COORDINATION AND COOPERATION PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC OFFICES: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY IN TANZANIA

A Dissertation

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Nicolaus Herman Shombe

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Abstract

A weak state and poorly functioning public sector is one of the constraints to achieving socioeconomic development in many developing countries. Policy making organizations such as government ministries, which are the core part of public service delivery, have not received much attention by researchers mainly due to difficulties in observing and measuring individual performance. Using a novel field survey data of 252 officers drawn from central government while utilizing the coordination experimental studies of game theory, this dissertation investigates the nature and sources of inefficiencies and their correlates in 63 public offices of 21 ministries in Tanzania. The study focuses on the two important basic and daily activities of government officials: formal office meetings and document filing. The empirical findings suggest that workers are trapped in unproductive meetings and poor filing while better situation is achievable with coordination and cooperation. Workers tend to be late to the meetings when they believe that their coworkers will equally be late. Eventually, such meetings start late and remain unproductive. Moreover, regardless of the length of the meetings and free participation in discussion, meetings are likely to be ineffective if workers perceive that their ideas are ignored. Likewise, despite the fact that filing is being guided by national laws, the findings suggest that the actual workers' actions towards filing, depend on the belief on others' behavior on document filing. Also, the dissertation finds that effective leadership, frequency of communication, and incentives have a strong relationship with the quality of office meetings and document filing. Overall, the findings suggest that adoption of various practical policy measures, which have a potential to induce good leadership and effective communication, is vital.

Summary of the Dissertation

The capacity of the state to efficiently deliver public goods and services is critical for achieving socioeconomic development of a country. Admittedly, until present, state capacity remains weak in many countries, especially in developing countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). A number of studies have been conducted to explain the nature and sources of incapability in public sector in developing countries. However, most of these studies focused on organizations which provide public services such as schools and hospitals, or individuals such as teachers and doctors. In contrast, services provided by public policy making organizations such as the Ministry offices in the Central government are much more difficult to define, observe, and hence measure. This might explain the absence of rigorous studies focusing on public policy making organization in the literature.

Motivated by the existing gaps in the literature, this study attempts to investigate the nature and sources of inefficiency in central government offices. It focuses on the two basic and important activities of government officials. These are formal meetings and paper document files. Traditionally, governments have been functioning through meetings and documents. Hence, efficient meetings and filing should ideally lay the foundation for effective governments. However, both workers and leaders often complain about unproductive meetings and poor document filing.

The abovementioned situation resembles coordination failure which is widely studied in the laboratory experiments. Such experimental studies have established that coordination failure is the common cause of inefficiencies and poor workplace productivity. Additionally, those studies have established that leadership, communication, group size, and incentives are

correlated with coordination failures. Nonetheless, these correlates have not been tested in the real work environment. I collected data on office plenary meetings and office document files in 63 offices from 21 ministries in Tanzania. A total of 63 supervisors and 189 frontline workers were interviewed in this survey.

As shown in chapter 3 of the dissertation, workers in the government ministries in Tanzania on average spend at least four office hours per week for the plenary workplace meetings only. Such meetings customarily start late, haphazardly prepared, and provide unsatisfactory information. The descriptive results further show that there are significant differences between supervisors and their subordinates in terms of the reported number of meetings per week, satisfaction with office meeting outcomes, the frequency of communication, and extent of punctuality. Also, there are some significant differences across departments in the same ministry in terms of the quality of the meeting practices.

To advance the analyses, I implemented regression analyses. The results, in chapter 3, show that leadership by example, leaders' communication, and workers communication about punctuality can significantly reduce unpunctuality to the meetings. Intriguingly, the results show that although workers dislike meetings which start late, meeting lateness is a common practice and that one of the main causes of lateness is late arrivals. The finding is confirmed by regression results which suggest that lateness is likely to increase when workers are late and vice versa. The finding implies that the chronic meeting lateness represents a suboptimal equilibrium of a game in Tanzania's government offices. Also, in all scenarios, findings show that meetings tend to be more unproductive when starting late.

Chapter 4 explores the factors associated with the amount of time workers spend to search for a working file when needed, length of time to find document(s) within the file, and extent of incidences of misfiling of official documents. I find that government office workers tend to spend a significant amount of office time searching for working files and in most cases, documents are missing in the appropriate files. In fact, about 90 percent of workers admitted that they are not satisfied with filing situation in their offices. Surprisingly, however, only 20 percent of workers reported to complying with the filing guidelines. Furthermore, the estimates show that there is significant difference between leaders and workers on the extent of filing problems and workers actions. Also, there is significant difference between departments in terms of the filing problems whereby offices with less filing problems are the one which experienced more leadership by example (i.e., leaders themselves demonstrated filing in their offices).

The estimations results indicate that worker's actions on filing, office leadership, and frequentness of communication about proper filing are the main correlates of quality of filing. However, a larger office, which is defined by the number of workers, is likely to have more filing problems than a smaller office. Unexpectedly, the effect of incentives (reward and sanctions) was found to be insignificantly correlated with file tracing time and incidences of missing documents but not with disarrangement of documents in the file. One possible explanation is that monitoring is less difficult to detect individuals who filed wrongly in the file than to tracing who caused missing documents or removed document from the folder.

Interestingly, the presence of filing standing rules and guidelines in the office has no independent role on the quality of filing but it complements the leadership input. Thus,

leadership matters, particularly when it is institutionalized (e.g., establishment of rules and laws). These findings together, are consistent with the existing literature from laboratory coordination games which suggest that inefficient practices in the government offices are somehow similar to coordination failure.

To the best of my knowledge, the existing literature in economics, public administration, and political science is almost lacking detailed empirical evidence suggesting coordination failure as the sources of poor performance of government offices in developing countries. Specifically, the literature has neither associated government office incapability with strategic interactions of government office workers nor coordination failure. There are two closely related research to my dissertation. First, is a recent study by Nsubuga, (2017) which suggest that coordinating failure exist in the government offices in Uganda. Second, is more recent work by Mhede, (2018) which studied communication as part of management practices in government agencies in Tanzania. This study found that public offices have communication problem which is a critical input toward coordination. However, these studies did not take up concrete examples such as meetings and files. In this dissertation, I have provided detailed analysis as well as different interpretations on those typical examples.

The main contribution of my dissertation is fourfold. First, it contributes to the scholarly literature on the public sector performance by attempting to provide empirical evidence of source of inefficiencies in government offices based on the detailed survey data. Second, it focuses on the actual policymaking organization at the lowest level of public administration in the ministries, which is an important workplace where most of day-to-day functions of government take place. Third, the study focuses on the key mechanisms by

which governments coordinate workers activities and considers public servants as a group of people interacting strategically and use game theory interpretation to provide evidence of coordination failure from the field. Forth, and last, the empirical findings in chapters 3 and 4 have policy implications. I discuss such policy issues in chapter 5 of the dissertation.

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Dedication

To my Family

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Nicolaus Herman Shombe

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The capacity of the state to deliver public goods efficiently is critical for long-run socio-economic development of a country (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2005; Besley & Ghatak, 2007). Despite its importance, this capacity remains weak in many countries, especially in developing countries in Sab-Sahara Africa (SSA) (e.g., Botero, Ponce, & Shleifer, 2013; Peters, 2010; Pollitt, 2003). Reflecting the importance of the issue, a growing number of studies have examined the phenomenon of weak state capacity in these countries (e.g., Besley & Ghatak, 2007; Collier & Gunning, 1999; Crook, 2010; Rasul & Rogger, 2018).

Many of these studies focus on public services provided by teachers, healthcare workers, and police officers and measure the behaviors and performances of these service providers. Compared with education, healthcare, and security services, those services provided by the ministry offices in the central government are much more difficult to define, and observe, and hence measure. There is naturally a dearth of successful studies exploring the nature and causes of inefficiency of central government offices in developing countries, with a few exceptions, such as the work of Rasul & Rogger (2018) and Nsubuga (2017) . Rasul and Rogger use rarely collected information, specifically, information on engineering assessments of completion rates of a large number of civil service projects, together with a management survey of bureaucrats in charge of these projects. Nsuba's dissertation used government officials' survey data to investigate coordination failure in the government of Uganda.

The present study attempts to investigate the nature of inefficiency in central government offices by focusing on basic and daily activities of officers; specifically, office meetings and documents filing. Officers shape ideas about making, implementing, and evaluating policies through meetings and share within a department or ministry, if not the government as a whole, the same understanding about policy issues through meetings so that they can function as an organization. Filing of government documents is gradually being replaced by computer systems, but it still plays important roles in sharing, storing, and retrieving information in virtually every government office (Eyre, 1989; Hull, 2012; Rogger, 2017). Efficient meetings and filing should ideally lay the foundation for the efficient functioning of central government offices.

To obtain information on the practices related to office meeting and filing, I interviewed 252 officers from 21 ministries in the central government of Tanzania. Among the 252 respondents, 63 were supervisors and the rest were workers under these supervisors. Tanzania is one of the countries in SSA, where state capacity is said to be grossly deficient (e.g., Besley & Ghatak, 2007; Collier & Gunning, 1999; Crook, 2010a; ECA, 2014; Girishankar & Migliorisi, 2013; Therkildsen, 2000). I chose Tanzania for my case study because I had, as a government officer there, a rapport with some leaders of the ministries, without which it would be impossible to obtain permission to collect vital and sensitive information on meetings and filing in central government offices.

From these interviews, I learned that the majority of officers complain that their office meetings did not provide sufficient information, and that they spent large amount of time searching for files and pages in files in their offices. Since I have information on meeting and

filing practices neither in the private sector in Tanzania, nor in the public sector in other countries, I cannot compare the situation that I found in the Tanzanian government and the situation in other places. Still, it is clear that many government offices fail to have productive meetings and efficient filing practices.

The question arises as to why workers and supervisor in the same office do not change their ways. While Tanzania used to be under a socialist regime, it has not embraced tyranny or surveillance. Risk of reprisal, if any, is small when government officers express their true opinions to their colleagues. The leaders of ministries, such as permanent secretaries, who allowed me to interview their subordinates wanted to see improvement in managing office meetings and filing practices. It is noteworthy that the study did not find any major structural impediments or regulations preventing officers from improving their inefficient ways of conducting meetings and filing records. Moreover, they are far from uneducated people: they went to school for an average of 17.5 years, and many have master's degrees. Thus, inefficiencies in organizing meetings and filing can hardly be ascribed to less educated workers. What then accounts for the unproductive meetings and poor filing practices perpetuated by these officers?

Such a situation is reminiscent of the concept of coordination failure, which has been discussed in the vast literature on game theory and laboratory experiments of weak-link games (e.g., Brandts and Cooper, 2007; Cartwright, Gillet, & Van Vugt, 2013). In a weak-link game, there are multiple equilibria that are Pareto-ranked; that is, every player prefers an equilibrium to another or is at least indifferent between the two equilibria. Coordination

failure refers to the situation in which the players are trapped in the inferior (or Pareto-dominated) equilibrium because they fail to coordinate to achieve the superior one[1].

It seems reasonable to interpret unproductive meetings in government offices in Tanzania as a kind of coordination failure. This may happen when each officer in an office is too pessimistic about the behavior of his or her colleagues and supervisor. For example, all officers think that their colleagues will show up twenty or thirty minutes late for an office meeting because office meetings in the past always started at least twenty minutes late. Each officer knows of the possible benefits from discussion, if a meeting starts on time. Nonetheless, someone chooses to show up late because they are sure that they would have been kept waiting had they arrived on time for the meeting. As a result, they arrive late, and the same applies to each of their colleagues. Thus, the late start of the meeting reinforces everyone's pessimism over the behavior of their colleagues.

Moreover, even if there is plenty of time for the meeting, it will likely not be as productive without the active participation of relevant office members. Each member, however, maybe unwilling to provide his or her ideas or information if they think other members will not appreciate and improve on ideas under discussion. Their pessimism will make their meeting unproductive thereby fulfilling their pessimism. Thus, it is not individual

[1] Coordination is a broadly used term in many fields and normally there is mix up between coordination, cooperation and collaboration. These three terms may mean different things depending on the discipline of study but from a game-theoretical perspective, the main difference depends on the structure of the situation or payoff. Cooperation can happen in a situation with conflicting interests of actors but they opt for an action that is suboptimal for themselves but superior for the collective. Collaboration simply mean doing something together regardless of the structure whether there is a conflict or not. Coordination does not require a situation with conflicting interests between actors it happens in a situation where there several options that are individually and collectively optimal, but actors need to coordinate their actions in order to reach an optimal outcome.

ability but perception about the colleagues' behavior that matters. If their perception can be coordinated, they will be able to have productive meetings.

This interpretation based on the concept of coordination failure seemed to sound natural to those leaders of the ministries who encouraged me to interview their officers. For many readers, however, it would raise an obvious question as to why officers fail to coordinate. When a new office is created, a coordination failure may take place initially. The officers, however, work together every day, often for a year or more. How do such failures continue to exist? Game theorists have conducted a number of laboratory experiments of weak-link games with different structures in terms of the number of players, their payoffs, the number of sessions they play, and so on, using university students or post-graduate students as experiment subjects (e.g., Brandts, Cooper, & Weber, 2014; Cartwright et al., 2013; Dong, Montero, & Passajennikov, 2017). One common finding from these experiments is that the probability of coordination failure remains positive if the same weak-link game is played repeatedly by the same set of players, even though repetition reduces the probability.

This literature has also found that coordination failure is commonly associated with communication among group members, such as pre-play and cheap talk (e.g., Brandts & Cooper, 2007; Levy, Padgitt, Peart, Houser, & Xiao, 2011), leadership practices and legitimacy (e.g., Brandts et al., 2014; Cartwright et al., 2013), and incentives including both rewards or punishments (e.g., Brandts & Cooper, 2006a; Hamman, Rick, & Weber, 2007). The literature has further found that coordination failure increases with number of players (e.g., Van Huyck, Battalio, & Beil, 1990; Weber, 2006, to mention but a few).

Of course, the situation in real offices is very different from laboratory experiments. The design of a laboratory experiment is often intended to replicate some essential features of actual workplaces where workers play complementary roles, but there remain considerable differences. While unproductive meetings of government officers working in the same office look like a coordination failure, they might not be the same as the coordination failure defined in the game theory or the setting of any laboratory experiment of weak-link games. A resemblance between unproductive meetings and coordination failure does not guarantee that those findings about coordination obtained in the game theory and experiment literature hold true for the low productivity of real meetings. Admittedly, study by Nsubuga, (2017) suggest that coordinating failure exist in the government offices in Uganda.

This study asks whether these findings from the game literature on coordination failure hold true for office meetings. The question is confronted with the data collected from 252 officers through structured interviews. As to the issue of disorganized filing, the situation seems less similar to the coordination failure than unproductive meetings. As discussed in Chapter 4 below, it may be similar to the Prisoners' Dilemma rather than coordination failure. In other words, officers may have an incentive to free-ride on the effort of other members of their office to keep files neat and tidy with such a free-riding incentive, players find it always better to cheat on other players whether the other players cooperate with them or cheat on them. As a result, the players are unlikely to achieve a preferable outcome but likely to end up with the miserable outcome, which is the only pure-strategy equilibrium. By contrast, players of weak-link games are not doomed to failure because a desirable outcome in which players help each other is one of the multiple equilibria. Chapter 4, however, considers the

possibility that a supervisor changes the rules of the game or incentive structure for office workers by, say, introducing punishment for those officers whose disorganized filing practices are too much to tolerate. Chapter 4 attempts to test the hypothesis that even for filing practices, the same findings from laboratory experiments of weak-link games, such as the roles of communication and leadership by example, hold true because such punishment will change the payoff (or incentive) structure among officers into the one similar to a weak-link game.

Although the data set used in this study includes objective and reliable information (in the sense that it is not about distant past), most of the data are subjective and self-reported. This, therefore, runs the risk of social desirability and reference biases (Podsakoff, Mackenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). For example, workers might have provided biased opinions about their office practices or supervisor. Likewise, the same rating may have a different interpretation to different people. For instance, older or long tenure workers might generally report higher levels of satisfaction with information provided by office meetings than new employees due to adaptation to the situation. To mitigate these potential biases, several measures were attempted in different stages of data collection and analysis. This includes extensive training about the rating scale, which was offered to enumerators to increase inter-rater reliability. Also, interviews were conducted in a discussion style which allowed the interviewers to ask more specific supplementary questions and seek clarifications whenever required. More details of mitigation measures are presented in the next chapter. Of course, these countermeasures might not solve the bias problems completely, therefore estimated results of this study should be cautiously interpreted.

Major findings of this study are as follows. On average, workers in the sample offices spend about four hours in weekly office meetings which normally starts about 40 minutes later than the scheduled time, meetings poorly prepared, and provide workers with insufficient information. Further, descriptive results indicate that there are significant differences between supervisors and their subordinates. The most interesting difference is the number of meetings per week, in which supervisors reported almost twice the number reported by their immediate workers. These results may have several interpretations. First, supervisors might have exaggerated the number of meetings because it is mandatory to hold regular meetings in the government offices in Tanzania. Second, supervisors may know the importance of meetings for office management and that is why they reported a larger number. Third, supervisors may have meetings with a subset of office workers, leaving others unaware of those meetings. And finally, workers might have understated the number of meetings for some reason such as lack of clear description of office meetings. In addition, while most workers reported that they don't get sufficient information from the meetings, supervisors do not admit that workers are not provided with sufficient information.

Interestingly, both workers and supervisors reported a more substantial amount of self-communication and punctuality than was reported about them from other evaluating parties. Supervisors reported to communicate more frequently about punctuality and that they themselves were mostly punctual, but workers reported that supervisors communicated less frequently and most of the time their supervisors were unpunctual. Likewise, workers reported to keep time and communicate with each other more frequently about punctuality, but supervisors reported workers rarely communicate and rarely keep meeting times. A

natural way to interpret these findings is that both supervisors and their subordinates are incentivized to report higher numbers because they understand the importance of communication and punctuality.

To advance the analyses, I implemented different regression techniques. The results indicate that communication, leadership by example, and incentives are negatively and significantly associated with unpunctuality to the meetings. The analysis further reveals that workers are likely to be late to the meetings if they believe that other workers will also be late and vice versa. These findings suggest that the meeting lateness represents a suboptimal equilibrium of a weak-link game in Tanzania's government offices.

With regards to the meeting effectiveness, the regression results in all scenarios indicate that workplace meetings are likely to be unproductive when meetings start late. Results further indicate that a free discussion has no significant impact on the effectiveness of meetings while consideration of workers opinions is positive and significantly associated with meeting effectiveness. My interpretation is that while workers have plenty of time for discussion, they seem to discuss issues not substantially related to the meeting, or workers attend meetings unprepared believing that preparation is waste of time if their opinions will not be considered. Furthermore, both the frequency of meetings and advance distribution of meeting agenda are found to have a positive and significant association with meeting effectiveness but unexpectedly, meeting duration does not have a significant impact on the effectiveness.

On office filing, data shows that government office workers tend to spend a significant amount of office time searching for working files and in most cases, relevant

documents are missing in the appropriate files. Further, about 90 percent of workers admitted that they are not satisfied with filing situation in their offices but surprisingly only 20 percent of workers reported to complying with the filing guidelines. Furthermore, the descriptive statistics show significant differences between leaders and workers in reporting the magnitude of filing problems and filing efforts. That, only 44 percent of average office workers reported that their supervisor normally files office documents, while about 70 percent of supervisors reported that they themselves file office documents properly. Likewise, results show that about 79 percent of frontline workers reported to properly file office documents but only 27 percent of supervisors reported that workers in their offices normally do. The difference might be due to the exaggeration by workers as proper filing is required by law and workers can be punished for not filing.

