peace feelers from the Japanese side toward the end of the war, and the events around the official capitulation that was sent to the U.S. via Swiss and Swedish diplomatic channels. The peace feelers, although ultimately unsuccessful, have been a subject of investigation in the academic community because they were an alternative attempt at bringing the Pacific War to a conclusion. The U.S. Government’s stern rejection of any informal negotiations and their unwillingness to accept anything short of unconditional surrender were the reason for the failure of these attempts. It has been noted by U.S. scholars such as Leon Sigal that such ‘backstage channels’ did exist and as Krebs’ research shows, were even proactively maintained, albeit more as an

intelligence source than for informal negotiations as some Japanese circles had hoped for.\textsuperscript{110}

Lastly, the Swedish case has been researched to an even lesser degree than the Swiss. The only three researchers who wrote on instances of Swedish-Japanese relations during Japan’s Wartime period were Ingemar Ottosson, Bert Edström, and—again—the German historian Gerhard Krebs. Ottosson wrote a voluminous account of Swedish-Japanese commercial relations in the 1930s but stopped his analysis in 1939. His book \textit{Handel under Protest}\textsuperscript{111} (Trade under Protest) is available in Swedish only, but he created a summary of it in English.\textsuperscript{112} Bert Edström and Gerhard Krebs both looked at the Swedish legation during the War in the Pacific in two papers that they wrote separately from each other on the Swedish Minister to Japan (Widar Bagge) and his involvement in Japanese-U.S. peace feelers in 1945.\textsuperscript{113} Beyond their accounts, no other systematic research on Swedish-Japanese relations seems to exist for the 1939–1945 period.\textsuperscript{114}

\textbf{1-3-2. Works on Neutrality during WWII and the Demons of the 1990s}

The second body of literature that is relevant to this study is research focused on neutral states during WWII. Two books are especially outstanding: Neville Wylie edited a very

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{111} Ottosson, \textit{Handel under Protest}.
\textsuperscript{112} Ottosson, “Trade under Protest: Sweden, Japan and the East Asian crisis in the 1930s.”
\textsuperscript{114} The mentioned authors confirmed this observation: personal communication with Ingemar Ottoson (July 23, 2016), Bert Edström (July 15, 2016) and Gerhard Krebs (June 29, 2016).
\end{flushright}
useful volume on *European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents*,\footnote{Wylie, *European Neutrals and Non-belligerents during the Second World War*.} in which he brought together chapters on both, the harmed and unharmed small Power neutrals. Herbert Reginbogin, on the other hand, in his monograph *Faces of Neutrality*\footnote{Herbert R. Reginbogin, *Faces of Neutrality: A Comparative Analysis of the Neutrality of Switzerland and other Neutral Nations during WW II*, trans. Ulrike Seeberger and Jane Britten (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2009).} compared the military and economic actions of only those states that remained unoccupied and neutral during most of the WWII period. Eric Golson wrote an excellent comparative dissertation on the economic aspects of the neutrality of Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, which is the only in-depth study using econometric and statistical data to analyze neutral-belligerent relations during WWII. There are a few more book-length works that exist either on comparative aspects of WWII neutrality\footnote{A good overview is given by Karsh, *Neutrality and Small States*. See also the article-length version of his book: Efraim Karsh, "International Co-operation and Neutrality," *Journal of Peace Research* 25 (1988). See also} or on individual neutrals in the same period, akin to the above-mentioned national literature.\footnote{Most of them, however, focus on the European theater of the war and discuss Japan, Asia, and the Pacific only marginally. That is also true for Wylie, Reginbogin, and Golson.} This thesis will show that there is a good reason to study European neutrals and their engagements in the Asian theater of the war. On the other hand, what it does not attempt is to analyze ‘Asian neutrals.’ Apart from Soviet Russia and Turkey, there were some

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Wylie, *European Neutrals and Non-belligerents during the Second World War*.
\item A good overview is given by Karsh, *Neutrality and Small States*. See also the article-length version of his book: Efraim Karsh, "International Co-operation and Neutrality," *Journal of Peace Research* 25 (1988). See also
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
more cases that could be analyzed under this aspect. Although they are not perfect fits, it could be argued that some territories in Asia retained a great deal of freedom to maneuver between the blocks. A case in point was Thailand, for which two studies by Bruce Reynolds exist. Other fascinating cases were the neutral Portuguese colonies of Macau and Portuguese Timor, which both have seen only limited interest by scholars. A notable exception is Helena Lopes, who, in her recent dissertation, focuses on Portugal’s neutrality during the Sino-Japanese conflict.

Lastly, there is one more body of literature which also focuses on the European WWII neutrals but in a particular manner; the research that emerged in the 1990s and early 2000s about the neutral’s collaboration with Nazi Germany. It is helpful to think of this as a separate category because much of it was published with the explicit goal of attacking the romanticized image of untarnished and benevolent small European states that avoided the carnage of WWII through their clever politics and strong militaries.

First of all, that stereotype was itself a trope which the countries in question—Switzerland, Sweden, and the Vatican in particular—were, not innocent of creating. The

---


shameful episodes of the neutral’s role in the Second World War had been ignored for a long time, which came to haunt not only their scholars but their governments, too. Much of the sudden attention in the 1990s had to do with the publicity that Holocaust survivors received when the news broke that their rightful assets were still held in Swiss Bank accounts and that neither the Banks nor the Swiss Government were willing to lend a helping hand in finding the heirs of the so-called ‘dormant accounts.’

On the contrary, the survivors and their families had to proactively fight for the right to get access to information sealed behind dubious Swiss laws of banking privacy. In the wake of the ‘Eizenstat Report,’ 123—a U.S. congressional investigation into the whereabouts of looted gold and other Jewish assets—an entire literature suddenly started flourishing on the ‘shady’ business of the European neutrals that survived the war without fighting. The tendency of that research is often clear from the book titles: *Hitler's Secret Bankers: The Myth of Swiss Neutrality during the Holocaust*, *Hitler’s Secret Ally, Switzerland*, *Hitler’s Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII*, etc. 124

What most of the English works have in common is that they do a good job at tracing historiographically how and to what extent the neutrals engaged with Nazi Germany or

---


Fascist Italy, but they are incredibly weak at setting these findings into the larger picture of neutrality—usually they do not even bother defining the term. The line of argument is usually that neutrals should not have dealt with Nazi Germany at all, but since they had economic ties with it they were not ‘truly’ neutral or—even worse—they were hidden allies of the Nazis, prolonging the war for up to a whole year.\textsuperscript{125}

Publications in the national languages of these countries tend to be less accusing in their tone, while still engaging in the same venture to finally unearth the dark secrets that had been buried behind bank vaults and in sealed archives.\textsuperscript{126} To eventually come to grips with this past, the Swiss Government mandated an extensive study between 1996 and 2002,—the so-called ‘Bergier Report’—costing 22 million CHF and producing several volumes and a final report.\textsuperscript{127} Together with the Bergier Report and the turn of the millennium, a new chapter in the historiography of WWII neutrality began. Some authors started to de-construct the earlier narratives, like David Dalin, who wrote a book about \textit{The Myth of Hitler’s Pope: Pope Pius XII and his War against Nazi Germany}.\textsuperscript{128} Others just took a step back, away from the gruesome details of looted tooth fillings, stolen jewelry, and tragic fates of the victims of Nazi Germany and began asking

\begin{flushleft}
\end{flushleft}
questions about the systematic aspects of neutral interactions with both belligerents. Wylie, Reginbogin, and Golson’s work can be interpreted as standing in that development, trying to counter the one-sided criticism—without, of course, denying the historical facts.

The reason why the 1990s literature should be thought of as a separate category is that it has less to do with research about neutrality than with the dealings of neutral states with Nazi Germany, even conflating the term with other meanings (see chapter 1-2-2). The many works that have been produced since the early 2000s are, however, more in line again with the long history of thought about neutrality in International Law, International Relations and Diplomacy. Wylie, Reginbogin, and Golson are as much part of this re-aligned neutrality research as other eminent scholars like Abbenhuis, Neff, Chadwick, Tames, Devine, and Blower, discussed below.

1-3-3. Neutrality in IL, IR, and Diplomacy Studies

Probably the most substantial body of literature on neutrality is publications on it in International Law and, to a lesser extent, in International Relations. It is extensive and old. Although relevant arguments date back to Plato’s ‘Republic’ and the works of Cicero, the most important starting point for the study of neutrality in IL is Hugo Grotius (1583–1645). The Dutch legal scholar of the early Renaissance founded the notion of a law governing over nations, whether at war with each other, or not. In his 1625 book On the Law of War and Peace129 he built a theory of natural law, statehood and the relations between nations, holding that they form an international society, which

is ultimately governed by norms. From the web of these norms, the imperatives of natural law, and the self-interest of states, one can deduct that there are rules, whose existence and obligations are in the common interest of all members of the international society.\textsuperscript{130} That is the law of nations. The peace of Westphalia in 1648, one of the first treaty-based, international peace settlements, shortly after Grotius’ death, marked the beginning of a development of legal writing on this subject. Subsequent European and American scholars like Thomas Hobbs (1588–1679), Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–1694), William Blackstone (1723–1780), and his student Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), as well as Emer de Vattel (1714–1767), James Mill (1773–1836), John Austin (1790–1859) and many more continued working on them.

The Englishman Bentham coined the word ‘international,’ and transformed the understanding of the Law of Nations. It used to be understood as a body of law, governing over cross-border disputes, be it between subjects of one nation with subjects of another, or between the nations themselves. Bentham in his more refined term of IL cut the concerns of citizens of a nation amongst each other out of his definition and held that IL was solemnly concerned with the rules applicable to sovereign states \textit{inter se}.\textsuperscript{131} Interestingly, modern IL is closer to the original meaning of the law of nations, since nowadays also organizations or even individuals can qualify as its subjects. Although the two terms of IL and law of nations are often used interchangeably, we should bear in mind that the scholars of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century understood IL


in the Benthamian sense. They excluded private persons from the scope of its subjects. It was under this meaning of IL that in the early nineteenth century a trend started for ever-closer regulation and codification of the state of war, peace, and neutrality.

The most important contemporary works on this are without doubt Stephen Neff’s *The Rights and Duties of Neutrals: A General History*, and Maartje Abbenhuis’ *An age of Neutrals: Great Power Politics, 1815-1914.* While Neff focuses more on the IL aspects, Abbenhuis’ brilliantly written account brings the International Relations aspect to the fore, while still following the traces laid out by IL thinkers and practitioners. Similarly to Neff’s work, Kentaro Wani recently wrote a detailed study with a focus on the Law of Neutrality in his monograph *Neutrality in International Law: From the Sixteenth Century to 1945.*

Another highly useful resource on neutrality in IL was written by Elizabeth Chadwick; a comprehensive article on the topic in the Oxford Bibliographies, where an extensive list of further literature can be found. She also published many articles in journals with a focus on maritime and armed neutrality. There are other contemporary authors whose

132 Oppenheim tells us, that this understanding is true for most jurists of his sage. See Oppenheim, *International Law: A Treatise - Peace*, I, Para 63.
135 Wani, *Neutrality in International Law: From the Sixteenth Century to 1945.*
136 Chadwick, "Neutrality."
articles are important: Brooke Blower wrote an enlightening piece about the ‘rebranding’ of U.S. neutrality to ‘isolationism’ and the pitfalls of it while Karen Devine and Christine Agius wrote about the resilience of the neutrality concept. Both articles are on the crossroad between IL and perceptions, helping very much with the understanding of the development that the neutrality went through. Slightly less recent are the IL contributions by Greenwood, Vagts, Donini, and Ross. They are nevertheless important because they discuss traditional IL neutrality in the light of developments like the Genocide in Rwanda or the war in Yugoslavia. Scholars of their standing combine research on neutrality with the crucial topic of human security, a project that also Herbert Reginbogin is engaged in.

In the context of IL and neutrality scholarship, there is a category that deserves explicit mentioning, which is the extensive research that has been conducted in the inter-war period by American scholars. Especially the 1930s have seen a vast amount of journal articles and monographs published on the question of U.S. neutrality. P.C. Jessup, for

---

example, edited and wrote massive four volumes on it. Also Quincy Wright,¹⁴⁶ Henry Morgenthau,¹⁴⁷ and P.M. Brown¹⁴⁸ worked on the subject. The number of publications in law journals is genuinely astounding and European writers participated in it as much as their American colleagues. The notorious Nazi thinker, Carl Schmitt,¹⁴⁹ for example, published on it as well as authors in France and Italy.¹⁵⁰ It is no understatement to say that neutrality research was going through a boom in the inter-war period.

Compared to International Law, there is much less literature available about neutrality in the realm of ‘pure’ IR. Efraim Karsh has written an important study in which he engages more about the dynamics of the international system, operative components, and Geo-strategic considerations.¹⁵¹ Some authors have written about the influence of neutral policy and neutrality discourse on the psyche of local populations.¹⁵² However, there are no works available, for example, on game theoretical approaches toward neutrality nor is there something that could be called an ‘IR theory’ of neutrality. The


¹⁵¹ Karsh, *Neutrality and Small States*.

only literature which goes in that direction is Cold War studies of neutrality. They are
distinct from earlier IL oriented research and from the work of scholars who research
pre-WWII neutrality because Cold War specialists are much more concerned about
concrete foreign policy issues and the way the discourse about neutrality influenced
policy thinkers. Cold War research tends to be much less interested in IL aspects and
grows much more with topics of power, policy, and pragmatism. From the Cold War
onward, the discourse about neutrality became more tedious because of changes in the
way concepts were used. The word ‘Cold War’ is the best example, which was itself not
a war but an international system. Concepts became less clear and with them the
applicability of related terms like neutrality. However, there is a small but thriving
community of Cold War neutrality researchers who have produced much insight in this
field that works differently from pre-1945 neutrality.153

Lastly, there is one more category of researchers that is relevant to this thesis; scholars
researching diplomacy. David Newsom,154 for example, edited an important book on
the above-described institution of protecting Power. Charles Henn and James Blake also
contributed significant work to this topic.155 Geoffrey Berridge wrote an important
monograph on embassies that got caught in armed conflicts, which is an important

153 Many of them can be found with recent articles in the themed journal publication on “Neutrality and
Nonalignment in World Politics During the Cold War.” See about this journal issue the introduction:
Thomas Fischer, Juhana Aunesluoma, and Aryo Makko, "Introduction: Neutrality and Nonalignment in
World Politics during the Cold War," ibid. Furthermore, the following are recent books: Heinz Gaertner,
ed. Engaged Neutrality: An Evolved Approach to the Cold War (USA: Lexington Books, 2017); Peter
Ruggenthaler, The Concept of Neutrality in Stalin’s Foreign Policy, 1945-1953 (New York: Lexington,
2015). And less recent books which still offer a decent oversight: Róisín Doherty, Ireland, Neutrality, and
European Security Integration (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002); Richard E Bissell and Curt Walter Gasteyger,
154 David Dunlop Newsom, Diplomacy under a Foreign Flag: When Nations Break Relations (London:
155 Blake, "Pragmatic Diplomacy: The Origins and Use of the Protecting Power."; Henn, "The Origins
and Early Development of the Idea of Protecting Power."
source for the study of neutral legations.\textsuperscript{156} The same author also created a useful dictionary of diplomacy which is handy to look up diplomatic titles and roles.\textsuperscript{157} Last but not least, on the crossroad between diplomacy and WWII studies, there lies a sweet but unexplored spot; the memoirs of the diplomats and politicians of the war. It is surprising that no collection of this exists yet. There is an unheard discussion floating in several memoirs of the men (there were no female diplomats) who went through the war as its diplomats. They all knew each other—or were at least closely connected—whether friends, enemies, or neutrals and many of them left well-written texts behind that have become important historical sources.\textsuperscript{158}

\textsuperscript{156} Berridge, \textit{Embassies in Armed Conflict}.
\textsuperscript{157} Berridge and Lloyd, \textit{The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Diplomacy}.
1-4. Chapter Summary & Conclusion

This thesis contributes knowledge to the diplomatic history of bilateral relations between Sweden, Spain, and Switzerland and the Empire of Japan during its wartime period (1931–1945). On the other side, it contributes to the International Relations of Neutrality Studies. Whereas the Spanish case has received a fair amount of attention from Spanish and German scholars, the cases of Sweden and Switzerland are largely unexplored. Hence, this thesis aims to break new ground through the primary work on sources from their national archives.

The inspiration for this research comes from puzzles of diplomatic history. For example, why did the small Power neutrals not simply leave Japan after Pearl Harbor? The Japanese Empire was a dangerous place for European’s to live in—even for citizens of neutral countries—and the Foreign Ministries and diplomats of the neutrals, in fact, contemplated the evacuation of their citizens from Japan. However, in the end, they stayed. Even more surprisingly, the three neutrals became heavily involved diplomatically with the Empire, after 1941, when all of them became protecting Powers in Japan and for Japan. Instead of withdrawing from Asia, all three neutrals decided to engage more with it, even though Japan was not a particularly important market to any of them, nor was it a military threat like all other great Powers of the war. Popular narratives about small European states using their neutralities to withdraw from international politics and escape the warfare does not make sense in the context of the Pacific theater. The small Power neutrals chose to remain engaged even though Japan was no life-or-death situation to them. Therefore, what were their motives? Is it possible that 1941 was not as dramatic a break for neutral countries as it was for Japan and the U.S.? Were their relations with Japan already operating under a ‘wartime mode’ ever
since the beginning of the Empire’s expansion into mainland Asia? After all, Europe’s small Powers were heavily opposed to Japan’s blatant infringements of the League of Nations Covenant. Did that have a significant influence on their behavior toward Japan?

The following chapters will systematically compare the cases of Sweden, Spain, and Switzerland. Each chapter will begin with a historical overview of their relations with Japan, followed by economic and political analyses of two periods before the Pacific War (1931–1937 and 1937–1941) and two periods between Pearl Harbor and Japan’s surrender (1941–1944 and 1944–1945). This systematic analysis will make the three experiences comparable even though they show considerable differences in their developments.

The most important concepts for this dissertation are the institution of neutrality—which chapter 2 will explore in detail—and the practice of protecting Power. The latter did not only keep neutral diplomats busy but was also the reason why Sweden, Spain, and Switzerland became the three most important neutrals to Japan’s diplomacy during the Pacific War.\textsuperscript{159} They are, therefore, the most interesting ‘successful’ (unoccupied and non-belligerent) neutrals to study in conjunction with the Empire. Ireland, Portugal, the Vatican, and the European micro-states also remained outside the general warfare, but they were of only limited diplomatic importance to Japan.\textsuperscript{160} Turkey, the Soviet Union, the U.S. are not part of the study because they were either belligerent neutrals (U.S.S.R.) or entered the general warfare at some point. Finally, the many nations that

\textsuperscript{159} Please note the important difference between ‘diplomacy’ and ‘foreign policy.’ This dissertation will argue that for the foreign policy of Japan, the U.S.S.R. was the most important neutral—not one of the small Power neutrals.

\textsuperscript{160} The most important two omissions are Portugal and the Vatican. Portugal had a Minister Plenipotentiary in Tokyo and the Vatican a diplomatic representative (not a nuncio). The other states did not have a sufficiently large diplomatic service to interact with Japan.
started out as neutrals but were invaded are not studied because they lost their sovereignty and hence their diplomatic status. In short, for the analysis of the Diplomatic History and International Relations of Japan and neutral states, Sweden, Spain, and Switzerland were the only three countries that mattered.
2. Neutrality—A Framework

Chapter 1-2-1 discussed neutrality regarding its roots in International Law. This chapter will look at a related but different aspect; neutrality as an International Relations concept. There are no established frameworks available for this. Game-theoretical approaches to neutrality or ‘realist’ and ‘constructivist’ debates have not emerged to the extent that one could talk about established ‘schools of thought’ on neutrality within the IR community. There are, however, IR approaches that can be used to conceptualize neutrality during WWII and, at the same time, serve as context for the three neutrals in this study.\textsuperscript{161} Most important is the distinction between great and small Power neutrals and the different functions of neutrality.

\textsuperscript{161} Parts of the following framework have been explored by Ephraim Karsh and Maartje Abbenhuis. See: Karsh, \textit{Neutrality and Small States}; Abbenhuis, \textit{An Age of Neutrals: Great Power Politics, 1815-1914}. 
2-1. Neutrality in International Relations until WWII

Analyzing neutrality in International Relations means to focus on the role of the concept in the system of nation-states. Be it to explain why states choose neutrality as a foreign policy over a strategy of alliances, or to analyze the impact it has on the overall economic and geostrategic situation at a given moment. In this context, some realist thought can be used to contrast with important findings of IL scholars and historians. It must be said though that, overall, realism has produced scarcely little on neutrality. That is likely due to its inherent bias toward the analysis of great Powers and a stereotype of neutrality as an affair for small states only.162 That notion is deeply flawed. Great Power neutrality and even ‘belligerent neutrality’ (see the case of the U.S.S.R. below) were critical factors for the development of WWII—but also for many other international systems, as we shall see. Realism has been blind-sighted by the false impression of neutrality as a policy for the weak. To classic realism, one of the historical ways to contextualize neutrality and display its dangers (or uselessness) is Thucydides’ Melian dialog, in which the story is told of the Melians who tried to defend their moral ‘right’ to remain neutral but were ultimately vanquished by the logic of military power, paying in blood for their stubborn assertion of moral superiority.163 To realists like Henry Kissinger, there are more than enough examples of this sort, how neutrality and weakness is a provocation and no self-respecting power is deterred by proclamations of neutrality—much like Hitler was not deterred from invading neutral European countries

163 Ibid., 121-23.
and like Kissinger himself did not respect Cambodian or Laotian neutrality when sanctioning the bombings of their territory during the Vietnam War.\textsuperscript{164}

What is problematic with such approaches is the singular focus on neutrality as a security paradigm. Neutrality—permanent or occasional—cannot guarantee a state’s security when arms speak. There is always a danger of statesmen not living up to their words or generals disregarding the official policies of their governments.\textsuperscript{165} Neutrality cannot solve the security dilemma\textsuperscript{166}—but that is the same for any security strategy; be it bandwagoning, hedging or even the logic of (nuclear) mutually assured destruction. Those are security strategies, based on one or the other logic of international systems; they are not failproof security guarantees. The real value of neutrality for International Relations is in a different place; on the structural level.

Neutrality can serve as a stabilizer of international security architectures. Most of that has to do with the provision of economic and financial stability during times of war. Bits and pieces of this analysis have appeared in journal articles, and some slightly dated monographs,\textsuperscript{167} but no one has as clearly and succinctly presented the case as Maartje Abbenhuis in her 2014 book \textit{An Age of Neutrals: Great Power Politics 1815–}

\textsuperscript{164} Gabriel, \textit{The American Conception of Neutrality after 1941}, 216-17.

\textsuperscript{165} This is equally true for all states—the neutrals included. Switzerland’s WWII General, Henri Guisan, famously dealt the hardest blow to Swiss neutrality himself by secretly agreeing with French generals to let their armies enter and fight in Switzerland in case Germans should try to stage an attack on France through Swiss territory. It never came to the situation because the German advance in the north had worked like a charm. When the Nazis discovered the secret plans for a military alliance between the French and the Swiss, the Federal Council had the hardest time to reassure Germany of its neutrality. See on this episode: Bonjour, \textit{Geschichte der schweizerischen Neutralität : Kurzfassung}, 144-47.

\textsuperscript{166} Or as Gunnar Hagglof, the head diplomat of the Swedish Foreign Trade Office during WWII put it: “But neutrality is not a magic formula by which you protect yourself from the pressures and problems of the outside world.” Gunnar M. Hägglöf, ”A Test of Neutrality: Sweden in the Second World War,” \textit{International Affairs} 36 (1960): 154.

1914.\textsuperscript{168} She developed what could be called the ‘theory of stabilizing neutrality,’ which describes how neutrality functions as a factor that supports a Balance of Power system.\textsuperscript{169}

That particular notion of neutrality in IR is not only useful for the nineteenth century but also for the analysis of neutrals during WWII. Abbenhuis ends her analysis by saying that “the age of neutrals died with the onset of the First World War” and that applications of Nineteenth century neutrality “shifted fundamentally in an age of total war and collective security.”\textsuperscript{170} This chapter, on the other hand, will argue that her notion of neutrality, in fact, had a brief revival at the end of the interwar period. There is ample evidence that the international system was very close in 1939 to where it was in 1914, and that especially small Power neutrals ‘hurdled back’ to the familiar patterns of behavior that they knew from earlier decades.

To make that argument, this chapter will first study the fundamental ontological basis for the justification (or condemnation) of neutrality, because that has important implications for the way in which the concept developed after the Medieval age in Europe. Next, it will move to the core of Abbenhuis’ thesis on the role of neutrality in the nineteenth century, before looking at the impact of WWI and the interwar period. Finally, the chapter will take these insights and apply them to the general development of great and small Power neutrals for the Pacific War. That will simultaneously serve as

\textsuperscript{168} Abbenhuis, \textit{An Age of Neutrals: Great Power Politics, 1815-1914}.
\textsuperscript{169} Being a historian herself, she would probably not agree to calling her work a ‘Theory’ since she has analyzed only one Balance of Power system; the Concert of Europe. It is however a potential start for an IR hypothesis.
\textsuperscript{170} Abbenhuis, \textit{An Age of Neutrals: Great Power Politics, 1815-1914}, 237.
background information and set the stage for the narrative of the three neutrals in this thesis and their interactions with the Asian theater of the Second World War.

2-1-I. The Philosophy of Neutrality

On the most abstract level, an ancient discourse has been going on between two ethical principles which, at their core, are mutually exclusive. On the one side stands the tradition of International Law itself with its overarching goal of ‘taming war’ through the creation of rules for the behavior of combatants. On the opposite side stands another typical European tradition; Just War Theory.

To start with the latter one, the origins of Just War Theory are traceable to at least Plato’s Republic. The undisputed father of it is, however, Aurelius Augustinus, the Catholic bishop of Hippo, in the fourth century.171 His work served as the theological foundation for the Roman Catholic Church’s stance on war, establishing the fundamental distinction between ‘Jus ad Bellum’ (the law of war) and ‘Jus in Bello’ (the law in war). The latter has much bearing of the described International Law and the rules of warfare itself, but the first principle describes something that is alien to theorists who approach war as a natural way for states to settle disputes. Theories of Jus ad Bellum are concerned with the question when a state is legitimately allowed to go to war, stipulating that there are many instances during which warfare itself is an unjust and illegal enterprise. In its essence, Jus ad Bellum reasoning allows for warfare only under two circumstances. Firstly, under measures of self-defense. If attacked, a state always had the right to defend itself and the resulting actions were not to be considered

---

as unjust. By implication, this reasoning provided that, in the event of war, one of both sides would necessarily be waging an unjust war of aggression. Warfare in and of itself contains an element of international injustice, since it implies that a state had been attacked. Consequently, in a just international society, build on the pillars of lawful interactions of states, war cannot occur unless one of the parties is an offender of the law. In that case, however, it is not only just for the attacked state to defend itself, but it is, in fact, immoral to let the offender go unpunished.172

Augustinus was foremost a theologian tasked with squaring the circle of making pacifist catholic doctrines compatible with Christianity’s newly assigned role as the state religion of the Roman Empire. As such his approach needed to show under what circumstances there could be a ‘divine’ right to take up arms. In the context of the Christian belief system, that was, of course, the case when defending the will of God by fighting those who were offending him.173 “Augustine sees in war a manifestation of the will of God who either directly authorizes the war through one of his divinely appointed oracles (…) or indirectly through the medium of a political sovereign whom he permits to reign.”174

Both instances had the same implication; for third states, not to assist the ‘just’ side of a war was an act of immorality. It follows that there can be no ‘in-between’ or ‘standing outside’ when it comes to wars. There can be no neutrality when good fights against evil. Good is good and evil is evil. Not being inside the realm of the good means to stand for evil. In this context, Neff explains that “[t]he idea that states could even have a

174 Ibid., 8.
legal duty to be neutral, in the style of Belgium in the nineteenth century, would have been utterly preposterous to a medieval lawyer."\textsuperscript{175} It is hard to imagine how under such ‘airtight’ reasoning there could be any space for the development of a school of thought that did allow for neutrality to thrive?

Luckily neutrality is a concept that does not rely on theories. It is, what Nicolas Thaleb would call, a heuristic,\textsuperscript{176} that is, a rule of thumb, founded on practical application. That is why for the second theoretical approach to neutrality—International Law—practice predates theory.\textsuperscript{177} Just as the Peloponnesian Wars occurred before Thucydides’ discussion thereof, also the codification of the rules of war, peace, and neutrality came before the ‘philosophizing’ of it. The oldest written documents in this regard are very interesting because they bear witness to the genesis of neutral practice: On the one hand, the Catalan ‘Consolato del Mar’—the Consulate of the Sea—is a compendium of maritime law dating back to the thirteenth century, detailing the rules and rights of maritime neutrality for the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{178} Some researchers claim that this is the real root the neutrality discourse in IL because the right of sea-born traders mattered much more to the functioning of medieval Europe and was observed more stringently by

\textsuperscript{175} Neff, \textit{The Rights and Duties of Neutrals: A General History}, 7.
\textsuperscript{176} Nassim Nicholas Taleb, \textit{Antifragile: Things that Gain from Disorder} (New York: Random House, 2012).
\textsuperscript{177} Stephen Neff also puts it beautifully when he says that: “From the brute fact of neutrality, a body of law would gradually grow - not by way of deduction from the fundamental principles of the law of war, but instead in a rather untidy, piecemeal manner, to deal with the myriad practical problems that arose whenever some states were at war while others were at peace.” Neff, \textit{The Rights and Duties of Neutrals: A General History}, 8.
belligerents than the less adhered territorial neutrality. This view is, however, doubtful in the face of evidence that around the same time also for territorial neutrality a clear understanding existed of how to formulate clauses of neutrality in treaty documents. An example thereof is the 1492 Letter Patent of Liège, in which King Charles of France promised to observe the neutrality of the principality of Liège. The reference to neutrality was done in such a madder-of-factish way that it must be assumed that the concept was anything but new. The Letter Patent seems to have built on a well-established norm that did not even need defining. The oldest examples for documents with treaty character go back even further, they date well into the twelfth century.

When Hugo Grotius started working on the philosophical principals of war, peace, and neutrality, he was therefore not acting in a vacuum but had plenty of historical material to build upon. His was, however, the first thoroughly crafted theoretical work on the topic and he is therefore rightfully regarded as one of the fathers of International Law. The core of his and similar endeavors by IL scholars was to create a legal way for states to go to war with each other while restraining the devastation that the operational side of warfare necessarily brought along. That is because to Grotius, and

---

179 See on this argument: Leos Müller, "The Forgotten History of Maritime Neutrality, 1500-1800," in Notions of Neutralities, ed. Pascal Lottaz and Herbert Reginbogin (Lanham: Lexington, 2018 [Forthcoming]).
182 Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace.
183 Although the term “International Law” had been coined by Jeremy Bentham, replacing the earlier term “law of nations.”
many of his successors, war was not only a question of moral right or wrong but a simple fact of life;

because war is undertaken for the sake of peace, and there is no dispute, which may not give rise to war, it will be proper to treat all such quarrels, as commonly happen, between nations, as an article in the rights of war: and then war itself will lead us to peace, as to its proper end.\textsuperscript{184}

This was the beginning of a long tradition of thinkers who, from the fact of war, deducted and argued about its utility. In a Machiavellian fashion, they did not try to promote war but talk about it in terms detached from the realm of the moral and within the logic of law and statecraft.\textsuperscript{185} This approach found arguably its culmination in Carl von Clausewitz’ famous statement that “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means”\textsuperscript{186} It is not surprising that under a mindset that acknowledges war as something that serves a purpose, we would also find arguments for the usefulness of neutrality. Clausewitz, in this sense, not only coined the central tenant of modern realism but in an important way kicked of an age of neutrals\textsuperscript{187}—the nineteenth century.

2-1-2. The Nineteenth Century

War before the twentieth century never was a global affair but had only a local impact. At the Congress of Vienna, the European powers, rattled from the impact of the French revolution and the subsequent devastation of the Napoleonic Wars, deliberately created an international system, in which they tried to give nearly equal strength to all the major


\textsuperscript{185} That is not to say that they argued for war. Also Groetius went back to Just War Theory as to delimit the cases under which one can speak of a just cause of war, using a mix of biblical scripture and natural law arguments in which he embedded all previous arguments of ‘divine’ law. See: ibid., 18-41.


\textsuperscript{187} Abbenhuis, \textit{An Age of Neutrals: Great Power Politics, 1815-1914}.
powers on the continent. The development of another European hegemon (like France), had to be prevented. The pragmatism of the conference participants was that they recognized, that rivaling powers on the continent could keep a general equilibrium. If military and economic power was divided among the many, there would be no potential for large-scale violence in the system. On the other hand, were there one or two major powers, with the economic and military strength to overshadow the others, they would produce, once more, a great conflict with the potential to grind the continent to the point of breaking. Therefore, the Congress of Vienna re-shuffled the cards: Prussia was strengthened, Germany and Russia were stabilized on equal footing, France was stripped off some parts of its possessions. Also Britain, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden were negotiating terms at the same table where small Switzerland was defined as a neutralized zone along the border of France, Germany, and the Italian states. The same happened to parts of Savoy and, in 1830, also to Belgium which was established as a neutral power between the big players. The arrangement of the Congress turned out remarkably stable. Although the 100 years between the events in Vienna and Sarajevo were not perfectly peaceful (since there were many short wars in Europe and overseas), overall, the balance of power remained intact and no continent-wide conflict occurred in that period. The logic of the system rested on the assumption that large-scale wars were a catastrophe, that could ruin all of Europe. Small wars, on the

---

188 Ibid., 41.
189 Herman Amersfoort and Wim Klinkert, Small Powers in the Age of Total War, 1900-1940 (Boston: Brill, 2011), 38-40.
other hand, were not only acceptable but, as Count von Moltke put it in 1881, they were a necessity of life:

Perpetual peace is a dream, and it is not even a beautiful dream. War is an element in the order of the world ordained by God. In it the noblest virtues of mankind are developed; courage and the abnegation of self, faithfulness of duty, and the spirit of sacrifice: the soldier gives his life. Without war the world would stagnate, and lose itself in materialism.¹⁹²

With such views on the desirability of war and with Carl von Clausewitz’ previously cited book On War, there was little hope in that century for the outlawing of war. Not until WWI and the subsequent establishment of the League of Nations would the international system see an approach towards the banning of war from the face of the earth. The nineteenth century system was one that embraced war, as long as it could be kept within limits. And the general idea was that those limits would be set by the institution of International Law.

In this Balance of Power system of limited warfare, neutrality plays more than just the role of a passive bystander. A world of small wars will only remain stable if the majority of states do not participate in them. Local conflicts could only be contained if the majority of the world community remained neutral.

More than anything else, the uniformity in the application of International Law to neutrals explains why by 1900 the great powers had a vested interest in defining and fine-tuning the laws of neutrality. They were all occasional neutrals, after all. (...) Between 1815 and 1914, (...) limited war aided belligerents and neutrals alike. As C. H. Stockton explained in 1920, it created the strange anomaly wherein a country's armed status — a 'military war' — could be differentiated from its economic arrangements — 'a commercial peace'. (...) Altogether, it is impossible to separate

¹⁹² Letter from Count von Moltke, German Field Marshal-General, to Professor Blunschli, on the Laws of Warfare. 1880. Published in: Thomas Erskine Holland, Letters to "The Times" upon War and Neutrality, 1881-1909 with some Commentary (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1914), 25-26.
neutrality from the functioning of European international politics during the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{193}

In other words, if war was a necessity of international life, so was peace. The freedom to trade or to sail on the seven seas, to connect colonies with motherlands and the possibility to travel back and forth between states was crucial for the economic wellbeing of the European states. The globalization of the world economy was already too far advanced for any of them to live in perfect isolation. Raw materials had to be exchanged and final goods needed to be brought to foreign markets for the national elites to be prosperous. It was in the interest of all states who participated in this global economy that war would not lead to a total breakdown of the commercial flow. Every nation, whether great or small, had an interest in defining the laws of neutrality and make sure that they would be useful for whenever they would find themselves in the neutral position.

A perfect example for this is the case of the ‘Alabama claims,’ which was a legal dispute between the U.S. and the U.K., fought out in an arbitration court in Geneva in 1872. The case revolved around U.S. accusations of British infringements of neutrality law when the latter did not stop its private shipbuilders from supplying the Southern Confederacy with ships made in the U.K. during the American Civil War. Since the northern Government had called a naval blockade on the southern states, their claim was that the British infringed on their duty of impartiality through negligence. The British view was of course the opposite, that no reason existed for them—the neutral party—to hinder the free flow of private trade and that an unenforceable blockade could

\textsuperscript{193} Abbenhuis, \textit{An Age of Neutrals: Great Power Politics, 1815-1914}, 18-21.
not be used to make legal claims. The case was settled in favor of the U.S. plaintive, with the U.K. paying 15.5 million Pounds in reparations. The irony of the case was that the same arguments that the US used to assert its right to restrict neutral British trade with its enemy in the south were used fifty years later by Britain, during WWI, when it curtailed the right of the neutral U.S. to trade with its WWI enemies.

Besides the issue that the verdict strengthened the rights of belligerents vis-à-vis neutrals, the interesting aspect of the case is the forcefulness with which the British side fought for the rights of neutral trade. In the spirit of the nineteenth century, neutral rights mattered very much too large and powerful states like the British Empire and not only to the small permanent neutrals which were recently created in continental Europe. In fact, only a handful of states were, after 1815 perpetually neutralized; Switzerland and Krakow (1815), Belgium (1831), Luxembourg (1867), and Congo in (1885). The majority of neutrals in the long nineteenth century were occasional neutrals who found themselves sometimes at war and sometimes at peace with states who might or might not be at war with some other states as well.

Therefore, if war was the continuation of politics by other means, neutrality was the continuation of peace by other means. That is why the legal codification of neutrality went necessarily along with that of war and peace. During the ‘Alabama Claims’ arbitration, for example, no concrete body of law existed that could be used for the settlement of the claims and the rules of the arbitration case had to be settled beforehand.

---

196 Malmborg, Neutrality and State-building in Sweden, 89.
through a bilateral arbitration treat (signed in 1871 in Washington). Such treaties and the rulings of arbitrations turned into the body of International Law that is known today as Neutrality Law.

The most important source for IL is treaties. They are lawmaking if the content they hold establish new general conduct, or if they abolish or change existing practice. It is important to note that not every treaty is automatically law-making. If a treaty is conducted only between two states, their content is not binding to others and has no (immediate) effect on IL. If, on the contrary, a large group of states accedes to one treaty text and ratifies it, a multilateral contract becomes part of the sources of IL. Oppenheim holds that a further distinction has to be made between general IL and universal IL. If a great amount of states concludes a treaty, that will make it general IL. Only through the passage of time and the ‘sinking in’ of these rules in the community of nations can it become universal IL, that is, when all states accept the principle of that treaty, regardless of whether they have signed it or not. In regard of neutral rights and obligations, there are four modern multilateral treaties, which serve as the sources for the existing IL on neutrality:

1. Declaration of Paris of 1856
2. Geneva Convention of 1906
3. Convention respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Land (Part of The Hague Conventions) of 1907

---

198 Chadwick, "The British View of Neutrality in 1872."
200 Ibid., Paras 17-19.
201 For the complete list of lawmaking treaties of International Law, see the well worked list in Oppenheim’s Appendix. In: ibid.
4. Declaration of London of 1909

Some of these law-making treaties failed to be ratified in some signatory states. The Declaration of London, for example, was never ratified by even a single country. Whether the lack of ratification, then strips that convention or declaration off its law-giving character was a contested question among legal scholars. Some like Oppenheim and Holland seem to hold that the treaty text had at least implications for customary IL since it represents the will of the community of nations to accept certain standards of behavior—even if the individual national governments failed in making them part of their Municipal Law.\textsuperscript{202}

That is where custom as a source of IL comes to play a role. Oppenheim holds that “Wherever and as soon as a frequently adopted international conduct of States is considered legally necessary or legally right, the rule which may be abstracted from such conduct, is a rule of customary International Law.”\textsuperscript{203} It is therefore with the sheer passage of time and the generally accepted conduct by nation-states that certain custom can become a source to alter IL. This is important to note because the precedent of WWI was one in which, through the alteration of agreements and systematic infringement on rights of neutral states, the definitions of essential parts of IL was altered to the disadvantage of neutral states.

\textsuperscript{202} Ibid., Paras 510-12, 68b; Holland, \textit{Letters to "The Times" upon War and Neutrality, 1881-1909 with some Commentary}.

2-1-3. The Impact of WWI

Thanks to the legal practices of the nineteenth century, the formal rules of neutrality were well defined at the outset of the Great War in 1914. “As lawyers continually pored over these topics, the result was that war, along with neutrality, became perhaps the most elaborately detailed parts of the whole of International Law.”204 However, WWI started with a bad omen for the relevance of IL during total war. Only nine days after the first declaration of war (Austria-Hungary on Serbia), Germany, having just declared war on Russia and France, started a surprise attack on the latter by invading neutral Belgium and Luxemburg. The nephew of the above-cited Count von Moltke, H.J.L. von Moltke, general of the German army in the first months of the war, was detrimental for the decision to bluntly ignore the most important right of any neutral, the right to its territorial integrity.

Other nations were quick in issuing declarations of neutrality as the war flung into full action with Britain entering on the side of France and Russia. But the difficulties for neutrals rose with every year of the war. “Because the stakes in the conflict were so high, the warring sides had few reservations about interfering with the rights of neutrals. Both the Allied and Central Powers rejected International Laws and other legal recourses open to neutrals when and where it suited them.”205 Already in 1914, belligerents on both sides took recourse to an old belligerent trick—extending the lists of absolute and conditional contraband.206 Just two years earlier, lists of what counted

206 Jessup chronicled several instances between the sixteenth and twentieth century were belligerents acted in this way, arguing that any good reaching their enemy would count as contraband. See: Jessup, Neutrality: Its History, Economics and Law: Today and Tomorrow, 4, 11-16.
as contraband and whatnot had been defined under the declaration of London but since that was never ratified, the belligerents felt free to include primary goods like iron ore, lead, rubber and other materials which they thought could be used for weapon manufacturing by their enemies. All belligerent governments kept issuing ever longer lists of economic goods, that they would consider as essential to enemy warfare and which they would try to intercept coming from neutral states. The British Government unilaterally amended the Declaration of London (in breach of International Law) and put it into force on its territory. The amendments decreed that conditional contraband, not destined to an enemy port, would also be subject to seizure, could the owner not prove that the transported material would never reach enemy territory. In addition to this, the British decided that neutral ships that were suspected to have carried (on a former journey) contraband, could be captured legally and were not immune to seizer as established under article 38 of the declaration.

The emerging strategy from these decisions became what is called a ‘long-distance blockade.’ The British goal was to economically suffocate Germany and Austria-Hungary under a total blockade of goods from the outside world (i.e., the neutrals). This tactic of economic warfare was not new, and IL had provisions for it under the name of ‘blockade of enemy ports.’ Neutrals had to respect such blockades and had no right to claim their freedom of commerce when a blockade was effective. Just, to execute a traditional blockade, belligerents had to be able to patrol the vicinity of those

---

ports. However, the changed nature of WWI with its new technologies like sea mines and submarines made this classic kind of economic warfare impossibly dangerous for the British Navy. Their ships could not patrol enemy ports without being sunk after a short while. The alternative which the British found was to restrict trade through their unrivaled power on the high seas. First, Britain, again unilaterally, expanded the scope of the right to visit neutral ships for search. It claimed the right to force them to British ports for examination. Although neutral seafaring nations like the U.S. protested, there was nothing they could effectively do against this policy. London was so successful in patrolling the sea and in coercing neutral ships into one of their four search stations, that shipping companies started to plan routes through them, to be voluntarily searched, as to decrease time lost by being intercepted on the high sea. The next step for Britain was to devise exemption papers, which could be applied for—the so-called ‘navicerts,’ which were a form of British issued passport for goods, certifying that they were not contraband or not destined for enemy usage. This meant that shipping companies of neutrals had to declare their cargo beforehand with the British Admiralty, effectively, giving them control over (and valuable data on) the kind of shipments that took place between neutrals. This, in turn, furnished Britain with insight in world trade and would help them to decide if new items had to be added to the conditional contraband list to prevent them from reaching enemy hands. The intensity of the economic war continued even further. In 1916, the U.K., struck by Germany’s expanded submarine warfare, declared that any commercial good, destined for an enemy nation, would be regarded as contraband. Therefore, London demanded, that neutral merchants could prove that

cargo, which was going to another neutral, would not be re-exported to an enemy nation. 214 And even further, with the knowledge they had gained about the trade volumes of neutrals, they started a rationing system. The contraband authority in London would be in charge of estimating how much of a certain commercial good a neutral nation would need for its own consumption, and would block any further trade of the same good to prevent attempts of reselling them to the central European powers. 215

Not only the British had found a way to prevent their enemies from access to world trade, but the other side also did the same. Graham wrote about this five years after the war had ended that “[a]s regards the right of search, the German Government appears in general to have desired to dispense with the formality and to condemn neutral merchantmen a priori to destruction.” 216 The most audacious tactic in this respect was the usage of German submarines for the purpose of its own blockade, which commenced in 1915. With torpedo attacks, enemy cargo ships were sunk in the Atlantic. Although attacks on merchant ships were first carried out with some precautions, including warnings to the crew of the ships before the sinking to allow for time for evacuation, the intensifying of the war and the additional element of danger to the submarines led the Germans ultimately to sink merchant ships under enemy flag on sight.

Although such acts were against the International Law of war, they were not directly an infringement of the International Law of neutrality, since the attacks were directed exclusively against belligerent vessels. Ships under neutral flag were let to pass unharmed in 1915. Collateral damage to neutrals, on the other hand, was unavoidable through this policy. Neutral cargo and neutral nationals on board of civilian ships under belligerent flag came to harm. Such acts were, under the declaration of London, as well as the declaration of Paris, illegal. But the worst in this respect was yet to come. As the spiral of retaliation for the abandonment of principles of warfare had peaked on the British side by intercepting any cargo suspected to be destined to the Central European Powers (including foodstuffs), the German side decided to launch an unconditional submarine blockade of the British islands. Any vessel, belligerent or neutral, military, merchant, or passenger ship, was from that moment on a target to be torpedoed. Knowing that this step would probably lead to a declaration of war by the U.S., German strategists hoped to deal a decisive blow to London, resulting in a Germany’s victory, before the U.S. could intervene. Their calculation would not come to fruition. Ultimately it was the blunt disregard for the lives and the safety of neutral nationals, which moved the United States to intervene in the war on the side of the U.K. to protect its own interests.

All in all, belligerent infringements on neutral rights during the war had the character of some occasional transgressions at first but became systematic and total as the war...

---

progressed. The neutrals, on the other hand, had their own mixed track record, regarding infringements of International Law. Although there were breaches of lawful neutrality especially small permanent neutrals made sure that they lived up to their duties. The Swiss, for example, had episodes when their army contacted exponents of the armed forces of both sides and exchanged information with them. On the other hand, the Swiss, like other neutrals, also amended their laws to allow for conscription and surveillance to signal to the belligerents that they were taking measures to prevent violations of their permanent neutralities. The Netherlands, too, “discharged key neutrality responsibilities, including interning foreign troops and military materials and refusing entry to armed merchants” but did so because its neutral rights had been disregarded in the first place. The breaching of rules for them was necessary to gain leeway for negotiations with both belligerent parties. The Danes, too, compromised on their policy of neutrality but did so because of prior infringements on their neutral rights. While the sympathies of the Danish press, the general public, and even the government lay with the Allied powers, the fear of German intervention in the North See moved the Danish leaders to proclaim ‘benevolent neutrality’ towards Germany. The Danes offered to put “certain Danish islands at the disposal of Germany if the need arose,” while assuring the Germans to resist any British violation of its neutral status. The disregard for neutral trading rights, under the British total naval war, had a similar

---

220 Paul Moeyes, ed. Neutral Tones. The Netherlands and Switzerland and Their Interpretations of Neutrality, Small powers in the age of total war, 1900-1940 (Boston: Brill, 2011).
223 An old, Grotian, Just-War understanding of neutrality, often contested for its logic plausibility.
effect on the other two Scandinavian neutrals. While Norway became “Britain’s ‘neutral ally’ (...). Sweden, until 1917, was to all practical effect Germany’s neutral ally (...).”\textsuperscript{225} However, especially for the case of Sweden, the country’s natural resources, which were sought after by all belligerents and its geostrategic position gave it enough leeway to bargain with both powers and keep its neutral rights intact, including the right to trade with all belligerents.\textsuperscript{226} Regarding the big neutral on the other side of the Atlantic, the career diplomat George Kennan composed in 1951 a short analysis on the First World War, in which he wrote that, from a purely legalistic point of view, the U.S. would have had as much pretext to go to War with Britain, over her infringements of neutral rights of commerce, as she had to actually declare war on Germany.\textsuperscript{227} Woodrow Wilson himself wrote in Summer and Fall of 1916 to the British that “I am, I must admit, about at the end of my patience with Great Britain and the Allies (...) I am seriously considering asking Congress to authorize me to prohibit loans and restrict exportations to the Allies (...).” And in a second cable, he wrote that the American people were “growing more and more impatient with the intolerable conditions of neutrality, their feelings as hot against Great Britain as it was at first against Germany.”\textsuperscript{228} But in the end, Kennan knows, it was the understanding of the shared interest of the balance of power system, under a general hegemony of England, which made Wilson, in the words of Jessup, “water down our neutrality policy to the benefit of

\textsuperscript{226} Ibid., 114-15.
\textsuperscript{227} That view was shared by other American Historians, who researched the many complaints lodged by the United States and even Wilson himself against the British treatment of US merchant rights. See Jessup’s explanation on “the problem of neutrality.” In: Jessup, \textit{Neutrality: Its History, Economics and Law: Today and Tomorrow}, 4, 36.
\textsuperscript{228} Cited in ibid., 9.
The US was clearly more sympathetic towards the British cause in the Great War in Europe than towards Germany. Washington helped London by tacitly accepting the latter’s illegitimate trade blockade (in contrast to a legal port blockade) of Germany. That was not what the spirit of impartiality would have demanded, but neither was it as bluntly an infringement of International Law as the steps taken by the belligerents against the rights of neutral commerce or territorial integrity.

There seems to be a consensus among historians that neutrals made sure that they were, overall, in accordance with the obligations of neutrality under IL. There was no systematic breach of neutrality law by the non-belligerent states. On the contrary, many national governments made sure that their municipal law was in tight accordance with IL, as not to fabricate a pretext for the belligerent powers to intervene on their territory. The above mentioned breaches which did happen, were either unique occurrences, sometimes illegal even under municipal law—as for example the Swiss army personnel who, on a private basis, shared information with belligerents—or they happened as a hedge against the disregard of the belligerents for the rights of the neutrals in the first place.

---


2-2. The Interwar Period: Rise and Fall of Collective Security

The end of WWI heralded the dawn of a new age. Under the leadership of the Wilsonians, the League of Nations and its principle of collective security was to replace the disgraced Balance of Power system, devised a hundred years earlier in Vienna.

2-2-1. A New Security Architecture

The war in Europe was a disaster for U.S. trade and Woodrow Wilson was determined to oversee a transition to a new principle for stability in transatlantic affairs, build on principles of peaceful resolution of conflicts through processes of international arbitration. His vision was well formed even before his famous program of Fourteen Points in 1918. Already a year earlier, in January 1917, when the U.S. was still neutral in the war, he laid out his plans for a ‘League of Peace’\(^{232}\) that should have the supranational power and authority to “guarantee peace and justice through-out the World.” His motivation was that the “paths of the sea must alike in law and, in fact, be free. The freedom of the seas is the sine qua none of peace, equality, and cooperation.”

The state of warfare in Europe was an unsurmountable obstacle for U.S. trade, on which the prosperity of the American continent rested. His conviction therefore was that the New World—the governments of the Americas—had to play a role in the security architecture of the future\(^ {233}\) which could not keep running on the same old, failed principles.

---


\(^{233}\) This was also evident from Wilson’s decision to engage in the allied intervention in the Russian Civil War (against the advice of his Department of War). Together with the Japanese, British, French and other allied nations, Wilson committed 13,000 U.S. troops to an invasion of Russian territory in support of those
I spoke on behalf of humanity and of the rights of all neutral nations like our own, many of whose most vital interests the war puts in constant jeopardy. (…) Mere agreements may not make peace secure. It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations could face or withstand it. If the peace presently to be made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind.

The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this: Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace.\textsuperscript{234}

Some in International Relations have treated the visions of the Wilsonians as unrealistic idealism or utopianism—rooted in belief more than in practicality.\textsuperscript{235} Recent scholarship has, however, shown that the collaboration on Wilson’s project was done largely in terms of Realpolitik.\textsuperscript{236} The central crux for many U.S. decision makers who were living in a country that had been practicing neutrality for all of their lives was that collective security was at odds with the neutral obligation (and aspiration) to remain outside of military alliances—especially outside the dangerous European intrigues. This aspect of U.S. foreign policy was central to many of Wilson’s political foes like Senate majority leader Henry Cabot Lodge. Himself a historian, “Lodge and those of his

---

\textsuperscript{234} Wilson, "Peace Without Victory Note, January 22, 1917," 338-40.


persuasion had a definite historical image of the manner in which neutrality should be maintained,"237 which to them was bold and strong and most of all, independent from external interferences like a binding obligation to join military forces or sanctions as article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations prescribed. Lodge won the domestic battle against the League. It was his vision of (neutral) U.S. foreign policy that won the approval of his peers, not Wilson’s collective security approach. Washington famously never joined the club that the U.S. itself had initiated.238 The irony of the situation was poignant; the global collective security approach, initiated by the leader of a neutral nation (for the sake of guaranteeing the freedom of neutral commerce), envisioned abandoning neutrality altogether, just to be challenged and defeated domestically over a divergent view on the importance of neutrality and sovereignty.

Despite the world’s largest neutral opting out of the ‘League experiment,’239 small neutrals did not share the same reservations. The promise of equality among states which Wilson ardently advocated, was too sweet a siren’s song to resist.240 The Danish Foreign Ministry, for example, attested that “the equality of rights of the States [was] a very important factor for the confidence that, especially the small States, will have to put in the League of Nations.”241 Having equal rights with great Powers in a club of peers was attractive to small Powers who were used to be rule-takers rather than rule-
makers. The permanent neutrals of Europe who had survived WWI without fighting, flocked under the umbrella of the new organization. Since the covenant was part of the Versailles Peace Treaty, they could not sign it (because they never had declared war) but they were invited to accede and, in the same process, they were involved in the drafting of amendments to the covenant through propositions and negotiations with the allied powers in closed door meetings. Of course the new principle of collective defense and the difficulty to reconcile it with principles of neutrality did not escape their attention. Especially the permanent neutrals debated the ramifications of the Covenant extensively. In Switzerland, a heated discussion about its neutrality ensued causing the accession bill to be passed several times between the upper and lower houses of parliament. In the end, the inclusion of article 435 in the Treaty of Versailles which explicitly referenced to the guarantees of 1815 for Switzerland’s permanent neutrality swayed the Swiss parliament to vote for the accession to the covenant. It was an odd situation but it speaks for the pragmatism of all parties involved, that they jointly agreed on ‘squaring the circle’ by the tacit acceptance of the fundamental contradiction between permanent neutrality and collective security. Nowhere is this better exemplified than in the Council’s London declaration of 1920:

The Council of the League of Nations, while affirming that the conception of neutrality of the Members of the League is incompatible with the principle that all Members will be obliged to co-operate in enforcing respect for their engagements, recognizes that Switzerland is in a unique situation, based on a tradition of several centuries which has been explicitly incorporated in the Law of Nations, and that the Members of the

243 Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the Mirco-States.
244 See on this: Kluyver, Documents on the League of Nations, 168-83.
245 The decision was made with a large majority of 128 to 43 votes in the national council. See : ibid., 242.
League of Nations, signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, have rightly recognized by Article 435 that the guarantees stipulated in favor of Switzerland by the Treaties of 1815, and especially by the Act of November 20th, 1815, constitute international obligations for the maintenance of peace. The Members of the League of Nations are entitled to expect that the Swiss people will not stand aside when the high principles of the League have to be defended. It is in this sense that the Council (…) has taken note of the declaration (…) with which Switzerland recognizes and proclaims the duties of solidarity (…) including therein the duty of co-operating in such commercial and financial measures as may be demanded by the League of Nations against a covenant breaking State, and is prepared to make every sacrifice to defend her own territory under every circumstance, even during operations under taken by the League of Nations, but will not be obliged to take part in any military action or to allow the passage of foreign troops or the preparation of military operations within her territory.246

The above was the League’s recognition of a novel interpretation of neutrality that the Swiss had devised during the year 1919 to make their traditional foreign policy compatible with the collective security; something they called ‘differential neutrality.’247 Under this approach, they accepted the responsibility to carry-out economic sanctions, mandated by the League against offending states, including blockades and embargoes but they would stop short of joint military interventions. Neither would they agree to breaches of neutral responsibilities during third party hostilities involving the League. After its accession, the Swiss Government, in fact, deliberated whether the provisions of article 10 and 16 of the Covenant necessitated the withdrawal from the fifth Hague Convention of 1907, about the rights and duties of neutral powers on land, prescribing the duties of a neutral to shelter its territory from

246 Ibid., 248-49.
any belligerent use. However, since the League had officially accepted Switzerland’s
continued military neutrality, the Government decided that no contradiction between the
membership in the League and The Hague Conventions existed.248

Although Switzerland was the only country that received written guarantees from the
League to respect its neutrality, it was not alone with its approach. Also the Danes, the
Norwegians and the Swedes proposed amendments to the covenant that would allow
them to declare ‘one-sided neutrality’ if the need arose.249 Like the Swiss, the
Scandinavian governments did not commit themselves unconditionally to the economic
or military sanctioning systems. They expressed concerns over the necessary
modifications to their neutral status but, in the end, all of them joined the League as
founding members in 1920.250

The third decade of the twentieth century began with a cautious but hopeful re-
definition of neutrality in Europe and the refusal of such on the North-American
continent. The new approach to international security, away from the goals of regulating
war under the auspices of multilateral conventions like The Hague or London Treaties,
but toward the complete outlawing of any form of warfare reached its zenith with the
1928 Kellogg-Briand pact, whose signatories renounced warfare as a sovereign right,
pledging to resolve international conflict by peaceful means. To permanent neutrals like
Sweden and Switzerland this was not a difficult decision to make, all European neutrals
joined the pact within a year.251 It was a time of ideals and good intentions—to end war

---

248 DDS, Bd. 8, Dok. 42, "CONSEIL FÉDÉRAL Procès-verbal de la séance du 25 février 1921", 1921.
249 Kluyver, Documents on the League of Nations, 179.
registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations (1929), 59.
ones and for all—during which diplomats and statesmen of great and small Powers alike worked on the realization of the principles of the League of Nations. Neutrality, although not abandoned, had reached a limbo-state. On the one hand the permanent neutrals were experimenting with the differentiation of economic and military aspects of their neutral duties, on the other hand, thinkers in Europe and the U.S. heavily debated the validity of the concept for future generations. Had the 1920s indeed given way to an era of prosperity and lasting peace, as the engineers of the League and the Kellogg-Briand Pact had envisioned, war might have become obsolete and, as the Austrian academic Joseph L. Kunz said, “without war, no neutrality.”

However, history took a different turn. The sudden collapse of several world markets and a global banking crisis after the Black Tuesday stock market crash in 1929 was the start of a period of socio-economic deterioration in Europe that paved the way for political forces in Germany to take the same route of fascist anti-humanitarianism as Italy had already begun four years earlier. The 1930s became a rapid succession of events that undid much of the internationalism of the previous decade. Contributing to this was a global network of violent developments in Europe and the Far East which

---


254 Kunz, "The Covenant of the League of Nations and Neutrality."
ultimately broke the fragile and ineffective collective security system that the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact tried to establish. For European small states and the permanent neutrals, it was a time that put their new principles to the test. Surprisingly, they turned out to be the most ardent supporters of the new collective security approach when the first military crisis hit; Japan’s grab for Manchuria.

2-2-2. Clinging to New Principles during the Japanese Challenge

The Manchurian incident of September 18, 1931 during which Japanese soldiers of the Kwantung Army staged an attack on the Japanese operated South Manchurian Railway, led within weeks to the complete occupation of the entire Manchurian territory by the Imperial Army. It was the start of Japanese military expansionism on the Asian continent, increased nationalism in mainland Japan, accompanied with political instability—including the assassination of moderate politicians, intellectuals, and business leaders—and the end of Japan’s cooperation with the western democracies in international diplomacy. While the Guandong branch of the Japanese Army got reinforced by Korean troops to fight its undeclared war with Chinese forces, Chinese diplomats in Geneva appealed to the twelve-year-old League of Nations to internationalize the conflict and bring about a resolution from the outside. Only four days after the incident the League’s Council issued a resolution to both governments to stop any actions that might aggravate the situation. With the Government of Wakatsuki Reijiro unable to stop the army’s advance and ever mounting euphoria among the Japanese public, the fighting did not seize but, on the contrary, after the collapse of his

Government, extended to Shanghai in early January 1932. The hostilities between
Japanese and Chinese forces intensified and only ended in March, after the Japanese
side had been able to install an own Government in Manchuria, which proclaimed
independence from China and thereby created the puppet state of Manchukuo.256
On the request of the Chinese Government, the League convened a special session of its
assembly to deal explicitly with the Sino-Japanese conflict. It was only the second time
in the twelve-year history of the league that an extraordinary assembly was called. It
met for the first session on March 3, 1932. From the very beginning it was the small
states, not great Powers, that took the strongest stance against the Japanese delegate’s
interpretation of the events as an act of “self-defense against an impending and
appalling danger to her nationals and to the International Settlement.”257 Eliel Löfgren,
one of Sweden’s representatives and a former Foreign Minister held a passionate speech
on the issue on March 5.

(…) until the last few days the position in the Far East has become worse,
and although the news appears to be contradictory, no one can deny that
what is taking place is war in everything but name. At this moment I will
say nothing as to what has been done by the organs of the League to put an
end to this deplorable conflict. (…) No one can deny, especially after the
report by the Committee of the League at Shanghai dated February 3rd,
that the military means employed in the conflict between China and Japan
are not in conformity with existing treaties.
Sweden, for her part, has maintained on several occasions during the
League discussions that the provisions of the Covenant prohibiting the use
of armed force retain their entire validity whether either of the Parties
describes the use of armed force as war or not. Without wishing at this
moment to give any opinion on the respective claims underlying the
conflict, I wish to state that, in the opinion of the Swedish Government,

virtue of Article 15 of the Covenant at the Request of the Chinese Government*. 1932, 33.
See on this also: Ottosson, "Trade under Protest: Sweden, Japan and the East Asian crisis in the 1930s," 2.
the landing of troops and their use in military operations on the territory of another power are contrary to the provisions of the Covenant and of the Pact of Paris. Any such attempt to extend the conception of legitimate defense in the manner adopted in the present case would render it impossible to maintain any legal international order. 

(…) I realise the complicated nature of the conflict and the special conditions prevailing in the Far East. These special circumstances cannot, however, be invoked by one of the Parties as an excuse for evading the procedure of conciliation and arbitration laid down in the Covenant. 258

Löfgren’s words condemning Japan’s aggressions were surprisingly strong for a small European power with relatively little stakes in East Asia. They were followed up by actions in the resolution drafting committee. After the various speeches on March 5, the commissions’ president invited drafts by each delegation who wished to present a resolution text to the assembly to be adopted by the league. The U.K., Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Norway, Salvador, Sweden, Spain, and Switzerland all send their proposed draft versions to the bureau of the commission. The two drafts that were the strongest in their demands toward Japan came from Sweden and Switzerland. They both included provisions that a complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from Shanghai was necessary for the start of direct negotiations with Tokyo about the peaceful settlement of the underlying dispute. 259

Regarding the concrete military power distribution during the conflict it was clear that there was very little chance that the Japanese side would ever accept such a resolution. Swedish and Swiss representatives however did not argue from a position of power political considerations but from the stand point of International Law and the necessity to impose its rules on all members. It was the great Powers and especially the representative of the U.K., Foreign


259 Ottosson, Handel under Protest, 129.
Secretary John Simons who made the most Japan-friendly proposals even openly saying that the League’s decisions might not be enforceable this time. The Swedes and the Swiss on the other hand both had a strong incentive to push all league members to adhere to the standards of IR as they were defined in the Covenant of the League. Their stake in the matters of the Far East was relatively small but the new principle of collective security and the power of the rule of law was important to the smaller members who did not possess large armies to play the game of great Power politics. For them the Chinese situation was the first important test case for the principles that the League represented and up on which they might become depended at some point themselves if faced with the demands of a larger neighbor. In the end, a weaker resolution text was adopted, without declaring Japanese actions as contrary to the Covenant nor an infringement of the Kellogg-Bryan Pact. Nevertheless, Tokyo did, of course, not appreciate the positions of the small Powers. The Japanese press reacted with disdain toward those nations who firmly held the position, that Japan was committing an act of injustice with its use of force on the Chinese mainland and with the creation of Manchukuo. Japanese Newspapers of the days mocked the small States and compared their criticism to the “barking” of dogs and their objections in the name of the league’s principles to the reasoning of “theorists,” who disregarded the practical facts of the concrete and special situation that Japan had been caught up in. Their arguments and those of prime minister Inukai’s Government was that the situations in Manchuria and in Shanghai were power politics which needed

---

quick and concrete (military) action. Abstract provisions of IL had no meaning there, they held. The line of argument of the small States was deemed “academic and inapplicable.”263 A recurring topic in the contemporary Japanese debate was that its situation in China was special and unique. The criticism of small States, it was argued, failed to understand the situation as such. The Japanese side thereby represented a view that was the exact opposite of what small States argued for, which was the universality of the league. In any case only the community of states had the right to pass judgment, not individual members who ‘understood’ the local situation. That, they held, would destroy the fundamental idea of collective security itself.264

In the Swiss parliament, Japan’s actions in Manchuria sparked heated discussions on the fundamental direction that the confederation should take toward the League. The head of the Social Democrats and Member of Parliament in the National Council265 Ernst Reinhard, demanded to know the planned course of the Government at the extraordinary session of the League of Nations in Geneva? The ongoing conflict and the unyielding behavior of the Japanese Forces indicated to him and other parliamentarians that the league, if its weakness in the face of Japan’s militarism continued, might not be able to provide security for small States, which was the primary hope of the Swiss when they acceded the organization in 1920. Reinhard therefore demanded a firm stance of his Government against any assertion of right through might.266 Particularly Japan’s precedent of excusing its actions as a policing activity, negating that its military actions

264 Ottosson, Handel under Protest, 135-36.
265 The National Council is the lower (and larger) chamber of the Swiss Parliament.
266 CH-BAR ONLINE, 100001462, CH-BAR#E1301#1960/51#294, "Protokoll des Nationalrats, NR 01. Sitzung vom 06.06.1932", June 6, 1932. 8.
were acts of war, frightened Swiss policymakers who warned of the “dangerous analogy of the Japanese action. If, one day, our country should be faced with a similar method as the one that Japan is using against China, the large question will arise, if the League of Nations can protect us sufficiently.” The Swiss communist party went as far as to argue that Japan’s aggressions and the inaction of the league revealed the imperialistic nature of it and presented parliament with a motion to exit the league. To be fair; this was more a propaganda stunt than serious politics. None of the other parties supported the communist motion, even the Social Democrats who opposed the original accession to the league, did not support the countries exit from it in 1932. However, emotions ran high when Federal Councilor Motta delivered a passionate speech for the value of an international institution that, even though not successful, at least was a step forward from pure anarchy among nations. Confronted with the Japanese challenge, he restated what could be called Switzerland’s stance of neutral internationalism:

And something equally astonishing is that we, who until now have been making politics of neutrality, which we want to continue because neutrality is the fundamental maxim of our country—and I always defended this idea with utmost conviction—we were called into a commission of the [League’s] assembly, made of 19 members to assist the cause of peace for which the League of Nations convened that very assembly. And we, in that commission, (…) we have been participating and striving (…) to lead the ideas of [international] law to a triumph as far as possible.

Far from retreating, international-minded politicians like Motta, who also represented Switzerland’s official stance in Geneva, favored and defended the multilateral forum of

---

266 CH-BAR ONLINE, 100001463, CH-BAR#E1301#1960/51#294, "Protokoll des Nationalrats, NR 02. Sitzung vom 07.06.1932", June 7, 1932. 50-64.
268 Ibid., 56. [ODeTA].
269 Ibid., 22. [ODeTA].
the league in 1932. The Far-Eastern Question triggered in that sense a serious soul searching for Switzerland’s international politics, involving not only considerations of industrialist liberals who were concerned about trade issues, but the left and ultra-left visions for Switzerland’s position in the world.

