

**博士論文審査結果報告**  
**Report on Ph.D. / Doctoral Dissertation Defense**

National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)  
 Associate Professor Stephan Litschig

審査委員会を代表し、以下のとおり審査結果を報告します。

On behalf of the Doctoral Thesis Review Committee, I would like to report the result of the Ph. D. / Doctoral Dissertation Defense as follows.

学位申請者氏名 Ph.D. Candidate	Aamer Shahid		
学籍番号 ID Number	PHD15401		
プログラム名 Program	GRIPS Global Governance Program (G-cube)		
審査委員会 Doctoral Thesis Review Committee	主査 Main referee	Stephan LITSCHIG	主指導教員 Main advisor
	審査委員 Referee	園部 哲史 SONOBE, Tetsushi	副指導教員 Sub advisor
	審査委員 Referee	Boo Teik, KHOO	副指導教員 Sub advisor
	審査委員 Referee	恒川 恵市 TSUNEKAWA, Keiichi	博士課程委員会委員長代理 Acting chairperson of the Doctoral Programs Committee
	審査委員 Referee	Anh, TRAN  Associate Professor, Indiana University	外部審査委員 Referee from outside institutions
論文タイトル Dissertation Title	Measuring Corruption in Public Works Projects: Evidence from Contractors' Internal Records in Punjab, Pakistan		
(タイトル和訳)※ Title in Japanese	公共工事関係の汚職の測定：パキスタン・パンジャブにおける請負企業の内部資料に基づく事例研究		
学位名 Degree Title	博士（政策研究） Ph.D. in Advanced Policy Studies		
論文提出日 Submission Date of the Draft Dissertation	2018年 5月11日	論文審査会開催日 Date of the Doctoral Thesis Review Committee	2018年 6月8日
論文発表会開催日 Date of the Defense	2018年 6月8日	論文最終版提出日 Submission Date of the Final Dissertation	2018年 9月5日
審査結果 Result	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around;"> <span style="border: 1px solid black; border-radius: 50%; padding: 5px;">合格 Pass</span> <span>不合格 Failure</span> </div>		

※タイトルが英文の場合、文部科学省に報告するため、和訳を付してください

If the title is in English, please translate in Japanese in order to report MEXT.

## **1. 論文要旨 Thesis overview and summary of the presentation.**

Government officials in many countries stand accused of corruption but hard evidence on the extent of corruption is notoriously difficult to come by. Previous systematic studies on corruption have been based mostly on expert outsider assessments of public officials' activities, for example through external audits of government construction projects or public procurement contracts. While such studies are typically able to indicate the presence of corruption, pinpointing the magnitude in monetary terms is often difficult. The study closest to this thesis measures corruption based on the internal records of one anonymous government contractor and finds an average bribe of about 15% of product cost. The main limitation of that study is that it is unclear whether the findings generalize to government contractors in general.

Aamer Shahid's dissertation quantifies corruption in water and sanitation projects commissioned by the Public Health Engineering Department (PHED) of Punjab, Pakistan. The focus on infrastructure projects is guided by two main considerations: First, such projects are very common not only in Punjab and Pakistan but in developing countries more generally. Second, corruption in water and sanitation projects may adversely affect the quality of these projects and thus the quality of drinking water. The candidate collected data on bribe payments from internal records of 28 PHED contractors and 237 projects. While a personal connection provided access to the records of one contractor as in the study above, Aamer made arrangements to contact a total of 48 additional contractors from all districts in Punjab. Although both paying and receiving bribes is illegal in Pakistan, CEOs tend to view themselves as victims and prosecutions focus almost exclusively on public officials, not on contractors. This may explain why 27 of 48 contacted CEOs were willing to give access to their records and be interviewed for his thesis on the condition of anonymity. To the extent that CEOs who pay more bribes are less likely to reveal their records, bribes in the sample of 28 participating CEOs will represent a lower bound on bribery in PHED projects.

In addition to quantitative data on project cost, bribes, and profits, the candidate also collected qualitative data based on interviews with contracting firms' CEOs, PHED engineers, and beneficiaries of water supply projects. Moreover, the study also measures the quality of contract execution in 20 water supply projects based on an independent engineer's assessment of the extent to which project specifications were followed. Last but not least, the thesis also aims to test whether the presence of a new regional office of Pakistan's anticorruption authority reduced bribes and improved the quality of public works projects.

Both quantitative and qualitative evidence suggest that the level of bribes depends heavily on whether the contract was awarded competitively or effectively by the engineer in charge of the project. Only about one-third of contracts in the sample were awarded competitively. Without competition, PHED contractors on average pay about 15% of the project budget in bribes. About 12% is paid to the engineering department and about 3% is paid directly to the politicians who sponsored the project. When there is competition for the contract, the average total bribe percentage is only about 10%, with 8.5% going to the department and 1.5% going to politicians on average. The results of the study with respect to the deterrent effect of the new anti-corruption office on bribes are inconclusive.

The thesis defense went well. The candidate gave a clear presentation and responded well to questions. For example, one reviewer questioned whether the bribes data could have been fabricated by the contractors. Aamer explained that contractors had little incentive to do so and that each contractor showed him the original project books which Aamer then digitized.

## **2. 審查報告 Notes from the Doctoral Thesis Review Committee (including changes required to the thesis by the referees)**

The members of the committee agreed that the substantive contribution of the thesis fulfils the requirements for the PhD. The external reviewer was the most enthusiastic, perhaps because he is also the author of the only other study using internal records to measure bribes mentioned above. He emphasized two main contributions: first, the approach of reaching out to other bribe-paying CEOs through a contact and second, conducting stake-holder interviews not only with contractors but also with corrupt officials and project beneficiaries. At the same time, all referees agreed that the institutional context needed to be further fleshed out and the contribution clarified. The most important criticisms by the referees were as follows:

1. The challenge of objective and systematic measurement of corruption was not sufficiently established through direct excerpts from prior literature.
2. The reason for being able to study corruption from the inside, namely the personal connection, was not properly acknowledged.
3. The study is driven by the availability of the data through connections, which limits what we can learn about corruption.
4. Institutional background on Punjab, the PHED and contractors was insufficient.
5. The introduction was hard to follow and did not lead naturally to the research questions addressed in the thesis.
6. Examining whether the presence of the new regional anti-corruption office reduced bribery was premature since it had only been two years since its establishment.
7. The thesis concluded with an idea for a reform proposal that was too speculative.

The committee decided that the required revisions would be checked again by its members within one month after re-submission.

**3. 最終提出論文確認結果 Confirmation by the Main Referee that changes have been done to the satisfaction of the referees**

Aamer submitted his revision on July 31 2018. The referees were not fully satisfied and requested another round of minor revisions. On September 5 2018 the final version was turned in and the main advisor found the dissertation satisfactory.

**4. 最終審查結果 Final recommendation**

The doctoral thesis review committee recommends that GRIPS award the degree of Ph.D. in Advanced Policy Studies to Mr. Aamer Shahid.