Regression results indicate that leadership by example, and frequentness of communication about proper filing are negatively and significantly associated with filing problems such as tracing time and misfiling of documents. Further, results show that filing problems are likely to increase with office size, which is defined by the number of workers. Unexpectedly, the effect of incentives was found to be insignificantly correlated with file tracing time and incidences of missing documents, but not with disarrangement of documents in the file. One possible explanation is that it is easier to monitor and detect individuals who filed documents incorrectly in a file, than to tracing who caused missing documents or removed documents from the folder. Interestingly, leadership becomes more significant when workers are aware of the presence of filing guidelines. This might be interpreted that

leadership matters, particularly when offices are properly institutionalized; the conduct of the office is largely guided by the established rules and laws.

The overall interpretation of these findings seems to suggest that government office situation, particularly late attendance to meetings and poor filing, is akin to the weak-link problems in the coordination games. That is both meeting lateness and poor filing cases are determined by the lowest effort worker, which means that better situation is achievable if all workers are coordinated to offer high effort. As the results reveal, this can potentially be achieved by improving workplace communication and leadership practices.

While Tanzania ministries are my specific research context, they are likely sharing many characteristics with other public organizations in most of developing countries. Therefore, the findings from this dissertation are expected to have a wider relevance to other developing countries including the adoption of some practical measures that are known to be effective in correcting these failures.

The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the public sector capability and coordination game, identifies research gaps, describes research questions, hypotheses, and presents methodology. Chapter 3 presents the empirical analysis of coordination game in office meetings. Chapter 4 discusses the empirical analysis of the office filing. Chapter 5 summarizes the empirical findings, presents policy implications, and proposes areas for future research.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1: An Overview

Literature on the public sector capability and coordination game points out three issues: first, coordination failure, which is widely interpreted as one of the main sources of group and organizational inefficiencies, is a common phenomena in laboratory setting experiments but the same has not been investigated in inefficient government offices. Second, most previous studies on public sector capacity in developing countries focus more on policy implementers with little or no successful studies exploring the nature and causes of inefficiencies in central government offices. Third, studies have scarcely investigated how government functions by exploring tools such as meetings and files by which most governments operate.

The natural questions that arise from the reviewed literature and field survey are why does the public sector in developing countries continue to be inefficient despite a long period of research and policy intervention? Why government office problems in developing countries are so obvious but they still persist? The main hypothesis of the dissertation is that the persistence of inefficiencies (at least) in the government offices is mainly due to coordination failure.

2.2: Related Literature

Many public sectors are said to be inefficient especially in developing countries (e.g., Besley & Ghatak, 2007; Collier & Gunning, 1999; Crook, 2010; ECA, 2014). Economics,

public administration, and political science researchers have attributed the inefficiency of public sectors in developing countries to poor incentives and motivation (e.g., Carpenter, Doverspike, & Miguel, 2012; Dal Bo, Finan, & Rossi, 2013; Fisman & Wang, 2017; Perry & Wise, 1990), poor monitoring and accountability system (Botero et al., 2013; Deininger & Mpuga, 2005; Pollitt, 2003), limited resources (Besley & Ghatak, 2007; Crook, 2010; Kleinknecht, Kwee, & Budyanto, 2016; Peters, 2001), and relationship structure between bureaucrats and politicians (Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017; Hymowitz, 2016; Nistotskaya & Cingolani, 2016). Recently, it has also been related to poor management practices (Banerjee, Chattopadhyay, Duflo, Keniston, & Sigh, 2012; Bloom, Lemos, Sadun, & Van Reenen, 2015; Rasul & Rogger, 2018)[2]

These studies focus on measuring behaviors and performances of individuals providing public services such as teachers and standardized test (e.g., Duflo, Dupas, & Kremer, 2015; Glewwe et al., 2010; Reinikka & Svensson, 2011), healthcare workers and number of penitents (e.g., Bloom, Carol, Seiler, & Van Reenen, 2015; Chaudhury et al., 2006), and police officers on arrest and crime data (Banerjee et al., 2012; Eterno & Silverman, 2012). It is difficult to conduct concrete analytical studies within as well as across policy-making organizations such as government ministries especially when trying to measure workers performance (Brehm & Gates, 1997; Peters, 2010; Simpson, 2009)[3]. Therefore,

[2] Management practices used in these studies generally include goals setting, monitoring, use of incentives, recruitment and retain high ability worker, and workers autonomy which are measured using management scores.

[3] Public sector consist of three organizations (i) Core government (Policy Making), (ii) Agencies which deliver public programs, goods, or services, and (iii) Public enterprises- deliver public programs often have their own sources of revenue (Dube & Denescu, 2011). In practice ministries make policies which determine quality of public service delivery (Besley & Ghatak, 2007; Caulfield, 2002; Rogger, 2017)

rigorous studies using consistent data on the nature and causes of the inefficiencies of government organizations and government officials are non-existent.

The present study uniquely takes up office formal meetings and filing which are crucial, yet basic daily activities of officers working in the central government offices[4]. Efficient meetings and filing are the bedrock of well-functioning central government offices. Meetings provide the platform for securing a common understanding of policy issues and coordination of activities within a department, ministry or the entire government machinery. In fact, policies, visions and missions, analysis outcomes, and resolutions are formally decided, legitimized and communicated through official meetings. Likewise, records of the meetings, office activities, employees, clients, and government partners are traditionally processed, communicated, and stored in the form of paper documents. Notwithstanding the crucial roles of meetings and filing, the two aspects are barely examined in the empirical literature to ascertain their impacts on the performance of central government offices.

As in many organizations, including public organizations, outputs are jointly produced with different levels of interdependence among workers, but in central government ministries in particular, outputs are multidimensional and unobservable which complicates attempts to measure workers performance (Besley & Ghatak, 2007; Mas & Moretti, 2009; Matsuyama, 2002; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). For example, in typical government offices such as ministries, policy documents are usually jointly produced by many workers whereby

[4] Oxford English Dictionary, define formal meeting as an assembly of people for a particular purpose, especially for formal discussion to debate certain issues and problems, and to take decisions and its deliberations are recorded in a written form. Similarly, the Cambridge Dictionary define filing as the activity of putting documents into files and file as a folder holding together loose papers with information about a particular person or thing or number of issues and responsibilities relating to a particular policy.

the completion of the document requires workers to work together or share information or data (Nsubuga, 2017). In such interdependent and complementary working environments, workers' performance might be limited by the lowest individual performance among office members as the game-theoretic literature on coordination predicts (e.g., Brandts & Cooper, 2006a; Brandts, Cooper, & Weber, 2014; Van Huyck, Battalio, & Beil, 1991)[5]. Therefore, in the context of the observed nature of activities and output of officials in the ministries, it may seem reasonable to speculate that at the heart of inefficient offices is the issue similar to coordination failure.

Indeed, the literature on coordination games has long suggested that coordination failure is common in the laboratory environment and it often causes groups to become trapped in a situation that is unsatisfactory to all involved (Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, & Ross, 1990, 1992, Van Huyck et al., 1990, 1991). These studies further argue that unsatisfactory situations caused by coordination failure can persist even though preferable outcomes are feasible and would be stable if reached. Further, laboratory experimental studies have strongly suggested that coordination failure is the main source of inefficiency for most organizations and groups (e.g., Brandts & Cooper, 2006a; Brandts, Cooper, & Weber, 2014; Stirling, 2012). This line of laboratory based evidence might support the thinking that government offices may equally be worthy examples of such organizations. This hypothesis remains the main focus of this dissertation[6].

[5] This may cause moral hazard and free-riding, the problems of agents to supply proper amounts of productive inputs when their actions cannot be observed, or verified (Abramitzky, 2018; Holmstrom, 1982)

[6] It is important to note that unlike coordination game theory, other several prominent economic theories such principal agency theory (e.g., Besley, 2006; Besley & Ghatak, 2008; Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015), incentive and motivation theories (Benabou & Tirole, 2003; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992;Perry & Wise, 1990),

Therefore, the basic hypothesis of this study suggests that the persistent inefficient situation in government offices in Tanzania is similar to coordination failure. This hypothesis can best be explained by the simple 2×2 coordination game matrix presented in Figure 2.1, which verbally captures the essence of the office situation.

As an illustration, consider an office of two workers labeled *Officer 1* and *Officer 2* who must complete certain office task. The output is jointly produced in such a way that the completion of the task is determined by low effort worker the same as in the weak-link game. Suppose that each worker can give in either a low level of effort or high level of effort. The combination of effort level will determine the output produced as well as payoffs. Assume that Officers' effort level is positively associated with private cost (non-monetary cost) such as opportunity cost of time and that, each Officer's effort depends on the belief about the other Officer's action. In this case there are four possible combinations of outcomes: both Officers exert low effort where the payoff is A{A1, A2}, Officer 1 put high effort while Officer 2 put low effort and vice versa in which payoffs are B{B1, B2} and C{C1, C2}, and the fourth option is both Officers put high effort which gives payoff of D{D1, D2}.

In this case there are two pure Nash equilibrium when both workers choose the same effort level[7]. Under this situation, any worker who unilaterally put high effort receive less payoff than when both workers put either low or high effort. Therefore, the workers who begin to work harder will be worse off unless she or he is adequately certain that other worker

and multiagency theory (Gibbons & Roberts, 2013; Holmstrom, 1982) have widely been discussed and tested in workplaces with characteristic similar to those of government offices.

[7] Coordination game has three Nash equilibrium which are two pure Nash equilibrium and one mixed Nash equilibrium. In many the mixed equilibrium isnot satable strategy but it is also dominated by the two pure Nash Equilibrium (Aumann, Maschler, & Stearn, 1995; Farrell, 1987; Weirich, 1998). Therefore, for the simplicity of discussion, this study will focus on the two Pure Nash equilibrium.

will also put in high effort otherwise it is rational to put in low effort. When this happens, the situation will persist unless there are mechanisms such as leadership and communication which can change workers belief about others actions (Brandts & Cooper, 2006a; Brandts et al., 2014; Masiliūnas, 2017). Therefore, in this hypothetical game the two Pareto ranked Nash equilibria are A {A1, A2} and D {D1, D2}, whereby D {D1, D2} is superior to A {A1, A2} for both players. Moreover, both equilibria dominate the non-equilibrium outcomes {B1, B2} and {C1, C2} such that payoffs are ranked (i.e {B1, B2/C1,C2} <{A1,A2}< {D1, D2}). Ideally, the superior outcome is when both officers put in high effort and the inferior outcome is when both Officers put in low effort which yields worse payoffs for both officers.

2.3 Government office meetings and Coordination game

As defined by Schwartzman (1989), meeting is a specific type of focused interaction activity involving three or more people who agree to assemble for a purpose ostensibly related to the functioning of an organization or group. This means that, in practice, one individual cannot start a discussion without the presence of other members. In most cases, government office meetings follow Robert's Rules of Order whereby minimum quorum is required before the start of the meeting (Robert, 2011, PP 319), implying that late arrival workers are the ones determining the actual starting time of the meeting. Likewise, workers who are not active in exchanging ideas or giving opinions are the ones who determine the quality of discussions and ideas produced by the meeting. Therefore, it seems reasonable to consider workplace meetings as a typical example of weak-link activities in government offices.

Compared to other factors associated with the effectiveness of meetings, timekeeping especially meeting starting time has been regarded as the most distractive factor (Lehmann-Willenbrock & Allen, 2017). It has also been widely considered by practitioners including organization leaders as one of the most disgraced office practice (Kauffeld & Lehmann-Willenbrock, 2012; Leach et al., 2009). Surprisingly, meeting lateness is a common problem not only in the public sector but also in private organizations (Allen, Lehmann-Willenbrock, & Sands, 2016; Leach et al., 2009; Lehmann-Willenbrock & Allen, 2017; Rogelberg et al., 2014). In exploring why meetings start late, Rogelberg et al. (2014) found that about 66 percent of the meetings that begin late is due to meeting attendees waiting for at least one late participant.

In this study, the persistence of meeting lateness is therefore used as an archetypical example of coordination failure in the ministries in Tanzania. Hypothetically, workers have two main options of either being punctual or late. The ideal situation is for the majority of the workers to be punctual so that meetings can start as scheduled. The undesirable situation for the individual worker is to be punctual and wait for unpunctual workers. In a typical government office, individual workers might not know the exact time coworkers will arrive but based on the past experience, they might know average late time[8]. This creates a situation reminiscent of what Van Huyck et al., (1991) call strategic uncertainty in game theory.

Now, let's assume meeting arrival time as a simple coordination game with multiple ranked equilibria that is bad equilibria {*late, late*} and good equilibria {*On time, On time*}.

[8] This is in line with the argument by Crawford & Haller, (1990) and Eckel & Wilson, (2007), that coordination failure is normally historical dependency.

Further, assume that this game is played between each worker and the rest of the workers {worker1, worker 2}. The meeting can start only when both workers are available not when it was scheduled and when one worker is late, the on time worker must wait for the other worker. Suppose that there are costs associated with arriving on time and having to wait such as wasting time that could be used for other activities and frustrations (-1)[9]. But there is no significant cost or benefits of being late because the latecomer just allocated time to other activities (0). Assume that both workers could be better off if both keep time and start meeting on time (1). The individual payoff of being late is more than that of being punctual when a colleague is also late, on the other hand, the payoff of being punctual is higher than being late when the colleague is also punctual. Thus, hypothetical incentive structure that office workers face when they have an office meeting may be illustrated by the payoff matrix presented in figure **2.2**.

As mentioned, office meeting is just one of many examples of weak-link activities in the government offices. The low effort situation in the government is similar to quadrant **A** where inefficiency equilibrium is selected instead of the preferable outcome (**D)**. This is what I mean by hypothesizing that the inefficient situation in the government offices is similar to coordination failure. However, a large collection of literature in economics has associated inefficiency of the public sector with poor incentives in general and material rewards and penalties in particular (e.g., Banerjee, Chattopadhyay, Duflo, Keniston, & Sigh, 2012; Bénabou & Tirole, 2003; Besley & Ghatak, 2007, 2008; Dal Bo et al., 2013). The main

[9]Payoff in broad sense consist of both monetary and non-monetary e.g. satisfaction and self-esteem or reputation

argument of these studies is that public sector performance is poor because public servants are not incentivized as much as their private sector counterparts. Further, experimental studies in game theory have also found that monetary incentive such as bonus matters for coordination (Brandts & Cooper, 2006a; Hamman et al., 2007). The same findings were reported in non-experimental study in the Government of Uganda (Nsubuga, 2017)

Within this context, one may expect that the use of incentives in public organizations would likely make workers want to exert effort and change equilibrium from bad to good. Now, let's continue with the payoff matrix presented in Figure 2.2. The presented game has two equilibria where both workers can choose either to be late (low effort) or punctual (higher effort). An incentive can change the payoff structure from multiple Pareto ranked equilibrium to one dominant equilibrium in which both workers keep time. For example, a leader may decide to reward high effort workers (100) or punish low effort workers (-100). Ideally, either positive or negative incentive is expected to discourage lateness. In this simple 2×2 game, high positive incentives will make punctuality be analogous to payoff-dominant equilibrium while harsh negative incentive will likely lead to an outcome that is analogous to the risk-dominant outcome. This might change equilibrium from bad to good, reflecting the common argument that incentive matters.

Then the question that arises is, is it possible to apply harsh punishment or reward in the government offices? One of the common arguments about why performance-based incentive seems not to be effective in the public sector is difficulty in observing and measuring individual effort (e.g., Besley & Ghatak, 2008; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; Simpson, 2009). But this is not the case for office meeting as it is easy to observe who is late

and who is on time. The possible reason in my view is that leaders themselves need to be punctual to be able to identify and punish latecomers. It might be morally difficult for supervisors to heavily punish workers if the supervisors themselves don't keep time. Further, the public sector is somehow complicated as supervisors are highly constrained in the ability to use tools such as contracts and financial incentives (Brehm & Gates, 1997). It should be noted that, this study focus on the lowest level of central government ministries; department sections where financial incentives are exogenously determined. Incentive matters but if it is difficult to use economic incentives then leadership and communication become very important. Both leadership and communication have the potential to increase intrinsic motivation, which is found to be critical in the public sector (Banuri & Keefer, 2013; Bénabou & Tirole, 2003; Cassar & Meier, 2018). The roles of leadership and communication are considered in detail in the section on testable hypotheses.

2.5 Government Office Filing and Coordination game

Now, let's look at office documents filing which is another important and common activity of officers in the central government ministries. Document files are argued to be one of the most important working tools used by all governments (Eyre, 1989; ISO 9001, 2015; Sellen & Harper, 2002; Smith, 2007)[10]. But, bad documents filing is common in the public sector, particularly in developing countries, yet is known to be highly consequential to workers, clients, and organizations (Hull, 2012; Sellen & Harper, 2002; Smith, 2007; Stewart, Scharle, & Greene, 1989).

[10] Despite the revolution of information and communication technology (ICT), the use of paper documents by governments has persisted in both developed and developing countries.

To explore why offices tend to experience poor filing, assuming a workplace where workers perform their duties on shared files. Hypothetically, workers have two main options or strategies: One, not to file at all, which requires minimum efforts, and two, to file properly which requires high effort. Both workers are better off if the office has good filing, which is achievable only when all worker file but are worse off if all choose not to file. The worst situation for an individual worker is to unilaterally try to file while others don't as it exposes him/her to exploitation by others. Good filing situation is similar to a common good where everyone can enjoy it regardless of the effort level which literarily makes filing similar to Prisoners' Dilemma. Under such a situation, literature on game theory and collective action in common resource predicts that an individual worker would prefer not to file regardless of others' action (Abramitzky, 2018; Agrawal, 2002).This situation can be illustrated by the hypothetical 2×2 matrix presented in Figure **2.3** which is borrowed from (Crawford, 2016).

The interesting question is, why then is filing not like that if all workers prefer not to file? Judging from the above discussion and field survey in Tanzania, this study suggests three possible reasons. First, effective supervisors might change the rules of the game or incentive structure for office workers by punishing officers who do not comply with the filing guidelines. Punishment can reduce free riding and increase cooperation (Fehr & Gächter, 2000). Second, if public servants are intrinsically motivated agent driven by motives to serve the public as argued by Perry & Wise (1990), then, they are better off filing office document to serve the public than not. Third, a real working office is different from the one-short game, but akin to a repeated game where workers have been repetedly interacting each other, thus workers may decide not to free-ride because of good reputation and avoid retaliation from

colleagues. In this context, leadership and social sanctions might change filing from seemingly a Prisoners' Dilemma situation to look like a coordination game.

How does this relate to the real situation in the government offices in developing countries? In most government offices, Tanzania in particular, there are at least three main types of files: open and confidential files, which are kept by the organization; general files, which are kept in offices; and personal files, which are kept by individuals for personal records and quick reference. In most cases, poor filing is a problem common to the first two types of files, which are shared by different individuals. Given that files are often used to coordinate and integrate employee work, for a work to be completed, a working file normally moves from one individual to another. This means that a worker cannot work on the file if that particular file is being used or kept by another worker. The nature of file movements in the government offices is therefore similar to what Brandts and Cooper (2007) describe as an example of the assembly line in which the slower worker determines the rate at which the file moves.

In this case, everything being equal, the quality of filing in terms of ease of traceability and availability of information is assumed to be determined by the efforts of all users in terms of how long they keep files and how well they organize documents in the file. This may mean that, as much as in any other shared activity, good filing needs a coordinated effort. A detailed discussion of the issue of office filing is provided in Chapter 4.

