2026-03-08T03:45:34Z https://grips.repo.nii.ac.jp/oai

oai:grips.repo.nii.ac.jp:02000134 2024-09-20T04:40:43Z 1:1712910681242

The Effect of Competition on Corruption: Evidence from Contractors' Internal Records AAMER, Shahid LITSCHIG, Stephan Rents competition corruption bribery public works https://www.grips.ac.jp/list/en/facultyinfo/litschig-stephan/ This paper investigates the extent to which competition for public contracts reduces projectlevel rents and bribe payments to public officials. Water supply and sanitation project contractors for the provincial government of Punjab in Pakistan were interviewed on the condition of anonymity and gave access to 237 project-level construction ledgers. Under collusion, contractors pay about 15 percent of the project budget in kickbacks on average. Under competition for the contract, the winning bid and associated available rents go down by about 11 percentage points. Even under competition, public officials take almost 10 percent of the project budget in bribes. JEL Classification Codes: D73, D78, H41, H83, K42 We acknowlededge financial support for data collection from the Japanese Society for the Promotion of Science (Kakenhi 25101002, "Emerging State Project SONOBE A01 Group"). GRIPS Policy Research Center 2024-09-20 eng technical report AM https://doi.org/10.24545/0002000134 https://grips.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/2000134 10.24545/0002000134 GRIPS Discussion Papers 24-10 https://grips.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/2000134/files/DP24-10.pdf application/pdf 843.8 KB 2024-09-20