It was in this spirit that Motta took his parliament’s stance on the Sino-Japanese conflict back to Geneva were tensions between Japan and the small States rose soon again at the end of 1932. From December 6–9, the next round of plenary meetings of the league’s special assembly took place. In the eleventh meeting on December 7, 1932, he insisted that might cannot make right:

I know this undertaking always to submit disputes to pacific procedure may sometimes, especially to great Powers, appear to be a hindrance. Those who have force at their disposal are naturally tempted to use it, especially in defense of what they consider to be their rights. The law, however, places a limitation on rights, and such limitation is a guarantee of security for each one of us. If the states that are members of the League ceased to admit the maxim that none may take the law into his own hands, or that the very justification of our institution is its categorical condemnation of violence in international relations, then it would be better to say, quite frankly, that our hopes of achieving a new international order are vain! Right-thinking men will not readily give way to such moral bankruptcy.²⁷⁰

Motta kept emphasizing that his small country had not “come here to take sides with either party,” he stressed thoroughly the very principles of the league and that “the cause I plead is that of the League itself and of its Covenant, the Covenant and its

principles.”²⁷¹ He was not alone in his plea for collective action. Swedish Minister Östen Undén just as forcefully supported that view:

The opinion has been expressed that no one is really responsible for the events which have taken place, and are still taking place even now, in the Far East; or, in other words, that the party which has had recourse to warlike measures has only exercised its right of self-defense. China’s internal troubles and the disorganization of the country had the effect it is alleged, of forcing Japan to act in self-defense in protection of her interests. It is even added that Japan is alone competent to judge and determine the character of her own acts. Nevertheless, the thesis that the internal difficulties of a country justify, on the part of another country, warlike measures and the annexation of vast regions cannot be recognized. Moreover, no Member of the league can—and this is one of the essential principles of the Covenant—shirk the duty of asking the League and its organs to determine whether or no, in any special case, it has, when defending its interests, violated its fundamental obligations.²⁷²

The Spanish representative, Salvador de Madriaga, was no less forceful in his approach toward the situation. Like his Swiss, Swedish, and Czechoslovak colleagues, he criticized Japan’s militarism bluntly, while also emphasizing that his friendship for Japan was unwavering. Historian Florentino Rodao says about him that he was “the spokesman for the interests of small countries interested in promoting the role of the League as an organ of collective world security (…).” His speech on December 7, right before Swiss Minister Motta, indicated Spain’s close adherence to the League’s principles:

(…) as regards the League, it [establishing the law] is necessary because the League would find its Covenant pine and perish of mortal disease if, by default, we were to allow the public to become convinced that Article 10 permits of Chinese Manchuria becoming Japanese Manchukuo, that

²⁷¹ Ibid., 42.
²⁷² Ibid., 38-39.
Article 12 allows of military invasion becoming permanent, and that the principles of the Covenant must be waived in exceptional cases, when, in fact, all cases are and always will be exceptional cases.  

The debate continued with the representatives of small States unceasingly voicing their clear concerns about the Japanese position. In the end, again a resolution had to be adopted. This time two drafts were presented to the assembly. One version was submitted by Czechoslovakia and Switzerland, the other one by Czechoslovakia, the Irish Free State, Spain, and Sweden. The former resolution text—the Swiss co-sponsored version—was relatively mild in its wording, not condemning Japan in any way for the ongoing conflict. However, the four-state resolution draft with Sweden and Spain as sponsors was a tough document that clearly reflected the positions of Löfgren and Undén. It contained the statement that Japanese troops had occupied Chinese territory without a declaration of war, that the formation of Manchukuo cannot be interpreted as a sincere movement of independence, that the fighting of Japanese troops in Manchuria and Shanghai cannot be viewed as an act of self-defense, and that the governments of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (who were both not part of the league) should be asked for their cooperation in the resolution of the conflict.

The four-state resolution draft was everything that the Japanese delegation had denied for a year. Not surprisingly, its chief-delegate, Yosuke Matsuoka, raised strong objections. He complained that the draft condemned Japan one-sidedly and that it was crafted “in an accusing spirit which I deem altogether unwarranted.” As a point of order, he requested the four sponsoring states to withdraw it completely or, if they were not

---

273 Ibid., 42.
274 See: 0 Annex
275 The reasons for the Swiss moderation in the actual policy tool for the League is unclear, even less so why the Czechoslovaks decided to be on part of both resolutions.
willing to do so, that the assembly may vote on it to make the Leagues position clear.

Foreshadowing Tokyo’s decision to withdraw its delegation from the League of Nations, Matsuoka finished his statement by saying that “I am afraid, let me add, that the handling of this resolution may, I even think will, entail consequences perhaps not intended or anticipated by the authors of the resolution.”

The assembly president referred Matsuoka’s motion of order on the four-state resolution draft to the assembly bureau (a core group made of eight elected state representatives, the president and the Secretary General of the League of Nations). The next day the president announced that the Bureau had unanimously decided not to present the assembly with the four-state resolution text but only with that drafted by Czechoslovakia and Switzerland. The second resolution draft did not contain any wording on Japanese military aggressions nor mentioned the situation in Manchuria or the non-recognition of Manchukuo. No passage was included on the involvement of the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. either. Instead the resolution provided only for the special committee of the assembly to “draw up proposals with the view to settlement of the dispute (…) at the earliest possible moment.”

Japanese media celebrated this preliminary outcome as a victory of Matsuoka’s diplomacy over the shortsightedness of the small States. The below cartoon image was printed on December 10 in the Yomiuri Shimbun, one of the country’s most widely read newspapers. It accompanied a long article about the proceedings in Geneva and shows

---

277 Ibid., I: 74.
Matsuoka throwing around a small State representative (bearing resemblance to Östen Undén) that had dared to ‘bite’ Japan with the first resolution text.

Picture 2: Matsuoka Yosuke throwing around a representative of Small States. The caption reads: “Poor guy being thrown around; Although a small country, it had the nerve to bite.”

However, the victory was short lived. On February 24, 1933, the assembly met again to vote on the draft report prepared by the committee. This time, the text was clear in its wording on the blame of the Japanese military forces on the war-like situation in China and the illegal occupation of Manchuria. The assembly voted to accept the report with one vote against (Japan) and one abstention (Siam). In the following plenary discussion, Matsuoka took the stage a last time:

It is a source of profound regret and disappointment to the Japanese delegation and to the Japanese Government that the draft report has now been adopted by this Assembly. (…) I deeply deplore the situation we are not confronting, for I do not doubt that the same aim, the desire to see a lasting peace established, is animating all of us in our deliberations and our actions. (…) Japan, however, finds it impossible to accept the report adopted by the Assembly, (…) and the Japanese Government is obliged to feel that it has now reached the limit of its endeavors to cooperate with the League of Nations in regard to the Sino-Japanese differences.  

He once more expressed his regret about the assembly’s decision, thanked them nevertheless for their efforts and left the room together with the entirety of the Japanese delegation. Japan had withdrawn itself from the League of Nations.

2-2-3. Back to Neutrality

The events around the Sino-Japanese conflict were especially frustrating to small states who were the most active advocates for a multilateral solution in the spirit IL. Motta was disappointed but not surprised by Japan’s actions. He argued that, all in all, the empire’s exit was still “the most functional solution, because had Japan stayed inside the league while still continuing its war against China, the impression would have been created that this happened with the consent of the League of Nations, who’s judgment thereby would have been robbed of all value.” However, that was mere sugar-coating of the sad reality; the international legalist approach that Sweden, Spain, Switzerland and the other small States started to champion had seriously failed. Japan had lost the

281 CH-BAR ONLINE, 70013182, "Beschlussprotokoll(-e) 10.02.-11.02.1933", February 10, 1933. 4-6.
battle for legitimacy at the League but had won the challenge of Power that it had thrown at the institution. Matsuoka proved that the League was a toothless paper tiger. Although Undén expected Japan eventually to return to the League, his political opponents in the Swedish Parliament drew different conclusions. Manchuria, a territory of thirty million people that used to belong to a member state of the League had been invaded and conquered by another member. Former Prime Minister Hajalmar Hammarskjöld argued that this tragedy proved that the world was back at the old maxim of every nation on its own. Politicians worldwide echoed this assessment. Distrust toward the practicability of global collective security had started to manifest already in the late 1920s as the sudden rise of bilateral non-aggression treaties attests. Between 1927 and 1929, four of them were concluded between members of the League but their number multiplied after 1932. The Soviet Union, despite joining the League in 1934, also continued to negotiate Non-Aggression Pacts with other European powers and so did Germany, which, in fall 1933 withdrew from the disarmament conference in Geneva and subsequently from the League itself, dealing yet another blow at the institution. All was not lost yet but the heaviest hit to collective security followed just two years later with the Italian invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia), another attack by one member of the League on another.

The new crisis had been in the making for a year and, on October 2, 1935, the Italian invasion began of Abyssinia began. Although only two days later the league voted to impose economic sanctions on the Italian aggressor with a fifty to three vote, the

---

measures could not start immediately because they were not taken with the required unanimity. 286 Until October 19, the League adopted five measures of economic sanctions, including an arms embargo and a complete ban of imports from Italy, aiming at crippling the country’s export economy. However, not only did these measures not include an oil embargo (which would have hit Italy hardest) but by December it was clear that the five measures would not be completely implemented by all member states. “Although the Italian invasion was widely condemned as an act of aggression and a gross violation of the League Covenant, the entire conflict was marked by an inability of the international community to respond in kind with a total blockade.” 287 The whole affair was a fiasco not only for poor Abyssinia but the League’s principles. Once again, like in Manchuria, the diplomats in Geneva were unable to stop the illegal action and could not even implement their own modest economic sanctions to a satisfactory degree. There were no mechanisms to oblige all members to equally implement the measures. The outrageous aspect was that this time, there existed no question of ‘legitimacy’ or whether or not the attack was a policing operation—as the Japanese had claimed earlier. There was near consensus that this was an aggressive war waged by Italy against an innocent member of the League.

In the early days of the crisis, it was again the small Powers that reacted most forcefully against the Italian aggression. Undén, for example, argued in August that “Peace-loving people insist now not on neutrality in the sense of impartial passivity but the prevention of war or the stopping of hostilities by mutual effort.” 288 By the time the crisis had flung

287 Ibid., 53.
288 As cited in: ibid., 61.
into full war, Swedish Foreign Minister Sandler ardently spoke for “collective action in order to build respect for the international legal order” because that, to him was “a gain which cannot be measured by the petty yardstick of the day” and clarified that “it is not against Italy but against war which the sanctions are directed.”289 The Swedish position in 1935 was much stronger than that taken by France and the U.K. who both tried to carefully avoid pushing Italy into a corner, hoping to avert further escalation of the conflict into a European war. The Hoare-Laval Pact of December 1935—a secret agreement between the British and the French Foreign Ministers to give to Mussolini two-thirds of Abyssinia in return for peace—was only one example of how the remaining great Powers of the League thought of dealing with the situation through cautiousness instead of economic or even military force. The Swedes were much more outspoken, which, in fact, reflected the attitude of large parts of the public at home, as historian John Ross pointed out: “One of the most noteworthy and consistent features of Sweden’s response was the high degree of political unanimity in favor of a resolute stand by the League.”290

As the League weekend, however, so did the Swedish commitment to collective security.291 With the fall of Addis Ababa, the capitol of Abyssinia, in April 1936, the Swedish attitude changed. Conservative voices in the parliament who demanded a return to Sweden’s traditional neutrality became louder. Sandler, still a strong believer in the principles of the League, argued against this view that the old concept of neutrality would only be a policy of isolation and would give Sweden just as little

289 Ibid., 63.
290 Ibid., 62.
291 See also: Ottosson, "Trade under Protest: Sweden, Japan and the East Asian crisis in the 1930s."
guarantee for peace and stability as continuous support for the League and its sanctions on Italy. In Stockholm, the domestic tide had begun to shift against the League experiment and although internationalists like Sandler and Undén were still defending the approach, it became increasingly untenable. A further sign for Sweden’s shifting back toward its traditional neutrality came in July 1936 when together with Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland announced to the League its opposition to the unconditional application of Article 16 of the covenant (the article that prescribed collective economic sanctioning against League offenders). Historian Neville Wylie interpreted the declaration of July 1, 1936, as the “ditching of Article 16,” and the contemporary observer, Hans Morgenthau, used it for the beginning of an article on the “Resurrection of Neutrality in Europe.” To be fair, however, the text of the declaration (reproduced in its entirety in Annex 7) reads more like a stern warning of the small States, that unless stronger sanctions against offenders of the covenant were taken and if reform was not implemented, they saw the entire ‘experiment’ in grave danger. Under these circumstances they saw themselves “obliged to bear that fact in mind in connection with the application of Article 16.” Their declaration also coincided with the League’s decision to lift all sanctions on Italy at an Assembly

---

meeting on July 4, which was the official recognition that the League’s enforcement mechanisms had failed their purpose.²⁹⁶

For Switzerland, the situation was particularly thorny. The geographical, cultural and linguistic proximity (one of Switzerland’s national languages is Italian) to its southern neighbor made any decision on future relations with it extremely impactful, especially to the three border cantons of Valais, Ticino, and Graubünden. Also, Switzerland’s influential long-time Foreign Minister and chief negotiator at the League, Giuseppe Motta, was himself an Italian speaker from the Ticino, which was a not unimportant detail in the ensuing Swiss debates about the sanctions which can only be interpreted as tiptoeing around a very unpleasant question. On the one hand, the initial Swiss reaction to the hostilities in October 1935 were in clear support of the League’s principles, asserting that the “Swiss Confederation will not fail in its duty of solidarity with the other Member of the League of Nations.” On the other hand, Motta tried to make it clear from the beginning, that Switzerland would also consider questions of neutrality in its position but that the “other category of sanctions [apart from military] is that of economic and financial sanctions. By their nature and purpose, such sanctions are not designed to be and, in our eyes do not constitute hostile acts.”²⁹⁷ Thereby Switzerland expressed the hope to use economic sanctions, if need be, without giving up on its neutral status—differential neutrality in action, that is. However, a statement by Motta on October 9, that declared that Switzerland would avoid all sanctions that posed a


threat to its neutrality drew strong criticism from other League members and confused many. The apparently uncommitted position of Switzerland soon came under further criticism from the League when the Federal Council decided to implement the arms embargo equally against Italy and Abyssinia—thereby undermining the League’s position that Italy alone was to blame for the ongoing war. Switzerland’s inconsistencies continued over the course of the crisis with various refusals to completely implement all economic or financial sanctions, usually with the justification that they were either impossible to implement in the border regions, or because they would cause too much damage to its economy. In contrast to its earlier actions against Japan and the forceful reaction of Sweden, Switzerland’s approach even during the initial stages of the crisis was less than lukewarm.

The learning outcome for the Swiss of the Abyssinia episode was therefore more than what it was for Sweden. The impotence of the League was only one aspect, the other was the difficulty of carrying out sanctions in cases were core interests of the country were at stake—something that was not the case for the Swedes. The result, however, was the same. After July 1936, the small States reversed tracks, hurdling back to assurances and policies of neutrality. In 1937 Switzerland (Motta) and Sweden (Sandler) both paddled back in their rhetoric at home, affirming that their neutralities were ones again the backbone of their countries’ foreign policies and Switzerland made it even known to the League in 1938 that it wished that its ‘absolute’ neutrality be recognized by the Assembly. Together with the League of Nations, differential

298 Ibid., 92-112.
neutrality, too, had failed. In this regard Wylie’s observation sums the situation neatly up:

The international response to Mussolini’s invasion of Abyssinia provided conclusive proof that Europe’s fate lay in the hands of the Great Powers, not with righteous civil servants in Geneva. Above all, it showed that the experiment in liberal internationalism begun in 1919 was at an end. The return to neutrality was a symptom, rather than a cause of this process. (...) With the exception of Switzerland and the new nationalist government in Spain, the ‘former neutrals’ tried to retain ‘one foot in each camp’. ³⁰⁰

Also Hans Morgenthau, while citing Lauterpacht, observed in 1939 cunningly that “‘Neutrality and collective security,’ it has been rightly stated, ‘are complementary concepts; the more there is of the one, the less there is of the other.’ Thus the complete collapse of the collective security in the crises of recent years finally brought about the automatic renewal of neutrality as a political fact (...).” ³⁰¹

However, the small European states were again only part of the global story of Neutrality. Their hurdling back to traditional neutrality concepts in Europe coincided with the steady strengthening of neutrality legislation in the U.S. where no less than four laws were enacted in the 1930s that enforced its traditional foreign policy. The first was enacted on August 31, 1935, prohibiting the export of ammunition, arms and other implements of war to belligerent nations. This was the U.S. Congress’ direct answer to the conflict between Italia and Abyssinia, binding the hands of president Roosevelt who was not given discretionary authority to decide on which side might be embargoed and which side not—fearing that he might side with the League of Nations, punishing Italy

and jeopardizing U.S. impartiality. This congressional decision was remarkably close to Switzerland’s interpretation of its neutral duties. It definitely went against the wishes of Roosevelt himself, who despite enacting the law by his signature, released a strongly worded statement that

the inflexible provisions might drag us into war instead of keeping us out. The policy of the government is definitely committed to the maintenance of peace and the avoidance of any entanglements which would lead us into conflict. At the same time it is the policy of the Government by every peaceful means and without entanglement to cooperate with other similarly minded governments to promote peace.

The next four years the struggle between the executive and the legislative for interpreting U.S. neutrality continued and was repeatedly won by Congress. The 1935 neutrality act was set to expire the next year but was renewed on February 29, 1936, enforced by provisions that would also forbid American loans to warfaring nations. In January 1937, in the face of the raging Spanish Civil War, Congress passed another act, declaring that also civil wars fell under the provisions of U.S. neutrality legislation and thereby forbidding arms export to either side of the conflict. This act did make some concessions to internationalists like Roosevelt. It included a ‘Cash-and-Carry’ provision, which allowed for trade in non-contraband goods with belligerents if they could pay for them in cash and bring them to their shores on their own ships. A final neutrality act in November 1939 modified the initial acts to allow for arms sales but only under the ‘Cash-and-Carry’ provisions. The grip of neutralist forces on U.S. foreign policy only

---

303 Ibid., 178.
ended with Roosevelt’s decisive victory through the Land-Lease Act of 1941, enabling him to arm Britain, China, and the Soviet Union at his own discretion.

The new neutralism of the 1930s did not stop there. Besides the traditional neutralities of small Powers and the U.S., there was one more form of neutralism that made a stunning comeback in 1936; the occasional neutrality of great Powers. The Spanish Civil War was the cause of that. It forced a decision also on European great Powers whom they wanted to support, the democratically elected, left-wing Republican Government that had been in power for five years, or Franco’s revolutionary fascist nationalists? The effect that the internal situation of Spain had upon the great Powers was similar to that of the Italian war against Abyssinia on Switzerland. It put its immediate neighbors into an uncomfortable situation where the straight-forward support of one faction would have led to serious complications internally—domestic opinion in most European countries was divided over the matter—and externally. As in the case of Italy and Abyssinia, Britain, and France feared that support for the Spanish Republic might provoke a German and Italian backlash, maybe even resulting in war. This let the European powers to unanimously declare the only foreign policy option they had left; neutrality. They intended to contain the danger of a spillover-effect through the adoption of a ‘Non-Intervention Agreement.’ In late August 1936, a ‘Non-Intervention Committee’ was formed by representatives of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the U.S.S.R., and smaller European states—including Sweden but not Switzerland—charged with the oversight of the collective decision. Even the Japanese government
decided to follow the same course, declaring its adherence to Non-Interference in the Spanish Civil War. 304

The ‘Non-Intervention Agreement’ was noticeable for two aspects; firstly, it was initiated by France and Britain outside the structure of the League of Nations. Secondly, no legal instrument was drawn up and no documents were actually signed. The ‘agreement’ was only “founded upon an exchange of notes between Britain and France, August 15, 1936. These notes, which were substantially identical, contained references to the establishment of a common attitude toward the Spanish strife, a preamble and three declarations of policy.” 305 Unable to straightforwardly support the Spanish republican government, neither the French nor the British government used their military or economic capabilities to come to the rescue of another liberal government on the continent. This left the door open to the totalitarian regimes of Germany and Italy to intervene in Spain at their own discretion. Although first appeals to Germany by the insurgents in Morocco under Generalissimo Francisco Franco failed, he eventually convinced both, Hitler and Mussolini to send support for him—informally, of course. Officially, Germany and Italy were party to a collective arms embargo. In contrast to their democratic counterparts, the totalitarian regimes abused the neutralist stands to covertly smuggle weapons and troops into Spain to support the fascist cause, resulting in the ultimate victory of Franco over his Republican adversaries. 306

The sad irony for the Republicans was that the Non-Intervention policy of the future Allied Powers was the worst kind of neutrality to them. It was, in fact, an unheard-of precedent in favor of the insurgents as one contemporary observer commented: “Neutrality and non-intervention in time of unrecognized insurgency and in time of international warfare involve very different propositions. To apply to unrecognized and irresponsible rebels the same principles that are applicable to sovereign states and established governments is to encourage rebellion and disorder and to weaken public law and authority.” 307 Had the powers decided to invoke principles of ‘classic’ neutrality, without an arms embargo, the chances for the Republicans to defend their position would have been much improved. 308 The complete isolation of Madrid from world markets for weapons clearly worked in the favor of Franco’s nationalists.

In February 1939, toward the final days of the Civil War, the Republican Government—at that time already in exile in France—could not even hope for political lip-service anymore from the neutral democracies. The British Government under Chamberlain only strove for a solution that would keep the Balearic Islands firmly in the hands of a Spanish Administration and out of the reach of Italian influence. The British consul in Mallorca, Alan Hilgarth, therefore assisted the nationalists to organize the island’s surrender on board of the HMS Devonshire. Britain and France thereafter recognized the nationalist government on February 27, and so did the U.S., recalling its ambassador.

307 Padelford, ”The International Non-Intervention Agreement and the Spanish Civil War,” 586.
308 It is not clear what this would mean, however, since civil wars were not covered by the provisions of The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. However, such considerations did not stop the Swiss Government from issuing an official statement that for reasons of its permanent neutrality, it would not join the common declaration of non-interference but would nevertheless comply autonomously with that policy. See: ibid., 581.
to Madrid.\textsuperscript{309} The Spanish Republic died a month later. It was put to rest together with collective security, next to the empty tomb of neutrality—who was weeping over the tragedy of her resurrection.

2-3. Size Matters: The Difference between Great and Small Power Neutrals

By the time Germany attacked Poland on September 1, 1939, Europe had come full-circle. Spain was back to a dictatorship, the League was all but a useless shell, the great Powers on the continent were at war and declarations of neutrality were flying from the government-rooftops of the world. Within less than a week, Italy declared it would be ‘benevolently’ neutral toward Germany. Yugoslavia said it would remain neutral as long as Italy did. The ‘traditional’ neutrals Sweden, Switzerland, the U.S., and the Netherlands had already started mandates of protecting Powers for the belligerents. Persia declared neutrality and so did Mexico, Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela. Japan as well handed its foreign diplomats a note, informing them that the Empire would remain neutral and wished not to be provoked into a situation in which it would have to give up its policy of non-involvement.\textsuperscript{310} The world, once more, polarized into belligerents and neutrals.

However, besides the fact that declarations of neutrality were not necessary (under IL) for a state to count as a neutral, the proclaimed neutralities of the different governments were not equal. Italy’s ‘benevolent neutrality’ was more of a letter of moral support for Germany than a promise to stay out of the war. Yugoslavia’s conditional neutrality was a warning that it would not cede territory to Italy if it should try to take advantage of the general warfare, and Japan’s note was a gentle reminder to Moscow that Tokyo and Berlin were in a defense agreement and that a Soviet attack on Germany would oblige Japan to enter the war on the side of its Anti-Comintern partner. These neutralities were different in their qualities, diverging greatly from one another and from the neutralities

\textsuperscript{310} Neue Zürcher Zeitung, \textit{Various Articles}, September 6 1939.
of the permanent neutrals. The rest of this chapter will briefly consider the most important neutralities in the two years before and during the Pacific War, because those madder most to the following chapters.

2-3-1. Great Power Neutrals: Decisive Forces

Before looking more closely at the small Power neutrals during the Pacific War, it is important to briefly consider what should be called the ‘great Power neutrals of the Second World War.’ The U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and even Japan count as such, due to their neutralities at different moments of the war. Just consider, for example, the words of U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt on September 3, 1939, to glimpse the degree of legalism with which the situation had been understood by that great Power:

At this moment there is being prepared a proclamation of American neutrality. This would have been done even if there had been no neutrality statute on the books, for this proclamation is in accordance with International Law and in accordance with American policy. This will be followed by a proclamation required by the existing Neutrality Act. And I trust that in the days to come our neutrality can be made a true neutrality.311

Whether or not Roosevelt meant these words or if he was just swimming with the political tide is subject of lively debates.312 Neutrality had been official U.S. foreign policy for more than a hundred years, mainly to keep the country out of wars across the Atlantic.313 That is why Harold Nicolson, writing in October 1941, still calls the raging

conflict the ‘Second German War’ and not a world war. 314 Not even the short two-year intermezzo of U.S. participation in WWI was reason enough to have the U.S. Senate abandon neutrality for good. On the contrary, the newly forged neutrality acts of the 1930s, to which Roosevelt alludes above, worked to the opposite effect. They made neutrality the law of the land again. 315 The situation had changed only slightly with the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese war on July 7, 1937. The Marco Polo Bridge incident lead to full-scale warfare between the Empire of Japan and the Republic of China. There as well Roosevelt would have been under the obligation to invoke the provisions of the Second Neutrality Act, cutting both sides from access to U.S. arms. But the lack of a declaration of war allowed him to circumvent the provisions and continue shipping weapons through third parties to China. 316 Doubtlessly, the U.S. had a highly ambivalent opinion on its neutrality. However, the belief in its utility was one of the most important reasons that the U.S. joined the Allied forces only two years after the German attack on Poland. Only the quasi-separate conflict with Japan bombed the North Americans once and for all out of their neutrality and transformed the war in Europe into the Second World War. 317 Until today the U.S. has not returned to it and the period of its non-involvement in foreign wars is presently most commonly referred to as

314 Nicolson, Diplomacy, 7.
‘isolationism’ and not ‘neutrality’—a clear sign of the change in public perception that neutrality underwent.318

An even more important case to discuss is the special nature of the neutrality of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet efforts to formalize a neutral relationship with Japan went back to 1926 when Moscow made several attempts to propose a Non-Aggression Pact. The Japanese side refused, wanting to maintain its freedom of action. When, in 1931, the Manchurian incident lead to a large number of Japanese soldiers taking over the northern part of China, expanding the Japanese empire further into the sphere of Soviet interests, an agreement on mutual relations became even more important.319 In December 1932 the Japanese government again refused to consider a Soviet offer for a Non-Aggression Pact, citing that the Kellogg-Briand Pact, to which both were signatories, made such a treaty superfluous. From 1933 onward, having firmly established Manchukuo, Japanese politicians and military started preparations for a future war with the U.S.S.R. The unsuccessful campaigns against China and the slow development of Manchukuo’s economy—which Japanese strategists found to be the backbone of any war attempt with the Soviets—precluded the belligerent plans. That the Soviets helped Chang Kai-Shek with substantial amounts of war material and that Soviet pilots even fought alongside Chinese aviators against Japan was well understood in Tokyo. Conflicts at the border of Manchukuo and the U.S.S.R. increased the following years with clashes of the two armies that only lacked a formal declaration to be called a war. During the battles of Nomonhan (Khalkhin Gol) alone more than

318 Blower, "From Isolation to Neutrality: A New Framework for Understanding American Political Culture, 1919-1941."
20,000 men died on both sides. Japan’s defeat in these clashes and the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, lead to a change in Tokyo’s foreign policy toward the U.S.S.R. It became clear that the German’s were in favor of a Japanese-Soviet pact of Non-Aggression, as that would increase the likelihood of Japan to fight against the British in South East Asia and thereby aid German aggressions against the U.K. In fall and winter 1939 the public debate in Japan began shifting toward considering negotiations and the normalization of relations with the Soviet Union. To Japanese strategists, the time seemed opportune to refocus its armed forces to the South instead of battles with the Soviets. Also the militarists in the government had understood through the heavy defeat at Nomonhan that the Red Army was much stronger than they had expected and that there were benefits in a diplomatic solution to the Soviet problem.320

On June 9, 1940, an agreement was signed between Japan and the U.S.S.R. over the Nomonhan area, formalizing the status quo ante of the territory. The next month, something interesting happened. Shigenori Togo, the Japanese ambassador in Moscow proposed not an agreement of non-aggression, but one of neutrality.321 The text was modeled after a Neutrality Pact between the U.S.S.R. and Germany that was concluded in 1926 and not after the Non-Aggression Pact between the same two states of the previous year. It is not clear what the reasons were for the Japanese Government—and Ambassador Togo in particular—to suggest a Neutrality Pact instead of a Non-Aggression Pact. The Japanese and the Soviets understood well that they had different

320 Ibid., 13-19.
implications; a Neutrality Pact was weaker than a Pact of Non-Aggression. A Neutrality Pact would only have prevented the U.S.S.R. from directly intervening in the Sino-Japanese conflict but would not have precluded the sales of armament. Even Boris Slavinsky, who wrote the most extensive and detailed account on the Neutrality Pact could only guess: “I personally hold to the view that in planning to resolve the ‘China incident’ the Japanese government was not then contemplating attacking the USA or the U.K. On the contrary, it thought that on clashing with Japanese expansion in China and its encroachment on their national interests, those countries might declare war on Japan. A Neutrality Pact with the U.S.S.R. might then save Japan from being encircled and having to fight on two fronts.”\footnote{Slavinsky, \textit{The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact: A Diplomatic History, 1941-1945}, 19.} That is not a convincing argument, however, because Togo’s proposal would have merely confined the parties to the provisions of neutrality law, which did not preclude them from maintaining amicable relations (including the sales of weaponry) to either side of a third-party conflict. But that was one of the main goals that the Japanese side wanted to achieve, stopping U.S.S.R. arms sales to Chiang Kay-Shek and making sure that it would not lend support (economically or militarily) to Britain or the U.S. should war with them occur.

The Gaimusho realized the weakness of its proposal quickly. After Togo left Moscow in August 1940, his successor, Yoshitsugu Tatekawa handed Molotov a fresh draft for a new treaty approach on October 30, 1940. This time toward a Non-Aggression Pact.\footnote{Draft text in Annex 3: Draft text of Japanese treaty proposal for a Non-Aggression Pact with the U.S.S.R.} Tatekawa stated that the Konoe government considered the discussion on neutrality between the two countries as finished. With the new proposal, the Japanese...
side sought to receive explicit guarantees from the Soviets to not support any Japanese enemy in any form. Molotov discussed the matter with Tatekawa again on November 18, arguing that the maximum the Soviet Union could offer was a promise for its neutrality but not for non-aggression. To his country, that would be a much closer alliance to Japan and could only be considered if, in turn, Japan was willing to return territory to the U.S.S.R. that Czarist Russia had lost in the war of 1904–1905, especially the South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. Since Japan had been clear on not negotiating these issues, Molotov handed the ambassador a soviet proposal for the weaker agreement—a new Neutrality Pact. Negotiations continued for six more months, centering continuously around territorial issues, concessions regarding fishing rights and oil drilling and most importantly the nature of the agreement. In April 1941, while coming back from a meeting with Hitler and Mussolini, and aware of the high likelihood that a German-Soviet war might start soon, Foreign Minister Matsuoka in a diplomatic stunt negotiated the agreement to an end. He conceded that a Neutrality Pact would be sufficient to Japan as proof of the Soviet’s amicable intentions toward Japan and received in return concessions on the territorial questions, as well as an implicit recognition of Manchukuo by the U.S.S.R. The pact was signed on April 13, 1941.\textsuperscript{324} From that day onward, the Soviet Union was officially a neutral to Japan.

On June 22, Germany broke its Non-Aggression Pact with operation ‘Barbarossa,’ invading Russian territory. Italy soon followed by sending more than 200,000 troops to aid the Germans. Japan on the other hand did not join the war with its European allies

\textsuperscript{324} Treaty Text in Annex 4: Final text of the “Neutrality Pact between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan.”
and the Soviet Union, in turn, remained neutral to the war that started between Japan and the other Allied powers after Pearl Harbor. Diplomatically, the U.S.S.R. had become to Tokyo a neutral like Spain, Sweden, or Switzerland, with the difference that from the Soviets, Japan had the promise in writing. This had a significant impact on the strategic thinking of the politicians and diplomats in Tokyo. The Soviet Union was on par with other neutral states which was clearly reflected in government reports and newspaper articles. On the first anniversary of the Neutrality Pact, on April 13, 1942, Togo, who by then had become Foreign Minister, invited not only the representative of the U.S.S.R., Ambassador Maliki for a festive lunch, but with him the other ministers of the countries that were still neutral in the conflict. Malik reported back to Moscow that it was clear that this event was meant to demonstrate Japanese “neutralness” toward the U.S.S.R. The Japanese government as well as the media proactively lumped the U.S.S.R. together with other neutrals, time and again, to reinforce that impression. Although it is clear from Malik’s reports that this did not calm his suspicions, the Japanese side continued that tactic. In the below picture, taken from the Mainichi Shinbun of March 12, 1944, a similar event is depicted and ambassador Malik stands in the middle between Foreign Minister Mamori Shigemitsu (left), Widar Bagge and Camille Gorgé, the Swedish and Swiss ministers. The message was clear: Malik was a neutral Ambassador, like the others were neutral Ministers.

---

Although mutual suspicions never vanished, the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact remained in force for almost the entire time of WWII. Only on the last days of the war did Stalin break the agreement, declaring war on Japan. Only then the political leadership of Japan realized that the pact which officially was valid for another year had lost its power.

Signs of the imminent disaster were plentiful. The Japanese Navy Attaché in Stockholm, Makoto Onodera, had learned about the secret protocol at the Yalta conference (February 4–11, 1945) in which Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin agreed that the Soviet Union would enter the war with Japan within three months, but this information never

---

326 Yomiuri Shimbun, "Foreign Minister Invites Diplomatic Corps of Neutral Countries to Banquet," March 12 1944. The article, in fact, lists all remaining neutral envoys at the time: Yakov Malik (Soviet Union), Widar Bagge (Sweden), Zul Facar Khan (Afghanistan), Camille Gorgé (Switzerland), Luis Estevez Fernandez (Portugal) and Haidar Görk (Turkey).
reached the highest ranks of the Japanese government. Similarly, Yoshikazu Fujimura, another Navy Attaché in Switzerland had sent a telegram with the same warning to his headquarters in Tokyo, but it was equally ignored. Until the very end, Japanese officials in the Government, the Army, the Navy and even the Emperor himself pinned their hopes on a negotiated peace agreement with the U.S. through the mediation of the neutral Soviets. The Emperor even sent former Prime Minister Konoe as his special Envoy to the U.S.S.R. with the explicit request for the Government in Moscow to work as a mediator for a peace agreement between the U.S.A., Great Britain, and Japan. In return, the Japanese Government was willing to make full concessions to the U.S.S.R. regarding the status of Manchukuo (which they offered to neutralize), fishing rights and all other Soviet interests. It is known today that the official Japanese efforts to negotiate a settlement with the Soviets reached the highest ranks not only of Moscow but of all three Allies. At the Potsdam conference on July 28, Stalin informed Truman and Atlee about the Japanese approaches. He read to them the written statement of Japan’s latest ambassador to the U.S.S.R., Naotake Sato, containing clarifications on Konoe’s proposal. After the information was circulated, Stalin himself suggested to the other two leaders not to react to the proposal at all. Truman and Atlee agreed. For Stalin, this was a tactic to keep the Japanese waiting for Moscow’s help while preparing for battle, to reap gains from the imminent end of the war. To Truman and Atlee their decision was in line with previous demands and the

conviction that nothing short of an unconditional Japanese surrender was acceptable. Back in Moscow, Ambassador Sato was kept in the dark about these plans. The impossibility to receive help from the U.S.S.R. must have been evident to him. On July 30, he cabled to Foreign Minister Togo, that there was “no chance whatever” to persuade the Soviets to help end the war through their Good Office. Still, Togo replied that “in spite of your views, you are to carry out your instructions. (...) endeavor to obtain the Good Offices of the Soviet Union in ending the war short of unconditional surrender.” It was a hopeless attempt. On August 9, 1945, the day the second atomic bomb eradicated Nagasaki, Stalin declared war on the Empire of Japan. As a neutral observer, the Swiss Minister, Camille Gorgé, commented the desperate situation as follows:

The last illusion for the possibility of a prolonged resistance has disappeared after the Soviet declaration of war, which caused a real panic in the government, but which the press does not comment. Minister Togo who was grossly wrong about the Soviet attitude hastily returned to Karuizawa, literally shattered. Composure cannot replace intelligence.

24 hours later, the Japanese Government cabled to the Swiss—it's protecting power—that it accepted the Potsdam declaration, starting the negotiations for unconditional surrender which was completed on August 15.

Soviet neutrality in this regard was a critical factor in the decision-making process of the Japanese institutions that oversaw the country’s war efforts. One is tempted to

---

332 DDS, Bd. 16, Dok. 22, "Télégramme No 479", August 13, 1945, [OFrTA]. The last sentence of the quote has to be understood as an expression of the personal relationship between Gorgé and Togo. The word ‘composure’ was translated from the French ‘flegme’ which could, in this context, just as well mean ‘stoicism.’ The Swiss Minister knew Togo for more than 20 years and found him to be a very dry and distanced diplomat with poor interpersonal skills. Gorgé obviously thought that Togo’s misinterpretation of the Soviet attitude was largely due to the Minister’s poor judgement.
imagine that the war might have ended differently had Onodera or Fujimura’s telegrams reached the cabinet level, or had Stalin straightforwardly denied Japan’s requests for mediation. Had the hopelessness of the ‘Soviet option’ been known, many Japanese leaders might not have put their faith in the big neutral to the west.333 Leaving out the Soviet Union as a neutral Power is therefore maybe one of the largest omissions of this study. Under the above aspect, it can be argued that the U.S.S.R. was the most detrimental political neutral to Japan. It would, on the other hand, change the nature of the study if the Soviet Union was included. The U.S.S.R. was, after all, the largest continental Allied Power and its role as a neutral to Japan was clearly of political nature—not diplomatic. Therefore, the U.S.S.R. cannot be tossed in the same category of neutrals as Sweden, Spain, and Switzerland despite its Neutrality Pact with Japan. The U.S.S.R., after all, was a so-called ‘belligerent neutral,’ which was not the case for the three small Power neutrals.

2-3-2. Small Power Neutrals: Diplomatic Service Providers of Last Resort

After the above discussion, it might seem odd to lump together two traditional permanent neutrals like Sweden and Switzerland, with an occasional neutral like Spain. The latter did not even remain neutral on paper since on June 10, 1940, Franco adopted the highly suspicious status of ‘non-belligerency,’334 which was the same term that


334 Opposed to “neutrality”, “non-belligerency” was not (and still is not) defined under International Law. It is commonly understood as a state in which the non-belligerent state does not proactively join a belligerent party but does not intend to be bound by the restrictions of strict neutrality, i.e. the non-
Mussolini used for Italy, right before he joined Hitler in the war. That was a parallel that rang alarm bells among the Allies. There was a wide spread and justified fear of Spain entering WWII on the side of the Axis powers. After the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the U.S. government accepted the Japanese request for Spain to become its protecting Power in Washington but, at the same time, asked to prepare for the representation of U.S. interests in Spain and Turkey in case those two neutrals should join the war on their enemies’ side. Should these considerations not disqualify Spain as a ‘real neutral’ for this study?—Not quite.

Despite the obvious tilt towards the axis powers and the difference in the nature of its neutrality, Spain remained largely (and officially) outside the battlefield, keeping both belligerent parties at arm’s length for the whole time of the war. Surely Spain’s neutrality was a tactical one, and not a matter of deeply engrained principle, as was the case for Sweden and Switzerland but for the diplomacy on the ground, that did not matter. Spain, just like the other two neutrals, was able to keep its embassies and legations open around the world, conduct an independent foreign policy and—importantly for this study—lend its Good Office to Japan and its enemy nations alike.


337 The requests were send to the Swiss Federal governments on January 18 1942 in regard to Spain and 4 days later, on February 22 for Turkey. See: Letter Purry to Pilet-Golaz, dated January 19 1942. And letter U.S. legation in Berne to Federal Political Department, dated December 22 1941. In: CH-BAR, E2001D#1000/1553#1977*, B24.0, "Notenwechsel mit der USA - Gesandschaft betreffend die Uebernahme von USA - Interessen durch die Schweiz", 1941-1945. 22 & 34.
338 For a short but concise overview of Spanish WWII neutrality see: Marquina, "The Spanish Neutrality during the Second World War."
339 An exception was the “Blue Division.” See chapter 4-4.
For practical reasons of diplomacy, Spain’s occasional neutrality (and non-belligerency) was as good as Sweden or Switzerland’s permanent neutrality.

A look at the ways in which the belligerent powers made use of Sweden, Spain, and Switzerland makes this point clear. The three neutrals were the only states which were systematically serving as protecting Powers in or for Japan. After Pearl Harbor, only Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Portugal represented the interests of Allied nations in Tokyo. Vice versa, Japan was represented by the same four neutrals plus Argentina and Turkey. The latter two, however, were only marginally involved in the diplomatic relations for Japan. Turkey was representing Japan only in Iraq. Argentina did the same only in Greece and Syria. In neither of these countries Japan had an important emigrant community, nor were they the object of concrete Japanese war interests. In comparison to that, having a diplomatic representative in the U.S. and Canada (Spain), Hawaii (Sweden) or the U.K. (Switzerland) was of great importance because of the Japanese emigrants there and the potential strategic value in negotiations with the main enemy nations.

The following four maps are important for the rest of this study. They represent graphically the mandates that the neutrals held in Japan for allied nations (map 1 & 3)

---

340 More precisely: The French mandate for Syria and the Lebanon, as the former Ottoman territory was under a league of nations’ mandate at the time.

341 Spain did not have any diplomatic representation stationed on the Islands of Hawaii. The Gaimusho therefore approached the Swedes who were operating a consulate there for their help. At the time, Hawaii was home to over 400,000 ethnical Japanese. That was more than a third of the entire Hawaiian population. See on these statistics: Eleanor C. Nordyke and Scott Y. Matsumoto, “Japanese in Hawaii: A Historical and Demographic Perspective,” Hawaiian Journal of History 11 (1977).

342 The maps are based on the table of neutral mandates of Good Office of Annex 14. The size of the country flags does not carry any meaning.
and for Japan in allied nations (map 2 & 4).\textsuperscript{343} The maps are only an imperfect approach at understanding the diplomatic side of Japan’s war, because the situation kept changing every month. New countries declared war, some nations were overrun by one side or the other and territories changed hands. The picture was ever changing. A more precise, but less intuitive list of representations, on which these maps are based, can be found in Annex 14.

There are two moments that are particularly well suited for a ‘snap shot’ of the global state of affairs. The first pair of maps depicts the situation in mid-1942, when the question of diplomatic representation had been settled for most of the countries that had declared war on Japan in the initial weeks and months after its attack on Pearl Harbor. The second pair shows the situation toward the last stages of the war in August 1945, when many representations had changed for the end-game.

Japan asked Spain to be its representative in most of the Americas, with the important exception of Mexico and Hawaii, where the Spanish did not have diplomatic agents to act for the Japanese. In most of the British Empire and its former colonies, the Japanese chose Switzerland as its representatives and four selected countries that had either close ties to Sweden or where Switzerland was weekly represented, they chose Sweden. The mirror image of the above are the countries for which each neutral held mandates of Good Office in Japan, that is, the representation of their interests in Tokyo.

344 Mexico was one of the few governments which openly and full heartedly supported the Republican side during the Spanish Civil War. On March 8, 1939, when Franco’s final victory became apparent, Mexico withdrew its diplomats from Spain. It only reestablished diplomatic relations with it after the dictator’s death in 1977. See on this: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. Organización y Presupuesto Dirección General de Programación Manual de Organización de la Embajada de México en España: 2002, 3.
When comparing the above two maps, an interesting difference becomes obvious; except for the Republic of Paraguay, no other American country (north or south) for which Japan had asked Spain for its Good Office, also wanted to use the Spanish to represent their interests in Tokyo. Despite the shared language and cultural ties of Latin America with Spain, there was an obvious lack of trust toward the Spanish. The reason for which will be explored in chapter 4.

For the second ‘snap-shot,’ the most impact full event that changed the picture of diplomatic representations was Franco’s decision to completely sever relations with Japan in April 1945. This, of course, meant that the Spanish also laid down their mandates of Good Office for Japan. It was Switzerland and Sweden who subsequently agreed to take over those representations. The picture of the world map of representations for Japan in August 1945 was the following:
The Swiss and the Swedes both ‘inherited’ the mandates Spain used to hold. In Spain itself, although Franco did not declare war on Japan, the Japanese asked Switzerland for their protecting Power services. The Spanish did the same as pictured below, on the mirror image of the Good Offices that neutrals held in Japan for enemy nations in 1945.

It is worth noting that the time we are talking about were also the last years of European, U.S.-American and Japanese colonialism around the globe. As the available records of the Gaimusho and the Swiss and Swedish foreign office archives show, a lot of
emphasis was put by all involved sides on legally precise definitions of representations. That is why we find some of the U.K. and U.S. colonies and territories mentioned explicitly as jurisdictions within which the Swiss or the Swedes were named as protecting Powers for the Japanese. Allied nations explicitly accepted the representation of their enemy’s interests in the territories that were under their control. Japan, on the other hand, did not reciprocate. No neutral could officially serve as protecting Power in the occupied territories in East and South-East Asia, as, for example, in the Philippines, in occupied China, in Hong Kong, or in Singapore.345 The situation was slightly different for Japan’s colonies. Tokyo recognized that neutral protection extended to Korea, Formosa and the Kwantung Peninsula, however, since all three neutrals had only limited resources there (their only consulates were operated in Dairen—Kwantung Leased Territory), the protection of Japan’s enemy interests had to be organized from Tokyo, which was cumbersome and dangerous.346

On the other hand, the picture was not completely black and white. Although Japan refused to officially recognize the jurisdiction of neutral powers for the protection of enemy interests in the occupied territories, the Gaimusho secretly agreed that it would not stand in the way of neutral diplomatic agents acting in that capacity. The Swiss in their final report on the country’s role as a protecting Power listed many of the occupied

345 Although no official representation of enemy interests was tolerated by the Japanese Government outside the mainland, there were instances when the Gaimusho agreed to have Swiss or Swedish representatives act on these territories. For example, during the closure of enemy embassies or consulates and for some visits of prisoner of war camps. The latter was accepted only selectively and only late into the War in the Pacific. See on this: GORGÉ DIARY, "Debacle au Soleil-Levant: Journal d’un Témoin", 1939–1945, Entry July 5 1945.

346 The Swiss delegate Robert Bossert, who was sent from Kobe to oversee the orderly closure of the U.S. consulate in Formosa, was assassinated on the way back. See chapter 5.4.4.
territories under the category ‘de facto’ protecting Power. This was another one of the many complications that arose from the divided state the Japanese administration was in. The Gaimusho was, in general, sympathetic toward neutral representation of enemy interests but that the War Ministry as well as the Army and Navy were much less understanding, impeding the neutrals protecting Power work.

The only Asian territory that was under ‘real’ and effective neutral protection was the island of Macau, which was a Portuguese colony. The island’s neutral status was recognized by all belligerent powers for the entire time of the war. Because it was a neutral colony, Macau hosted the most interesting abnormality in terms of foreign representation. It was the home of a British consulate (an Allied power), representing the interests of the United States (another Allied country) who did not have a permanent diplomatic representative there.

As described in the introduction, the mandates of protecting power can be counted. For this purpose, a state that represents two belligerents on each other’s soil would count as two mandates. For example, Switzerland’s representation of Japan in the U.K. and the U.K. in Japan is two different mandates although the neutral Power was the same. Counting each instance of representation as a separate mandate, the relative importance of the neutrals to Japan becomes even clearer. The following numbers varied over time and they also depended on whether the colonial territories of European Powers were counted separately or not, but, in general, the following was the case: For the mid-1942 period, Switzerland had a total of thirty-nine mandates, Spain thirteen and Sweden had

---

347 See chapter 1-2-4.
348 Reeves et al., The Lone Flag: Memoir of the British Consul in Macao during World War II.
349 Ibid., 71-73.
eleven. Regarding the other neutrals, Portugal and Argentina\(^{350}\) both held two mandates and Turkey one. Toward the very end of the war, these numbers had completely changed, leaving Switzerland with sixty mandates, Sweden with thirty-seven, Spain with none and Portugal with three. Argentina had ruptured ties with Japan already on January 26, 1944, giving up its mandates and it even departed completely from its neutrality on March 27, 1945, when declared war on Japan.\(^{351}\) The Turkish government similarly had ruptured its relations with the empire on January 6, 1945, and declared war on it on February 23.\(^{352}\)

\(^{350}\) Before May 1942 Argentina had a total of five representations, being also in charge of representing British, Canadian and Australian interests in Tokyo. Those mandates came to an end because of the lack of capacity of the Argentinian legation in Tokyo. This episode is explained at the end of chapter 5-4-1.


2-4. Chapter Summary & Conclusion

This chapter proposes to frame the historical experiences of Sweden, Spain, and Switzerland toward the Empire of Japan under the general development of the neutrality concept in International Relations. It explains that the law of neutrality was born out of neutral practice and that the philosophical underpinnings lie in Just War Theory and the theory of International Law. Although norms of territorial and maritime neutrality have been around as a fact of international life for at least 800 years—but most likely much longer—it’s high time came only with the long nineteenth century. After 1815, statesmen and diplomats started building an international security architecture which relied upon the functioning of neutrality law as one of its pillars. The European Balance of Power would not have succeeded in keeping the continent free of an all-consuming war like the Napoleonic Wars or WWI, had it not been for explicit provisions of neutrality, which great Powers, like the British Empire, Russia or the United States defended because they were neutrals more often than belligerents. The right of neutrals to trade with all belligerents was the most essential aspect of nineteenth century neutrality. It was built around the Clausewitzian premise that small-scale wars were a fact of international life and trade during war was, therefore, a necessity for everyone. The Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and the Declaration of London represent the culmination of that legalistic approach toward International Relations. The belligerents of WWI broke with much of that tradition, not at least through the systematic infringement of the law of neutrality. Ironically, it was the blunt disregard for the rights of neutrals which, in the end, forced a decision of the conflict by drawing in the largest neutral of the era—the United States—into the war on the side of the Entente Powers.
Some historians have claimed that WWI and the beginning of the collective security era, under the League of Nations, was the end of the ‘Age of Neutrals.’ This chapter, however, argues that although collective security was warmly embraced especially by small Powers, the provisions of the nineteenth century lived on, re-emerging just the way they used to be, with the demise of collective security in the 1930s. Ever after 1936, small Powers paddled back from their experiments with ‘differential neutrality’ to ‘absolute’ and ‘permanent’ neutrality. The United States never even gave up its traditional neutrality—on the contrary, it continuously strengthened its domestic provisions for it. The Spanish Civil War brought back also the occasional neutralities of the other great Powers—including Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Japan. By the time Hitler attacked Poland in 1939, the international system was back to where it was in 1914, with dozens of nations declaring neutrality toward the war in Europe. Some of these neutralities were the ‘traditional’ kind; permanent neutrals like Switzerland, Sweden, Holland, or the U.S., and some of them were tactical neutralities; like those of the U.S.S.R., Italy, Spain, and Japan.

This network of neutralities created situations which might seem bizarre. The Neutrality Pact between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, for example, meant that even Japan was a neutral state for most of the time of the Second World War, but only toward one Allied belligerent. Swiss Minister Gorgé rightfully once called this “the strangest neutrality that one has ever seen.” In the end, the ‘strange’ neutralities of the U.S.S.R., the U.S., and Japan played decisive roles in the development of the Second World War. The

neutralities of small Powers, on the other hand, had a completely different function and impact. Especially in the years 1939–1941, the number of neutrals—small and great Powers—were still relatively large but decreased over time either because neutrals were attacked and occupied, or because occasional neutrals shed their status to join the war. The ‘bizarreness’ of great Power neutralities puts Spain’s neutrality into a different light, making it, in fact, rather typical. Even though Madrid changed its status to non-belligerency, the nineteenth century provisions for its rights and duties still applied and enabled it to play a similar role for Japan during the Pacific War as Sweden and Switzerland did—acting as protecting Power on both sides.
3. **Sweden**

The best country to begin the comparative analysis of this thesis is Sweden because its relations with Japan were not disturbed by a Civil War—as in the case of Spain—nor did it invest early on into diplomatic relations with Japan, like Switzerland. Sweden is in this sense the most ‘normal’ neutral to contrast the other two experiences with. Its relationship with Japan used to be relatively calm in the beginning, intensified shortly after the turn of the twentieth century and reached a climax during the wartime period.
3-1. Early Modern Swedish-Japanese Relations

Swedish-Japanese relations date back to the time when Stockholm was still in a union with Oslo. The ‘United Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway’ was the twelfth nation to establish diplomatic relations with Japan after the archipelago’s 250 years of seclusion from the world. Although the Scandinavians did not belong to the first round of seafaring nations to approach Japan after its forceful opening by the U.S. in 1853, it was, however, the first country to conclude a treaty of Commerce and Friendship with the new Meiji Government after the demise of the Tokugawa Shogunate. The treaty was signed on November 11, 1868, by the Minister Resident of the Netherlands, Dirk de Graeff van Polsbroek. Sweden did not send its own embassy to Japan to negotiate the terms of the agreement, because it was, in essence, the same document that the other great Powers and Switzerland had already concluded—an ‘unequal’ treaty, granting more rights to the western Powers than to Japan and including a most-favorite-nation clause. Also after 1868 foreign representation of Swedish-Norwegian interests remained an important aspect of the Kingdom’s diplomacy toward Japan. It did not name a Swedish-Norwegian national as its diplomatic representative for nearly forty years. Instead, it left its diplomacy in Tokyo to Dutch and—occasionally—Spanish

355 In chronological order of treaty establishment, Japan’s first diplomatic relations were with: The United States (58), The Netherlands (58), Russia (58), Great Britain (58), France (58), Portugal (60), Prussia (61), Switzerland (64), Belgium (66), Italy (66), Denmark (67), Sweden-Norway (68), Spain (68), North German Confederation (69), Austro-Hungary 69), Hawaii (71). See on this Appendix one in: Michael R. Auslin, Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).


357 Auslin, Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy, 154.

ministers, who lent their Good Offices to the Scandinavians. It was not until 1906 that a proper Swedish minister would be named to handle the country’s diplomatic relations with Japan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frederik Philip (Jonkheer)</td>
<td>Van der Hoeven</td>
<td>Minister Resident</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td>1872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilhelm Ferdinand Henrik</td>
<td>Van Wekherlin</td>
<td>Minister Resident</td>
<td>1872</td>
<td>1878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmond Willem Ferdinand</td>
<td>Wtewaal van Stoetwegen</td>
<td>Minister Resident</td>
<td>1879</td>
<td>1881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johannes Jakobus</td>
<td>Van der Pot</td>
<td>Minister Resident</td>
<td>1881</td>
<td>1889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dmitri Louis, Greve</td>
<td>Van Bylandt</td>
<td>Minister Resident</td>
<td>1890</td>
<td>1896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hannibal Casimir Johannes</td>
<td>Testa</td>
<td>Minister Resident</td>
<td>1896</td>
<td>1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hannibal Casimir Johannes</td>
<td>Testa</td>
<td>Envoy</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthur Martin</td>
<td>Sweerts de Landas Wyborgh</td>
<td>Envoy</td>
<td>1902</td>
<td>1905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Désiré (Baron)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John, Jonkheer</td>
<td>Loudon</td>
<td>Envoy</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>1906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gustaf Oscar</td>
<td>Wallenberg</td>
<td>Envoy</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Kristian</td>
<td>Bergström</td>
<td>Envoy</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>1922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oskar Anton Herman</td>
<td>Ewerlöf</td>
<td>Envoy</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johan Erik Evald</td>
<td>Hultman</td>
<td>Envoy</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widar</td>
<td>Bagge</td>
<td>Envoy</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Swedish Representatives in Japan 1871–1945

---

359 There are two sources on this from the Swedish and the Japanese side. For the Swedish side see: Sweden. Utrikesdepartementet. Kungl. utrikesdepartementets kalender: 1938. [Calendar of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs]: 1938, 211. And for the Japanese part see Kawasaki Seiro’s account: Kawasaki, "Kenkyu Nouto: Meiji Jidai no Toukyou ni atta Gaikoku Koukan (4) – The Foreign Missions in Tokyo of the Meiji Period (4)," 78. Interestingly, the Swedish primary source, the Calendar of the Swedish Foreign Office, does not mention the short periods during which Spanish ministers represented Swedish interests in 1877 and 1880, as described in Kawasaki’s paper which he bases on archival records of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is possible that those were inter-rim mandates taken over by the Spanish mission during the period’s when no official Dutch representatives was stationed in Tokyo.

360 Jonkheer is the lowest of the titles of nobility in the Netherlands. It is equivalent to the English “squire.”

361 Dutch noble title for “Count.”

362 The Swedish sources of the Foreign Office suggest that Wallenberg was Sweden’s envoy until 1920, while already naming Bergström as his successor from 1918 onwards. The Japanese sources however mention that Wallenberg left his position in 1918 already.
The reason for the change in attitude toward Japan had its origins in the domestic political developments a year earlier. 1905 unexpectedly turned into one of the most important years for Sweden’s foreign policy in the young twentieth century. On the one hand, the political union with Norway came to an abrupt but un-bloody end when first the Norwegian parliament and subsequently the population voted to break away from Sweden to become an independent nation again. The new proportions of the Swedish state changed the strategic considerations of Stockholm significantly. Long forgotten were the days when the country was a major power to be reckoned with on the European continent.364 Surrounded by a Europe with an increasing number of large, imperialistic nation-states (Germany and Italy had been unified less than 50 years ago) Sweden had once and for all become a small Power.365 This marked the beginning of a more pro-active Swedish diplomacy around the globe.

On the other hand, 1905 was also the year when Japan rose to the status of a great Power in the eyes of the Europeans, after its victory over Tsarist Russia. It was the first ever victory of an eastern army over a European state. In light of these shifting power dynamics, a specially appointed committee on diplomatic and consular matters refocused Sweden’s foreign policy on the promotion of trade and commerce. Among other measures, it took the decision to put more emphasis on relations with Asia.366 In

contrast to Denmark, which chose to base its eastern diplomatic headquarters in China, Sweden, under the guidance of the committee, decided to make Japan its hub in Asia. The military might of the Empire and the already existing Swedish diplomatic network there made it an attractive option. At the same time, the committee overhauled the Swedish foreign service, opening it up to non-aristocrats, which broadened the choice of possible envoys. Sweden’s Foreign Ministry chose in 1906 Gustaf Oscar Wallenberg to become its first proper Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Japan. Wallenberg was an influential local ship owner and belonged to one of Sweden’s most prominent families of financiers. His brother, Knut Agathon Wallenberg, would become Sweden’s Foreign Minister for the longest time of WWI, 1914–1917, and his grandson was the famous Raoul Wallenberg who saved tens of thousands of Jews from deportation by the Nazi in Hungary during WWII.

From the beginning, Gustaf Wallenberg’s mission to Tokyo went beyond considerations for diplomatic relations with Japan alone. His task was to increase Swedish trade in Asia in general. Especially China offered large potential gains for a small export-oriented nation if just the right mode of interaction could be established. Historian Bert Edström put it as follows: “With one quarter of the world’s population, China had enormous needs that the Japanese industry could meet. The logic was that if Sweden

---

367 Ibid.
could become a supplier to Japan, then it would automatically result in an upsurge in Swedish exports as a result of the rapid growth of Japan’s exports." Wallenberg was subsequently side-accredited to China a year later, in 1907. The prospects for Swedish trade were good for both countries since the local population was clearly more inclined to seek out small European powers for questions of trade and knowledge transfer instead of the large, imperialistic nations with whom both had already made experiences of being forced to accept highly unequal relationships.

3-1-1. Trade and Diplomacy

The new trade strategy was relatively successful. Between 1908 and 1914 Swedish exports to Japan almost tripled from 2.27 million SEK to 6.32 million SEK. At the

---

371 Edström, "Japan as a Distant Friend: Scandinavian Countries Adjusting to Japan’s Emergence as a Great Power," 222.
373 Salmon, Scandinavia and the Great Powers 1890-1940, 36.
374 Photographer Unknown, Picture of Gustaf Oscar Wallenberg (Veckojournalen, 1913). ©Public Domain
relatively low inflation rate of 1.12% (on average)\(^{376}\) that signified a real growth of exports and not just an increase on paper.

Figure 3: Swedish Imports & Exports to Japan 1908–1912, in million SEK\(^{377}\)

The trend continued. At the end of Wallenberg’s tenure, in 1918, exports to Japan had again more than doubled to 13.11 million SEK\(^{378}\) However, since the Great War in Europe caused considerable inflationary tendencies, not all of the revenue increase of that period stem from an actual increase in exported products.\(^{379}\) Especially in the last two years of WWI the Swedish economy suffered from large increases in the general price level of goods and services.\(^{380}\) Nevertheless, even with this qualification it is evident that the Swedish foreign policy and the workings of Wallenberg’s diplomacy

---


\(^{377}\) Data Source: Swedish Statistical Yearbooks 1908–1914.


\(^{379}\) The inflation of those days sore at times to 23.6%.

succeeded in attracting more currency from Japan in payment for Swedish goods. Trade relations beneficial to Sweden were on a steady rise.

![Swedish Imports & Exports to Japan 1914–1930](image)

The Chinese market on the other hand grew significantly slower, reaching only a quarter of the Japanese numbers. It is unclear how much of Swedish exports to Japan was destined for re-export or became part of new products exported to the Asian mainland. Even without this information it is clear, however, that the Swedish strategy to foster export markets in Asia succeeded at least partially. According to Edström, among the Scandinavian countries Sweden was the only nation that managed to “forge substantial bonds” with Japan during the first decade of the twentieth century. Sweden continued sending diplomats with close ties to political and commercial circles to Japan. Wallenberg’s successor was the well-connected David Kristian Bergström, a

---

381 Data source: Swedish Statistical Yearbooks 1914-1930. The precis economic analysis of the change in trade of the inflation years would go beyond the scope of this thesis and will be omitted.

382 Edström, "Japan as a Distant Friend: Scandinavian Countries Adjusting to Japan’s Emergence as a Great Power," 230.
journalist and former member of parliament (MP) who achieved popularity as a public intellectual. His newspaper publications and his work for the introduction of universal suffrage around the turn of the century were famous. Like Wallenberg, he devoted his time in Japan to improve trade relations.\textsuperscript{383} Revenue from export peaked under his watch in 1920 at more than 31 million SEK.

Sweden’s next Envoy was Oscar Anton Herman Ewerlöf, who took his position up in 1923. Ewerlöf too was a Swedish political insider, having served as Chancellor and Head of the Department of Legal Affairs since 1907 and then in the position as cabinet secretary from 1913 to 1918. Although Ewerlöf was not an industrialist or merchant like Wallenberg, he was no stranger to questions of trade and commerce. He used to serve as a member of the State Commerce Commission from 1915 to 1917. However, more than his predecessors, Ewerlöf was also interested in the political situation of East Asia. He joined the Special Conference on Chinese Customs Tariff in 1925.\textsuperscript{384} The conference was convened in accordance with the 1922 Washington Naval Conference and the (unequal) Nine Power Treaty, which itself was a vehicle for the U.S., Japan and European Powers to cement the Open-Door policy in China. It gave special rights only to Japan in Manchuria but held that all other parts of the country must be equally accessible to all nations who wished to do business there. In return, China was promised that at a next conference the question of custom tariffs and the principle of extraterritoriality would be re-negotiated. That conference took place on October 26, 1925. Sweden was not one of the signatories of the original Nine Power Treaty—it

\textsuperscript{383} G. Jacobson, s.v. "David Kristian Bergström," (accessed 2017/08/05).
\textsuperscript{384} Bengt Hilderbrand, s.v. "Ewerlöf, släkt," (accessed 2017/08/06).
included only the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, Italy, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, and China—but, for the follow-up conference, Beijing extended invitations to other major seafaring nations as well, namely Sweden, Denmark, Spain, and Norway.\footnote{W. Jianlang, Unequal Treaties and China (2-Volume Set), Unequal Treaties and China Series (Enrich Professional Publishing (S) Private, Limited, 2015), 137-44.} Riots and political upheaval in Beijing delayed negotiations and toward the final phase, the conference was deadlocked due to seemingly irreconcilable stances on country internal tariff systems. Ewerlöf together with his Danish colleague helped to mediate positions during these tense moments. Ultimately, the treaty through which China regained its tariff autonomy after eighty years, was completed on November 19, 1926.\footnote{The treaty came into force on January 1, 1929. See: ibid., 144.} For Sweden, the significance of the treaty was that the new tariff regime and the status of a guarantor nation to China became guidelines for its foreign policy toward Asia.\footnote{Ottosson, Handel under Protest, 85.}
3-2. Diplomacy and Foreign Policy 1931–1937

At the beginning of the 1930s Swedish relations with Japan were firmly rooted in their mutual trade interests. The previous decade had been marked by a steady flow of goods between the two countries. The trade balance stayed at any time positive for Sweden with the only remarkable ‘dent’ in trade from 1919 to 1921 but that was due to the rampant inflation of the years immediately following WWI (between 30% and 80% annually). Apart from some cultural exchanges and continued trade not much happened between the two nations. Politically there were no strains on their relationship. That changed with the outset of the Mukden incident and the Japanese Army’s aggressions in Shanghai. The eleven-year-old League of Nations became for the first time the forum for a tense international conflict and Sweden took an active role in it. Sweden’s outspoken stance against Japanese expansionism in China became the first serious diplomatic dispute between Stockholm and Tokyo (see chapter 2-2-2).

3-2-1. Trade

The developments in Geneva in 1932 and 1933 were dramatic and ended in failure and the defeat of the League as the world policeman. Japan did not reverse its course and Manchukuo remained a de facto occupied territory under the Empires’ control until its surrender to the Allies in 1945. Despite the strong words of Swedish representatives in Geneva neither the league as a whole nor Sweden individually put sanctions against Japan into force.\(^{388}\) In fact, diplomatic dispute had hardly an effect on Swedish-Japanese trade relations. During and even after the dispute, trade between the countries

continued to flourish as always. Even years later, in 1938, when Japan became so unpopular in Sweden that left circles called for a country-wide boycott of Japanese products, their efforts failed and public opinion, although strongly against Japanese aggressions, had only a marginal influence on trade. Although some members of the Japan-Sweden society in Tokyo threatened to withdraw from the body due to their indignation over Swedish actions in Geneva, all in all, the 1930s were a decade of growth for the bilateral exchange between the two. Imports from Japan were still significantly smaller in quantity than exports but the decoupling of the Yen from the gold standard and its devaluation helped making Japanese products cheaper, resulting in a noticeable increase of imports in the following years.

There were several Swedish trading companies based in Japan. The most important one was the Gadelius trading house, established by Knut Gadelius in 1890 in Sweden

---

390 Data Source: Sweden Statistical Yearbooks 1931-1939.
with its first subsidiary in Yokohama founded in 1907. Gadelius imported Swedish high technology like air heaters and steam turbines—products known for their high quality to Japan. But more importantly, these trading houses imported much needed raw materials and technical parts like Swedish steal and ball bearings that were bought by Japan’s heavy industry and engineering companies. Weapons, on the other hand, were also sold but not to Japan, they were only exported to the Chinese market through companies licensed by the Swedish government. That, however, had less to do with moral indignation of Swedish politicians than with path dependency; weapons trade with China had been going on for fifteen years already while Swedish armament companies found it impossibly hard to enter the Japanese market.

3-2-2. Diplomacy

Just like trade continued undisturbed after the Manchurian incident, so did diplomacy on the ground in Tokyo—and by extension—in China. Swedish diplomats in Tokyo, in fact, tended to side with Japan on the question of Manchukuo. Ewerlöf’s successor, J.E.E. Hultman in his reports to the Royal Swedish Foreign Ministry (Kungl. Utrikesdepartementet—KUD), in 1930 and 1931 expressed the opinion that Manchuria was not one of the ancient territories of the Chinese and that it suffered greatly from lawlessness and bandits which only the Japanese were able to keep at bay through their

391 The company lives on today under the name of Gadelius Industry K.K. and—in the form of another offspring—as the Swiss-Swedish ABB holding.
393 Ottosson, Handel under Protest, 86.
394 Ibid., 88-89.
395 Ibid., 167.
army and police officers. The unruly state of Manchuria and especially the perception that the land was suffering from anarchy was a common theme among western observers. Hultman and other Swedish diplomats stationed in East Asia shared these perceptions and felt it right to communicate them to their superiors in Stockholm, supporting the view that it was the Japanese who were bringing a principle of order to the messy country.