2.5: Research gaps, questions, and testable hypotheses

The preceding literature review has identified four research gaps:

(i) Coordination failure, which causes groups or organizations to be trapped in inefficient situation, is found to be common in the laboratory experiments. To the best of my knowledge, no study has investigated this in a real work setting, such as inefficient government offices. Therefore, this dissertation is the first attempt to associate coordination failure with capacity of government offices.

The closely related research to this is the study by Nsubuga (2017) which suggests that coordination failure exists in the government offices in Uganda. Both Nsubuga's study and the present study are empirical studies which use data collected from central governments in Uganda and Tanzania respectively. However, there are significant differences in terms of the method of data collection, focus area, and interpretation of the results. For example, Nsubuga (2017) study used a mix of data which some were collected by face to face interviews and some by self-administered questionnaire but, all data used in the present study are more consistently collected using face-to-face interview which has additional advantages as described in the data collection section. Also, Nsubaga's coordination survey questions are designed like hypothetical games but this study asked about the existing meeting and filing practices in their offices. However, while Nsubuga (2017) used meetings as an example, she did not concretely study meetings as an activity. The current study has provided a more detailed analysis and interpretation of inefficient meeting and filing as daily activities of government workers. Further, the former study focused on the department level but this one focuses on the lowest level of administration which is office unit. Lastly, Nsubuga (2017) studies monetary incentive but the current study extended by studying nonmonetary incentives.

(ii) While most of the literature on the public sector capability in developing countries has predominantly focused on policy implementers such as doctors, teachers, and police, there is a dearth of concrete studies based on collected data exploring policy-making organizations, such as central ministries and their workers. In practice, workers in these ministries formulate, regulate, monitor, and evaluate policies related to public service delivery, while policy implementers act as agents to provide services to the public. Lack of capacity in policy-making organizations may imply a vicious circle of bad policy formulation, weak policy monitoring, evaluation, and weak state capacity.

(iii) Both academic and policy researchers have long recognized the role of leadership in public organizations performance. However, most studies and interventions on leadership in the public sector, at least in developing countries in SSA, focus exclusively on the top management of organizations. A question arises, however, as to whether the leadership of lower-level managers is really important. There have been few or no studies which have investigated whether the leadership of lower level managers is important for the public organizations. The focus of this dissertation is on the lowest level of government ministries' administration, usually headed by either assistant director or assistant commissioner. To the best of my knowledge, previous studies have grossly overlooked this level of administration.

(iv) Lastly, the previous studies on government performance miss an important part of workplace capability; the mechanisms by which government offices operate. This research takes up office meetings and files to investigate sources of inefficiencies in the central government offices.

Research Questions

The foregoing literature and anecdotal evidence from government officials' survey suggest that most of the persistent problems in government offices in Tanzania are obvious, but there is room for achieving better outcomes which would be sustained, if ever achieved. Therefore, the review of the literature on public sector capability and the field survey I conducted in Tanzania broadly suggests two research questions:

Question 1: Why are government offices in developing countries trapped in a vicious circle of seemingly obvious inefficiency despite decades of reforms and capacity building?

Question 2: What are the correlates of coordination failures in the government offices in Tanzania? Or what makes responsible/rational, educated and experienced workers in government offices, unable or unwilling to embrace coordination despite its benefits?

2.6 Testable Hypothesis

While the direct investigation of coordination failure in a real working situation, such as government offices, might be tricky for several practical reasons, the plausible approach is to rigorously investigate the factors correlating with coordination failure in laboratory studies, and test them in actual government offices. That way, if the situation in the government offices in Tanzania echoes coordination failure, then logically, results obtained from experimental studies should also be true in the real government offices.

There are, however, differences between laboratory environments and actual government work places. In the laboratory-based studies, the environment is controlled to

suit the experiment, and participants are normally university students who interact just for the study. In contrast, in government offices, workers have a long-term relationship, interact repeatedly and somehow know each other's behavior. This study uses small groups of government officials who are relatively highly educated and are guided by clear institutional rules and procedures, but differ in age and experience. Additionally, workers in the government offices are subject to other dynamics of life, such as political interference and culture, which might directly or indirectly affect their characteristics. Despite these differences, we believe that findings from laboratory studies are worth investigating in the government offices. Therefore, learning from laboratory experiment studies, I identified the major correlates of coordination failures and derive the following testable hypotheses:-

Leadership, Communication and coordination failure

Experimental studies on coordination games [11] provide robust evidence that leadership plays a critical role in overcoming coordination failure. These studies argue that leaders overcome coordination failure by persistently raising their effort (lead by example), signaling action to take, and communicate right messages. They further argue that leadership matters because leaders help change followers' beliefs towards each other's actions, build trust, change payoff structure, and motivate group members.

Equally, evidence from both theoretical and experimental studies have shown that even nonbinding communication such as cheap talk, pre-play, and signaling matter in

[11] Stag hunt game, weak-link game (Brandts & Cooper, 2007; Brandts, Cooper, & Fatas, 2007; Cartwright et al., 2013), public game (Brandts & Cooper, 2006b; Brandts et al., 2016; Levy et al., 2011; Rigg & Richards, 2006), and turn around game (Brandts et al., 2014; Brandts and Cooper,2006b).

overcoming coordination failure (Brandts & Cooper, 2007; Cooper et al., 1992; Crawford, 2017; Ellingsen & Östling, 2010). In fact, regardless of the content and type of messages, results from laboratory experimental studies suggest the following: two-way communication improves coordination more than one-way communication (Cooper et al., 1992), the effectiveness of communication increases with the frequency the message is communicated (Brandts et al., 2014; Langbein & Jorstad, 2004), communication is more effective when it comes from people with high status such as leaders (Eckel & Wilson, 2007), communication is more effective when it comes from elected leaders than randomly selected leaders (Brandts et al., 2014), a human communicator is more effective than a machine communicator such as computer (Levy et al., 2011), and face-to-face communication enhances coordination more than other mediums of communication such as video and audio (Brosig, Weimann, & Ockenfels, 2003; Levy et al., 2011). Therefore, a common thread of this literature is that leadership and communication can potentially reduce coordination failure, as the following hypotheses summarize:

Hypothesis 1: *Coordination problem in the government workplaces decreases with an increase of leadership.*

Hypothesis 2: *Coordination failures in the government offices decrease with an increase of the frequency of communication among worker as well as supervisors*

Incentive and Coordination Failure

A package of financial incentives such as bonus is another factor argued to reduce coordination failure in laboratory experiments. (e.g., Brandts & Cooper, 2006a, 2007;

Hamman et al., 2007). However, in a public sector setting, notably central government, almost all economic incentives and promotions which are directly linked to monetary benefits are not a function of workers effort but tenure and seniority. Admittedly, financial incentive matters in public sector too as most of the workers we interviewed said they are not satisfied with their salary; something that can potentially contribute to the inefficiencies (Stiglitz, 1976)[12]. While the role of monetary incentive is acknowledged, this study takes it as given and incentives referred here are non-monetary reward or sanctions. I, therefore, hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 3: *Coordination problem in the government offices is associated with (non-monetary) incentives*

Group size and Coordination Failure

Numerous experimental and theoretical studies suggest that cooperation is difficult when the number of agents increase (Anderson, Goeree, & Holt, 2001; Olson, 1971; Van Huyck, Battalio, & Rankin, 2007; Weber, 2006; Zenger & Lawrence, 1989). In addition, recent studies on game theory have demonstrated that coordination failure is positively associated with group size (Dutta, 2012; Ellingsen & Östling, 2011; Kyriacou, 2011; Nosenzo et al., 2015; Weber, 2006). It is therefore hypothesized that:

Hypothesis 4: *Coordination failure in the government offices increases with office size*

[12] The efficiency wage hypothesis says that the services a laborer renders are a function of the wage he receives (Stiglitz, 1976).

Office Layout and Coordination Failure

Besides common correlates of coordination failure from experimental studies, Devetag & Ortmann (2007) argue that there may also be other factors which can directly or indirectly affect coordination failure. In this study, I introduced office layout as one of the important factors in the government offices especially frontline offices. Previous work in management practice in hospitals (Bloom, Propper, Seiler, & Van Reenen, 2015), as well as in manufacturing and engineering (Boutellier, Ullman, Schreiber, & Naef, 2008; Kelly, 2006) state that work floor layout may have an effect on the firm's productivity through coordination. Thus, office layout is expected to play a vital role by improving social learning, peer monitoring, and social network (Falk & Ichino, 2006; Mas & Moretti, 2009; Schotter & Sopher, 2003). In addition, peer monitoring is argued to reduce free-riding and increase cooperation (Abramitzky, 2018; Brandts & Cooper, 2006b; Holmstrom, 1982). These arguments are therefore summarized in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 5: *Frontline government office with open layout is likely to experience less coordination failure than closed office.*

These testable hypotheses are separately tested in the analytical chapter 3 and 4, which investigates office meetings and filing practices, respectively.

Conceptual Framework

Based on the literature review and field survey, I developed a conceptual framework to empirically test the above hypotheses. It attempts to conceptualize workers interaction in the government offices in Tanzania and link it to office meetings and filing practices. Apart

from workers and supervisor variables, there are other factors which can directly or indirectly affect coordination outcomes. These include office size, office layout, nature of activities, enforceability of rules of the game, and workers demographic characteristics. Therefore, Figure 2.4 presents the conceptual framework includes these factors to control for their impacts[13].

The contribution of the study

This dissertation contributes to the academic literature and policy discussions on state capacity in three ways: First, it provides a new interpretation of the sources and nature of inefficient situation persisting in government offices by suggesting how similar the situation in government offices is when compared to coordination failure. To explore coordination failure situation, the study identified the major correlates that seem to affect the incidence of coordination failure in the laboratory environment. Then, applied the same using field data on the workplace meetings and office document filing which are daily activities of government officers and the main tools by which governments operate.

Second, it contributes to the knowledge of public sector capability by studying policy making institutions, which are the core of public service delivery but rarely studied empirically. It specifically explores the behavior of an underexplored group of bureaucrats working in ministry offices in the central government, namely the frontline managers and workers who carry out day-to-day activities of these policy-making organizations. More

[13] It is important to note that, there are other issues such as culture which might be fundamental in determining people's behavior, but discussion of such issues falls outside the scope of this dissertation.

importantly, it explores the role of leadership practices and workplace communication in overcoming coordination failure within the smallest units of office administration.

Third, it closes an important empirical gap by offering new suggestive evidence that significant amount of time in government offices in Tanzania is spent on activities not related to productivity (*muda).* This includes time spent by workers in searching for poorly filed working files and time lost waiting for the office meeting to start due to late coming or long unproductive meetings. This is has potential contribution to the literature on Kaizen as detailed in the conclusion chapter.

2.3: Methodology

Data Collection

(i) Tanzania as a case study

In this study, I used Tanzania as a case study. Tanzania is one of the developing countries in SSA that has experienced several major policy, legal, and institutional reforms to strenghthen its state capability. While this study will not go into details on the reforms that have been implemented in Tanzania, it is important to highlight some of the key reforms here. In the mid-1980s, under the support of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, Tanzania implemented the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). Subsequently, Tanzania carried out two major reform programs namely Civil Service Reform Program from 1991 to 1999 and the Public Service Reform Program from 2000 to 2007. These reforms aimed at creating a small effective government (Girishankar & Migliorisi, 2013; Grindle & Hilderbrand, 1995; Rugumyamheto, 2004; Therkildsen, 2000).

Further, Tanzania was among the first few developing countries to adopt executive agencies initiatives similar to the one proposed in the New Public Management (Caulfield, 2002; Pollitt, Talbot, Caulfield, & Smullen, 2005). It also enacted an Executive Agency Act in 1997 which according to Caulfield, (2002) and Pollitt, (2003), even UK, where the executive agency reform originated, did not have. Despite these initiatives, state capacity is still weak. For example, the recent World Bank Independent Evaluation Group report, focusing on Tanzania, indicated that the reforms did not achieve the intended objective of improving the performance of the government (Girishankar & Migliorisi, 2013).

Further, the government implemented other related initiatives. An important example is the adoption of the Big Result Now (BRN) initiative, which was launched in 2013 to improve public service delivery. The programme sought to adopt the deemed successful Malaysian approach to economic development and improving service delivery. In some cases, the government hired experts or received technical support from international organizations such as United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), US Treasury, Malaysia Performance Management and Delivery Unit (PEMANDU), and international consultancy firm (McKinsey). In a large measure, these interventions vis-à-vis the reported persistence of inefficient public sector, serve to make Tanzania an appropriate case to investigate the sources of incapability in the wider context of developing countries.

(ii) Preliminary Survey

In October 2015, I conducted a preliminary field study of government offices in Tanzania for two main purposes. The first is to seek experts' opinion from senior government

officials regarding performance challenges faced by their organizations. The second is to build rapport and explore the feasibility of conducting an actual survey of government officials. During this survey, I was able to meet with senior officials from eleven institutions including central government ministries, government agencies, and local governments. I also met with JICA officials and the Japanese Ambassador to Tanzania as stakeholders of the government. In addition, I met with officials from one of the major civil society organizations dealing with the education sector (Haki Elimu) and experts from a private management consultancy firm to get a third party opinion about the public sector performance[14]. Indeed, the discussions helped in designing the questionnaires for this empirical study based on more realistic government working environments.

(iii) Research Design: Survey

Following the preliminary survey, I developed a novel questionnaire to interview officials working in the ministries in Tanzania. Two separate questionnaires were prepared for frontline supervisors and frontline workers. The two questionnaires are structured in such a way that, supervisors self-assess their leadership style as well as the behavior of their frontline workers, while frontline workers also self-assess, assess coworkers and their supervisors. The use of survey approach is motivated by practical and ethical reasons such as the highly confidential nature of government activities, and the busy schedules of government officials. More importantly, the survey method is selected because it is an

[14] List of institutions is in Appendix Table A2.1.

appropriate approach for providing snap shot analysis sufficient to study and interpret the existing situation in government offices.

To ensure quality data is collected, the following strategies were employed before the actual survey. First, a pilot interview was conducted at GRIPS where the majority of students are public servants from developing countries mainly Asia and SSA and the outcomes of the survey were duly incorporated in the questionnaires. Second, experienced enumerators from a reputable local consultancy firm were hired to carry out the survey, conduct interviews, and manage raw data. Third, interview guidelines about the study and confidentiality of the information were issued to enumerators and respondents. Fourth, a seven-day training period covering the facts, practices, nature of the study, the questionnaire, and response rating was offered to enumerators spending a minimum of seven hours per day primarily to increase inter-rater reliability. Fifth, the questionnaire, originally prepared in English, was translated into the Swahili language to increase the validity and reliability of the instruments as the interview was mainly conducted in Swahili. Lastly, the translated questionnaire was pretested with staff from two departments of the Tanzania's Ministry of Finance and revisions were made to improve the validity of the questionnaire.

To get approval to conduct a formal survey in the central government ministries, I sent a letter to 23 government ministries requesting for the permission to conduct a survey in the respective ministries. In addition, I managed to secure a support letter from the Paymaster General and Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance (my employer) addressed to all permanent secretaries introducing surveyors and requesting for the support of their ministries. The letter was also seconded by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Industry, Trade,

and Investment who also endorsed the survey. This formal application and the good rapport established during the preliminary survey somehow helped to get full support from ministry leaders and increased interviewees' confidence during data collection.

(iv) Sample selection

We planned to survey all 23 central government ministries in Tanzania, but two ministries declined our request on the grounds of national security and the highly sensitive nature of their activities. This reduced our targeted sample size by six supervisors and eighteen workers as in each ministry we targeted to interview three supervisors and nine workers. Our total sample, therefore, involved 63 supervisors from 21 ministries who were selected based on their positions and 189 randomly selected officers working under these supervisors (more details in Figure 2.6 and Appendix Table A2.1)[15]. In each ministry, our sample was drawn from three departments: Human Resources (HRD), Policy and Planning (PPD), and Sector Specific (SSD). The selection of these departments was due to their homogeneity across ministries in terms of structure and functions.

However, it is important to acknowledge the possibility of selection bias in our sample. For example, it is possible that our sample contains less capable individuals because the more capable might have much busier schedules and therefore unable to participate in interviews, or such more capable people were interviewed as they could have been intentionally selected to give biased opinions about their office practices. More importantly,

[15] Surveyed offices have an average of 6 workers whereby in each office, three workers were randomly selected except for offices with exactly 3 frontline workers where all workers were interviewed.

most of the variables used in this study are subjective based on supervisors and workers perceptions which may run a risk of social desirability and reference biases.

Therefore, several measures were attempted to increase the validity and reliability of survey responses. First, similar questions were asked to supervisors and frontline workers to check the consistency and accuracy of their responses. Second, interviews were conducted in a discussion style to allow respondent supply proof of the existing situation compared to a self-administered questionnaire that could guide their responses[16]. Third, to reduce recall bias, respondents were asked about the general pattern rather than specific past incidences of meetings and filing practices. Fourth, we followed Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) recommendation that surveying somebody junior enough to know day to day activities of the organization helps to minimize respondents bias. Lastly, although the interview was fully endorsed by the permanent secretaries and department heads, participation was voluntary, and each respondent was free to fix interview appointments and confidentiality of their information was guaranteed.

(v) Questionnaires and data collection

The actual survey was conducted from 4th January, 2017 to 27th February, 2017 in Dar es Salaam and Dodoma where government ministries are located. Our data set is divided into three sections: First, office characteristics such as office size; and office layout and workers which include demographic data such as gender; age; level of education; job position; and employment history. Second, office meeting data include frequency of

[16] On average, interview took approximately 45 minutes for supervisors and 41 minutes for the frontline workers.

meetings, average length of meetings, punctuality tendency, frequency of communication, and satisfaction with meeting outcomes. Third, office filing data such as amount of time spent in tracing working files and documents, and incidences of missing documents. Importantly, most questions solicited quantitative information which could be compared between respondents.

Method of Analysis

General Analytical Framework

Ordered Probit is used as the main estimation model in this dissertation. The choice of this model is informed by ordinal variables with categories that are ranked from low to high and vice versa, which might not meet some standard assumptions of linear regression models (Long & Freese, 2014; Verbeek, 2004; Wooldridge, 2002). Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression assumes that dependent variable(s) has normal distributed errors that exhibit homoscedasticity. But, most of the categorical dependent variables do not exhibit these properties (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). Nonetheless, if the ordinal dependent variable is measured on a Likert scale with categories that are equally spaced across the continuum, then the usual OLS and ordinal regression results converge (Cohen et al., 2003; Long & Freese, 2014). If these conditions are not met, then OLS regression may be inefficient and might lead to the problems of non-normality of residuals and heteroscedasticity.

