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        <identifier>oai:grips.repo.nii.ac.jp:00000952</identifier>
        <datestamp>2023-11-20T09:00:48Z</datestamp>
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          <dc:title>Egoist's Dilemma: A DEA Game</dc:title>
          <dc:creator>NAKABAYASHI, Ken</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>TONE, Kaoru</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject>Game theory</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>cooperative game</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>DEA</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>variable weight</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Shapley value</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>nucleolus</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>assurance region method</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>cost allocation</dc:subject>
          <dc:description>https://www.grips.ac.jp/list/facultyinfo/tone_kaoru/</dc:description>
          <dc:description>This paper deals with problems of consensus-making among individuals or organizations with multiple criteria for evaluating their performance when the players are supposed to be egoistic, in the sense that each player sticks to his superiority regarding the criteria. We analyze this situation within the framework or concept developed in data envelopment analysis (DEA). This leads to a dilemma called the 'egoist's dilemma.' We examine this dilemma using cooperative game theory and propose a solution. The scheme developed in this paper can also be applied to attaining fair cost allocations as well as benefit-cost distributions.</dc:description>
          <dc:description>Research supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C) Japan Society for the Promotion of Science</dc:description>
          <dc:description>technical report</dc:description>
          <dc:publisher>GRIPS Policy Research Center</dc:publisher>
          <dc:type>AM</dc:type>
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