The reason why Hultman’s opinion deferred so greatly from that of the Swedish statesmen in Geneva lies in his career path. Hultman belonged to the first generation of pure career diplomats. He joined the KUD at the age of thirty and was stationed in London, Cape Town, Saint Petersburg, Arkhangelsk, Shanghai, Helsinki, and Hamburg before reaching the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary when he was assigned to Tokyo in 1928. To him and others of his rank and file, Japanese army officers, diplomats, and politicians who expressed a sense of mission to educate and bring order to chaotic parts of the world rang the familiar bells of the colonization discourse that had accompanied them throughout their careers. The idea that tyrannical local leaders, the pathetic state of subjects and social chaos legitimized foreign rule was nothing foreign to them. Knut Gadelius, the mentioned head of the largest Swedish trading house shared similar views and the former Minister to Japan, Oskar Ewerlöf, upon being interviewed on the Manchurian question straightforwardly answered that: “my sympathies are more on

---

396 See for example the accounts of the Swiss reporter A.R. Lindt, who reflected these issues even in the title of his adventure-novel type of correspondence from Manchukuo a few years later: A.R. Lindt, *Im Sattel durch Mandschukuo: Als Sonderberichterstatter bei Generälen und Räubern* (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1934).


400 Ottosson, *Handel under Protest*, 121.
the Japanese side, because Japan represents progress, order and the countries work, which the Chinese do not do on their own." Hultman was also of the opinion that Chinese nationalism and China’s steering of anti-Japanese feelings were a great problem to the peaceful resolution of the conflict. Ottosson’s conclusion on Swedish diplomats outside the realm of the League of Nations arena is that while they “distanced themselves from the actions of the Japanese military, they found it hard to hold any warmer feelings for the Chinese side.”

Many of Ewerlöf’s and Hultman’s opinions are reflected in the official government reports of the early 1930s — for example, the view that Manchuria never was a true Chinese province and cannot be counted as a proper Chinese territory. Hultman’s belief in Japan’s right to defend its interests on the Chinese mainland did not fade out of the white papers easily. Only a year later, in 1932–1933 his reports from Tokyo started painting a bleaker image of the situation. However, that had not so much to do with the developments in Manchuria than with the political developments on the mainland. The assassinations of Japanese leaders like Prime Minister Inukai in May 1932 and the general instability that surrounded the government were the causes of his concern.

Although the Swedish Envoy never believed that the Mukden incident was staged by Japan as a pretext for invasion, he was not that easily fooled about the ‘independence’ of the newly created puppet state of Manchukuo. Neither were his superiors. When the Swedish executive received a letter from the newly formed ‘Government of

401 See footnote 48 in: ibid., 91.
402 Ibid., 111.
403 Ibid., 91.
404 Ibid., 96.
405 Ibid., 111-12.
Manchukuo,’ dated March 12, 1932, the Swedes did not even send a reply to acknowledge its receipt. On the other hand they also never reacted to the request of the Chinese minister in Stockholm, who wished that the Swedish government issued a protest against Japan’s recognition of Manchukuo.406

By mid-1933 Hultman reversed his earlier position on the healthiness of Japanese rule in China and even started to warn Swedish entrepreneurs from entering the Japanese market as he judged the local economy to be in a precarious situation.407 The businessmen in the Swedish community did not, however, agree with him. They voiced opinions that their country had to remember its traditional policy of neutrality and should, for the sake of commercial interests, refrain from taking sides. Similar discussions on the future course of action toward Japan and the League of Nations was happening in the Riksdag, the Swedish Parliament. Opinions were diverse, ranging from understanding for Japan’s withdrawal all the way to voices who wanted to withdraw Sweden from the League. No such course of action was adopted but the debate about the future of politics and trade was in full motion.408

During the following four years (until the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese war in July 1937) bilateral relations between Japan and Sweden relaxed. The political fallout was over.409 However, to Swedish politicians, diplomats, civil society and business leaders, commerce with East Asia had to be considered under two new aspects. First, how to deal with a nationalist Japan that allied itself with Nazi Germany and second, how to operate trade with China, considering that Japan controlled Manchukuo? To the

406 Ibid., 132.
407 Ibid., 141.
408 Ibid., 152-55.
409 Ibid., 179.
Social Democratic government, it was of course out of question to extend any form of recognition to Manchukuo or backtrack on its criticism for Japanese military actions. To them, Japan, together with Italy and Germany, was a threat to world peace.410 This view coincided with the interests of those groups in society who felt increasingly threatened by what had come to be framed in strong racial terms; the ‘yellow peril.’ Much like the same debate in the U.S., Japan’s assertiveness in China fueled the fears of social groups who had most to lose from cheap imports. Representatives of the working class (especially those engaged in the garment industry) spoke out against unfair ‘dumping’ prices of Japanese imports and how those were not only harmful for local labor but had also been produced by exploiting Japanese workers.411

3-2-3. Manchukuo and the Beans

On the second issue, the same forces had rather little to say since imports from China (including Manchuria) were of a different nature and did not contain a lot of manufactured goods. The strongest opinions were voiced by the business community. On the one hand, Manchukuo with its thirty million people could not possibly be ignored as a market. After all, 15% of customs revenue with China had previously come from Manchuria when it was still under Chinese control.412 But even more important were considerations for what could be imported from Manchukuo; oil—soybean oil. Manchuria was rich in fertile land that was used to cultivate soy in large quantities. Soybean had high concentrations of vegetable fat that was not only convenient to use as

411 Ibid., 211-12.
412 Ibid., 155-57.
a basis for processed foodstuffs (margarine, for example) or cosmetics, but it was also an important source of protein. Swedish merchants had early on discovered the nutritional benefits of soy and started importing it. Since the beans are easy to store and to process, they promised to alleviate the country from the fear of mal-nutrition during times of agricultural hardship. The beans could be consumed either directly or used as feeding stuff for cattle. During the height of WWII, soybean would even be used as a replacement for coffee beans to brew what Yuriko Onodera (the wife of army attaché Makoto Onodera) observed to be the Swedish national beverage.  

413 Already in 1930 Hultman reported that “the whole world is dependent on the flow of oil from the Manchurian fields.” 414 Time would prove him right because soybean imports from Manchuria continued to grow rapidly.

![Soybean Import from Manchukuo (JPY)](image)

Figure 6: Growth of Soybean Import from Manchukuo to Sweden in million JPY (1932–1936)  

In early March 1937, Gösta Guston, the East Asia manager of Svenska Kullagerfabriken AB (SKF), a ball bearing manufacturer, and Swedish consul in Yokohama, informed the new Swedish Minister to Tokyo, Widar Bagge, in two letters about the situation of soybean exports from Manchukuo. Firstly, shipments from Dairen with destination Stockholm had reached an all-time high in the previous year. A total of 136,456 tons had left the harbor. The value of that trade was 20 million SEK.\textsuperscript{416} In comparison, total imports from Japan proper for the same year were merely half that number and the total of imports from China (to which the Manchurian imports belonged to in the official statistics) was 28 million SEK. Even Imports from Japan proper of that year were worth merely 15.6 million SEK. In terms of total trade volume, Manchukuo’s Soybeans accounted for roughly 1.2% of Swedish Imports in 1936.\textsuperscript{417} It was a commodity in high demand.\textsuperscript{418} Although Imports from Manchukuo were certainly not a lifeline of the Swedish economy, soybean was a factor on the minds of Swedish politicians and diplomats. Consul Guston’s detailed assessments are an interesting account in this regard. On the one hand, it is telling that he—the consul in Yokohama—found this to be an important economic aspect that his new boss, the Minister to Japan, ought to know. Sweden recognized Manchurian soybean, of course, only as a produce of China (not Japan) and in the eyes of the official Japan it was an export that concerned only Manchukuo. However, to diplomatists no such illusions prevailed. It was clear to the practitioners that Swedish imports from Manchukuo depended on the agreement from Tokyo to export them and that this trade had to be counted toward that of the Japanese

\textsuperscript{416} Letter Guston to Bagge, dated March 4, 1937. In: ibid.
\textsuperscript{418} On this issue see also Ottosson, Handel under Protest, 199-201.
Empire. Guston explicitly listen exports from Manchukuo to Sweden under the heading of “trade relations between Sweden and the Japanese Empire.” 419 Guston was of the opinion that this needed to be kept in mind negotiating with Japanese representatives. Guston even suggested that the recognition of this trade volume might help Sweden to receive favorable export terms with Manchukuo—or at least not be discriminated against when competing with Germany which had signed a trade agreement with Manchukuo in April 1936. 420 Under such unofficial considerations for the size of the Japanese Empire, trade balance tips in favor for it. Guston calculated in the same letter that, all in all, Sweden was running a trade deficit with the Japanese empire of 2.6 million JPY. To him the strategic question was not if Manchukuo should be recognized or not—it was clear that the political situation would not allow for any such considerations—but how to utilize these numbers to receive more favorable trade terms? He was convinced in “the importance of protecting our interests in this territory as a future valuable Export market” 421 and this could be achieved because the “Manchukuo Authorities well recognize the necessity of confining any discussion to strictly Trade questions, and also that the unsatisfactory experience with the German-Manchukuo Trade Agreement may invite consideration of Sweden as a substantial buyer of Soybeans—a fact hitherto not known.” 422

Guston never grew tired of emphasizing the importance of Manchukuo. In later letters, he recommended exploring possibilities for Swedish direct investments as well as

420 Gerhard L. Weinberg, Hitler’s Foreign Policy 1933-1939: The Road to World War II (Enigma Books, 2010), 104.
422 Ibid.
collaborations with Japanese concerns that were known to establish factories or branches in Manchukuo.  These remarks were strong for an official representative of Sweden, but they must be understood in the context of his personality and the mission he saw himself promoting—increase trade relations with East Asia. Guston was well connected within the Japanese business world and he had a sharp eye for local conditions. When the argument in Sweden arose against Japanese imports because those were produced by the exploitation of cheap labor, Guston was among those who vehemently rejected the criticism pointing out the difference in living costs and the living standards in Japan with medical care, cheap rents and pension funds available for local workers.  What he was afraid of was retaliation from the Japanese side, should his country decide to implement import restrictions. Regarding tariffs, his arguments supported the views of the Japanese and the Swedish business community; they should be lowered to facilitate the sales of goods from East Asia in Sweden to encourage the Japanese parliament to follow suit and not slide into protectionism. In this sense, Guston was a Swedish liberal-internationalist business man, and not a representative of the Swedish political course of action. Those were merely the boundaries within which he and the Swedish business community operated. Overall, business was—like Guston—Japan friendly perceiving Manchukuo not as a threat to principles of International Law and the life among nation-states, but as an opportunity to strengthen the national interest through commerce.

423 Guston suggests encouraging Swedish exporters to more closely collaborate with the Japanese automotive manufacturer Nissan, because that company was known to open factories in Manchukuo the next year. See: Letter Guston to Bagge, dated November 19, 1937. In: ibid.
424 Ottosson, Handel under Protest, 219.
425 Ibid., 219-21.
3-3. The Impact of the Second Sino-Japanese War: Relations 1937–1941

A big change for the Swedes and their relations to East Asia came in summer 1937. On July 7, the Marco-Polo Bridge incident sparked the beginning of the official stage of the war between Japan and China. The Japanese army attacked Chinese military positions and started assaults against the Government of Chang Kai-shek, raiding cities and attacking the capital Nanjing. The Chinese leader and his government retreated from their position, leading to the fall of the city on December 13, 1937. Subsequently, Japanese soldiers committed some of the worst atrocities of the entire war in the subdued capital. Although Swedish top foreign policymakers kept working with the League of Nations until the bitter end, the league had already become largely ineffective when China again appealed to it for help on August 13, 1937. This time, the Japanese government simply refused to participate in any attempts for discussions or mediations. The League’s assembly condemned Japanese actions as a violation of both, the Kellog-Birand Pact and the Nine-Power Pact. The only concrete effect of this action was that Japan’s Privy Council decided to cut any remaining ties that Japan still had to the various organs of the league. As per November 2, 1938 Japan suspended any interaction with it.426

Apart from the obvious failure and humiliation of the Swedish internationalist position at the League of Nations, the most impactful problems the new situation created had again to do with trade. This time not only because the markets in China disappeared, or fell under Japanese control, but the full-scale warfare and a Japanese mandated blockade of the Chinese coastline made the trading routes unsafe. Shipping became

dangerous to the point that Swedish companies had to offer war risk allowances for sailors on dangerous routes.\textsuperscript{427} Similarly, Swedish missionaries in China came under pressure from both the Japanese and Chinese sides. Most of them had to flee to safety in 1938 and 1939. The country’s diplomats and the expatriate communities in the big port cities had the same problems, the deteriorating security situation put all of them in danger. A Swedish sailor died during the battle for Shanghai and lots of Swedish property was destroyed or damaged. The situation did not improve much once the Japanese forces had secured their positions, foreigners were treated with suspicion and one Swedish Businessmen, K.G. Söderblom, was even arrested on charges of espionage.\textsuperscript{428}

Trade with China naturally suffered under these conditions. Exports fell from 15.4 million SEK in 1937 to 8.0 million SEK a year later and to 6.0 million SEK in 1939.\textsuperscript{429} Numbers for imports remained stable at around 31 million SEK but that was only because the official statistics were still counting Manchurian soybean as a product of China. The actual total sum of imports for 1939 was 5.2 million SEK. That was only a third of what Sweden at the same time imported from Manchukuo (15.6 million SEK).

Trade with Japan proper also took a sharp turn. Whereas 1937 had been the most outstanding year for Sweden’s exports with 47.8 million SEK, the number plummeted back to 26.3 million SEK in 1938. The change manifested also in the consular logs of the port cities. Whereas for the year 1938 a total of fourty-seven Swedish ships called at the port of Yokohama and the following year still registered fourty, the number of ships

\textsuperscript{427} Ottosson, \textit{Handel under Protest}, 252.
\textsuperscript{428} Ibid., 258.
fell to twenty-five in 1940 and not a single port call to Yokohama was reported by the
Swedish consulate in 1941.\textsuperscript{430} The reason for that was twofold. On the one hand the see
passage became much more dangerous and cumbersome when the war in Europe broke
out in September 1939. Britain started patrolling the see, demanding that neutral cargo
must obtain its Navicerts to be allowed to pass (see below). But on the other hand,
domestic policy in Japan got in the way as well. The parliament enacted new legislation
in 1937 to eliminate trade deficits, aiming at spurring domestic production of vital
goods and thereby decreasing Japan’s dependence on foreign production. On the second
point, Minister Bagge summarized the situation in September 1937 in a telegram to the
KUD as follows:

\begin{quote}
(...)
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{431} The ideology of nationalism had reached the business world. Even Bagge’s restrained
optimism for Sweden’s core exports turned out to be too optimistic. As he points out,
wood, pulp, and paper used to be the strongest exports to Japan but even those
commodities quickly fell prey to the new restrictions and almost vanished from the
trade statistics from 1938 onward. The consolation for Swedish trading houses who had
to deal with the new wind of economic nationalism was that the products that survived
the wrath of the regulators were difficult for Japan to replace. Ball bearings, for

\begin{footnotes}
\item[430] See the quarterly reports of the consulate in: RA, “Korrespondens”, 1937-1943.
\end{footnotes}
example, on which SKF had a near monopoly position in the country, and high-quality machinery would be needed in even higher quantities due to the warfare in China. That, on the other hand seriously impeded Swedish interests there. Ever since the beginning of open warfare, Bagge had to protest to the Gaimusho in the name of Swedish companies and the consulate in Shanghai, when Japanese attacks struck their property or when Japanese forces confiscated them. Usually his protest was of little help. The good years for Swedish trade with East Asia were over.

3-3-1. The Swedish Minister to Japan

The man who led the Swedish mission to Japan during the height of the crucial war years was Widar Bagge. Born on April 30, 1886, Bagge, like his predecessor, was a career diplomat who had been going through many stages at the KUD, starting with the position of Attaché on March 12, 1919. His first postings abroad in junior positions were to Helsinki (July 29, 1921) London (December 16, 1921), Brussels (August 12–September 30, 1922) and Rome (November 13, 1922). After that he was sent back to Helsinki (June 27, 1924) where he reached the rank of First Secretary on November 27, 1925. He was then sent for a first time to Tokyo on March 3, 1928 where he started working as Frist Secretary on May 24, 1928. The year of his arrival was also the time when the legation’s head changed from Ewerlöff to Hultman. Bagge therefore worked for three years under the man whose position he would ultimately inherit years later. His work in Tokyo was only interrupted by a short posting to Shanghai as consul general.

---

432 Ottosson, *Handel under Protest*, 259-64.
(May 23 – September 1, 1930). He returned to Stockholm in early 1931, where he became the head of the trade division on February 20. He worked there for three years with two short postings abroad, one as Chargé d’Affaires in Warsaw (June 22 – November 15, 1934) and as counselor to the legation in Paris (September 3, 1934). Bagge returned to Tokyo on January 29, 1937 to become the new Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. He would hold that position until his hastened departure on April 13, 1945, shortly before the end of the war.434

Unlike the Swiss Minister, Bagge did not keep a diary of his time in Japan. There are no personal accounts about his work other than the telegrams and notes he wrote to the KUD. Little do we know about his private life for example; only that he was not married and that, unlike other diplomats, he was seemingly not a great socialite. Historian Bert Edström interviewed his niece, Lillebil Bagge, as well as two of his aids at the embassy, Erik von Sydow and Gunnar Jarring in 1993 and 1994. From their accounts, he writes about Bagge that he “was a senior diplomat but never belonged to the upper echelons of Swedish foreign service. According to one of his colleagues in the Swedish diplomatic corps, he was known as a demanding head of mission who was very conscious of diplomatic etiquette, had a pedantic disposition and was conscious of his own dignity. Another colleague who worked for Bagge for five years in Tokyo describes him as a ‘difficult person,’ while a close relative characterizes him as ‘a loner.’

434 Biographic information from: Sweden. Utrikesdepartementet. Kungl. utrikesdepartementets kalender. 1938, 149. See also: Bert Edström, “Widar Bagge, Japan and the End of the Second World War,” Center for Pacific Asia Studies Working Paper, 41 (1995): 2. There are discrepancies between Edström’s timeline and this one. They stem from the differences in the original source. Edström used a dossier on Widar Bagge at the Foreign Ministry (he cites it as “Dossier I:II Bagge”), whereas this timeline is based on the above mentioned calendar of the ministry.

172
He was a bit of a busy body.” While he might have been distanced with his own family and his staff, he was certainly not anti-social in professional terms. Robert Craigie, the British ambassador mentions him as one of the only other foreign members of the prestigious Fujizawara club-house (a golf club), a place “where one could meet and play with Japanese political leaders and other prominent Japanese without seeming to arouse the suspicions of the security police. (…). Amongst the most assiduous visitors to Fujizawara was Prince Konoye, who plays an excellent and steady game of golf (…).” Those were certainly the moments when Bagge tied friendships to Japanese politicians that were important for him as a diplomat. He was known, among the Japanese elite as a friend to Japan and Japanese sources on the countries diplomacy describe him as a Japanophile. The connection to Prince Konoe, for example, would prove influential in the episode for which Bagge has become most famous in Japan; an unsuccessful bit at ending the war through the mediation of Sweden (see chapter 3-5-2). Even pictures of Widar Bagge are rare. The following two were discovered only after extensive research in Swedish newspaper archives.

436 Craigie, Behind the Japanese Mask, 98.
From the Swiss Minister, Camille Gorgé, we have a few more descriptions about Bagge. For example, that he “enjoys sailing on his flat boat of the type that is required here for regattas. If you visit him at his place, he looks more like a natural science professor than like an athlete. You wouldn’t think much of his musculature. But don’t trust that impression! Outdoors, on the shores of the lake, he has the light-hearted ease of a young sailor. To untie a rope entangled by the wind, I saw him jump around on the boat like a gymnast.” In another instance, he described Bagge as rather fearless in the face of threats. When, on December 16, 1944 an earthquake shook the legation while the Swiss were dining with guests “everybody hurriedly stood up, fearing that parts of the sealing

---

439 Svenska Dagbladet, *Minister med Parisplanet* (Stockholm1945). ©Public Domain. These two pictures are the only known (sharp) photographs of him. Coincidentally, they show him a few months before and after his posting in Tokyo. One more photograph of him, taken during his first tenure in Tokyo, is reproduced in the annex (page 287). The only other picture of him where he is visible partially is the one in low quality in the introduction of this thesis (2-3-1, showing him with Swiss minister Gorgé, ambassador Maliki and the Japanese foreign Minister Togo Shigenori.
might fall on their heads, except for Mr. Bagge, the Swedish minister, who remained immovable on his place.”\textsuperscript{441} However, one observation that merits attention is that Gorgé wrote remarkably little about his Swedish colleague. Although Sweden was the only other legation apart from Switzerland that systematically represented enemy interests in Japan and the two collaborated frequently on issues that concerned them both, there is an ominous lack of description of that in Gorgé’s personal diary of 500 pages. Neither did he ever mention Bagge in the same intimate tone as he talked about Spanish Minister Mendez de Vigo, whom he constantly refers to as ‘my dear friend.’ No such bonds seem to have existed between the Swiss and the Swedish heads of mission—despite their collaboration. Bagge most likely kept a professional distance to his peers in the diplomatic corps.

\textbf{3-3-2. The Swedish Mission}

Like the Spanish mission, the Swedish legation too was small and constrained in its resources when Bagge arrived in Tokyo. To take care of the Swedish colony of around 100 people\textsuperscript{442} he only had one legation secretary at his disposal and a chancellor. On the other hand, Sweden operated the largest consular network of the three neutrals in this study. It had a total of five honorary consulates in the Empire—the Swiss had none and Spain only one. Four Honorary Consulates were on the Japanese mainland and one in

\textsuperscript{441} Ibid., Entry dated December 16 1944. [OFrTA].
\textsuperscript{442} Number based on Bagge’s assessment in 1941. See: Telegram Bagge to KUD, dated September 5 1940. In: RA, "Avgående Chiffertelegram", 1933-1942.
Dairen (Kwantung Leased Territory). In 1937, at the beginning of his term, those positions were staffed as follows:\textsuperscript{443}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diplomatic Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minister Plenipotentiary: Widar Bagge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Secretary: Tor H. W. Wistrand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legation Chancellor: Johan J.W. Hjortzberg-Nordlund\textsuperscript{444}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Honorary Positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Honorary Consul Kobe: Ernest W. James</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honorary Consul Yokohama: Gösta B.T. Guston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honorary Consul Dairen: Walter H. Winning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honorary Vice Consul Nagasaki: Frederik E.E. Ringer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honorary Vice Consul Shimonoseki: William H. Sainton</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None (Unknown)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 Personnel of the Swedish Mission to the Empire of Japan (at beginning of Bagge’s term)

The consulates were designated as ‘honorary’ because they were not staffed with career diplomats from the KUD, but with business men, of whom some, like E.W. James in Kobe, were not even Swedish citizens. That stands in contrast to Spain which had a career diplomat stationed in the Kanzai region to operate their consulate for Kobe and Osaka. The consul in Yokohama, the above mentioned Gösta Guston was a business man but left his post in late 1938. He was replaced \textit{ad interim}\textsuperscript{445} by Mr. G.A. Neville, another business figure, the manager of the Swedish trading company ‘Nickel & Lyons

\textsuperscript{443} Sweden. Utrikesdeparmentet. \textit{Kungl. utrikesdeparmentets kalender}. 1938, 70.

\textsuperscript{444} Before June 18 1937: John S. Widenfelt

\textsuperscript{445} Neville had functioned as Guston’s replacement during his absences before but was asked in late 1938 to function as consul until a permanent consul could be found. He was not entirely happy with this situation as he commenced asking on the progress of the situation from May 1939. See: Letter Neville to Bagge, dated May 8 1939. In: RA, "Korrespondens", 1937-1943.
On May 12, 1939, R.G. Bell, another trading company owner, took the post over permanently. Also the other consuls were part of the international business community in their respective areas. Frederik Edward Erasmus Ringer, for example, was the wealthy, Nagasaki-born son of Frederick Ringer, a British merchant who came to Nagasaki when Japan opened its doors again to the world in the late 1860s. Despite his British nationality Frederik Edward Ringer served as consul for Sweden and Norway while being the general manager (and one of the owners) of Holme, Ringer & Co., the company his father founded. He died aged fifty-six in 1940.

In Kobe, Ernest William James served as Honorary Consul for the district of Kobe and Osaka (the Kansai area). He was endowed with an even larger private wealth than

---

Ringer and, like him, was British by nationality although he was born in Japan and had been living there his entire life. He made his fortune at A. Cameron & Co., another trading company and served as Honorary Consul for Sweden from 1933 until he had to leave the country in September 1941, to flee the dangers of the anti-British campaigns that started before the war broke out (see chapter 3-4-2).  

![Ernest William James](http://www.meiji-portraits.de)

The biographies of the Honorary Consuls show how the Swedish consular network depended on the business connections of the country’s merchants. Many of them were not Swedes themselves but either worked for Swedish companies or had close ties to them. The consular network was therefore rather extensive and it seems that it was not problematic for Bagge to find new consuls to staff the positions before the war in the

---

Pacific broke out. The diplomatic corps, on the other hand, was constrained. In 1940 a new legation secretary arrived in Tokyo, Erik von Sydow, but only as a replacement for Hugo Wistrand who was transferred to Berlin. The legation was only reinforced in 1945 through Olaf Ripa, who became Second Secretary to the legation, shortly before Bagge left in April 1945. Ripa stayed even after the departure of Sydow and was the last remaining Swedish diplomat in Tokyo, with the title of ‘Diplomatic Representative to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers’ during the first years of Japan’s occupation. He left Tokyo in 1949.451

3-3-3. Keeping Trade Alive

The deterioration of relations between Japan and the allied powers started to impact Swedish-Japanese affairs the year after the outbreak of the war in Europe. The first visible trace thereof is the almost complete lack of trade records for the years 1940–1945. The Swedish statistical yearbooks, which chronicled the above depicted trade development almost completely blank for the period after 1939. The only official information available are import numbers for 1944 and 1945, according to which Sweden received goods of a value of 634,000 SEK and 277,000 SEK respectively. Although these numbers mean that trade between neutral Sweden and Japan never completely ceased, it is nevertheless only a twentieth of the 10 million SEK of goods imported in 1939.

Minister Bagge was naturally trying to forestall the trend but 1940 turned out to breed ever new trade hurdles. Port calls of Swedish ships to Japanese harbors had halved in

that year. The sea connection between Sweden and Japan suffered from the dangerous situation in European waters. The land route via Siberia, Moscow, and Tallinn to Stockholm had therefore gained in importance but in August the Soviet government started to require certificates of origin for the transport of Japanese goods. Those could only be obtained through the Soviet embassy in Tokyo but “not without difficulties,” as Bagge put it.452 He requested the KUD to negotiate minimum fright contingents and to install a local agent in Vladivostok to help expedite cargo clearance of goods from Swedish companies destined to Stockholm.453 That strategy seemed to work for the first few months (the latter half of 1940) and there were encouraging signs from the Japanese side as well. Bagge received the principle agreement by the Japanese finance minister that the export to Sweden of non-vital goods would still be allowed in the coming months. Trade numbers for the running period were still healthy. He reported that between August 19 and October 23 he had legalized documents for the transit of 3030 tons of cotton, wool, and knitted goods for a total value of 6.4 million JPY.454 Considering that the KUD had declared in February of the same year that it would use a ratio of 1 SEK for 1 JPY, that was a very high two-month average of exports, even in comparison to 1939.455 Around half of the transports were done via Siberia and the

453 Telegrams Bagge to KUD, dated September 21 and October 22, 1940. In: ibid.
454 Not all of it was Swedish trade though. The Minister admitted that Swedish companies were only responsible for about 600 tons per month (a bit more than a third of the total transit volume). The rest he legalized for other companies, probably with the goal of re-exporting the goods from Sweden to their final destinations. See: Telegram Bagge to KUD, dated October 25, 1940. In: ibid.
other half by ship.456 But the trend did not last long. Already in early January 1941 cargo transport through Siberia was suspended due to Russian measures that required routing traffic solemnly to the German Königsberg and because of Japan Railway’s lower capacity for that route. This would have culminated in additional taxes and applications for waybills that made the transport all but impossible. The Swedes had to wait for the conclusion of negotiations between Japan and Russia on transit agreements as well as themselves negotiate with Japan Railways for additional space on their Siberian lines.457 On the other hand, the sea route, apart from being dangerous, suffered from additional bureaucracy as the British government in its attempt to beat Germany went back to police the high sea with its extensive maritime power and demand that any cargo from and to Europe was accompanied by U.K. issued ‘navicerts.’ A navicert was basically a passport for neutral trade, which testified that the cargo was not destined to an enemy power. Navicerts were an instrument to expand the policy of sea blockades against enemy nations beyond its shores—a policy that was an infringement on International Law, but had worked well for Britain already in WWI.458 To sea fearing neutrals like Sweden, it was a heavy-handed infringement on the right to trade with both belligerents. However, since Great Britain with its extensive fleet controlled large portions of the Atlantic and the Pacific, there was little that could be done against the unilaterally sanctioned policy and Bagge had therefore to continuously apply for

456 Bagge reported in a telegram in January 1941 that the transit of 3 million SEK went through Siberia for the months of September, October and November. See: Telegram Bagge to KUD, dated 22. January 1941. In: RA, "Avgående Chiffertelegram", 1933-1942.
457 Telegrams Bagge to KUD, dated January 8, 18, 24 and February 13 and 22, 1941. In: ibid.
navicerts. The process could take weeks as it necessitated proof of the final destinations of the goods (separate cargo needed separate navicerts) and they were frequently rejected. During 1940 and 1941 Bagge and the KUD repeatedly protested the withholding of navicerts for Swedish ships from or to Japan, usually to little avail. Many trade initiatives came to a late end because even if they could be negotiated between Swedish and Japanese stakeholders in principle, shipment could become impossible. The largest setback in this regard was the attempted export of Swedish Nickel and Cadmium of 125 tons and 12 tons respectively in October 1941. The sale had been in preparations for months, just to fail to receive British navicerts in the end. It was a clear sign of London’s distrusted of Tokyo, which was allied with Berlin but had not yet been part of the war. From May onward, refusals of navicerts for Swedish-Japanese trade had become the norm.

On the other hand, also the Japanese government was a source of problems to Swedish trade. In March 1941, when Navicerts were already difficult to obtain, the big Japanese conglomerates Mitsubishi and Mitsui showed considerable interest in importing thousands of tons of Swedish pulp, steel, and paper. Although these goods were important to the concerned companies, the economic nationalist ideology of the Japanese authorities stood in the way. To grant an import permit, they wanted a state guarantee from Minister Bagge that Sweden would import goods from Japan of the

---

460 Telegram Bagge to KUD, dated September 24, 1941 and October 3, 1941. In: ibid.
461 Telegram Bagge to KUD, dated May 20, 1941. In: ibid.
same value. It was not acceptable to the Japanese side that the old trade deficit with Sweden would continue.462

Furthermore, the worsening political situation between Japan and the U.S. let the former to openly consider the abolition of U.S. dollars to pay for Japanese goods on world markets and instead switch to German Reichsmark for trade with Europe. Sweden’s largest exporter, SKF had already started negotiations with its trading partners to settle bills in German currency but Bagge came up with a different idea; a genuine Swedish-Japanese clearing system. The move was supposed to eliminate the need for a third intermediary currency and thereby at least remove the uncertainty about the availability of money. Bagge proposed to clear exchange directly through a SEK denominated account for Japan at the Swedish Enskilda Bank463 and a Swedish-owned JPY account at the Yokohama Specie Bank (YSB).464 Bagge’s proposal found open ears on both sides, especially the YSB was eager to move the plans forward. On the Swedish side adjustments were needed but in the end the deal was implemented between the YSB and the Swedish Riksbank—the country’s central bank, not the private Enskilda Bank. With the consent of Gunnar Hägglöf, the head of KUD’s trade department, the agreement came into force on May 28, 1941.465 However, world affairs once again overturned all strategic planning. Operation Barbarossa—the German invasion of the Soviet Union—started less than a month later on June 22, turning Japan’s military ally, Germany, into

462 Telegram Bagge to KUD, dated March 21, 1941. In: ibid.
463 The Enskilda Bank was frequently used by the Swedish government for trade negotiations with all belligerents of the war. It was founded by André Oscar Wallenberg, the father of Gustaf Oscar Wallenberg, the above mentioned first Swedish minister to Japan.
465 Telegram Bagge to KUD, dated Juen 21, and December 3, 1941. In: ibid.
an enemy of the U.S.S.R, with whom Foreign Minister Matsuoka had just reached a Neutrality Pact (see chapter 2-3-1). All trade from and to Europe stopped for weeks.\textsuperscript{466} Goods from the Japanese mainland as well as exports from Manchukuo could not be transported via Siberia because the preferred trade destination of Königsberg had become enemy territory to the Soviets and the port in Tallinn fell to them as well a month later, in July. Only the limited sea connection offered some possibilities for goods to leave or enter Japan. Those however were still traded in German Reichsmark, Argentinian Pesos or Swiss Francs.\textsuperscript{467} The Swedish-Japanese clearance system had in this regard only a limited impact. Especially in later years free and international currencies like the Swiss Franc were more popular than the Swedish Crown in Japan because it was usable for more international transactions, owing to the dominance of the Swiss National Bank in international finance and the fact that the Swiss Franc was also the house currency of the Basel-based Bank for International Settlements, which operated throughout the war.\textsuperscript{468} However, the direct clearing system between Sweden and Japan remained an option for the settlement of payments when both sides accepted the other currency. Especially for the Swedish trading companies in Japan it became a frequently used mechanism since they dealt in both currencies.

In short, export and import became more and more difficult as the political situation and the security on the traffic routes deteriorated in 1940–1941. Almost every shipment had

\textsuperscript{466} Telegram Bagge to KUD, dated July 3, and 14, 1941. In: ibid.
\textsuperscript{467} Telegram Bagge to KUD, dated November 25, 1941. In: ibid.
to be negotiated with at least two or three actors (Japan, U.S.S.R., U.K., Germany, Japan Railways) as goods had to pass through territories on land or see which they controlled and demanded licenses for. However, the Swedes did not give up. As late as March 1941 Bagge reported to his ministry that there was “significant Japanese interest” for the import of Swedish pulp, paper and steel for a value of 7 million JPY through Mitsubishi corporation. Bagge argued that his ministry should use this opportunity to demand from Japan imports of equal value.\textsuperscript{469} He was most likely eying for an increase in soybean imports from Manchukuo.

3-3-4. Keeping Relations Alive

The deterioration of Swedish-Japanese sea traffic in 1940 coincided with the occupation of Denmark and Norway by Germany in April and the Winter War between Finland and the U.S.S.R. at the same time. With three out of five Nordic countries under (quasi-) foreign control, many observers in Japan believed Scandinavia was no longer of any practical importance in international relations. Bagge at first only reported about newspaper articles arguing in this direction but it was an opinion held by circles beyond the media. In early January 1941, the Japanese Minister to Sweden, Shikao Matsushima was ordered to leave the country to take up a new position in Berlin as a special diplomatic representative for tripartite negotiations. A replacement for him in Stockholm was not planned.\textsuperscript{470} This came as an unpleasant surprise to the Swedes since it meant another hurdle for bilateral relations. Bagge held it for “undoubtedly important, from a Swedish point of view, that a Japanese minister is again accredited to Stockholm

\textsuperscript{469} Telegram Bagge to KUD, dated March 21, 1941. In: RA, "Avgående Chiffertelegram", 1933-1942.
\textsuperscript{470} Telegram Bagge to KUD, dated January 11, 1941. In: ibid.
as soon as possible (...)." He quickly visited Foreign Minister Matsuoka to negotiate this issue. He pointed out that the Japanese media was mistaken in discarding Scandinavia, emphasizing Sweden’s centrality for trade with the block and that he expected shipping to restart soon. Matsuoka on his part assured that Matsushima’s reposting to Germany was a necessity and had nothing to do with Japan’s appreciation of Sweden. The delay in sending a new envoy, the Foreign Minister held, was solemnly due to a shortage of adequate personnel for the position. However, either the Gaimusho was running severely low on skilled diplomats, or Matsuoka’s words were not entirely truthful. It took the Japanese side nearly two years to appoint a replacement. The Japanese diplomatic staff stationed in Sweden for the years 1941–1942 was extremely meager:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chargé d’Affaires</td>
<td>Jotaro Koda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Attaché</td>
<td>Makoto Onodera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Military Attaché</td>
<td>Fukashi Higuchi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Japanese Diplomats in Sweden 1942

The Gaimusho did not even appoint a Consul to the city of Stockholm for this period. The only additional staff was an Honorary Consul in Goteborg, but that was a Swede (Tor E.J. Broström) who had been filling that administrative position since 1934. And the two Military Attachés were not sent to Sweden by the Japanese Foreign Ministry but

472 Whether he believed in this assessment is difficult to judge.
475 Ibid.
by the authorities of the army. That there was only a single representative of the 
Gaimusho—the Chargé d’Affaires—strongly suggests that the Gaimusho did not have 
much interest in Sweden as an outpost for trade or diplomacy. For two long years 
Stockholm remained largely neglected despite the fact that Sweden became a protecting 
Power for Japan after 1941. The Chargé d’Affaires in Stockholm and Bagge in Tokyo 
were obviously considered to be enough for the management of this relationship.

Beyond these problems, the Swedish legation was also impacted by a wave of arrests of 
American and British nationals in summer 1940. Both above depicted consuls, Frederik 
Ringer of Nagasaki and Ernest James of Kobe, were arrested on July 27, on charges of 
violating the law on military secrets (i.e., espionage). 476 James was released from 
custody in Kobe after five days, but Ringer remained detained for over a month and 
died later that year. 477 Whether his death was connected to the incident cannot be 
judged from the available records. The repressions against British citizens and the death 
of a Reuter’s journalist 478 while in custody was the reason for James’ departure in 
summer 1941 (the country he had lived in for his whole life). For Bagge these 
developments gave rise to great concern for the safety of Swedish citizens too. Like his 
Swiss colleague, he reported that the dangers for all foreigners in Japan had risen over 
the past year. Although Sweden was not part of the Anglo-American block with whom 
war was becoming ever more likely, that was no guarantee for the safety of Swedish

also: Telegram Bagge to KUD, dated August 1, 1939. In: RA, "Avgående Chifftertelegram", 1933-1942. 
478 Reuters main representative M. J. Cox died during detention after falling from the third floor of the 
building where he was interrogated. The police officers involved claimed that a suicide note proved that 
he took his own live. The international community in Tokyo drew a different conclusion, suspecting 
citizens from the notorious military police. “The possibility of Japan’s entry into the war carries special risks for its white inhabitants in view of the strong increase in Xenophobia” was his assessment of the situation in late August 1941. However, he was of the opinion that his government should not issue an official statement. Neither an evacuation of the Swedish colony nor a repatriation recommendation was warranted in his opinion. He assured his ministry that he was in close contact with the Swedish companies to ensure that they took care of the safety of their employees and that companies would check the validity of employee passports but “total evacuation (…) seems excluded considering the financial interests of the companies.” The circumstances were not a live-or-death matter (yet). Maintaining the Swedish commercial position was more important to Bagge than escaping the suspicions of certain circles in Japan. However, he recognized how serious the situation had become. He left the choice of remaining or leaving to the concerned individuals themselves. A round of questions was sent to the 100-people strong community to inquire about their wishes. By September, only thirteen Swedes (which included two children) wished to be repatriated. Everybody else preferred to stay. Minister Bagge had therefore to prepare only for the evacuation of 10% of his flock before the beginning of Japan’s most disastrous part of its wartime folly—the War in the Pacific.

479 Telegram Bagge to KUD, dated August 30, 1941. In: RA, "Avgående Chiffertelegram", 1933-1942. [ÖSvTA].
480 Telegram Bagge to KUD, dated September 5, 1941. In: ibid.
481 Telegram Bagge to KUD, dated September 8, 1941. In: ibid.
3-4. After Pearl Harbor: Relations 1941–1945

The nearing war with the United States had been felt by Bagge for a while before hostilities commenced. In July he wrote that “considering the uncertain situation” he viewed the legations secret archives as a liability, wishing KUD’s consent to destroy them and in early September he telegraphed a highly pessimistic account about Japan’s expansions in Indochina, calling U.S. Ambassador Joseph Grew’s hopes for a solution without war “utopian.”

Even though he recognized that the Konoe cabinet was trying to broker a last minute understanding with the Americans, he viewed the military’s unwavering demand for a “New Order” in East Asia as incompatible with U.S. foreign policy and could not see how these differences could be overcome peacefully. Time should prove him right. In the evening hours of December 8, 1941, the legation sent a telegram to Stockholm with the information that “the Japanese foreign ministry has officially notified the legation about the state of war between Japan, the U.S.A., Great Britain and the British dominions.” In the morning, Japanese forces had attacked Pearl Harbor.

3-4-1. New Jobs for Swedish Diplomats

The expansion of Japan’s warfare on the U.S. and its allies affected Sweden immediately. On December 10, the Gaimusho handed the legation a list of territories where it wished to receive Sweden’s services of Good Office to represent Japanese interests. It included Burma, Ceylon and the Northwestern parts of India (Baluchistan, the Northwest Border, Punjab and Kashmir)—that is, the British colonies around the

eastern part of the Indian Ocean. However, the most crucial item on the list was the first one. The Gaimusho wanted Sweden to be its protecting Power in Hawaii. It was the only American held territory for which Tokyo solicited Stockholm’s help. For the rest of the U.S.—and indeed for most of the American continent—the Gaimusho had turned to Spain. The reason for the exception with Hawaii was one of practicality; neither the Spanish nor the Swiss operated consulates on the island but there were 422,770 people of Japanese descent living there in 1940. That was 37.9% of the total Hawaiian population. Many of them were already second or third generation Japanese emigrants who felt more Hawaiian than Japanese but for others the ties to Japan were still intact. Japan also operated a large consulate in Honolulu, infamously staffed with several spies who had sent information about Pearl Harbor’s military base to the Japanese Navy. Those were important reasons to have a genuine and effective protecting Power on the ground with the capacity and willingness to intervene on behalf of Japan. Stockholm accepted the task.

Since Spain was Japan’s representative in Washington and Switzerland in Tokyo, that made Sweden the third neutral to be involved in U.S.-Japanese wartime diplomacy. This had implications on a topic that immediately appeared on the records of the legation; the question of how to evacuate the diplomats and civilians of the Empire’s new enemies who were now so unfortunately stranded in Japan. Already by the beginning of January 1942, the Swiss announced the plan to organize a prisoner exchange on the neutral territory of Lorenço Marques (Maputo), the capital of Portuguese Mozambique at the

---

483 Telegrams Bagge to KUD, dated December 8, and 10, 1941. In: ibid.
South-Eastern coast of Africa. The largest stakeholders in this civilian exchange programs were the U.S., Great Britain and Japan because they had the most people on each other’s soil. Since Sweden was Japan’s protecting Power in Hawaii it had to join the negotiating table. In addition to the patchwork of diplomatic organization that included Switzerland and Spain, the political decision of Washington and London to coordinate their efforts for exchanges added another layer of difficulty because Britain’s protecting Power in Japan was Argentina at the time (London switched to Switzerland only in May 1942). Adding four neutrals to the discussions between three belligerents meant the involvement of seven governments in highly sensitive negotiations. Even just from the viewpoint of communication lines that signified a considerable amount of complexity and potential for misunderstandings.\(^{486}\) Minister Bagge had to coordinate on a daily basis with his Swiss and Argentinian counterparts to drive the discussion on civilian prisoner exchanges forward.\(^{487}\) The only thing he could do to simplify the situation was to make it clear to his Government that Sweden should stay as passive in the affair as possible. He held that “although Sweden protects Japanese interests in Hawaii, the principles of the evacuation must be prepared through Swiss mediation.”\(^{488}\) Switzerland was leading the negotiations in Tokyo but Bagge followed them closely. Over the next year, the Swedish legation cabled regularly information on the state of evacuation ships and the negotiations between the U.S. and Japan back to his ministry. Bagge’s American protégés from Bolivia, Honduras, and Mexico were included in the first exchange ship to the U.S. and the European’s from Belgium, the Netherlands, and

\(^{486}\) Corbett, *Quiet Passages: The Exchange of Civilians between the United States and Japan during the Second World War*, 46.

\(^{487}\) Telegram Bagge to KUD, dated December 30, 1941. In: RA, ”Avgående Chiffertelegram", 1933-1942.

\(^{488}\) Telegram Bagge to KUD, dated January 5, 1942. In: ibid. [OSvTA].
the unofficially represented Norwegians and Greek were on the second ship for the British exchange a few days later. British Ambassador Craigie, who was in the second batch of evacuees, recalls distinctively the joy of meeting again the colleagues with whom no contact had been possible for nearly eight months.

We found on board a number of our colleagues of the United Nations, including Monsieur Forthomme, the Belgian Ambassador, and Madame Forthomme, Monsieur Politis the Greek Minister, Mr. Keith Officer, the Australian Chargé d'Affaires, Monsieur Samaika, the Egyptian Chargé d'Affaires, Monsieur Kolstadt, the Norwegian Chargé d'Affaires, and Madame Kolstadt, Monsieur Reuchlin, the Dutch Chargé d'Affaires, and Madame Reuchlin. There was also Mr. Havlicek, the Czechoslovak Minister, who had been imprisoned by the Japanese after Japan had broken off diplomatic relations with his country.” To alert potential evacuees the legation posted several notices in Japanese newspapers, asking them to express their desire to be repatriated. 489

An example of such notices is the following little extract from the Japan Times of May 25, 1942:

489 Craigie, Behind the Japanese Mask, 152.
An especially important service was rendered by KUD in Stockholm. Because Switzerland had only few ships sailing under its flag and none of them big enough to accommodate the over 1,000 passengers that the exchange plans envisioned, the Swedes organized a cruiser of theirs—the ‘Gripsholm.’ The splendid ship was painted in the colors of the red cross to signal to all submarines and war ships that the Gripsholm was a hospital ship under international diplomatic protection.
On the other hand, Bagge also immediately started working for the interests of the nations that had asked for his legation’s Good Office in Tokyo. The Dutch were the first to solicit the help of Sweden after their Government in Exile had declared war on Japan on December 8, alongside the U.S. and the U.K. Like the latter two embassies also the legation of the Netherlands was sealed off and its diplomats were made prisoners in their own mission. Bagge was able to speak to the Dutch minister on December 10 and transmit information about it via Stockholm to the Dutch Government in Exile. A day later the Swedish legation forwarded the first telegram of Belgian ambassador Forthomme to Stockholm since his ministry (also in exile) had decided to break off diplomatic relations with Japan—one step short of declaring war. The same was true for the Norwegian and the Mexican legations. Their governments broke off relations on

---

December 9, which for their diplomatic representations in Tokyo meant that they became subject to the same treatment as the missions of those states who had declared war, because the military police refused to differentiate between enemies and nations without diplomatic contact. Communication with their governments were interrupted and their buildings isolated. Bagge was allowed to visit the heads of these missions only occasionally. He heavily protested that restriction but, like his Swiss colleague, he had little leverage to change it because even the Gaimusho was not always able to alter the behavior of the Military Police.

To be fair, it must be said that the outbreak of the war with the Allied powers caused a considerable amount of confusion also among Japanese agencies and the question of how to proceed with protecting Powers who represented enemy interests had probably not been studied ahead of the war. It took the Gaimusho three months to release official guidelines pertaining to the rights and duties of protecting Powers. Japan promised therein to adhere to common practices, granting diplomatic representatives (agents of embassies, legations or consulates) the following rights:

1) Visit the diplomatic personnel of the represented country.
2) Take over the buildings, archives and the furniture of the protected power.
3) Assist the diplomats of the protected Power in matters concerning their private life.

---

On December 20, the declaration of war from Belgium on Japan followed and that of Mexico was proclaimed four months later. On the Belgian declaration of war see also: Raoul Delcorde, Belgian Diplomats, ed. Pierre Mardaga (Wavre: Mardaga, 2010), 65.
493 See Annex 9: Japanese Regulations pertaining the functions of protecting Powers in the Empire
4) Inquire about the status of enemy civilians, including interned or arrested subjects.
5) Manage financial affairs of the protected Power, including that of interned and arrested subjects.

All five clauses were accompanied by the qualification that the Gaimusho and concerned Japanese agencies had to be informed before any of these steps were taken and that permissions by them had to be granted beforehand.495 This meant that the property of enemy legations remained enemy property—despite the state of war. Their buildings the lands and the bank accounts were not seized by Japanese forces, only sealed off for the time of the war. Bagge was therefore also charged with the caretaking of these foreign assets. Bank accounts were often not released for his use but the private funds of diplomats and the cash that legations and consulates held on their premises could in most cases be transferred to the Swedish legation. Bagge kept accounts for the countries under his protection and credited them whenever financial assets of theirs could be secured.

The protection of buildings was more difficult. In the beginning the stranded enemy diplomats took care of their own premises because they were interned therein but after the evacuation of the diplomats in summer 1942, Bagge had to find other solutions. First, he arranged for the former Japanese staff of the defunct diplomatic missions to occupy and care for the buildings. But especially for the Dutch legation this arrangement did not work well. He therefore moved his own staff into the Dutch

495 These provisions were only valid for the case of Japan proper. The Gaimusho explicitly ruled out the authority of protecting Powers on the territories it occupied. See: Note Verbale Gaimusho to Swedish Legation, dated October 1 1942. In: RA, "Administrativa handlingar", 1941-1946.
buildings with von Sydow and Ericson designated to live there. Physical presence was the best form of protection possible.496

In a similar way, visits to POW camps became an important part of the Swedish mandate in Japan which, according to the regulations, could only be accomplished by Swedish nationals with diplomatic status. From February 1942 onward, representatives of Bagge’s legation visited internment camps roughly three to four times a month. The most visited one was the Dennenchofu camp near Tokyo but also the camps in Urawa (near Tokyo), Nagasaki, Kogane, and Kobe were visited frequently. Niels Ericson, the head of the B-Section and consul Troedsson (see chapter 3-4-2) were most often in charge of the inspections. They were supported by Consul Wirén and Secretaries Gawell and von Sydow and sometime also directly by Minister Bagge. Over the course of the first 16 months, the Swedes made about fifty camp visits.497 Considering that Japan was running hundreds of POW camps and prisons in the country, the visits were not as plentiful or extensive as they would have needed to be to provide for a comprehensive assessment of the situation of all POWs in the country. In addition to that, the Gaimusho did not concede to neutral inspections of camps outside Japan proper (with few exceptions). Requests for visits to the Changi internment camp in occupied Singapore were, for example, quickly denied.498 A regulatory gray area were the camps located in the overseas territories of the Japanese Empire—that is the colonies that were

497 The most reliable source of the visits is a list of camp visits for the time between February 1942 and June 1943. The list mentions that some visits to Kobe were not recorded. The average of three to four visits per month is therefore only a rough estimate. See: List named “Visit to Civilian Internment Camps”, dated July 5, 1943. In: RA, "Administrativa handlingar", 1941-1946.
part of the Empire since before the outbreak of hostilities on the continent. Camps in Formosa (Taiwan) were one example (see 3-4-4), the other was civilian internees on the Kwantung Peninsula. Consul Kjellin, Sweden’s representative in Dairen, reported that although he did not have an official mandate as part of the Swedish protecting Power “(...) as I am one of the few neutral foreigners living here, I have considered it a humanitarian duty to try to assist the British citizens interned here in different ways and to help them with food, tobacco, etc. The local authorities have also been accommodating in this respect and given me permission to visit the interned persons.” 499 Some limited impact outside Japan was possible, but certainly only with the benevolent consent of local Japanese authorities. It is also unclear how long such unofficial activities could be sustained. Beyond this one letter from Kjellin, for example, there are no more reports pertaining to the situation of interned foreigners in Dairen.

Beyond diplomats and POWs, the legation’s new responsibilities extended also to the care taking of enemy civilians. The first such case pertained to seven Dutch business men in Kobe who, right after the outbreak of the war, were arrested and imprisoned by Japanese police. All of them were either directors of trading companies or bank managers. Like their British colleagues a year earlier they were accused of espionage, a charge that allowed Japanese authorities to imprison subjects indefinitely and without trial. Bagge reported that the charges were “in my opinion, only pretext, the real purpose is to take hostages.” 500 The best that he could do was to launch repeated complains toward the Gaimusho and try to evacuate these civilians through the

exchange ships as soon as possible. In the meantime, he would look after their physical wellbeing for as long as their confinement lasted.

These jobs were new and incomparable to the time before Pearl Harbor when the legation was working almost exclusively on economic questions. The contrast was also felt by the consulates. The work of the consuls in Yokohama used to consist mainly of granting visas, indexing Swedish trade at the ports and assisting its nationals in case of illness or accidents. But by 1942 the new Vice-Consul in Yokohama, Mr. Kallin, was suddenly ordered to take care of the Dutch, Belgian, Mexican, and later also the Bolivian consulates in his district. Bagge instructed him to secure the consular archives, their belongings and report about the treatment of the former consuls. Kallin also started visiting the Negishi internment camp as soon as February 25. Dutch and Belgian nationals were imprisoned there and needed the help of their diplomatic representative to pass messages to their home governments and families or to request better treatment in case of illness or financial hardship.\(^{501}\) The Kallin made regular cash payments to the foreign nationals (interned or free) under his care to allow them to buy food and clothes for the winter months. Interesting, in this context, is that although the Swedes had not officially taken over the representation of Norwegian interests in Japan in 1942, the consulate in Yokohama started caring about Norwegian nationals all the same ever since the beginning of the war. Bagge himself initiated requests at the KUD whether and how to help Norwegians in Hong Kong when it became clear that the Gaimusho had refused Argentina as Norway’s protecting Power in April 1942.\(^{502}\) Also

\(^{501}\) See, for example: Letter Heseltine to Bagge, dated February 27, 1942. In: RA, "Korrespondens", 1937-1943.

Luxembourguian and Greek subjects were among the ones the consulate checked on regularly, starting from July 1942. Soon Kallin also started filing legal claims toward the Japanese authorities in the name of the people and companies he represented. In late March 1942, he intervened in the name of the Dutch ‘Japan-China Trading Company’ against the capture and sale of a steam ship that was seized in the port of Yokohama when the war broke out. Captured civilian enemy vessels were subject to confiscation and liquidation by Japanese prize-courts. Kallin and his boss Troedsson helped in such cases the defendants to protect their property—even if the chances of success were extremely small.

This shows how diverse the new jobs of the entire Swedish mission had become and how abrupt the change from normal diplomatic interactions to ‘Post-Pearl Harbor’ relations were. Not only Bagge but his whole staff became heavily involved in issues of other nations while, at the same time, Swedish diplomats at home and abroad lent their Good Offices to Japan. That was not a matter of course—the KUD could have rejected the requests of either side. But Bagge and his employer decided that a refusal to serve as protecting Power was not a suitable course of action. In one of the first telegrams to Stockholm after the attack on Pearl Harbor Bagge explicitly recommended his government to accept the responsibilities for Japan since “the fulfillment of such tasks might result in benefits in other respects (…).” He was hopeful that the Japanese

---

506 Telegrams Bagge to KUD, dated December 8, and 10, 1941. In: RA, "Avgående Chiffertelegram", 1933-1942. [OSvTA].
authorities would extend their good-will to Sweden in matters of trade and commerce. His superiors seemed to have shared his opinion. None of Japan’s requests was rejected.

### 3-4-2. New Diplomats for Swedish Jobs

Literally overnight the Swedish mission acquired a brought range of new responsibilities, all of which had to do with the extension of their Good Offices to other nations in Tokyo. To Minister Bagge it was clear that this situation would result in a significant increase of the work load for his legation. Before the end of the year he requested more diplomatic personnel—a Swedish diplomat stationed in Moscow, if possible, as such a person would be able to start his post in Tokyo relatively soon. Additionally, Bagge asked his ministry for a free hand in hiring local staff, Japanese or foreign.\footnote{Telegram Bagge to KUD, dated December 22, 1941. In: ibid.} It was a reasonable request. The diplomatic correspondence between the legation and Stockholm became twice as extensive for the four years of the war compared with the years before Pearl Harbor. Whereas one or two telegrams per week used to be the norm before, the new standard was daily contact with Stockholm, often with several issues per message. Bagge hired two new consuls on December 11 already.

Ivan Troedsson, a civil engineer was appointed to the consular district of Yokohama and Tokyo. Lorens Wirén, a Swedish businessman became the successor of James in Kobe and Osaka. Troedsson, although named consul for Yokohama, had his work place in the legation in Tokyo, not in the consulate in Yokohama. The latter office was staffed with a new Vice-Consul in January 1942—the Swedish national Nils Fredrik Andres Peder Kallin. He had been one of the local directors of SKF and was only thirty-five
years old at the time of his appointment. He took over the entire administrative affairs of the consulate, that is, the dossiers that Guston, Bell and Heseltine had been working on before him. However, the content of his work was highly different to that of his predecessors. The multiplication of all the humanitarian and legal cases he had to deal with increased communications from the consulate to the legation from a few letters each month to daily correspondence with Bagge, his boss. The workload on him soon became too high to handle. The Minister therefore started expanding the missions’ staff also with administrative positions. In May 1942 he appointed Gunnar Wester, a Swedish national like Kallin, to support the Yokohama consulate as a secretary.

Bagge also hired new legation staff: On January 1, 1942, Mr. A. Olofson, another Swede, entered the service. Ulf Wendbladh and Nils Ericson were hired in February and April alongside a Japanese typist (Mrs. Uchiyama) an errand boy (K. Oyama) and a chauffeur (K. Kawahara) to work in the newly established ‘B-Section,’—the legation’s Department of Foreign Interests. The only person who was removed from his position was a Japanese interpreter, Mr. Kokubu, who Bagge reported was “undoubtedly working as a special agent of the police (...)” Bagge new that this was nothing extraordinary and happened in other legations too, but the circumstances compelled him to replace the employee through a new interpreter, Mr. Hashimoto.

---

508 There are no records detailing how and why Kallin was appointed, but there exists a short record on him. See: Letter Kallin to Bagge, dated December 31, 1942. In: RA, "Korrespondens", 1937-1943.
509 From the records of the consulate it is not clear why there was another change from Heseltine to Kallin because there is a considerable gap in the documentation. Between October 31 1940 and January 20 1941, no files are available in the folder of consular correspondence to the legation.
What stands out regarding the new arrivals at the legation is that only Swedish and Japanese nationals were taken in. The times when honorary consuls with a different nationality could be contracted were over. Only a Swedish passport could guarantee some recognition of Japanese military and civilian personnel. That is not to say though that Bagge did not try to extend the diplomatic umbrella to other nationals, too. There were cases in which he tried to hire people into his services to protect them from repercussions. Mr. George-Adis was the earliest example of that tactic. He had been living in Yokohama for nearly two decades but did not have a valid passport that could certify his nationality when the Pacific War broke out. He claimed to be Greek but since he spent his youth in Rumania the Greek legation did not believe him and refused issuing a passport. In effect George-Adis ended up stateless in Yokohama, unable to even request an evacuation because he would not be granted clearance to travel—even during a World War a passport was still a necessity. After Bagge had failed to convince the Greek Minister to recognize George-Adis, he tried to hire the unlucky man into his legation under the highly dubious pretext that he was in need of an interpreter for Greek-English translations—never mind that the Swedish legation was not in charge of Greek interests. The military authorities denied the request.

Bagge was however able to hire other foreigners. A Danish national, Mr. E.F. Johansen was working for the legation until mid-May 1945 when he was arrested by the Japanese police after Denmark had been liberated by the allies from the German occupation.

Also a Portuguese citizen was in his service, Mr. R. da Silva as well as a Korean office

---

By May 1943, eighteen months after Pearl Harbor, the mission staff had grown to twenty people, out of which eleven were Swedes. But even that was not enough. Bagge requested to receive at least one more official from Sweden to support the career diplomats in Tokyo. The KUD proposed to send a senior official to take over the B-Section of foreign interests. However, by that time Bagge had already given this particular position to Ericson, whom he judged to be perfectly equipped for the task because he had been living in Japan for twenty years and spoke fluently Japanese. Those qualities, Bagge insisted, were absolutely necessary for the head of the B-Section whose duties consisted of regular POW camp visits and delicate negotiations with local Japanese civilian and military officers. The solution to the problem in the end was to convert Ericson into a full-fledged diplomat. Bagge requested a diplomatic passport for him through which Ericson officially joined the ranks of career diplomats as a legation secretary.

3-4-3. *New Times, Old Issues: Trade and Diplomacy*

In Stockholm, diplomatic developments moved more slowly. The outbreak of the Pacific War had no direct effect there. The unsatisfactory situation with nothing but one Japanese Chargé d’Affaires from the Gaimusho and one Military Attaché from the army continued well into the first year of hostilities. Although the Swedish Government

516 There are no precise lists of the mission personnel that could help to identify the staff exactly. However, they are mentioned sometimes in reports from the legation. From those documents, we know that in addition to the already mentioned people the following employees were also on the legation’s payroll but in less important positions: John Andersson (mechanical engineer), Arne Svenson (captain), Oscar Petterson and E. B. Gawell. See on this: Confidential memorandum concerning the international YMCA activities in Japan, dated November 25, 1943. In: RA, Beskickningsarkiv Tokyo, SE/RA/230/230033.2/F2c/2, ”Handlingar Rörande Y.M.C.A.”, 1942-1944.

wished for a stronger Japanese representation, neither the KUD nor Bagge had any leverage to move the Japanese side. The only thing the minister in Stockholm could do was to keep mentioning the unfortunate situation whenever he met with high ranking Japanese officials. It was only after a meeting with Prime Minister Hideki Tojo in late October 1942, that he finally met with serious interest to reappoint a Minister Plenipotentiary to his country. Togo appointed Suemasa Okamoto to Stockholm who was the former General Consul to Shanghai but had resided in Calcutta when the war with the Allies broke out. He was interned by the British authorities in India but came free in August through the very prisoner exchange program in Lorenço-Marques that the three neutrals had organized. He was nominated Envoy to Sweden by the Emperor on November 26, 1942, assuming his post the next month.

Okamoto’s appointment was an interesting development because it coincided with the creation of the Ministry of Greater East Asia on November 1, 1942, which absorbed the Gaimusho’s East Asia and South Sea Bureau’s—a move that cut the Gaimusho’s personnel in half and undermined its standing within the cabinet. That at this moment the diplomatic connection to Sweden was given more emphasis is not self-evident. Whether the decision was based purely on an intuition of Tojo and other senior Japanese officials, or if it was part of an emerging new strategy toward the European neutrals cannot be judged from the available sources. However, as time went by, the previous Japanese disdain for Stockholm turned in its opposite. The further the war situation in the Pacific and in Europe deteriorated, the more personnel did the Gaimusho,

520 JACAR, B14090870300, M-2-1-0-13_17, ”7. 岡本季正”, 1942.
the Army, the Navy and even the Air Force sent to the Scandinavian outpost. By 1945, Sweden hosted fifteen Japanese diplomats. A remarkable change compared to three years earlier.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date Assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minister Plenipotentiary</td>
<td>Sueamasu Okamoto</td>
<td>1942 (Dec.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attaché</td>
<td>Kazutoshi Sato</td>
<td>1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attaché</td>
<td>Goichi Takeuchi</td>
<td>1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second leg. Secretary</td>
<td>Jun Tsuchiya</td>
<td>1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third leg. Secretary</td>
<td>Matao Urui</td>
<td>1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third leg. Secretary</td>
<td>Goro Hattori</td>
<td>1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attaché</td>
<td>Ken-ichi Tōh</td>
<td>1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attaché</td>
<td>Rynichi Ando</td>
<td>1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attaché</td>
<td>Ken-ichi Abe</td>
<td>1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Attaché</td>
<td>Makoto Onodera</td>
<td>1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Military Attaché</td>
<td>Kiyokazu Ito</td>
<td>1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Military Attaché</td>
<td>Tatsuya Sato</td>
<td>1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Military Attaché</td>
<td>Masaki Inaba</td>
<td>1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Attaché</td>
<td>Iori Mishima</td>
<td>1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Attaché</td>
<td>Yasukazu Kigoshi</td>
<td>1944</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Japanese Diplomats in Sweden 1945

With the arrival of Okamoto in late 1942, Tokyo started using Stockholm more proactively as an outpost for Japanese spying activities (see chapter 3-4-5). Systematic intelligence gathering by the Gaimusho began when Okamoto arrived (first by himself and then through a network of informants in Europe). The ‘Magic Summaries’—the counterintelligence reports of the U.S. (see chapter 1-1-2)—speak a clear language on this issue; reports from Stockholm on military developments in Europe only started flowing back to the Gaimusho when Okamoto commenced his work. Before December 1942 there are only little and sporadic news contained in the Magic Summaries. Spying

---

in Scandinavia was nothing new though. Japan’s Military Attaché, Makoto Onodera, had been doing so for years for the Japanese Army. Only he must have used different channels to deliver his insights to his headquarter because those were apparently not captured by U.S. counter-intelligence units which monitored Japanese telegraphic correspondence.522

Nevertheless, the episode allows to draw two conclusions: Firstly, it was certainly not the wishes of the Swedish Government for better (trade) relations with Japan that moved the Gaimusho to accredit more of its diplomats to Sweden. Especially before the outbreak of the War in the Pacific, direct Japanese access in Stockholm to the Swedish authorities was not one of its priorities. Probably it was outside forces like the development of the war in Europe that increased Tokyo’s interest in Stockholm. Otherwise, Minister Bagge would not have had to fight for nearly two years to just receive a new Minister Plenipotentiary for his country. Secondly, Swedish authorities obviously had little objections to receiving such an extensive number of Japanese diplomats, since they could have blocked the arrival of them by withholding their accreditation as the Japanese Government did in Tokyo—as, for example, with Mr. George-Adis. Hosting fifteen Japanese diplomats on Swedish soil meant more than just adhering to diplomatic etiquette. It was Swedish consent to Japan’s newly found use for it. But then again, why would the KUD oppose that development? Firstly, it granted the same rights to all belligerents. In 1945, Germany and the U.S.S.R. both had twenty-one accredited diplomats in Stockholm, the British were represented with twenty-nine and

522 The “Magic Summaries” contain only sporadic and general observations on the military situation in Europe for the time before Okamoto which must have been compiled by Koda, the Chargé d’Affaires. From December 1942 onward, those become much more frequent and detailed and contain information obtained through “informants.”
the U.S. with forty-five. And on the other side, this was what Swedish diplomacy was seeking for a long time. Closer diplomatic relations with Japan would enable its foreign policy strategy—trade with Asia through its hub in Tokyo. That is the other field where no dramatic change in Sweden’s diplomacy occurred. For the entire time of the war, Bagge and the KUD never gave up working on Swedish-Japanese trade relations. The commodities that Sweden wanted to receive from the Japanese Empire during that time were rubber, soybeans, tin, and tungsten. Japan on the other hand wanted to make use of Swedish raw materials like nickel and cadmium and the country’s high-quality ball bearings and piano wire, all of which had important military use. Swedish wool and yarn was also still a welcome commodity. The responsible authorities in both countries agreed that negotiations should be held but under the cloak of secrecy. The Swedish Bureau of Foreign Trade under Gunnar Hägglöf was aware that trade with Japan would not only meet fierce resistance from the allied side but would probably also be unpopular among the workers who made the goods to be exported. However, negotiations were important for several reasons. For one, Bagge was constantly afraid of Swedish merchandise being confiscated for the Japanese war efforts without due payment to the owners. Ever since summer 1941, he reported about the danger of expropriation or undervalued payments, especially of nickel shipments. One of them—69 tons of nickel and cadmium—had arrived in the port of Yokohama in late

525 LHMA, "MAGIC Summary No. 272", December 23, 1942, 7.
November 1941, and was blocked in the port for months, which left Bagge negotiate
back and forth for the release at an advantageous price for the Swedish owners.527
The hostile and economically volatile trade environment in Japan did, of course, not
improve with the outbreak of the Pacific War.528 In early 1942, Japan’s industries had
reached a new level of integration with the national government that made the two
nearly indistinguishable. Markets were eliminated and all trade was completely
refocused on the needs of the war economy. The largest national companies like
Mitsubishi and Mitsui were charged by the government to execute trade in compliance
with the government’s wishes, which, in turn, forced Bagge to react:

The Finance Ministry has given Mitsubishi an exclusive mission on behalf
of the Japanese government to act as buyer of the goods. The legation is
negotiating with the Foreign Ministry on the selling principles while a
final contract and a delivery is made to Mitsubishi that will have all the
details about the goods and is working in cooperation with the Planning
Board and the military authorities who will have the right to decide.529

This new mode of production changed the way of trade with Sweden distinctly and put
Minister Bagge at the center of business interactions. As the official representative of
the Swedish state, he had the strongest bargaining position. Swedish trading companies
like Gluckman, Gadelius, and SKF did not matter anymore. Bagge could receive much
higher price concessions when he intervened on their behalf. With a certain sense of
pride, he reported in March that “[r]egarding the nickel question of my ciphered

---

527 Telegrams Bagge to KUD, dated December 1 and 12 1941 and January 13, 1942. In: ibid.
528 Bagge reported that the price level had increased four-fold compared to 1937. (See: Telegram Bagge
to KUD, dated June 29, 1942. In: ibid.) Modern economic estimates of Japanese war inflation levels
range around the same estimates, between a two and six-fold increase compared to 1936 levels. (See:
Mark Harrison, The Economics of World War II: Six great Powers in International Comparison
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 261.)
[OSvTA].
[telegram] 149 of last October, Gadelius could not even get half of the price I did.  