Therefore, a standard Ordered Probit model is presented in the following form

$$Yi^{*} = Xi'\beta + \mu i \dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots (1)$$

Where, in equation (1), the dependent variable is a single latent variable Y* which is unobserved, X and β are variables and parameter matrices and μ is a vector matrix of normally

distributed error term. In this case, Y* is unobservable efforts but what is observed is just the selection of individuals and thus Y* is known only when it crosses the thresholds of such selections. In our case for example, if the level of satisfaction with information acquired from office meetings is ordered such as (1) not satisfied, (2) neutral, (3) somewhat satisfied, (4) satisfied, and (5) very satisfied, it means that there is a latent continuous variable with 1 to 5 groups and 4 thresholds. These thresholds are basically cut off points between the five categories and are denoted by $\propto$. This can be expressed as follows:-

$$Y_i = j \; if \;\; \propto_j - 1 < Y^* \leq \propto_j \;\; \text{such that:}$$

$Y \;\; = 1$ (or perception 1)if $Y^* \leq 1$..... (2)

$Y \;\; = 2$ (or perception 2)if $u_1 < \;\; Y^* \leq u_1$..... (3)

$Y \;\; = 3$ (or perception 3)if $u_2 < Y^* \leq u_2$ ..... (4)

$Y \;\; = 4$ (or perception 4)if $u_3 < Y^* \leq u_3$..... (5)

$Y \;\; = 5$ (or perception 5)if $u_4 \leq Y^*$..... (6)

Therefore, the general analytical framework that will guide the subsequent empirical analysis in chapter 3 and 4 is specified in the model below:

$$\boldsymbol{OM} = f_M(\boldsymbol{C_l}, \boldsymbol{C_w}\, \boldsymbol{A_l}\, \boldsymbol{A_w}, \boldsymbol{I}, \boldsymbol{N}, \boldsymbol{Z}) \ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots (\mathbf{7})$$

$$\boldsymbol{OF} = f_F(\boldsymbol{C_l}, \boldsymbol{C_w}\, \boldsymbol{A_l}\, \boldsymbol{A_w}, \boldsymbol{I}, \boldsymbol{N}, \boldsymbol{Z}) \ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots (\mathbf{8})$$

Where ***OM*** is workplace meeting outcomes such as meetings punctuality and meetings effectiveness; ***OF*** is filing outcomes such as average time spent by office workers looking for a working files and average incidences of missing office documents. The variables of

interest are the correlates of coordination failure identified from laboratory studies as specified in the conceptual framework which are; ***C*** is frequency of communication which includes workers and leaders communication, $\mathbf{A}_{\boldsymbol{l}}$ is Leadership by example, $\mathbf{A}_{\boldsymbol{w}}$ is coworkers action, **I** is non-monetary incentives both negative and positive; **N** is office size defined by number of workers, and **Z** other control variables[17].

This study is not the first one to use Ordered Probit as the similar model has been used by other scholars to study coordination problems/failures in laboratory settings (Anderson et al., 2001; Brandts, Cooper, & Fatas, 2007; Brandts et al., 2014; Cartwright et al., 2013). Apart from Ordered Probit model, this study uses OLS and other models mainly for the comparison and robustness check purpose.

2.4: Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the existing literature on the public sector capacity, especially the capacity of the part of government that make policy and the literature on the coordination game to identify the research gap and question and formulate testable hypotheses. After developing a conceptual framework to analyze coordination situation, this chapter has also discussed data collection methodology and the framework of empirical analysis. This sets the basis for the discussions in Chapters 3 and 4, which empirically examine coordination situations in government office work meetings and office filing, respectively.

[17] As hypothesized, it is expected that better leadership practices, communication, and incentives to be negatively associated with government office problems such as files tracing time and meeting lateness. While office size is expected to increase with office problems, Z may take either negative or positive sign.

CHAPTER 3

GOVERNMENT OFFICE MEETINGS

3.1: Introduction

This chapter studies the correlates of coordination failure to explore the persistence of unproductive meetings in central government ministries in Tanzania. To do so, I identified correlates which are found to be commonly associated with coordination failure in the laboratory experimental studies and apply them in the formal plenary meetings. The correlates include leadership, communication, incentives, and office size. I interviewed 252 officials working in central government ministries in Tanzania and collected information on these correlates in relation to meetings. I also collected information about meeting lateness and meeting effectiveness as outcome variables. The data collected is used to conduct concrete descriptive and regression analysis to test the association of the identified correlates with unproductive meetings.

Workplace meetings matter for the organization and workers performance (e.g., Allen et al., 2016; Kauffeld & Lehmann-Willenbrock, 2012; Rogelberg, Leach, Warr, & Burnfield, 2006)[18]. It provides a platform for workers to communicate, share information, solve problems, and coordinate organizational activities. In most public sectors, meetings are considered as an obligatory activity and vital management practice. In Tanzania, for example, all senior officials are required by the Code of Ethics of Public Service and the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act no 13 of 1995 to hold regular formal meetings with staff for

[18] Note that some scholars argue that most of meetings are ineffective and regard meetings as a destructive and costly activity (e.g., Allen, 2014; Bang, Fuglesang, Ovesen, & Eilertsen, 2010; Rogelberg et al., 2006).

the purpose of promoting efficiency. In fact, policies, plans, and decisions at all levels of governments from departmental sections to cabinet are normally discussed and legitimized through formal meetings. This is important as not only do meetings provide a platform to generate more ideas, but it is generally considered a perilous task for any one person to offer public advice to politicians and public servants who make decisions (Pollitt, 2008, P.159). As a result, government workers tend to spend much of their time in meetings as part of their frequent activities.

However, despite the importance of meetings, anecdotal evidence and field survey suggests that many government offices fail to conduct productive meetings. For example, the majority of the government officials I interviewed in Tanzania complained about the frequency of very long meetings which usually start late and often do not provide sufficient information to workers to perform their jobs well. Intriguingly, ministry leaders such as permanent secretaries who I met during the preliminary survey also want the quality of meetings to be improved for the efficient functioning of government offices[19]. This is very interesting as while workers and top leaders of government offices resent and continuously complain about unproductive and delayed meetings, the situation has persisted. In economics, this kind of situation is said to be an equilibrium.

[19] Tardiness behavior has always been ascribed to as unpunctuality custom of the so-called African time. According to Wikipedia, African time is the perceived cultural tendency, in most parts of Africa toward a more relaxed attitude to time. This is mainly associated with luck of punctuality in appointments, meetings and events. Is it true that tardiness is African culture? I would argue, probably no, it is not an African Culture. The African villager will go to a village meeting on time and will attend church service on time. In my opinion, this perception stems from a rebellious attitude some educated Africans developed during colonization when they had to meet their white bosses.

Although meetings are rarely studied in economics, scholars in other fields such as psychology, management science, and organization studies have been studying workplace meetings. Most studies in these fields have focused on the factors affecting meeting process and outcomes. These include preparations (Scott, Allen, Rogelberg, & Kello, 2015); leadership (Geimer et al., 2015; Leach et al., 2009; Myrsiades et al., 2016), frequency and duration of meetings (Edmunds, 2003; Scott et al., 2015), and tardiness (Lehmann-Willenbrock & Allen, 2017). Among these factors, lateness is considered to be common but also a serious problem and argued to be attributed to attendees late arrival (Allen et al., 2016; Leach et al., 2009; Lehmann-Willenbrock & Allen, 2017; Myrsiades et al., 2000; Rogelberg et al., 2006). What is lacking, however, is empirical evidence of why meeting participants tend to be late or why many organizations including government offices are caught in a trap of unpunctual and unproductive meetings. This gap is the main focus of this chapter.

Testable hypotheses for office meetings

This study argues that unproductive meetings are the outcome of coordination problems resembling weak-link games with multiple Pareto ranked equilibrium. In the government offices, a formal meeting can only start when the required number of workers and the supervisor who usually chairs the meetings are present. If either of these two conditions is not met, the punctual workers have to wait for the unpunctual workers before the meeting can start. Thus, latecomers are the ones who determine the actual meeting starting time. However, each worker knows that everyone will benefit from a good discussion that is possible only if everyone is punctual and the meeting starts on time. This means, each worker has an incentive to coordinate so that meetings can start as scheduled, which is better

for all, but they chooses to show up late because based on the past experience, they are substantially sure that showing up on time will mean wasting their time waiting for others who always show up late and the same applies to each of her colleagues.

Now, the central policy question here is how to overcome this inefficient equilibrium? Obviously, this can only be overcome if something can be done to make workers believe that everyone will be punctual. According to findings from experimental studies, leaders as enforcers of the rules of the game can do this by using at least three tools: (i) communication (e.g., Brandts & Cooper, 2006a; Chaudhuri, Schotter, & Sopher, 2009; Eckel & Wilson, 2007) (ii) lead by example (e.g., Brandts & Cooper, 2006b; Cartwright et al., 2013; Rigg & Richards, 2006), and (iii) incentives (e.g., Brandts et al., 2014; Hamman et al., 2007). Experimental studies also provide important insights on the role of players' communication, signaling actions, and group size. The following section briefly presents a summary of a set of testable hypotheses specifically for office meetings.

Leader's communication and actions: in the government offices, supervisors are normally coordinators and chairpersons of the meeting. Given this positional leadership, supervisors can potentially reduce unpunctuality by effectively communicating about the importance of keeping time and starting meetings as scheduled. Apart from effective communication, leaders themselves need to keep time and lead by example. This is summarized in the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3.1: *Government offices in which supervisors communicate more frequently about punctuality are more likely to experience less meeting lateness.*

Hypothesis 3.2**:** *Workers are likely to be punctual if they expect office supervisor to be punctual*

Incentives: both leaders and meeting participants can easily observe who is late and sanction them or reward those who are punctual which in either case is expected to reduce unpunctuality. For instance, in the case of meeting lateness, supervisors can punish latecomers by locking them out of the meeting, publishing their names in the minutes of the meeting, and assigning them additional responsibilities. Therefore, it is expected that, both positive and negative incentives will likely discourage late coming and hence reduce the coordination problem:

Hypothesis 3.3*: Incentive is negatively associated with meeting lateness*

In the coordination game, communication is said to be more effective in a situation where the involved parties have common interest but fail to coordinate because of the uncertainty of actions of involved parties (e.g., Acocella, Di Bartolomeoy, Hallettz, & Piacquadio, 2014; Cooper et al., 1992; Kim & Sobeli, 1995). In the office meeting, we assume that the common interest for workers is meetings to start on time as scheduled and be productive which is beneficial for all. This can be achieved if workers remind each other about the importance of keeping time. I therefore hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 3.4: *Offices in which workers frequently remind each other about the importance of keeping time are likely to have less lateness problem.*

The laboratory results suggest that coordination failure can be lowered when players disclose their actions (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000; Masiliūnas, 2017). In the same line of argument, if office workers observe and experience coworkers keeping time it is likely that they will also keep time. Therefore we hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 3.5: *Workers are likely to be punctual if they expect coworkers to be punctual.*

As discussed, a meeting is likely to start when the minimum number of workers or key members is present. Since the minimum number of workers required to hold a meeting is usually specified in percentage terms or proportion of all office workers, it means that the possibility of workers to be late will increase with the total number of workers. Therefore, I hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 3.6: *The extent of lateness of offices meetings increase with number of meeting participants. .*

Lastly, some empirical studies in manufacturing and health sector have documented how working environment such as workplace layout might affect performance (Bloom, Propper, et al., 2015). It is also possible that office layout is associated with the way activities in the government offices are coordinated. For example open office layout can facilitate monitoring of coworkers actions and increase peer pressure on workers who don't keep time. On that basis, it is expected that workers in open office layout will experience less meeting lateness than workers who use private offices. I therefore hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 3.7**:** *Meeting lateness will be lower in open offices than closed offices.*

3.3 Econometric specification for the office meetings

I tested above meeting hypotheses using Ordered Probit model (7) presented in chapter 2, which is replicated below as equation (3.1):

$$\boldsymbol{OM = f_m(C_l, C_w\ A_l\ A_w, I, N, Z)} \ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots (\mathbf{3.1})$$

Where ***OM*** is Meetings Outcomes such as meeting lateness and meeting effectiveness. $\boldsymbol{C_l}$ is leader's communication, $\mathbf{C}_w$ is workers communication, $\mathbf{A}_l$ is Leadership by example, $\mathbf{A}_w$ is workers punctuality, ***N*** is Office size defined by number of workers, and **Z** represents other factors such as individual characteristics and office characteristics.

3.2: Empirical findings

Descriptive analyses

(a) ***Office workers and office characteristic***

Table 3.1 presents the characteristics of sample government offices and officials working in those offices. Column (1) shows the characteristics of the full sample which combine both supervisors and frontline workers. Columns (2) and (3) describe the characteristics of the office supervisors and their frontline workers respectively. Columns (4) and (5) decompose the sample into differences between the supervisors and frontline workers while column (7) shows the results of the test of equality of mean differences between old and young cohorts.

The full sample composes 252 officials from 63 government offices representing 67 percent of all 378 workers working in the sample office at the time of survey. Out of the full sample, 63 workers (equivalent to 25 percent) are the office supervisors and 189 workers

(equivalent to 75 percent) are frontline workers. Of the sample workers, 56 percent are of the old cohort which is defined here as workers who were older than 40 years during data collection and employed before year 2004, while 44 percent are young cohort which is defined here as workers who were equal or younger than 40 years old and employed from year 2004[20].

Comparing supervisors and their frontline workers, on average, supervisors are older than frontline workers by almost 10 years and the difference is significant at 1 percent level as shown in column (6). On the one hand, supervisors have 20.16 average years of experience of which 9.22 years worked in the same office as shown by tenure in the current offices. On the other hand, frontline workers have an average of 10.99 years of experience out of which 7.51 years in the current office. Further, results reveal that supervisors on average have been in a leadership position for about 4.5 years as depicted by tenures in the current position. This suggests that most of the supervisors rose into a leadership position in the same office when considering tenure in the current office. As it can be seen from the results, about 95 percent of supervisors belonged to the old cohort compared to 43 percent of frontline workers. These two cohorts have a difference of 14 average years of age which is highly significant at the level of 1 percent.

In addition, there is a significant difference between the supervisor's and average worker's amounts of salary. The difference is also highly significant between old and young cohort workers. These differences can possibly be ascribed to the fact that rewards such as

[20] As part of public service reform program, government literary suspended recruitment of workers for about 10 years resumed employment in 2004 which resulted to age gap among old cohort and new cohort (Ndulu and Mutalemwa, 2002). Similar category of cohorts is adapted by Mhede(2018)

salary and promotions in the government offices are mostly functions of the seniority (i.e., years of service) rather than individual performance. In terms of education, on average, the supervisors and frontline workers have 18.29 years and 17.2 years of formal schooling respectively. In part, this is because most of the government technical workers are employed with a bachelor degree but during their tenure, they also have opportunities to undertake masters and even doctoral studies as part of motivation and capacity building.

Further, the results in Table 3.1 reveal that about 70 percent of frontline workers use shared office (henceforth, open office layout)[21] compared to 16 percent of supervisors. Also about 25 percent of supervisors' offices are distantly located from their immediate workers' offices. Lastly, our sample offices have an average size of six (6) workers (see, the last row in columns (1) to (3) of Table *3.1*).

Table 3.2 presents the background characteristics of government workers by department type. Column (1) shows characteristics of the combined sample from all three surveyed departments. Column (2) is Policy and Planning Departments (DPP), while columns (3) and (4) are Human Resources Departments (HRD) and Sector Specific Departments (SSD) respectively. Further, columns (5) to (7) present the test statistics of equality of means between departments.

The analysis shows that in these departments, the characteristics of the offices and workers are generally similar but with some noteworthy differences. Among the surveyed departments, on average, SSD is staffed with older, longer-tenured, more educated, more experienced workers and a larger number of workers than the other two departments.

[21] Open office variable is set equal to 1 in office with open floor architecture and 0 otherwise.

Specialization nature of the SSD can partly explain these differences particularly education and tenure. SSD workers are specialists as they are equipped with special skills suitable for their sectors. Thus, workers in SSD are less likely to move from one department to another within and even across government ministries. The results further show that HRD has a higher proportion of female workers compared to the other two departments. The results of the test of the equality of means (see, columns (5), (6), and (7) of Table 3.2, further display insignificant differences in office layout between departments except for the SSD which is statistically significant at 10 percent level.

(b) Descriptive analyses of government office plenary meetings

To investigate the source of meetings lateness and the effectiveness of government office meetings, a number of questions were asked about workers' experience on meeting practices. Table 3.3 describes the plenary meetings situation using three variables: (i) average meeting delay time, (ii) average time spent in the office plenary meetings, and (iii) adequacy of information received from meetings. Panel A of Table 3.3 presents data on the officer's unpunctuality (i.e., measured by an average delay time)[22]. Such data was constructed from the question which asked: On average about how many minutes normally is the office plenary meetings start delayed? The possible responses were: 1. Less than 10 minutes, 2. 10 – 20 minutes, 3. 20 – 40 minutes, 4. 40 – 60 minutes, and 5. More than 1 hour. This question was

[22] The uses of the frequency distribution (with frequencies and number of observation) is more appropriate than the use of measures of central tendencies (e.g., mean, standard deviation, and number of observations) which might be more informative. However, when variables are categorical in nature, the latter might be misleading as in ordinal the values between categories might not be the same, thus using a measure of central tendency would be statistically misleading

preceded by an introductory question which asked, Does a typical plenary meeting in your office usually start on time?[23] The answer was either Yes or No. The results show that, on average, about 42.08 percent (i.e., 28.57 + 8.33 + 5.16 = 42.08 percent) of our respondents in the full sample reported that meetings tend to start not less than 40 minutes later than the scheduled time (Figure 3.2).

Panel B of Table 3.3 presents the distribution of responses to the question which asked: On average, about how much time do (you) and your office people spend in a typical plenary meeting? The possible answers were 1. Less than 30 minutes, 2. 30 – 45 minutes, 3. 45 minutes – 1hour, 4. 1 hour – 2 hours, and 5. More than 2 hours. The results in Panel B indicate, about 70.24 (i.e., 47.62 + 22.62 = 70.24 percent) percent of respondents reported that on average office meeting takes at least one hour. Others, representing about 22.62 percent of the total sample, reported that the office plenary meetings take the duration of more than 2 hours.

Finally, Panel C presents results of the question related to the effectiveness of office plenary meetings. Here, the proxy measure of the meeting effectiveness is the sufficiency of information workers receive from office meetings. The responses came from the question asked to the supervisors: In your office, do officers tend to get sufficient information and instruction to perform their official duties through routine office plenary meetings? The answers provided by the supervisors included: 1. they always get sufficient information, 2. Yes, in many cases they get, 3. It depends on a case by case, 4. most of the time they do not get, and 5. The opposite is the case. A similar question was asked to workers if they get

[23] On time here we mean not more than 10 minutes after scheduled time.

sufficient information from office meetings to perform their official duties with similar personalized responses.

Panel C shows that 64.28 percent (i.e., 53.57 + 10.71 = 64.28 percent) of the respondents stated that they either always do not get sufficient information or most of the time the information they get from these meetings is not sufficient for them to perform their duties efficiently. The finding is a surprise one. Partly, because, on average such offices hold about two (2) regular office meetings per week and spend about two hours per meeting as shown in Table 3.4. This is suggestive evidence of certain inefficiencies.

Table 3.4 presents the descriptive statistics of plenary meetings in our sample government offices. Column (1) shows data of the combined sample of both individual supervisors and individual workers, Column (2) shows data of average office workers excluding supervisors while column (3) represents supervisor's information.

As the first row of columns (1), (2), and (3) show, about 94 percent of respondents reported that their offices tend to hold regular plenary meetings. However, the reported number of plenary meetings per week differs significantly between office supervisors and their immediate workers. That is, while the frontline workers reported to have had an average of 1.38 meetings per week, their supervisors reported 2.59 meetings per week. The difference is statistically significant at 1 percent level. These results may have several interpretations. First, the difference in the number of plenary meetings is a suggestive evidence that such offices are undergoing coordination problem (Mhede, 2018). This is possible because supervisors may have meetings with a subset of office workers, leaving others unaware of those meetings. Second, supervisors might have exaggerated the number of meetings because

office meetings in the government offices in Tanzania are mandatory or supervisors may know the importance of meetings for the office management. Third, workers might have understated the number of meetings for some reasons such as lack of clear description of office meetings.