In other words, the nationalization of industries in Japan led to a quasi-nationalization of private Swedish trade under its legation—although the Swedish companies were not nationalized as such. In the same telegram Bagge describes clearly that the trading companies were in no position anymore to take care of their core business:

By the above described procedure, the legation considers itself [prepared] for war-risks, being able to save considerable values otherwise threatened. The firms seem to have small qualifications hence and have not by themselves made any initiatives in a direction to eliminated war-risks. In the current situation, interference from the firms in the sales procedures would be inappropriate and harmful. However, the firms, in their own interest, will be contacted by the legation in order to keep the prices up. That is for instance of importance for band- and frame-saw steel. For this purpose, Gadelius has been consulted regarding the steel shipments.

Indeed, over the next three and a half years the legation remained at the center of business interactions, negotiating prices and quantities of goods imported and exported.

Some trading companies complained about this interference from the side of the legation but Bagge was convinced that under the new circumstances individual foreign firms needed state intervention on their behalf:

It is desirable that stranded goods are sold as soon as possible, considering the risk of confiscation and damage. If this task was entrusted to the private firms they would not be able to escape the sales and price controls exerted by government agencies and business organizations. The sales would be separated and the shipments subdivided. Only the most sought-after parts would be sold with much reduced profit margins. The legation has been able to discuss the matter with the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Finance and the principles have been adjusted under a negotiation with them, skipping otherwise normal control procedures. The sales can now be organized following uniform procedures quicker and

---

530 Telegram Bagge to KUD, dated March 24, 1942. In: ibid. [OSvTA].
531 Telegram Bagge to KUD, dated February 17, 1942. In: ibid. [OSvTA].
bigger in scale. (...) The criticism from Gadelius is not trustworthy and bears witness of an inability or unwillingness to understand the situation.532

Be that assessment correct or not, the record of the legation suggests that over the next years all trade issues exceeding a few 1,000 JPY worth went through the hands of the legation staff. From wool and yarn to large shipments of ball bearings, nickel, and piano wire, the legation was involved. Entire telegram threats were labeled as pertaining to the so-called ‘nickel question’ and the ‘rubber question,’ the former being a good that Bagge helped to import to Japan, whereas the latter was the major export item that the Swedish Trade Bureau wanted to receive from the Japanese Empire.533

In connection to this role as Swedish trade organizer, the legation also functioned as financial intermediary through its account at the Yokohama Specie Bank which enabled the clearing system with the Riksbank in Stockholm. Any trade that was settled in JPY that had to generate income in SEK needed to go through the legation’s Yokohama Specie Bank account. This had the beneficial side-effect that liquidity for other work areas of the legation was created. Bagge only had to debit the accounts that he kept for the trading companies for which they then earned interest. After some negotiations with the Gaimusho the Japanese side agreed that the funds could be used in the entire Yen-block. That enabled the usage of funds for the well-being of the Ningpo and Miramar crews in Hong Kong and Saigon (see below), the payments of the consulates in Shanghai, Saigon, Hong Kong, and Dairen, as well as for the legation itself to fulfill its

532 Telegram Bagge to KUD, dated March 14, 1942. In: ibid. [OSvTA].
533 The indices of the telegraphic correspondence of the legation were recorded with content tags for certain issues. Evacuation related telegrams were labeled “Evak.”, Foreign Interests received an “S”, YMCA issues were called “KFUM” and among the same tags we also find “Gummi” for the rubber business and “Ni.” for telegrams containing information on nickel issues.
mandate as a protecting Power. In summer 1942, for example, Bagge informed his ministry that the B-Section during the six months that it existed had had roughly 175,000 JPY in costs for which he borrowed SKF’s money at 4.25% interest. This availability of yen denominated funds explains why the legation was never caught in liquidity troubles. Money for its activities was available due to its activities for Swedish companies’ commercial interest—which were still considerably large in 1942. Official statistics are, as mentioned, not available between 1940 and 1945 but from the legation’s telegrams it is possible to judge that Swedish exports to Japan were worth several million SEK in the first year of the Pacific War. In March alone there were still ball bearings worth 2.3 million SEK in the port of Yokohama and another 2 million SEK worth of SKF goods in transit in Siberia.

Other developments were less pleasant for the Swedes. On December 30, 1941, Japanese forces had seized the Swedish steamer S.S. Miramar at the port in Saigon. Bagge learned of this event only ten days later when the consulate in Vietnam informed him about the capture of the ship and its Swedish crew which were taken to an unknown location. The reason given by Japanese officials was that the neutral ship was suspected to carry contraband and would therefore be handed over to a prize-court. Bagge protested this treatment and the possible appropriation of a Swedish ship immediately. He took the case to the Deputy Foreign Minister and Minister Togo himself. His protests were sharp, almost to the point of threatening: “I have insisted

---

537 LHMA, SRS935, ”MAGIC Summary No. 384“, April 14, 1943.
toward the Japanese authorities (...) that the benevolence and good-will of Sweden as a neutral, friendly country must not be taken for granted. (...) the gain that Japan can achieve by confiscating Swedish property can hardly outweigh the damage caused by the loss of trust.”\(^{539}\) However, nothing was gained by the strong words. Over the next two years, the Miramar case became the major strain on Swedish-Japanese relations. The Japanese side simply refused to release the boat. The Swedes therefore had to settle for a compromise according to which the ship would be leased to the Japanese navy at an advantageous rate that was to be paid in JPY.\(^ {540}\) The crew went free and could be repatriated\(^ {541}\) but the ship had effectively been surrendered to Japan. Minister Bagge stressed in one of his many reports regarding the affair that “this is not a question of free negotiations since the Japanese dictate the terms through prize-courts and confiscations.”\(^ {542}\) The Miramar was thereby involuntarily leased to the Japanese state and that was not the only such case. At least one other Swedish Ship, the Ningpo MV, was treated in a similar way. After suffering heavy collateral damage during the Battle of Hong Kong (where it was anchored at the time the war broke out), the ship was repossessed by the Japanese Government to serve as a merchant steamer for the Empire.\(^ {543}\) It was sunk sailing under Japanese flag on June 29, 1944, torpedoed by a U.S. submarine.\(^ {544}\)

\(^{539}\) Telegram Bagge to KUD, dated March 3, 1942. In: ibid. [OSvTA].
\(^{540}\) Telegram Bagge to KUD, dated July 7, 1942, In: ibid.
\(^{542}\) Telegram Bagge to KUD, dated October 24, 1942. In: RA, "Avgående Chiffertelegram", 1933-1942. [OSvTA].
\(^{543}\) Telegram Bagge to KUD, dated February 19, 1942. In: ibid.
A similar high-profile case was the treatment of Swedish interests on Japanese occupied territories in China. Although the official foreign policy of the empire was not to interfere with neutral interests, the reality looked different—especially in the case of the ‘American Far Eastern Match Co.,’ a subsidiary of ‘Svenska Tändsticks AB’ (STAB), a producer of matches, lighters and Tobacco products. Because of the unfortunate naming, the Shanghai based subsidiary was seized by the Japanese Army at the beginning of the war. Bagge tried to correct the misunderstanding, stressing that the company was fully owned and controlled by Swedish capital but his repeated demarches at the Gaimusho had little effect. The company was not returned and could not operate anymore. The issue was so important to the Swedes that the Swedish Foreign Minister was involved in it as well, arguing over the case still a year later with the newly appointed Minister Okamoto. The treatment of Swedish interests regarding STAB and the Miramar were the two most contagious bilateral issues plaguing Swedish-Japanese relations until well into 1943, partially shattering Minister Bagge’s initial hopes that Sweden’s Good Offices for Japan would gain it benevolent treatment.

3-4-4. Swedish-Swiss Collaboration and the Neutral Committee of the YMCA

The archival record suggests that the closest political ally to the Swedish legation was the Swiss mission. There are several episodes indicating that. Vice-Consul Kallin, for example, wrote to Bagge in July 1942 that he recommended him to seek out the opinion

545 JACAR, B02032937000, A-7-0-0-9_26_3, "5. Protection of interests of Swedes concerning enemy country trading companies in China (including "Swedish Match Co." in Shanghai) / From December 31, 1941 to February 9, 1942", 1941–1942.
547 LHMA, SRS929, "MAGIC Summary No. 378", April 8, 1943.
of the Swiss minister before advancing on a matter concerning Axis and neutral legations in Tokyo. The question there was how neutral states among themselves should coordinate to achieve concessions from the Gaimusho. Kallin did not mention the Spanish, the Soviets, or any other neutral, only the Swiss seemed relevant to him to coordinate with when handling issues of inter-neutral interest.\textsuperscript{548}

A more important case was the collaboration of the Swedish and the Swiss legation to inspect prisoner of war camps in Formosa (Taiwan) in the fall of 1943. It was one of the very few cases in which the Gaimusho sanctioned the inspection of POW camps outside the mainland, carried out by neutral diplomats and not representatives of the ICRC. Japanese authorities did not recognize neutral diplomats as protecting Powers in the occupied territories. The neutral diplomatic umbrella could therefore not be extended to those areas. However, because Formosa, like Korea, had been a Japanese colony since well before the war with the U.S. or China, special conditions applied there.\textsuperscript{549} The Japanese forces operated thirteen POW camps on the island and permitted a joint Swedish-Swiss inspection to visit six of them from September 21 to October 2, 1943. Why the visit was done by two representatives from different neutral countries is not clear. It might have had to do with the death of the Swiss delegate, Robert Bossert, who perished on a mission to Formosa a year earlier.\textsuperscript{550} Sending two diplomats might

\textsuperscript{548} The request concerned the property of the Yokohama Amateur Rowing Club which was a private club, jointly owned by several legations and embassies. The club was designated as “enemy property” and seized by the Japanese police in early 1942. Since diplomats of Axis powers as well as many neutrals were among the owners of the club, Kallin was involved in a joint intervention toward the Gaimusho. See on this the letter Kallin to Bagge, dated July 21, 1942. In: RA, "Korrespondens", 1937-1943.
\textsuperscript{550} He was sent there to officially close the British consulate but died under mysterious circumstances on the voyage back home. He was most likely murdered on board of the ship from Formosa to Kobe. See
have been a security measure for the personnel. The collaboration seemed to have been fruitful on a different level as well. Nils Ericson, head of the B-Section (of Foreign Interests), concluded in his final report the following:

The arrangements for a joint visit by the Swiss and Swedish delegates seemed before our start somewhat dubious but I am now of the opinion that the advantages were many and that further visits to camps inside Japan Proper ought to be made jointly. No doubt the Swiss delegate who proved to an (sic.) experienced and valuable companion, and I are to a great extent able to supplement each others informations (sic.) and impressions.551

Evidently, collaboration between the Swedes and the Swiss legations produced results.

On the other hand, there was little alternative left. Japan’s enemies used the Good Office of either Sweden or Switzerland. They were the only possible partners. This point also transpires from the legations telegraphic record. In 1942 Bagge referred to the Swiss government, the Swiss Minister or the Swiss legation on twenty-two separate instances. Spain, Portugal and the Soviet Union were not mentioned a single time.552

However, that does not mean that collaboration for the two legations was a simple task.

On the contrary, joint initiatives had to be carefully planned and executed if they were to succeed, since the political environment in Japan was highly suspicious of neutral interventions. The best example for the delicate situation was the way in which the

more on this case below and in: GORGÉ DIARY, "Debacle au Soleil-Levant: Journal d'un Témoin", 1939–1945, Entry dated June 6 1942.


552 RA, "Avgående Chiffertelegram", 1933-1942. The Soviet Union was mentioned only as part of Bagge’s political observations on the situation of the war and Japanese-Soviet mutual distrust.
legations dealt with the only international NGO besides the ICRC that had the capacity to extend a helping hand to Tokyo—the Young Man’s Christian Association (YMCA).

The YMCA was founded in 1844 in London. It had grown into a worldwide organization within a decade of its existence to promote Christian values and offer young men sports and mental health related activities to engage in.553 By the time WWII broke out it was a well-established and—like the ICRC— it was headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, under the name of ‘International YMCA.’ National committees existed all around the world, including Japan. In March 1942, the International YMCA contacted the Swedish legation to ask for their help in organizing relief work for Prisoner of War in Japan and occupied territories. The legation, willing to assist, forwarded the request including promises for funds to the national Japanese YMCA. The local office was headed by Soichi Saito, who had been its long-term Secretary General. Saito was a well-known public intellectual, a devout second generation Christian and a strong supporter of peaceful relations between the U.S. and Japan. He was among the last delegates of the YMCA in the U.S. in 1941 and the second Japanese man to visit the U.S. again after the war in 1948. On the other hand, he also had a track record of defending Japanese actions in Manchukuo and criticized the international YMCA heavily for its siding with the League of Nations on the issue. Under his leadership, the Japanese YMCA withdrew from the international YMCA in 1941.554 His

553 The YMCA became an object of popular culture in 1978, when the U.S.-American disco group Village People created the iconic pop song Y.M.C.A. whose lyrics, in a joking ambiguity, talk about the core values of the organization while simultaneously praising it as a popular cruising spot for gay men.
ambivalent nationalist stance proved to be a major hurdle for the success of the relief efforts initiated by the Geneva based mother organization. A legation report on the issue stated that “[l]engthy discussions with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military administration ensued and it gradually became evident that the Japanese YMCA were not only helpless in the matter of dealing with the authorities, but also that they were more inclined, perhaps forced by the prevailing situation to become active for benefit of the Japanese soldiers.”\textsuperscript{555} Saito had made such a bad impression on the legation that Bagge and his staff decided that to save the initiative, a neutral committee had to be formed to carry out the task. It was inaugurated on June 22, 1942 under the patronage of both, the Swedish and the Swiss legation in the following configuration:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Widar Bagge</td>
<td>Swedish Minister</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camille Gorgé</td>
<td>Swiss Minister</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Paravicini</td>
<td>Red Cross Delegate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. Bernath</td>
<td>Swiss Legation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. P. Troedsson</td>
<td>Consul of Sweden</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. E. Ericson</td>
<td>Swedish Legation</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Composition of the Neutral Committee of the YMCA

The actual work of the committee was handled by Ericson in ‘constant consultation’ with Bagge and the staff who carried out the committee’s missions was the B-Section of the legation of which Ericson had been the chief.\textsuperscript{556} Through this arrangement, the B-section gained a second identity as the Office of the Neutral Committee of the YMCA.


\textsuperscript{556} Ibid., 6.
The Swiss stayed on the sidelines of this initiative. Although Camille Gorgé lent his name to the Neutral Committee which gave it a more international footing, he and his staff were scarcely involved in the actual work. Their only real collaboration happened through K. Bernath who, together with Ericson, formed the ‘working committee’ to guide the actions. The absence of Gorgé and especially the ICRC delegate, Fritz Paravicini, from the real work of the committee had two reasons. On the one hand, they were already deeply engaged in other relief actions through the ICRC. It therefore “seemed to be a reasonable and rational division of work, if the Swedish Legation undertook to assist the YMCA.”557 In contrast to the ICRC, the Neutral Committee of the YMCA decided not to engage in any efforts relating to the treatment of POWs. On the contrary, to forestall negative reaction by the Japanese authorities and to not confuse the two mandates, the Neutral Committee of the YMCA explicitly decided not check on the situation of POWs in the camps. They were only trying to deliver relief goods for the mental and physical recreation of the prisoners. They distributed books, sports gear, gardening tools, and musical instruments to POW camps to allow the prisoners to engage in activities that would help ease the intense stress and deprivation that they were under. This was not only in line with YMCA goals but ensured that the Neutral Committee would not duplicate the work of Paravicini and the ICRC, who oversaw the delivery of food stuffs, medicine, and clothing.

On the other hand, the YMCA initiative came with the risks to other activities that the two legations had to carry out. The Swiss legation was especially sensitive not to jeopardize its relationship with Japanese authorities. In the beginning of the YMCA

557 Ibid., 2.
initiative, when the military showed nothing but rejection and suspicion toward the committee’s requests “the Swiss Legation appeared rather uneasy about the effects these negotiations might have on their work as a protective power and for the International Red Cross, and even felt it advisable to withdraw one of their members from the YMCA Neutral Committee in order not to risk having his work among civilian internees impeded.”

The Swiss had to be careful because their own mandates were already delicate. Supporting yet another initiative to help Japan’s enemies by lending Swiss personnel would certainly seem even more objectionable to Japanese bureaucrats who did not trust foreign activities, in general. After all, the fear of espionage and the distrust toward foreigners was at its absolute height in those years.

Only after some months the Neutral Committee was able to achieve first successes. That began when the resistance from the Ministry of War to let them distribute relief goods started fading. By then the committee was able to approach the War Prisoners Information Bureau and initiate confidence-building measures. Bagge’s personal involvement in this phase was crucial. Through repeated dinner invitations of the Bureau’s chief, Major General Hamada, he built the necessary trust to receive permits for his staff to visit POW camps and carry out their YMCA mandates. Nevertheless, difficulties always remained since even with Major Hamada’s consent local authorities could block camp visits at the last minute. “The military authorities have had to be treated with the utmost discretion and at the least sign of disapproval a back out has had to be effected (sic.).”

---

558 Ibid.
559 Ibid., 3.
In the end, the efforts and the great care with which the missions were carried out paid off. By the end of 1943 Ericson and Bernath reported that more than 16,000 books and magazines had been distributed, 25,000 JPY were spent on musical instruments and roughly the same amount went to sports equipment, indoor games, and other recreational articles. To put these numbers in perspective: the highest payed monthly salary for the Swedish staff working at the office of the Neutral Committee was 800 JPY. 560

Beyond these efforts, the Neutral Committee was also able to work in the other direction. Several thousand Japanese books were sent to Japanese internees in the U.S.A. and Canada to support the YMCA relief efforts there. The committee also tried to expand its operations to other territories by soliciting the help of Swedes and Swiss outside the Japanese Mainland. In Shanghai, the Swede C.G.C. Askar was appointed local representative of the Neutral Committee of the YMCA. In Hong Kong Mr. F. Kengelbacher, as Swiss, accepted the same position and in Bangkok and Manila the Swedish Consuls F. Enstedt and H. Janson did the same. Unfortunately, only the representative in Thailand could carry out concrete relief work in POW camps. The others did not receive the consent of the local Japanese authorities to enter the camps or were not even acknowledged as YMCA representatives. The impact of the international network of the Neutral Committee was therefore limited. 561 However, the episode demonstrates the willingness of the Swedish legation to utilize any possible chance to extend its humanitarian work beyond the narrow margins of mainland Japan.

560 Ibid., 6.
3-4-5. *Spying in Stockholm*

Soon after his arrival in Stockholm, Minister Okamoto started scraping together observations and intelligence reports. In the beginning those contained only his personal observations about the opinions of Swedes, in general, and assessments about meetings he had with high ranking officials like Gunnar Hägglöf, the head of the Foreign Trade section at the KUD. However, over time his assessments became more refined. The lack of adequate sources precludes a precise description of the nature of his contacts but what can be judged from the telegraphs intercepted by U.S. intelligence is that he used his acquaintance to high ranking diplomats and well-connected individuals in Stockholm to produce reports not only on Swedish affairs but on the security situation of the Soviets, the Germans, and the U.S. For example, he speaks of one of “(...) my agents here who has contacts in Russia (...)” to inform his ministry of an alleged meeting between U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Soviet Ambassador Maxim Litvinov. On another occasion, Okamoto telegraphed back to Tokyo that he had talked with “an authority on Russia here who has connections with the Soviets (...)” to report about the situation of Soviet military preparations for the next German attacks. In short, the minister was trying to find ways to extend the reach of his intelligence assessments through local informants. Unfortunately, it is unclear just how successful Okamoto was with this approach. However, there was another Japanese on the ground who had by far more experience in the region and a head-start of two years compared to the minister—the Military Attaché, Makoto Onodera.

562 LHMA, SRS883, "MAGIC Summary No. 332", February 21, 1943.
563 LHMA, SRS883, "MAGIC Summary No. 382", April 12, 1943.
564 LHMA, "MAGIC Summary No. 384", April 14, 1943.
Until 1940 Japan did not station Military Attachés in Stockholm. The post used to be in the Finnish capital, Helsinki, executed by Officer Toshio Nishimura. With the onset of the Soviet-Finish Winter War Helsinki became too dangerous and like the Japanese diplomats in the Baltic capitals half a year later, all Japanese diplomats had to be evacuated to safety. Since Nishimura was side-accredited to Stockholm and because Sweden had become the last Scandinavian outpost—unoccupied and not at war—in which Japanese diplomats could freely and securely move around, Nishimura relocated there.\footnote{Onodera, \textit{An den Gestaden der Ostsee: Onodera Makoto als japanischer Heeresattaché in Riga und Stockholm: (1936 - 1938, 1940 - 1945)}, 57. Also the Military Attaché in Riga, Hiroshi Onouchi, was evacuated to Stockholm.}

Already in fall 1940 the Military Headquarter in Tokyo decided that Makoto Onodera should take over the position because Nishimura seemed to be too allied-friendly in his assessments of the war. Onodera was a young but experienced officer for this job. He had already served as Military Attaché in Riga, three years before and, after that, was assigned to the same position in Shanghai after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese war. In Stockholm, he started working in January 1941. Within months he had rebuild many of the connections to former friends and informants that he knew from his time in Latvia. His wife, Yuriko Onodera chronicled in her memoirs the life of her husband and the family in Sweden.\footnote{She wrote her memoirs in Japanese and as of 2018, no English translation exists. German historian Gerhard Krebs has, however, edited a valuable German version of her book. See: \textit{ibid.}}

Regarding the informants that helped Onodera with his spying activities, his wife tells us that “the most important source of information were the excellently trained Estonian

---

\footnote{Onodera, \textit{An den Gestaden der Ostsee: Onodera Makoto als japanischer Heeresattaché in Riga und Stockholm: (1936 - 1938, 1940 - 1945)}, 57. Also the Military Attaché in Riga, Hiroshi Onouchi, was evacuated to Stockholm.}

\footnote{She wrote her memoirs in Japanese and as of 2018, no English translation exists. German historian Gerhard Krebs has, however, edited a valuable German version of her book. See: \textit{ibid.}}
officers, to which he had close relations due to his service in Riga. (…) One of them was Richard Maasing, who “during our time [in Riga] headed the General Staff and had been named Military Attaché to Sweden thereafter. (…) After the end of his home country he functioned as central point for his former coworkers who conducted secret operations in several European countries and supplied him with information. He gave many of these valuable communications to my husband (…)”. Maasing was also well connected to Swedish military circles, obtaining information about Soviet and German moves from them. He shared such observations with Onodera, which otherwise would have been out of his reach. The Japanese Attaché sent reports based on Maasing’s intelligence back to Tokyo, marking them as ‘Ma-Info’ which, for example, contained detailed assessments on the impending German attack on the Soviet Union—something the Army Staff in Tokyo did not believe. Another important source came from Polish informants. Onodera employed Mihal Rybikowski, a former member of the Polish General Staff, who, now in Stockholm, acted under cover of a false name and passport. Onodera protected the Pole from the grasp of the German Secret Service and in return Rybikowski functioned as middle-man to Major Felix Brzeskwinski, Military Attaché of the Polish Government in Exile (in London), with whom Onodera had been friends back in Riga but whom he could not talk to anymore publically because of the enemy status of their countries. Through the Rybikowski-Brzeskwinski connection and their respective networks in the U.S.S.R. and the U.K., Onodera received extensive and reliable information about developments in Moscow and London throughout the entire

567 Ibid., 110.
568 Ibid., 111.
569 Ibid.
time of the war. He forwarded them to Tokyo under the name ‘B-Info.’ It was for example through this connection that he obtained the news about the Yalta conference and the planned war entry of the Soviet Union against Japan. The records of the Magic Summaries revile that the U.S. code breakers were able to catch some of that information but only relatively late into Onodera’s activities in Stockholm. One of the summaries written on August 24, 1943 states that “There has come to hand a ‘BU Intelligence’ report (…) dated May 8 (…). Note: ‘BU Intelligence’ reports all seem to come from the Japanese Military Attaché in Stockholm and to cover information purporting to come from London and Moscow. The British belief that the information is supplied by agents. As yet there are not enough ‘BU’ reports available to permit dependable evaluation.” Right they were. But the lack of many of these reports made it impossible for the Allies to locate the sources of the information leaks. The Polish connection held throughout the war. Onodera had been warned by different sources that the Japanese code had been broken by the Americans and was therefore probably more careful with his communication. Minister Okamoto, on the other hand, did not believe the reports. Like many other Japanese diplomats in Europe he left a very visible trail of information that the U.S. could decipher. Onodera seems to have been the better spy of the two. His communication was more secure and his informants more widely distributed all over northern and eastern Europe. The Estonian and the Polish connection might have been his most important sources but they were far from the only

570 Ibid., 121-23 & 67-74.
571 LHMA, SRS1066, "MAGIC Summary No. 516", August 24, 1943. The difference in the description “B-Info” and “BU Intelligence” stems probably from the respective translations. The quoted passages from Yuriko Onodera’s book were taken from the German translation of the Japanese original (no English translation exists today). The Magic Summaries on the other hand were an English translation of the original Japanese reports.
ones. His network extended also to Hungarian and German officials with whom he shared his own work on Soviet activities in return for observations on U.S. and British military affairs. In 1944 even Finnish support to decipher Soviet codes was added to his extensive contacts, all of which allowed him to send substantial analysis back to Tokyo.\(^{572}\) He had to accomplish most of this work by himself, supported only by his wife (who took care of encoding and decoding of his communication) and a small secretariat. Only toward the end of the war his superiors in Tokyo decided to extend the office of the Military Attaché. As mentioned above, three additional officers\(^ {573}\) were assigned to him in December 1944. At the same time, the office budget was substantially increased with the order to “use these resources as efficiently as possible.” Both developments came as a welcome reinforcement to Onodera but the timing was nevertheless too late. By the beginning of 1945, the chance to turn the tide of the war through spying had long passed and the office of the Military Attaché knew that. “Did the headquarter finally recognize the achievements of the Stockholm office? But what could still be achieved by now with this much money! I will never forget the bitter feeling of powerlessness when I had deciphered the telegram and saw the clear text lay before me.”\(^ {574}\)


\(^{573}\) Yuriko Onodera informs that one more helper arrived at the same time, a secretary dispatched from Helsinki. He was not a diplomat and therefore did not figure in the Swedish national statistic.

3-5. The End of the War

By 1944 the situation of the European War had deteriorated for the Axis powers to the point that the only possible transport route for cargo from Sweden to Japan was by submarine from Germany. Steel balls, ball bearings, and piano wire were brought to Japan under water.\textsuperscript{575} Onodera’s office organized the purchases in Stockholm but a Swedish company carried out the actual transport.\textsuperscript{576} The quantities were, of course, much smaller than what they used to be when proper shipments or rail transports via Siberia were still possible. On the side of the Swedish legation, all business correspondence related to rubber exports for Sweden came to an end in late 1943 and the last telegram pertaining to the sales of nickel to the Japanese is dated February 1, 1944. During the last eighteen months of the war, trade between the two nations came to a near standstill.

3-5-1. Worsening of Diplomatic Relations

Diplomatic relations between Sweden and Japan also started suffering in 1944. A wedge was driven between the Swedish mission and its host country by the mandatory evacuation of the legation to Karuizawa, a northern town in the mountains of Nagano. Bagge and his neutral colleagues from Spain, Switzerland, Portugal, and Turkey jointly protested with verbal notes against the forceful removal of their legations from Tokyo. The Gaimusho however argued that the evacuation was necessary to protect the diplomats from the danger of U.S. air raids and that there was no practical downside to

\textsuperscript{575} LHMA, SRS1510, "MAGIC Summary No. 988", December 8, 1944.
\textsuperscript{576} Onodera, \textit{An den Gestaden der Ostsee: Onodera Makoto als japanischer Heeresattaché in Riga und Stockholm: (1936 - 1938, 1940 - 1945)}, 177.
the legations because there would be a Gaimusho Branch Office in Karuizawa to allow for continuous communication with the Japanese Government. However, to Bagge and the other neutral Ministers the measures were nothing but an attempt to constrain their access to information about the development of the war. Tokyo was the center of political activities and an isolation from it impeded the protecting Powers ability to carry out their mandates. Especially the strict order not to travel to Tokyo without permission and police escort came as a blatant infringement on the freedom of movement guaranteed to diplomats under International Law. Most suspiciously, the representatives of Axis powers were not under that restriction, which made it all too clear that the primary concern of the Gaimusho was not to keep the diplomats safe but to cut off the flow of information from Tokyo to neutral Governments (who might forward them to the Allied powers). 577 The written complaints did not help, the policy remained in force and the diplomats were cut off from Tokyo.

This was an acute problem because representation of foreign interest and the care taking of Swedish citizens had become by far the most important tasks for the legation. Living conditions worsened on the Japanese mainland and its shrinking empire overseas. In February 1944 Bagge had already reported of another joint neutral demarche together with the Swiss and the Spanish legation to request the evacuation of their citizens from Japanese occupied territories in the Pacific. Especially the Swiss had been vocal for months that they wanted their citizens in occupied territories evacuated. The Japanese side had been ignoring the requests repeatedly. The joint diplomatic action was

---

therefore aimed at increasing the pressure on the Gaimusho to receive at least an amelioration of the living conditions of the concerned neutral nationals. But again, the goal was not achieved. Neutral objections to their treatment inside or outside of Japan had rarely any impact anymore. At the same time, reports from Hong Kong and the Philippines of mistreatment of neutrals nationals kept pouring in, especially in the latter half of 1944 and early 1945. The worst atrocities were committed in Manila, where more than a hundred Spanish and twenty Swiss citizens were executed by Japanese soldiers during the final battle for the city. The Swedish were luckier. Not a single casualty was reported. All seventeen Swedish families who resided in Manila survived the slaughter. Only one Swede, Adolf Greiffe, was wounded by a shot from a Japanese officer but he and his family were alive. 578

The incident in Manila was the reason why the Spanish finally relinquished their representations of Japanese interests in the Americas (see chapter 4-5-2). For Sweden, no such question arose. In one of his last telegrams before departing back to Sweden (in April 1945) Bagge instructed his ministry to prepare for the Japanese request to take over the country’s interests in the U.S. He emphasized that if the Swedish government decided to accept the mandate, it should not do so without using the request as a bargaining chip to receive important concessions for the Swedish mandates as protecting Power in Japan. He wanted more food rations given to the POWs, imprisoned Norwegians, and Swedes freed, and arbitrary arrests stopped. 579 In the end, Japan convinced the Swiss to represent Japan’s interests in the Americas and Bagge

could not make his demands heard. Nevertheless, the episode shows that the Swedish diplomats, much like their Swiss colleagues, tried to use every possible way to receive concessions from the Gaimusho to improve the way they and the powers under their protection were treated. The fact that Sweden was serving as protecting Power for Japan in many countries around the world was not enough to be treated favorably. Only concrete issues could serve as bargaining chips toward the Gaimusho.

The biggest favor was yet to come in the last year of the war. With the U.S. Navy approaching the Japanese homeland, the Imperial Forces in retreat, and American bombers bringing havoc to mainland cities, many Japanese inside and outside the political circles became aware of the urgency to end this lost war. But how to do that? A negotiated peace that would spear Japanese militarism from dismantlement was out of the question for the U.S. who made it clear that nothing short of unconditional surrender was acceptable to Washington. But in Tokyo, even to peace-minded cabinet members like Foreign Minister Shigemitsu only an end that was “consonant to the honor of Japan” was an acceptable solution. 580 The central issue was to preserve Japan’s polity (‘Kokutai’), with which the survival of the institution of the Emperor was inextricably linked. The possibilities of the Emperor’s political (and physical) survival had to be sounded out through peace feelers. One of the best chances for that was through Minister Bagge’s Good Office and Swedish mediation. Important circles in the highest ranks of Japanese politics hoped to achieve a negotiated peace agreement with the Allies through the Good Offices of Stockholm. The so-called ‘Bagge Maneuver’ is today one of the best-known aspects of WWII Swedish-Japanese relations because of its

potential implications. It has been well researched in detailed accounts by Gerhard Krebs and Bert Edström and is reproduced here for the sake of a complete account of events.\(^{581}\)

### 3-5-2. The ‘Bagge Maneuver’ and Peace Feelers through Sweden

In September 1944, Minister Bagge was contacted by an old friend, Bunshiro Suzuki. The managing director of the daily newspaper *Asahi Shimbun*, who told him that former Prime Minister, Prince Konoe, was soliciting his services to broker a separate peace deal with the U.K.\(^ {582}\) It was uncovered later that Suzuki had acted on his own in this moment, without Konoe being aware of these plans. However, Bagge believed his friend and cabled the content of the conversation back to his ministry with the note that “If resonance is found in London, they are prepared for preliminary discussions via Sweden.”\(^ {583}\) This information was treated with urgency in Stockholm were Foreign Minister Christian Günther informed the British about the important telegram. They, in turn, informed the U.S. but Secretary of State, Cordell Hull and the British Minister to the U.S., Lord Halifax, agreed that the Allied powers must not react to indirect Japanese attempts because that might be interpreted as a sign in Tokyo that the Allied forces were willing to negotiate favorable peace terms—which they were not. The U.S. and U.K. decided that no action would be taken on the peace feeler but that the U.S.S.R.

---


Government would be informed of the Japanese action. Bagge was kept in the dark about these issues. Nevertheless, the telegram instructed Bagge to stay in contact with his informants.

Back in Karuizawa Bagge did just that. He stayed in touch with Japanese business men, diplomats and politicians who wished to bring about a peace agreement through Swedish mediation. These efforts were naturally a hidden affair in Japan. On the one hand the official policy of the government still was to change the situation through military victories and on the other side, any politician who seemed inclined to negotiate a surrender of Japan was risking assassination by rogue exponents of the armed forces. It is remarkable therefore that Bagge reported later to have been in personal contact even with Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu who asked him to investigate the possibly for peace. He reported those renewed interests for a Swedish mediated peace in early April to the KUD, less than two weeks before his scheduled return to Sweden. Bagge’s messages reached again the highest ranks of U.S. decision makers but their stand point had not changed—no secret contacts. Secretary of State Edward Stettinius told the U.S. Minister in Stockholm that no U.S. interest in these advances should be expressed to Sweden.

In the meantime, Bagge had met with Shigemitsu on April 7, two days after the Kuniaki government had collapsed (which meant that Shigemitsu was not Foreign Minister anymore). However, Shigemitsu asked Bagge to help Japan and make an acceptable Allied peace proposal possible. This meant that he wanted Bagge to negotiate with the

586 Ibid., 10.
U.S. for a peace proposal short of unconditional surrender. Shigemitsu was aware that Bagge had been recalled to Stockholm and would be leaving Japan shortly. He wanted him to be in touch with Okamoto back in Stockholm and work on this issue that was of highest priority to Japan. Later, Bagge was informed that also the new Foreign Minister, Shigenori Togo, was very much in favor of Swedish initiated peace feelers with the Allied powers. The condition therefore was, however, that the Japanese side would not be seen as the source of the approach, since this would amount to a confession of weakness toward the Allied powers. It was Togo’s wish that Sweden found a way to initiate peace talks that both sides could agree to.\textsuperscript{587} The essential part in this endeavor, from the Japanese side, was therefore that Sweden had to take the initiative and that the hidden communication with Bagge would need to stay just that—a secret. In Stockholm, Bagge’s telegrams on the issue did not spark much enthusiasm. The Swedish side was well aware that any independent action on their side for peace talks with Japan would be running against Allied interests to bring about an unconditional surrender by military force. The answer that was sent back to Tokyo was therefore brief and clear: “no initiative [will be taken by] Sweden regarding proposals or information.”\textsuperscript{588} Bagge did not receive that telegram anymore. He had left Japan on April 14, from Haneda Airport on a specially airplane, arranged by the Gaimusho, that brought him to Manchukuo from where he continued to travel via the Trans-Siberian Railway, arriving

\textsuperscript{587} Ibid., 10-14.

in Stockholm at the beginning of May.\textsuperscript{589} There he immediately contacted Minister Okamoto but in a private discussion it became clear that the latter had not received any instructions from Tokyo to carry the peace feelers forward with Bagge. Okamoto sent a telegram about the meeting to Tokyo on May 10, asking if the Foreign Minister wished to solicit Swedish help officially for a peace initiative?\textsuperscript{590} This, however, was not what Togo had expected to happen. If Japan needed to solicit a peace initiative by Sweden, the negotiation position for Japan would be much weaker than if it could agree to independently organized peace talks and, on the home front, a coup d’etat by the military or even assassination attempts would loom large. In his answer a week later Togo rejected the indication that Bagge had received any official request by the Japanese Government. Okamoto informed the disappointed Minister Bagge on May 25 of the answer which effectively ended the Maneuver for peace through Sweden.

The research of Historian Bert Edström shows that the principle reason on which the initiative failed was the miss-expectation about who was to initiate the sounding out of possibilities for peace talks. From the memoirs and testimonies of high ranking Japanese Officials like Togo, Shigemitsu and his Private Secretary Toshikazu Kase it seems as if the Japanese side was expecting Sweden to act independently, but that notion was strongly rejected by Bagge. In a letter written in 1960 to Richard Storry, Professor of Japanese Studies at Oxford, Bagge explained that the recollections of some of his Japanese counterparts were not the same as his memories of the affair:

\textsuperscript{589} The special arrangement for Bagge’s return to Sweden are another indication for the importance that the Gaimusho gave to the Swedish peace feeler.

In the collection of documents published by Gaimusho (see above) there are two erroneous and misleading passages which I should like to point out. From the statement of Mr. Tadashi Sakaya as well as from the one attributed to Mr. Shigemitsu himself one must get the impression that I did propose myself to act as mediator for peace negotiations. This is quite wrong and you will see from what I have written above that all the time my attitude was carefully reserved, although I was prepared to act for the good sake when I was asked to do so.

That nothing came out of this initiative of Mr. Shigemitsu was of course entirely due to the fall of the Koiso Government and the different attitude of Mr. Togo, who had other ideas. If Mr. Okamoto, the Japanese Minister to Stockholm, had got instructions to go ahead, I could of course have started quite a strong action and there might have come something out of it.591

There is no way of verifying either Bagge’s claims or those of the Japanese officials he cited. It might well be that Shigemitsu had understood that Bagge would be the proactive part of the affair and that Togo was led to believe the same. Or, even more likely, neither side was clear on the expected actions to follow and once Bagge had arrived in Stockholm and a decision had to be made, the incompatibility of the Japanese and Swedish expectations just surfaced. Whatever the turn of events in reality was, it is clear that the miss-alignment of expectations was the reason that the ‘Bagge Maneuver’ did not lead to actual peace talks. Togo had by that time already pinned his hopes for a negotiated peace on Soviet mediation anyhow—the place where he himself had served as Japanese ambassador until his appointment as Foreign Minister.

Onodera, too, had been working on peace feelers in Stockholm, trying to involve the King to create a connection between the emperor and the British Royal Family. But his endeavors were even less fruitful than those of Minister Bagge. If anything, they were counterproductive as his unsolicited peace initiatives drew the strong condemnation of

the Gaimusho, the armed forces and Togo himself who, after learning of Onodera’s actions, issued a warning to all diplomatic representations that no independent peace initiatives must be undertaken. In this regard, Sweden was an important platform for potential peace feelers, but in the end, none of them had any impact on the outcome of the war. On August 9, the day the second atomic bomb obliterated the city of Nagasaki, the U.S.S.R. declared war on Japan. A day later, the Gaimusho send a declaration to the Allied Powers, accepting to surrender under the condition that the imperial system was not to be touched by the victors. The U.S. and the U.K. rejected the condition, demanding full acceptance of the Potsdam declaration. After an intense twenty-four hours of negotiations, remembered today as Japan’s longest day between the war and peace factions in Tokyo, with the Emperor casting the deciding vote, Togo finally sent a telegram of unconditional surrender to the legations in Stockholm and Berne. The Swedish and Swiss governments were asked to forward them to the allied powers where, on the evening of August 14, victory over Japan was declared.

593 Pacific War Research Society, Japan’s Longest Day.
3-6. Chapter Summary & Conclusion

Sweden-Norway was the twelfth nation to establish treaty relations with Japan and the first one to do so with the new Meiji Government in 1868. The agreement was modeled after the earlier Bakufu treaties and signed by the Dutch Minister Resident because Sweden-Norway did not send its own representative to Japan. For almost forty years, the Scandinavians had their diplomacy looked after by Dutch or Spanish representatives. Only Stockholm’s divorce from Oslo in 1905 changed Sweden’s global trade strategy. From the following year, the Swedish government began sending influential business people and politicians as envoys to Tokyo, aiming at making Japan a hub for trade with Asia. The new strategy paid off quickly. Commerce boomed because Swedish exports were well received in the Japan of the 1910s and 1920s. Of the three nations in this study, Sweden developed the largest consular network in the Japanese Empire, which helped generate the largest trade volume.

The first serious dispute between Sweden and Japan started over the Empire’s expansion into Manchuria. During the interwar period, Sweden, in the words of Diplomat Gunnar Hägglöf, “devoted all the energies of her foreign policy to the League of Nations. The building up of an international order within the framework of the League became the hope of successive Swedish Governments, and there is in my opinion little doubt that Sweden would have abandoned the policy of neutrality for good if Great Britain (…), had given a strong lead to the movement for an effective international security organization.”594 Japan’s infringements of League principles and the organization’s incapacity to stop them were the first of a succession of bitter

disappointments, which its diplomats in Geneva, however, condemned more forcefully
than the great Powers and with the strongest words of any of the permanent neutrals.
Despite the indignation that Sweden’s criticism caused in Tokyo, the backbone of
Swedish-Japanese relations—trade—did not suffer from the political fallout. On the
contrary, exports to Japan tripled between 1931 and 1937 and soybean from Manchukuo
became one of Sweden’s strongest imports from Asia, worth almost twice as much as
all imports from Japan combined.
Changes in Japan’s domestic economic structure brought these developments to an end.
The beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War, in 1937, and the subsequent
restructuring of Japan’s economy toward self-sufficiency cooled the trade relationship.
However, commerce did not cease altogether, because although Japanese interest in
Swedish pulp, steel, nickel, and cadmium decreased, it never completely faded. Also,
not all trade hurdles were domestic. Once the war in Europe broke out, sea routes
became more dangerous, and British insistence on navicerts for neutral trade impeded
transport heavily. In 1941, even before Japan’s entry into the war, British suspicions
toward Tokyo led to repeated rejections of navicert applications. On the other hand, the
war between Russia and Germany blocked trade routes via Siberia. Nevertheless, trade
between Stockholm and Tokyo never completely ceased. Even at the very end, piano
wire and ball bearings were still transported to Japan via German submarines—the
value of these exchanges was, however, considerably low.
Pearl Harbor, was a watershed moment for Swedish-Japanese relations. For Swedish
business, everything changed with Japan’s new mode of industrial production for the
war economy. The nationalization of Japanese business conglomerates led to a quasi-
nationalization of Sweden’s trade. Price negotiations were suddenly not conducted
anymore between Swedish and Japanese companies but between the legation and the
Ministry of Trade. This went so far that Swedish companies complained about the
interference of the legation in their business. Minister Widar Bagge defended the
measures, arguing that under the new rules of the game only the Swedish state—as
represented through him—had an adequate standing for negotiations with Japan. Indeed,
he was able to get much higher concessions than the company directors.

Diplomatically, Sweden became Japan’s second largest protecting Power and one of the
three neutrals tasked with organizing the exchange of enemy nationals among the
belligerents. Especially its role as Japan’s protecting Power in Hawaii and as the
provider of exchange ships made it a crucial neutral partner to Tokyo. On the other hand,
Sweden collaborated in several areas with Switzerland to protect Allied POWs,
diplomats, and civilians. It also became an enabler for private humanitarian relief efforts
by lending a helping hand to the ‘Neutral Committee of the YMCA’ (made of Swedish
and Swiss diplomats) which would act as the Japanese outlet of the worldwide
organization. Through the committee, the Swedes could channel YMCA goods and
funds to interned enemy nationals in the Empire. If Switzerland was the diplomatic
partner of the ICRC, Sweden was the partner of the YMCA.

Paradoxically, the new role Sweden came to play occurred in tandem with Japan’s
decaying interest in bilateral relations with the Scandinavians. For nearly two years
(January 1941 – November 1942), Japan did not have a Minister Plenipotentiary
stationed in Stockholm, operating its legation on minimum capacity only. Sweden
strongly disliked the situation since it meant even fewer possibilities to make its
interests and grievances heard in Tokyo. The official reason the Gaimusho gave was a
lack of skilled personnel, but the truth was probably more mundane—the geopolitical
situation of these years had isolated Sweden in the eyes of Japan, making diplomatic efforts there unnecessary. That perception changed radically toward the final years of the war. Once the Gaimusho and Japan’s Armed Forces realized the value of Stockholm as an outpost for intelligence gathering, Japan sent not only a new minister but a dozen delegates to gather information on the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, Germany, and the U.S. alike. Especially the crafty Military Attaché, Makoto Onodera, used his post in Stockholm to build an elaborate and well-functioning spy-network, uncovering many allied plans—including the Yalta agreement. In contrast to Japanese Minister Suemasa Okamoto, Onodera’s activities were only rarely uncovered by the Allies because he used communication channels different from those of the legation, fearing that the Japanese cipher code had been cracked—which was indeed the case.

Sweden’s new role as provider for diplomatic and humanitarian services increased the workload of the KUD considerably. To cope with the situation, it founded a division dedicated only to Foreign Interests, the so-called ‘B-Section.’ In Japan, Bagge made a former Swedish company director the head of his local chapter of the B-Section. In general, Bagge had to hire many more Swedish and Japanese employees to fulfill all the new jobs. His Mission grew from a handful of people to over twenty. Besides the apparent necessity to assist individuals in danger—the legation cared also for nationals who were not covered by a mandate of protecting Power—Bagge recommended to his government not to turn down request for Sweden’s Good Office because he hoped that these favors would grant Sweden an advantageous position for its own interests, especially inside Japan. These expectations did not come true. With every year of the war, it became more difficult for Bagge to uphold commercial interests and to protect his own citizens who became targets of the military police. Neither was he able to
convince the Gaimusho to evacuate his compatriots from occupied territories in East and Southeast Asia, not even through a joint Swedish-Spanish-Swiss protest. The Scandinavians were lucky, however, since no fatalities were reported from the territories, including Manila, where many Spanish and Swiss citizens perished during the battle for the city in February 1945.

The last favor that Japan received from Sweden was Bagge’s efforts to help end the war through peace feelers in Stockholm. He returned there in April 1945, after several contacts with Japanese officials, including Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, who asked him to help organize peace talks with the Allies. The information about these contacts reached even Washington—Roosevelt and Truman both knew about them. However, the allied intransigence on back-door channels, their rejection to accept anything less than unconditional surrender, the refusal of Japan’s political leadership to officially initiate talks, and Sweden’s stance on not ‘forcing’ talks through unilateral action, precluded any chance for a peace negotiated through Stockholm. However, in comparison to all other peace initiatives of the war, the ‘Bagge Maneuver’ came closest to an actual solution because it involved Japanese government ministers (Shigemitsu and Togo). It was one of the most realistic chances for peace talks but failed on unsurmountable strategic considerations on all sides.
4. Spain

The first official contact between representatives of Spain and Japan dates to the late sixteenth century, predating Japan’s ‘Sakoku’ period of national isolation. Before Japan closed its borders for 250 years, the Spanish had already established a firm foothold in the Philippines, controlling Manila and other important coastal cities. That development in the Southeast Asian neighborhood did not escape the feudal leaders of Japan.

---

595 In the 1630s Japan was effectively cut off from International Relations. Its rulers made it punishable by death for foreigners to enter Japan or for Japanese to leave the country. Only few exceptions were granted to ports in Nagasaki and trade through the kingdom of the Ryukyu islands. The period of isolation lasted until 1868.
4-1. Early Modern Spanish-Japanese Relations

In 1592 Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the de facto ruler of the country—even though not its emperor—who had just finished uniting Japan, sent a letter to Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas, the Spanish Governor of the Philippines. The letter, written in Chinese, posed a problem to Dasmariñas because his Chinese language experts disagreed on the meaning of it. Did Hideyoshi just propose friendship and good relations with the Spanish in the Philippines, or did he demand the vassalage of the islands? To settle the question, the Governor sent a diplomatic mission to Japan, headed by his most renowned scholar of Chinese language, Father Juan Cobo. The Dominican priest thereby became Spain’s first official emissary to Japan. He did not stay for long, departing again for Manila in the year 1593. Unfortunately, his return ship got caught in a tempest leading to his shipwreck on the island of Formosa where Cobo died the same year. The documents he carried with him were lost at sea and the exact intention of Hideyoshi has been debated by scholars ever since.596 In Manila, Dasmariñas decided to have another try at relations with Japan and sent a second Spanish embassy to the northern neighbor. The Franciscan Fray Pedro Bautista was the Envoy this time.597 He sailed off on May 26, 1593 tasked with negotiating trade terms with the Japanese. Initially, his mission was successful. Hideyoshi granted him and his companions a place to stay in the capital, Kyoto, and in January 1595, a treaty of friendship was signed between Japan and the Philippines. This was crucial for Spanish missionaries. Within three years, the Franciscans converted

20,000 Japanese—or at least so they claimed. However, the situation changed dramatically when Hideyoshi reversed his Christian-friendly course a year later. Listening to the advice of Buddhist sects and the counsels from Portuguese Jesuits who saw the Spaniards as a threat to their trade with Portuguese Macau, Hideyoshi, on December 8, 1596 ordered the arrest of Bautista and his Franciscan brotherhood. They were forced to march to Nagasaki where they were crucified the following year, together with two dozen Japanese Christians.\textsuperscript{598} The Franciscans managed a temporary comeback after Tokugawa Ieyasu, the first of the Tokugawa Shoguns, succeeded Hideyoshi in 1603. For ten years he allowed Christians back into the country, trying to establish beneficial trade relations with Spain as to break the Portuguese monopoly. However, after 1613, also Tokugawa changed his mind, largely because newly converted, Japanese Christian nobility started to become a threatening factor for his powerful rule.\textsuperscript{599}

The last diplomatic contact before Japan’s complete isolation of the Sakoku-period was the Keicho Embassy, named after the contemporary Japanese epoch. It was led by Hasekura Rokuemon Tsunenaga and Luis Sotelo, a Spanish Franciscan friar who, after fleeing the anti-Christian movements of Tokugawa in Edo, found a supporter in the Daimio of Mutsu, the north-eastern part of the Tohoku region, a man named Date Masamune. The Daimio’s goal was to create trade relations between his region and New Spain in the Americas while Sotelo sought to found his own diocese in northern Japan to secure the influence of the Franciscans over the Portuguese Jesuits. The 180-

\textsuperscript{598} A. M. Hurtado, \textit{Estudios sobre el Franciscanismo} (2016), 290-94.
people strong crew left Japan in late 1613, traveling through Mexico to Spain where they arrived in fall of the next year. Although Ambassador Hasekura met with King Philip III in Madrid in 1615 and was even baptized in front of the Monarch, Philip was keenly aware that the Embassy did not have the backing of the highest ruler of Japan. Being but the representation of one of the powerful noblemen of the country, he rejected the request for a trade relationship with Date Masamune. Similarly, Sotelo failed to receive Rome’s blessing to establish his own church in Japan. The embassy returned to Japan nine years after its departure without substantial diplomatic achievements to show. Tokugawa, through a string of anti-foreigner legislations, expelled all traces of Christianity from Japan and with it all Spanish (and Portuguese) influence, closing the country to foreigners by 1637.601

4-1-1. Spanish Diplomacy and the Role of the Philippines

Preciously little contact existed between Spain and Japan until the U.S. American Commodore Perry forcefully reopened the country to international trade by threatening military action should the Japanese government not yield to his demands for open ports during his two visits in 1853–1854. After yielding to what the Bakufu Government of the Shogunate perceived as a grave threat to the national security of its port cities and the archipelago’s sea-lanes of communication, the ports of Shimoda and Hakodate were declared open for the anchoring of U.S. ships through the 1854 Kanagawa Treaty. Although this did not yet give the U.S. a right to trade with Japan, it was the start of a

600 Although the Sakoku period was a time of extreme seclusion, it was never perfect. Trade relations with Chinese and Dutch merchants remained on small scale through a special port in Nagasaki, as well as trade in Hokkaido with the Ainu people in the Ryukyu islands which also provided for trade with China.
radical rethinking of foreign relations on the part of the Bakufu government. Japan’s first commercial treaty followed in 1858, after several years of negotiations, not only with the Americans but the Dutch, the Russians, the British and the French who all signed similar treaties in the months that followed. In the same year, the Spanish diplomats stationed in China became aware of the prospects of trade with Japan for their most important Asian colonial outpost, the Philippines. They recommended that the Central Government in Madrid took steps to follow suit with the other European nations to establish trade relations with Japan for the sake of new export markets for products shipped from Manila. Simultaneously, also the Spanish government of the Philippines (Gobierno Civil Superior) became aware of the prospects, urging Madrid in similar language to become active. Their considerations were also directed towards securing new markets for Spanish and Filipino goods in East Asia but went beyond purely mercantile considerations. They included the wish for immigration from Japan to the Philippines. The Spanish authorities in Manila had been struggling for the longest time of the nineteenth century with a lack of skilled agricultural labor to farm the fertile lands under their control. Since the Japanese used to be an important group of immigrants before breaking off contact with other countries and because they were known for skillful agricultural labor, the idea of the government in Manila to restart immigration from Japan was not far-fetched.

---


Madrid was slow to respond to the wishes of its colony. At the same time, the anti-
foreigner sentiments of 1861 in Japan, together with the Namamugi incident a year 
later—the killing of a British national by Samurai—gave rise to an armed conflict 
between foreign powers and the Satsuma clan of Southern Japan (Kyushu). These 
developments stalled approaches by the Spanish for official diplomatic relations. In 
1867 the Governor General of the Philippines, José de la Gándara, addressed again the 
foreign ministry in Spain, urging them to finally send an official embassy and negotiate 
a treaty that would be beneficial to his territory. A year later, fed-up with the slow pace 
of Madrid, the Governor General took the incentive and approached the Japanese via his 
own, unofficial delegation, led by Captain D. Claudio Montero. Aided by the Minister 
Resident of the United States, the Captain was able to hand a letter to the Japanese 
government with the Philippine-Spanish proposal for mutual commercial relations:

(…) Philippine ships can bring to these Japanese ports rich products of our 
country, like sugar, abaca [Manila hemp], gum, wood, Catalan cotton and so many other products. And also that Japanese ships can come to these 
Philippine ports, just like the Spanish [ships], to sell gold and silver coated 
produce, the rich porcelain, the excellent stone coal and as many things as 
the Empire of the Rising Sun produces.604

Invoking powers that conventionally can only be exercised by the Foreign Ministry, the 
Governor General suggested to interface Spain and Japan via Manila, hoping to find 
new markets for his own goods and not yet mentioning earlier hopes for Japanese 
immigration to the Philippines. However, the unofficial mission failed. The lack of 
Spanish credentials on the one hand and the tumultuous situation of Japan, which was in

---

604 Letter Governor General José de la Gándara to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, dated February 
1 1868. Cited in: ibid., 22-23. [OEsTA].
plain civil war after the Bakufu government had collapsed, on the other hand were the cause. Beleaguered and embarrassed by the actions of its colony, the Spanish Foreign Ministry saw it finally fit to send its own Plenipotentiary to Japan, charged with the mission to seek a trade agreement. Heriberto García de Quevedo became the first official Spanish diplomat after Fray Pedro Bautista to visit Japan almost 300 years later.

Minister García de Quevedo was lucky. Four years after Switzerland got its treaty of Friendship and Commerce, and only one day after the Kingdoms of Norway and Sweden concluded the first treaty of the Meiji era, the Spanish got their own agreement.

---

All Gracia had to do was to accept the treaty text, which was modeled precisely after the other documents of the Bakufu time. Negotiations took only three days. With the help of the U.S. Embassy and by way of translation by the French, the treaty text was modified to Spain and signed on November 12, 1868. A year later, it was ratified in Madrid.606

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>José Heriberto</td>
<td>García de Quevedo</td>
<td>Envoy</td>
<td>1869</td>
<td>1869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fibureio</td>
<td>Rodríguez y Muños</td>
<td>Chargé d’Affaires</td>
<td>1870</td>
<td>1875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariano</td>
<td>Alvarez</td>
<td>Chargé d’Affaires</td>
<td>1875</td>
<td>1883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Minister Resident</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luis</td>
<td>Del Castillo y Trigueros</td>
<td>Minister Resident</td>
<td>1883</td>
<td>1886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José</td>
<td>Delvat y Aréas</td>
<td>Minister Resident</td>
<td>1886</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luis</td>
<td>De la Barbera607</td>
<td>Minister Resident</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramiro</td>
<td>Gil de Ulibarri608</td>
<td>Envoy</td>
<td>1907</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francisco</td>
<td>Serrat y Bonastre609</td>
<td>Minister Resident</td>
<td>1915</td>
<td>1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juan Francisco</td>
<td>De Cárdenas610</td>
<td>Envoy</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santiago</td>
<td>Mendez de Vigo y Mendez de Vigo</td>
<td>Envoy</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: List of Spanish Heads of Mission to Japan611

606 Ibid., 23-25; Sánchez, "El Inicio de las Relaciones Hispano-Japonesa en la Época Contemporánea (1868-1885)."
607 Information on Luis de la Barbera from: El mundo de los periódicos, El mundo de los periódicos: anuario de la prensa española y estados hispano-americanos: 1 enero 1898 (Quintana1889-1890), 21; Librería Editorial Bailly-Bailliere e Hijos, Guía comercial de Madrid publicada con datos del Anuario del Comercio (Bailly-Bailliere): Año 1899 (Madrid1899), 15.
608 ABC, Japoneses y Españoles. Concurrentes al banquete que el ministro de España en Tokio (ABC, 1910), 7473600.
611 The list is probably incomplete, as there are several periods missing and dates unclear. The available historical record, based on Spanish sources does not allow for a more precise indexing of Spanish Ministers to Japan. More research is needed in Japanese or Spanish archives. List until José de la Barbera from: Seiro Kawasaki, "Kenkyu Nouto: Meiji Jidai no Toukyou ni atta Gaikoku Koukan (3) – The Foreign Missions in Tokyo of the Meiji Period (3)," Gaimusho Chousa Geppou, no. 1 (2013): 7.
Like the case of Sweden-Norway, this was another ‘inexpensive’ treaty—in terms of diplomatic investment. Also, similar to the Scandinavians, Spanish interest for Japan too remained relatively uninspired in the beginning. No economic initiatives were taken and for ten years Spanish interests were represented by a Chargé d’Affaires only. Unlike Sweden-Norway, however, Spain had its own diplomat in Tokyo, whose status was even elevated to the rank of a Minister Resident in 1883.

Besides the ‘regular’ representation, Spain sent a special diplomat to Tokyo in 1895—D. José de la Rica y Calvo, a full Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary—to handle a specific diplomatic issue; a permanent line of demarcation between the pacific possessions of the Japanese Empire (including deliberations about the status of Formosa) and the Philippines. These efforts resulted not only in a formal division of islands between Spain and Japan but ultimately in a revised treaty of Friendship and Commerce, replacing the earlier ‘unequal’ treaty, in 1897. 612

There are two more Spanish ministers to Japan who deserve attention because of their impact on Spanish foreign policy later in life. They served in Tokyo a few years before Santiago Méndez de Vigo y Méndez de Vigo—the main protagonist of this chapter. One was Francisco Serrat y Bonastre, who would become Franco’s first ‘Minister of Foreign Affairs’ 613 during the first years of the regime’s war against the central authority in Madrid. The other man was Juan Francisco Cárdenas who served Franco as unofficial contact man in Washington and later, after the Fascist’s victory, became

---

Spain’s Ambassador there during WWII. Both of them also had brief periods of service in Tokyo.

One of the view fields for which Spain took an active interest in Japan was the Christianization of the island but that was not particularly welcomed by the Japanese authorities. On the other hand, several Spanish diplomats in Tokyo tried to revive the earlier idea of the Governor of the Philippines to negotiate a treaty with Japan to let its citizens emigrate to the Philippines, where skilled agricultural labor was still very much in need. However, the proposal never went beyond the planning stage. At first the Japanese side refused to think about the proposal and once the mood in Tokyo had shifted (in the late 1880s) the Spanish let the idea go because the rapidly modernizing Japan with its colonial ambitions toward Taiwan and Korea started to look more like a threat to the Philippines than like a solution to its labor shortage. The interest in securing its possessions in the East and expanding its influence in China led Madrid to perceive Tokyo as an emerging adversary.614 Spain chimed into the tune of the ‘Yellow Peril’ heard also from other great Powers like the United States.615 Only the 1895 treaty to establish clear spheres of interests in the Pacific calmed the Spanish nerves.616 It is almost ironic that, in the end, Spain lost the Philippines—its pearl in the pacific— not to Japan but to the U.S., after the short Spanish-American war of 1898.

Commercially, Spanish-Japanese relations never reached a significant level. In 1879, ten years after the ratification of their first treaty, Spanish exports to Japan were a mere

0.2% of its total exports around the world (which does not include trade with its colonies) and 0.3% of imports—a meager result considering the hopes that the Colonial Government of the Philippines originally had for the Japanese market.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>57,784</td>
<td>36,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>50,682</td>
<td>4,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>86,879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>1280</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Spanish Imports & Exports to Japan 1879–1883, in ESP

The available statistical data before the turn of the century together with the records of the statistical yearbook—first issued in 1912—shows that Japan did not occupy a large role in Spain’s economic considerations. Not only was the trade volume low but with the exception of one year (1881), Spanish exports to Japan were continuously lower than imports. Seemingly, a trade deficit with Japan did not bother Madrid. This indifference is even more clearly visible in the twentieth century. Until the end of WWI trade with Japan continued on low levels and exports never surpassed imports. In the early 1920s Spain even imported goods from Japan for ten times the value for which it exported to the Empire. Unlike Switzerland and Sweden, Spain never treated Japan as an important export hub for its trade relation with Asia.

617 Data source: Sánchez, "El Inicio de las Relaciones Hispano-Japonesa en la Época Contemporánea (1868-1885)," 41.
4-1-2. The Domestic Background: National Turmoil

On the other hand, the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were a period when Spain had little time to seriously concentrate on strategic expansion of commercial relations. In 1875, Spain adopted a liberal constitution under Prime Minister Cánovas, with the goal of modernizing Spanish politics under democratic principles of a two-party system. However, the reform neither solved the increasingly worrisome social disparities in Spanish society, nor did it remedy the anachronistic mindset of large parts of the nobility, who were convinced that the Spanish malaise was to be remedied not by local political rejuvenation and the strengthening of weak social classes, but by forcefully retaking its rightful place among the great Powers. Understandably, a period of national turmoil started when the country lost almost all of its colonial territories during the Cuban revolt (1895–1898) and the Spanish-American War of 1898—a moment that made history as the ‘Disaster’ of 1898—disillusioning an entire generation

about their place in the world. Spain had to grant independence to Cuba and cede Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines to the United States. It was the end of empire for Spain.  

What followed in the forty years until the Second World War was what historian Derek Gagen called ‘the politics of a failing democracy.’ While holding on to its last possessions in Africa, even fighting a nasty, brutal war in Morocco, national politics failed to include marginalized but growing segments of society—mainly the excluded fringe areas in Catalonia and the Basque Country, impoverished rural areas and the large class of blue-color workers in the cities that belated industrialization had created also in Spain. Socialist and Marxist groupings under the leadership of trade unions gained steam in the early years of the twentieth century, adding further to the fragile democracy that was still mostly controlled by the descendants of the old, landowning nobility. Whereas Spain avoided the disaster of WWI by remaining neutral during the entire conflict, “it was to be the war in Morocco that triggered the final crisis. In 1917, disaffection in the army, allied to widespread demands for renovación coming from Catalonia, caused the regime to falter.”

Almost two decades of instability began with the military dictatorship of General Miguel Primo de Rivera in the late summer days of 1923. With the help of the army and the agreement of the Spanish monarchy, he dissolved parliament, proclaimed martial law and installed himself as the head of a national directorate, composed of nine men. Unable to stabilize the messy political situation or to deal appropriately with the

---

620 Ibid., Paragraph 8.
621 Ibid., Paragraph 10.
economic crisis, his downfall came when the military stopped supporting him. He resigned from his posts January 28, 1930 and was replaced by Dámaso Berenguer, who, in turn, was succeeded quickly by Juan Bautista Aznar-Cabañas. When King Alfonso XIII called for elections in April 1931, voters gave power to a coalition government called the Popular Front, a highly heterogeneous mix of republican leftists, socialists, communists and unions, who ended the dictatorship by proclaiming the Second Spanish Republic.

However, also the democratically elected republican government was not stable. Much like Japan in the same period, the republic experienced a rapid succession of governments. From 1931 to 1936, before the Civil War broke out, the government changed fourteen times under ever different coalitions. Under such fluctuations, it did not take long for the nation’s men under arms to dream the dream of power again. Only five years after the end of Primo de Rivera’s military dictatorship, exponents of the Spanish forces planned to seize power through a coup d’État which took place on July 17 and 18, 1936. Originally the operation was planned to be a quick military intervention to overthrow the government. However, the revolutionaries could not capture the major cities in the country in the first confusing days of the coup. That turned the endeavor into a bloody civil war of three years. In early 1937, the Republic was set to win the fight; it occupied a superior position over the nation’s strategic assets (like its ports) and the relative isolation of Franco’s forces weakened the insurgency. However, internationally, the Republicans found themselves unexpectedly isolated due

---

to the stern non-involvement policy of potential allies. Neither from the League of Nations, nor from Britain or France help was delivered to Madrid. To contain the conflict, the other European Powers had decided to adopt a stern policy of neutrality toward the internal affairs of Spain. The U.S. Congress even passed a second neutrality law in 1937, forcing President Roosevelt to extend the applicability of weapon embargos to the parties of civil wars (the previous legislation only covered inter-state wars).  

On the other side, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy did not keep to their word not to support the insurgency militarily. Both regimes sent assets, weaponry, military advisers and even pilots and soldiers to support Franco against the isolated Republican Government. Bit by bit the Republic lost on ground and the bloody war which cost between 500,000 and 1 million lives only found an end with the fall of Madrid on March 28, 1939 and General Franco’s proclamation of victory on April 1.  

The consequence of this was that on the eve of the Second World War a new fascist Spain was born with internal and external objectives opposite to those held by the previous Republican Government and that of the democratic forces in Europe and America. Within a period of sixty-five years—less than a human life—Spain had gone through several rounds of political renovation, ranging from monarchy to democracy and an authoritarian dictatorship, while losing most of its colonies and experiencing civil unrest and a traumatizing civil war. The following account of Spain’s diplomacy and foreign

625 Viñas, *Al servicio de la Republica*, 57.
policy toward Japan needs to be understood against these domestic developments and
the impact they had on the individuals who lived through them.
4-2. Diplomacy and Foreign Policy 1931–1937

The 1930s became unexpectedly the most turbulent decade for Spanish-Japanese relations ever since the re-establishment of diplomatic ties. Economically, the Great Depression of 1929 impacted Spanish purchasing power, leading to a drastic drop in the modest import-trade. Since Japanese purchases did not go back, this had the effect that, for the first time in many years, Spain actually held a trade surplus toward Japan in the early 1930s. However, trade in both directions had always been low compared to the size of the Spanish industry and to the trade volume of smaller nations like Switzerland and Sweden who traded five to ten times as much in the same period.626

![Figure 8: Spanish Imports & Exports to Japan 1931–1937, in million ESP](image)

Commerce was not an issue to Spain or Japan in the 1930s. The real concern for their relationship was political, caused by two separate developments; Japan’s aggressions in Manchuria and the Spanish Civil War.

---

626 The values are in different currencies but the exchange rates of the interwar period were mostly pegged. The Swiss Franc and the Spanish Peseta were even on par, exchanging at 1:1 ratio. The Swedish Crown was a third more expensive, exchanging for a ratio of 1:1.38 to CHF and ESP. See on this the exchange table in: Switzerland. Statistisches Bureau des eidg. Departementes des Innern. *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz* 1937: [Statistical Yearbook of Switzerland 1937], Berne: 1937, 221.

4-2-1. *The Spanish Minister to Japan*

Don Santiago Mendez de Vigo y Mendez de Vigo was born in 1876, Son of Felipe Méndez de Vigo y Osorio and Maria de la Paz Méndez de Vigo Oráa. The doubling in his family name stems from the Spanish tradition to carry both family names, that of the father and the mother. A child inherits the first half of each family name, representing the male lineage in both families. Santiago’s parents were, in fact, cousins. See, for example, the family tree here: "Felipe Méndez de Vigo Méndez de Vigo Osorio," Accessed October 1 2016, http://gw.geneanet.org/sanchiz?lang=en&p=felipe&n=mendez+de+vigo+mendez+de+vigo.

His family was closely related to the house of Bourbon, the royal family of Spain. His father was a diplomat of the highest rank who had served, among other postings, as Minister Plenipotentiary to Washington (1879–1881) a view years before the US-Spanish war. Santiago took over the family tradition, starting his diplomatic career at the age of twenty-two, when he was first dispatched as an Attaché to Berlin. Various posts in Europe and at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores—MAE) followed. His Curriculum Vitae reads like a template for any career diplomat. It includes representations in Vienna, ministerial posts in The Hague and Prague as well as postings in Latin America. He served first as Minister Plenipotentiary in Santiago de Chile (1927–1928) until the legation was elevated to the rank of an embassy which consequentially made him an ambassador from then on. He held the same position thereafter also in the Spanish Embassy in Havana (1928–1931), until he arrived in Japan in 1932 to take up his last position before retirement. He was, at that point, one of the

---

628 The doubling in his family name stems from the Spanish tradition to carry both family names, that of the father and the mother. A child inherits the first half of each family name, representing the male lineage in both families. Santiago’s parents were, in fact, cousins. See, for example, the family tree here: "Felipe Méndez de Vigo Méndez de Vigo Osorio," Accessed October 1 2016, http://gw.geneanet.org/sanchiz?lang=en&p=felipe&n=mendez+de+vigo+mendez+de+vigo.


630 Until 1938 the ministry was called “Ministerio de Estado” (Ministry of State). For the sake of unity, its newer name will be used throughout this chapter.

631 Macías Martín, "La diplomacia española ante el "machadato" y la crisis cubana de 1933," 259; Juan Luis Carrellán Ruiz, "Las Relaciones de España con Iberoamérica desde la Independencia a la Crisis de 1929 - El Caso de Chile" (Master, Universidad Internacional de Andalucía, 2010), 137-40.
most senior Spanish diplomates at the MAE, a fact that would play a role in the years to follow.\textsuperscript{632}

Despite Méndez de Vigo’s title of Ambassador, the Spanish mission to Japan had not the rank of an embassy, but only that of a legation. Although attempts had been made as early as 1925 to elevate the diplomatic relations between Spain and Japan, those efforts had not come to fruition.\textsuperscript{633} Therefore, when Méndez de Vigo arrived with his wife in Tokyo, he was obliged to accept the position of a Minister Plenipotentiary. Lucky for him, the MAE did not demote its personnel, he was allowed to keep and use his title ‘Ambassador of Spain’ to indicate his personal rank.\textsuperscript{634} As a result, many newspaper articles confused his personal title with his official role—as, for example, the text accompanying the below picture. The distinction was confusing; Ambassador Méndez de Vigo was serving as Minister Plenipotentiary in Japan and that did not change during his term in office since the legation was not elevated to an embassy. Such would only be the case after the end of the American occupation of Japan in 1952, when Spain normalized its relationship with the new government in Tokyo and sent Francisco Castillo (former Consul to Kobe) to be Spain’s first ‘real’ Ambassador to Japan.\textsuperscript{635}

\textsuperscript{633} AGA, (10) 052 CAJA 54/05137, Note, "Letter without title", April 28, 1925, Carpeta: Relativo a la Legación del Japón en Madrid y proyectos de este Gobierno.
\textsuperscript{634} That was a fact which his colleague and friend, Camille Gorgé, the Swiss Minister, never grew tired of pointing out in his Memoirs.
\textsuperscript{635} Rodao, "Relaciones Hispano-Japonesas, 1937-1945," 117.
There is one curious anomaly in the otherwise so clean record of this noble man and that is the relationship with his wife. Méndez de Vigo got married only relatively late in 1926 (age fifty) to the twenty year younger Victoria Lovestein Harris, a divorced Jewish American woman from Boston. For a man with a strong catholic background that was an unlikely liaison, opposed by the strong Spanish catholic church. It might well be that this is the reason for Santiago Méndez de Vigo’s complete missing in the publicly available genealogic record of his family.636

636 The Family Méndez de Vigo is relatively well documented, but none of the sources available for this research mentions Santiago, whereas all of his siblings are documented. That is truly odd regarding the fact that apart from his brother, Manuel Méndez de Vigo y Méndez de Vigo, Santiago reached the highest echelons of Spanish civil society including the title of Ambassador of Spain and the medal of the Grand Cross of Isabella the Catholic, an order that since 1815 has been bestowed to only 500 people. See: ABC, "NECROLOGICAS - Don Santiago Mendez de Vigo," February 26 1947; ABC, "Don Santiago Méndez de Vigo Méndez de Vigo Osoria y Oraà," February 26 1947; Agencia Estatal Boletín Oficial del Estado.
Professionally, Méndez de Vigo was a highly sociable person who maintained close contact to his peers in the diplomatic community. Despite his personal support for fascist Franco during Spain’s civil war (see below) Méndez de Vigo was first and foremost a Royalist and an aristocrat with the according mindset and self-esteem. His outgoing personality won him many friends. Among them was the Swiss Minister, Camille Gorgé, who in his memoirs repeatedly called the Spaniard “my dear friend Santiago.” The following is Camille Gorgé’s diary entry for March 10, 1941, which the Swiss Minister dedicated entirely to Méndez de Vigo. It is the only such profound description of a diplomat in Gorgé’s work:

Bridge at the Spanish legation. The host, Mr. Santiago de Vigo, who has the [personal] title of ambassador, is a classy little man, as thin as an olive tree, his forehead high and narrow with the hollow cheeks of an El Greco character; his temples gray with the seal of age on a figure with the beautiful wrinkles of a Spanish conquistador, but his body still seated like a matador of his Galicia, all in nerves, his eyes full of fire, his mouth vengeful, easy to curse, colorful in his speech of a frankness prompt and brutal and, with that, a heart of gold for his friends. However, with the reserve that, at the bridge table, he can be of utmost violence with anyone. I saw him make a lady cry who could not explain to him why she had not played her heart seven. But what do you want; in front of the green carpet, Santiago sees read. Woe to anyone allowing themselves to annoy him on the counterpart! (...)

Of his legation, he is the only one to scorn the Germans. No harm in that if he did not shout it from the roof tops to the great annoyance of his Consul and his Military Attaché, notorious but discreet germanophiles. That does not prevent him from making a laugh of the first Nazi to come around. By the devil, he knows how to live! (...)

Same thing and more against the Japanese. Santiago scorns them whenever he has the opportunity. One day, at a luncheon at the French Commercial Attaché's residence, he forgot himself to the point of accusing Japanese officials of ‘tartuffism’ [bigotry/hypocrisy], while there were two or three of them around him. They doubtlessly did not understand that

word, but, heaven! How we all felt hot! But however expressive our friend Santiago is, no one ever resents him. He is fortunate that, provoking all the time, he is not challenged. We do not take him seriously or, which amounts to the same, his bravado is forgotten quickly. That he's being forgiven everything is perhaps also because from time to time, his good nature makes him give a fair compensation to those whom he mishandles with so much casualty. While wishing Vichy to the devil, he will make a compliment to the Ambassador of France and, to amuse the latter, will say some flattery to the Ambassador of Germany. It's not his character, if you will, it's only his interpersonal skills, but, it must be said, it's not so bad in the present circumstances for a Spanish diplomat to relieve his heart and his conscience, without breaking with those whom professional duty obviously commands him to spare.637

Gorgé was not the only one who was impressed by Méndez de Vigo’s personality. Also U.S. Ambassador Joseph Grew counted to his close friends. The two men had started their posts in Tokyo at almost the same time and dined together frequently. In the tragic days of December 1941, Grew first received the news about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor from Méndez de Vigo—not from the Gaimusho. At least partially because of that friendship with the Spanish minister, Grew recommended to the State Department to choose Spain as the protecting Power for his embassy.638 However, from the U.S. communication with Berne it is clear that Washington considered a war with Spain itself as not unlikely and therefore turned to Switzerland for its protection.639 That is why in the end Gorgé and not Méndez de Vigo were responsible for the repatriation of Ambassador Grew and his staff. The episode illustrates the high esteem in which Méndez de Vigo was held by his peers, to the point that even seasoned statesmen like

637 GORGÉ DIARY, "Debacle au Soleil-Levant: Journal d'un Témoin", 1939–1945, Entry March 10 1941. [OFrTA].
Grew, who were well aware of the international situation, were inclined to believe in the benevolence of the Spanish.

4-2-2. The Spanish Mission

Méndez de Vigo arrived in Tokyo on April 17, 1932 and was accredited shortly thereafter by the Showa Emperor (Hirohito).

The first years of his new post were unspectacular, as he conveyed in his trimestral reports to Madrid. There were no pending questions in regard to the relations between Japan and Spain nor were there any problems to solve for the Spanish colony. He attributed this to the relative small number of compatriots living in the country which, including the diplomatic representatives and their spouses, amounted to only around 100 people in 1933. It was merchants, catholic missionaries and a few Spanish teachers who lived mostly in the Kanto or Kanzai regions.

---

640 AGA, (10) 052, CAJA 54/05137, Note, "No title", Nota de Mendez de Vigo al Ministro de Estado, April 20, 1932, Carpeta: Relativo a la Legación del Japón en Madrid y proyectos de este Gobierno.

641 AGA, (10) 052, CAJA 54/05133, Trimestral Report, "Tokio, 13 de agosto de 1932", Informe Trimestral 2 - Del Ministro de España (Mendez de Vigo) al Ministro de Estado, August 13, 1932, Carpeta 1 - Informes Trimestrales a Estado.

642 AGA, (10) 052, CAJA 54/05134, Note, "No 295 - Asunto: Situación Vicecónsules y Agentes honorarios", Nota de Mendez de Vigo al Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, Burgos, July 26, 1939, Carpeta: Servicio Consular a cargo de la Legación 28-111 BIS.
Diplomatic Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minister Plenipotentiary</td>
<td>Santiago Mendez de Vigo y Mendez de Vigo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Secretary</td>
<td>Juan Gómez de Molina y Elio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Secretary</td>
<td>Vacant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consul (Kobe)</td>
<td>Francisco José del Castillo y Campos</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Honorary Positions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Honorary Vice Consul (Yokohama)</td>
<td>Salvador Pérez</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Office Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None (Unknown)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: Personnel of the Spanish Mission to the Empire of Japan (during key moment of Wartime Period)

The legation itself was small as well. It was staffed with merely two people. There was a first and a second secretary (names unknown), the latter of whom was on leave of absence at the time Méndez de Vigo became the head of mission. Additionally, Spain also operated two consulates. A regular one, staffed with a career diplomat in the port city of Kobe, and an Honorary Consulate, operated by a non-career diplomat in Yokohama. Kobe and Yokohama were the two most important cities for international trade at the time, as they featured large ports where most international cargo would be passed through to and from Osaka (for the case of Kobe) and Tokyo (for Yokohama). This was more or less a standard arrangement, as other nations also organized their representations in a similar fashion. Tokyo had in this sense always been the seat of the political representation for ambassadors or ministers and their staff, while the port cities where the natural locations for consulates.643 At the beginning of Méndez de Vigo’s term, the consulate in Kobe was newly assigned to be under the mandate of Consul

---

643 Ibid.
Second Class, Mariano José Miranda del Monte, who was assisted in his work by one administrative staff, Toshio Fujii in the position of chancellor of the consulate. In Yokohama, it was Juan Planas Cañáere who acted as Honorary Vice-consul.

Méndez de Vigo soon came to the conclusion that the consular network was actually too extensive considering the actual needs of the small Spanish community. Although the consulates were able to generate some income through the granting of visas, certificates of origin for shipments from and to Spain and certificates of nationality that all Spaniards had to renew on a yearly basis, with barely 100 people in the country, the population was too small to justify the expenses the consulates generated. The minister therefore started efforts to move the Kobe consulate to Yokohama and replace the non-career diplomat there with a regular consul. Madrid however did not approve of the plan. The situation for the consulates therefore stayed the same for several more years. The personnel at the three locations, however, changed soon after Méndez de

644 Consul second class, appointed on April 1, 1932. He assumed his post only on September 1, 1932 and served until May 31, 1934 when he officially was granted a leave of absence, from which he apparently never returned. See: AGA, (10) 052, CAJA 54/05129, Note, "No 60 - Asunto: Remite relacion de los funcionarios adscritos a este Consulado", Chancellor of the Consulate to the Minister of State, December 27, 1934, No 60 - Asunto: Remite relación de los funcionarios adscritos a este Consulado; AGA, (10) 052, CAJA 54/05129, Note, "No 8", State Ministry to Legation in Tokyo, May 24, 1934, No 8.

645 There were at least five people in Kobe associated with the consulate: Eduardo Vázquez Ferrer, Joaquín Márquez Hernández, Manual de la Escosura y Fuertes, Pedro Antonio Satorras de Dameto and Guillermo Giráldez y Martínez de Espinosa. They probably never worked directly at the consulate, as their names never appear on any official documents. We cannot be sure though as many of the records of the consulate were lost in a fire in 1923. See: AGA, "No 60 - Asunto: Remite relacion de los funcionarios adscritos a este Consulado", Chancellor of the Consulate to the Minister of State, December 27, 1934; AGA, (10) 052, CAJA 54/05133, Note, "Cónsul Castillo solicitando trasladar el consulado de Kobe a Yokohama", Consulado de España en Kobe, January 12, 1937, Grupo de carpetas 2 - Correspondencia en Kobe - Correspondencia con la legación en Tokio y correspondencia oficina.

646 It is not clear from the records for how long Juan Planas acted as Honorary Vice-Consul. He was once mentioned in that position in a letter in 1927 and is referred to again in a list of consulates in Japan in June 1935. It might therefore be assumed that he occupied this position for a lengthy period. See: AGA, (10) 052, CAJA 54/05142, Verbal Note, List of the Members of the Spanish Consular Corps in Japan, June 19, 1935, Carpeta “Lista de Cuerpo Diplomático Consular”.

647 Méndez de Vigo calculated that for the year 1935 neither of them would make more than 6000 yen each. See: AGA, "No 295 - Asunto: Situación Vicecónsules y Agentes honorarios", Nota de Méndez de Vigo al Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, Burgos, July 26, 1939.
Vigo’s arrival. Most importantly, he received a new aid at the legation, Marquis Juan Gómez de Molina y Elio, who became his new first secretary in March 1933 and in Kobe, the monarchist Francisco José del Castillo y Campos became the new career consul two years later, in March 1935. Both were soon convinced that the Consulate in Kobe and the honorary representation in Yokohama made little sense and started supporting the chief of mission with letters to the MAE for a consolidation. Both men would become important figures in the events unfolding the next year. It is worth mentioning that one more post was changed in that same time period, the position of the Honorary Vice-Consul in Yokohama. The long-served Mr. Planas was succeeded by Salvador Pérez, another merchant man in the city, who would run the Honorary Consulate as a non-career diplomat.


During the minister’s voyage to Japan, an international crisis of far reaching consequences had commenced—the Manchurian incident (see 2-2-2). The alienation between Japan and the League of Nations continued and would culminate the next year, in 1933, in the unprecedented Japanese withdrawal from the League. From the moment Méndez de Vigo took up his office in late April 1932, the international situation between Japan and European powers had been at its lowest since the opening of Japan

649 Ibid.
650 It is not clear when exactly Pérez took over the office, but judging from the records of correspondence it must have been either in the second halve of 1935, or early 1936, before the break out of the Spanish Civil War in June of that year. See: AGA, List of the Members of the Spanish Consular Corps in Japan, June 19, 1935; AGA, (10) 052, CAJA 54/05134, Note, "No 1 - Tokyo, December 2, 1937", F.J. del Castillo to Salvador Perez, December 2, 1937, Carpeta: Vice-Consulado en Yokohama.
eighty years earlier. The new minister could feel this estrangement clearly when he wrote in his first report to the MAE on April 28, 1932, that although there were no negative views regarding Spain itself being published in Japan, the local news of the “(...)

 session of the 19 powers, in which the Spanish delegation has demonstrated great activity, often against the interests of Japan (...) has left bad impressions in the press and the general public, which is now referring to Spain and other powers dismissively as ‘small Powers’." The passage refers to the deliberations of the special assembly of the League of Nations, called for by China in defense of its rights as a sovereign state, in which the Spanish envoy, De Zulueta, made it clear that

Spain reaffirms in this Assembly the axiom, enunciated by twelve Members of the Council (including Spain) in an appeal recently sent to the Government of Japan, to the effect that the Members of the League cannot recognize any political or administrative changes brought about by force or in disregard of the principles of the Covenant or of the Pact of Paris.

The Spanish Republic was on the same side as the rest of the western democracies when it came to the spreading violence in the Far East. It was even one of the only Governments to contemplate sending troops to enforce the league’s position that the conflicting parties must not change the status quo through violence. In Japan, the Spanish chair of the council of the League of Nations, Salvador de Madriaga, who was

---

652 AGA, (10) 052, CAJA 54/05133, Trimestral Report, "Tokio, 28 de abril de 1932", Informe Trimestral I - Del Ministro de España (Mendez de Vigo) al Ministro de Estado, April 28, 1932, Carpeta 1 - Informes Trimestrales a Estado.
654 Rodao, Franco y el Imperio Japonés. Footnote 67.
harshly opposed to the actions of the Japanese Army, was dismissively called the ‘Don
Quixote of Manchuria.’  

To explain the strong Spanish condemnation, Historian Florentino Rodao holds that the
young Spanish Republic was interested in strengthening its international profile and that
its representative in Geneva was especially eager to be “the spokesman for the interests
of small countries that want to promote the role of the League as an organ of collective
world security.” It was a similar stance to that of other small Powers who had the
most to win from internationalizing and regulating the use of force.

Méndez de Vigo was therefore confronted with the issue of the Spanish Republics
stance toward Japan in the international arena from the beginning of his mandate.
However, notwithstanding the criticism in 1932 of Matsuoka Yosuke, the head of the
Japanese delegation in Geneva (and future Foreign Minister), Spain’s engagement in the
League of Nations did not pose a threat to the actual relations between Japan and Spain.

Minister Méndez de Vigo was able to access and build relationships with the highest-
ranking officials in the Gaimusho and did not encounter fundamental problems in the
execution of his duties in Tokyo. None of the records available indicates that there
had ever been intense strains on the bilateral relations and Méndez de Vigo continued
fostering ties between the two nations with regular diplomatic activities until those
faithful days in summer 1936.

---

656 Rodao, *Franco y el Imperio Japonés*. Kindle location 1646. [Original in Spanish, translated by Florentino Rodao]
657 See for example: AGA, "Tokio, 28 de abril de 1932", *Informe Trimestral 1 - Del Ministro de España (Mendez de Vigo) al Ministro de Estado*, April 28, 1932.
On April 14 of that year, Consul Castillo in Kobe organized a dinner for the Spanish community in the area to come together and celebrate the anniversary of the Republic. Five years had passed since the left wing Popular Front had won the national elections and proclaimed the new democratic government in Madrid. The distance between Tokyo and Kobe being too far to travel for just a dinner, Minister Méndez de Vigo instead sent a message to Castillo which the latter read out loud to his guests:

When I heard that a banquet will take place at the consulate that you are organizing to celebrate the anniversary of the Republic, I did not want to miss telling you about my loyal and enthusiastic support to what this likable party represents. I want to extend my most cordial greetings to you and to the Spaniards who work there honoring so worthily the Spanish Republic.  

Four months later the Spanish legation in Tokyo cut all ties with the Republican Government in Madrid and Méndez de Vigo declared his adherence to the cause and the principles of General Francisco Franco.

4-2-4. The Civil War Years

The Spanish Civil War was much more than ‘just’ an internal struggle for power by rivaling factions in the Spanish state but a major clash of ideologies with important ramifications for the whole international system. On the one hand, the ‘Spanish problem’ developed into another nail in the coffin of the League of Nation system, that was unable to handle the situation according to its own standards, or to keep its members

---

658 AGA, (10) 052, CAJA 54/05118, Carpeta: Consulado en Kobe - Certificados de Origen, Telegramas recibidos de la Legación en Tokio, Correspondencias varias, Contabilidad, Correspondencia con el Consulado en Yokohama, Impresos varios, Correspondencia de la Legación en Tokio con el Ma de Asuntos Exteriores, Telegram, ”Telegrama de Méndez de Vigo al Consulado en Kobe “, April 14, 1936. [OEsTA].
from violating basic treaty promises (see chapter 2-2-3). The conflict gained an international dimension within weeks after the initial insurgent attack when Germany and Italy both started to secretly support Franco’s forces through monetary, material and outright military help—against their official adhesion to the Non-Intervention Agreement of August 1936. Much historical research has been conducted on this issue and it is doubtlessly clear that without the outside support, the fascist rebellion would never have managed to swallow the Republic military, as it eventually did. To this end the nationalists were, from the very first moment, dependent on the working of their diplomacy which, in turn, means that Spanish Foreign Policy and Diplomacy cannot be studied reasonably without the constant context of the Civil War in mind.

For the diplomats on the ground, the Civil War years were as dramatic a transition as it was for the general populace. To many of them who were born into the high echelons of Spanish nobility, trained and educated under the monarchy and a dictatorship, the ideals of the socialist republic were not the same as theirs. In a Civil War, ideology matters, identity matters and loyalty matters. Within three months from the outbreak of the conflict, 90% of the Foreign Service defected to the fascist side to support the force that they saw as the only one capable of restoring the old order and lead Spain back to the

---


660 On the issue of the international dimension of the Civil War, Viñas in his excellent analysis of the Grand Strategy of the Republic claims that after the multitude of studies that have been conducted we can assert today “In whatever history of the Civil War, the interaction with external factors is impossible to overstate (…) the Civil War was not predetermined by or immanent to the political, economical social evolution of the Second Republic. It was the result of an international factors, inserted in to a (local) situation that lead to the military coup of July 1936.” Angel Viñas, “La Gran Estrategia de Política Exterior de la República,” in Al servicio de la República, ed. Angel Viñas (Madrid: Marcial Pons Historia, 2010). [OEsTA].
Although the Republic retained until the end all the archives and records as well as the monetary reserves needed to run its foreign service, the Fascists won its people. Although the Republic retained until the end all the archives and records as well as the monetary reserves needed to run its foreign service, the Fascists won its people. That explains why not many diplomats actually lost their positions after the end of the Republic. Franco replaced only people in key positions at the MAE, like the Ambassador in London, with the Duque of Alba, or in Washington with Don Juan Francisco de Cardenas. The latter used to serve as Republican Ambassador to France but defected and went to Washington to serve as Franco’s unofficial contact and lobbyist there. For his labors, Franco later named him his Ambassador to the U.S. Neither of the two men belonged to the very core of Franco’s Falange party, which on the one hand is an indication for the limited choice the new government had with appointments to its Foreign Service. On the other side, it also manifests the strong network of defected Spanish diplomats around the globe that were readily available for the new regime to deploy after its victory, as both of these men had been helping the cause of the nationalists since 1936. All of this had the curious effect that although the regime in Madrid had just changed through a bloody war, killing more

---


665 del Castillo Jiménez, "Relaciones diplomáticas España-Japón."
than half a million people, its Foreign Service, the eleven embassies, thirty-one legations and three dozen of general consulates, stayed largely the same.\footnote{Ibid.}

The case for the Spanish legation in Tokyo was no exception in this regard. Santiago Méndez de Vigo had been the Spanish Envoy to Japan since 1932. The leftist republican government under Manuel Azaña first assigned him there. To Méndez de Vigo the transition from the Republic of Spain to Fascist Spain was as bumpy as for most of his colleagues.

4-2-5. \textit{All is Fair in Love and War—A Rebellion Extends to Tokyo}

Only a few days after the attempted coup d’état, the first high ranking officials of the Ministry of State started to defect to the side of the Fascists. The Spanish Ambassador in Berlin separated from his ministry on July 30—a mere twelve days after the uprising had started—and it would get only worse for the Republic. For Méndez de Vigo in Tokyo, the situation was difficult as information passed only slowly. Residing in the northern town of Karuizawa, in his summer estate during the time of the uprising, he telephoned Molina, who had remained in charge of the legation in Tokyo. At first, he decided not to move in favor of either side and to pretend to be out of reach in the mountains. But when Consul Castillo arrived in Tokyo from a stay in Barcelona—having left only a few days before the uprising on July 12—Méndez de Vigo received reliable information on the state of the country and was informed that also the Consul in Shanghai, whom Castillo had met on the way, had already joined the nationalists.
Furthermore, Castillo informed Méndez de Vigo about his plan to do the same. This information swayed the minister to come back from Karuizawa. On August 26, he sent a statement to the press, declaring that his entire legation identified with the cause of the rebels, whom he called “men of dignified and patriotic history, who through their lives have maintained as their ideal the welfare and glory of Spain.”

In subsequent statements he made it even clearer as to how his thoughts on his former employer in Madrid had evolved. Calling the current (democratically elected) regime a “red dictatorship,” he explained to an American Newspaper that “the Spanish

---

669 Asahi Shinbun, "Chunichi Supein Koushikan ga kakumeigun shiji wo seimeisu.,” August 27 1936.
670 “Red dictatorship” was a sentence frequently used also by other members of the Foreign Service who declared themselves as adhering to the rebel cause to discredit the socialist leadership in Madrid. See on this: Viñas, *Al servicio de la Republica.*
Government as it now exists stands for communism and chaos. I am for any positive, protective government that will recognize the constitution of Spain which the present government does not.”

He went on to personally hand the statement to the Gaimusho, where he was received by Undersecretary Hirouchi, a moment captured on the photograph below.

The fraternization of the legation in Tokyo with Franco’s uprising changed everything for Spanish diplomacy in the East. Five days before Méndez de Vigo’s separation, Manuel Azaña, Minister of State of the Republic, issued a declaration that all members of the Foreign Service who did not report their loyalty to the government in Madrid were to be removed with immediate effect.

---

672 Photographer Unknown, Santiago Mendez de Vigo and Undersecretary Horiuchi (Densho Digital Repository: The Hawaii Times Photo Archives Foundation, 1936). ©Creative Common CC BY-NC-SA 4.0
673 Viñas, Al servicio de la Republica, 450.
August, without an official representative of Spain although its old envoy was still in Tokyo. The situation was unprecedented, leaving even his diplomat peers puzzled on how to interact with the renegade minister. Méndez de Vigo resolved the awkward situation himself by leaving the country on September 10. He boarded the cruiser Asama Maru to the U.S., from where he went on to Paris to raise money for the rebel cause.

The Japanese government adapted the same stance as the European and American powers not to interfere with the conflict and keep official relations with Madrid, not Burgos—the new seat of the Franco Government. It instructed its officials and private citizens not to act in behalf of either side and display a strict neutrality toward the conflict. And although some newspaper articles in Japan did mention the potential benefit of a Fascist victory over Madrid, the knowledge in Japan about the situation in Spain was limited. The Gaimusho decided therefore to discontinue official relations with the Spanish legation and revoked the accreditation of Méndez de Vigo one day before he left the country. The legation itself would still belong to Spain but had the status of not hosting an official envoy and the Gaimusho would from then on rely on its own Minister in Madrid for all official communication with Spain. It even instructed him to seek the council of the American Ambassador and take decisions regarding the diplomatic corps in Madrid (the heads of mission used to meet for deliberations on the

---

675 Coincidentally, this was the same ship which five years later would be used by the Swiss legation to evacuate enemy diplomats and civilians from Japan in the biggest POW exchange program during the war.
677 Ibid.

situation) in accordance with him. This shows how aware the Gaimusho was of the risks connected to the rebellion but also that the Japanese leadership did not want to preclude any future opportunities by throwing its limited weight behind either of the two parties. Keeping in mind how the German and Italian Government betrayed their obligations regarding the Non-Intervention Agreement and that the ties to them was growing closer in the period after Japan’s exit from the League of Nations, one might be tempted to reason that Japan also might have lent much more support to Franco, had its geographic positioning of Japan been different. The sheer distance between the two nations precluded however any such support and there are no signs that it has ever been sought by Franco. On the contrary, Méndez de Vigo and his staff saw it rather fit to leave their posts and support the nationalists from Europe. Also Consul Del Castillo had originally planned to return to Spain and Molina left for Burgos on July 8, the following year.

However, until the latter’s departure the two men took matters in their own hands. Without instructions from Salamanca—Franco’s military and foreign policy headquarter—Del Castillo relocated from Kobe to Tokyo where, together with Molina, he commenced building Spain’s nationalist post-Civil War diplomacy for Asia. They were able to do so because despite losing the official recognition of Japan, they managed to retain the premises of the legation and found ways to communicate with their new superiors. Already in November 1936 Molina managed to relay a letter from Castillo (at that point still residing in Kobe) to the nationalist’s first ‘Foreign Minister’

678 Bowers, My Mission to Spain: Watching the Rehearsal for World War II, 368.
680 Burgos was the official seat of the Franco government. However, important decision making bodies of his regime, including his improvised foreign policy team, were located in Salamanca.
Francisco Serrat Bonastre\textsuperscript{681} by sending it to Méndez de Vigo in Paris who forwarded it to Salamanca.\textsuperscript{682} This proved a stable line of communication, as Serrate also sent his replies back to Tokyo via the same route. In March 1937, he instructed the diplomats to do everything in their power to retain the legation building and the diplomatic archive under their control.\textsuperscript{683} And so they did. Del Castillo and Molina successfully blocked Madrid’s new Chargé d’Affaires, José Luis Alvarez Talardiz, a scholar from Osaka (cited above for his research on Juan Cubo who lead Spain’s first embassy to Japan) from entering the legation building, forcing him to take up an improvised office in the Marunouchi Hotel.\textsuperscript{684} Bringing the fight between nationalists and republicans to Tokyo, Del Castillo made it his mission to sabotage Alvarez’ legitimacy. Especially Del Castillo’s good contacts with the Spanish colony came in handy, as he could convince the majority of his compatriots to register themselves with his nationalist legation and not with the republican adversary. He used this circumstance to signal to the Gaimusho that he was the legitimate representative of the Spanish living in Japan.\textsuperscript{685} These efforts would probably have been fruitless had it not been for a second international development that played into Del Castillo’s hands.

\textsuperscript{681} Viñas, Salamanca, 1936. Francisco Serrat Bonastre. Memorias del primer “ministro” de Asuntos Exteriores de Franco.

\textsuperscript{682} AGA, (10) 052, CAJA 54/05133, Note, "Encargado de Negocios Juan G. de Molina a Francisco de Asís Serrat, Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores", Asunto: Remite pliego del Señor Cónsul de la Nación en Kobe, November 19, 1936, Grupo de carpetas 2 - Correspondencia en Kobe - Correspondencia con la legación en Tokio y correspondencia oficina.


4-3. The Impact of the Second Sino-Japanese War: Relations 1937–1941

In June 1937, a new cabinet under Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe came to power which proved to be more sympathetic to the Spanish nationalists. Only a month later the Marco Polo Bridge Incident—a skirmish between Japanese and Chinese troops—escalated overnight into a full-scale Japanese invasion of the Chinese mainland. This lead to an even further isolation of Japan from the international community in Geneva, which again condemned the Japanese actions, fully supporting Chinese claims against the aggression. For the Chinese, it was a moral victory only because the League had long lost its teeth and meaning. No actions followed the condemnation and the Konoe cabinet simply initiated the complete withdrawal of the remaining Japanese diplomats in Geneva who had been engaged in low-level councils of the League’s organs. 686 The international isolation was, however, something the Gaimusho sought to overcome eventually and therefore increased its activities to seek recognition for the New Order it tried to build in Asia from the regimes most likely to agree. It was not a simple task. Not even Japan’s Anti-Comintern Pact ally, Hitler, had at that point recognized the sovereignty of Manchukuo because he was still interested in cooperative relations with Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist Government of China. Franco, on the other hand, who was fighting with a Government that repeatedly opposed Japan’s visions and was seeking international recognition himself, suddenly started looking like a more interesting option.

4-3-1. The Recognition Bargain

Historian Florentino Rodao put it bluntly; “To Francisco José Del Castillo, the only Francoist representative remaining in Tokyo, war in China was a blessing.” In August 1937, Castillo was for the first time contacted directly by the Gaimusho which inquired about the unofficial contacts Burgos had with other European nations. The mood in Japan toward Franco was changing and Castillo enthusiastically tried to capitalize on this, informing Salamanca accordingly. On August 26—precisely a year after the legation’s official rupture with Republican Madrid—he received a telegram with very clear instructions: “You must direct your efforts toward obtaining full recognition by Japan.”

Through contacts of the old Military Attaché, Eduardo Herrare de la Rosa, Del Castillo succeeded in receiving audiences with Foreign Minister Hirota and Prime Minister Konoe. He reported back to Salamanca the favorable opinions in the Japanese Government toward official recognition and that he could count on the support of German and Italian diplomats. However, the cabinet still had reservations regarding the national situation in Spain and was insecure about what the recognition Franco’s Government would mean for Japan’s international politics. The recognition was foremost a political issue in Tokyo. It received support from army and navy leaders, especially the General Staff as well as the Ministry of War and from the younger

---

689 Ibid., 167–70.
diplomats in the Gaimusho. On the other side, the idea was opposed by the older guard of officials and those close to the Emperor who feared that such a move might align Japan to closely with Nazi Germany and Italy.

By fall 1937, several stars aligned for Del Castillo; Italy was negotiating its joining the Anti-Comintern pact and Franco won important battles in Spain, making a final victory of his army more likely. The mood in Tokyo tipped to favor recognition and Del Castillo sensed it. In a bold move, Franco’s unofficial representative sent a formal request for recognition to Foreign Minister Hirota, claiming that it came from his government. It was a lie. Franco’s headquarter in Salamanca had not sent him anything, but ends justify means. Del Castillo’s written request passed through the highest ranks of the Japanese decision-making process in the Imperial Council and the Council of Ministers, coinciding with the Italian accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact on November 6, 1937. The international development among the Axis powers as well as the situation in the Civil War now worked very much in Castillo’s favor. On November 7, Hirota, at a banquet, communicated to the Italian ambassador the principal willingness of his Government to recognize Burgos. However, there was a catch; in return Hirota wanted Franco to promise Spanish recognition of Manchukuo. In principle, this was a tricky request because so far, except for Japan itself, only very few governments had recognized Hsinking. Not even Germany or Italy had gone this far, establishing only low-level ties through consular and commercial agreements. A

---

690 AGA, (10) 052, CAJA 54/05137, Telegram, "Nota de Castillo donde informa que ofreció una cena a Moriya por su viaje a España. Dirigida al Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Salamanca", January 28, 1938.


recognition through Spain would have meant a considerable boost for Japan’s international politics. It was a delicate affair—or at least Hirota thought so.

Castillo was informed immediately by the Italian diplomats. He cabled the good news back to Salamanca the same night. To Franco’s foreign policy team, it was a no-brainer. Within a day Salamanca confirmed its willingness and gave Del Castillo free hand in negotiating the actual agreement, providing him with the power that under normal circumstances was reserved to plenipotentiaries. Although some more hurdles had to be cleared, the basic bargain was approved by the Japanese Council of Ministers on November 12—ironically, the 69th birthday of the signing of the first Spanish-Japanese treaty of Friendship and Commerce. Within weeks the deal was translated into practice with Japan officially recognizing Franco’s regime as the only legitimate Government of Spain on November 29, and Burgos, in return, recognized Manchukuo as an independent nation-state on December 2, 1937.
Thus ended the limbo of the Spanish legation outside official diplomatic structures. Castillo was reaccredited as Chargé d’Affaires until Méndez de Vigo returned to his legation in October 1938, to resume his post as Spanish Minister to Japan. Tokyo assigned one of the remaining Japanese diplomats in Spain, Teiichiro Takaoka, as its representative to Salamanca and in February 1938, a Military Attaché was sent to reinforce the small diplomatic mission. It was a foreign policy success for both regimes. The Spanish (Republican) opposition to Japanese imperialism in Asia had been wiped away at the stroke of a pen, which redefined their mutual relations for years to come.

694 AGA, (10) 052, CAJA 54/05142, Telegram, "No 273 Asunto: Remite fichas ordenadas por circular numero 8", October 13, 1938.
695 AGA, "Nota de Castillo donde informa que ofreció una cena a Moriya por su viaje a España. Dirigida al Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Salamanca", January 28, 1938.
4-3-2. A New Era for Economic Relations?

Commercially, the four years from 1937 to 1941, between the recognition of Franco’s regime and the outbreak of the War in the Pacific, are difficult to evaluate. On the one hand, there is no Spanish data available for the years of the Civil War. The Bureau of Statistics was another one of the collateral damages of the bloody internal conflict. Recording the inbound and outbound trade until 1939 was just not feasible. Rodao estimated that trade between the two countries was near zero, which is a reasonable guess since business activities within Spain during the war were much reduced and shipping in these conditions was also difficult. The situation changed after the fall of Madrid on April 1, 1939. The victory of Franco’s nationalists was not to the detriment of Spanish-Japanese trade. When the Bureau of Statistics became operational again it registered record trade with Japan. In 1940 alone Spain exported goods worth 14 million ESP to Japan and a year later it was still more than 7 million. Compared to the relatively low levels (between 1 and 3 million ESP) before the war, that was an astonishing improvement, especially compared to imports which remained low at roughly 1 million ESP. The available records unfortunately do not reveal what the content of the exports were, but it was most likely primary materials for Japan’s military manufacturing, since all other imports were discouraged by the Ministry of Trade (see chapter 3-3-3). However, since there was no willingness in Japan for genuine free trade relations—not even with a regime as friendly as that of Franco—several Spanish

---

697 Ibid.
698 The available records unfortunately do not allow for a judgement on what the content of the trade was and which companies were involved in it. Further research on this issue is needed.
attempts for more commerce with the Empire failed. The most obvious case was that of a Spanish economic mission.

In summer of 1940, a twenty-people strong delegation under the leadership of José Rojas with representatives of various ministries arrived in Japan to tour the country, but besides busy visits to industrial sites, no agreements for economic cooperation was reached. The delegation did, however, visit Manchukuo and Japanese occupied China to negotiate possible trade agreements with the puppet governments there. For Wang Jingwei’s collaborationist government in Nanking it was even the first visit of a diplomatic delegation and was in this regard of special importance. Those acts had a clear political meaning as to signal support for Japan’s intended new order in its sphere of influence.\(^{699}\) The mission was therefore much more political in nature—at least on the Japanese side—than economic. In terms of tangible results for Spain, it achieved relatively little. Whether or not the above massive increase in Spanish exports to Japan was due to the mission cannot be judged from the available documentation. It is only clear that the members of the mission expressed their frustration about the speed and secrecy with which the Japanese side treated the visit.\(^{700}\) Even the relatively high exports of 1940 and 1941 were short lived. Right after the outbreak of the Pacific war, they collapsed again to minimal levels, below 0.2 million ESP for the two first years of the war, and after 1943 data vanished again completely. This time—most likely—because there was nothing more to report.

---

\(^{700}\) Ibid., 256-57.
4-4. After Pearl Harbor: Relations 1941–1945

While the fragile new trade relationship collapsed, the outbreak of war in Europe did not initially impact Spanish-Japanese political relations negatively. Franco had joined the Anti-Comintern Pact already in May 1939, bringing Spain into the same camp as Japan, Germany and Italy. He even followed Mussolini’s lead on June 10, 1940 by declaring his country a ‘non-belligerent’ (as opposed to a ‘neutral’), which was a status undefined by International Law\(^\text{701}\) and suggested a later war entry of Spain, just like Italy had done. Franco justified breaching the legal rules of neutrality to grant German and Italian forces access to its ports and facilities. Franco also sent a group of 18,000 ‘volunteers’ to support the German army at the Eastern Front to fight Soviet Russia. The ‘blue division’ was tasked to fight only the ‘communist threat’ but to refrain from any engagements with the western allies.\(^\text{702}\) Franco wanted to fight the Bolsheviks but not declare war on them, which would have made peaceful relations with the other Allies almost impossible. However, on October 23, 1940, in the French-Spanish border town of Hendaye, Franco agreed in a secret protocol with Hitler to join the war on the side of the Axis powers. Had it not been for Hitler’s reluctance to share the expected spoils of war, Franco would have entered the war immediately but since the Fuhrer did not want to give up portions of North Africa, Franco only agreed to joining in a few months’ time. The strategic situation in Europe changed however quickly and a year

\(^{701}\) Some classic writers did consider the term, but discussed it under the meaning of ‘non-combatants.’ See on this: G. Breton, "Des Non-Belligérants - Leurs Devoirs - Leurs Droits - La Question des Otages" (Ph.D Thesis, University of Paris, 1904).

\(^{702}\) For study on the blue division see: ABC, Japoneses y Españoles. Concurrentes al banquete que el ministro de España en Tokio.
later, when the German army had gotten stuck in the east, and Italy’s military fiascos necessitated German support interventions, Franco quietly withdrew the proposal.\textsuperscript{703}

In this regard, Spain and Japan were in the same camp of the war, although Franco had not joined the fighting (officially). At the same time, this did not imply bonds of unconditional friendship. The geopolitical situation of Spain was, for example, cause for repeated Japanese recommendations to Hitler that Germany should invade the Iberian Peninsula to occupy Gibraltar and thereby deny British access to the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{704}

Another example is the Gaimusho’s rejection of Spanish efforts to elevate diplomatic relations between Toyo and Madrid to Ambassadorial level. While Spain had been ready for the step ever since the economic mission of 1940, Tokyo did not consent. Spain remained positive toward Japan for roughly two more years and its reaction to Pearl Harbor was decidedly supportive. However, the Spanish attitude became unaccommodating after fall 1942 when Count Francisco Gómez-Jordana Sousa became succeeded Franco’s powerful brother-in-law, Ramón Serrano Suñer as Foreign Minister. Jordana differentiated the wars, stating in a discussion with U.S. Ambassador Hayes that Spain felt neutral only toward the Anglo-American war with Germany and Italy, but held strong anti-Soviet feelings toward the war Germany was fighting with the U.S.S.R. and was decidedly against a Japanese victory in Asia.\textsuperscript{705} This new narrative became more pronounced the more the fortunes of war turned against the Tenno’s empire.

\textsuperscript{704} Krebs, "Gibraltar oder Bosporus? Japans Empfehlungen für eine deutsche Mittelmeerstrategie im Jahre 1943."
\textsuperscript{705} Rodao, "Relaciones Hispano-Japonesas, 1937-1945," 387.
4-4-1. Protecting Power for (but not in) Japan

The most important way in which Franco initially lent his support to Japan was by letting it make good use of Spanish neutrality. Since the ‘non-belligerent’ status it had been claiming for more than a year when the Pacific War started, the U.S. State Department was at a bit of a loss; having just turned from a neutral to a belligerent themselves, what should they do with the Spaniards who declared that they would not act neutrally but, at the same time, did not engage in belligerent acts toward them, nor severed diplomatic relations? The logical conclusion was that if diplomacy was not broken, it would continue. The Spanish Ambassador to Washington, Juan Francisco de Cárdenas, who, like Méndez de Vigo, had deserted the Republic in 1936 and had become Spain’s official representative to Washington again after Franco’s victory, continued to serve his country normally. Spain’s foreign policy of non-belligerency had no impact on Spanish diplomacy, which continued under the provisions of neutrality. To the Gaimusho this was a stroke of luck because it meant that there was a neutral nation that could be asked for diplomatic support while also being friendly to its war aims. Spain was in this sense a ‘benevolent neutral’ to Japan—another undefined term under International Law.\footnote{Oppenheim, \textit{International Law: A Treatise - War and Neutrality}, II, Para 304.} Therefore, right after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Gaimusho reached out to the Spanish—not the Swiss or the Swedes—to solicit their Good Offices in the United States.

To the State Department, Japan’s choice of Spain posed a dilemma. The ambiguity with which it considered the situation transpires from the diplomatic actions taken; on the one hand, the U.S. accepted the Japan’s choice. Cárdenas was allowed to assume his
new duties and take care of the Japanese Embassy and its staff. On the other hand, the trust in Spanish neutrality was so low that the State Department not only refrained from asking for its Good Office in return (the U.S. chose Switzerland) but, in fact, it sent a confidential request to the Political Department in Berne to ask that Switzerland prepared to assume U.S. interests in Madrid and Ankara, in case Spain and Turkey also declared war on the U.S. At least until late 1942 the State Department believed that war with Spain was likely. This is where the Spanish case as a protecting Power is most interesting. Although the State Department did not trust Spain’s neutral attitude to endure, it still accepted it as a protecting Power. This serves as a perfect reminder of Harold Nicolson’s argument that foreign policy and diplomacy are not the same thing and do not always go hand-in-hand. Although Spain’s foreign policy of ‘non-belligerency’ should have disqualified it to serve as a neutral, the diplomatic practice of the day was to follow the previsions of the law of neutrality for as long as diplomatic relations were not ruptured.

By mid-1942, the Spanish had assumed eleven mandates of protecting Power for Japan, all of them in the Americas. On the other hand—and in stark contrast to Sweden or Switzerland—Spain was not asked by any of these countries to serve them in Japan. The only country which wanted to use the protecting Power of the Spanish was the Republic of Paraguay but even that was a very limited affair. Asuncion had but one diplomat residing in Japan and that was the Honorary Consul, José Chihan, who was also the

708 Nicolson, Diplomacy.
709 Canada, U.S.A., Cuba, El Salvador, Peru, Panama, Colombia, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela.
only Paraguayan citizen in the entire Empire. Minister Méndez de Vigo, in fact, delegated the responsibility for Chihan’s orderly evacuation from Japan on one of the exchange ships to his friend Camille Gorgé, the Swiss Minister.\textsuperscript{710} Only one more Paraguayan citizen lived in Shanghai, another honorary consul, but that man, coincidentally, also held Swiss citizenship and refused to be evacuated.\textsuperscript{711}

4-4-2. The Sidelined Legation in Tokyo

In short, with a single exception, none of the countries which broke relations with Japan after 1941 trusted Spain to be a reliable protecting Power for them in Tokyo. In conjunction with the almost non-existent economic activities between Spain and Japan during the Pacific War, this resulted in a small workload for the Spanish Minister in Tokyo. In addition to that, Méndez de Vigo’s role for Spanish-Japanese relations was further diminished by two more developments that were out of his control. On the one hand, he lost his most important diplomatic contact, Foreign Minister Francisco Jordana when Franco replaced him with J. L. Beigbeder. The new Foreign Minister did not trust Méndez de Vigo and consulted him for nearly nothing. Beigbeder’s successor, Ramón Serrano Suñer, Franco’s brother-in-law, who was a strong Nazi supporter, was no friend of Méndez de Vigo neither. Although he supported the Fascist cause, being himself married to a Jewish woman, he also harbored strong feelings against the Nazis.\textsuperscript{712}


\textsuperscript{711} His name was Ernesto Sandrever. See: Telegram Méndez de Vigo to Serrano Suñer, dated May 21, 1942. In: AGA, (10) 052, CAJA 54/05133, Telegram, "En relación telegrama V.E. treintavos Señor Ernesto Sandrever rehusa evacuación", May 21, 1942, Carpeta: Intereses Paraguayos en el Japón.

\textsuperscript{712} See the above quote of Camille Gorgé about Méndez de Vigo scorninig Germans (4-2-1).
On the other hand, Méndez de Vigo had a diplomatic rival in Japan. The Falange—Franco’s fascist party—named Eduardo Herrero de la Rosa, a former Military Attaché, who had been living in Tokyo for decades, as their delegate to Japan. From him the Falange (which was the only party allowed to exist under Franco’s dictatorship) received political and economic reports that rivaled those of Méndez de Vigo. The combination of these factors diminished the role the Spanish legation in comparison to the Swedish and Swiss case. In stark contrast to his neutral colleagues, Méndez de Vigo had only little dossiers to handle and did not need to hire new staff. After the departure of Consul Del Castillo only one more diplomat came to support Méndez de Vigo in 1939, Mariano Vidal Tolosana, who became his second in command until the end of the war. The only other ‘addition’ to the Spanish mission in Japan was made due to complaints from the Spanish colony in the Osaka-Kobe area that they had no access to consular services. A Spanish business man, Joaquín Mustaròs, was named Honorary Vice-Consul to Kobe and Méndez de Vigo made Mustaròs daughter a non-diplomatic secretary of the legation in Tokyo. Méndez de Vigo’s field of action was constrained to the writing of reports about the war, assisting the Spanish community and the maintaining of contacts with the rest of the diplomats in Tokyo. There was so little to do that he even had time to publish an (illegal) little bulletin together with the Argentinian Chargé d’Affaires, four times a week, filled with allied news that he

---

713 Rodao, *Franco y el Imperio Japonés*. Kindle location 2345-90.
714 Ibid., Kindle location 2345-67.
obtained through his short-wave radio. His ‘newspaper’ circulated among diplomats, other foreigners and even a few Japanese.\footnote{Rodao, \textit{Franco y el Imperio Japonés}. Kindle location 6546.}

For the case of Spain, the majority of diplomatically relevant activities took place outside Japan. The work that Spanish Embassies in North- and South America did for Japan were much closer to the Swedish and Swiss experiences. In the Americas Spanish diplomats took over Japanese embassies and consulates, remained in contact with Japanese diplomats, started organizing the repatriations and visited the infamous internment camps, to which the United States and other countries relocated even their own citizens if they were of Japanese descent.\footnote{On U.S. detention camps see: Elleman, \textit{Japanese-American Civilian Prisoner Exchanges and Detention Camps, 1941-45}.} The Spanish missions also assisted Japanese nationals financially, since many lost their sources of income. Madrid served in these cases as an intermediary to channel funds from Tokyo to its citizens in the camps.

However, after the first batch of diplomats and civilians had been successfully repatriated to Japan it became clear that the Spanish were not as careful with their humanitarian duties as the Gaimusho had hoped for. The evacuees complained about mistreatment and humiliating conditions during their imprisonment. Especially for the case of the U.S., Ambassador Cárdenas had assured that the treatment of Japanese nationals was good but he was accused of not having taken enough time to properly investigate the situation. In their criticism for the Spanish attitude toward their duties, Japanese officials pointed to the case of Switzerland which hired a great number of new staff to fulfill its duties in Tokyo (see chapter 5-4-2), whereas Spain did not appoint any
special staff for the same purposes in the U.S. This criticism might have been
exaggerating the situation but was at least partially shared by the observations of the
U.S. officials responsible for Japanese prisoners of war. Historian P. S. Corbett holds
that “The consensus of those who dealt with the Spanish [in the U.S.] was that they
represented Japan's interests fairly and scrupulously, although they were not always as
energetic as the Swiss were in representing American interests.”

By summer 1942 the Gaimusho’s disillusion over Spain’s commitment for Japanese nationals went so far that it contacted the Vatican to request help for an accurate understanding of the situation in the Americas. However, what the Spanish lacked in enthusiasm for humanitarianism they more than compensated in another area: intelligence gathering.

4-4-3. Of Spies and Magic

Tokyo had prepared for the use of Spain as a second center for its European intelligence gathering besides Stockholm since March 1941, when the Gaimusho sent its former chief of the information division, Yakichiro Suma, to Madrid to become its new Minister Plenipotentiary there. Shortly after the beginning of hostilities between the U.S. and Japan, the Spanish Foreign Minister, Serrano Suñer, established the contact between Suma and the man who would be tasked with organizing a spy network for the Japanese; Ángel Alcázar de Velasco. Both men became central for Japanese intelligence through Madrid. Suñer provided much of the political cover. Agents in the U.S. used, for example, his personal secret code to cipher telegrams that went back to Madrid and

---

718 Corbett, Quiet Passages: The Exchange of Civilians between the United States and Japan during the Second World War, 46.
some reports were sent to him disguised as private letters to the Foreign Minister. From Suñer they went directly to Suma who then communicated the information back to Tokyo either directly or via the Japanese embassy in Berlin.\textsuperscript{720} The operational side of the network was organized by Velasco who had previously been gathering intelligence in London, under the cover of being a Press Attaché for the Spanish embassy. The spy ring that he built became known as the ‘To-Network.’\textsuperscript{721}

Velasco and Suma met for the first time in January 1942 for consultations. The Spaniard designated four agents, two were sent to the U.S., one to Dakar and one more to Australia—all of them with diplomatic status provided by Suñer. The most important place for activities was without doubt the United States, where, by summer, twelve Spanish informants provided intelligence for the network, and later up to twenty people.\textsuperscript{722} They reported on the general mood of the Americans, Navy activities, the movements of ships and political developments which all were also passed on to Germany.

Not all information was accurate and especially in the beginning the reports contained many mistakes or were of trivial nature as some of the agents relied heavily on newspapers for their reporting. However, the intelligence became more accurate over time and contained some details that were of great interest to Tokyo. It is, for example, evident that Tokyo learned about U.S. progress with their atomic program by way of the To-Network and that this information was one of the reasons that Prime Minister Tojo

\textsuperscript{720} Ibid., 323.
\textsuperscript{721} ‘To’ was originally meant to represent the Japanese character for stealing ‘盗’ but was later rebranded as its homophone ‘To’ representing the word ‘East’—‘東’. See on this: Krebs, "Japanese-Spanish Relations, 1936-1945," 34.
\textsuperscript{722} Ibid., 36.
gave the order to increase research on the development of a Japanese atomic bomb.\footnote{Ibid., 39-40.}

The way of transmission for such information was diverse and included transporting reports to Mexico and Chile from where they were sent by short wave radio stations to Spanish ships that could then pass them on all the way to Madrid.

However, as important as this intelligence was, it did not go unnoticed. Mainly due to the carelessness of Japanese diplomats, a lot of the intelligence that the Spanish uncovered was known to U.S. and British counter intelligence. As pointed out in the introduction (1-1-2), the Japanese cipher-code had been broken since 1940 and the Allies were able to read all telegrams sent back and forth between Tokyo and its outposts. Although it should have been clear to Suma that much of the secret information that came to him from the American continent must be treated with highest care, he thought it impossible that the Japanese code had been broken and often sent detailed telegraphic reports about the information he obtained back to Tokyo, including the real names and places of deployment of the Spanish agents.\footnote{Rodao, "Relaciones Hispano-Japonesas, 1937-1945," 325-27.} It was therefore not a difficult task for U.S. counter intelligence to crack down on the network once its reports became too accurate to be allowed to continue. At least one of the Spanish agents, a twenty-four-year-old with the code name ‘Rogelio’ was, in fact, killed in Las Vegas in April 1943.\footnote{Krebs, "Japanese-Spanish Relations, 1936-1945," 40.} Historian Rodao concludes that in many ways Spanish spying was more helpful to the Allies than the Axis, as they were well aware of what kind of information flew to Tokyo and the enemy might have believed to be true.\footnote{Rodao, "Relaciones Hispano-Japonesas, 1937-1945," 327.}
In the whole affair, Spanish diplomats were not the only ones engaged in spying activities. Just as Suma was an intelligence specialist, so were his U.S. and British counterparts, Carlton Hayes and Samuel Hoare.\textsuperscript{727} Germany and Italy as well were using Madrid (and Lisbon) as hubs to gather information on their enemies. What was special about Spanish spies was that they belonged to a country which diplomatically was a neutral and was not supposed to lend such services in the first place. Whereas Switzerland and Sweden were used as territory for spying by belligerent actors, Spain was proactively participating in the game and threw its lot with the side it liked best. Much of these activities, however, were closely connected to the personalities in charge in the dictatorship that Franco built. Gerhard Krebs and Florentino Rodao both agree that Foreign Minister Suñer was central not only to the spy network but to Spanish support for the Axis powers, in general. When he was replaced by former Foreign Minister Jordana on September 3, 1942, Japan lost an important political ally in its neutral outpost.

4-4-4. \textit{Mood Swing against Japan}

A change of hearts in Madrid had been in the making for a while. The first signs of cooling relations was the propagandistic attack on Spain’s humanitarian competence as protecting Power after the arrival of the first exchange ships. Not only were the allegations of Spanish neglect by former internees circulated in the press, but Foreign Minister Togo chimed-in to criticize Ambassador Cárdenas in Washington for believing

\textsuperscript{727} Both of them left memoirs about their missions in Spain. See: Hoare, \textit{Ambassador on Special Mission}. Hayes, \textit{Wartime Mission in Spain, 1942-1945}.  

296
U.S. statements at face-value to the effect that he let the Americans deceive him.\textsuperscript{728} On the one hand, such statements were certainly directed toward the national audience to ignite outrage against the ‘criminal’ ways in which the enemy treated Japanese nationals. However, the absence of similar complaints about Switzerland’s engagement suggests that the Gaimusho did have at least some serious worries about Spain’s willingness to live up to the task.

On the Spanish side, the first real bone of contention was the Philippines. After Japan had finished its invasion, expelled the U.S. forces and occupied the archipelago, the military administration permitted only the use of Japanese and Tagalog as official languages, discriminating not only against English but Spanish too. The Japanese occupation forces were, as it turned out, interested not only in outrooting American influences but European culture, in general. Méndez de Vigo sent alarming reports to the MEA about mistreatments of Spanish nationals, the confiscation of Spanish companies and the restriction of activities by Catholic orders.\textsuperscript{729} The news caused first disenchantments in the Spanish press but, more importantly, they contributed to the image of Serrano Suñer—the strongest pro-Japanese voice in the circle of power around Franco—as too weak in defending Spanish values.\textsuperscript{730}

On the other hand, Franco’s strategic thinking on the development of the war also changed with the slowing of Japanese victories and the ever-more worrisome development of the Eastern Front about which he, in his hate for communism, cared much more than about a victory for the Japanese. In summer 1942 Franco, for the first

\textsuperscript{728} Rodao, \textit{Franco y el Imperio Japonés}. Kindle location 5536.
\textsuperscript{729} Krebs, "Japanese-Spanish Relations, 1936-1945," 43-44.
\textsuperscript{730} Rodao, \textit{Franco y el Imperio Japonés}. Kindle location 5478-90.
time, recommended to the new U.S. Ambassador to Madrid, Carlton J. H. Hayes, that the U.S. strive for a peace agreement in Europe, with the argument that this would free their capacities to win the war in the Pacific.731

The culmination of the first wave of anti-Japanese feelings in Spain was reached with the sacking of Serrano Suñer. In his two years at the helm of fascist Spain’s new Foreign Ministry he had been gambling much of his political career on the military success of his nationalist friends in Germany and Italy, offering a helping hand also to Japan to signal his clear support of the Axis cause. His fall from grace came with the changing tide of Franco’s opinion about the future of these regimes.

For the spying activities, Serrano Suñer's fall from grace was a heavy blow. Velasco lost with him his most important connection to the Spanish Government and an unreplaceable channel for the intelligence reports from the Americas. Jordana did not play along the same lines. Although the incoming Foreign Minister assured his support for the intelligence sharing with the Axis, Velasco had to inform Suma that his agents would be sending less reports from now on, since the important private transmission channels were lost. Information from Spain did not dry-up completely but Suma realized that Japan would not be able to count on Spanish support much longer.732

Spanish-Japanese relations did not turn sour overnight and there were certainly some positive episodes to report that happened even after Jordana took over the Foreign Ministry. One of the most note-worthy successes was, for example, the realization of a

---

731 Ibid., Kindle location 5571.
second exchange ship between the U.S. and Japan. Although the chances for reaching a second agreement were dim, Cárdenas and Méndez de Vigo both contributed to the pressure that in the end convinced the both belligerents to let one more exchange happen. Another encouraging diplomatic sign was that, in 1943, the Spanish agreed to send an Aerial Attaché to Tokyo, a man named Fernando Navarro Ibáñez, who reached Japan on the third exchange ship in November. His task was to gather more information about the development of the Pacific War, since the information flowing back from Méndez de Vigo was limited. However, the timing of his appointment gave rise to suspicions about him being send to Tokyo to actually spy there for the Allied Forces—but that hypothesis was never proven.

Important bilateral issues were, on the other hand, deteriorating rapidly. The elevation of Spanish-Japanese relations to ambassadorial level was, for instance, still on hold. When former Foreign Minister Serrano Suñer, who had kept in touch with Suma, proposed to revive this issue in January 1943, Tokyo actually agreed that now was the time—even receiving the formal consent of the Emperor to finalize the step. The Spanish Foreign Ministry, however, once the plan became concrete, did not consent anymore. It was a huge embarrassment to Tokyo and, most seriously, to the emperor, but Jordana did not allow for the plan to go through. He was well aware that such an act would have angered the Allies and would not have been in Spain’s best interest at a moment when the war was clearly turning against the Axis. In the same year, Spain

733 I.e., the third and last exchange ship that left Japan in 1943, after the second exchange had taken place with Great Britain. See in this thesis chapter 5-4-3.
735 Rodao, Franco y el Imperio Japonés. Kindle location 6493-528.
scaled back also the rest of its support for Axis belligerents. The ‘Blue Division’ was recalled from the eastern front, transports of belligerent nationals by plane from Spain to Tangier were forbidden and, in September 1943, Franco declared that Spain would pedal back to full neutrality, abandoning its ‘non-belligerent’ status.\textsuperscript{736} Ties with the Axis powers were revoked, one by one and the benevolent neutral stance toward Japan was no exception. When in late spring 1944 Velasco had to flee Madrid to escape assassination by Allied agents also the spying activities for Japan found an end.\textsuperscript{737}

\textsuperscript{736} Reginbogin, \textit{Faces of Neutrality: A Comparative Analysis of the Neutrality of Switzerland and other Neutral Nations during WW II}, 119-21.

\textsuperscript{737} Krebs, "Japanese-Spanish Relations, 1936-1945," 46-49.
4-5. The End of the War

By early 1944 the international situation had changed to its opposite from two years before. With Italy defeated, the eastern front pushed back to the Baltic States and Allied invasion plans for France on the way, the strategic situation in Europe looked bleak for encircled Nazi Germany. After giving up the ‘non-belligerent’ status Spain halted much of the military support it had been giving to the Axis in violation of the legal duties of a neutral Power. Economically, however, Spanish companies continued to trade with Germany the way they had been doing for most of the war. Since that was not an infringement on the law of neutrality, these activities were initially not under threat. The Allies loathed especially Spanish-German trade of tungsten, mercury, iron ore, and zinc, all of which were important primary materials for armaments and the hardening of steel.738 Little did they expect that one of the major diplomatic levers to demand an end to those interactions would come from the pacific theater of war. The so-called ‘Laurel Incident’ would serve as another wedge between Tokyo and Madrid and help the Allies to push Franco further away from Nazi Germany.

4-5-1. The Laurel Incident

Japan invaded the Philippine archipelago on December 8, 1941, immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor. By March 1942 U.S. General MacArthur fled the islands and a month later the Japanese took the remaining American and Philippine forces prisoners. For the first two years of the Japanese occupation Tokyo exercised direct rule over the Philippines through the fourteenth army and its military administration which directed

738 Reginbogin, Faces of Neutrality: A Comparative Analysis of the Neutrality of Switzerland and other Neutral Nations during WW II, 121-23.
civil affairs. In fall 1943, Japan changed that approach by giving administrative powers to a local civil government. The move was supposed to create benevolence toward Japan among the Filipino population and, simultaneously, it was also in line with Tokyo’s plans for a ‘Co-Prosperity Sphere’ of independent nation-states in Asia, which would allow Japan to increase its international standing through satellite governments. On paper, the Philippines thereby became independent but the new political executive was, of course, a hand-picked regime, closely aligned to Japan’s policy goals. José P. Laurel, a former Supreme Court Justice, became the country’s president, declaring his country’s independence on October 14, 1943.739

In Spain, the news of a Philippine Republic in the orbit of the Japanese empire was received with mixed feelings. The Spanish press and government both commented positively about the development but did not praise or acknowledge Japan for the deed. Several circles in Madrid believed that an independent Filipino state would be in favor of Spanish interests since cultural ties were still running deep, even after forty-three years of U.S. administration.740 On the other hand, the diplomatic situation for Spain grew tricky because Minister Suma (in Madrid) requested in two meetings with Foreign Minister Jordana that Spain recognized the new Philippine state just as it had done with Manchukuo. On the other hand, it was crystal clear that any such act would provoke strong reactions from Washington and London. Therefore, when President Laurel sent a short telegraphic note to Madrid with the request for ‘cordial relations of friendship,’741 the relatively simple and uncontroversial way out of the situation would have been to

739 Setsuho Ikehata and Jose Ricardo Trota, eds., The Philippines under Japan: Occupation Policy and Reaction (Manila: Ateneo de Manila Press, 1999), 21-30.
741 Ibid.
not honor the request with an official reaction. From the Spanish point of view, no need for an immediate recognition nor for a condemnation of the new regime existed. Jordana’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, did something unexpected. It replied to the note in the most cordial tones:

Over so many centuries no other country has had such a deep mutual understanding with the Philippines as Spain and these ties of history, blood, and cherishing are indestructible (...) relations between the Philippines and Spain are always placed on the level of the most perfect comprehension and the most cordial mutual understanding. (…). 742

Although the telegram does not mention the official Spanish position regarding recognition of the proclaimed Philippine Republic, its unmistakably cordial wording with reference to ‘relations’ and Jordana’s signature gave it the air of Spain de facto extending its recognition to the Laurel regime. U.S. Ambassador Hayes recalled in his memoirs that he and his staff “knew of no precedent for the sending of such a message by one government to another which it did not recognize or plan to recognize.” 743

This was the source of the so-called ‘Laurel Incident,’ which gave the U.S. State Department a welcome excuse to increase pressure on Spain to halt the remaining support for Axis powers on the continent. Although Ambassador Hayes defended Jordana toward his own government (well aware that the U.S. was better careful not to lose an important pro-Allied personality in the Spanish Government), 744 he also telegraphed to Washington that he hoped “to use the incident of Jordana’s message to

742 Ibid., Kindle location 7414. [Original in Spanish, translated by Florentino Rodao]
743 Hayes, Wartime Mission in Spain, 1942-1945, 188.
Laurel to improve our position in Spain and to bring further deterioration in the Axis position here and elsewhere.”

Jordana’s note to Laurel has puzzled historians of Spanish Foreign Policy for a while. Opinions range from ‘diplomatic blunder’ or the result of carelessness on the part of Jordana, all the way to it being called a ‘carefully worded’ telegram, intended to strike a balance between expectations of Axis powers and Spain’s own interests in the Philippines. Whichever the reasons were and however it is evaluated today, for Jordana and Franco, the note to Laurel became a major foreign policy emergency because the State Department, after a few days of strategic silence, took the position that Spain had officially committed a highly unfriendly act against the interests of the United States. For maximum diplomatic pressure, the case was even publicized by way of newspaper articles. The Laurel incident coincided with the unmasking of a Spanish spy, the Spanish consul in Vancouver, Fernando de Kobbe Chinchilla, who had been working for Velasco. These two developments gave the State Department a welcome excuse to demand nothing less than the complete stop of Spanish wolfram exports to Germany.