Similarly, the reported proportion of meeting time used exclusively to discuss office issues is significantly different between office workers and supervisors. Specifically, workers reported an average of 76 percent while supervisors reported an average of 84 percent of meeting time. Interestingly, both workers and supervisors reported a more substantial number of self-communication and punctuality than the way other parties evaluated them. That is supervisors reported to communicate more frequently about punctuality and themselves as mostly punctual but workers reported supervisors to communicate less frequent and most of the time are unpunctual. Likewise, workers reported to keep time and communicate with each other more frequently about meeting punctuality, but supervisors reported workers rarely communicate and hardly keep meeting time. A natural way to interpret these findings is that both workers and supervisors understand the importance of communication and punctuality that is why they have the incentive to report higher numbers.

Table 3.5 shows correlation matrix of office meeting lateness variables. The correlation analysis reported in this table shows that most of our variables of interest are significantly correlated with outcome variables and all signs are going in the expected direction. Specifically, meeting lateness is negatively and significantly correlated with leadership, communication, incentive, meeting effectiveness, and office layout.

Main Estimation Results

(i) Exploring correlates of coordination failure on meeting lateness

Results of this section attempt to answer the question that asked why workers continue to be late to the regularly scheduled meetings albeit delayed meetings being undesirable. Table 3.6 presents main results in different regression models on how the correlates of coordination failure are associated with meeting starting time in. Column (1) presents the results of the preferred specification model which is Ordered Probit. Column (2) – (4) report results from other different specifications which are OLS, Ordered Logistic model, and generalized linear model (GLM). Column (5) is office fixed effect model, column (6) is department fixed effect, and column (7) is ministry fixed effect regressions.

In all models, results show that leaders' punctuality, coworkers' punctuality, leaders' communication about punctuality, workers communication, and open office layout is significant and negatively associated with meeting delay time[24]. Together this suggests that offices in which leader and workers keep time and communicate about the importance of punctuality tend to have less delays. The findings support hypothesis 3.1 - , 3.5 with the exception of Hypothesis 3.3 which is about incentives. These results are in line with a number of previous experimental studies in coordination game (Brandts & Cooper, 2007; Brandts et al., 2007; Devetag & Ortmann, 2007; Van Huyck et al., 2007) which found group efficiency is associated with communication, leadership, and expectation about group members actions.

[24] The most striking result to emerge from the data is the impact of workers action that meetings are likely to start late if workers keep showing up late in all specifications and vice versa.

Unexpectedly, in all regressions, the incentive variable has no significant result except in the fixed effect model. These results indicate that the impact of incentive or disincentive on lateness is marginally effective after fixing offices, departments, and ministries. Therefore Hypothesis 3.3 about incentive is weakly supported. This is especially interesting as for the case of meeting tardiness, it is easy to monitor who is on time and who is late and hence reward punctuality and discourage unpunctuality. The possible explanation on this is that, if leaders themselves as enforcers of the rules of the game are frequently late, morally they cannot punish other latecomers. Another possible reason is the incentive type and size which are probably not structured in a way that can affect workers payoff to discourage lateness behavior. In addition, office size is positively associated with meeting lateness as predicted but the results are not significant. Therefore, there is no significant support for hypothesis 3.6 that larger offices are more likely to experience more lateness problem.

Finally, findings show that workers in open offices are more likely to experience less delay in meetings than workers in closed offices. Accordingly, these results adequately support Hypothesis 3.7. I suspect that communication is much easy in the open office than closed office thus omitting office layout might significantly overestimate communication. Additionally, another interesting result is the department dummy variable. Results of these estimates reveal that in all regression types, Human Resource Department has the lowest level of lateness than other departments.

Robustness Check Regression analysis of using different measures of correlates of meeting lateness

This section investigates the robustness of the analysis of the main results presented above. The robustness test is conducted with various measures of independent variables, including individual data, average office data, and coworkers' data. The analysis also split supervisors and workers data and analyzed them separately with the intention to study their perceptions towards regular office meeting practices. Table 3.7 reports the results of different models with different measures of independent variables. Column (1) replicates exactly the result from our main baseline regression using individual data. Column (2) looks at workers only, Column (3) is supervisors only, column (4) examines average frontline office workers, and column (5) average office. Finally, Column (6) presents the results of Fixed Effect models of average office data.

In general, results are similar in all models but with some differences in the levels of significance. More specifically, in all models, the variable of leader's communication is negatively and significantly associated with meeting lateness except for model (2) and (4) where the level of significance disappeared. Further, punctuality by both supervisors and workers are likely to significantly reduce meeting lateness in all models except for models (2) and (4), which use supervisors' data where the significance level disappeared but the sign is consistent. For, supervisors only, years of experience is negatively associated with lateness in both Odered Probit and OLS. Open office layout is also negatively associated with meeting lateness, but results are marginally significant in models (5) and (6) when using average office data. These results suggest that allowing different measures and different models do

not significantly change the main results either. These findings suggest that, delays in meeting starting time in the government offices in Tanzania are associated with office communication practices, leadership, workers punctuality behavior, and working environment, such as office layout.

In addition, the self-reported data used in this study are mainly based on the perception of frontline supervisors and workers, with possibility of bias responses such as over-reporting or under-reporting. As a further robustness check, this analysis separately analyzed workers evaluation about supervisors' communication and punctuality, supervisors' evaluation about their own communication and punctuality, supervisors evaluation of workers punctuality and communication, and workers self-evaluation about communication and punctuality. Table 3.8A and 3.8B presents results of supervisors' evaluation and workers evaluation, respectively. The finding shows that, while both supervisors and workers seem to evaluate themselves doing better in terms of punctuality and communication, on average the results are not very much different[25].

Findings on why some departments, particularly HRD, are doing better than others are presented on Table 3.9. The analysis is done by studying individual departments separately. Column (1) uses data from PPD, Column (2) uses data from HRD, and Column (3) uses data from SSD. Results show that in HRD, long-tenured workers seem to report

[25] Peters, (2010) recommended so called 360 evaluations that is workers are evaluated by coworkers, supervisors, and those who are below them. He argued that this can be rational tool to determine rewards and retention but it also can be useful tool for the individual being rated to improve his or her performance. But he also cautioned that this method is very subjective and relies on the willingness of participants to make often difficult judgments of co-workers. Other workers may not like supervisors for some reasons which Peter agued if that is the case it is sign of bad leadership. Thus we included self-judgment in the robustness analysis despite that even evaluate might not know that he is really doing good job or not.

more delay while more experienced workers seem to report less lateness. The impact of long-tenured and experienced workers appeared to net off. However, in other departments both tenure and years of experience are negative insignificantly associated with meeting delay.

The incentive is found to have no significant impact in both departments except in human resource where it is marginal. In all departments, leader's communication is negative and significantly associated with meeting delay. Likewise, leadership punctuality is negatively and significantly associated with delay in DPP, marginally significant in HRD but not significant in SSD. Equally workers punctuality is negative and significantly associated with delay in DPP, marginally significant in HRD but not significant as seen in SSD column. Conversely coefficient of workers communication is consistently negative but insignificant in DPP while is highly significant in HRD and SSD.

The natural question then is why HRD has less delay than other departments? The possible explanation is that in HRD, both leaders and workers frequency of communication are highly significant but also both leaders and workers punctuality is at least marginally significant. Contrarily, DPP which is the second least in delay has both leaders' communication, workers communication, and leaders' punctuality which are significant, while in sector department only leader communication is significant. As this analysis uses survey cross-sectional data, the direction of causality is hard to establish, but these results suggest that less delay departments have a combination of both correlates. For example, HRD has a combination of both leader's communication and punctuality and workers communication, and punctuality.

Table 3.10 substantiate this premise by disentangling these correlates and tests them individually in columns (1) – (7) and jointly in column (8). The result shows that communication among workers is the most powerful correlate as can be seen in its level of significance as well as R-squared. Interestingly, results show that apart from workers communication all other variables are independently insignificant but jointly significant. This demonstrates just how important communication is as confirmed by the previous findings in laboratory studies. These results also suggest that one or two correlates alone do not have a tangible effect on punctuality. This means that leaders should communicate, act, and incentivize; likewise, workers should communicate and act at the same time.

(ii) Exploring the impact of lateness on effectiveness of workers meetings

The effectiveness of office meetings in this chapter is measured using meeting output, meaning the sufficiency of information acquired by workers from the meetings. To accurately capture the impact of meeting lateness to the effectiveness of meetings, I controlled for the factors that may correlate with meeting lateness and meeting effectiveness, which can potentially generate spurious correlation if omitted[26]. I therefore include a set of factors that have previously been shown to correlate with the effectiveness of meetings (e.g., Leach et al., 2009). These include the frequency of meetings, advance distribution of meeting agenda, meeting duration, attendees' participation, and distribution of records of the previous meetings.

[26] It is important to note that this section is not trying to establish causation between lateness and meeting effectiveness rather it claims a negative relationship between meeting lateness and meeting effectiveness.

Regression results of the meeting effectiveness and detailed discussion are given in Table 3.12. Column (1) uses meeting lateness as a variable of interest while controlling for individual characteristics and office characteristics. Columns (2) to (6) include all other variables identified to have an impact on the effectiveness of meetings. In all regressions, the coefficient of lateness is consistently negative and highly significant except for column (6) that includes supervisors only where the level of statistical significance disappeared.

These results may have different interpretations. First, the insignificant impact on supervisors could be due to the small sample size (low statistical power to detect the impact). Second, supervisors don't see lateness as a problem as in many cases the meeting can only start when the supervisor is ready, and when they are late everyone must wait for them. Equally, in managerial and psychology studies, lateness has long been considered as a withdrawal behavior (e.g., Adler & Golan, 1981; Gupta & Jenkins, 1983; Koslowsky & Dishon-Berkovits, 2001). That is, as a sign of annoyance of lateness, workers may have reported to obtain insufficient information from meetings starting late than they otherwise would.

The preceding findings casually seem to indicate that lateness affects meeting outcomes. This is consistent with a recent laboratory experimental study by Lehmann-Willenbrock and Allen (2017). However, this might be a wrong conclusion for several reasons. First, the analysis do not explain how or what factor(s) of lateness makes meeting ineffective. Second, the use of lateness as an independent variable might raise analytical questions. Therefore, the analysis went further by replacing the variable of meeting lateness with the correlates of coordination failure. Table 3.13 presents results of the analysis. Among

the correlates of meeting lateness, leadership communication seems to have positive and robust impact on the effectiveness of meetings. This confirms the importance of leadership described above. Alternatively, this might mean that a leader who communicates more frequently about punctuality can also communicate more effectively in the meetings. Offices with many workers seem to experience more ineffective meetings than small offices[27].

Lastly, apart from meeting lateness, results presented in tables 3.12 and 3.13 also show that office meetings are likely to be more productive if are well prepared for example advance distribution of meeting agenda. Surprisingly free expression seems to have no impact on the meeting effectiveness, contrarily meetings are found to be effective if workers believe that their opinions are considered. Also, the frequency of meetings is found to have a positive and significant impact on the meeting effectiveness but unexpectedly, meeting duration does not have a significant impact on the effectiveness[28]. These results are somewhat in line with several previous studies mainly in Psychology (Bang, Fuglesang, Ovesen, & Eilertsen, 2010; Lehmann-Willenbrock & Allen, 2014; Nixon & Littlepage, 1992).

The analysis went further to estimate the cost of meetings to the government. Most literature agrees that meetings are one of the main components of most of the organization cost (e.g., Lehmann-Willenbrock & Allen, 2017; Shore, 2013). This is because of the fact that workers tend to spend a significant amount of their work time in unproductive meetings. As it is seen from the data in table 3.14, offices on average hold about two meetings per week and spend at least 2 hours excluding time spent preparing for the meetings and waiting for

[27] This support Schanck, (1982) that larger groups tend to be less effective than small sized group.
[28] In almost all offices, have open-ended meetings where meeting length is not pre-determined.

the meeting to start. Unproductive meetings are more costly because labour time which could be used for other activities is lost. In the government of Tanzania, labour cost is one of the main components of government expenditure. According to the budget figure of 2017/18, workers' salary and wages accounts for about 37 percent of total government domestic revenue. The cost estimation presented in table 3.14 shows that on average, staff meetings in the central government alone, cost about 10 percent of the total salary.

3.3: Conclusion

This chapter analyses formal meetings which are not only one of the main activities of government officials but also an important mechanism by which governments operate. It used survey data which I collected from central government ministries in Tanzania to empirically study pre-scheduled plenary office meetings involving supervisors and frontline employees. Three empirical analyses are conducted. First, it attempts to measure the extent of meeting lateness, a common yet crucial aspect of meeting ineffectiveness. Second, it uses coordination game experience from laboratory studies to analyze and interpret the persistency of inefficient meeting practices in the government offices. Third, it investigates the linkage between meeting lateness, effectiveness and coordination failure.

The chapter used both descriptive and econometric analysis to study and test the correlates associated with coordination failure in the laboratory experiments and applied them in real government offices. Although the real government working environment is different from laboratory studies, the results generally seem to be consistent with the lab findings. In fact, the study suggests that offices are trapped in unproductive meetings, which are harmful to workers and organizations. On the other hand, efficient meetings can be

achieved with coordination among office workers. These may be interpreted that, while workplace meetings are used as a coordination tool in most organizations, meetings themselves are prone to coordination failure. This implies that initiatives to improve government capability should address coordination failure not only between organizations but also within offices. In this regard, this chapter argues for practical interventions among others to improve leadership and communication practices at all levels of government offices and hence overcome the inefficiency trap.

Use of self-reported data is a limitation of this study as it might lead to biased conclusion; however, several mitigation measures are applied to minimize potential biases. Therefore, one possible research direction with regard to meetings is to conduct a field experiment or use an observation methodology. Another interesting related area would be to study meetings not only within offices but also between offices and organizations, and across departments. Further, most policies and decisions in most government offices, if not all, are initiated, discussed, and deliberated through meetings. This implies that poorly organized meetings can be not only a costly activity in terms of workers time and materials, but also lead to bad policies and outcomes. Thus, it might be interesting to study the link between the effectiveness of meetings and public sector performance.

CHAPTER 4

GOVERNMENT OFFICE FILING AS COORDINATION GAME

4.1: Introduction

This chapter investigates the filing practices and explores the sources of improper filing in the government ministries in Tanzania. In particular, it addresses two main issues. First, it attempts to provide evidence of inefficiency in the government office filing practices. This is done by systematically quantifying the amount of time spent by workers searching for working files and appropriate document an activity which does not add value to the office productivity (*muda in Japanese).* Second, it applies field data to concretely explore sources and nature of poor filing and record keeping in the government offices in Tanzania[29]. To do that, the study uses game theory concepts of Coordination Failure and Prisoners' Dilemma to study and interpret the persistence of poor filing in the government offices.

Traditionally, governments and public sector organizations in general work on papers (e.g., Eyre, 1989; Sellen & Harper, 2002; Smith, 2007). In many developing countries at least, records of government's activities, employees, clients, and partners are usually processed, recorded, communicated, and stored in the form of paper documents[30]. Likewise, the information stored in the files is used for government operations such as policy advice and decision making but also is an essential instrument for accountability of government officials. That is, the quality of document filing matters for the performance of officers and

[29] Oxford English Dictionary defines file as a folder holding together loose papers with information about a particular person or thing or number of issues and responsibilities relating to a particular policy.
[30] Oxford English Dictionary defines file as a folder holding together loose papers with information about a particular person or thing or number of issues and responsibilities relating to a particular policy.

organizations, is hardly controversial (e.g., Ghupta, 2012; ISO 9001, 2015). Admitedly, the flow of official information, the quality, reliability, and speed of decision making in the government offices depends greatly on the quality of filing in terms of traceability, accessibility, and adequacy of information.

Filing is therefore an important and one of the frequent activities of government officials. In the actual government workplaces, officers tend to receive instructions from their superiors mainly through paper documents. It is common practice for oral instruction to be backed up by written instructions. Moreover, even when a document is received in a file or as a loose document, the procedure requires that work be done and transmitted in the file. In practice, therefore, there is both vertical and horizontal movement of files as illustrated in figure 3.1. Accordingly, the main concern of poor filing has always been on the time wasted searching for the appropriate file and documents (e.g., Eyre, 1989; Heath & Luff, 1996; Sellen & Harper, 2002) [31]. However, bad filing have reputation risk to to the organization and workers than time wasted. For example, duplication and misfiling of official documents can result in inconsistent decision making, which may lead to wrong or delayed decisions and service delivered by public organizations. Poor filing systems might also lead to corruption, lack of integrity, and injustice to the public service recipients. Consequently, poor filing may cause loss of confidence and psychological suffering to both government clients and workers (Hull, 2012; Smith, 2007; Stewart et al., 1989).

[31] These works were primarily to engage into the debate over whether the information and communication technology would replace paper documents for the better office performance. This chapter will not attempt to go very far into this debate but it is important to mention that these studies concluded that paper documents will continue to play a critical role.

However, despite its importance, many public sectors in developing countries are said to experience poor filing and record keeping (Rogger, 2017; Stewart et al., 1989). For example, the World Bank assessment on Tanzania public service capability found that government workers spend a substantial amount of time looking for files which is argued to have damaging effects on the service delivery (Girishankar & Migliorisi, 2013). Further, leaders from various ministries whom I met during the plenary survey categorically mentioned poor documentation and record keeping as the main source of the problem of ghost workers which is common and has persisted in most of the public sector in developing countries (e.g., Chaudhury & Hammer, 2003; Reinikka & Svensson, 2002). This anecdotal evidence was substantiated by the survey data whereby about 90 percent of government office workers reported that filing is a serious problem in their offices.

This is somewhat surprising because Tanzania is one of the countries which have undertaken rigorous initiatives to improve filing and record keeping in the public sector (Girishankar & Migliorisi, 2013). Briefly, in the year 1984, the government formulated a filing procedure manual and in 1997 initiated a project to manage documents and filing systems in all ministries[32]. In 2001, it enacted a law and regulations, while in 2007 and 2011 a new government filing procedures manual and policy were issued respectively. Further, in 2000, record management cadre was introduced in the public service and Public Service College was concurrently established to offer certificate and degree programs in records management. Surprisingly, a closer look at the filing and records management of Tanzania

[32] Despite that most of ministries have electronic file tracing system, almost in all ministries the system is not functional. One of the main reason is that only registry staff are aware of the system.

public sector reveals a close resemblance to that of the United Kingdom. In fact, institutional structure, legislation and regulations, duties and responsibility specifications are practically the same as the one specified in the UK Public Records Acts 1958 and 1967. With this in mind, the present study asks precisely why then filing in the government offices in Tanzania is poor despite all initiatives?

The most common response to this question is that offices lack proper filing procedure and rules, filing facilities, and record management skill (Stewart et al., 1989). As a result, previous initiatives focused on the institutionalization of the filing system by introducing laws and filing facilities. However, Aoki (2001), described institutions as rule of the game which are endogenously generated and self-enforced through strategic interactions of agents including the enforcers of the rules. Likewise, Mailath, Morris and Postlewaite (2017), argue that laws are made to prohibit a particular behavior but law by itself does not directly change the individual engaging in prohibited behavior but individual change depends on the change of others' behavior. In the context of filing, this literature seems to suggest that despite the presence of good institutions and laws, the actual workers' actions towards filing will depend on others' behavior on the filing.

This aspect of workers interaction particularly file users is almost overlooked in both written works and policy interventions[33]. Therefore this chapter to some extent fills this gap by empirically studying how the strategic interaction of government workers particularly files users is associated with filing situation in the workplace. This is due to the fact that

[33] Practically, office filing has a life cycle with mainly three stages which are (i) creation, (ii) active use, (iii) achieve. However, the existing studies and policy initiatives have essentially ignored the second stage and much attention is given to the other two stages.

office files are a shared resource which makes office filing a victim of free-riding behavior which somehow resembles Prisoners' Dilemma. The best choice for any worker is to always cheat on other workers whether the other players cooperate or not. However, this study considers the possibility that a supervisor can change the rules of the game or incentive structure for office workers to a situation similar to weak-link coordination game. Therefore the following section briefly discusses testable hypothesis in relation to office filing.

Testable hypotheses for filing

As discussed, in Tanzania, proper filing is required by law, guided by policy and standing guidelines which requires all government workers to comply with established standards and that non-compliance is punishable. However, laws and regulations without enforcement are cheap talk as they don't directly change people's behavior. Thus we consider the possibility that a supervisor changes the rules of game or incentive structure for office workers by introducing punishment for noncompliance. But supervisors have to communicate and show moral examples to convince both the players to coordinate their behavior for a better result. Therefore this is summarized in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4.1: *Offices in which supervisors communicate more frequently about proper filing are likely to have less filing problems*

Hypothesis 4.2**:** *Frontline office workers are likely to file documents if they frequently observe their supervisors properly filing office documents.*

Hypothesis 4.3*: Incentive to properly file documents or disincentive to avoid doing wrong filing is likely to improve the quality of office filing.*

One way out of a social dilemma and coordination situation especially under repetitive environments is communication (e.g., Arechar, Dreber, Fudenberg, & Rand, 2017; Cooper et al., 1992). However, even if all workers agree and remind each other that filing is good for the offices, workers themselves have to commit to their messages by disclosing their actions (Masiliūnas, 2017). Even in a social dilemma situation, workers are likely to increase their effort level if coworkers offer high effort due to different reasons such as social pressure and contagion enthusiasm (Mas & Moretti, 2009)[34]. It is therefore predicted that workers are likely to file properly meaning systematically organizing documents in the file and return the files to the designated place immediately after finishing using the file if they believe others will also do the same. The role of workers communication and actions is summarized in the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 4.4: *Government office filing problems decrease with an increase in frequency of communication about filing among workers.*

Hypothesis 4.5: *Workers effort to file documents increases with belief that coworkers are also filing properly.*

The main problem in shared resources is free-riding which is also known in economics as the shirking problem or the moral hazard problem (Abramitzky, 2018; Holmstrom, 1979). Likewise, experimental studies found that coordination problem increases with the size of group members (i.e; Kyriacou, 2011; Weber, 2006). By this line of

[34] As described by (Mas & Moretti, 2009) social pressure mean that workers experience disutility when working less hard than other workers working together. They also describe contagion enthusiasm that a worker experience if she is not working hard relative to others even if no one knows she is working slowly.

reasoning, it is expected that, offices with a large number of workers will be likely to experience more filing problems:

Hypothesis 4.6: *Offices filing problems increase with the number of file users.*

Lastly, office layout is expected to play an important role in increasing cooperation in filing. This is because open office layout may facilitate peer monitoring and repeated interactions which can potentially increase cooperation. It is therefore hypothesized that:

Hypothesis 4.7**:** *Workers in the open office layout are more likely to experience less filing problems compared to workers in closed offices.*

4.3 Econometric specification for the government office filing

To test the stated hypothesis and answer the research questions, this chapter considered equation (8) as stated in chapter two which is replicated bellow:

$$\boldsymbol{OF} = f_F(\boldsymbol{C_l}, \boldsymbol{C_w}\ \boldsymbol{A_l}\ \boldsymbol{A_w}, \boldsymbol{I}, \boldsymbol{N}, \boldsymbol{Z}) \ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots (\mathbf{4.1})$$

Where $\boldsymbol{OF}$ the dependent variable is filing outcomes, $\boldsymbol{C_l}$ is leaders communication about filing, $\boldsymbol{C_w}$ is Workers communication about filing, $\boldsymbol{A_l}$is leaders demonstration, $\boldsymbol{A_w}$ is workers filing effort, $\boldsymbol{I}$ is incentive, **N** is number of office workers or office size. Apart from the identified correlates which are used as variables of interest, regression analysis also included **Z** which control for office characteristics and workers characteristics.

Since there is no other scholarly study or data on the filing practices which could be used to study office filing in the government offices, all data used in this chapter comes from

the government workers survey which I conducted from 4th January 2017 to 27 February 2017 in Tanzania. My sample focused on the lowest level of administration in the ministry where workers (commonly referred to as file pushers) deal more with files hence the quality of filing can potentially affect their productivity[35].

4.2: Empirical findings

There is no standard definition of good filing and bad filing in the literature. However, Eyre,(1989), Ghupta, (2012), and Stewart et al. (1989) described that there is a close relationship between poor filing systems and time spent to search for the appropriate files with the right information. The present study extended this description and develop three outcome variables to measure the goodness of workplace filing. The outcome variables are: (i) file tracing time which measures the average time spent by office workers to trace a working file when needed, (ii) time to find an appropriate document, which is measured by average amount of time workers spend to find the needed document(s) within the file, and (iii) incidence of misfiling[36] which measure errors and mistakes in the handling of office documents. Since there are no standard statistical method on how these variables are measured, I created an ordered scale ranging from 1 to 5 where 1 is good and 5 is poor for all three outcome variables.

Item (i) comes from the question which asked, on average, about how many minutes does it normally take you to find a general (subject) file that you want to work on? **1**. Less

[35] We also had an opportunity to access some of ministries' registry to physically observe the way files are handled. This included discussion with registry staff about their experience of filing situation and challenges.
[36] Oxford dictionary defines misfiling as "to file (papers, documents, records, etc) in the wrong place or order"

than 20 minutes **2.** Between 20 minutes – 30 minutes **3.** Between 30 minutes – 45 minutes **4.** 45 minutes – 60 minutes. **5.** More than1 hour. The second outcome variable is constructed from the question which asked that On average, how much time do you normally spend searching in the file and a get page(s) with the information you need at the right moment when you need it? **1.** It takes at most 10 minutes **2**. It takes between 10 minutes - 20 minutes. **3**. It takes about 20 minutes – 30 minutes. **4.** It takes at least 30 minutes – 1 hour **5.** It takes more than 1 hour and sometimes pages cannot be found in the file. The third outcome variable asked, Describe in more detail when you open the file you expect to find a page, how often you cannot find a proper page in the file or you find misplaced pages? **1**. Never experienced such situation **2**. Approximately 10 percent of the time **3**. About 20 percent of the time **4**. 30 percent of the time **5**. More than 50 percent of the time. The summary distribution of responses to the above three outcome variables is presented in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1.

The Descriptive statistics of the government office document filing

Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 present data on the office filing situation in the government ministries in Tanzania. Panel A presents summary data of the average time spent by workers and their supervisors searching for working files. The results indicate that, on average, about 46.4 percent of both frontline workers and supervisors reported to normally spend at least 30 minutes to get a file when it is needed. The results in Panel B show that once the file is found, both frontline workers and supervisors, on average spend not less than 10 minutes looking for information in the file. Panel C presents results of the incidence of misfiling of documents whereby documents are either not filed in the appropriate folder or is totally missing. The results show that 69.9 percent of workers have experienced misfiling of document(s).

Interestingly, about 22.6 percent of the workers reported to have experienced at least 3 misfiling out of 10 files they have worked on.

Table 4.2 presents the correlation matrix of government office filing variables used in this study. All the three outcome variables are positively correlated implying that those offices where workers spend longer time searching files are likely to spend longer time searching for documents as well as experience higher incidence of misfiling. Further, results indicate that most of the variables of interest which are communication, workers filing effort, leadership, group size, office layout, and filing guidelines are significantly correlated with outcome variables except for incentives which is insignificant but all signs are going in the expected direction.

Table 4.3 presents descriptive statistics of government office document files. The analysis shows that, while on average about 90 percent of workers report to have commonly experienced poor filing and record keeping in their current offices, the difference between frontline supervisors and workers is significant. Supervisors seem to report to encounter more filing problems compared to their subordinates. This is probably due to the fact that supervisors usually know better about their organizations' strength and weakness than workers (Bloom, Duggan, Qian, Bloom, & Duggan, 2018), as they deal with more files than individual workers. Further, about 83 percent of workers reported that they are aware that their offices have a standing order or written guideline that outlines or regulates different aspects of filing. Surprisingly when they were asked if they normally observe coworkers complying with the filing guideline, only 23 percent of frontline workers reported coworkers normally comply, while only 13 percent of supervisors who states that workers normally

comply. The difference is statistically significant.

Table 4.3 shows that, about 48 percent of workers reported that normally office supervisors file office documents. However, the comparison by workers status reveals a significant difference between supervisors and average frontline workers. That only 44 percent of average office workers reported that their supervisor normally files documents, while about 70 percent of supervisors reported that they themselves file office documents properly. Also, results show that about 79 percent of frontline workers reported to properly file office documents but only 27 percent of supervisors reported that workers in their offices normally file properly. The difference might be due to exaggeration, as proper filing is mandatory and workers can be punished for not filing.

About office communication, nearly 63 percent of all workers reported that supervisors frequently encourage frontline workers to properly file office documents. Also, about 53 percent of both workers and supervisors reported that workers in their offices normally communicate with each other about the importance of proper filing. Lastly, around 45 percent of workers consider incentives as an important tool that can increase workers' filing effort. Again, the difference is significant as nearly 47 percent of frontline workers think incentives can work compared to 40 percent of supervisors.

Table 4.4 presents descriptive analyses of office filing characteristics by department type. Column (1) presents data for Policy and Planning Departments (PPD), column (2) is Human Resource Departments (HRD), and column (3) is Sector Specific Departments (SSD). Column (4) compares means of PPD and HRD, column (5) compares means of PPD and SSD, and column (6) compares HRD and SSD. While both departments generally reported having

serious filing problems, there were small number of major differences between the departments. One of findings from these figures is that workers in the HRD seem to spend less time search for a working file, less time finding documents, and fewer incidences of misfiling compared to other departments. But also workers from HRD reported that their leaders tended to file more frequently compared to other departments. PPD reported more leader and workers' communication than other departments.

Main Estimation Results

Government Office filing - Main Regression results

The first set of analysis focused on the correlates of time spent by workers searching for a working file. The second set of analysis focused on the correlates of time spent by workers searching for the appropriate page(s) in the file. The third set of analysis is on the determinants of misfiling of office documents:

(i) Estimation results: *File tracing time*

Regression analysis starts by testing correlates of coordination failure on the average time spent by government office workers searching for a working file. Table 4.5 presents results of different estimates. Results of the Ordered Probit which is my preferred model are presented in column (1). The remaining columns of the table show the results of other model specifications mainly for comparison. Column (2) is Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model, column (3) is Ordered Logit model, and column (4) presents results of Generalized Least Square (GLS) model. Further column (5), (6) and (7) displays the results of office fixed effect, department fixed effect, and ministry fixed effect models respectively.

Apart from the OLS model, the findings show that female workers are more likely to report spending less time tracing for a working file(s) but the level of significance reduces once the fixed effect model is introduced. Zenger & Lawrence, (1989) argue that employees of different gender and age often have different social relations, educational and work experience. These differences in social, education, and experience may result in different perceptions of the quality of filing.

In all models, the findings show that communication by supervisors about filing can reduce the amount of time spent by workers in searching working files. Therefore these results strongly support Hypothesis 4.1 that the frequency of communication from supervisors is negatively associated with filing problems. Likewise, it was expected that workers would also file their documents if they observe their supervisors filing office documents. This also turned out to be the case that hypothesis 4.2 is supported. In all models, leaders' demonstrating filing is negatively associated with time spent by workers searching for a working file. However, the level of significance slightly declined in fixed effect models.

Results in all model specifications show, that incentives have no significant impact on the file tracing time. Hypothesis 4.3 therefore finds no significant support in these regressions that incentives reduce the amount of time spent by workers to trace working files. These results are contrary to the laboratory experimental studies on coordination game by Brandts and Cooper (2007) and Hamman et al. (2007) who found incentive can correct coordination failure. The possible explanation of this is that, incentives work more efficiently in a real working environment when actions and output are easily observable and monitoring is possible, which might not be the case in office filing.

The finding further indicates that communication among workers about filing is significant and the direction of the coefficient sign is as predicted. This is in line with Hypothesis 4.4 that an office in which workers communicate and encourage each other about filing is likely to have less filing problems. The possible explanation is that communication increases social closeness which can lead to an increase in trust hence minimize free-riding, which seem to be the main source of problems in a shared resource like files.

We also hypothesized that, workers are likely to file if they believe other workers will file properly. In all models, files tracing time is negatively and significantly associated with the variable of workers effort to file. Thus hypothesis **4.5** is strongly supported. This is contrary to the common belief that in a situation like filing which has features of Prisoners' Dilemma, cheating is the unique dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium. Possible explanation as to why workers might file instead of cheating when others file, is that bad filing is punishable by law, which likely changes payoff structure of the game due to the threat, but also literature about reputation building, altruism, and morality have shown that cooperation is possible even in social dilemma games, especially in repetitive environment where members have long-term relationships (Abramitzky, 2018; Gino, Norton, & Weber, 2016).

In all models, the variable of office size is positively and significantly associated with the amount of time spent by workers tracing working files. The findings favor the acceptance of hypothesis 4.6. This relationship between office size and file tracing time may suggest that the problems in shared office filing are partly caused by the free-riding problem among members. Lastly, the results show that frontline office workers who are working in open offices are likely to spend less time looking for a working file than workers working in closed

offices but the result is significant only in fixed effect models. This weakly supports **4.7** that the open office layout is likely to have less filing problems than the closed office.

Robustness Check Filing: ***Regression using various measures***

The robustness test is conducted with different measures of explanatory variables which include individual data, average office data, and coworkers' data. The use of different measures is to test the reliability of the main results which can potentially be affected by individual worker biases. Table 4.6 report results of different model specifications. Column (1) replicates results from baseline regression, columns (2) and (3) present only frontline workers and supervisors' results respectively. Columns (4) contains data of average frontline office workers excluding supervisors to investigate how office workers on average perceive office filing practices, column (5) uses data of coworkers' perception on the office filing, and column (6) uses data of average office which includes both supervisors and frontline workers to study overall office perception on filing practices.

Generally, regression results show that all variables of interest are largely consistent with the main results. More specifically results indicate that workers in large offices are likely to have experienced more file tracing time in all models except that results are not significant in supervisors' data. In all column, variables of workers communication and workers filing effort are individually negative and significantly correlated with file tracing time. Leader's communication is significant in all models except in supervisors. This may possibly be because the leaders sample size is small, but also it may imply that leaders think that communication is not necessary for filing. Leader's demonstration is also statistically significant and negative except in models (4) to (6) where the level of significance disappears

but sign remained negative. Since workers are the ones normally assigned to bring up files they might be fully aware of what it takes to trace files and hence reported leaders do not demonstrate filing. Generally, these results suggest that even using different measures of explanatory variables does not significantly change main results either.

Incentive and file guideline is same as above, no statistically significant results. Further, office layout can reduce file tracing time but the results are marginally significant. In addition, results show that in column (4) and (5) aged workers are more likely to report less file tracing time, while in column (1) female workers are more likely to report less file tracing time.

The analysis went further to explore which factor contribute more in reducing files tracing time by decomposing variables of interest while maintaining control variables. Table 4.7 presents the results of decomposed correlates. The results seem to prove that communication among workers; workers effort toward filing, and leadership by example are the main determinants of how much time workers spend in searching files. When all correlates are included, not only the coefficient on the leader's communication variable becomes significant but also that on the leader's demonstration increases in its magnitude and significance level. These results suggest the omission of these two variables representing the leader's communication and demonstration will lead to an estimation bias.

(ii) Estimation Results: *Time to find the proper page in the file*

Table 4.8 shows results of factors which determine the amount of time spent by workers searching for the right document(s) in the file after the file has been found. Column (1) presents results of Ordered Probit while column (2) – (7) are alternative models using the same independent and dependent variables. Results indicate that female workers are likely to report spending a shorter time searching for the proper documents in the file than male workers. Specifically, gender variable (1=female), is negatively associated with average time spent by workers searching for proper documents in the file.

Further, in all columns, results also show that workers in the offices with a larger number of workers are likely to report spending more time searching for documents in the file. Conversely, both communication among workers about filing and worker filing effort are negative and significantly associated with time spent by workers searching for documents in the file. Unexpectedly results show that neither communication nor leader's demonstration has significant impact on the time spent by workers to find the proper page although the coefficient sign is as expected. This might be because most workers rarely experienced supervisors demonstrating filing as supervisors themselves consider filing as a secretarial duty.

The single most striking results to emerge from the data in Table 4.8 is the linkage between incentive and filing guideline. Both variables are likely to reduce the time spent by workers searching for a proper page. In all regressions, the coefficient of incentive and presence of filing guidelines is negative and highly significant. It does, however, suggest that when file guideline is available and since it is easy to detect who files improperly, punishment

can work in reference to the filing guidelines. This also suggests that the importance of guidelines cannot be emphasized much without consequences to the individual's action.

Robustness Check: ***Time to find proper page in the file***

Table 4.9 reports results of the estimates of factors that determine time spent by workers in searching for proper pages in the files using different measurements. Column (1) contains only individual data, Column (2) Workers only, Column (3) Supervisors only, column (4) Average workers, column (5) Coworkers, and column (6) Average office. Apart from incentives and filing guidelines, all other variables of interest reflect the results of the main regressions. Incentive seems to have an impact only on individual data but the impact disappears in other models. Similarly, the presence of filing guidelines seems to have a significant impact only on the supervisor's data. This can be interpreted as supervisors are more effective working in offices with well-established rules. Otherwise, results in all models presented in this strongly support my hypothesis that communication, leadership and workers actions are associated with time spent by workers looking for the appropriate page(s) in the file. Lastly, the results also shows that more educated workers are more likely to report spending more time searching for a document while more experienced workers reported spending less time looking for pages in the file.

(iii) Estimation Results: *Misfiling*

The last component of filing quality in this analysis is misfiling which investigates incidences of missing documents in the files. Table 4.10 reports the main results in different models. Colum (1) is an Ordered Probit model and columns (2) - (7) are alternative models.

Results show that workers filing effort, workers communication about filing, leader's communication, open office layout, office size, and filing guidelines are highly significant with expected signs. This broadly provides support for the respective hypothesis on these variables.

Again, incentives seem to have no significant impact on the missing documents but the sign of coefficient is as predicted. The rejection of incentive hypothesis is in contrast to the strong support of our earlier incentive hypotheses on the time spent by workers searching for documents in the file. It suggests that incentive to reduce misfiling is not as significant as the effect of incentive on wrong filing of documents because of easy of tracing of those who filed wrongly in the file than it is tracing those who caused missing documents or removed documents from the folder. Lastly, the results show that, coefficients of tenure of workers in the office is negatively and significantly correlated with the incidence of missing documents. This suggests that long-serving employees are likely to report lower rates of misfiling probably due to adaptation.

Robustness Check: Time to find proper page in the file

Table ***4.11*** reports estimates of the correlates on incidences of misfiling in different models using different measurements. While column (1) shows the result of using the data of all individual data, column (2) shows the result of using the data of workers only, column (3) the data of Supervisors only, column (4) the data of Average workers, column (5) the data of Coworkers, and column (6) the data of Average office. Generally, results are similar to the main results with few exceptions where significance levels decrease and in some cases disappear but still signs of coefficients remain the same. The main purpose of using different measurements is to test the robustness and validity of the main regression.