The diplomatic fall-out that ensued over the next half a year was tedious for both sides. On the one hand, Hayes and his colleagues in the State Department had to be careful not to provoke a resignation of Jordana, who, after all, still was much more of a pro-Allied force than other exponents of the Franco regime. On the other hand, the direction was clear; Spain had to be coerced to refrain from exporting important metals for Germany’s

---

war efforts. Franco’s regime on the other hand was interested in settling the two issues as soon as possible and restore normal relations with its important trade partner. Through U.S. pressure followed, which culminated in an oil embargo in February 1944 that only ended when Franco conceded to U.S. demands, stopping nearly all exports to Germany in April.\(^\text{748}\)

The Laurel incident and the Spanish spy network for Japan had become a major point of contestation for Spanish-U.S. relations, driving a wedge also between Franco and Hitler. The developments clearly lead to an acceleration of Madrid’s forced realignment with the Allies and its increasingly negative attitude toward Tokyo. Ever since the end of 1943, Jordana and Franco uttered more frequently to U.S. and British diplomats that Japan was a ‘yellow peril’ and represented the real threat together with Soviet communism.\(^\text{749}\) It was the start of an increasingly rapid deterioration of Spanish-Japanese relations. After the unexpected death of Jordana of a hemorrhage on August 3, 1944, U.S. Ambassador Hayes, for example, had a conversation with the new Foreign Minister José Félix de Lequerica y Erquiza which attests to that:

\[
\text{(...) I expressed to the Foreign Minister the hope that, as the war in the Pacific proceeded and areas were liberated from Japanese domination, Spain would decline to take under its diplomatic protection any consulates or missions of Japan or of puppet governments which Japan might have set up in those areas. Señor Lequerica assured me that the United States could count on full and hearty compliance by Spain with the request. He reminded me of what the Caudillo had said about Japan in July, 1943, and}
\]


\(^\text{749}\) Rodao, Franco y el Imperio Japonés. Kindle location 7524-36.
again in July, 1944,\textsuperscript{750} and added that the breaking-point had just about been reached in Spain's relations with Japan.\textsuperscript{751}

Although the break did not happen immediately, the necessary justification was on its way. The news of systematic discrimination of Spanish companies in the Philippines, the mistreatment of its catholic missionaries and restrictions of monetary transfers served as welcome pretexts to decrease any collaboration with Japan. The changing attitude of Franco was clearly felt by the Gaimusho to the point that Foreign Minister Shigemitsu gave the order to protect the rights and property of Spanish citizens in the Philippines as far as possible. He did, however, not agree to the evacuation of the Spanish colony as requested by Méndez de Vigo together with his fellow neutral ministers Bagge and Gorgé in March 1944. The three had submitted a joint demarche to request a special evacuation ship for their compatriots in the increasingly endangered occupied territories, including the Philippines. Fearing a humiliation, the Gaimusho rejected the request and no neutral citizens were able to leave the dangerous zones.\textsuperscript{752}

This would prove not only lethal to many neutral civilians but the reason for the final rupture of relations between Japan and Spain. Ever after summer 1944, Franco was searching for a face-saving way to completely withdraw all support for Japan and

\textsuperscript{750} Lequerica was referring to the Franco’s comments about Japan as a danger to the west and an enemy that needs to be defeated.


comply with U.S. demands for a pro-Allied attitude. The Japanese army soon delivered the needed excuse.

4-5-2. The Manila Massacre and the End of Spanish-Japanese Relations

On February 3, 1945, the battle for Manila, began with the attack on the capital city by General MacArthur’s forces. Although the Japanese Chief in Command, General Yamashita, had not planned to defend the city, many of his subordinate officers resisted his command to withdraw to the mountains, forcing a showdown between the U.S. and Japanese troops in a city of one million people. The ensuing humanitarian catastrophe cost the lives of 100,000 civilians and almost completely destroyed Manila. What exacerbated the suffering was the violent fury of the embattled young Japanese men who, in their despair, raped and killed civilians indiscriminately. The foreign population was not spared from the same fate.

Spanish residents were especially heavily hit, not only because many of them lived in the most embattled areas, but only few fled before the beginning of hostilities because they expected the recapturing of Manila to play out in the same way as the first battle did three years earlier—with the attacked party declaring the city as ‘open’ and withdrawing to spare the population. They did not. Once the scale of the imminent danger became clear, many Spanish and Filipinos tried to rescue themselves onto the premises of the Spanish consulate only to meet their fate there. Japanese troops killed over fifty people on February 12 in the consulate when shelling the building with heavy

---

explosives and attacking with machine guns before setting fire to it. Before the end of the month, over 200 Spaniards lost their lives and 90% of the Spanish heritage in the city was destroyed.\textsuperscript{754}

The outrage in Madrid over the barbaric acts was trumped only by the cynicism of the justification that the Japanese Government provided in reaction to the sharp Spanish protest—it held that some members of the Spanish community in Manila were doubtlessly involved in acts of espionage and sabotage and that the deaths were the inevitable result of the city having become a battle ground.\textsuperscript{755} At the same time, however, the Gaimusho was highly aware of the gravity of the situation and that the acts of the murder of civilians and diplomats of friendly nations demanded reparations. As with the case of the Swiss,\textsuperscript{756} the Gaimusho offered compensation payments and even an impartial investigation.\textsuperscript{757} Franco, however, used the situation to finally break with Japan. His demands for an amicable resolution were so exorbitant that minister Suma described them as ‘astronomical,’ and had to be regarded as a rejection of the Japanese offer.\textsuperscript{758}

The Manila massacre was doubtlessly a grave incident but historians generally agree that it was used as a mere pretext by Franco’s regime to execute the long desired complete break with Japan.\textsuperscript{759} There are numerous indications for this assessment, a clear one is, for example, the discussion which took place on March 17, 1945, between

\textsuperscript{754} Rodao, \textit{Franco y el Imperio Japonés}. Kindle location 8727-933.
\textsuperscript{756} See chapter 5-5-1.
\textsuperscript{757} Pilapil, "The Far East," 225.
\textsuperscript{758} Krebs, "Japanese-Spanish Relations, 1936-1945," 49.
Minister Lequerica and the British Military Attaché, Windam W. Torr, which Rodao in his work cites as follows:

[Lequerica] said: “It seems as if we are going to declare war on Japan.” In answer to Torr's question about when it would be, he said, “I hope very soon, we must do it before Portugal” and, finally, about the motive, Lequerica, apparently, shrugged his shoulders and said: “Well, Franco always hated the Japanese.” Torr replied: “And what about the atrocities in the Spanish Consulate,” to which the Minister said: “Yes, of course, we can use it very well.”

Spain terminated its mandates of protecting Power for Japan on March 27, 1945, and, three weeks later, broke off diplomatic relations with it.761 Minister Méndez de Vigo and Vidal Tolosana thereby lost their privileges, and were confined to their place of evacuation in Karuizawa. With one of his last telegrams to Madrid, Méndez de Vigo had recommended Switzerland to become the protecting Power of Spain in Japan. Although the step was only taken in mid-July (with Japan accepting in September), from the correspondence of the Swiss Minister it is apparent that Switzerland assumed the de facto protection of Spanish interests right after the rupture. Through Minister Gorgé, the communication between Méndez de Vigo and Madrid, in fact, continued throughout the last months of the war.762 After seventy-seven years of diplomatic relations, Spain broke with Japan. Méndez de Vigo and Vidal

---

761 The precise date of the break of relations cannot be clearly determined because of the great difficulties of communications during the early days of April. The Spanish Government declared the rupture already on April 12, but Méndez de Vigo in Tokyo could not confirm them until April 19, when he received four telegrams from Madrid regarding the decision. He himself was still able to answer to that communication two days later on April 21, which would indicate that Tokyo had not yet officially taken note of the new situation. The minister’s communication with his government would otherwise already have been forbidden. See about this: Telegram Méndez de Vigo to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated April 21, 1945. In: AGA, (10) 052, CAJA 54/15903, Telegram, "No. 21 - Asunto: Ruptura de relaciones diplomáticas con el Japón", April 21, 1945, Carpeta: Ruptura relaciones España-Japón. See also the Swiss sources in: CH-BAR, E2001D#1000/1553#2112*, B24.4, "Vertretung Spanischer Interessen in Japan", 1945.
Tolosana returned to Madrid in 1946, around the same time as Suma was repatriated to Tokyo. The relationship between the two countries was normalized only in 1952, a year after Japan regained its sovereignty through the San Francisco peace treaty. Former consul Castillo was the one who returned to Tokyo to become Spain’s first regular Ambassador to Japan.
4-6. Chapter Summary & Conclusion

The pre-WWII relationship between Spain and Japan was extraordinary in several ways. In comparison to the other two states in this study, it stands out for its long history, dating back to the sixteenth century, and its different trajectory between 1868 and 1945. In both periods, the most surprising aspect is what brought the two states together—and what also drove them apart—were not questions of trade but of empire. The Philippine archipelago was the leitmotif of Spanish-Japanese relations before 1945. It repeatedly surfaced during the most crucial times of their interactions. From the very beginning in 1592, when Toyotomi Hideyoshi wrote a cryptic letter to the Spanish Governor of the Philippines, to the forceful push of the Spanish administration in Manila for trade relations and immigration from Japan in the 1860s, over the reason for the second Spanish Embassy that was sent to Japan in 1895, all the way to their rupture over the Manila Massacre in 1945—the Philippines was the central issue of their diplomatic relations. The low level of trade between Japan and Spain is proof that commerce never was a crucial aspect of their bilateral relations. Geo-strategic considerations were much more detrimental to their interactions.

At the same time, it is also important to recognize the role of domestic developments in Spain to evaluate the interaction between Madrid and Tokyo in the fourteen years of Japan’s wartime period. Spain’s strong condemnation of Japanese actions in Manchuria at the League of Nations echoed the push of other small States in the early 1930s for a functional collective security approach. That, however, coincided with the Government of the Second Spanish Republic—a left wing, democratic regime that existed for only eight years. Had representatives of the authoritarian regime of Primo de Rivera been in Geneva, Spain’s reaction to Japan might have been different. However, just like the
cases of Sweden and Switzerland, the diplomatic fall-out at the League had no real impact on Spanish-Japanese bilateral relations. The life of the diplomats in Tokyo, and of the Spanish colony, in general, continued normally. The Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939, was much more dramatic. Within a month after the attempted coup d’état, the Spanish Minister, Santiago Mendez de Vigo, together with the two other Spanish diplomats, defected to Franco. Careful about its foreign policy, the Gaimusho withdrew the accreditation of Méndez de Vigo and declared its own neutrality toward the conflict—like most European and American states at the time. However, within a year several international developments played into the hands of the Fascists in Japan.

Most importantly, the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese war brought more bellicose forces to power in Tokyo, who, in the end, craved for international recognition more than for diplomatic prudence. This lead to the recognition bargain of 1937—Japan recognized the Fascist regime in Burgos as the official Spanish Government, in return for Franco extending the same favor to Japan’s pet-project in China, recognizing Manchukuo as an independent nation-state. Spanish diplomats played a crucial role in this affair, not only interfacing the two sides but deciding much of its outcome through their defection and passionate adherence to the ideology of Franco’s regime. It was a moment when diplomats made history, because without Méndez de Vigo, Del Castillo, and Molina, the outcome would have been different.

The result of the Civil War, in turn, impacted the relationship between Tokyo and Madrid before and during the Pacific War because it created a ‘benevolent’ Axis-neutral who Japan could incorporate in its wartime diplomacy. Not only did Spain represent Japanese interests in most of the Americas, it went far beyond what a neutral should offer in diplomatic services by lending an entire network of Spanish spies to Japan.
Especially in the first two years of the war, when things looked good for the Axis in Europe, and for Japan in Asia, Spanish support for Japan was strongest. These favors ceased together with the advance of the Allied Powers in both theaters of the war.

The other consequence of Franco’s grab for power was that, on the other side of the equation, the Allies did not trust Madrid and therefore never counted on Madrid’s impartial support. Although the U.S. and other American governments accepted Spanish representation of Japanese interests, they did not delegate their own interests to them, because they thought it was likely that Madrid would join Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo eventually. One result of this was the reliance on Sweden and Switzerland for diplomatic services while, on the other hand, it meant that Spanish diplomacy was only busy for Axis belligerents outside of Japan, but not inside it. The Spanish mission, in fact, decreased in size during the Pacific War. This stands in stark contrast to the Swedish and the Swiss legations which, after Pearl Harbor, tripled and quintupled in the same period.

For various reasons, the bilateral relationship been Franco’s Spain and Japan worsened drastically from 1944 onward. When in February 1945 Japanese troops, during the battle of Manila, killed more than 200 Spanish civilians and diplomats—many of whom were inside the Spanish Consulate building—Franco used the situation as a pretext to sever relations with Tokyo. Over the course of two years, Japan had transformed from a strategic partner to a “convenient enemy,” 763 who was used to signal to the Allied Forces that Spain ended its support for the Axis Powers. Franco’s regime is in this sense a prime example for how a state could make use of its neutral foreign policy not to

escape international relations during times of war but to play on both sides—not for either of them but for itself.

On April 12, 1945, Méndez de Vigo informed Camille Gorgé about the rupture of relations between Spain and Japan, requesting the Swiss Minister’s services of Good Office to represent also Spanish interests from then on. This change in diplomatic affairs would turn out to become an unconventional bargaining chip for the Swiss Legation.
5. Switzerland

Of the three countries analyzed in this study, Switzerland was the only non-maritime power but, at the same time, the first to conclude a treaty of amity and commerce with Japan, after its forced opening to the world in 1853. The Swiss were four years faster than the Swedes and the Spanish in this endeavor, signing a treaty already in 1864 with the Bakufu regime of the Tokugawa Shogunate. In fact, negotiations started in 1859, on the heels of the treaty agreements that the U.S. and half a dozen European powers forced on Japan. Furthermore, in contrast to the Kingdom of Sweden-Norway which used the Good Offices of the Dutch embassy to negotiate and sign a treaty, the Swiss sent their own Plenipotentiary to Japan, spending a significant amount of money on the treaty negotiations. This discrepancy warrants a closer look at the early modern relationship between Switzerland and Japan.

764 In contrast, the Swedes and the Spanish concluded their treaty in 1868 with the new Meiji Government.
5-1. Early Modern Swiss-Japanese Relations

The first known contact between a Swiss official and Japan was not of diplomatic but of literary nature. In 1586 Renward Cysat, chancellor of the Canton of Lucerne published the first study of Japan by a Swiss, which also was one of the first books on the country written in the German language.\textsuperscript{765} Having never been to Japan himself, Cysat wrote the book \textit{On the Newly Discovered Japanese Islands and Kingdoms (…)}\textsuperscript{766} based on extensive second-hand Jesuit (Portuguese) sources. It describes Japanese customs and politics as well as the presumably wonderful influences of the roman catholic faith on a ‘heathen’ country. Cysat’s book was a hit at its time. It was published in three editions in the catholic canton of Freiburg (i.Ü.). It came at a time of a Europe-wide ‘Japan boom’ following the arrival of the first-ever Japanese delegation, the ‘Tensho Embassy,’ to Europe in 1585. The Embassy visited the head of the catholic church, Pope Gregor XIII. The four Japanese diplomats did, however, not visit any of the Helvetic territories on their tour. Unlike seafaring nations, the Helvetic cantons did not have overseas colonies nor did they produce many missionaries. There are consequently no records of Swiss seamen, merchants or clergy men on the Japanese islands. Cysat’s academic work remains the closest encounter of the Helvetic Confederation with Japan before the Tokugawa Shogunate sealed the country off from foreign influence in the mid-


\textsuperscript{766} Renward Cysat and Abraham Gemperlin, \textit{Warhafftiger Bericht von den newerfundnen Japponischen Inseln und Königreichen, auch von andren zuvor unbekandten Indianischen Landen… neben dem allen erfindet sich in diser Edition gründliche anzeygung von der Japponischen Legation neuwlich gehn Rom ankommen…} (Getruckt zu Freyburg in der Eydgenoschafft: bey Abraham Gemperlin, 1586). In 2009 the library of the Canton of Fribourg digitized the second edition (published in the same year as the first edition, in 1886) of this important first work of Swiss Japanology. It contains the first known German language map of Japan and is freely available online (http://doi.org/10.3931/e-rara-10558).
seventeenth century. Only after that ‘Sakoku-period’ of national isolation official diplomatic relations between the newly formed Swiss Confederation (founded in 1848) and Japan is documented. The news of Commodore Perry’s arrival in Kanagawa and the opening of Japan reached Switzerland in March 1854, upon which representatives of the Swiss watch making industry in La Chaux-de-Fonds were the first to express their interest to the Federal Council (Swiss Government) to start exports of their products to Japan. In the following years watch manufacturers in Le Locle, industrialists in Basel and the Chamber of Commerce in Zürich joined the chorus of those who urged the authorities to establish relations with the new market in the east. Under the name ‘Union horologère’ several watch makers joined forces to push for better trade relations with Asia in Singapore, Ceylon, Siam, China, and Japan. Especially the news of the relatively low import duty of 5% in Japan that the U.S. and the U.K. had secured in their treaties of 1858, excited the Union horologère. Quickly they won the support of industrialists in St. Gallen, Glarus, Zürich, Basel, Waadt, and Geneva. Their plan to send a representative to the east who would scout for new markets was ultimately approved by the Federal Council on January 3, 1859. Through the Swiss consul in Amsterdam the opportunity had been secured two months earlier to send the first Swiss products together with a representative for Swiss trade to Japan. The young Swiss Government, which was barely ten years old, delegated the task back to the Union horologère who named the Prussian national Dr. Rudolf Lindau to be the first

---

769 Not the same institution as the twenty-first century “Union horologère,” which is a modern Swiss watch making company. It is, however, is not directly connected to the historical precursor which was more a trade union of different watch makers—a small watch-making cartel.
representative of Swiss commercial interests to Japan. The choice of a Prussian representative was not a coincidence; the Union horologère was a purely Neuchâtelian endeavor (La Chaux-de-Fonds and Le Locle are both located there) which between 1814 and 1857 was simultaneously a canton of the Helvetic Confederation and a duchy of Prussia. The bonds between Neuchâtel and Prussia had therefore been old and deep. It is nevertheless remarkable that only two years after Switzerland almost fought a war with Prussia over Neuchâtel, the Swiss Government still agreed to charge a Prussian with the duty to negotiate in the name of Switzerland. The reasons therefore are unclear but on May 9, 1859 the Ministry of Commerce and Customs agreed to the request of the Union horologère to expand Lindau’s mission by charging him in addition to his private mandate as a representative of their industry with an official mandate to conclude a treaty of commerce with the Japanese government in the name of Switzerland. However, he was not given the official diplomatic title of ‘Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary’ but only became the ‘Delegate of the Federal Department of Commerce and Customs.’

Lindau left from Marseille on April 28, 1859 and arrived in Nagasaki on September 3, from where he continued his voyage to Kanagawa in October. Through the help of the Dutch envoy, van Polsbroek (the same man who would sign the first Swedish-Japanese treaty, nine years later), the Swiss representative was able to meet with Japanese

---

770 The risk of a Prussian-Swiss war in 1857 were acute and only narrowly averted after both parties had already mobilized their troops and were in full preparations for battle plans. On the military aspects of the so-called “Neuenburger Affair” see: Hans-Dierk Fricke, “Der vermiedene Krieg zwischen Preußen und der Schweiz: Operationsgeschichtliche Aspekte der »Neuenburger Affaire« 1856/57,” Militaergeschichtliche Zeitschrift 61, no. 2 (2002).

officials on November 7, 1859. However, negotiations with the Bakufu were complicated by two factors. On the one hand Lindau’s semi-official position as a merchant man and a representative of a state caused confusion among the Japanese. Secondly, his request arrived at a moment when the Bakufu had just made the decision not to extend anymore treaty relations to other states beyond the five seafaring nations with which it had already concluded such agreements. It was, in fact, the Swiss request for another treaty that hardened the Japanese standpoint. Its officials feared that if even non-seafaring nations in Europe concluded commercial treaties with Japan, there would be a proliferation of relations to dozens of western states, which would lead to a complete draining of Japan’s resources. The Bakufu was afraid of too much export, not too little. The only concession Switzerland’s first semi-official envoy to Japan could reach during the three rounds of negotiations was the written promise of the Bakufu that Switzerland would be the first state to receive a treaty of commerce and friendship before any other nation with whom Japan did not have treaty relations as of 1860. Switzerland would be the ‘most favored among the not favored nations’—so to speak.772

Dr. Lindau left Japan without the desired treaty in 1860. The outcome was a disappointment to the Swiss Government and the subsequent news that the Bakufu had agreed to two new treaties with Portugal and Prussia773 the following year did not add to

772 Ibid., 30-32.
773 The head of the Ministry of Commerce and Customs, Federal Councilor Frederich Frey-Herosé, was not particularly angered about this development. On the one hand the promises that Lindau had received just months earlier made him hopeful that Japan now would come around on the Swiss question if a new initiative was started. On the other hand, he indicated that the treaty with Prussia was most likely struck in the name of the German customs union (Zollverein). That made it more understandable to Frey-Herosé because Prussia had more bargaining power than Switzerland (ibid., 37.). That guess however was
Swiss excitement about the promises received. Although in December 1860 the Swiss asked for (and were granted) the protection of their merchants by the newly established U.S. mission in Edo, the Federal Council and the business community under the leadership of the Union horologère were aware that only a proper treaty arrangement would allow for the desired safe and extensive market access to Japan.774 Since the countries major industrialists were also members of the two parliamentary chambers, the decision was quickly made to invest a second time into official relations with Japan. Under the leadership of the Ministry of Commerce and Customs, the Federal Council approved a proposal to approach Japan once more for a treaty to which both parliamentary chambers gave their consent in summer 1861, sanctioning a budget of 103,000 CHF to do so.775 It was again through the Good Offices of the Dutch and especially through Envoy van Polsbroek that the Swiss approached the Bakufu for new negotiations. The Dutch also agreed to bring a new Swiss mission to Japan and extend their protection to them in case of emergencies in Japan. On August 30, 1861, the Federal Council chose the prominent and influential politician Aimé Humbert as their first real Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Japan.

mistaken. The German customs union was not yet included in the Prussian treaty and it was in fact the upcoming Swiss negotiations that inspired the Prussians to try to extend their treaty to the customs Union. See on this: Holmer Stahncke, Die diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und Japan 1854-1868, Studien zur modernen Geschichte (Franz Steiner Verlag, 1987), 216.


775 That was a large amount of money, considering that the budget of the Ministry of Commerce and Customs was barely 5,000 CHF the year before. See on this: Jonas Rüegg, "Aimé Humbert - Wertvorstellungen eines Bourgeois und das Japan der Bakumatsu-Zeit," Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Asienkunde, Asiatische Studien 69, no. 1 (2015): 51.
Humbert was forty-three years of age at the time of his appointment but he already had a long career to look back on. As a member of the Government of the Canton of Neuchâtel he helped to dispel the local crisis that had almost caused a Prussia-Swiss war in 1856–1857. Since 1854 and until his departure to Japan in 1862, he was a member of the council of states (the smaller chamber of parliament) which he even presided for a year. Unsurprisingly, Humbert was also strongly connected to the Union horologère—he was the company’s president (and thereby Lindau’s former boss). His insistence in parliamentary commissions to try again to establish relations with Japan was essential for the official sanctioning of the mission. It was Humbert who negotiated with the Dutch in Amsterdam for their support as protecting Power of his legation and their passage to Japan under their flag on a Dutch war ship—a not unimportant detail

---

777 Nakai, "Die Aufnahme der diplomatischen Beziehunen zwischen der Schweiz und Japan im Jahre 1864," 44.
when considering that Japan so far had only agreed to treaties with seafaring nations who made use of their gunboat diplomacy.

The Swiss legation under Minister Humbert was six people strong\(^{778}\) and arrived in Nagasaki on April 9, 1963. For several reasons, the timing of the Swiss legation was not lucky. On the one hand, the Bakufu was still not keen on extending treaty rights to another European nation and wanted the Swiss mission to stay at the Dutch premises in Dejima for the time being. On the other hand, the Namamugi Incident, during which the British national Charles L. Richardson was killed by a Samurai of the Satsuma Daimyo in September 1862, still occupied the Bakufu to the fullest. The incident sparked the largest foreign policy crisis in Japan since the arrival of Perry’s ships a decade earlier. The incident, together with other anti-foreigner attacks lead to heavy handed retaliations by U.S., French and British forces against the Satsuma and Choshu clans in Japan’s South West, were they attacked the port cities of Shimonoseki and Kagoshima. Riots and more calls to expel foreigner were the consequence. On top of this, Japan’s internal power struggle between the Shogun’s Bakufu and rebellious forces, which sought to reinstall the Emperor as the political sovereign of Japan, were approaching a climax that would, once and for all, eliminate the Shogunate in 1867. In the mists of this confusion and climate of mutual distrust the Swiss question was not one that the Bakufu treated with priority. Negotiations might have been impossible had it not been for the support of the U.S. Minister R. H. Pruyn and the Dutch Consul General von Polsbroek. The latter intervened several times on behalf of the Swiss legation, demanding that

---

\(^{778}\) Aimé Humbert (Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary), Kaspar Brennwald (legation councilor), John Bringolf (General Staff, Attaché), Iwan Kaiser (Officer of the Artillery, Attaché), James Favre-Brandt (watch manufacturer, Attaché), Eduard Bavier (Merchant, Attaché). See: ibid.
negotiations for a Swiss-Japanese treaty should begin according to the promises made three years earlier. Still, for a long time no concrete actions were taken on the Japanese side. The situation was so unfruitful that in October 1863 the Federal Council ordered Humbert to aboard the mission and return home. Desperate to reach an agreement with the Japanese, Humbert promised to return by the end of the Japanese new year, in February 1964. In late December, the situation finally changed for the better and negotiation started with Bakufu delegates. In the end, a treaty granting Switzerland the same most-favorite-nation rights to the other seven sea Powers was signed on February 6, 1964, in Edo—only one day before Minister Humbert’s planned departure.\footnote{Ibid., 44-63.}

Despite the long waiting time, the outcome of the Humbert Mission was exactly what the Swiss Government had hoped for—a durable, strategic relationship with a promising Asian nation. The Federal Council described the new relationship with Japan in an explanation to parliament as follows:

In general, this treaty can be said to give more to us than what we must concede. For the privileges that Japan assures us of, we are not obliged to reciprocate in a substantial manner. Incidentally, it must be stated here that the contracts with Japan that are currently in effect should be understood much more as introductory steps toward future agreements than as a remaining instrument for the transport of trade with that country. (…). The justified expectations that this treaty conclusion will lead to the opening of new export markets should however not be overestimated at the moment. Sometime will be needed until the Japanese are adapted to the changed circumstances and until they are familiar with European goods. In contrast, it can be expected with certainty that in the future the more and more evolving civilization in the country will develop trade which will bear plentiful fruits for our efforts. This expectation is mainly justified by the industrious and intelligent character of the Japanese people.\footnote{Ibid., 64.}
The treaty was ratified by both parliamentary chambers in summer 1864. There is no doubt that a majority of Swiss politicians had high hopes for future trade with Japan and that they saw their efforts as an investment for the prosperity of their country. Notwithstanding the inconvenience that Switzerland did not have its own merchant fleet, the experience of confederation with overseas trade relations seemed to make any such considerations secondary. The transport of goods could be organized. The important aspect was to be allowed to trade. Market access was the corner stone of the strategy the Swiss followed under the strong influence of the export-oriented watch-industry.

Not surprisingly, Swiss private business was quick to capitalize on the new chances. Besides eight Swiss merchants who already had resided in Yokohama at the time of the signing of the treaty, three of the five delegates who accompanied Minister Humbert did not return to Switzerland. They started businesses in Japan (Kaiser, Favre-Brandt, and Bavier) specializing on import and export of watches, fire arms, printed materials, silk, and garments. The legation councilor, Kaspar Brennwald returned two years later in 1866 to Yokohama where he, too, founded a trading house. His company, Siber & Brennwald Co. became one of the most influential Swiss businesses in Yokohama. It functioned simultaneously as a private company and the diplomatic representation of

---

781 Stefan Sigrist, "Die Fürhe Schweizergemeinde und die ersten Schweizer Unternehmen in Japan," in Handbuch Schweiz-Japan = Manuel des relations nippo-suisses: Diplomatie und Politik, Wirtschaft und Geschichte, Wissenschaft und Kultur, ed. Patrick Ziltener (Zürich: Chronos, 2001). Note: Sigirst talks about 11 Swiss that were in Japan in 1864, but his count includes the three members of the Humbert mission.

782 The company was renamed several times, depending on the partners who entered (or left) the business. It became the Siber-Wolf & Co. in 1899 and the Siber-Hegner & Co. in 1910. The company went through several more transformations, relocating its head quarter back to Zürich in the 1930s and merging in 2002 with two other trading companies, founded by W.H. Diethelm and E.A. Keller who, like Siber and Brennwald had sailed East in the 1860s to Singapore and Manila respectively. The company today employs 28,300 people and carries the name DKSH. On the Brennwald and Siber, their company and partners see the extensive online database of Bernd Lepach. "Meiji Portraits." 2017.
Switzerland. Between 1864 and 1866 Van Polsbroek had served as Honorary Consul for Switzerland in Japan but immediately after Brennwald’s return, the young business man took over the official mandate, installing the Swiss Honorary Consulate General at his company’s head quarter. From then on, all heads of his company also became Switzerland’s top diplomats in the country. It was not until 1895 that a professional career diplomat, Dr. Paul Ritter, became Switzerland’s first fulltime Consul General to Japan. For thirty years, four consecutive Honorary Consul Generals came from Brennwald’s trading company, which (coincidentally, or not) was so successful that it still exists today under the name DKSH.783

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aimé</td>
<td>Humbert</td>
<td>Envo</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>1864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dirk de Graeff</td>
<td>van Polsbroek</td>
<td>Hon. Consul General</td>
<td>1864</td>
<td>1866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caspar</td>
<td>Brennwald</td>
<td>Hon. Consul General</td>
<td>1866</td>
<td>1867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hermann</td>
<td>Siber</td>
<td>Hon. Consul General (ad int.)</td>
<td>1867</td>
<td>1870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caspar</td>
<td>Brennwald</td>
<td>Hon. Consul General</td>
<td>1870</td>
<td>1882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnold</td>
<td>Wolf</td>
<td>Hon. Consul General</td>
<td>1882</td>
<td>1888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnold</td>
<td>Dumelin</td>
<td>Hon. Consul General</td>
<td>1888</td>
<td>1895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul</td>
<td>Ritter</td>
<td>Consul General</td>
<td>1895</td>
<td>1906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul</td>
<td>Ritter</td>
<td>Envo</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferdinand</td>
<td>Von Salis</td>
<td>Envo</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>1920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles L. E.</td>
<td>Lardy</td>
<td>Envo</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter</td>
<td>Spycher</td>
<td>Chargé d’Affaires (ad int.)</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfred</td>
<td>Brunner</td>
<td>Chargé d’Affaires (ad int.)</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emile</td>
<td>Traversini</td>
<td>Envo</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armin</td>
<td>Daeniker</td>
<td>Chargé d’Affaires (ad int.)</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter</td>
<td>Thurnheer</td>
<td>Envo</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camille</td>
<td>Gorgé</td>
<td>Envo</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: Swiss Representatives in Japan 1863–1945784


784 See for this list: Kawasaki, "Kenkyu Nouto: Meiji Jidai no Toukyou ni atta Gaikoku Koukan (4) – The Foreign Missions in Tokyo of the Meiji Period (4)."; CH-BAR ONLINE, Geschäftsberichte des Bundesrates, "Berichte des Schweizerischen Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über seine
Paul Ritter was also the first Swiss Minister Resident in Japan, after his rank was raised to that of an Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in 1906 when the Swiss and Japanese sides had agreed to elevate diplomatic relations. Until 1945 most heads of Switzerland’s representation were of the rank of a Minister except for a four- and two-year period in the 1920s and 1930s, when the position itself was left vacant and the legation was led by two different Chargé d’Affaires, Alfred Brunner and Armin Daeniker, both of the rank of First Secretary. Otherwise, Switzerland made sure to send senior diplomats to the Empire. Between 1945 and 1952 no official relations with Japan were possible anymore due to the country’s occupation by the United States. Japan had lost its sovereignty and the U.S. forbade diplomatic contacts. In 1952 relations were restored and in 1957 the Swiss mission was elevated to its current status of an Embassy.  


785 The Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary whose rank was increased to that of an Ambassador in Japan was Max Troendle who had been serving as the head of the legation in the last two years. See on this also: Jean De Rahm, ”Les Relation entre le Japon et la Suisse de 1864 à 1964,” in *Nippon-Helvetia, 1864-1964* (Tokyo: Akatsuki Insatsu, 1964), 70.
5-1-1. Trade

On the economic side, Swiss trade developed slowly in the 1870s and 80s. For the first pioneers, however, it produced handsome profits. Especially Brennwald’s trading house ‘Siber & Brennwald Co.’ was able to dominate much of Japan’s silk exports with a total market share of 40% of all the Japanese silk sold to the world. In relation to Switzerland, the company enjoyed a near-monopoly position on Japanese exports, because silk constituted 95% of all Swiss imports from Japan of which Siber & Brennwald Co. was the main dealer. On the side of exports, it is not surprising that watches were among the most important goods. Roughly halve of all exports to Japan was made of silver,

---

786 Photographer Unknown, Picture of Paul Ritter (Bernd Lepach, 1917).
nickel, and golden pocket watches. The second most important product category was cotton textiles followed by chemicals (colorings, alcohols, etc.) and woolen textiles.\textsuperscript{788} Precise import and export numbers for the time before the turn of the century are not available because Switzerland’s statistical office lumped trade with Japan together with that of China and other East Asian nations. The closest to official numbers stems from a report by the Federal Council in 1896. Confronted with Japanese demands for a treaty revision to set the bilateral relations on an equal footing, a new treaty was signed that year in Yokohama and had to be ratified by parliament. The Federal Council in its address to the legislature held that within the first thirty years of Swiss-Japanese relations the value of trade had increased tenfold.\textsuperscript{789} It also estimated that Switzerland had exported in 1896 goods for roughly 4 million CHF to Japan while importing mainly raw silk for about 6 million CHF from there. Although there was a considerable leeway for statistical error in these numbers, the Federal Council held that the current state of trade should not be the guiding motive for the parliament to decide on the issue:

\begin{quote}
A more precise consideration [of imports and exports] is, as of today, an impossibility. But we do not believe that it matters which side receives the greater advantage. All in all, we must view the new order of things in the Japanese empire as a given fact which we cannot oppose. We emphasize the primary interest which has already guided the Federal Administration in 1864, to not be treated less favorably than any other nation in Japan and to be in friendly relations with the government of that empire. That will without doubt be beneficial to our commerce and to our citizens.\textsuperscript{790}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{789} Ibid., 794.
\textsuperscript{790} Ibid., 806-07.
The Swiss Government thus expressed its strong support for diplomatic and trade relations with Japan under the guiding strategy that commercial relations even under the new parameters would be useful to Switzerland, regardless of current details of the trade situation. Parliament followed that recommendation, ratifying the new treaty in 1896. Diplomatic and trade relations between the two countries continued over the turn of the century without significant changes. From 1901, reliable trade statistics become available as Swiss authorities started to index trade with Japan. Up until the beginning of WWI, the trade balance was mostly negative for Switzerland. Only in the period from 1904 to 1908 exports surpassed imports, mainly due to increased demand for Swiss textiles and watches during the Russo-Japanese war. Starting from 1907 watch sales in Japan reduced markedly due to the beginning of local watch production, while textile imports to Switzerland increased, leading to a renewed trade deficit for the years until 1914. Overall, during the first decade of the new century, Japan was more important to Switzerland as an exporter of raw silk for the Swiss textile industry than as a market place for Swiss goods.791 Without the important Japanese raw material many Swiss garment manufacturers would have struggled to meet their production targets. A trade deficit with Japan was the result thereof. However, the intuitive notion that such a deficit was not beneficial to Switzerland should be relativized by the fact that the import and export business were both controlled by Swiss merchant houses who got to benefit handsomely from their position as middle men.

WWI became a catalyst of Swiss-Japanese trade. Just as for the case of Sweden, trade sky-rocketed with imports and exports nominally quadrupling between 1914 and 1918. Although part of this change in the trade statistics must be attributed to the very high Swiss inflation of those years (up to 25% in 1918), the Japanese market suddenly gained in importance as an export destination and even more as a provider for raw materials at a moment when European markets had dried up due to the destruction of the war. Suddenly not only raw silk but also other forms of textiles were imported in large quantities in 1918 (12 million CHF), as well as metals, machinery and instruments (12 million CHF). A surprisingly high amount of food stuffs like sugar, oils, and beans was also brought to the alpine nation from Japan (15 million CHF). The worse the trade situation in Europe got, the more it flourished with Japan. Inversely,

---

once necessary food stuffs and textiles could be imported from European neighbors again, purchases from Japan ceased. Import numbers did not climb back to the heights of the late 1910s until well after the Second World War when Japan regained its position in world trade as an exporter of cars and electronic articles. By 1921 import numbers had fallen back to almost the same level as before the outbreak of the Great War.

By the beginning of the 1920s, the trade balance tipped over to a continued Swiss trade surplus that would last until the end of WWII. There were fifteen Swiss companies that were active in Osaka, Kobe, Yokohama, and Tokyo, generating combined import/export trade for a volume of roughly 80 million CHF, which made Japan one of the most important trade partners in Asia, rivaled only by the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) and British India. If we take into consideration that a major part of trade value with

---

796 In the Swiss statistics, “British India” included India, the Straights Settlement and Burma.
British India came from gold imports, Japan as a genuine trading partner for raw materials, machines and textiles was the most significant market for Switzerland in Asia.

The only other non-colonized Asian country besides Japan was the Kingdom of Siam with which Swiss trade was far below 10 million CHF for the above period. Even with China, trade reached only about half the size of that with Japan. In other words, Japan, although not a vital market, was nevertheless ‘normal’ when compared to small Powers in Europe and the Americas.

---

798 Ibid.
These numbers are not to suggest that Japan ever was a main trading partner of Switzerland. The 80–100 million CHF worth of trade could never match the importance Switzerland's immediate neighbors or the great Powers played. With Italy, France, Great Britain and the United States trade was worth around half a billion CHF every year. With its main trading partner Germany, the trade volume was in some years even twice as large, reaching a billion CHF worth of cross border commerce. However, the above discussions show that by the end of the 1920s Japan had reached a status to the Swiss that was comparable to that of other European and American nations. In trade and diplomacy, the Empire had become a significant force that the Swiss recognized as a great Power and with whom they wanted to actively follow through with their strategy of commercial engagement.

---

799 Ibid.
5-1-2. *Foreign Policy*

There have never been serious disagreements between Switzerland and Japan since the
treaty of 1864. Its terms have been revised twice, in 1896 and 1911.\(^{800}\) The treaty
revisions gave Japan the long deserved equal standing regarding trade duties and
removing consular courts and with them all extraterritorial rights of Switzerland in
Japan. The revisions were discussed but neither government nor parliament seriously
questioned the validity of Japan’s claim for equal rights.

The only notable foreign policy disagreement that occurred before WWII concerned a
Swiss proposed treaty on arbitration. Switzerland had had a long tradition of concluding
arbitration treaties with other states in the spirit of nineteenth century International Law.
In line with its new role as a League of Nations member, the Federal Council decided to
seek more international stability not only by means of collective security but by creating
a network of arbitration treaties.\(^{801}\) The Federal Council approached the Gaimusho in
1921 to sound out the Empire’s willingness to negotiate a modern mechanism of
bilateral dispute settlement. The Swiss tried something entirely new and experimental,
which was to suggest that arbitration cases must be handled in a binding manner by the
newly created Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). The goal was to
establish the principle that bilateral disputes between two contracting powers would be
settled by a court and that by virtue of a treaty both parties would a priori agree to
accept the ruling. Such an agreement would have greatly strengthened the PCIJ, because
there was no multilateral agreement in place that would have made its rulings

---

\(^{800}\) That treaty is still in effect as of 2018.
\(^{801}\) CH-BAR ONLINE, 10082274, "Rapport du Conseil fédéral à l'Assemblée fédérale concernant les
traités internationaux d'arbitrage", December 11, 1919.
mandatory. States needed to agree on a case-by-case bases to accept PCIJ decision, which was an approach with obvious flaws—when disputes broke out states were naturally unwilling to accept rulings that went against their interests. The Swiss proposal would have meant that for Japanese-Swiss bilateral relations, either party would have had the right to bring a dispute with the other party to the court room in The Hague as an arbitration case. This would have set a precedent in International Law for the strengthening of the rule of law—international jurisdiction by bilateral agreement. The Swiss proposal was in line with a general movement among small States to strengthen the jurisdiction of the PCIJ by making its verdicts compulsory. However, they failed to achieve their goal in the multilateral forum of the League due to the strong opposition of great Powers. Switzerland’s bilateral proposition to Japan was in this regard a second attempt to sneak the court’s jurisdiction in through the backdoor, even if only with one of the great Powers. However, their proposition did not meet with much enthusiasm in Tokyo. In its reply to the Swiss proposal the Gaimusho rejected all experimental parts relating to the binding nature of the treaty, insisting that, although it agreed to the principles of arbitration, any case would have to be reviewed individually and Japan would reserve the right to shelter any matter from arbitration that it deemed to touch upon its “sovereignty, the national honor, a vital interest or the interests of a third state.” Among other reservations, it was with this clause (which was a standard in arbitration contracts, especially with great Powers) as a precondition for the treaty, that the original intent of the Swiss proposal was lost. The Gaimusho was very clear that

---

803 DDS, Bd. 8, Dok. 153, "Le Ministre de Suisse à Tokyo, Ch. L. E. Lardy, au Département politique", December 30, 1921. 409.
without the clause Japan would not agree to an arbitration treaty. The Federal Council thereupon deliberated in front of the parliament on December 3, 1923, on the value of the watered-down treaty proposal:

There can be no illusions on the character of the treaty that is proposed to us. It will not at all marque a new stage on the way of arbitration. It has, all in all, the same practical bearings as the treaties that were concluded in 1904 by Switzerland with Belgium, Great Britain, the United States of America, Italy, Austria-Hungary, France and Sweden-Norway. It will be the classic treaty where the parties, instead of binding themselves to the precise stipulations of categories of litigation (...), they adhere to a principle—even if not wrong, then at least too rigid—of the notion of state sovereignty. It is the principle that will persist in a number of countries and especially with the great Powers, with the status of a dogma on which the ideas propagated in the world by the League of Nations are more or less ignored. (...) It is therefore right to say that, for the moment, mandatory arbitration persists only as a formula for small States. [However,] this conclusion must not lead us to renounce the making of international treaties with powers that do not share entirely our views; because a treaty, even if it comes with essential imperfections, is still preferable to a situation empty of all conventions (...).804

A year later, on December 26, 1924, a strongly modified treaty of arbitration was concluded.805 Although it did not achieve its original purpose to bind two sovereign states closer to the rulings of an international judiciary institution, it nevertheless deserves a few considerations. Firstly, it still included a reference to the PCIJ, which could be chosen (voluntarily) as the judicial body to implement an arbitration case if the parties did not want to use an arbitration panel. That was the first time that a bilateral agreement referred to the court at all. Secondly, regarding Swiss-Japanese relations the process of the treaty creation unveiled hopes of the Swiss Government to create a

---

804 DDS, Bd. 8, Dok. 301, "CONSEIL FÉDÉRAL Procès-verbal de la séance du 3 décembre 1923", December 3, 1923. 805-06.
805 Switzerland. Bundesrat. Traité de règlement judiciaire entre la Suisse et le Japon: [Treaty on judiciary rules between Switzerland and Japan]: 1924. Ratified by Switzerland on September 25 1925 and put into force on December 19 1925. This treaty is still in force as of 2018.
precedent through Japan. Several of the cited documents refer to the Empire as one of the world’s great Powers and, in 1921, it was the only one with which Switzerland did not have any previous experience in negotiating an arbitration treaty. The Federal Council was fully aware that most militarily powerful states were reluctant to bind themselves by voluntary agreements to surrender parts of their sovereign power to international judiciary panels. The rejection of the U.S.’ parliament to join the League of Nations being the most prominent example of the suspicion of great Powers against the project of internationalism. With Japan, there was no such track record. The Swiss proposal for a binding arbitration agreement is therefore best understood as an experiment on the Swiss side to find out if the new great Power in the Pacific was different and could help to further the cause of International Law, to which the Swiss subscribed. Its rejection came as a disappointment but not as a surprise. By the 1920s Japan had become a great Power like the ones the Swiss already knew and it played its cards the old-fashioned way.
5-2. **Diplomacy and Foreign Policy 1931–1937**

Swiss-Japanese relations were impacted heavily by the outbreak of hostilities in China. Japan’s aggressions met with political and popular disapproval in the Alpine nation. Especially the fighting in Shanghai was well documented, which drew the condemnation of Japanese actions in Swiss newspapers: “The continuation of the horrible battles in Shanghai has led to heavy resentments among the circles that used to show a certain benevolence toward Japanese actions in Manchuria. The true and ugly face of far-eastern imperialism manifests itself in all of its brutality.”

At the same time, the Swiss armament industry and parts of the government started to debate if weapons could still be exported to Japan and China or if the practice would have to stop now that the two trading partners had become military enemies? Official opinion remained divided on a general prohibition for private companies to deal in arms with either side. Conservative members of the Federal Council like Rudolph Minger, Minister of Defense, did not object to arms sales at all, whereas Foreign Minister Giuseppe Motta, who represented Switzerland at the League of Nations, believed that, for moral reasons and regarding the League’s principles, they would have to be stopped by emergency decree. However, the seven-member cabinet did not take such action. Motta was alone with his interpretation of Switzerland’s moral duties. He only made it clear to the weapons industry that the supply of armament to either side by the Federal

---


807 Motta served as president of the Federal Council in 1932, which did not give him special powers among his colleagues, it made him the *primus inter pares* representative of the Swiss Government.
State was out of question. The government as a whole took the stance that private weapon exports would only infringe the principles of the 1907 Hague convention on the rights and duties of neutral Powers, if Switzerland took one-sided actions to prevent the sales to one or the other party in the conflict. Even after the condemnation of Japan’s actions of February 24, 1933, the government only discussed a potential arms embargo but did not enact legislation thereof.

5-2-1. The Questions of Economic Relations with Manchukuo

After Ambassador Matsuoka’s dramatic walk out on the League of Nations, Japan’s interactions with the organization did not terminate immediately. Due to the withdrawal period, stipulated by the Covenant, Japan’s departure from the league did not become official until two years after the instrument of withdrawal had been handed to the League. Officially, Japan remained a member until March 26, 1935, but without sending representatives to the assembly. Apart from the armed conflict that sporadically flared up on the Chinese mainland and in the port city of Shanghai, the most impactful new fact that Japan created in the realm of IR was the Northeastern Chinese puppet state of Manchukuo that was under complete Japanese military and political control. The last Chinese Emperor, Puyi, was first installed as Head of State in 1932 and elevated to the status of Emperor two years later—a move that brought Manchukuo’s legal structure more in line with those of the mother land. Although there

808 DDS, Bd. 11, "Protokoll über die Sitzung des leitenden Ausschusses des Verwaltungsrates, abgehalten am 15. November 1932, vormittags 9 1/2 Uhr, im Verwaltungsgebäude der Gesellschaft", 1931.
809 DDS, Bd. 10, Dok. 111, "Le Gérant du Consulat général de Suisse à Shanghai, A.Daeniker, à la Division des Affaires étrangères du Département politique", 1931.
810 DDS, Bd. 10, Dok. 278, "Le Chef de la Division des Affaires étrangères du Département politique, M. de Stoutz, aux Légations de Suisse et au Consulat général de Suisse à Shanghai", 1933.
is no doubt today that the new country was under very tight Japanese control,⁸¹² there is a fair argument to be made that influential political and academic elites in the new country had a genuine interest in shaping Manchukuo in the image of Japan and that such an approach was anything but exceptional. In the words of historian Thomas D. DuBois “Manchukuo was quasi-sovereign in the sense that it freely surrendered to a foreign power the right to staff and ideologically mold its judiciary. (…) Even if the state was officially rejected by the League of Nations and reviled by many of its contemporaries, Manchukuo was at the time of its creation only one of many dozens of partially sovereign states, dependent polities, insular possessions, and other examples of what Lauren Benton (2008) has referred to as legal and territorial ‘anomalies’.”⁸¹³ The U.S. possession of the Philippines would be one example thereof and the British mandate in Palestine another one for scholars who point out that Manchukuo was anything but an anomaly of the international system at the time. However, what was singular to it was the claim to statehood as a satellite nation, shaped in the image of the power around which it orbited. As such, the Japan-Manchukuo relationship was more akin to the international order that would arise soon after 1945 in the block system of the Cold War.⁸¹⁴ It was this element of a claim to statehood while being clearly controlled by Japanese foreign policymakers that shaped the negative impression of Manchukuo among the diplomats of small states. Even eight years after its declaration

---


⁸¹⁴ Ibid.
of independence, in 1940, Camille Gorgé observed that diplomatically there was not even a hint of sovereignty: “[I] received the new list of the diplomatic corps. Manchukuo, this state that the Japanese assured in Geneva would be made independent, figures on it with a distinctively Chinese Ambassador, assisted by 22 collaborators that are just as distinctively Japanese. (…) One cannot speak anymore of hypocrisy, but blunt cynicism in the denial of these engagements!” 815 The independence of Manchukuo was a farce. But nevertheless, it was being entertained and nourished by the Japanese side and came with an important implication: Manchukuo, the Northeastern part of China with a size of 1.5 million square kilometers and an estimated population of thirty million people, was firmly under Japanese control. Switzerland had accepted to not recognize Manchukuo by signing the League’s resolution of February 24, 1933. But what about business interests? Manchukuo had rich farming lands, natural resources and rapidly developing cities and infrastructure projects. Swiss politicians were in a dilemma between their country’s official stance in international politics and the economic interests of their merchants. Manchukuo was a potential market and soon enough it became clear that there was a mutual interest, not surprisingly, originating from Japan.

In his first address to parliament after the new-years break on January 22, 1935, Koki Hirota, Japan’s foreign minister explained to his law makers the situation in Manchukuo as follows:

Now that the work of laying the national foundations of Manchoukuo (sic.) has been completed, her future progress will largely depend, I

believe, on the unreserved co-operation between her people and ours. Especially in the economic field, it may well be expected that by ministering to each other’s wants we shall be able to achieve an ample measure of mutual well-being and prosperity.\textsuperscript{816}

It was clear to the Japanese government that the success or failure of their artificial creation on the Asian mainland depended not only on the military power but also on economic success. To this end, Hirota started early on to solicit help from abroad. Notwithstanding the tense relationship between the Small States and Japan a year earlier, Hirota approached the Swiss Chargé d’Affaires, Armin Daeniker in late spring 1934 informally at a banquet for a word on Manchukuo’s economy. Hirota thought the time was right to look for foreign investment. He proposed to the temporary head of the Swiss legation to find ways for Swiss capital to flow to Manchukuo and contribute in a profitable way to the infrastructure projects that his government and its contractors where engaged in. The bad memories of Geneva seemed long forgotten.

Daeniker was not even surprised about the proposition. He had been gathering information about the region for some while and found that there were some Swiss funds already active in Manchukuo through Swiss investments in foreign development agencies (although rather insignificant in size). Daeniker therefore set up a letter to Minister of Foreign Affairs Motta. In a few pages, he explained the economic situation in Manchukuo, laid out how mainly Japanese holdings like Mitsubishi, Misuho, or Sumitomo were involved in investments in Manchukuo and how there is increasing interest by some (small) European Powers—notably Belgium, Holland but also Poland

\textsuperscript{816} Letter Swedish legation to Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated January 23 1935. RA, Utrikesdepartement 1920 Ars dossiersystem, SE/RA/221/2210.03.1/HP/669, XII, Xj, "Politik: allmänt", Japan, 1934-1936.
and Czechoslovakia—to create private investment groups. He made it clear that if the country prospered there would be considerable economic opportunities and that the time for a small, non-threatening state like Switzerland was exceptionally good. From his talks with Minister Hirota and from some other sources he deduced that the Japanese General Staff who controlled the area was much more interested in capital flowing to Manchukuo from small states and not from Germany, the U.K., or the U.S. whose power and influence they did not wish to grow in Manchukuo.\footnote{DDS, Bd. 11, Dok. 45, “Le Chargé d’affaires a.i. de Suisse à Tokyo, A. Daeniker, au Chef du Département politique, G. Motta”, 1934.} Fully aware of the delicate situation that official Swiss investment aide to Manchukuo would entail, Daeniker added to his letter that, for the sake of economic affairs, the question of recognizing Manchukuo would not be a requirement by the Japanese government. Only collaboration with the ruling Japanese administrators in the country would be necessary. In other words, what the Swiss Chargé d’Affaires was asking was whether he should start preparing to build up economic relationships with a foreign country which the official Switzerland did not recognize and was strongly opposed to support.

Despite Foreign Minister Motta’s strong words at the League of Nations, he did not reject the proposition flat out but chose to secretly gather information on the concrete interests of Switzerland’s business circles. The Political Department sent Daeniker’s report to Walter Stucki, the director of the Office of Commerce at the Department for Public Economy (Ministry of Economy).\footnote{Today: The Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research (EAER).} Stucki, in turn, forwarded the confidential report to four institutions that might be interested in the matter: The Central Bank, the Banker’s Union, the Federation of Commerce and Industry (Vorort), and the Central for
Trade Facilitation in Zürich. Their assessment was that capital investments at this point in time was considered too risky but that more information on the future development of the situation in Manchukuo would be very much appreciated. Motta and the Political Department adopted that view, ordering Daeniker to keep an eye on the developments in Manchukuo.  

Daeniker’s successor, Envoy Walter Thurnheer, implemented Switzerland’s wait-and-see approach. Soon after he was accredited as Swiss Minister in 1935, he traveled to Manchukuo personally, where he gained a positive impression of a country that he thought could become a powerful economic center in Northeast Asia. In the report that he wrote on the development of Manchukuo in 1938, he was showing great optimism for the opportunities it held. “Although Japan will, without doubt, be gaining the lions share, there will be an interesting sphere of influence left for third-party states and therefore for us as well.” Although no official contact between the Swiss Legation and the Manchukuo Embassy could be kept, Thurnheer made sure that his Japanese staff stayed in touch with its personnel, while he also helped the business men from Switzerland and Manchukuo to travel between both countries for their dealings. In return, Manchukuo’s Japanese authorities proved to take a benevolent stance toward Swiss interests there. Thurnheer reported that “with only one exception, I had so far no complaints from my compatriots, be it travelers, tourists, commercial travelers or Swiss companies.”

---

820 DDS, Bd. 12, Dok. 491, "Le Ministre de Suisse à Tokyo, W. Thurnheer, au Chef du Département politique, G. Motta", December 23, 1938. [ODeTA].
821 Ibid.
A serious setback to Thurnheer’s strategy of benevolent engagement of Manchukuo occurred in 1937, when Switzerland recognized the Italian occupation of Abyssinia and failed to carry out the sanctions against Italy that the League of Nations had mandated. Foreign Minister Naotake Sato, during his short period in office (March–June 1937), complained personally to Thurnheer that Switzerland’s position seemed to lack consistency and that after the Abyssinian case the recognition of Manchukuo should be next on Switzerland’s agenda—not the least because of the interesting commercial opportunities. Thurnheer, although not in favor of a recognition, was quite understanding and sympathetic to the demand. He recommended that his government should wait, until the situation between Japan and China had become less precarious, but as soon as some other countries of the League of Nations accepted Manchukuo, it would be save and wise for Switzerland to do the same. Thurnheer even receive the permission of Foreign Minister Motta to let the Japanese Government informally know of Switzerland’s willingness to recognize Manchukuo under such circumstances. Although Thurnheer never made use of the authorization (by the time he received the green light, the political dynamics in Japan and abroad had shifted) he still thought of the Manchurian region as a lucrative field of investment and requested the Federal Counsel to authorize the establishment of a consulate in Dairen, the most important port

---

822 DDS, Bd. 12, Dok. 72, "Le Ministre de Suissse à Tokyo, W. Thurnheer, au Président de la Confédération, G. Motta", May 10, 1937.
city on the Asian mainland (Kwantung Leased Territory) for commerce with Manchukuo. This was granted and the consulate started operations in 1939.824 It is difficult to say how large exactly the economic interest of Switzerland in Manchukuo was. On the one hand, we cannot exclude the possibility of private Swiss investments in the Japanese forced industrialization boom of the 1930s. But because Switzerland never recognized the country it also does not figure in the official statistics.825 It is mentioned for the first time in the *Annual Statistical Yearbook* of 1937 as a footnote to the section heading of ‘China’ to indicate that export numbers include those for Manchukuo.826 In the same year trade with China recovered from 8.8 million CHF to 20.6 and in the following year even soared to pre-crisis levels of 30 million CHF. However, 1937 and 1938 were also the time when exports to Manchukuo fell drastically. Between 1934 and 1936 Switzerland imported goods between 6 and 8 million CHF while exporting for roughly 8–9 million CHF to Manchukuo. In 1937 those numbers fell to 1.7 and 2.7 million CHF and in 1938 to 1.75 and 2.5 million CHF. The reason for that was the heavy-handed currency restrictions imposed by the Japanese controlled Manchurian authorities after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese war to restructure trade to the needs of the war economy.827 The opening of the consulate in Dairen in 1939 therefore came at a moment when trade with China was picking up and that with Manchukuo all but collapsed. However, it is important to note that the

---

824 CH-BAR ONLINE, Geschäftsberichte des Bundesrates, 50000297, "Bericht des Schweizerischen Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über seine Geschäftsführung im Jahre 1939", 1940, 81.
825 The few numbers available are those recorded and preserved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
827 DDS, Bd. 13, Dok. 221, "Le Consul général de Suisse à Shanghai, E. Fontanel, au Directeur de la Division du Commerce du Département de l'Economie publique, J. Hotz", December 29, 1939.
decision to invest into a consulate and unofficial contacts to Manchukuo’s statesmen was not made for petty calculations of current economic value. Thurnheer, made it quite clear that Manchukuo carried foremost a potential strategic value for the years to come:

Whatever the future political fortunes of Manchukuo will be, the development to a modern economic area that was initiated six years ago will continue even if it is being interrupted temporarily. That is in accordance not only to the needs of the country itself, but also to surrounding countries and even those further away. It will be a natural aspiration of Switzerland to take part in the development of the newly opened agrarian lands. The experiences in other parts of the world teach us that this must be accomplished with the necessary precaution and far-sightedness. Japan will doubtlessly save the lions share for itself but even so there will remain an interesting field of action for third states and thereby for us.828

All in all, the Swiss position toward Manchukuo displayed a high willingness for strategic relations with Imperial Japan and (for economic reasons) to give-in to demands about the status of Manchukuo. This is not particularly surprising in the light of the above discussion (see chapter 2-2-3). Switzerland, by 1937, had already given up its stance on differential neutrality. Although still a member of the League of Nations, it did not feel strictly bound to their decisions on sanctions and other collective actions anymore. It was in this context that Thurnheer sympathized with the Japanese position and looked favorably at a recognition of Manchukuo—something that albeit never happened.

828 DDS, "Le Ministre de Suisse à Tokyo, W. Thurnheer, au Chef du Département politique, G. Motta", December 23, 1938, [ODeTA].
5-2-2. *Trade Relations with Mainland Japan*

Not all Japanese officials were as forthcoming as Hirota or Sato. Shigeru Yoshida (who would become Japan’s most influential post-war prime minister) was made Japan’s Ambassador to the U.K. in 1936. Before departing for London, he told Thurnheer that “Japan is not in the League of Nations, because Mr. Motta did not want that.” Motta honored this comment with a handwritten exclamation mark on Thurnheer’s report.829 But that was all to it. The bitter standoff between the small states and Japan in 1933 had left its mark on Swiss-Japanese relations literally only on the margins. When it came to issues of real importance—like trade—there was hardly any spill-over effect. For the year before the world financial crisis, 1928 the main trading categories were the following:830

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports 1928</th>
<th>CHF (million)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Exports 1928</th>
<th>CHF (million)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silk</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>Machines*</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Textiles</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Watches</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Three Main Import Categories from Japan 1928

Table 12: Three Main Export Categories to Japan 1938

Although the 1930s started with a drastic reduction of trade between Switzerland and Japan, that had little to do with diplomatic developments. The reason for the change was the negative economic spiral that impacted both countries during the crisis years. Switzerland’s main exports of watches and precision machines did not sell anymore in Japan because the domestic production of textile commodities that they were used for

* Includes metals and instruments.
had to scale back in reply to decreased demand in Japanese fabricated textiles abroad. The below graph shows the reduction of trade between the two nations in the early 1930s. Exports to Japan collapsed by 70% and imports by 50%.

The economic crisis was the reason for the reduction in trade, not the diplomatic grievances. On the contrary, the worst year for Swiss–Japanese diplomatic relations, 1933, was also the year in which the economic downturn between them finally came to a halt. Five years later trade numbers had recovered almost to the point of pre-crisis levels with the only permanent casualty being watch exports. They fell to below 2 million CHF even in the strongest year for Swiss exports, 1938, and never regained their dominant position. On the other hand, precision instruments and machines were sold again to Japan in large quantities until the latter’s restructuring of its economy after the second Sino-Japanese war started.

---

Although the trade balance stayed positive for the Swiss during the whole time of the 1930s some sectors saw a radical change, especially the trade of cotton fabrics. Before WWI, Switzerland exported cotton garments in large quantities, but by 1935 Japan had become so industrialized and skilled in manufacturing clothing that it rivaled Swiss production. Suddenly, Switzerland started importing more fabric from Japan than it exported. \(^{832}\) Even worse for Swiss producers, Japanese competition started to rival Swiss textile goods on world markets to the point that officials deliberated protectionist moves to safeguard the industry. Albert Masnata, the director of the Swiss office of trade expansion, wrote in 1934:

> We obviously do not have the means which for example Great Britain possesses to protect the markets which, politically or economically, depend on her. But the sense of our weakness in international politics should not hinder us to intervene actively and in all places where we think of it as necessary. (...) Japan constitutes for us a relatively important client (10 millions Swiss Francs in 1933) but, on the other hand, these exports to Japan lose at the moment in importance. Which means, that the trade

---

\(^{832}\) Nanchen, "Relations diplomatiques et économique entre la Suisse et le Japon durant la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale," 550-64.

* Includes metals and instruments.

** There exists a discrepancy between the numbers reported for imports of silk between the official Statistical Yearbook of 1938 and the numbers reported above, taken from the accounts of former Ambassador Jean de Rahm in *Nippon-Helvetia 1864-1964*. The Statistical Yearbook reports 5.9 million CHF of raw silk imports. It is possible that De Rahm mistakenly subsumed these numbers under the cited “Other Textiles” section, as no such category appears in the Statistical Yearbook. The 0.3 million CHF of silk imports in the table might refer to products made of silk instead of raw silk. However, the actual reasons for the discrepancy are unknown. The Total of 12 million CHF of imports in 1938 are identical between both sources.
balance with Japan, which is still favorable for us, could cease at some point to be an absolute hindrance to a participation in measures to really compensate us on other markets. (...) We can still stay ahead of this fearsome adversary by specialization and quality but quality alone will not suffice as a means of dense. We will probably have to be helped by commercial policies.  

Protectionist debates on the costs and benefits of tools like trade subsidies or import restrictions were held in the wake of the general economic downturn, heralded by the application of a Federal Council decree to limit imports and “promulgate economic measures against foreign countries.” Japan was not the primary target of these policies but politicians asked the question all the same whether restrictions against Japan might not benefit the Swiss economy? Or was the Japanese market too important to antagonize? In the end, no measures were imposed although the domestic textile industry suffered. Japan remained a large enough customer to the Swiss that the Government did not want to risk retaliation over unilateral restrictions. Battling Japan for percentage points in export shares to third markets was a concern of business people, but not the focus of the government.

---

834 CH-BAR ONLINE, "Beschlussprotokoll(-e) 10.02.-11.02.1933", February 10, 1933. [ODeTA].
5-3. The Impact of the Second Sino-Japanese War: Relations 1937–1941

With the next stage of the armed conflict in China the nature of Swiss-Japanese relationships changed. It was a period of transition in the commercial affairs of the two countries which Camille Gorgé, the successor of Thurnheer, called “the dusk of Japanese economic liberalism.”

5-3-1. Business as (Un)usual—Swiss-Japanese Relations until Late 1941

In 1937, Japan reorganized the trade relation with Switzerland based on the need of its war in China, replacing the import of luxury articles with military goods and machinery. At the same time, Japan also started measures to control imports and capital to reduce the growing deficit of its trade balance. Authorities directed the Japanese economy according to the country’s war efforts to support the increased costs of military campaigns, or how the legation report of 1939 put it: “Even more than during the course

---

of the last year, Japan reserved the availability of foreign currency for the purchase of materials and products of which it has an urgent need. That excluded even more severely the import of products considered «not necessary and not urgent» among which watches, perfumes and certain culinary specialties and pharmaceuticals figure.  

Urgency and necessity had from 1937 onward become the guiding principles of Japanese trade policy. That Swiss export numbers for 1938 were still high was mainly due to large quantities of aluminum and arms transported to Japan, but Switzerland’s normal exports were already falling rapidly. Watch sales, for example, could not bounce back to pre-crisis levels; time-tracking was just not important enough an issue to merit the consent of Japan’s new military leadership to be invested in.  

When the new Swiss Minister to Japan, Camille Gorgé, arrived in Tokyo in early 1940, the largest issue to be handled was that of commerce. In relative terms, however, Switzerland still belonged to the more fortunate trading partners of Japan. The legation report for the year 1939 had the following to say about the situation:

The legation took particularly care of examining how Japan treated exports that were destined to countries that compete with ours. There was no occasion for us to intervene in this respect because, as far as our calculations reveal, the quantities that were admitted for Swiss products were, in all groups, relatively more important than those which were imported from our competitors. In this sense, we were treated in a privileged way even though we had to register a decline in total numbers.

837 Ibid., 13-14.
838 Ibid., 14. [OFrTA].
That was only little consolation, however, because the trend was negative and Gorgè’s arrival did not change the outlook. The report of the next year bears witness to the deteriorating situation:

More and more did Japan in this year [1940] transition from foreign trade controls to a centrally planned state economy. The continuously increasing needs of the Japanese war economy and the currency shortage had as a result that import and currency permits were only granted for urgently necessary goods. In the Japanese understanding that is war materials and goods that the war industry required.839

The Empire’s policy to reduce the trade deficit extended all the way to Manchukuo, leading to the above (chapter 5-2-1) described crippling of commercial activities between Switzerland and the puppet state. The policies of the Japanese authorities were straightforward; imports to Manchukuo needed to be compensated by equivalent export purchases to keep the trade balance positive. Unlike Sweden which had a long history of soybean imports and had developed a small industry around Manchukuo’s number one produce, the Swiss imported almost none of it. They knew so little about what soybean could be used for, that the Consul General in Shanghai needed to add an explanatory note to his report describing the nutritional benefits of the bean.840

A rare opportunity to change the commercial fortunes with Manchukuo presented itself with the beginning of WWII in Europe. Germany, Manchukuo’s main European trading partner, was suddenly cut off from the commercial routes with the Asian continent. Halve a million ton of soybean would not reach the Reich anymore and on the other hand much needed machinery for Manchukuo’s industrial development was stuck in

---

839 Ibid.; CH-BAR, E2400#1000/717#966*, "Geschäftsbericht der Schweizerischen Gesandtschaft in Japan für das Jahr 1940", 1940. [ODeTA].
Germany. Emil Fontanel, the Consul General to Shanghai recommended that Switzerland try to fill the gap by negotiating an exchange agreement with the Japanese of Manchurian soybean for Swiss industrial machines. However, the proposal was not taken up by the Swiss Political Department. Trade with Manchukuo decreased between 1936 and 1940 to a few million CHF only so suffer even more during the following period of total war after Pearl Harbor.

The situation was not much better for Swiss companies on the mainland. On the one hand, Japanese import and currency restrictions became a major obstacle for Swiss merchant houses but by the end of 1940 the largest problem for trade was the worsening transport situation. “The legation has paid fullest attention also to this question. In collaboration with the Shanghai office and the Center for Commerce it has been informing Swiss companies located in Japan about all shipment possibilities to Europe, freight rates, etc.” The legation also frequently started to intervene on behalf of Swiss companies outside of Japan when the new trade practices menaced Swiss interests in the Japanese controlled territories. The important trade of raw silk in central China, for example, “had become subject to strict controls. A Japanese corporation was formed that alone had the right to issue transportation permits for raw silk to Shanghai and allocate it to export companies. Because this corporation considered mainly Japanese companies, Swiss exporters were heavily disadvantaged in their business.” By 1940, the legation’s interventions on economic issues had barely any effect anymore.