Table 4.12 presents results of individual variables of interest to investigate its association with incidences of missing documents in the government office files. The results show that incidences of missing documents are negatively associated with workers filing effort, workers communication, leader's communication, office layout, and filing guidelines. However, leader's demonstration and incentives seem to have no impact on missing documents. On the other hand, the variable of missing filing is found to be positively associated with office size, meaning that larger offices are likely to experience more incidences of missing documents.

While the issue of disorganized filing seems similar to the Prisoners' Dilemma rather than coordination failure, the overall regression results in this chapter share a number of similarities with several laboratory experimental and theoretical studies on coordination failure. For instance, leadership is found to reduce coordination failure (e.g; Brandts et al., 2015; Gillet & Cartwright, 2009; Levy et al., 2011); communication improves coordination (e.g; Arechar, Dreber, Fudenberg, & Rand, 2017; Brandts & Cooper, 2007; Brandts et al.,

2015; Ellingsen & Östling, 2010); incentives temporarily correct coordination failure (Brandts & Cooper, 2007; Hamman et al., 2007); coordination failure increases with group size (Kyriacou, 2011; Weber, 2006).

4.3: Conclusion

This chapter studied official document filing in the government offices in Tanzania. It is probably a first study to empirically examine the government working tools such as files and associate it with organization capability. I used field survey data which I collected from frontline supervisors and officers working in the central government ministries in Tanzania. Two main empirical analyses are conducted in this study. First, it attempted to measure inefficiencies in public offices by systematically quantifying the amount of time workers in the sample offices spend searching for the working files and documents. Second, it applied the knowledge of game theory to interpret the nature and source of inefficient filing practices in the government offices by studying workers strategic interactions in relation to filing.

The study offers several interesting empirical findings that might provide insights about the existing filing situation in most of the public sector organizations in Tanzania. First, many government offices are experiencing filing problems which have persisted despite decades of initiatives such capacity building programs, equipment including shelves and computers, and formulation of legislation and guidelines. Second, workers in the government offices in Tanzania are spending significant amounts of time searching for working files and in most cases documents are wrongly filed or missing. Third, I find that leadership and communication can significantly reduce filing problems in the public sector workplaces. My

general interpretation is that poor filing in the government offices may partly be attributed to a cooperation problem.

While the link between quality of filing and capacity of public organizations seem obvious, there is no concrete study to establish such relationship. Therefore one of the possible research directions with regard to workplace filing is to conduct field experiment in the government offices such as *Kaizen* and investigate the impact of improving workplace filing and record keeping. Indeed, anecdotal evidence of such intervention in hospitals in Tanzania has indicated substantial impact in service delivery. It might also be interesting to study the link between the effectiveness of filing situation and common problems in the public sector such as corruption, and ghost workers and public sector performance.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The objective of this dissertation is to investigate the nature and sources of inefficiencies of public sectors in developing countries. This objective has been achieved by examining the complex processes and performance effects of formal meeting and document filing in 21 government ministries in Tanzania. Meetings and filing are not only frequent activities of government officials but also key tools used by organizations to coordinate workers activities. However, most public sector organizations particularly in developing countries are evidently trapped in unproductive meetings and poor record keeping.

I conducted personal interviews with 252 officials of which, 63 were frontline supervisors and 189 were frontline officers. I also collected detailed information about meetings and filing practices in the sample government offices. The commonality of meetings and paper filing across ministries provided unique features to conduct detailed study in policymaking organizations where performance is difficult to observe and hence measure. Therefore, this dissertation is a report on the empirical analysis of data that I collected using original survey.

Given the nature of activities and inefficiencies in the ministries in Tanzania, the basic hypothesis was that the situation in the government offices is somehow similar to the outcomes of coordination failure. To interpret this situation, I collected data on the correlates which is found to be commonly associated with coordination failure in the laboratory experiments, and tested if they are associated with unproductive meetings in government

offices. I then advanced this analysis to the more complex issue of document filing which seems to be similar to the Prisoners' Dilemma rather than coordination failure. In these two different situations, I investigated how leadership, communication, incentives, and office characteristics are associated with the existing situation. This is probably the first study to empirically measure and associate inefficiencies in the public sector with the outcomes of public officials' strategic interactions using concrete examples.

Chapter 3 studied plenary staff meetings in the level of departmental sections which are the lowest level of administration in the ministries structure in Tanzania. It first measured the extent of meeting lateness and investigated why workers in the sample offices tend to be late into prescheduled meetings. Second, it explored the impacts of lateness on the meeting effectiveness. The descriptive results show that on average, meetings start 40 minutes later than scheduled time. Moreover, workers spend about 4 hours per week exclusively for office plenary meetings while about 65 percent of workers claimed they normally do not get enough information from these meetings. Further, regression results indicate that lateness is likely to increase when workers are pessimistic about others' punctuality behavior and vice versa. Additionally, the findings show that communication and leadership by example matters in determining workers punctuality. Regarding the effectiveness of the meetings, this study has established that, in all scenarios, meetings are likely to be unproductive when they start late and vice versa. With these findings, it seems reasonable to interpret unproductive meetings in government offices in Tanzania as a kind of coordination failure which is rooted in workers pessimism.

Chapter 4 measured the extent of filing problems and analyzed factors associated with the amount of time workers spend searching for working files and finding appropriate document(s) in the file. The chapter also examined incidences and problems of misfiling of official documents. I find that, government office workers tend to spend a significant amount of office time searching for working files and office documents. Estimation results show that, other factors remaining constant, the demonstration and communication by supervisors as well as communication between workers about filing are the main correlates of quality of filing in the government offices in Tanzania. Findings also show filing problems are likely to increase with the office size as defined by the number of workers. I also find mixed results on the impact of incentive where significant association is seen only in reducing wrong filing, where it is easy to detect persons who file wrongly. Intriguingly, workers knowledge about the presence of filing standing rules and guidelines in the office have no independent impact on tracing time, but when it is included in the analysis, the impact of leadership increased significantly.

This study has several suggestive applications and policy implications for practitioners, academic and policy researchers. First, the findings have shown that communication among workers can play an important role in improving coordination and addressing social dilemma in the workplace. This seems to suggest several courses of actions to promote and advocate for more technical communication among public servants. As part of public sector improvement policies, communication should be one of the key initiatives. This could include improving workers communication skill, encouraging frequent staff meetings and information sharing, and the use of open office layout architectures for frontline

workers, which might enhance physical communication, mutual monitoring, and collaboration.

Second, this work has revealed that leader's actions and communication have an important role to play even at the lowest level of administration. In my view, these results are an excellent initial step toward improving not only management capability in the public sector but also leadership skills in all levels of organizations. From the coordination game context, supervisors in this study have two main roles, one as a player of the game and another as enforcer of the rules of the game. One policy interpretation in this is that capacity building in the government should include communication and leadership skills not only to the top level management but also in the lowest level of government offices[37].

Third, the findings of this study suggest that coordination failure could be one of the main sources of inefficiency in the government offices in Tanzania. Therefore, policy wise, this study could possibly help decision makers to formulate practical policies that can identify and target specific types of coordination failure. For example, in this study, failures in meeting and failures in filing are different and thus need different policy measures. Specifically, the evidence from this study suggests that meeting problems particularly meeting lateness is mainly due to strategic uncertainty which is likely to be embedded in workers beliefs about other workers actions based on their past experience. On the contrary office filing problem is mostly due to the free-riding problem. Thus for the meeting lateness,

[37] Previous literature insisted improvement of top leadership as one the strategies for improving public sector performance in Africa (ECA, 2014)

the policies should target reducing uncertainty, while for the filing the policies should target reducing free ridding problems.

Fourth, this study contributes to the literature on Kaizen in different ways. For example, regular staff meetings studied in this dissertation are the most common and traditional type of workplace meeting. They are regular in such a way that, habits and culture on how these meetings are organized and conducted tend to developed in organization. Now, what do workplace culture and Kaizen have to do with workplace meeting problems? If workers experience meeting lateness they will likely to develop similar culture of not keeping meeting time and vice-versa. One way to improve meeting quality is to set up procedures such as meeting day, venue, and time and make them know to all and be followed persistently. With regards to the preparation, it can be agreed that workers will run the meetings in rotation thus require all attendees to prepare for the discussions and take responsibilities for the meeting outcome. As insisted by Kaizen practices, success to change workplace culture depends upon building a consistent and establishing a consistent pattern of behavior within an organization[38]. The same can be applied to the filing practices that standard filing procedures and visible signs can help to improve filing practices. Therefore, initiatives such as *Kaizen* which have anecdotally been proved to have the ability to impart cultural change might be considered as one of the plausible policies towards improving state capability.

Lastly, the results of this study may definitely improve knowledge about the role of meetings and files for government operations. Therefore, policies to evaluate and improve

[38] As argued by Mailath et al.(2017), what matter is what people does not what laws says. Since Kaizein is said to be more human friendly approach (Liker, 2013; Otsuka, Jin, & Sonobe, 2018), it is more likely to change the way workers interact in their workplaces.

these mechanisms will potentially improve quality, reliability, and timeliness of public service delivery.

It is important to note that the present study has only focused on Tanzania government offices as a case study which might correspond to situations in most of the governments of developing countries. Because of the absence of data, I cannot compare the situation I found in Tanzania with other countries. However, numerous studies have found that problems such as the persistence of problems such as ghost workers, workers absenteeism, poor record keeping, poor quality, and untimely service provision are common in developing countries. Likewise, there is robust evidence that coordination failure is common in companies, groups, and even international organizations. Therefore, this research can potentially serve as a base for future studies in other developing countries.

Despite the achievements in terms of contribution and results, this study clearly has some potential limitations. First, it follows game theory framework particularly coordination game to investigate the existing situation in the government offices. However, most of the literature referenced in this study is that of laboratory experimental studies which might not be entirely useful for the real world. For instance, the study used simple 2X2 coordination game example to interpret the inefficient situation but what is going on in the real government offices is more complex. For example, in the real government offices, there are more than two workers who interact repeatedly, they are subjected to different management practices, actions are mostly guided by laws and organizational culture, and they face multiple challenges ranging from limited facilities to significant political interference. These issues are far beyond a strict game-theoretical analysis conducted in the laboratory settings and

therefore results in this study should cautiously be generalized [39] Therefore, while the findings seems to suggest that inefficiency situation in the government offices is akin to coordination failure, they might not be the same as the coordination failure defined in the game theory. One plausible recommendation is to conduct a field experimental study in a government office setting to further investigate and confirm coordination game.

Second, this study focused on coordination within offices, it does not address all coordination issues in the government. For example, it has not considered coordination across offices, departments, and organizations. It is likely that coordination is a big problem not only within offices but also across offices. There is a possibility of complementarity, competition, and strategic decisions between offices in terms of selection of public programs and struggle for resources which can lead to unfavorable outcome among offices. Further, the present study focuses exclusively on the central government ministries but it can be extended to other public offices. One potential area for replication of this study would be in the local government where in most developing countries at least in SSA have been said to experience chronic inefficiencies. Therefore, further research on coordination game is recommended to be undertaken across public offices and organizations.

To conclude, this study generally argues that three things have specifically to be considered in understanding government productivity at least in developing countries. These are: the nature of activities and output produced by government offices; mechanisms by which government institutions especially policy-making organizations operate; and

[39] According to (Brandts et al., 2014) in the laboratory there is high degree of ability to randomly to assign interventions, identify effectiveness of intervention, absent of selection and endogeneity problem.

bureaucrats' interactions. Most of the studies particularly in the economics field clearly overlooked the interaction of these three aspects while studying public sector capability in delivering public service. Therefore this dissertation considered these aspects and argues that coordination failure might be one of the key sources of inefficiency in most of the government organizations not only in the ministries but also in other offices.

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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of government officers and offices by status and cohort

	Combined sample	Workers	Supervisors	Old Cohort	Young Cohort	Test of the equality (2) – (3)	Test of the equality (4) – (5)
	Mean (Std.)	Mean (Std.)	Mean (Std.)	Mean (Std.)	Mean (Std.)	Mean diff [*t*-Value]	Mean diff [*t*-Value]
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Age of respondent (years)	41.16	38.69	48.57	47.34	33.18	-9.88***	14.16***
	(8.51)	(7.79)	(5.94)	(4.77)	(4.13)	[-9.21]	[23.22]
Old cohort (= 1 if > 40 years	0.56	0.43	0.95			-0.52***	
and employed before 2004)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.21)			[-8.02]	
Gender (1 = female)	0.41	0.43	0.35	0.34	0.51	0.08	-0.17**
	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.48)	(0.47)	(0.50)	[1.18]	[-2.77]
Years of schooling	17.47	17.20	18.29	17.92	16.88	-1.09***	1.04***
	(1.27)	(1.12)	(1.33)	(1.22)	(1.08)	[-6.36]	[7.07]
Training (Yes = 1)	0.61	0.79	0.06	0.80	0.79	0.73***	0.02
	(0.49)	(0.41)	(0.25)	(0.40)	(0.41)	[13.47]	[0.33]
Prior working experience	5.78	4.06	10.94	8.86	1.80	-6.88***	7.06***
(years)	(6.78)	(5.17)	(8.31)	(7.44)	(2.44)	[-7.75]	[9.56]
Tenure in the current	7.51	6.94	9.22	9.63	4.77	-2.29**	4.85***
office (years)	(6.08)	(5.74)	(6.75)	(6.98)	(2.95)	[-2.62]	[6.84]
Tenure in the current	3.49	3.19	4.40	3.96	2.89	-1.21**	1.07**
post (years)	(2.78)	(1.90)	(4.39)	(3.41)	(1.45)	[-3.03]	[3.07]
Total years of experience	13.29	10.99	20.16	18.49	6.57	-9.16***	11.91***
	(8.38)	(7.51)	(7.03)	(7.38)	(3.25)	[-8.52]	[15.78]
Monthly salary (TZS 000)	1359	1003	2427	1579	1075	-1424***	504***
	(796.95)	(462.70)	(613.63)	(887.53)	(546.75)	[-19.41]	[5.24]
Office layout	0.56	0.70	0.16	0.63	0.75	0.54***	-0.11*
(=1 if open office)	(0.50)	(0.46)	(0.37)	(0.48)	(0.44)	[8.45]	[-1.69]
Supervisors office location	0.75	0.73	0.76			-0.02	
(1=near)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.5)			[-0.25]	
Office size	6.00	6.00	6.00				
(number of workers)	(2.61	(2.61)	(2.63)				
Observations	**252**	**189**	**63**	**142**	**110**		

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels of statistical significance, respectively. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviation and those in brackets are t-statistics. Monthly salary is salary after tax not including other deductions such as pension and health insurance contributions. Office size is number of all frontline workers working under office supervisor (this exclude supporting staff), smallest has 3 workers and largest has 13 workers.

Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of government officers and offices by Department

	Departments				Test of Equality of Means		
	All Mean (Std) **(1)**	DPP Mean (Std) **(2)**	HRD Mean (Std) **(3)**	SSD Mean (Std) **(4)**	(2) - (3) Mean Diff [t-value] **(5)**	(2) - (4) Mean Diff [t-value] **(6)**	(3) - (4) Mean Diff [t-value] **(7)**
Individual Age	41.16	40.64	40.25	42.60	0.39	-1.95	-2.35*
	(8.51)	(8.64)	(8.12)	(8.68)	[0.30]	[-1.46]	[-1.81]
Old Cohort	47.34	48.00	47.65	48.85	0.07	-0.05	-0.12
	(5.49)	(4.34)	(5.44)	(5.64)	[0.92]	[-0.62]	[-1.54]
Young Cohort	33.18	32.93	34.43	34.65	-0.07	0.05	0.12
	(3.72)	(3.98)	(4.15)	(4.16)	[-0.92]	[0.62]	[1.54]
Female	0.41	0.26	0.56	0.42	-0.30***	-0.15**	0.14*
	(0.49)	(0.44)	(0.50)	(0.50)	[-4.09]	[-2.13]	(1.86)
Years of Schooling	17.47	17.43	17.27	17.70	0.15	-0.27	-0.43**
	(1.27)	(1.13)	(1.11)	(1.50)	[0.89]	[-1.34]	[-2.11]
Prior experience	5.78	4.37	7.08	5.88	-0.14**	-0.05	0.10
	(6.78)	(5.69)	(7.09)	(7.25)	[-2.23]	[-0.69]	[1.54]
Tenure in the current office	7.51	8.08	5.30	9.14	2.79***	-1.06	-3.85***
	(6.08)	(6.14)	(4.72)	(6.61)	[3.30]	[-1.08]	[-4.34]
Tenure in the current post	3.49	3.69	3.18	3.61	0.51	0.08	-0.43
	(2.78)	(3.62)	(2.01)	(2.46)	[1.13]	[0.17]	[-1.24]
Total Years of Experience	13.29	12.45	12.38	15.02	0.07	-2.57*	-2.64**
	(8.38)	(8.06)	(7.92)	(8.95)	[0.06]	[-1.96]	[-2.03]
Salary (TZS 000)	1354.2	1313.5	1351.7	1398.1	-38.18	-84.57	-46.39
	(796.5)	(823.1)	(842.1)	(734.5)	[-0.29]	[-0.69]	[-0.38]
Training (yes=1)	0.61	0.63	0.63	0.57	0.00	0.06	0.05
	(0.48)	(0.49)	(0.48)	(0.49)	[0.00]	[0.78]	[0.78]
Office layout	0.56	0.58	0.50	0.62	0.10	-0.04	-0.13*
	(0.50)	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.48)	[1.24]	[-0.47]	[-1.71]
No of office workers	6.00	5.67	5.71	6.62	-0.05	-0.95**	-0.90**
	(2.61)	(2.71)	(2.09)	(2.89)	[-0.13]	[-2.20]	[-2.33]
Observations	252	84	84	84			

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level of statistical significance, respectively. Numbers in parentheses and brackets are standard deviation and t-statistics respectively. In each ministry, three departments were surveyed which are Policy and Planning Department (DPP), Human Resource Department (HRD) and Sector Specific Department (SSD).