---

841 Ibid.
842 CH-BAR, "Geschäftsbericht der Schweizerischen Gesandtschaft in Japan für das Jahr 1940", 1940, 13. [ODeTA].
843 Ibid., 16. [ODeTA].
On the other hand, the winners of the transition on the Swiss side was the weapons industry. In 1939 alone, Switzerland exported war material for a total of 9.6 million CHF to Japan. That made it the third most important client for these goods right after the Netherlands (16.6 million CHF) and France (15.5 million CHF) and meant that two thirds of Switzerland’s exports to Japan had become armaments.844 Japan was eager to import all kinds of weaponry from Switzerland but had to proceed tacitly to secure the necessary funds in Swiss Francs, including the help of third parties. In a note from the Swiss National Bank (SNB) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the SNB tried to draw the attention of the Ministry to a shady deal that seemed to be in progress. A German national of the name ‘Dr. Hacke’ had requested a commercial loan of 150 million CHF in the name of Japan from the Swiss Credit Institute. The money, he held, would be used for the purchase of Swiss machinery but also war materials. Because the doctor did not appear to be very trustworthy, the Credit Institute ignored the request.845 What neither the Credit Institute nor the SNB knew was that this episode was the first contact between Swiss authorities and Dr. Friedrich Wilhelm Hack (not ‘Hacke’), one of the most important civilian middle men for the Germans and the Japanese with very high ranking connections on both sides.846 He was an old friend of Major General Hiroshi Oshima (who later became Japan’s ambassador to Germany) and also an acquaintance and agent of Joachim von Ribbentrop, Hitler’s Foreign Minister during WWII. In 1936 Hack acted as a crucial mediator for the two, helping to conclude the Anti-Comintern

845 DDS, Bd. 13, Dok. 32, "La Direction Générale de la Banque Nationale à la Division des Affaires Étrangères du Département Politique", Bericht bezüglich Dr. Hacke, 1939.
Pact for which he received an order by Emperor Hirohito. However, a few months later he broke with the Nazi regime and was jailed for several months. Hack subsequently emigrated to Switzerland in 1938 where he became an important figure for peace-feelers at the end of the war (see 5-5-2). In the meantime, Hack used his connections and talents to help Japan acquire military armament made in Switzerland. He could be called a ‘track two’ diplomat for the Japanese Empire. His request for a 150 million CHF loan by the Swiss Credit Institute to purchase weapons and machinery was therefore certainly founded on serious Japanese interest, probably from his connections in Japanese navy circles. When it became clear that the Swiss Credit Institute would not extend its help to the uncertain business, a second Japanese request followed a few months later in early 1940, this time through official diplomatic channels to the Swiss Overseas-Trade Cooperation (Übersee-Handels A.G.). The approach was carried out by Japanese diplomats who requested machinery worth 50 million CHF and the start of negotiations for the financing of these materials, preferably by compensation through imports of equal value from Japan or Manchukuo. Also this second initiative by Japan did not come to fruition. It is unclear how much Swiss-Japanese trade after 1939 was helped by Dr. Hack or how much of Switzerland’s exports in the early 1940s was weaponry. The available trade statistics for the years of the Second World War are much reduced and incomplete. It is not impossible that the suspicious hike in the export

---

848 DDS, "La Direction Générale de la Banque Nationale à la Division des Affaires Étrangères du Département Politique", Bericht bezüglich Dr. Hacke, 1939.
statistics for 1942 (a sudden increase to more than 22 million CHF) represents a late partial success of the Japanese efforts to obtain weapons from Switzerland.\textsuperscript{849}

5-3-2. \textit{The Swiss Minister to Japan}

On July 27, 1939, with the European continent at the brink of another war, Switzerland’s Federal Council named a replacement for Minister Thurnheer who had been serving the Confederation for four years in Tokyo and was reposted to London. For Japan, Berne chose a man who had applied for the job in a passionate letter and possessed credentials for it like no other; the career diplomat Camille Gorgé.\textsuperscript{850} In stark contrast to the little information available about Widar Bagge, the Swedish Minister to Japan, there are many sources on Camille Gorgé. Most importantly, Gorgé left nearly 600 pages of writing on his time as Minister to Tokyo in the form of an unpublished diary.\textsuperscript{851} Beyond this highly personal account, Gorgé also published several political, legal, and poetic works as monographs and frequently published essays or book chapters.\textsuperscript{852} The Swiss National Archives hold the diplomatic correspondence of Gorgé,

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{849} See on this: Humbert, "Les relations diplomatiques entre la Suisse et le Japon durant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale - La Légation et la colonie helvétiques dans l’Empire du Soleil Levant," 115-16. It is certain that war material exports for Bührle & Co constituted at least a good part of the 22 million CHF worth of goods exported to Japan in 1942. However, the precise numbers are unknown.
\textsuperscript{850} Ibid., 48.
\textsuperscript{851} The ‘diary’ was, however, written only after the events happened, around 1953. Its accounts therefore need to be read with a pinch of salt and cannot stand as an unbiased eyewitness account. Gorgé reconstructed his five years in Japan with the help of many of his reports and notes. His diary with its valuable descriptions and insights is currently the subject of a research project under the collaboration of the University of Fribourg, UniDistance and the Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland. An annotated but condensed version of Gorgé’s diary is due for publication in French in the latter half of 2018.
\end{flushleft}
the telegrams, letters, and reports that were sent from and to Tokyo and some of the most important papers were digitized and are now available online through the Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland.853

Gorgé854 was born on September 26, 1893 in the French speaking rural village of Bassecourt in the canton of Jura. He studied at the Universities of Leipzig (1912–1913) and Geneva (1913–1916) where he obtained a degree in Jurisprudence in 1916. The following year Gorgé entered government service, joining the Department of Economic Affairs and, in 1918, he changed to the Political Department (PD), Switzerland’s Foreign Ministry. In 1920, Gorgé was assigned to the newly created section responsible for Switzerland’s diplomacy at the League of Nations. There he made the acquaintance of Inazo Nitobe, one of Japan’s foremost internationalist thinkers. The young Gorgé must have made a positive impression on the veteran statesman because he recommended the young Gorgé to his home office, the Gaimusho, as a legal advisor.855 Gorgé was accepted in Tokyo and received a three-year leave of absence from the Political Department to serve the Gaimusho between 1924 and 1927. Gorgé later attributed his sincere affection for Japan to this earlier experience in Tokyo. “I am, in fact, one of those who can’t but love this country and this sentiment has lived in me since 1924 (…).”856 During these formative years Gorgé worked alongside young Japanese diplomats of whom some would become important figures in the Gaimusho

855 Dodis.ch
856 Ibid., 2. [OFrTA].

359
fifteen years later when he returned as Switzerland’s minister, among others Kaname
Wakasugi, later a special aide to the Nomura Mission to Washington and Shigenori
Togo the Foreign Minister at the beginning and the end of Japan’s war with the United
States.\footnote{Ibid. Entry October 24, 1941.}

Gorgé returned to his old post in Switzerland in 1927 were, a year later, he became the
chief (first class) of the League of Nations Section at the PD. As such he worked closely
with Foreign Minister Motta during the crucial years of the early 1930s when his former
employer antagonized the League over the developments in Manchuria. In the cases of
Japan and Italy, Gorgé both times defended the view that Switzerland needed to protect
the League’s principles of collective security even if that meant economic and
diplomatic costs for Switzerland.\footnote{DDS, Bd. 11, Dok. 152, "La Suisse et le conflit italo-éthiopien", 1935.}

His position was not shared by many colleagues but was much in line with that of Minister Motta whom Gorgé held in high esteem. When
the long-serving Foreign Minister (1920–1940) unexpectedly passed away in office at
the age of sixty-eight, only a few days after Gorgé had departed for his new position in
Tokyo, he wrote about Motta that “a great Swiss, maybe even the greatest of all, has
left.”\footnote{GORGÉ DIARY, "Debacle au Soleil-Levant: Journal d’un Témoin", 1939–1945, Entry January 24, 1940. [OFrTA].}
Gorgé left Switzerland together with his wife, Rose, in early January 1940 to travel on commercial liners from Naples via Lisbon to New York. There they boarded a train to San Francisco to continue the voyage by ship to Honolulu, reaching Yokohama on February 15.

A month later, on March 5, Gorgé was accredited by Emperor Hirohito. The ceremonial meeting with the sovereign of Japan impressed Gorgé strongly—“a day that will count

in my life”861—but he was much less impressed with the militaristic changes that the country had been going through during the past thirteen years. Although the War in the Pacific would not start until almost two years later, Gorgé experienced the international environment in Tokyo already as hostile: “My first Japan was dead. Well dead. The militarists have imprinted it with a new soul. It became hard, inhospitable, arrogant, almost mean.”862 Xenophobia and the fear of foreigners committing acts of espionage were rampant. On the other hand, Gorgé did not paint all Japanese with the same brush. He understood the disparities within the circles of power and that decisions were not made by those most exposed to high politics. About Prince Fumimaro Konoe, who became prime minister on July 22, 1940, he had to say the following:

[He is] a figure that could barely be further from the type of a Hitler or a Mussolini. Seldom there is a man less talkative, less of a poser and less inclined to watch himself in the mirror (...) than this aristocrat of Nippon. He is rather soft, calm, disillusioned, resembling much a mandarin-chines philosopher. It is true that you would never think of him as the “Führer” of Japan. The “Führer” if one should be needed, that’s the emperor. At least by law. In reality, the “Führer” is already there. A “Führer” with fifty or a hundred heads: The generals, the military camarilla, the worst of dictators, those with anonymous responsibility. Those who can commit all crimes because they don’t have to sign them.863

But also among the military representatives Gorgé found men whom he full-heartedly wished well in their endeavors to rain-in Japan’s expansionism. About Admiral Teijiro Toyoda, who took over the Gaimusho after Foreign Minister Matsuoka’s downfall, he reported, for example, to his government that “I was received yesterday at 6.45pm by

861 GORGÉ DIARY, "Debacle au Soleil-Levant: Journal d’un Témoin", 1939–1945, Entry March 5, 1940. [OFrTA].
862 Gorgé, "Les trois Japon," 104. [OFrTA].
the new Minister of Foreign Affairs. It is impossible to meet a man more pleasant, more hospitable and more modest. One is immediately under the charm of his smiling goodwill.”864

It was a rare occasion, however, that Gorgé talked well about the military. Throughout the five years of his service, the military clique had always been the largest dangers to him, to his staff, and to the other diplomats in Tokyo. Among them, the Kempeitai, the Military Police, was without doubt the most obnoxious institution. “The police are making us more and more difficulties. (…) Japan is generally hated among the diplomatic corps. That is true to the point that in the diplomatic environment, no one could express anything at a high and understandable voice without the authorities and institutions thinking of indiscretions, even among the Germans and Italians. (…) The police do whatever they please, and nobody can speak up against that. Not even the representative of a country explicitly a friend.”865 Especially after the outbreak of the war with the Allied Forces, most breeches of diplomatic custom were committed by the Kempeitai. Although the Gaimusho sometimes intervened on behalf of foreign diplomats, they did not always succeed in altering the behavior of the military. The most dramatic incident to the Swiss was the murder of one of Gorgé’s staff, Robert Bossert (see chapter 5-4-4).

865 GORGÉ DIARY, "Debacle au Soleil-Levant: Journal d'un Témoin", 1939–1945, Entry July 19, 1943. See also ibid., Entry June 5, 1942.
After the outbreak of the Pacific War Gorgé was in frequent contact with the heads of the missions for whose protection he was responsible. As such he earned himself a place in their memoirs. Robert Craigie, the British Ambassador, who became one of Gorgé’s protégés after Britain changed their representation from Argentina to Switzerland wrote about Gorgé that:

As Representative of the Power charged with the protection of American interests he [Gorgé] had already set up an efficient organization, having as assistants a number of keen, public-spirited Swiss residents in Japan who

---

had volunteered for the work. Expanding this organization to cope with our affairs, Monsieur Gorgé now threw himself into his new work with his usual zest and efficiency. He tackled firmly some of the outstanding problems and he and his assistants could not have worked harder during those hot summer months had they been engaged in protecting Swiss nationals and Swiss interests.867

Joseph Grew, the U.S. Ambassador had similar memories of Gorgé. Although he had originally requested Brazil or Argentina868 as protecting Power he was clearly not unhappy with his government’s choice of Switzerland: “The Swiss Minister again. (…) We could not possibly have a better person looking after our interests; he has a keen perception of the situation and a business-man’s approach, forceful while exercising great care not to compromise his usefulness by any improprieties or unorthodox procedure.”869 Gorgé won a reputation for due diligence in his work and dedication to the tasks he had to fulfill.

5-3-3. The Swiss Mission

Gorgé became the head of a small but well-staffed mission. He had the same number of diplomatic aides as the Swedish and the Spanish Ministers but unlike their cases, the Swiss also employed four office support staff. Together, the seven-people strong legation was responsible for the largest expat community of the three countries in this study. 253 Swiss nationals were registered with the legation in 1940.870

867 Craigie, Behind the Japanese Mask, 149.
868 Grew, Ten Years in Japan, 427.
869 Ibid., 441.
870 CH-BAR, "Geschäftsbericht der Schweizerischen Gesandtschaft in Japan für das Jahr 1940", 1940, 8.
Even before Gorgé’s arrival, the largest organizational impediment to the work of the Swiss mission had been the lack of a consular representation anywhere on the Japanese mainland. The honorary consulate in Dairen (Kwantung Leased Territory) had only been added a year earlier and served the connection for trade with the Japanese occupied part of Asia, it had nothing to do with the Japanese mainland per se. Whereas Sweden operated four honorary consulates on Honshu and Kyushu, the Swiss had none. That was especially problematic to the large Swiss colony in Kanzai. It meant, on the one hand, that all legal affairs for the port cities of Kobe and Osaka had to be run through Tokyo (which was troublesome) but also that no diplomatic agent was present outside the larger Tokyo area to help Swiss nationals in case of legal disputes with Japanese authorities. In view of the worsening treatment of foreign nationals Gorgé thought of this as a threat to the security of his colony and tried to convince the PD in

---

871 Until July 22, 1940 the position was occupied by Julien Rossat. See: ibid., 2.
1940 to agree to the financing of an additional honorary consulate in Kobe. To Gorgé, the necessity for a consulate in Kobe was self-evident:

Switzerland is a country that lives essentially of its exports. She has bits of interests everywhere and these interests must be protected. The best means to protect them that we have found so far is to possess diplomatic missions in a certain number of capitals and consular representations in commercial centers where, in our eyes, interests are manifested by the presence of a Swiss colony or by the number of [business] affairs, or by both at the same time. A consulate protects equally well the interest of the colony and that of our commerce.872

In this short extract Gorgé spells out one of the key concepts of Switzerland’s global diplomacy: Economic benefit necessitates physical presence of the state. Legations and consulates were the outlets of Switzerland’s strategy of economic involvement that served the nation. They needed to be spread, protected, and nourished to form a network which would allow the small trading nation to prosper. The Swiss living and working abroad in those areas were essential to the success of that strategy.

Although the Kanzai area with its rich port cities had doubtlessly the importance that justified the consulate, there were several stakeholders to convince. On the one hand, the designated Honorary Consul, Maurice Champoud, the local director of the Nestlé corporation had to be won-over because his boss, the U.S. based Edouard Muller, was initially not willing to have his employee spend two days a week for consular work. To convince the latter, Gorgé framed the situation as a patriotic act of a Swiss citizen and

---

his service as a duty not only to the Swiss living in Kobe but to the Grand Strategy of
the nation as a whole. 873

Gorgé got annoyed when he met with critical questions about the necessity of an
Honorary Consulate from the most unexpected of all places; from the Swiss community
in Kansai. His reaction was as blunt as a diplomat could get: “Rather than questioned, it
seems to me, I should be thanked. But I don’t ask for that because I did not have any
other merit in this affair than having added one more means of protecting our position in
Japan. And that was strictly my duty.” 874 Here again, Gorgé framed the case as an issue
of national importance to defend Swiss interests abroad by connecting the community
of compatriots more closely with the diplomatic service. He succeeded eventually,
enabling Champoud to take up the office as an Honorary Consul in January 1941. It was
the last such effort that came to fruition. A similar request a year later, after the
outbreak of the War in the Pacific, to establish another consulate in Yokohama, was
rejected by the Japanese authorities. The Gaimusho, by that time, changed its policy,
disallowing the extension of foreign access to its strategically important port cities
probably because of fears of spying activities. 875

A major administrative question was where the legation should be housed in the future
because the rental contract with the current landlord was expiring and suitable premises
in the Tokyo were rare. 876 Beyond such administrative issues, the Minister traveled to
Yokohama and Kobe to get acquainted with the local Swiss colonies. He also crossed

873 Humbert, "Les relations diplomatiques entre la Suisse et le Japon durant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale -
875 Humbert, "Les relations diplomatiques entre la Suisse et le Japon durant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale -
876 On this issue, see ibid., 32-38.
the Japanese see to visit the consulate in Dairen where he noticed the desolate economic situation of the city. “What can you do, the port is dying. Nothing is being imported anymore and what’s being exported is only little.”\(^{877}\) Commerce was at its lowest, leaving also the business of Félix Bryner, the Honorary Consul, and his brother in bad shape.

That does not mean that the Swiss mission did not grow anymore. On the contrary, by the end of 1944, the high time of the Japanese-U.S. war, the legation counted fifty-three employees and that did not include Mr. Bryner in Dairen nor Mr. Champoud in Kobe or his five assistants.\(^{878}\) The majority of the new employees were non-diplomatic office staff (see below) but the legation also grew in diplomatic personnel. In July 1942, Pierre-René Micheli joined Gorgé’s mission from Batavia (Jakarta) were he had acted as Consul until the Japanese invasion. He was named First Secretary of the legation, which made him the right hand of Gorgé. Two more diplomats were sent directly from Switzerland to Japan on board of the Conte Verde, one of the exchange ship that repatriated Japanese diplomats and civilians from the American continent.\(^{879}\) Walter Bossi and Paul Würth both became Attachés of the legation. Even more personnel were brought to Tokyo on the last exchange ship, the ‘Teia Maru’ with which three new Swiss diplomats reached Japan; Erwin Jost, who used to be the Swiss Consul in Rio de Janeiro and accompanied the ship as neutral observer. He joined the legation as Second

\(^{877}\) GORGÉ DIARY, "Debacle au Soleil-Levant: Journal d'un Témoin", 1939–1945, Entry October 31, 1940; CH-BAR ONLINE, "Bericht des Schweizerischen Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über seine Geschäftsführung im Jahre 1939", 1940, 3-5.


Secretary and Gontran Blailé and Rudolf Joss joined the Division of Foreign Interests as Attachés. This meant that the number of Swiss diplomats in Tokyo had more than doubled from three to seven. The reason for the staff increase was the same as for the Swedish legation; with the beginning of Japan’s war against the Allies the legation acquired a whole set of new responsibilities. The next section will report of those.
5-4. **After Pearl Harbor: Relations 1941–1945**

From the legation’s official records and from Gorgé’s personal diary it is unmistakably clear that the beginning of the War in the Pacific changed everything for the Swiss legation and its minister. Although the diplomatic relations between his country and Japan remained exactly as they were before Pearl Harbor, the swath of requests for Switzerland’s Good Office in Tokyo after Pearl Harbor lead to an exponential increase of work for the legation. Gorgé had already been engaged in a small number of representations of foreign interests in 1940 but only to assist the Swiss missions in Australia, New Zealand, and the Dutch East Indies to repatriate German diplomats and civilians when the European war broke out.\(^{880}\) This duty was of minor importance. It did not bind much of the legation’s man power and Japan’s war in China has not had any implications on Gorgé’s legation neither—no representations or services of Good Office were requested on that side of Japan’s war. The outbreak of hostilities with the Allied Forces, on the other hand, was a completely different story.

5-4-1. **Assuming Foreign Interests in Japan**

On the morning of the December 8, 1941, at 11.30 am., Mr. Huddle, the Chargé d’Affaires of the U.S. government in Berne, rushed with an urgent note to the Political Department. It was a one-pager on which the State Department asked the Swiss Government to accept the representation of U.S. interests in Japan and to urgently inform its Minister in Tokyo to help the U.S. diplomats and civilians there. Mr. Huddle held that “most Americans had already left Japan, which means that the interests which

---

\(^{880}\) CH-BAR, "Geschäftsbericht der Schweizerischen Gesandtschaft in Japan für das Jahr 1940", 1940, 23.
would have to be protected are not that considerable anymore.”

That was an understatement. Although the State Department had advised its citizens to leave the Far East, it never did so with urgency in order not to disquiet the Japanese that a war might be immanent. U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, and his peers in Hong Kong, the Straits Settlement, Manila, Batavia and the other Asian hubs with U.S. consulates never issued evacuation orders but only recommendations to leave the area. In May 1941, 15,000 U.S. nationals were still residing in Japan and thousands more in the other concerned areas in the Pacific and on the Mainland. Only few of them could be repatriated before the war broke out. For the others, a dangerous time lay ahead that the State Department sought to ease through Switzerland as its protecting Power.

The Federal Council replied to Huddle on the same day that it would accept the request and that it had already sent instructions to Gorgé to negotiate with the Gaimusho for their consent to represent the U.S. That was, of course, the condition for any work of Swiss Diplomats in Japan on behalf of an enemy nation. Without host country consent, no diplomatic work could be achieved. Gorgé urged Vice Minister Nishi personally that “I am counting on the understanding of the Japanese authorities. After all (…), the war will not last forever, Japan will reconcile with the United States one day. It is better to accept [the representation] than to regret any excess in the future.” The Gaimusho’s

---

881 CH-BAR, "Notenwechsel mit der USA - Gesandschaft betreffend die Uebernahme von USA - Interessen durch die Schweiz", 1941-1945, 65.
882 Corbett, Quiet Passages: The Exchange of Civilians between the United States and Japan during the Second World War, 16-18.
accent to Swiss representation followed on December 14, which enabled Gorgé to visit Ambassador Grew and his staff for the first time the following day.\footnote{There is a discrepancy of one day in the accounts of Gorgé and Grew on this matter. In Grew’s memoirs he recalles Gorgé visiting them on December 14 already. See on this: GORGÉ DIARY, "Debacle au Soleil-Levant: Journal d'un Témoin", 1939–1945, Entry dated December 14, 1941; Grew, Ten Years in Japan, 432.}

Gorgé was a careful negotiator, highly aware of the delicate role as an intermediary between two enemy nations. However, in the first year of the war the diplomatic side was only one aspect that needed to be handled. A problem just as large—if not bigger—was the administrative side of the endeavor:

[A] heavy task, crushing even for my legation, lack of personnel. I often don’t know where to turn my head to. It happens that I dictate a verbal note, hat on my head, and give instructions on the staircase, rushed, because I’m running to the Gaimusho to tend to an urgent matter for which I have a full briefcase. I also have to say that my visits to the American Embassy take a lot of time, even more so because we have to solicit every time a permission from the Ministry of Domestic Affairs, which does not make any effort to make things easier for us.\footnote{GORGÉ DIARY, "Debacle au Soleil-Levant: Journal d'un Témoin", 1939–1945. Entry December 19 1941 [OfrTA].}

By the end of December 1941 Switzerland represented in addition to the U.S. the Eastern Territories of India, South Africa, Cuba, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Egypt. For all of them, the most urgent task was to repatriate their diplomats and as many civilians as possible since all enemy nationals were either put under house arrest or relocated to internment camps. In contrast to the U.S., there were only relatively few citizens of these countries residing in Japan, their representation did therefore not create much more work for the Swiss legation. However, the second largest mandate was yet to come; Great Britain. His Majesty’s Government had not asked Switzerland from the beginning of the Pacific War for the representation...
of their interests. The Foreign Office (FO) decided at first to rely on Argentina. The reasons for the choice do not emanate from the available sources but there is a likelihood that it might have been due to the personal preferences of Robert Craigie, the British Ambassador. He probably had a large say in the decision and might have had similar preferences for Argentinian diplomats, as Joseph Grew had for the South American neutrals.

Whatever the reasons, the Argentinian mandate was not born under a lucky star. Already on December 14, 1941, the British Chargé d’Affaires in Berne let the Swiss know that “due to certain complications that happened in regard to the protection of British interests in Japan by the Government of Argentina, His Majesty’s Government might soon ask the Swiss Government to kindly assume British interests in Japan.”

The request did not follow immediately. However, because Argentina did not have consular representations in Shanghai or Hong Kong (by mid-December 1941, both were under the control of Japan), Britain asked immediately for Switzerland’s services there. Already on December 8, the PD telegraphed to the Swiss Consul in Shanghai that he was authorized to take over British interests for the whole of occupied China and on December 21 that the Consul in Hong Kong should do the same.

The representation of British interests in China, was no surprise to the Swiss. The FO had asked them already half a year earlier, to prepare for this task in case of a war.

---

885 This is the theory of Neville Wylie. [Personal communication on January 7, 2018].
887 Telegrams PD to Consulate Shanghai, dated December 8 1941 and British Legation to PD, dated December 21 1941. In: ibid.
between the Allies and Japan. However, at the moment of need, an unforeseen problem arose; Japan denied any rights of representation to the Swiss in the freshly conquered Hong Kong. Although the Swiss were allowed to become the protecting Power for Britain in Shanghai, the case for Hong Kong was different. The Empire would not tolerate any representation of enemy interests outside of its pre-war borders (to which it counted Korea, Formosa, and Shanghai). The Swiss were clearly not anticipating the Japanese refusal. The PD expressed its bewilderment in a telegram to Gorgé:

[We] always thought it self-evident that representation of interests extends automatically to conquered territories of power toward which it is exercised. For example, during present war, representation of British interests by United States extended gradually to Norway, Netherlands, Northern France, Yugoslavia and Greece. [We] understand well that protection of interests in Hong Kong is impeded momentarily by practical difficulties but principle refusal would be unprecedented and, in our opinion, untenable. Geneva Convention implicitly admits extension of competence of protecting Power to conquered territories.888

Unfortunately, there was little that could be done. Repeated protests by Gorgé in Tokyo and by the Political Department toward the Japanese legation in Berne did not influence the decision of the Japanese authority in Hong Kong about which Gorgé pessimistically wrote that the “Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not respond but the decision [anyway] depends on the Army.”889 The incapacity of the Gaimusho toward the military forces is a recurring theme in the records of the Swiss and was one of the main reasons for the Japanese refusal to accept any protecting Powers in the occupied territories.

In the end, the Gaimusho replied to Gorgé by indicating that it could only allow the protecting Power on the mainland to protect interests in the occupied territories, which

888 Telegram PD to Gorgé, dated January 13, 1942. In: ibid. [OFrTA].
meant that only Argentina, which did not operate a consulate in Hong Kong, would have had the approval to do so.\textsuperscript{890} This Japanese argument might have been one more decisive reason for the Foreign Office to change its protecting Power from Argentina to Switzerland, although it was certainly not the only one. On April 30, 1942, the official British request for Switzerland’s Good Office in the Empire of Japan was sent to Federal Councilor Pilet-Golaz. Swiss newspapers learned about the surprising development on the same day and speculated that the change could be due to the fact that Argentina’s new Minister to Japan had been on the way to Tokyo when the war broke out and found it impossible to actually reach Japan or that it was because Britain chose to consolidate its protection in the Empire of Japan and have it run by the neutral that was also most influential for Red Cross activities.\textsuperscript{891} Ambassador Craigie recalls in his memories that the “main reason for the change was that Switzerland had from the outset been charged with the protection of Japanese interests in Great Britain and of American interests in Japan and it was clearly more convenient that all these analogous duties should be concentrated in the same hands.”\textsuperscript{892} However, one more reason was the sheer lack of capacity on the Argentinian side to cope with the tremendous amount of work. Gorgé wrote in his diary that while he at that point had already more than a dozen people working on the repatriation of the Americans, the “Chargé d’Affaires of Argentina, the honorable Mr. Villa, is alone, all alone in facing a task as crushing as this.

\textsuperscript{890} Note PD to Pilet-Golaz, dated January 29, 1942. In: ibid.
\textsuperscript{892} Craigie, \textit{Behind the Japanese Mask}, 149.
All he did until now fits into a folder which he could skim through on his lap.”893 The Argentinians, although neutral, did not have the capacity in their legation to achieve much progress on the repatriation issue. Not only was the Ambassador absenting from Tokyo (due to unfortunate timing) but apparently the Argentinians also had no possibilities of hiring more personnel to cope with the situation. There was almost nothing in terms of documentation or preparation for repatriation that their embassy could handover to the Swiss legation. The annual report states that “[t]he work had to be restarted from the very beginning. (...) The results that had been reached for U.S. interests were incomparable to those reached for Britain until the day we took over.”894 Another case that points toward the conclusion that Argentina did not have enough personnel in Japan is an anecdote from the Swedish legation. In a letter to its Consul in Kobe the Norwegian national H. M. Albrethson complained that “on the 5th of April I sent in my application for evacuation to The Argentine Consulate, but have nothing heard from them since. At this time, I understand that all the arrangement is made through The Government of Sweden & Switzerland (sic.).”895 Albrethson had waited four months for a reply from the consulate of Argentina in Nagasaki. Swedish Consul Kallin, on the other hand, referred Albertson’s request immediately to the legation in Tokyo and assured the Norwegian in writing that they would take care of his case. The Argentinian consulates had seemingly as little man-power as their legation to deal with

894 CH-BAR ONLINE, Geschäftsberichte des Bundesrates, 50000301, "Bericht des Schweizerischen Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über seine Geschäftsführung im Jahre 1941", 1942. 61. [ODeTA].
the increased workload. This impediment understandably led London to seek for the help of a neutral with more capacity on the ground.

To Gorgé, the new mandate came rather as a blow, he had already been completely absorbed by the duties toward the U.S. and the other states that had solicited Swiss protection. His diary gives a clear idea about the situation:

March 8—The exchange of diplomats is giving us a hard time. Number of difficulties arise and crystalize around certain repatriations. Tough job, certainly ungrateful. Ten lines of telegram to Berne, ten hours of discussion in Tokyo. (...).

March 17—The more or less close repatriation of diplomats and enemy nationals is giving rise to a considerable exchange of telegrams between my legation and the Political Department in Berne, which transmits them to the U.S. legation. A bunch of questions are open that need to be resolved with the consent of the American and the Japanese Governments.  

In this situation, receiving the additional charge for the protection and immediate repatriation of the second largest belligerent of the war was a heavy additional duty and the Political Department new it. It cabled to Gorgé in almost apologetic words that “despite the great additional burden on you resulting of this, we cannot not accept [emphasis added]” the request of the British Government. The double negative in the telegram bears witness to the mindset of the PD that requests of all friendly nations for help on their belligerent’s soil had to be accepted.

---

5-4-2. The Impact of Japan on the Division of Foreign Interests

To cope with the increasing demand from newly belligerent states for Switzerland’s Good Offices, the Federal Council created the Division of Foreign Interests on September 8, 1939. The Division answered directly to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and was not part of one of the other sections of the PD. Its first director was the former Swiss Minister to Japan Charles Lardy who, however, died unexpectedly in October 1939. The division was subsequently headed first by Hans Fehr and 1940–1945 by Arthur de Purry, former Minister to the Netherlands.

Regarding Switzerland’s willingness to accept new mandates of Good Office, the final report of the Division of Foreign Interests stressed that the PD sought, whenever possible, to reply positively to any request for Swiss help in diplomatic affairs by any belligerent. The only exceptions when the PD denied representations was when Switzerland did not have a legation or a consulate of its own in the territory in question, or when the direct communication with either belligerent side was not possible. The default answer of the Swiss was almost always a ‘yes,’ even when there were valid reasons not to extend a helping hand. This point will become even clearer with the episode of Switzerland taking over Japanese interests from Spain after they renounced their mandates in April 1945 (see chapter 5-5-1). All in all, the PD interpreted the representation of foreign interests as one of the duties of neutrality. Pierre Bonna, head

---

898 Based on the extraordinary legislative powers that parliament had vested in it on August 30.
899 The most extraordinary moment when Switzerland needed to decline a representation request was the last one of the war coming from Japan on November 1, 1945. The Gaimusho asked the PD to represent Japanese interests in the neutral states of Afghanistan, Ireland, Portugal and Sweden. However, the occupation of Japan had by that time already begun and General Mac Arthur’s General Head Quarter forbid any contact between the Japanese and Foreign Governments, including the Swiss. With the prospect of not being able to contact its client in Tokyo, Berne declined.
of the Division of Foreign Affairs⁹⁰¹ expressed that view in a report to his boss, Minister Pilet-Golaz, a month later when he wrote that “[t]he special nature and the permanent character of the internationally recognized Swiss neutrality brought frequently with it the entrustment of the honorable burden of protecting Power.”⁹⁰² The final report of the Division of Foreign Interests is even more explicit.

It may be felt as a particular satisfaction that Switzerland, not at least because of its permanent neutrality—which is in the interest of all nations, could claim the privilege of having been favored by belligerents as [their] protecting Power.⁹⁰³

The paragraph illustrates the mindset of the PD that although rendering services of Good Office were a burden, they were also an honor. The basic attitude of the Swiss was therefore to accept all mandates and, if necessary, to prepare for eventual future requests. This had nothing to do with Japan per se but it was a secondary effect of the U.S. entry to the war, which created several precedents for the Swiss. On the one hand the U.S. had itself been a protecting Power for British and for other Allied nations until December 1941 and asked Switzerland to take over those mandates. Secondly, the State Department acted with similar precautionary foresight as the British Foreign Office did, by preemptively requesting for Switzerland’s Good Offices in states that had not yet

---

⁹⁰¹ The Division of Foreign Affairs (Division des Affaires Étrangères/Abteilung für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten) was a division of the Political Department, separate from the Division of Foreign Interests (Division des Intérêts Étrangers/Abteilung für Fremde Interessen). It was charged however with the task to handle the initial requests of foreign governments for diplomatic representation through Switzerland. See on this: ibid., 3. [ODeTA].

⁹⁰² Report Bonna to Pilet-Golaz, dated January 23, 1942. In: CH-BAR, "Abteilung für Fremde Interessen: Notiz "financement des intérêts étrangers"; Korrespondenz mit Dr. Stampfli; Räumliche Unterbringung der Abteilung für Fremde Interessen; Dankesaktion von ausländischen Staatsregierungen; Personelles und Notizen; Befreiung vom Militärdienst; Aufgaben und Tätigkeiten der Abteilung für Fremde Interessen", 1941-1944. [ODeTA].

⁹⁰³ DDS, "Rechenschaftsbericht der Abteilung fuer Fremde Interessen des Eidgenössischen Politischen Departementes für die Zeit von September 1939 bis Anfang 1946", January 31, 1946, 70. [ODeTA].
broken relations with the U.S., but which were likely to do so in the future. It is especially noteworthy that in confidential requests of December 1941 the U.S. asked Switzerland to prepare even for their representation in neutral Spain and Turkey. The PD did not have any guidelines for such inquires since usually only concrete requests were dealt with. Foreign Minister Pilet-Golaz in this situation decided that Switzerland would in principle ascend to such wishes and had an instruction sent to all diplomatic missions, urging them to prepare confidentially with their U.S. counterparts for smooth transitions if necessary.

In this regard, the European war which began on September 1, 1939, was the reason the Federal Council founded the Division of Foreign Interests but only the entry of Japan and the U.S. in the war caused the proliferation of protecting Power mandates to which the annual report of the Federal Council for the year 1941 bears witness:

It is no exaggeration to say that the work of the division has increased tenfold because of the assumption of numerous new representations. Especially because they include almost all great Powers. The work to be accomplished by the division was considerable already before December 1941 but it will be much more extensive in the year to come.

The following are just a few examples of the increase of work that the year 1942 induced on the Division: Whereas in 1941 it had handled 3,040 telegrams, a year later it was 17,962. On the side of its employees, in 1941 a total of 57 people was working for

---
904 Both countries never broke relations with the U.S. They turned against Japan in 1944/45 and Turkey even declared war on it in the final days of the war.
906 For details see: DDS, "Rechenschaftsbericht der Abteilung fuer Fremde Interessen des Eidgenoessischen Politischen Departementes fuer die Zeit von September 1939 bis Anfang 1946", January 31, 1946. [ODeTA].
the division (in Switzerland and abroad), but by the end of 1942 it was 460 people. That number would climb to more than 1,200 in 1944. It is therefore justified to say that the War in the Pacific impacted Swiss Diplomacy just as heavily as the war in Europe. The rapid expansion of Switzerland’s diplomatic services (worldwide) was the result.

5-4-3. New Jobs with New People

In fact, the capacity to hire people was the only reason why Camille Gorgé was able to cope with the workload in Tokyo. The relatively large Swiss community of roughly 250 compatriots played a crucial role in that. Since additional personnel from Switzerland reached Japan only through the exchange ships and from nearby Asian territories, the possibility to hire locally was essential for the legation to avoid the same impasse that the Argentinian Embassy suffered. In his memoirs, Gorgé explains that his hiring had a twofold benefit:

My personnel are now made of many compatriots who joined us from Swiss companies over here. Merchants whom we are converting little by little to secretaries of the chancellery. One of them even filled the position of secretary of the legation. The experience with this lucky reinforcement is quite satisfying. Remarkable and precious [is] in particular their knowledge of English. I get them out of unemployment, they get me out of this mess. They don’t owe me anything.

A large number of the new employees was assigned to the newly created Division of Foreign Interests, which, in analogy to the headquarter in Berne, was itself distinct form the rest of the Swiss diplomatic service. Within the first year of the war, twenty-four

---


382
people—among them seven Japanese—were hired to cope with the sixteen protecting
Power mandates. After a tedious nine months of negotiations, the Gaimusho allowed for
the housing of the big section in the vacated Canadian Embassy.\textsuperscript{910} Besides this ‘main
branch’ of the Division of Foreign Interests, Gorgé had Honorary Consul Champoud
and Honorary Vice Consul, Mr. Tillmanns, together with four aids work on Foreign
Interests in Kobe. The Swiss also wanted to open an additional consulate in Yokohama
to care for the many foreigners under their protection there but the Gaimusho did not
allow its establishment, fearing espionage. Instead, the legation received the agreement
for the next best solution, a ‘delegate’ of minister Gorgé was allowed to function as
outpost of the Division of Foreign Interests (without diplomatic status).\textsuperscript{911}
In all of these locations the Division of Foreign Interests became responsible for all
affairs of the nations under their protection with the following five main duties:

1) Care for enemy diplomats
2) Repatriation of diplomats and civilians
3) Protection of the possessions of protected Powers
4) Consular work for citizens of protected Powers
5) Humanitarian assistance for POW and civilians

\textsuperscript{910} Space for the growing number of employees had been an especially tedious issue for the legation in
1942. Although the Swiss represented U.S. and British interests, the Japanese authorities did not allow the
legation to move to their much larger premises even after their diplomats had long been repatriated. They
feared an abuse of the facilities to transmit secret information to the enemy. Although Gorgé would have
preferred the much larger premises of the British or the Americans, he gave his insistence up when he
realized that housing on one of their compounds might affect the Swiss negatively because it would add
to the image among the Japanese Military Police of the Swiss as an ally to the enemy nations. In the end,
the Canadian Embassy offered their buildings free of charge to their Swiss protecting Power, to which the
Gaimusho gave its consent.

\textsuperscript{911} CH-BAR, "Geschäftsbericht der Schweizerischen Gesandtschaft in Japan für das Jahr 1942", 1942, 10.
The first and second responsibility went hand in hand because the diplomatic personnel was imprisoned in their own embassies and needed to be repatriated as soon as possible. Gorgé started visiting his clients as frequently as possible to discuss all aspects of their internment and the evacuation. That included not only Ambassadors Grew and Craigie but also the ministers and consuls of the other nations under his protection. The Minister’s wife, Rose Gorgé, took regular care of the spouses of the diplomats, keeping them company and informing them of the situation. Together, the Gorgé’s made sure that the families of diplomats were treated in accordance with international norms until they could be sent back home.

Repatriations of diplomats used to be a simple affair during the nineteenth century because the provisions of International Law and etiquette among belligerent states provided for the right of emissaries to retain their diplomatic status and privileges until they crossed the border of their former host country. They used to be free to correspond with their governments to organize their own journey back home. WWI change this practice because belligerent started to add demands for letting enemy diplomats go, which in the end led to the practice of exchanges of diplomats instead of the relatively free repatriations. ⁹¹² WWII and the fight for intelligence on enemy affairs only intensified the distrust against diplomats, leading to intense negotiations for reciprocal exchanges that were anything but free. Enemy civilians, POWs, and diplomats alike had become bargaining chips for belligerent negotiations.

This implied for the Swiss that repatriating the U.S. Americans and later the British had to happen on the basis of a reciprocal exchange.913 Although this is seemingly a fair and logical system, historian P. S. Corbett correctly observed that “[r]eciprocity is a two-edged sword (...) any failure on the part of the American government to achieve high standards in its policies towards the Japanese would be met with equivalent reprisals against Americans.”914 Every new restriction or request on one side of the bargain would be met with equivalent demands or unfriendliness on the other, which did not make the job easier for their protecting Powers. Therefore, each technicality had to be negotiated and solved to the equal satisfaction of both sides as, for example, what route the ships should take, under which flag they would sail and even how much luggage passengers were allowed to carry.

Since the U.S. was without doubt the largest mandate for the Swiss, the majority of the planning for an exchange of enemy nationals happened in close contact with the ‘Special Division’ of the State Department on one side and with the Gaimusho on the other.915 Diplomats from other enemy nations were simply added to what had been negotiated between the two principle stakeholders. That was also the case for enemy nationals under the protection of other Powers. The diplomats and civilians under Minister Bagge’s protection were added to the first and second exchange ships

913 For an indepth account on the problems the understanding of “reciprocity” brought for the second and third attempt of exchanges see: Corbett, Quiet Passages: The Exchange of Civilians between the United States and Japan during the Second World War; Elleman, Japanese-American Civilian Prisoner Exchanges and Detention Camps, 1941-45.
914 Corbett, Quiet Passages: The Exchange of Civilians between the United States and Japan during the Second World War, 19.
915 The Special Division was a U.S. Government Agency with roots going back to the time of WWI, charged with the protection of U.S. citizen’s welfare abroad and matters of protecting Power issues when the U.S. was itself still a regular neutral. After the U.S. entered WWII, its ultimate purpose became the repatriation U.S. citizens caught between the battlefields in Europe and Asia.
alongside the main evacuees from the U.S. and the U.K. Minister Méndez de Vigo, who had only a single protégé in Japan, asked Gorgé to include that man—the Paraguayan Consul to Kobe and Osaka, José Chihan—in the first exchange to the American continent. The only other person Méndez de Vigo was responsible for was the Paraguayan Consul in Shanghai, Ernesto Sandreuter, who however refused to be evacuated and did not actually have to leave since he incidentally also held Swiss nationality. The work of the Swiss legation was therefore not complicated a lot by the interactions with the other protecting Powers. If anything, the cooperation of Minister Bagge made the work for Gorgé easier because of the cooperative stance of Widar Bagge who made sure that his ministry left all technical details to Gorgé, despite Sweden being the protecting power for Japan in Hawaii (see chapter 3-4-1).

On the other hand, something that complicated the repatriations of diplomats considerably was that the exchanges had to be used also for the evacuation of civilians. Especially the British and the Americans were keen to bring back home as many of their compatriots as possible. This meant that under the rules of reciprocity a similar number of Japanese nationals needed to return. The resulting problem of what to do when no adequate number could be found and if Japanese citizens abroad, with or without a second nationality, should be forcefully repatriated against their will was the cause of serious legal and humanitarian debates among U.S. agencies.

There were other practical complications in Japan, as, for example, overly protective measures on the part of Japanese authorities. The Military Police subjected Gorgé and

---

917 Corbett, Quiet Passages: The Exchange of Civilians between the United States and Japan during the Second World War, 79-95.
his staff to strict controls for any visit to enemy diplomats. Although Gorgé should have had free and unhindered access to his clients, he had to announce every visit beforehand to the Gaimusho. Even with their consent, the Military Police would still sometimes bar Minister Gorgé from entering the enemy missions. Although the Gaimusho did not approve of such a treatment of the official representative of enemy nationals, they had little influence. As a result, the discussions with the legation chiefs, the ambassadors and ministers, took by far more time than under normal circumstances.918

Secondly, although the bulk of negotiations happened between the ‘main client’ (U.S. or U.K.) and Japan, there were nevertheless important issues of third parties to be solved, for example, the Japanese citizens to be picked up from Latin American countries or the inclusion of Americans and Europeans in the occupied territories. There were also cases of disagreements between the allies themselves on how to proceed best about the exchanges. A serious complication, for example, presented the British request to link the exchange of their nationals with those of the U.S. London’s idea was to jointly press for repatriations with Washington and thereby increase their bargaining power. That was in the end refused by the American side which justifiably feared that such an approach would only further complicate the situation.919 Additionally, certain Japanese diplomats in Washington were also involved in the practical aspects of repatriation, like Ambassador Nomura who drafted lists of individuals to be exchanged that differed from the official lists from Tokyo.920 And—as if that was not enough—the necessary

919 Corbett, Quiet Passages: The Exchange of Civilians between the United States and Japan during the Second World War, 62-64.  
920 Ibid., 66-67.
involvement of two protecting Powers, the Swiss, and the Spanish, created misunderstandings and counterproductive communications.921

All of these issues caused considerable delays in the repatriation process. Negotiations and preparations took until the end of June 1942 when 770 North- and South American diplomats and 1,064 civilians could be exchanged against the same number of Japanese in the Portuguese port of Lorenço-Marques (todays Maputo, Mozambique).922 A few weeks later, on July 30, 1,400 British nationals (mostly) departed from Yokohama to be exchanged also at Lorenço-Marques by the end of August.923 With this, all diplomats had been repatriated but there were thousands of Allied civilians still waiting for an evacuation. For them, it took more than a year to organize the third exchange. Not until September 15, 1943 the second batch of 1,500 U.S. citizens could board the ‘Teia Maru’ to be exchanged in another Portuguese colonial port—this time it was the city of Goa on the eastern side of the Indian sub-continent.

921 Ibid., 98.
922 The final departure of the Asama Maru, the exchange ship, was not guaranteed until the very last moment, even when all passengers had already boarded on June 18 1942, they still had to wait for seven days on board of the ship until the last diplomatic incident had been solved between the U.S. and the Japanese governments. It finally departed in the very early morning hours of June 25.
923 There is a mistake in Gorgé’s diary on this point. He names the port of Goa as the place of exchange for the second ship with the British passengers on board. In reality only the third exchange ship passed through that port in India. The mistake has certainly to do with the fact that Gorgé put his memories on paper only a few years after the war had ended. GORGÉ DIARY, "Débacle au Soleil-Levant: Journal d'un Témoin", 1939–1945. Entry July 30.
Even with that exchange at least 5,000 Americans and about as many British and other enemy nationals still awaited evacuation from Japanese territories, while at least 20,000 Japanese on Allied soil expected the same. To their great disappointment, the third exchange was the last successful repatriation that the protecting Powers were able to organize. Although the negotiations for a next exchange with either the British or the U.S. continued well into 1945, a limit had been reached. The differences between the involved parties were too high to overcome. Corbett concludes that “[t]housands of people were still caught on the wrong side of the Pacific, and the transfer of such people continued well after the war. Though it had been in vain, an incredible amount of

---

924 The ‘Teia Maru’ was the third exchange ship but only the second one with U.S. civilians on it. International Committee of the Red Cross, Guerre 1939-1945. Shanghai. Rapatriement des ressortissants américains sur "Teia Maru", navire japonais de 15000 tonnes. (ICRC Audiovisual Archive, 1943), V-P-HIST-00985-22. ©ICRC
925 Elleman, Japanese-American Civilian Prisoner Exchanges and Detention Camps, 1941-45, 144.
energy had been expended by the State Department, the Special Division, Gorgé, and Keeley [the acting director of the Special Division] to bring about a third exchange.”

Besides repatriations, there were other new duties that the Swiss legation had to fulfill. The most important was overseeing the wellbeing of enemy civilians and prisoners of war that were incarcerated on the Japanese mainland and in the occupied territories. In both cases, Swiss diplomats worked closely together with representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Japan officially respected the authority of the Red Cross because it was a signatory of the Geneva Convention but since it had never ratified the document, Gorgé and his compatriot, Dr. Paravicini, the head of the ICRC in Japan, had no legal ground to base their demands on behalf of prisoners. Therefore, the permission to visit camps had to be obtained in time-consuming bureaucratic processes and they were not always granted. For the times when visits to internment camps were possible, Dr. Paravicini hired two of his compatriots to assist the work of the ICRC and collaborate with the Japanese Red Cross.

---

926 Corbett, Quiet Passages: The Exchange of Civilians between the United States and Japan during the Second World War, 111.
What made matter worse was that the Gaimusho did not inform the Swiss legation about new POW camps or the relocation of existing ones. Visits where only possible if the legation could obtain information on the whereabouts of the camps in the first place. The frustration that this caused the legation is evident from Gorgé’s diary:

December 18—Despite my unending interventions, I cannot obtain the authorization anymore to visit prisoner camps. The silence that hits me from the military is evidently systematic. They don’t want to show anything anymore. The last camps that were visited were those of Formosa. In November, my consul in Kobe, M. Champoud went himself to Tamsui, where he found prisoners of high rank, in particular the ex-commander of Singapore. Not knowing what to reply to me, Minister Suzuki told me the other day: ‘Tell me what camps you desire to visit and we will do the

---

927 From left to right: Mr. Harry C. Angst, Prince Tadashige Shimazu, Mr. M. Pestalozzi and Mr. T. Atsumi. Source: International Committee of the Red Cross, World War II. Tokyo civil internees camp No 2. Visit of the ICRC delegates to internees (ICRC Audiovisual Archive, 1945), V-P-HIST-03185-22A. ©ICRC
The consequence of these obstacles was that Gorgé could inspect only one third of the camps in the Japanese Empire. During the whole period of the War in the Pacific, he visited 11,300 prisoners of war out of a total of 36,000. That was still a considerable amount of work however. During the four years of war, Gorgé intervened more than 1,000 times personally, which included around 400 written appeals. However, he only received 124 responses from the Gaimusho. That shows just how difficult it was for the Swiss to live up to their mandates.

Even worse was the situation for the camps in the occupied territories. Japan did not recognize the Swiss consulates outside its pre-war boundaries except in China. Any official attempt to care for the wellbeing of POWs there had to be organized from Tokyo—a task impossible to fulfill to a satisfactory level. Luckily the Gaimusho did allow the Swiss consulates in the territories to remain operational de facto. This enabled them to have at least limited communication with POWs and the local diplomatic delegates could alert Gorgé who then would lodge official protests in Tokyo. Their objective was at least to obtain medical attention for their protégés and to secure due process in case of transfers of camps. To only mention one example, it was of great concern to the ICRC and Gorgé, that trains, transporting POWs where amply marked

---

929 Nanchen, "Relations diplomatiques et économique entre la Suisse et le Japon durant la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale," 576.
with the mark of the red cross and that transports where announced to the Allied Forces to prevent the accidental bombing of these trains.\textsuperscript{931}

Since Japan recognized only one official ICRC delegate in Japan, Dr. Fritz Paravicini and two more in the over-sees territories, one in Shanghai and one in Hong Kong (all of them Swiss nationals), it was extremely difficult for the ICRC to intervene on the behalf of POWs in South East Asia or China. Repeatedly ICRC members, doctors, and nurses, where amongst the victims of the Japanese armies’ aggressions. On the island of Borneo, an unofficial Swiss representative of the ICRC and his wife where executed together with twenty-four suspected accomplices on charges of espionage for trying to get access to a POW camp. In this light, it is doubtful whether the Swiss legation in Tokyo had any real influence on the work of the ICRC outside mainland Japan.\textsuperscript{932}

\textbf{5-4-4. Protecting Swiss Interests}

The other concern for Gorgé was the traditional duties of the head of a diplomatic mission; the functioning of his legation, the protection of Swiss commercial interests, and the physical well-being of the Swiss community. His staff was impacted mainly by the insufficient space in the legation building, necessitating a new location for its offices.\textsuperscript{933} The other potential problem, the availability of funds for the financing of legation operations, was quickly solved through a clearing system similar to that which

\textsuperscript{931} GORGÉ DIARY, "Debacle au Soleil-Levant: Journal d'un Témoin", 1939–1945.
\textsuperscript{932} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{933} Gorgé’s frustration about the situation is most vividly and undiplomatically explained in a letter of early May 1942: "My house is full to the point of bursting and since December we are working in abominable conditions while the Andrew houses are closed and we are refused the offices in the U.S. Embassy." Quote from: Letter Gorgé to PD, dated May 4 1942. CH-BAR, "Vertretung brittischer, australischer, canadischer, neuseeländischer und südafrikanischer Interessen in Japan und besetztes China, Honkong u. Mandschukuo", 1941-1945.
the Swedish legation negotiated with Japan. The Swiss, in fact, worked-out even two clearing agreements—a unilateral one between its companies and the Political Department, and a bilateral agreement between the Swiss National Bank and the Yokohama Specie Bank. The first ‘private’ clearing agreement was a simple understanding with several Swiss companies that the legation would receive the payments that various Japanese debtors had outstanding with them or for the sales of company property that the legation took charge of. These JPY denominated funds were then used for the legation’s purposes, including the protection of Foreign Interests. On the other side, in Switzerland, the Political Department would transfer corresponding CHF funds to the company headquarters. This agreement had the beneficial effect that considerable sums of money could be repatriated while helping the legation to stay financial afloat.934 The second clearing agreement was a deal struck with the Japanese Ministry of Finance concerning the Swiss National Bank and the Yokohama Specie Bank to clear each other’s accounts under a negotiated exchange rate. This allowed the Swiss legation to pay for its drastically increased expenditures—even after funds that it received from Swiss companies ran out. At the same time, it provided for a channel through which the ICRC could transfer funds to Japan, while Swiss companies also used the channel to bring even more funds back home. On the other hand, the legation did not succeed in including Swiss funds in the Japanese occupied territories (an estimated 36 million CHF), nor did Gorgé receive the approval to include funds from all desired sources in the deal. The provenience of money that was allegeable for transferal was strictly regulated by the agreement. Nevertheless, the clearing system with the

Yokohama Specie Bank proved to be a valuable tool all the same. It was also surprisingly resilient and survived not only the near standstill of trade relations but also the freezing of Japanese assets in Switzerland at the end of the War in September 1945. The agreement only ceased functioning in October 1945, when the American Treasury Department forbade further transfers of funds out of Japan.935

On the other hand, there were a few Swiss internal matters for Gorgé to take care of like the abuse of the Swiss code of arms by a Japanese pharmaceutical company. Those were, however, minor issues compared to the main concern, which was the deteriorating economic situation that impacted all Swiss companies and thereby the people working for them. The records of the annual reports of the legation were a testimony to that. Considering Swiss people residing in Japan for example, the following list shows the development of the Swiss community in Japan before and after Pearl Harbor:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Swiss Colony in Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16: Development of the Swiss Colony in Japan, 1939–1945936

Switzerland had the most nationals living in Japan compared to the other neutrals of this study. But already in 1941, a fifth of them left the country, escaping the deteriorating economic and social environment. The following year another eighty Swiss desired to

935 Nanchen, "Relations diplomatiques et économique entre la Suisse et le Japon durant la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale," 579 - 84.
936 Numbers taken from the corresponding annual reports of the legation.
leave for whom the legation had to obtain the according exit permissions from the Japanese authorities. Although the legation never issued any evacuation orders or even recommendations to the colony to leave, Gorgé himself was not keen on keeping his compatriots in Japan. Especially when the Pacific War broke out, Gorgé recommended the repatriation of at least a part of the remaining Swiss. The hardship to come during the years of the war were obvious to him. He was especially worried about the threat of Japanese xenophobia against anyone western, which he assured was omnipresent and unescapable—not even for diplomats of Japan’s allies: “But how can I complain about these people when I see that even the Italian Ambassador, an ally that is, cannot go to Yokohama without notifying the Ministry of the Interior by way of the Gaimusho, about the hour of his departure?”937 In this hostile atmosphere two Swiss were arrested by the military police on charges of espionage already in 1942. Such incidents repeated every year but usually ended in the release of prisoners except for the case of a prominent member of the Swiss community, the well-known John Treichler who was convicted to decades of imprisonment (see chapter 5-5). The situation reached its most dramatic point however at an early moment of the war when one of Gorgé’s own staff was killed while on official duty for the Division of Foreign Interests. The victim was Robert Bossert, a civilian who had been working for a private company in Kobe before the war and joined the service of the Swiss Consulate after losing his job in early 1942. Gorgé sent him to Taiwan to oversee the orderly closure of the British consulate there. On the way home Bossert disappeared. The Gaimusho settled on the interpretation that Bossert

had committed suicide. Gorgé protested strongly that he could not believe in such a conclusion from the available report which said that “[h]is cabin was in disorder. Blood had sullied a razor blade, as if the unfortunate wanted to slit an artery before throwing himself into the water.” Gorgé strongly suspected a crime. However, the legation’s demands for an independent investigation were not heard by the Gaimusho. Only much later, during the Allied Occupation, a U.S. investigation concluded that Bossert was probably murdered by agents of the Japanese Secret Police.

In view of these experiences, Gorgé, unlike his Swedish colleague, proactively recommended several times to the Political Department that the Swiss community be evacuated from mainland Japan. His superiors in Switzerland did not agree with his assessment however. Their reply is an astounding testament to the government’s foreign policy:

The [Political] Department has, however, repeatedly clarified its standpoint that the voluntary abandonment of previously cumbersomely gained positions should be avoided in view of the time after the war. It is preferable to patiently and bravely wait for the arrival of more favorable times. At the same time, it agreed to support compatriots on the ground in a fair measure for which it made a credit of 100,000 Francs available.

Weighing short-term dangers against long-term opportunities, the Political Department put its bets on the latter. The dangers to the people involved seemed apparently worth taking and investing in. The 100,000 CHF credit was used over the next years to pay for

---

938 Ibid., June 6, 1942. [OFrTA].
939 Stamm, "Die Vertretung fremder Interessen in Japan durch die Schweiz," 574.
940 CH-BAR, "Geschäftsbericht der Schweizerischen Gesandtschaft in Japan für das Jahr 1942", 1942, 53. [ODeTA].
the livelihood of those Swiss who had lost all opportunities to create an income of their own.941

Gorgé insisted the following years again that repatriations should be considered but he just received the same answer from Berne—an evacuation was not desired. A few Swiss tried to organize their own voyage back home but failed to obtain the necessary Russian visas for a return via Siberia and their applications for a space on the exchange ships were also rejected. Those slots were reserved for enemy nationals, not neutral citizens.942 The Swiss were not eligible.943 The colony therefore remained stable at around 130 people until the end of the war. The slight increase of a dozen people between 1942 and 1943 is explained by the arrival of a handful of Swiss diplomats from Berne who had been requested by Gorgé and a few Swiss who arrived from occupied territories in Asia, like Consul Micheli who relocated to Tokyo with his family.

Outside Japan proper, Swiss interests and diplomacy were heavily impacted by the Gaimusho’s decision to consider all occupied territories as war zones, which suspended all applicability of diplomatic representation there. Switzerland was ordered to seize the operation of its consulates in all territories except for China. The consulates in Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Saigon, and Manila were not recognized anymore and had to be closed formally. The impact of this policy was slightly ameliorated by two factors;

941 The credit conditions set up by the Political Department however specified that the distributed sums should, if possible, be recollected at a later point of time. The money was a credit after all—not a gift.
942 Although almost no Swiss left Japan on the exchange ships, they nevertheless had some practical value to the legation. First and foremost, the carried a total of five new diplomats to Tokyo who joined Gorgé’s team. But on the other side they also provided an important opportunity to send long written reports about the current status of Swiss companies in Japan to their Head Quarters in Switzerland. Since most private communication had been completely interrupted ever since Pearl Harbor, these reports became the basis for much research on the whereabouts of lost property enroute. See on this: CH-BAR, "Geschäftsbericht der Schweizerischen Gesandtschaft in Japan für das Jahr 1942", 1942, 28.
943 Ibid., 44.
firstly, under the still valid treaty of Friendship and Commerce, the Gaimusho allowed the consular agents to continue their work *de facto* for Swiss interests. With some limitations and without the diplomatic status they used to have, the Swiss agents were allowed to care for the wellbeing and legal affairs of their own citizens and companies. “The fact that this was a privileged position granted only as an exception is evident, among other things, from the fact that the legation had to guarantee that it would keep this modus vivendi secret from third powers and to treat it confidentially.”\(^9\) On paper, this meant a certain improvement not having consular representation at all. Practically, however, the rights that Japan was willing to grant the Swiss were not as far reaching as Gorgé had hoped for. Especially in economic affairs Swiss companies did come under pressure to pay much higher duties than axis powers, driving them to the brink of bankruptcy.

Secondly, regarding the protection of foreign interests, the former Swiss consuls still had some influence under their special status to facilitate the work of ICRC agents (who were usually also Swiss nationals). The consuls were allowed to cable information to the legation in Tokyo, where Gorgé was recognized as the protector of enemy interests in the occupied zones and hence could lodge complaints and requests with the Gaimusho. He was also allowed to occasionally name a delegate who would visit POW camps in Hong Kong and report back to him.\(^9\) The burden of this indirect and inefficient way of communication was additionally complicated by the fact that the local Japanese military officers were largely autonomous in their actions and that most

\(^{944}\) Ibid., 11, 47. [ODETA].
\(^{945}\) Ibid., 76.
consulates were only allowed to communicate with the legation in Tokyo through telegrams in Japanese. These restrictions made proper and constant communication between Tokyo and the consulates impossible. The Swiss diplomats in occupied territories had to act mostly on their own to care for the interests of their compatriots and to deliver the little help they could to the enemy nations that they represented. That was also the reason why the majority of Swiss who lost their lives in the Pacific Theater of WWII were outside Japan.

5-4-5. Economic Affairs: The Requirement of Reciprocity

Notwithstanding the above discussion on Japan’s reorganization of its trade principles to suit the needs of the war economy, commerce between the two countries never completely ceased. The one commodity which Japan continuously sought to procure from the Swiss, despite all considerations for a positive trade balance, were war materials. Especially during the first year of the War in the Pacific such shipments were easily arranged and Bührle & Co., one of Switzerland’s largest private weapon producers was an eager supplier. Although the entire volume of armament deliveries to Japan is not known, it is clear that throughout 1942 it remained possible for Swiss manufacturers to deliver weapon systems to Japan. One of the largest procurements was that of 240 wing cannons for a total value of 5.9 million CHF for which Bührle requested an export license in summer 1942.

Although neutrals were not forbidden under International Law to trade weapons with belligerent states there were other considerations on the mind of the Swiss. Mainly the psychological and political effects that the weapons trade with either party of the war had on all other parties was carefully examined on a case by case basis. Bührle’s 240
wing cannons for Japan are a perfect example for the delict nature of these deliberations in Berne. One might think that the main concern for Swiss authorities was the British or the Americans but, in fact, it was the Germans that weighed heaviest. Like all private war material exports, also Bührle’s cannons had to be approved by the Office of War Technics at the Import and Export Section of the Military Department, which used to share export requests with other ministries before making decisions. In this case, the Federal Department of Economic Affairs was asked for its approval because the Japanese order came with the request for exemption from a practice that Switzerland had initiated in the early days of the war; the demand for material substitution of the raw materials used in the final export produce. Especially toward the Germans, Switzerland’s largest customer of war materials, the Federal Authorities insisted on compensation not only in the form of a money payment but the right to import the quality and quantity of raw materials that had been used to manufacture the goods in question. The Department of Economic Affairs feared that granting an exemption to the Japanese, who were not able to ship the necessary materials to Switzerland, would create a dangerous precedent that could lead to the German demands for exemptions. In a note of September 18, 1942, the department head stated that “we would be even less able to grant those [German demands] because we continuously emphasized toward Washington and London that Swiss war materials were only delivered to the Axis against substation supply of those materials necessary for their production.”

For reasons known only to himself, Federal Councilor Walter Stampfli, the head of the

---

946 DDS, Bd. 14, Dok. 240, "Notice de la Division du Commerce du Département de l'Economie publique", September 18, 1942. [OFrTA].
Department of Economic Affairs disregarded his staff’s recommendation. On September 19, he gave his approval for the export permission through which Bührle could deliver the 240 wing canons to Japan.\textsuperscript{947} The episode nevertheless shows how delicate the question of trade with Japan had become and the situation was only going to get more complicated. The Bührle affair was one of the last big trade deals between Switzerland and Japan. In the following year exports plummeted by nearly 90 percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Million Swiss Francs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td></td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td></td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>September</td>
<td>0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>November</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December</td>
<td>0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>February</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 17: Swiss Exports to Japan 1942–1943\textsuperscript{948}

The reduction in trade was a development which the Political Department had hoped to avert but which occurred nevertheless for several reasons. One was the heavily disadvantaged position of Swiss trading companies in Japan after 1941. The last bits of economic liberties had disappeared with Japan’s decision to refocus its industrial capacities purely on the needs of the war. Trade associations were established which only the large Japanese conglomerates could join and whose membership was the prerequisite to receive import/export permits. Only three Swiss trading houses had survived the bumpy years before the war anyhow and all of them were excluded from


\textsuperscript{948} DDS, Bd. 15, Dok. 115, "La Délégation économique suisse à Londres aux représentants des Alliés – Memorandum (Aide-mémoire)", 1944.
membership in these trading associations. Gorgé took this issue all the way to Prime
Minister Tojo but with limited success. The situation only got more precarious in 1943,
when forced liquidations and expropriations were threatened to Swiss companies like
Nestlé whose ownership structures included U.S. holdings. In this situation, much like
in the case of the Swiss colony, the goal of the Swiss was not to remain in Japan to
make a profit during the war but to survive it. “Until the end of the reporting year,
luckily not a single Swiss company had been closed. We remain hopeful that they will
hold out until the end of the war in order to resume their activities under normal
circumstances again.”949 The strategy was desperate. Most Swiss companies were only
able to survive the administrative repressions and attempts for nationalization by
lending their operations to Japanese companies under whose names they could continue
their work in rudimentary form.950
However, that was only half the story. Swiss merchant houses were excluded from trade
business within the Japanese sphere of influence, which meant that they could not get
any deals on transportation from and to Japanese occupied territories done. But why
were they unable to execute at least some limited trade with Switzerland when the
Swedes, at the same time, still had shipments coming in? The source of that trouble
came from Berne, not Tokyo. The Japanese side was, in fact, still interested in
importing Swiss machinery and weapons but in late 1942 the Allied Delegation
requested the Swiss government to stop all exports to its enemy in the east. Switzerland
replied that arbitrary sanctions against another state “would not be acceptable owing to

949 CH-BAR, E2400#1000/717#966*, “Geschäftsbericht der Schweizerischen Gesandtschaft in Japan für
das Jahr 1943”, 1943. 37. [ODeTA].
950 CH-BAR, "Geschäftsbericht der Schweizerischen Gesandtschaft in Japan für das Jahr 1944", 1944,
46-47.
the fact that the policy of strict neutrality pursued by the Swiss government places them under the obligation of maintaining commercial relations with all countries." 951

Nevertheless, in order not to offend the British, the Swiss Government decided unilaterally to apply much stricter export rules. This time it was the Swiss who made good use of the principle of reciprocity. Berne started arguing that its trading partners were required to export goods of ‘actual interest’ to Switzerland in the same quantity as what was being exported. In other words, Switzerland started demanding compensation in kind and not just currency to continue shipments to Japan. By early 1943, however, the Japanese economy was so singularly directed toward production for the war, that no such export goods existed. Berne therefore first suspended war material exports and then most other trade. Only books, clocks and watches were still shipped to Japan until the end of the war. The Swiss legation in London therefore replied to the Allies in 1944 that

[t]he Swiss government are convinced that the autonomous steps thus taken by them as regards exports to Japan have led to results which practically correspond to the wishes of His Majesty’s government and the U.S. government. They are decided to further maintain this policy; but for the reasons given above cannot see their way formally to agree to the suspension of Swiss exports to Japan. 952

Decreasing trade relations with Japan drastically, while still maintaining a minimum of exports not related to any military purposes was the Swiss way to balance neutral obligations. It was a markedly different approach from a year before when the Department of Economic affairs sill thought it was possible to export Swiss weapons to

---

951 DDS, "La Délégation économique suisse à Londres aux représentants des Alliés – Memorandum (Aide-mémoire)", 1944.
952 Ibid.
Asia. Although the Japanese side protested against the requirement of reciprocity, the policy was not an infringement of Swiss neutrality. One-sided export restrictions would have been arbitrary, but demanding reciprocity in economic affairs was not. It was a way for the Swiss government to adhere to the principle of impartiality and the right of economic intercourse with all nations, while accommodating for the demands of the stronger belligerent that was closer to home.
5-5. The End of the War

The last twelve months of the war impacted Swiss-Japanese relations again heavily. Not only did the living conditions for the Swiss colony in the Empire deteriorate fast but the developments of the war lead to dramatic scenes in Tokyo and Berne. On the one side the desolate situation caused frenetic attempts to end the fighting through a negotiated surrender. Japanese and foreign actors wanted to establish peace feelers. Berne was a neutral outpost for Japan’s diplomacy, while also hosting high ranking representatives of the U.S. State Department. Like Stockholm, that made it an important location for negotiation attempts. Japanese minister Kase and the head of the Switzerland branch of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Allen W. Dulles, became involved in schemes to create a negotiation channel through Switzerland.

On the other hand, the deteriorating situation for the Imperial Armed Forces lead to a cascade of events in Asia Pacific and in Japan that dramatically altered the situation for the Swiss colonies and the diplomatic representations. First, there was a multiplication of legal actions against Swiss nationals. Five people had been arrested and detained on charges of espionage or acts against national defense laws. The worst case was that of John Treichler, the director of Siber Hegner & Co., who was tortured for two weeks until he confessed spying in the name of the Swiss minister. He was subsequently sentenced to eight years of imprisonment. Secondly, in the summer of 1944 the Swiss diplomatic corps was mandatorily evacuated to the mountain village of Karuizawa.

---

953 The successor company originally founded by Caspar Brennwald in 1866.
954 Treichler was released on August 14 after a multitude of interventions on his behalf by Gorgé. Although he was not officially acquitted of his alleged crimes, Japan’s surrender put an end also to this case. See on Treichler: Humbert, "Les relations diplomatiques entre la Suisse et le Japon durant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale - La Légation et la colonie helvétiques dans l’Empire du Soleil Levant," 154-63.
(Nagano prefecture). Officially, the Gaimusho ordered the evacuation to protect diplomats from the impending U.S. air raids. The main reason, however, was to hide the impact of the destruction from foreign eyes who might cable information to their governments which ultimately might aide the enemy to assess its tactics. All diplomats were kept well out of sight, banished from the capital. Although Karuizawa was not the end of the world—Tokyo was within a few hours ride by train or car—the Gaimusho imposed traveling restrictions. The freedom of diplomats to move only continued to exist on paper. In reality, they had become castaways. In the beginning the mission heads could at least still travel to Tokyo by car, but that freedom was strapped away by April 1945. The Gaimusho took new measures that forbade all diplomats—Neutral or Axis—to drive in their cars or to take a train to Tokyo without police escort. 955 This impeded the work of the diplomats heavily as it was now even more cumbersome to receive any information on the situation of civilians or POWs under their care or to lodge complaints to senior rank officials at the Gaimusho. 956

Although the measure usually protected diplomats from the dangerous bombadments in Tokyo—Gorgé was caught several times in the city during air raids—he clearly preferred the danger over the complete isolation in Karuizawa. He believed almost fatalistically that “(…) whatever, my mandate implies certain risks that I have to take.” 957 The traveling restrictions on the other hand incapacitated him to the point that

956 In fact, the Gaimusho installed a branch office with a diplomat of the rank of a minister in Karuizawa, which was supposed to allow the mission heads to remain in contact with it. Such a liason office could however never replace access to higher ranking officials like the Foreign Minister.
he informed the PD he felt like a prisoner in Karuizawa and suggested informing the U.S. and the U.K. that Switzerland was not able to fulfill its duties anymore.\textsuperscript{958}

On the other hand, matters were much worse in the occupied territories. With the Allies marching ever closer on the Japanese mother land, its soldiers started assaulting indiscriminately anyone western including nationals of neutral countries. Gorgé reported back home that “The closer it [the war] rolls toward their living quarters, the greater the mental and physical danger for these compatriots (...).”\textsuperscript{959} The first murders occurred in December 1943, when Dr. Matthaeus Vischer, an unofficial representative of the ICRC in Borneo, and his wife Betsy were executed by beheading on allegations of espionage because they were seeking to learn the number of prisoners in the local POW camp.\textsuperscript{960} Two more members of the same mission died later in military prison.\textsuperscript{961}

In 1944 over twenty Swiss in occupied territories were incarcerated, mostly without evidence of wrong doing or even without concrete charges.\textsuperscript{962} But the worst incident happened in Manila—similar to the Spanish tragedy—when Swiss nationals were trapped in the battle for the city that cost well over 100,000 local Filipino lives. In February 1945, twenty Swiss nationals were killed, at least fourteen of them through


\textsuperscript{959} CH-BAR, "Geschäftsbericht der Schweizerischen Gesandtschaft in Japan für das Jahr 1943", 1943, 66.


\textsuperscript{961} CH-BAR, E2400#1000/717#968*, "Geschäftsbericht der Schweizerischen Gesandtschaft in Japan für das Jahr 1945", 1945. 64.

\textsuperscript{962} CH-BAR, "Geschäftsbericht der Schweizerischen Gesandtschaft in Japan für das Jahr 1944", 1944, 78.
execution by the Japanese Army. The situation was particularly tragic because Gorgé had been trying to evacuate these compatriots for years. By 1944 the Political Department had largely accepted that at least in occupied territories evacuations of citizens were unavoidable but all efforts to organize voyages home failed at Japanese resistance to let any foreigners leave from the territories which it had designated as war zones. In February 1944, Gorgé even organized a joint neutral démarche with Minister Bagge and Minister Méndez de Vigo to protest the Gaimusho’s policies but to no avail. The massacre in Manila came as the sad confirmation of Gorgé’s darkest fears and threw a long shadow on Swiss-Japanese relations.

To the Spanish, the massacre in Manila was the ultimate transgression which the Franco regime used not only to renounce its protecting Power mandates for Japan but to cut all diplomatic ties. Looking at the hardship and the many unfriendly acts Swiss representatives and their citizens had to suffer in the Empire, it would have been understandable if they too had taken such action in spring 1945. In the end, however, the opposite happened. Switzerland took over most of the mandates that the Spanish had relinquished.

5-5-1. Pressuring Japan for Better Conditions

It was not generosity that moved Switzerland to continue its engagements for Japan around the world, but pragmatism. Breaking relations with Tokyo would have meant a

grave danger to the Swiss diplomats and the remaining civilians in Japan as they would have lost the little bit of a special status that they were still enjoying. They would themselves have had to find a protecting Power at a moment when only Portugal, Afghanistan and Sweden were left for that—the later without a Minister in Japan and the former two lacking experience and personnel.\footnote{The U.S.S.R. was also still neutral at that moment, but Switzerland did not recognize its government.} The severing of relations would also have meant that Switzerland would have had to give up its mandates of protecting Power and that would certainly have been considered as undesirable by the State Department and the Foreign Office.

At the same time though conditions in Karuizawa and the horrible treatment of Swiss nationals could not be ignored. In April 1945 Gorgé had send several strongly worded protests about the situation to the Gaimusho and the Political Department, requesting the latter to take a firm stance against Tokyo. Gorgé’s letters reached the Federal Council by the end of the month. Max Petitpierre, Switzerland’s new Foreign Minister (since February 1) presented to his colleagues the proposition drafted by his staff on how to pressure Japan into assuring better conditions for Gorgé and the Swiss in the Empire:

1. Raise a vigorous protest toward the Japanese Government against these serious injuries to persons and property of Swiss nationals.
2. Demand apologies as well as reparations for damages for the case for which that is still possible.
3. Demand assurances that Swiss nationals will in the future be treated in accordance with international practices and the legation will be able to carry out its mission without hindrance.

In the event that the reply of the Japanese Government is not satisfactory, it [the Political Department] proposes to inform the latter Government that the Swiss Government would not, to its regret, see the possibility of
continuing to ensure the protection of the Japanese interests that are currently entrusted to it.\footnote{966}

Especially the last paragraph—the threat to renounce its protecting Power mandates for Japan—was radical and reflects the mounting frustration of the PD over the situation in the East. However, although Petitpierre’s six colleagues in the council shared his outrage at the situation, they did not support the last part. After unrecorded verbal deliberations, the council adopted points 1, 2, and 3 but cautioned that Switzerland would not threaten to renounce its mandates of protecting Power for Japan but instead issue a weaker warning that “(…) the Swiss reaction could, if necessary, consist in the expulsion of the Japanese diplomats who had sought refuge in Switzerland from Germany.”\footnote{967} The dissenting opinion of the council from the proposal of the Foreign Minister is interesting. It means that among the other six ministers—which together with Petitpierre constitute the cabinet—at least four were of the opinion that the threat of relinquishing protecting Power mandates was not an option for Switzerland and that other means had to be found to achieve the country’s diplomatic goals.\footnote{968} No such threats would be issued. This is even more striking when considering that those were the final days of the war in Europe. At a point in time when no international backlash had to be feared anymore, the Swiss Government still felt bound to fulfill mandates of protecting Power, regardless of the situation of its citizens abroad. The council did not allow the PD to use this duty as a bargaining chip for negotiations.

967 Ibid. [OFrTA].
968 The Federal Council adopts decisions by majority vote among the seven members.
The PD was clearly not satisfied with the decision of the Federal Council. It did not report back to Gorgé until a week later when Walter Stucki, the new director of the Division of Foreign Affairs (and thereby Petitpierre’s direct subordinate), cabled a telegram to Tokyo that was stronger in its content and made use of recent development that had not been taken into consideration by the Federal Council’s resolution of April 27:

The head of the department [Petitpierre] as well as I [Stucki] have spoken several times forcefully with [Japanese Minister to Switzerland] Kase (...). After your last reports, we informed the Federal Council of the really untenable situation. The council is aware of the importance of the affaire and has decided that:

1. Tomorrow, the head of the department will hand a solemn note of protest in the name of the entire Federal Council to Minister Kase and he will demand in a strong manner the easing of conditions that you wish for.
2. Kase will be informed—and you are instructed to convey there [to the Gaimusho] that the Federal Council rejects the accession of further representations of Japanese interests, especially toward America, until a satisfactory answer to our note of protest has been received and until you confirm that substantial improvements have been attained.
3. As a protest against Japanese behavior, the Federal Council has, despite Kase’s urgent intervention, rejected 29 Japanese diplomats, including the Ambassador, who wanted to flee from Italy to Switzerland. Please inform [Gaimusho] accordingly. The Federal Council is strongly determined not to allow to be treated in such a manner. It stands firmly behind you and authorizes you to continue the fight with all your power. [Even] if we have not gone as far as to relinquish previously assumed representations of Japanese interests, the reason for that is that we want to avoid difficulties with the Allies, whom we are representing in Japan. But we are, prospectively, considering further defensive actions like the expulsion of Japanese Ambassador Mitani and other Japanese diplomats that have fled here from Germany. (...)969

The rejection of Japanese diplomats from Italy and the threat to expel those who had already arrived from Germany was certainly a stern warning to Tokyo but the strongest

hand with which the PD equipped Gorgé was the threat not to help Tokyo with the mandates that Spain had given up on March 27. The Japanese requests for an extended Swiss protection reached Swiss officials for the first time when its legation in Madrid had received a request on April 24 by the Japanese legation.\textsuperscript{970} A week later, Gorgé reported on his front about Prime Minister Suzuki who had visited him in Karuizawa (since he himself was forbidden from going to Tokyo) to ask for Swiss protection. Gorgé’s telegram to Berne contained a stern warning that such action should only be taken under the condition that his situation and the security of Swiss nationals inside and outside Japan improved.\textsuperscript{971}

In other words, the Spanish decision to renounce its support for Japan played well into the hands of the Swiss who did not want to go as far as to threaten ending their help for Japan but still needed diplomatic leverage to bargain for better conditions—especially to fulfill their mandates of protecting Power for the Allies. After the simultaneous demarches by Petitpierre in Switzerland and Gorgé in Karuizawa, the situation improved partially. The Gaimusho started granting again Swiss visits to civilian and POW camps that had been forbidden for months and issued at the same time notes of condolence and apologies for the death of the Swiss nationals in Manila.\textsuperscript{972} In a rare gesture, the Gaimusho acknowledged the fault of the Japanese Armed Forces and requested the settlement of the case through a cash payment of 1 million CHF to the

---

\textsuperscript{970} Telegram Stucki to Broye (Swiss Minister to Spain), dated May 9, 1945. In: ibid.
benefit of the survivors and the heirs to the victims. Positively surprised at the swift conciliatory reply, the Swiss Government accepted Japan’s apology and considered the Manila case thereby as closed. In fact, the cabinet interpreted these signs so optimistically that the PD informed Gorgé that “[in] regard of the settlement of the Manila affaire and considering the Japanese efforts to settle also other pending affairs, the Federal Council was no longer of the opinion to differ any longer the acceptance to protect Japanese interests (…).” Switzerland thereby took over protecting Power mandates for Japan in eight American countries, including the U.S. and Canada, as well as their protection in Spain.

Gorgé, who had still not received all the liberties he wanted—especially the freedom of movement—was surprised at this development which he could not but interpret as a misunderstanding: “The Gaimusho seems to think that the decision of the Federal Council concerning Japanese interests was taken without my knowledge (…). I now look as if though I had been beaten by Minister Kase or that I demand more than what my government expects. As you will understand without doubt, this will not make my task easier (…).” Gorgé’s trump card for negotiations had disappeared over night, causing him a great deal of frustration because the travel restrictions for himself and his staff had still not been lifted. In the end, he remained ‘exiled’ to Karuizawa, which made Switzerland’s protecting Power largely inefficient especially regarding the protection of interned enemy civilians and POWs.

It must be acknowledged, however, that due to the evacuation to Karuizawa, no neutral diplomats in Japan came to harm in the war, neither by Japanese nor Allied actions. On the contrary, the presence of the U.S. interests representing Swiss legation extended a protecting hand over the mountain village which was never targeted by air raids.\footnote{In fact, Gorgé asked the PD to request Washington to ‘immunize’ Karuizawa from Allied attacks. GORGÉ DIARY, "Débacle au Soleil-Levant: Journal d’un Témoin", 1939–1945. Entry dated June 10 1945.} This beneficial side-effect of neutral presence went so far that the house next to the Swiss legation was repurposed by the Japanese Government to function as residence for the Emperor’s mother, Empress Teimei.\footnote{Ibid. Entry dated June 3 1945.} Also, to set another record straight, Gorgé’s criticism of Minister Kase in Berne was not entirely justified. When the PD had tried to receive concessions from Japan for its demands through Kase’s office, the Japanese Minister viewed many of them very favorably. Especially on the repatriation issue of neutral citizens in occupied territories Kase had recommended his government strongly to help the Swiss ever since 1944. Kase argued in Japanese internal communications that the Swiss would be important for Japan: “With the present state of the European war, we shall have a lot of requests to make of the Swiss in connection with the representation of our interests and, if the worst happens, in connection with protecting our officials and citizens in Europe.”\footnote{Telegram Kase to Gaimusho. In: USNA, SRDJ74493, No 468, Telegram, "Without Title", October 12, 1944.} Gorgé’s Japanese counterpart in Berne was in this sense rather trying to help him, not work against the interests of the Swiss. In the end, however, only the termination of the war brought the functioning of the legation back to normal. Gorgé himself was not involved in the negotiations of the Japanese capitulation, as that was handled through Minister Kase’s office in Berne.
5-5-2. Peace Feelers in Switzerland

The search for peace on neutral Swiss territory had, in contrast to the Swedish version, little to do with the country’s politics or diplomats. Rather, it was a story of enemy offices on neutral ground seeking for the termination of a war that all sides knew Japan had lost. The full extent of peace feelers in Switzerland had been unknown for a long-time due to the secrecy they were shrouded in and the many individuals that were involved. Only the meticulous work of German historian Gerhard Krebs revealed the entire picture of the many strings of contacts that had been running through Berne. The following is but a short summary of his seminal 2005 paper.⑨79

The most central of the two dozen or so characters involved in the peace feelers were the formerly mentioned German arms dealer and unofficial contact for the Japanese, Friedrich W. Hack, and, on the other side, Allen W. Dulles,⑨80 the head of the Swiss outpost of the American OSS—the precursor of today’s Central Intelligence Office (CIA). Hack, who resided in Zürich during the war, had been in contact with Dulles through an old acquaintance, G.S. Gaevernitz, for more than a year when their discussions about brokering a peace with Japan became more serious in April 1945.

The first potential route for negotiations lead through a Japanese Navy attaché in Berlin, Commander Yoshikazu Fujimura. Hack used his contacts to Fujimura’s superiors who were keen on spearing Japan the fate that Germany was going through, and sent him to Berne as a representative of the Navy. Fujimura arrived in Switzerland in early March where he was accredited with diplomatic status. After some initial low-level encounters with trusted contacts of Dulles, a meeting with the OSS chief himself was set-up at a

⑨80 Allen W. Dulles was the brother of the more famous John Foster Dulles.
Hotel room in the Swiss capital. Fujimura revealed that the European outpost of the Japanese Navy hoped to reach a negotiated surrender with the U.S. Dulles, skeptical of Fujimura’s intentions demanded proof that he was actually authorized to negotiate in the name of higher authorities. Fujimura therefore started sending telegrams back to the Navy General Staff, trying to obtain their consent for official negotiations in Switzerland. However, since his operation in Berne was highly risky to himself, Fujimura adjusted the story to the extent that he claimed an important American in Switzerland had contacted him first for negotiations. Since Japan’s new cabinet at that time was made of important representatives of the Navy, the most important ones being Prime Minister Kentaro Suzuki, a retired Admiral, and Mitsumasa Yonai the Navy Minister, Fujimura was hoping to win over these factions and establish a true channel for negotiations. He was hoping that Dulles biggest success at the time, the negotiated surrender of German forces in Northern Italy, could function as a blueprint for a much larger agreement with Japan.

Dulles on his side informed Washington on June 2 about his contacts to Fujimura (without mentioning his name), whom he believed to be in a genuine position to create the said contact to the Navy faction of the new Japanese Government. This information from the OSS reached not only the U.S. Secretary of State but also the President himself. Fujimura was, in the meantime, trying to convince the highest echelons of the Japanese Navy of the value of direct negotiations in Berne with the Americans. He sent a total of twenty-one telegrams, of which one contained the same information on the Yalta conference that Makoto Onodera in Stockholm had found out about (the agreement of the U.S.S.R. to enter the war against Japan). Unfortunately, his efforts did not meet with enthusiasm in Tokyo. The Navy faction in the Government was, in fact, deeply divided
on the issue and all involved men there needed to be careful because any talk of
negotiations with the U.S. might trigger assassination attempts by radical elements in
the Armed Forces. It took until June 20 for Fujimura to receive Minister Yonai’s tepid
answer that he should hand the issue over to the Japanese Minister in Berne.
From there on, Minister Kase became the second possible route for peace feelers. What
Fujimura did not know was that Kase himself had also already been looking for
potential ways to bring the Americans to the negotiating table in neutral Switzerland.
The Minister had, in fact, built up an intricate network of personalities who might
become crucial for their contacts. On the one hand, he had worked on winning over
support from Japan’s most ardent war fanatics, the military forces, through a second-
hand contact to the military attaché in Zürich, General Okamoto. On the other side,
making use of two Japanese employees of the Bank of International Settlement in
Basel— one of the last remaining neutral international organizations of WWII— Kase
approached a Swedish national with private ties to the General Staff of the British Navy.
With this network Kase, independently of Fujimura, approached his Ministry, the
Gaimusho, urging them for the establishment of communication lines with the U.S., and,
on the other end, he contacted Hack on May 11 with the request to inform his American
network of the Japanese desire for discrete talks to bring hostilities to an end. In the
weeks that followed, Kase and Fujimura joined their activities and (through Hack)
assured the OSS that if the imperial System of Japan could be guaranteed, they would
be able to bring the Japanese Government to accept U.S. demands for surrender through
face-saving negotiations— presumably in Switzerland. The OSS was for the whole time
highly skeptical of the activities that were in progress because it could not be
established that the instructions for peace negotiations really came from Tokyo. At the
same time, however, the OSS sent several reports about the Japanese approaches to the State Department which again reached the desk of the President.

Kase interacted with at least two more potential channels to the U.S., including an important Swedish-Japanese contact through the Bank of International Settlement. But in the end his own Government was so dramatically disunited between ‘doves’ and ‘hawks’—the peace and the war factions—that any attempt at peace was a struggle for life and death by the involved individuals, as the developments of the final decision to surrender in August would ultimately prove. The various channels that were built up in Switzerland came to nothing. Only the entrance of the Soviet Union into the war was devastating enough for the war faction to be silenced by the voices of peace in the Suzuki Government—and by decisive vote of the Emperor. After that, indirect channels were not needed anymore as the surrender could simply be communicated through the official routes in Stockholm and Berne. At 6.04 pm., on August 14, after four of the most dramatic days in Japan’s political history, the Swiss Chargé d’Affaires to Washington handed Japan’s unconditional acceptance of the Potsdam declaration to Secretary of State Byrnes.  

981 Japan’s fourteen years of war had ended.

---

Chapter Summary & Conclusion

Swiss-Japanese relations were officially established in 1864 but first attempts for a treaty date back five years earlier to a semi-official diplomatic mission, initiated by the watchmaking industry in 1859. This early eagerness of Switzerland to establish relations with Japan is remarkable for two reasons: On the one hand, the Alpine nation followed on the heels of the original five great Powers who forcefully opened Japan with their Gunboat diplomacy and, secondly, it was the first land-locked country without even a merchant fleet to do so. The Swiss Government and its private sector both invested heavily into relations with Japan. Despite the initial failure, Switzerland was still four years earlier than Sweden and Spain to receive a treaty with Japan. The history of how and why Switzerland was seeking out Japan is a testimony to its clear strategy of creating an economic hinterland for commerce—wherever an opportunity presented itself. The way in which Switzerland’s diplomacy was motivated and executed in tight collaboration with its business community illustrates not only the country’s corporatist history, the approach also remained a constant theme of its relationship with Japan. The strategy bore fruit slowly but steadily with Swiss key industries and corporations controlling the lion’s share of trade with Japan. Although Japan never became one of Switzerland’s top trading partners, by the 1920s and 1930s Swiss-Japanese trade had climbed to around the same level as that which it had with small European nations like Portugal, Spain, Sweden or Belgium. At the same time, Japan also was Switzerland’s largest Asian trading partner.

982 The first countries to have treaty relations with Japan were the U.S., Holland, Russia, Great Britain and France, all of them signing their treaties in 1868. The next (second-tier) countries to establish relations were Portugal (1860) and Prussia (1861). See on this: Auslin, Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy.
Ever since Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War, the Swiss Government recognized Japan as a great Power. In the 1920s the Swiss even started experimenting with novel ways to interact with great Powers through Japan by proposing an innovative arbitration treaty. The initiative, however, failed and Japan’s belligerency in China, after the Mukden Incident of 1931, became a traumatizing experience for Swiss politicians in the League of Nations who opposed Japan’s expansionism sharply—even though a knot less aggressively than their Spanish and Swedish colleagues. The political fall-out in Geneva had, however, little to no effect on Swiss-Japanese relations. After the initial shock was dispelled, the Swiss Government even tacitly agreed to consider Japanese requests for investments in Manchukuo during the mid-1930s, signaling even the willingness to recognize the puppet state eventually, provided other League members took the first step.

Likewise, the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese war, in 1937, impacted Swiss-Japanese relations only marginally. Although trade became more tedious, no diplomatic changes occurred and business continued as usual. This stands in stark contrast to the complete re-organization of relations after December 7, 1941. The beginning of the Pacific War impacted Switzerland well beyond the realm of simple bilateral relations with Japan. Diplomatically, it marked the beginning of Switzerland’s most active engagement in global affairs during the WWII period. Although the Section of Foreign Interests was established in reaction to the war in Europe, in 1939, it only became busy with Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, since that caused a chain effect, resulting in Switzerland becoming the largest provider of Good Office services of WWII. The country’s diplomatic network had to be reinforced at home and abroad to cope with the multiplication of requests from all belligerents for the representation of their interests.
For the Swiss Minister in Japan, Camille Gorgé, that meant a complete revolution of his responsibilities and an increase of duties that he could only cope with because of the large number of Swiss residents in the country. The legation grew nearly tenfold in personnel, most of whom he hired from Swiss companies. This came with the double benefit of extending diplomatic protection to them, while they would take over essential functions in the legation to protect the interests of the U.S., Great Britain, and two dozen other countries. It was the second time in the history of Swiss-Japanese relations when the private-public aspects of Switzerland’s diplomacy became existential to the core functions of its foreign policy.

On the other hand, Switzerland also represented Japanese interests willingly. Even toward the end of the war, under great duress—and despite the maltreatment of Swiss interests and its citizens—the Swiss Government regarded its function as an impartial diplomatic service provider of last resort as a duty that bordered on stoic apathy. Switzerland’s humanitarian services—in Japan for the Allies and for Japan abroad—contributed to the relief of the tremendous suffering that the war entailed. Moral considerations were, however, not the driving factors behind Switzerland’s foreign policy. It was rather a pragmatic understanding of its obligations as a neutral nation that wished to remain engaged in both, Japanese and Allied affairs. The position as a neutral service provider of last resort enabled the Swiss (like the Swedes) to realize their goal of waiting the war out while protecting their immediate interests in the region. The last thing that they wanted was to give up the economic and diplomatic position that they had been ‘cumbersomely’ building over the course of eighty years.

The Swiss strategy was not unique to Japan. When the German occupation forces in the Netherlands decided in July 1942, that all foreign diplomatic representations had to
leave Amsterdam, the Swiss tried everything possible to receive the German agreement
to keep their consulate open or, at least, operate a mini-consulate from one of the other
cities to support the “considerable Swiss interests in the Netherlands (…).”983 The effort
was in vain but demonstrates the point in question. Medium sized markets mattered.
Exports to the Netherlands in 1942 were down to meager 20.6 million CHF, that was
only a tiny fraction compared to Swiss-German trade984 and less than a fifth of Swiss-
U.S. trade,985 but that did not mean that the Netherlands was insignificant. From
potential future opportunities to non-material or humanitarian considerations—the
protection of expatriate communities or support to the ICRC—there was a variety of
reasons for which diplomatic relations with almost any territory in the world—
sovereign or not—was better than being cut off from them. The same was true for Japan.
Maybe even more so because it was crystal clear that, should Japan prevail in
establishing its ‘Co-Prosperity Sphere,’ Tokyo would be the gatekeeper for any contact
with Asia in the future.
Swiss-Japanese relations were temporarily suspended not because of the war but
because of its end. With the occupation of Japan, the country lost its sovereignty.
Although the Swiss wished for continued relations with Tokyo, General MacArthur’s
Head Quarter forbade independent Japanese diplomacy during the occupation period.
However, considering the quick recovery of Swiss-Japanese ties after the peace
agreement in San Francisco and the success of Swiss companies and products after the
war, it would be cynical to speak of a failure of the strategy. In the end, the story of

983 CH-BAR ONLINE, Protokolle des Bundesrates, 70014175, Bd. 427, ”Beschlussprotokoll(-e) 11.11.-
13.11.1942”, November 13, 1942.
984 655.6 Million CHF
985 102.2 Million CHF
Swiss-Japanese relations is one of remarkable consistency. Switzerland continuously sought proximity to Japan, even at high costs, for the sake of future opportunities.
6. Summary & Conclusion

This dissertation tells various stories. The story of the differences between two permanent neutrals and an occasional neutral, the story of the fourteen years during which trade and diplomacy between three small Powers and Japan were ever-changing, and it tells the story of how the institution of neutrality enabled Sweden, Switzerland and Spain to lead independent foreign policies based on their strategic priorities. It also makes the point that the permanent neutralities of Sweden and Switzerland were not as different from the occasional neutrality of Spain, especially not when compared to much more bizarre forms of neutrality like that between the U.S.S.R. and Japan. For the purpose of diplomacy, Spain was as normal a neutral as Sweden and Switzerland. Chapter 2 showed how neutrality—far from being a tool just for small European nations—was a foreign policy used by great and small Powers alike. The difference lay in the ways their neutralities impacted the war. Neutralities of great Powers mattered for strategic reasons because they could tilt the war to one or the other direction. Those of small states, on the other hand, mattered for diplomatic purposes. When fighting in Europe broke out, in 1939, traditional neutrals like Sweden, Switzerland, the U.S., and the Netherlands were asked by Germany, France, the U.K., and the other belligerents to represent their interests in their respective enemy countries. In accordance with the Geneva Convention, the neutrals became so-called ‘protecting Powers.’986 They took care of the embassies, legations, and consulates of the belligerents in enemy countries, organized the repatriation of diplomats and civilians, cared for prisoners of war (POW) and assure communication among the belligerents by serving as go-betweens for

---

986 See chapter 1-2-4.
transmission of telegrams or by negotiating in the name of their client states. In short, they became diplomatic service providers of last resort. In contrast, Japan’s war-like situation with China did not trigger any diplomatic services of protecting Power. No neutral represented China in Japan or vice versa. The absence of a declaration of war and the unofficial character of the belligerency was a major reason for that.

For the three neutrals in this study, the first two years of the war in Europe did not cause massive numbers of protecting Power mandates. The Japanese attack on the U.S. changed that drastically. A report on Switzerland’s Division of Foreign Interests, for example, holds that “[i]t is no exaggeration to say that the work of the division has increased tenfold because of the assumption of numerous new representations, especially because they include almost all Great Powers. The work to be accomplished by the division was considerable already before December 1941, but it will be much more extensive in the year to come.”

It was not only the entrance of new belligerents into WWII which caused the increase but the loss of the U.S. as a neutral which managed many mandates as a protecting Power, especially for the British and the French. All of them went to the Swiss after December 7, 1941. Besides Switzerland, Sweden and Spain were the second and third largest protecting Powers of WWII.

Working as a diplomatic service provider of last resort was a multilateral affair because each belligerent was free to choose a neutral of its liking. This meant that not always the same neutral was the go-between for both belligerents. Many times belligerents chose

---

987 CH-BAR ONLINE, "Bericht des Schweizerischen Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über seine Geschäftsführung im Jahre 1941", 1942, 115. [ODeTA].
989 Ibid., Annex.
different neutrals to represent them. Chapter 2 showed in detail the various mandates for the case of Japan and discussed their impact. The most important finding of that comparison was the discrepancy between the Allies’ and Japan’s choices of ‘their’ neutral protecting Powers. Japan asked Spain for its services in most of the Americas, including the United States. A noticeable exception was only Hawaii, where the Spanish did not operate a consulate. Because of the island’s importance, Japan asked Sweden for its help, to which Stockholm agreed. The Swedes represented Japan’s interests also in the Netherlands, South Africa, Ceylon, East-India, and Burma. The Swiss, on the other hand, were asked to function as Japan’s protecting Power in Great Britain and most of its current or former dominions, including Singapore, before its fall in February 1942. These three neutrals did the bulk of Japanese representations worldwide. The only other neutrals who held a few mandates for Tokyo were Portugal, Argentina, and Turkey.

Japan’s preference for Spain as its representative in the Americas was not reciprocated by the local governments. Except for the Republic of Paraguay, all American countries that had declared war on the Empire (or just severed relations with it) chose either Switzerland or Sweden as their protecting Powers. The choice came from a lack of trust in Spanish impartiality—for very good reasons: Whereas the democratically elected Republic of Spain (1931–1939) had been a poster child of liberal internationalism at the League of Nations, Franco’s Government, that came to power in 1939, was a fascist dictatorship much like those of Hitler and Mussolini. Little wonder that American democracies did not put much faith in Madrid’s intentions. In fact, although the U.S.

990 See chapter 3-4-1.
991 See chapter 4-2-3.
Government accepted Japan’s choice of Spain as its protecting Power in Washington, the State Department sent a confidential request to the Swiss Foreign Ministry, asking Berne to prepare for the future representation of U.S. interests in Madrid, in case Franco entered the war on the Axis side. This distrust had the effect that only Sweden and Switzerland were serving systematically as protecting Powers for the Allies in Japan. Their legations grew manifold while the Spanish legation shrunk during the war.

However, the same aspects that raised U.S.’ suspicions against Spanish impartiality made it highly attractive to Japan as ‘its’ neutral of choice.’ The militaristic leadership of Tokyo judged that Franco would probably extend more favors to Japan than any other neutral. After all, the benevolent diplomatic collaboration between Francoist Spain and Japan had a successful history. In 1937, by way of Spanish diplomats in Tokyo who had switched sides in the Civil War, the two struck a symbolic deal in which Japan recognized Franco’s Junta in Burgos as the legitimate Government over the embattled Republic in Madrid.992 In return, Franco recognized Manchukuo as an independent nation-state. Four years later, choosing Spain as its representative in the Americas seemed again to pay off for Japan. Franco’s diplomats did not only fulfill their protecting Power mandates dutifully; they willingly agreed to go far beyond that, by providing the Japanese with spies—the so-called ‘To-Network.’

However, the friendship between Spain and Japan turned sour little by little, ending in the complete rupture of relations. Since the U.S. had broken the Japanese cipher codes, the Spanish Spy-network was easily dismantled once the U.S. counter-intelligence judged that the information became too accurate to be allowed to proceed. The

992 See chapters 4-2-5 and 4-3-1.
uncovering was a major diplomatic disaster for Spain, and the U.S. used the case to exert pressure on Madrid to halt any further support for the Axis. Franco, however, did not abandon Japan over this issue alone. The change in Spanish attitude toward Japan was a slow reversal of its former policies that went hand in hand with the decline of the Axis’ powers in the war. By late 1943, Franco had decided to shift his bets to the victory of the Allies and started talking about Japan as a threat like communism and that an Asian race should not win this contest for global supremacy. In this new environment, two incidents were particularly impactful on the rapid scaling-back of Japanese-Spanish relations. One was a congratulatory note sent in October 1943 by the Spanish Foreign Ministry to the short-lived Japanese puppet government of José Laurel. The note was, by any standards, “a diplomatic blunder,”993 because it was a seemingly unfriendly act of a neutral state against the interest of the U.S., which again jumped at the opportunity to exert pressure on Spain to stop trading with Axis nations. The second incident followed in February 1945, when the Japanese army, trying to hold the city of Manila against incoming U.S. troops, killed over 200 Spaniards. Diplomats and civilians alike were murdered, many of them while in hiding in the Spanish consulate. The Japanese Government tried to calm the nerves in Madrid by offering monetary compensation, but Franco did not agree. He used the bloodbath to break all ties with the Empire in April 1945.

For Japan, this was a real problem, since the line of communication to Washington was essential for any negotiation with the enemy and because now their interned POW’s and civilians were without protection. Therefore, the Gaimusho approached Sweden and

---

Switzerland for their help and both were willing to extend another favor to Tokyo. Four mandates went to the Swedes, the rest to the Swiss, including the critical important representation of Japan in the United States. This willingness of the other two neutrals to continue supporting Japan’s diplomacy was not self-evident because both had grievances toward Japan as a host country. On the one hand, the hostility with which the military authorities treated them complicated their diplomatic mandates heavily. The military police were constantly afraid of diplomats spying for the enemy—in light of Japan’s own intelligence activities, an understandable fear.

On the other hand, however, Sweden and Switzerland were also unsuccessful in protecting their core interests; the trade relationship with the Empire. Between 1942 and 1945, commerce ground (almost) to a hold, partially because of the war, but partly also because of the mistreatment of their companies. Another recurring problem for both neutrals was that their diplomatic authority could not be extended to the occupied territories in Asia and the Pacific. Although the U.K. and the U.S., in accordance with diplomatic norms, accepted the representation of Japanese interests in their colonies and territories, Japan did not. Neither in the colonies of Formosa and Korea nor in the occupied territories of China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Batavia did Japan recognize the authority of neutral powers to represent the Allies. The Gaimusho justified these steps by arguing that the territories were active military ‘operation zones’ and that this excluded them from normal diplomatic interaction.994 All three ministers in Tokyo repeatedly complained about the untenable situation and, since 1944, even jointly

994 Nevertheless, the Swiss were at least allowed to unofficially (de facto) protect their client’s interests in the occupied territories. In terms of humanitarian assistance, that made a small difference, even if the full scale of an officially recognized protecting Power could not be fulfilled. See on this: CH-BAR, "Geschäftsbericht der Schweizerischen Gesandtschaft in Japan für das Jahr 1942", 1942, 11, 47.
pressed the Gaimusho to be at least allowed to evacuate their citizens from the occupied territories. Japan, however, refused to do so. Spain paid the highest price for this policy, but also on Switzerland it had dramatic effects. There were several cases, including that of twenty people in Manila, where Swiss nationals perished at the hand of Japanese soldiers—only Sweden had no deaths to mourn in South East Asia. This coincided with the prolonged ‘quasi-internment’ of all neutral diplomats in Karuizawa, where they were mandatorily evacuated, for their safety, but also to conceal the status of Tokyo’s situation in the ongoing war. To Camille Gorgé, the Swiss Minister, the situation was untenable. He repeatedly protested against the loss of his freedom to move. In this regard, it is even more interesting that the Swiss Government was highly sensitive to Japan’s request to take over the Good Offices form Spain in the United States. Not that the Swiss had not tried to exert pressure on Japan. The Federal Council, in fact, issued demands that Japan had to improve Gorgé’s conditions and that it expected apologies and reparations for the Manila incident—but it never went as far as to threaten the breakup of diplomatic relations. Nor did it hint at the possibility that it might refuse to take-over Japanese interests in the U.S. The Japanese Government subsequently apologized for the deaths in Manila, offering a compensation payment of 1 million CHF.995 That was all it took to convince the Swiss. Although Gorgé’s working conditions had not improved to his satisfaction, the Federal Council thought that delaying the Japanese request for its Good Offices in Washington was not feasible

anymore. All in all, the Swiss commitment to become a protecting Power to whoever asked was astounding.

This raises the question why the Swiss and the Swedish Governments were, even at the end of the war, keen on helping the Japanese? After all, the war in Europe was over, and Japan was nearing its collapse. They could have broken relations with Tokyo too. The Spanish had just done exactly that, without fearing negative repercussions. Why did the Swedes and the Swiss not do the same? There are two answers to this. Firstly, practical considerations: When Spain cut its ties with the Empire, its Foreign Ministry could count on the support of the Swiss to protect their remaining citizens in Japan. Had the Swiss done the same, there would have been barely anyone left with experience in that task. The Swedish Minister, Widar Bagge, for example, had already departed Japan by that time, leaving the Swedish legation without a plenipotentiary. However, the much more important consideration was the overarching foreign policies of both neutrals, which they had been implementing for the entire time of the war. Since Sweden and Switzerland were heavily export-oriented economies, whose welfare depended mostly on the capacity to maintain beneficial trade relations around the world, access to foreign markets for current and future trade had top priority even during times of global warfare. Nowhere was this more clearly stated than in one of the annual reports of the Swiss Legation. Gorgé had recommended several times to start the evacuation of his legation and the Swiss colony, but he had always received the same reply:

The Department [of Foreign Affairs] has, however, repeatedly clarified its standpoint that the voluntary abandonment of previously cumbersomely gained positions should be avoided in view of the time after the war. It is
preferable to patiently and bravely wait for the arrival of more favorable times.\footnote{CH-BAR, "Geschäftsbericht der Schweizerischen Gesandtschaft in Japan für das Jahr 1942", 1942, 53. [ODeTa].}

The Swiss regarded it as vital to maintaining amicable relations with Japan under any circumstances, not because of the current situation but for the future of its trade relations. The same observation also goes for Sweden. In summer 1941, its Minister in Tokyo, Widar Bagge, also thought that “total evacuation (…) seems excluded considering the financial interests of the companies.”\footnote{Telegram Bagge to KUD, dated September 5, 1941. In: RA, "Avgående Chiffertelegram", 1933-1942.} Accordingly, he helped Swedish companies to survive the war as far as possible, even functioning as a go-between for commercial negotiations with the Ministry of Finance—under who most Japanese trades had been quasi-nationalized. What was clear to the small Power neutrals was that the war between Japan and its enemies would not last forever and that for the sake of future relations the current situation had to be waited out. The bargain was a simple one; diplomatic services of last resort in return for friendly trade relations. If not now, then at least in the future. Their neutralities were, after all, supposed to guarantee the continuation of normal relations with every side of the war because to them, the war was a problem only among the belligerents.

In conclusion, it turns out that one of the guiding questions of this research—why did the small Power neutrals stay—was asked the wrong way around. After the considerations of the three case studies it is clear that the question at the time was the exact opposite; why should they have left? And the notion of Japan as an unimportant and distant belligerent was also misleading. Japan, after all, did matter. Just not as a
great Power threat. The Swiss example showed that even though Japan was not a major issue regarding security or commerce, Japan was—for the lack of a better word—normal. In the 1930s it was far from Switzerland’s largest trading partner, but it was the biggest in Asia and approximately on the same level as some of the smaller European states, like the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, or Portugal. Yes, there was nothing essential about the Empire that the Swiss would not have been able to replace elsewhere. There was no overarching geostrategic importance to it and no economic dependency. But then again, Japan was a global player and a great Power. So why would the Swiss have cut relations with it? Why would any neutral cut relations with a non-threatening country with an economy of average importance? That would neither have been in their interest nor would it have been according to the diplomatic practices of neutral states which were, after all, still those of the long nineteenth century.

To none of the neutrals in this study, neutrality was a reason to disengage with a world at war. On the contrary, it was the enabling factor to remain engaged with all sides. For Francoist Spain, Japan had always been a convenient bargaining chip and neutrality was the game to play in the same way as it was for great Powers who waited to see if (or when) to abandon neutrality to reap gains from ending the war—as the U.S.S.R. did. For Sweden and Switzerland, on the other hand, neutrality was a tool to stay in close contact even with remote Japan, the most important Power in Asia. In the end, the relationship between Japan and the neutrals during its wartime period is a striking example for the power of neutrality to help states maintain their own grand-strategic positions.
Bibliography

Primary Sources


———, (10) 052, CAJA 54/05137, Carpeta: Relativo a la Legación del Japón en Madrid y proyectos de este Gobierno, Note, "No title", Nota de Mendez de Vigo al Ministro de Estado, April 20, 1932.

———, (10) 052, CAJA 54/05133, Carpeta 1 - Informes Trimestrales a Estado, Trimestral Report, "Tokio, 13 de agosto de 1932", Informe Trimestral 2 - Del Ministro de España (Mendez de Vigo) al Ministro de Estado, August 13, 1932.

———, (10) 052, CAJA 54/05133, Carpeta 1 - Informes Trimestrales a Estado, Trimestral Report, "Tokio, 28 de abril de 1932", Informe Trimestral 1 - Del Ministro de España (Mendez de Vigo) al Ministro de Estado, April 28, 1932.

———, (10) 052, CAJA 54/05129, No 8, Note, "No 8", State Ministry to Legation in Tokyo, May 24, 1934.

———, (10) 052, CAJA 54/05129, No 60 - Asunto: Remite relación de los funcionarios adscritos a este Consulado., Note, "No 60 - Asunto: Remite relacion de los funcionarios adscritos a este Consulado", Chancellor of the Consulate to the Minister of State, December 27, 1934.


———, (10) 052, CAJA 54/05133, Grupo de carpetas 2 - Correspondencia en Kobe - Correspondencia con la legación en Tokio y correspondencia oficina, Note, "Encargado de Negocios Juan G. de Molina a Francisco de Asís Serrat, Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores", Asunto: Remite pliego del Señor Cónsul de la Nación en Kobe, November 19, 1936.

———, (10) 052, CAJA 54/05118, Carpeta: Consulado en Kobe - Certificados de Origen, Telegramas recibidos de la Legación en Tokio, Correspondencias varias, Contabilidad, Correspondencia con el Consulado en Yokohama, Impresos varios, Correspondencia de la Legación en Tokio con el Ma de Asuntos Exteriores, Telegram, "Telegrama de Méndez de Vigo al Consulado en Kobe ", April 14, 1936.

———, (10) 052, CAJA 54/05133, Grupo de carpetas 2 - Correspondencia en Kobe - Correspondencia con la legación en Tokio y correspondencia oficina, Note, "Consul Castillo solicitando trasladar el consulado de Kobe a Yokohama", Consulado de España en Kobe, January 12, 1937.

———, (10) 052, CAJA 54/05142, Telegram, "No 273 Asunto: Remite fichas ordenadas por circular numero 8", October 13, 1938.

———, (10) 052, CAJA 54/05137, Telegram, "Nota de Castillo donde informa que ofreció una cena a Moriya por su viaje a España. Dirigida al Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Salamanca", January 28, 1938.


———, (10) 052, CAJA 54/15903, Carpeta: Ruptura relaciones España-Japón, Telegram, "No. 21 - Asunto: Ruptura de relaciones diplomáticas con el Japón", April 21, 1945.


Declaration of London. 1909.


———, Bd. 8, Dok. 42, "CONSEIL FÉDÉRAL Procès-verbal de la séance du 25 février 1921", 1921, dodis.ch/44684.

———, Bd. 8, Dok. 153, "Le Ministre de Suisse à Tokyo, Ch. L. E. Lardy, au Département politique", December 30, 1921, dodis.ch/44795.

———, Bd. 8, Dok. 301, "CONSEIL FÉDÉRAL Procès-verbal de la séance du 3 décembre 1923", December 3, 1923, dodis.ch/44943.


———. Records of the Special Session of the Assembly: Convened in virtue of Article 15 of the Covenant at the Request of the Chinese Government: 1933.


———, SRS883, "MAGIC Summary No. 332", February 21, 1943.

———, SRS929, "MAGIC Summary No. 378", April 8, 1943.

———, SRS883, "MAGIC Summary No. 382", April 12, 1943.

———, SRS935, "MAGIC Summary No. 384", April 14, 1943.
———, SRS1066, "MAGIC Summary No. 516", August 24, 1943.
———, SRS1510, "MAGIC Summary No. 988", December 8, 1944.


———, Beskickningsarkiv Tokyo, SE/RA/230/230033.2/F2e/3, "Passansökningar och krigsfängeärenden", 1943, https://sok.riksarkivet.se/?Sokord=230033.2&EndastDigitaliserat=false&AvanceradSok=FAls&postid=Arkis+06239d54-6373-4443-afea-7015dd538635&tab=post&FacettState=undefined%3ac%7c&vol=n%2cn&s=Ba
lder.
1941",


U.S. National Archives, SRDJ74493, No 468, Telegram, "Without Title", October 12, 1944.


Web Pages


Newspapers


———. "Don Santiago Méndez de Vigo Méndez de Vigo Osoria y Oraà." February 26 1947, 19.

———. "NECROLOGICAS - Don Santiago Mendez de Vigo." February 26 1947, 16.


———. Various Articles, September 6 1939.


———. "Envoy to Tokyo Backs Rebels." August 27 1936, 2.


"Foreign Minister Invites Diplomatic Corps of Neutral Countries to Banquet." March 12 1944, 2.

Secondary Sources


Archivo General de la Administración, (10) 052, CAJA 54/05133, Carpeta 1 - Informes Trimestrales a Estado, Trimestral Report, "Tokio, 28 de abril de 1932", Informe Trimestral 1 - Del Ministro de España (Mendez de Vigo) al Ministro de Estado, April 28, 1932.


Carrellán Ruiz, Juan Luis. "Las Relaciones de España con Iberoamérica desde la Independencia a la Crisis de 1929 - El Caso de Chile." Master, Universidad Internacional de Andalucía, 2010.


Hébert, Jules. Portrait de Aimé Humbert. 1875.


Hilderbrand, Bengt, s.v. "Ewerlöf, släkt," (accessed 2017/08/06),


Oota, Ichirou, ed. Nihon Gaikoushi 24 - Daitoua Sensou: Sendyi Gaikou. Edited by
Longmans, Green and Co., 1912.
Longmans, Green and Co., 1912.
Oran, Baskın. Türk dış politikası : Kurtuluş savaşından bugüne olgular, belgeler,
Orvik, Nils. The Decline of Neutrality 1914-1941. With Special Reference to the United
States and the Northern Neutrals. Oslo: Johan Grundt Tanum Forlag, 1953.
Ottosson, Ingemar. Handel under Protest: Sverige och Japan på väg mot andra
———. "Trade under Protest: Sweden, Japan and the East Asian crisis in the 1930s."
2002.
Padelford, Norman J. "The International Non-Intervention Agreement and the Spanish
Foreign Relations: A History: Since 1895 Vol. 2. New York: Cengage Learning,
2009.
Payne, Stanley G. Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany, and World War II. New Haven
Perrenoud, Marc, s.v. "Gorgé, Camille," (accessed http://www.hls-dhs-
dss.ch/textes/d/D14848.php
Phillips, William. Ventures in Diplomacy. London: John Murray, Albemarle Street,
1955.
Pilapil, Vincente. "The Far East." In Spain in the twentyeht-century world: essays on
Spanish diplomacy, 1898–19781, edited by James W Cortada. Westport:
Greenwood Press, 980.
Powaski, Roland. Toward an Entangling Alliance: American Isolationism,
Rana, Kishan S. The 21st Century Ambassador: Plenipotentiary to Chief Executive.
Rappard, William E. "Small States in the League of Nations." Political Science
Quarterly 49 (1934): 544-75.
Reeves, John Pownall, Day, Colin, Garrett, Richard, and Calthorpe, David. The Lone
Flag: Memoir of the British Consul in Macao during World War II. Hong
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2015.


**Attribution of Pictures, Tables and Graphics**


———. *World War II. Tokyo civil internees camp No 2. Visit of the ICRC delegates to internees*. ICRC Audiovisual Archive, 1945. ICRC.
———. Picture of Camille Gorgé in Diplomatic Passport. Private Archives of the Family Gorgé, 1939.
———. Picture of Camille Gorgé and Wife Rose in the Japanese Alps, with Driver. Private Archives of the Family Gorgé, 1940/41.

Annex

Annex 1: Number of references to respective country in the Annual Report of the Swiss Federal Council (references to capital city in brackets)\(^{998}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1 (2)</td>
<td>2 (0)</td>
<td>21 (1)</td>
<td>24 (2)</td>
<td>25 (2)</td>
<td>26 (2)</td>
<td>52 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>9 (1)</td>
<td>9 (1)</td>
<td>17 (2)</td>
<td>41 (3)</td>
<td>40 (3)</td>
<td>41 (7)</td>
<td>71 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>66 (9)</td>
<td>107 (8)</td>
<td>116 (9)</td>
<td>97 (3)</td>
<td>104 (6)</td>
<td>118 (6)</td>
<td>276 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>44 (4)</td>
<td>59 (8)</td>
<td>73 (10)</td>
<td>67 (1)</td>
<td>98 (1)</td>
<td>61 (7)</td>
<td>104 (9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annex 2: Draft text of Japanese treaty proposal for a Neutrality Pact with the U.S.S.R.\(^{999}\)

Article the First.
1. Both contracting sides affirm that the basis of mutual relations between the two countries remains the Convention on basic principles of mutual relations between Japan and the U.S.S.R. signed on 20 January 1925 in Pekin.
2. Both contracting sides must maintain peaceful and friendly relations and respect their mutual territorial integrity.

Article the Second.
If one of the contracting sides, despite its peace-loving mode of action, is subjected to attack by a third power or several other powers, the other contracting side will observe neutrality for the entire duration of the conflict.

Article the Third.
This agreement is concluded for five years.

Counts refer to the German version of the reports and include searches for the adjective version of the countries considered. Criteria:
Japan = “japan”
U.S.A. = “usa” + “vereinigte staaten” + “amerika”—“südamerika”—“zentralamerika”
Germany = “deutsch”
Italy = „italien”—„kapitalien”
The results are approximations, derived from documents made machine readable through optical character recognition. The imperfection of the process results in some errors that might influence the above result. The results are however still valuable as an insight on the relative attention that the Swiss Government apparatus had to dedicate to them.

Annex 3:  Draft text of Japanese treaty proposal for a Non-Aggression Pact with the U.S.S.R.\textsuperscript{1000}

Article I.
The two sides bind themselves to mutually respect each other’s territorial rights and not to undertake any aggressive action in relation to the other side, neither separately nor in conjunction with one or several third powers.

Article II.
If one of the sides becomes the object of military action by one or several third powers, the other will not support these third powers in any way.

Article III.
The governments of both sides will in future maintain close contact with each other for exchange of information or for consultations on matters touching the common interests of both governments.

Article IV.
Neither side will participate in any grouping of powers directly or indirectly aimed against the other. Article V. If any disputes or conflicts of any kind arise between the sides, they will be resolved exclusively by peaceful means through amicable exchanges of views or if necessary by appointing a commission to regularize the conflicts.

Article VI.
This pact comes into force from the day of signature, and remains in force for ten years. If neither side denounces it a year before its expiration, the Pact will be considered automatically extended for the following five years.

\textsuperscript{1000} As cited in: ibid., 26.

Annex 4:  Final text of the “Neutrality Pact between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan.”

Article the First.
Both contracting sides bind themselves to maintain peaceful and amicable relations between themselves, and mutually to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the other contracting side.

Article the Second.
In the event that one of the contracting sides becomes the object of military operations by one or several third powers, the other contracting side will observe neutrality for the duration of the entire conflict.

Article the Third.
The present pact comes into force from the day of ratification by both contracting sides, and retains its force for a period of five years. If neither of the contracting sides denounces the pact a year before the date of expiration, it will be considered automatically prolonged for the next five years.

Article the Fourth.
The present pact is subject to ratification in the shortest possible time. Exchange of letters of ratification must take place in Tokyo, also in shortest possible time.

Done in Moscow 13 April 1941, corresponding to the 15th day of the 4th month of the 16th year of Showa.

V. Molotov
Iosuke Matsuoka
Yoshitsugu Tatekawa

Declaration

In conformity with the spirit of the Neutrality Pact concluded on 13 April 1941 between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, the Government of the U.S.S.R. and the Government of Japan, in the interests of ensuring peaceful and amicable relations between the two countries, officially state that the U.S.S.R. binds itself to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of Manchukuo, and Japan binds itself to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the Mongolian People’s Republic.

Moscow, 13 April 1941.

On behalf of the U.S.S.R. Government
For the Government of Japan

V. Molotov
Iosuke Matsuoka
Yoshitsugu Tatekawa


A.(Extr.)162.1932.VII.

The Assembly,

Considering that the Commission of Enquiry appointed by the Council stated in its unanimous report that, as regards the questions pending between the two parties, every possibility of peaceful settlement had not been explored before September 18th, 1931; that the relations between China and Japan were those of disguised war; and that the
military operations which were undertaken by the Japanese troops after September 18th, 1931, and which created these relations could not be regarded as measures of legitimate defence;
Considering that, in its unanimous report, the Commission of Enquiry stated it to be a fact that, without declaration of war, an important part of what was indisputably Chinese territory has been seized by force and occupied by the Japanese troops, and that, as a sequel to this operation, it has been separated and declared independent of the rest of China;
Considering that the Commission of Enquiry further stated in its unanimous report that the present regime in Manchuria could not be regarded as the outcome of a sincere and spontaneous movement of independence:
Observes that the vast operations and the military occupation which followed the events of September 18th, 1931, cannot be considered as measures of legitimate defence;
Observes that the regime set up in Manchuria has only been able to be carried into effect thanks to the presence of Japanese troops;
Observes that the recognition of the present regime in Manchuria is not compatible with existing international obligations;
Authorises the Committee of Nineteen to solicit the co-operation of the Governments of the United States of America and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the purpose of getting into touch with the parties with a view to ensuring a settlement of the dispute on the basis of the above-mentioned findings.

Annex 6: Draft Resolution Proposed by the Czechoslovak and Swiss Delegations\(^{1002}\)

The Assembly,

Having received the report of the Commission of Enquiry set up under the resolution adopted on December 10th, 1931, by the Council, together with the observations of the parties and the Minutes of the Council meetings held from November 21st to 28th, 1932; In view of the discussions which took place at its meetings from December 6th to …, 1932:

Requests the Special Committee appointed under its resolution of March 11th, 1932:

(1) To study the opinions expressed and suggestions made during those discussions and also the draft resolutions submitted to the Assembly;
(2) To draw up proposals with a view to the settlement of the dispute brought before it under the Council resolution dated February 19th, 1932;
(3) To submit these proposals to the Assembly at the earliest possible moment.

\(^{1002}\) Ibid., 168.
Annex 7: “Geneva Declaration of July 1, 1936” by Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland on their application of Article 16 of the Covenant

The Foreign Ministers of Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland have exchanged views on the effects of current events on the organisation and working of the League of Nations. They find themselves in agreement on the following points:

The aggravation of the international situation and the cases of resort to force that have occurred during the last few years, in violation of the Covenant of the League, have given rise in our countries to some doubt whether the conditions in which they undertook the obligations contained in the Covenant still exist to any satisfactory extent. We do not think it right that certain articles of the Covenant, especially the article dealing with the reduction of armaments, should remain a dead letter while other articles are enforced. Although events inevitably raise the question whether the principles of the Covenant are being adequately applied, we feel that every effort should be made to ensure the success of the experiment represented by the foundation of the League as an attempt to establish an international society based upon law.

In view of the gravity of the situation with which the League is faced, we recognise that it is necessary to consider whether the Covenant could be so amended, or its application so modified, as to increase the security of States, which it is its object to ensure. Should proposals be made for amendments to the Covenant, we are prepared to give them careful consideration. We realise, however, the practical difficulties that this method would involve. We therefore think that, unless any unforeseen contingency presents itself, it would be better to adhere to a procedure whereby the Assembly would lay down rules for the application of the Covenant.

In the first place, an agreement must be reached to make more definite preparations for the application of the rules in the Covenant which are designed to obviate any violation of its principles, by strengthening the preventive activities of the League. Though not forgetting that rules for the application of Article 16 were adopted in 1921, we would place it on record that, so long as the Covenant as a whole is applied only incompletely and inconsistently, we are obliged to bear that fact in mind in connection with the application of Article 16.

Secondly, the League's activities in all political and economic spheres, which have been partially paralysed by recent crises, must be resumed, and an attempt must be made to progress towards the solution of the main problems of the day.

Annex 8: Widar Bagge in 1928

Annex 9: Japanese Regulations pertaining the functions of protecting Powers in the Empire\textsuperscript{1005}

Note Verbale

Le Ministère Impérial des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur de faire savoir à la Légation de Suède à Tokyo qu'un règlement concernant les fonctions de la protection d’intérêts vient d’être arrêté comme suit afin de faciliter l’accomplissement des fonctions des fonctionnaires, résidant dans l’Empire, du Gouvernement Suédois chargé de protéger dans les territoires de l’Empire les intérêts de puissances actuellement en état de guerre ou de rupture diplomatique avec l'Empire, et que les autorités compétentes de l'Empire ont été averties de cette mesure:

Le représentant d'une tierce puissance, (agent diplomatique ou consulaire), à laquelle est confiée la protection des intérêts, dans les territoires du Japon, d'un pays en état de guerre ou de rupture diplomatique avec le Japon, peut assumer la protection des intérêts de ce pays dans les conditions suivantes, sous réserve de modifications à y apporter à la suite de changements de circonstances ou de traitement accordé au représentant du pays protecteur des intérêts du Japon dans ledit pays.

1. Le représentant du pays protecteur d'intérêts peut visiter le personnel diplomatique ou consulaire du pays intéressé, après communication préalable de l'heure de sa visite au

Ministre des Affaires étrangères, & Tokyo, et & la préfecture intéressée, dans une région autre que Tokyo. Cette entrevue aura lieu, si cela est jugé nécessaire, en présence d'un fonctionnaire du Ministre des Affaires étrangères, à Tokyo, et d'un fonctionnaire de la préfecture intéressée, dans une région autre que Tokyo.

2. Le représentant du pays protecteur d'intérêts peut prendre en mains directement du représentant de l'Ambassade, Légation ou Consulat du pays intéressé la gérance des édifices (y compris les archives, les documents officiels et les meubles) habités actuellement par les membres de l'Ambassade, Légation ou Consulat de ce pays. Il devra, en ce cas, présenter, aux autorités compétentes japonaises, copie de l'inventaire de ces édifices (y compris les archives, les documents officiels et les meubles) gardés actuellement par les autorités japonaises, seront passés sous la gérance du représentant du pays protecteur d'intérêts, en présence du représentant de l'Ambassade, Légation ou Consulat du pays intéressé, quand ce dernier se trouve sur le lieu; dans ce cas le représentant du pays Protecteur d'intérêts sera reçu de signer l'inventaire.

Le représentant du pays protecteur d'intérêts prendra sous sa responsabilité la gérance et la garde des édifices et des biens qui lui auront été confiés. Les autorités japonaises lui accorderont les facilités nécessaires. Toutefois ledit représentant devra obtenir préalablement l'approbation des autorités compétentes japonaises, quand il désire déplacer ailleurs les archives, les documents officiels ou les meubles. Le représentant du pays protecteur d'intérêts peut, avec l'approbation des autorités compétentes, faire résider un gérant dans les édifices en question, ou le charger de s'y rendre régulièrement, ou encore fermer clef et sceller ces édifices sans y désigner un gardien. Il devra obtenir préalablement l'approbation des autorités compétentes japonaises, s'il désire engager un gérant ou un gardien.

3. Le représentant du pays protecteur d'intérêts peut prêter ses bons offices ou porter secours aux agents diplomatiques ou consulaires du pays intéressé, dans les affaires touchant leur vie privée. Toutefois, quand il s'agit d'un acte financier, le représentant devra se conformer aux dispositions du règlement sur le contrôle des transactions se rapportant aux étrangers et se mettre Préalablement en liaison avec le Ministère des Affaires étrangères.

4. Le représentant du pays protecteur d'intérêts peut se faire renseigner sur les ressortissants du pays intéressé (y compris les détenus et les arrêtés) résidant au Japon. Quand l'Ambassade, Légation ou Consulat du pays Protecteur d'intérêts désire exercer le service se rapportant à l'état civil ou aux attestations concernant les ressortissants du pays intéressé, il devra obtenir préalablement l'approbation des autorités japonaises compétentes.

5. La Gérance, le transfert et la liquidation des biens faits pour les ressortissants du pays en guerre ou en rupture diplomatique avec le Japon (y compris les détenus et les arthèses), ainsi que l'assistance financière à ces ressortissants, seront régis par les lois et règlements japonais en vigueur, à savoir la Loi sur l'administration des biens ennemis, le Règlement sur le contrôle des transactions se rapportant aux étrangers, etc.

Le 6 mars, 1942.
Annex 10: Aggregated Import & Export Data for Sweden (1908–1939)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th></th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>120384</td>
<td>2274429</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>930000</td>
<td>21449000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>429655</td>
<td>3292272</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>777000</td>
<td>17444000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1017854</td>
<td>5565245</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>1014000</td>
<td>21006000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>649609</td>
<td>5866020</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>1074000</td>
<td>16264000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>478260</td>
<td>6359450</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>1254000</td>
<td>15631000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>651000</td>
<td>7002000</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>1918000</td>
<td>15579000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>450000</td>
<td>6325000</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>4273000</td>
<td>10992000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>1083000</td>
<td>10374000</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>2912000</td>
<td>14036000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>4687000</td>
<td>14943000</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>3615000</td>
<td>12770000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>41000</td>
<td>7886000</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>4882000</td>
<td>16144000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>45185</td>
<td>13111113</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>7945000</td>
<td>22801000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>19194051</td>
<td>33536226</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>8927000</td>
<td>21924000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>14523000</td>
<td>31572000</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>10613000</td>
<td>26099000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>810439</td>
<td>21936384</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>12662000</td>
<td>46871000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>1147805</td>
<td>17509712</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>12097000</td>
<td>25747000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>1545000</td>
<td>17957000</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>10856000</td>
<td>27663000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annex 11: Aggregated Import & Export Data for Spain (1911–1943)¹⁰⁰⁷

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Export</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>933000</td>
<td>96000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>635000</td>
<td>168000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>630000</td>
<td>78000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>681022</td>
<td>104269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>1088903</td>
<td>369305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>1584156</td>
<td>481375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>916114</td>
<td>7821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>646681</td>
<td>4200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>3682814</td>
<td>252731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>5247000</td>
<td>399101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>3018000</td>
<td>678000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>3794000</td>
<td>866000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>1946000</td>
<td>2002000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>1924000</td>
<td>1164000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>1758000</td>
<td>1341000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>2096000</td>
<td>662000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Export</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>2998000</td>
<td>1695000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>3958000</td>
<td>585000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>4223000</td>
<td>780000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1170000</td>
<td>1044000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>1174000</td>
<td>1870000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>1242000</td>
<td>2942000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>2600000</td>
<td>2400000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>3313000</td>
<td>3001000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>Civil War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>Civil War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>Civil War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>Civil War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>642000</td>
<td>14207000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>30000</td>
<td>7825000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>42000</td>
<td>7000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>162000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Spanish imports & exports form/to Japan 1911–1943

---

471
Annex 12: Aggregated Import & Export Data for Switzerland (1901–1946)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>8728000</td>
<td>5987000</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>3450000</td>
<td>6710000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>8648000</td>
<td>5635000</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>1990000</td>
<td>4720000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>7433000</td>
<td>7279000</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>1610000</td>
<td>5600000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>8192000</td>
<td>6734000</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>2720000</td>
<td>4290000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>8487000</td>
<td>10909000</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>2640000</td>
<td>5590000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>12741000</td>
<td>1630000</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>1240000</td>
<td>4480000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>10693000</td>
<td>11445000</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>9900000</td>
<td>3390000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>8139000</td>
<td>9969000</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>7100000</td>
<td>2520000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>11767000</td>
<td>8277000</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>6600000</td>
<td>1560000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>12597000</td>
<td>7504000</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>4300000</td>
<td>9400000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>15621000</td>
<td>9395000</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>5800000</td>
<td>9000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>15712000</td>
<td>8496000</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>6500000</td>
<td>1160000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>19257000</td>
<td>8816000</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>7800000</td>
<td>1220000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>9566000</td>
<td>6171000</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>1510000</td>
<td>2060000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>16138000</td>
<td>6610000</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>1200000</td>
<td>3290000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>20381000</td>
<td>11465000</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1180000</td>
<td>1330000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>33158000</td>
<td>13516000</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1010000</td>
<td>1410000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>73694000</td>
<td>21325000</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>1040000</td>
<td>4500000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>61572000</td>
<td>30500000</td>
<td>1942</td>
<td>1700000</td>
<td>2220000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>32600000</td>
<td>48300000</td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>700000</td>
<td>3000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>10900000</td>
<td>53400000</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>400000</td>
<td>200000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>24500000</td>
<td>41800000</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>400000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>9700000</td>
<td>61700000</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>4000000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annex 13: Data Set Trade Volume Comparison for Switzerland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1917</th>
<th>1918</th>
<th>1919</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1922</th>
<th>1923</th>
<th>1924</th>
<th>1925</th>
<th>1926</th>
<th>1927</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brasil</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[1009\] In Million Swiss Francs. Compiled from the annual statistical yearbooks: ibid.
Annex 14: Neutral State’s Representation of Foreign Interests in and for Japan

This list is the result of the comparison of Japanese, Swiss, Swedish and Spanish sources on the representation of foreign interests. The sources do not always match.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japanese Representation in Country</th>
<th>Country Representation in Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beginning of War Changed to (in year)</td>
<td>Beginning of War Changed to (in year)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. Territories</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S. (Mainland)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. (Mainland)</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Samoa</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British Dominions and Territories</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Great Britain</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Australia</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canada</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New Zealand</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fiji &amp; Western Islands</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji &amp; Western Islands</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>West Samoa</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Samoa</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other British Pacific</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other British Pacific</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1012 Bagge’s Telegrafic correspondence. See the documents of the Riksarkivet, cited in Bibliography
1013 Rodao, "Relaciones Hispano-Japonesas, 1937-1945."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Islands¹⁰¹⁴</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burma (Myanmar)</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceylon (Sri Lanka)</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India - Western Territories (from Bombay)</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India (Eastern Territories)</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenia</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanganyika</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zanzibar</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other British Protectorates in Africa (Nyassaland, Pemba, Seychelles)¹</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>Switzerland (16.12.41)</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Switzerland (April 1945)</td>
<td>Switzerland (27.12.41)</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Sweden (29.6.1945)</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Switzerland (April 1945)</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Sweden (April 1945)</td>
<td>Switzerland (9.2.42)</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Switzerland (April 1945)</td>
<td>Switzerland (23.12.41)</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Switzerland (April 1945)</td>
<td>Switzerland (14.1.42)</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Sweden (April 1945)</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹⁰¹⁴ Switzerland was also asked to represent Great Britain in the Straits Settlements, Hong Kong, the Malay states and Borneo, but could not do so officially anymore after their occupation by Japan because the latter refused representation in occupied territories.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Representation</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Previous Representation</th>
<th>Change Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Switzerland (April 1945)</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Sweden (6.2.1942)</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Switzerland (April 1945)</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Switzerland (April 1945)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Switzerland (April 1945)</td>
<td>Switzerland (14.1.42)</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>Switzerland (8.1.42)</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Sweden (April 1945)</td>
<td>Switzerland (23.1.42)</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>Sweden (17.4.1942)</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Switzerland (18.5.1942)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Sweden (29.1.1943)</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Switzerland (1.2.1943)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Switzerland (1943)</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Sweden (28.1.1944)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Sweden (29.6.1945)</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Sweden (25.5.1944)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Sweden (30.9.1944)</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Sweden (29.9.1944)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Sweden (6.10.1944)</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Switzerland (1945)</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Switzerland (1945)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Switzerland (April 1945)</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Switzerland (14.8. 1945)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Sweden (31.7.1945)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1015 CH-BAR, "Vertretung Spanischer Interessen in Japan", 1945.  
Also: Jahresbericht der Legation 1946. 36.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Change 1</th>
<th>Change 2</th>
<th>Change 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>NONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>NONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>NONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>NONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle East</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>French Mandate of Syria and Lebanon</strong></td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Others</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>Switzerland (18.12.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch East Indies</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch West Indies (Netherlands Antilles)</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Caledonia</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Territories in the Pacific</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-French joint Territories</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hebrides (Vanuatu)</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/A = Not Applicable