Table 3.3: Description of the office plenary meetings practices

		All		Supervisors		Workers	
	Codes	Freq. (1)	Percent (2)	Freq. (3)	Percent (4)	Freq. (5)	Percent (6)
Panel A: Average delay time							
Less than 10 minutes	1	88	34.92	26	41.27	62	32.8
10 – 20 minutes	2	58	23.02	13	20.63	45	23.81
20 – 40 minutes	3	72	28.57	18	28.57	54	28.57
40 – 60 minutes	4	21	8.33	3	4.76	18	9.52
More than 1 hour	5	13	5.16	3	4.76	10	5.29
Panel B: Average time workers spend in a typical plenary meeting							
Less than 30 minutes	1	3	1.19	1	1.59	2	1.06
30 minutes – 45 minutes	2	11	4.37	3	4.76	8	4.23
45 minutes – 1hour	3	61	24.21	14	22.22	47	24.87
1 hour – 2 hours	4	120	47.62	28	44.44	92	48.68
More than 2 hours	5	57	22.62	17	26.98	40	21.16
Panel C: If workers get sufficient information from meetings							
Always get sufficient information	1	5	1.98	1	1.59	4	2.12
Yes in many cases I get	2	13	5.16	14	22.22	13	6.88
It depends on a case by case	3	72	28.57	34	53.97	58	30.69
Most of the time I do not get	4	135	53.57	14	22.22	101	53.44
The opposite is the case	5	27	10.71	0	0	13	6.88
Number of Observations		252	100	63	100	189	100

Notes: The uses of the frequency distribution (with frequencies and number of observation) is more appropriate than the use of measures of central tendencies (e.g., mean, standard deviation, and number of observations) which might be more informative. However, when variables are categorical in nature, the latter might be misleading as in ordinal the values between categories might not be the same, thus using a measure of central tendency would be statistically misleading *(see Figure 3.2*). These data come from the following questions. **Panel A:** "On average about how many minutes normally is the office plenary meetings start delayed?" The possible responses were: 1. Less than 10 minutes, 2. 10 – 20 minutes, 3. 20 – 40 minutes, 4. 40 – 60 minutes, and 5. More than 1 hour. This question was preceded by an introductory question which asked "Does a typical plenary meeting in your office usually start on time?" the answer was either Yes or No. **Panel B**: "On average, about how much time do (you) and your office people spend in a typical plenary meeting?" The possible answers were 1. Less than 30 minutes, 2. 30 – 45 minutes, 3. 45 minutes – 1hour, 4. 1 hour – 2 hours, and 5. More than 2 hours. **Panel C**: "In your office, do officers tend to get sufficient information and instruction to perform their official duties through routine office plenary meetings?" The answers range from 1 – 5 where: 1. they always get sufficient information, 2. Yes, in many cases they get, 3. It depends on a case by case, 4. most of the time they do not get, and 5. The opposite is the case. A similar question was asked to workers if they get sufficient information from office meetings to perform their official duties with similar personalized responses.

Table 3.4: The descriptive statistics of the office plenary meetings

	All	Average Office Workers	Supervisors	Equality of means
	Mean (Std. Dev) (1)	Mean (Std. Dev) (2)	Mean (Std. Dev) (3)	Mean Diff [*t*-value] (4)
Office has regular meetings	0.94	0.94	0.95	-0.02
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.21)	[-0.46]
Number of plenary meetings per week	1.68	1.38	2.59	-1.21***
	(0.92)	(0.60)	(1‘.12)	[-10.93]
Proportion of time to discuss office	0.78	0.76	0.84	-0.08**
issues per meeting	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.11)	[-6.12]
Meetings normally start on time	0.27	0.24	0.35	-0.11
	(0.44)	(0.43)	(0.48)	[-1.64]
Leader communicate about	0.36	0.32	0.48	-0.16***
punctuality	(0.37)	(0.31)	(0.50)	[-2.99]
Workers punctuality	0.23	0.25	0.17	0.07*
	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.38)	[1.65]
Leader’s punctuality	0.89	0.87	0.94	-0.06**
	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.25)	[-2.18]
workers communicate about	0.80	0.78	0.86	-0.07*
punctuality	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.35)	[-1.84]
Quorum needed to start meeting	0.81	0.82	0.79	0.03
	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.41)	[0.47]
Number of Observations	252	63	63	

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significant difference between supervisors and average office workers at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level respectively. All variables takes value of 1 or 0 except for the number of plenary meetings and proportion of meeting time used to discuss office issues. Punctuality means keeping time by less than 10 minutes otherwise it is considered late, thus if managers and workers are punctual, is 1 otherwise 0. The office average in column (2) is the average data of front line workers $Av.OFF_j = \frac{1}{n}\sum_{(i=n)}^{3} w_{ij} = \frac{1}{3}(w_1+w_2+w_3)$ while column (3) is individual supervisor’s data. Therefore we have average values of frontline workers from 63 offices each headed by one supervisor.

Table 3.5: Correlations between Office Meetings and the Determinants of Lateness

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
	Panel A: Full Sample															
(1)	Lateness	1.00														
(2)	Individual Age	-0.07	1.00													
(3)	Gender (1 = Female)	-0.03	-0.13*	1.00												
(4)	Years of Schooling	-0.09	0.46*	-0.02	1.00											
(5)	Tenure in office (years)	0.02	0.42*	-0.15*	0.30*	1.00										
(6)	Years of experience	-0.06	0.86*	-0.11*	0.44*	0.57*	1.00									
(7)	Monthly Salary (TZS 000)	-0.10	0.70*	-0.12*	0.44*	0.24*	0.63*	1.00								
(8)	Quorum	0.04	-0.08	0.07	0.00	-0.10	-0.02	-0.02	1.00							
(9)	Leader communication on punctuality	-0.25*	0.12*	-0.07	0.13*	0.07	0.12*	0.16*	0.02	1.00						
(10)	Incentive/sanction	-0.14*	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	0.02	0.07	0.06	-0.01	0.08	1.00					
(11)	Leader punctuality	-0.17*	0.14*	0.02	0.13*	0.02	0.12*	0.13*	0.08	0.12*	-0.07	1.00				
(12)	Workers communication on punctuality	-0.31*	0.09	0.05	0.18*	0.08	0.08	0.13*	-0.06	0.06	0.17*	-0.14*	1.00			
(13)	Office layout (1 = Open)	-0.12*	-0.29*	0.07	-0.18*	-0.09	-0.30*	-0.32*	0.03	-0.13*	0.02	0.07	0.06	1.00		
(14)	Time to discuss office issues	-0.15*	-0.10	0.11*	0.00	-0.02	-0.07	-0.09	-0.10	-0.01	0.05	0.02	0.07	0.14*	1.00	
(15)	Office size (number of workers)	0.04	0.06	0.00	0.05	0.01	0.05	-0.03	-0.07	0.04	-0.12*	-0.01	-0.01	-0.16*	-0.07	1.00
	Number of Observations	252	252	252	252	252	252	252	252	252	252	252	252	252	252	252
	Panel B: Frontline Workers															
(1)	Lateness	1.00														
(2)	Individual Age	-0.03	1.00													
(3)	Gender (1 = Female)	-0.10	-0.13*	1.00												
(4)	Years of Schooling	-0.11	0.40*	-0.01	1.00											
(5)	Tenure in office (years)	0.06	0.54*	-0.13*	0.35*	1.00										
(6)	Years of experience	0.00	0.84*	-0.12*	0.40*	0.71*	1.00									
(7)	Monthly Salary (TZS 000)	-0.08	0.63*	-0.10	0.31*	0.28*	0.52*	1.00								
(8)	Quorum	0.04	-0.06	0.10	-0.03	-0.06	-0.01	-0.03	1.00							
(9)	Leader communication on punctuality	-0.44*	0.06	0.13*	0.05	0.03	0.01	0.10	-0.07	1.00						
(10)	Incentive/sanction	-0.28*	0.09	-0.02	0.16*	0.06	0.13*	0.11	0.02	0.05	1.00					
(11)	Leader punctuality	-0.16*	-0.06	-0.02	-0.07	0.00	0.03	-0.04	0.03	0.05	0.06	1.00				
(12)	Workers communication on punctuality	-0.20*	0.14*	0.04	0.13*	0.08	0.12*	0.09	0.06	0.14*	0.12*	-0.13*	1.00			
(13)	Office layout (1 = Open)	-0.17*	-0.07	0.09	-0.03	-0.05	-0.09	-0.01	-0.01	0.37*	-0.12*	0.10	0.11	0.10		
(14)	Time to discuss office issues	-0.15*	-0.08	0.12*	0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.05	-0.21*	0.315*	0.07	0.06	0.04	0.06	1.00	
(15)	Office size (number of workers)	0.06	0.08	-0.04	0.05	0.02	0.08	-0.04	-0.05	-0.09	0.11	-0.14*	-0.01	-0.02	-0.06	1.00
	Number of Observations	189	189	189	189	189	189	189	189	189	189	189	189	189	189	189

(*continued*)

Table 5: (*continued*)

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
	Panel C: Supervisors															
(1)	Lateness	1.00														
(2)	Individual Age	-0.17	1.00													
(3)	Gender (1 = Female)	0.14	0.01	1.00												
(4)	Years of Schooling	0.07	0.10	0.09	1.00											
(5)	Tenure in office (years)	-0.07	-0.09	-0.16	-0.05	1.00										
(6)	Years of experience	-0.23*	0.61*	0.08	0.08	0.17	1.00									
(7)	Monthly Salary (TZS 000)	0.06	-0.04	-0.08	0.06	-0.29*	-0.14	1.00								
(8)	Quorum	0.03	-0.09	-0.04	0.14	-0.18	0.04	0.15	1.00							
(9)	Leader communication on punctuality	-0.11	-0.02	-0.17	-0.25*	0.03	-0.16	0.04	0.02	1.00						
(10)	Incentive/sanction	-0.28*	-0.13	0.05	-0.09	0.04	-0.05	0.31*	-0.13	0.12	1.00					
(11)	Leader punctuality	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	0.02	-0.19	-0.02	0.28*	0.16	0.08	0.11	1.00				
(12)	Workers communication on punctuality	-0.16	0.00	0.01	0.31*	0.10	-0.03	0.14	0.02	-0.16	0.27*	0.01	1.00			
(13)	Office layout (1 = Open)	-0.19	-0.19	-0.14	0.08	0.08	-0.11	0.03	0.11	0.11	-0.07	0.12	0.18	1.00		
(14)	Time to discuss office issues	-0.15	-0.07	0.06	0.09	0.00	-0.06	-0.11	0.20	-0.17	0.07	0.02	0.12	0.13	1.00	
(15)	Office size (number of workers)	-0.04	-0.09	0.11	0.13	-0.03	-0.14	-0.12	-0.12	-0.18	0.03	-0.02	0.03	-0.13	-0.09	1.00
	Number of Observations	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	63

Notes: Stared coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level

Table 3.6: Estimated equations explaining delay in meeting start

Type of Regression	OProbit (1)	OLS (2)	Ologic (3)	GLM (4)	Office FE (5)	Department FE (6)	Ministry FE (7)
Dependent Variable	**Delay**	**Delay**	**Delay**	**Delay**	**Delay**	**Delay**	**Delay**
Age	-0.009	-0.007	-0.018	-0.007	-0.005	-0.008	-0.014
	(-0.52)	(-0.46)	(-0.6)	(-0.48)	(-0.28)	(-0.52)	(-0.8)
Female	0.175	0.208	0.159	0.208	0.207	0.2	0.307**
	(0.18)	(1.26)	(0.48)	(1.32)	(1.45)	(1.4)	(2.11)
Years of Schooling	-0.024	-0.026	-0.053	-0.026	-0.045	-0.049	-0.052
	(-0.47)	(-0.54)	(-0.52)	(-0.56)	(-0.75)	(-0.82)	(-0.87)
Tenure in current office	0.006	0.006	0.005	0.006	0.008	0.008	0.011
	(0.42)	(0.45)	(0.16)	(0.47)	(0.53)	(0.54)	(0.73)
Total Yrs of Experience	-0.008	-0.006	-0.007	-0.006	-0.007	-0.006	-0.004
	(-0.73)	(-0.53)	(-0.37)	(-0.56)	(-0.46)	(-0.4)	(-0.28)
Monthly Salary (TZS)	0.147	0.136	0.231	0.136	0.135	0.051	0.041
	(0.72)	(0.71)	(0.64)	(0.75)	(0.67)	(0.29)	(0.22)
No of workers	0.018	0.024	0.014	0.024	0.035	0.036	0.012
	(0.47)	(0.63)	(0.19)	(0.65)	(1.32)	(1.33)	(0.36)
Leader communication	-0.717***	-0.582***	-1.226***	-0.582***	-0.462***	-0.461***	-0.427***
	(-5.7)	(-6.34)	(-5.63)	(-6.62)	(-3.16)	(-3.16)	(-2.8)
Leader's punctuality	-0.332**	-0.293**	-0.488**	-0.293**	-0.343**	-0.342**	-0.292**
	(-2.29)	(-2.27)	(-1.98)	-2.37)	(-2.38)	(-2.38)	(-1.98)
Workers punctuality	-0.430***	-0.414***	-0.631***	-0.414***	-0.455***	-0.457***	-0.421**
	(-3.08)	(-3.07)	(-2.58)	(-3.21)	(-2.7)	(-2.71)	(-2.41)
Worker communication	-0.910***	-0.882***	-1.471***	-0.882***	-0.956***	-0.955***	-0.816***
	(-4.51)	(-4.13)	(-4.2)	(-4.31)	(-5.39)	(-5.39)	(-4.48)
Incentive/sanction	-0.406	-0.419	-0.609	-0.419	-0.402*	-0.419*	-0.438*
	(-1.54)	(-1.54)	(-1.36)	(-1.61)	(-1.77)	(-1.85)	(-1.92)
Office Layout (1=Open)	-0.387***	-0.311**	-0.613***	-0.311***	-0.350**	-0.314**	-0.266
	(-3.4)	(-2.82)	(-3.16)	(-2.94)	(-2.16)	(-2.02)	(-1.59)
Department Dummy							
HR (2)	-0.444**	-0.433**	-0.713**	-0.433***	-0.463***		-0.487***
	(-2.48)	(-2.58)	(-2.21)	(2.69)	(-2.61)		(-2.8)
SD (3)	0.035	0.027	0.096	0.027	0.076		0.076
	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.25)	(0.14)	(0.44)		(0.45)
Interview Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Position Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Number of Offices					63		
Number of Departments						3	
Number of Ministries							21
Observations	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**

Notes: Dependent variable is meeting Delay time. All regression contain 252 observations***, **, and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significant level. All models use individual workers self-report data, t-statistics and z-statistics are in parentheses and standard errors are clustered at the ministry level. I have controlled for interview by including interview duration and enumerators' dummy. Also included workers position dummy to control for their status (i.e 1= supervisor, 0=frontline workers).

Table 3.7: Results for meeting delay in the government offices– Different Measures

Regression Method	**Oprobit (1)** Individual Workers	**Oprobit (2)** Workers Only	**Oprobit (3)** Supervisor Only	**Oprobit (4)** workers Average Office	**Oprobit (5)** average Office	**Office FE (6)** average Office
Dep. Variable	**Delay**	**Delay**	**Delay**	**Delay**	**Delay**	**Delay**
Individual Age	-0.009	0.01	-0.022	0.004	0.008	0.01
	(-0.52)	(0.53)	(-0.74)	(0.36)	(0.4)	(0.71)
Female	0.175	0.06	0.652	0.202	0.418	0.25
	(0.18)	(0.38)	(1.62)	(1.08)	(1.15)	(1.46)
Years of Schooling	-0.024	-0.083	0.148	0.133	0.239	0.12
	(-0.47)	(-1.11)	(1.26)	(0.79)	(0.78)	(0.73)
Tenure in current office	0.006	-0.002	0.04	0.006	0.043	0.00
	(0.42)	(-0.11)	(1.54)	(0.13)	(0.51)	(0.04)
Total Yrs of Experience	-0.008	0.01	-0.059**	-0.004	-0.001	-0.01
	(-0.73)	(0.67)	(-2.53)	(-0.17)	(-0.03)	(-0.47)
Monthly Salary (TZS)	0.147	-0.117	0.302	0.252	0.63	0.09
	(0.72)	(-0.52)	(0.44)	(1.03)	(1.27)	(0.26)
No of workers	0.018	0.023	0.017	0.043	0.09	0.05
	(0.47)	(0.57)	(0.24)	(1.02)	(1.16)	(1.41)
Leader communication	-0.717***	-0.57***	-0.488	-0.62*	-1.71**	-0.597*
	(-5.7)	(-2.82)	(-1.13)	(-1.78)	(-2.02)	(-1.78)
Leader's punctuality	-0.332**	-0.57***	-0.122	-0.75***	-1.81***	-0.884***
	(-2.29)	(-4.51)	(-0.31)	(-3.02)	(-3.05)	(-2.88)
Incentive/sanction	-0.406	-0.464*	-0.46	-0.194	-1.559**	-0.58
	(-1.54)	(-1.7)	(-0.71)	(-0.33)	(-2.23)	(-0.87)
Workers punctuality	-0.430***	-0.292*	-1.610***	-0.766**	-1.889**	-0.907**
	(-3.08)	(-1.84)	(-2.92)	(-2.26)	(-2.44)	(-2.43)
Workers communication	-0.910***	-1.06***	-0.476	-1.56***	-3.65***	-1.759***
	(-4.51)	(-5.11)	(-1.06)	(-4.65)	(-4.98)	(-4.50)
Office Layout (1=Open)	-0.387***	-0.336**	-0.917**	-0.212	-0.311	-0.380*
	(-3.4)	(-2.52)	(-2.05)	(-1.15)	(-0.91)	(-1.05)
Observations	**252**	**189**	**63**	**63**	**63**	**63**

Notes: In all columns: ***, **, and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significant level. Z-statistics in parentheses. In all models, standard errors are clustered at the organization level (21 ministries). Delay outcome variable is the response to the question: "on average about how many minutes normally is the office plenary meetings start delayed? The responses are 1. Less than 10 min. 2. 10 – 20 min. 3. 20– 40 min. 4. 40 – 60 min. 5 More than 1 hour". All regression include interview control which comprises interviewers dummy and interview duration. We also control for department by including the department dummy in all columns and workers status v is controlled only in column (1). Independent variables takes different measures in each column. Column (1) replicates exactly column (1) in Table 3.6 with all individual data, column (2) workers only, column (3) supervisors only, column (4) average data of frontline workers ($^{Av.OFF_j = \frac{1}{n}\sum_{(i=n)}^{3} w_{ij} = \frac{1}{3}(w_1+w_2+w_3)}$), column (5) Average office workers which include both supervisor and their workers.

Table 3.8A: Evaluation of Supervisors office meeting practices

	Punctuality			Communication		
	Workers only	Av. Workers and Supervisors	Average office workers	Average office Workers	Workers only	Av.Workers and Supervisors
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Frontline Workers						
Age (years)	-0.010**	-0.011*	-0.003	0.077	0.134	0.314**
	(-2.21)	(-1.93)	(-1.18)	(1.64)	(1.32)	(1.97)
Gender (1 = Female)	-0.018	-0.008	-0.043	-0.285	0.033	-0.329
	(-0.36)	(-0.12)	(-1.33)	(-0.89)	(0.04)	(-0.51)
Years of formal schooling	-0.022	-0.024	-0.071*	-1.855**	-0.075	-1.024*
	(-1.00)	(-0.72)	(-1.82)	(-2.32)	(-0.22)	(-1.77)
Tenure in current office (years)	-0.006	0.013	-0.01	-0.064	0.022	0.316*
	(-1.14)	(1.33)	(-1.08)	(-0.83)	(0.33)	(1.87)
Total years of experience	0.012***	0.013	0.016*	0.357***	-0.116	-0.347*
	(3.41)	(1.55)	(2.08)	(2.79)	(-1.39)	(-1.69)
Monthly Salary (TZS 000?)	-0.042	-0.152	-0.132	-2.162*	-3.050***	-3.951**
	(-0.9)	(-1.57)	(-1.35)	(-1.87)	(-2.69)	(-2.56)
Office size (No of workers)	-0.016	0.01	-0.011	0.171	0.136	0.268**
	(-1.57)	(0.68)	(-1.04)	(1.56)	(1.61)	(2.23)
Punctuality	-0.198**	-0.238**	-0.221***	-0.75	0.76	0.492
	(-2.8)	(-2.53)	(-3.54)	(-0.67)	(0.82)	(0.42)
Communication	0.102*	-0.154	0.017	-2.014**	0.056	-1.509
	(1.73)	(-1.01)	(0.16)	(-1.97)	(0.06)	(-1.09)
Office layout (1 = Open)	0.042	0.297***	0.225**	2.878***	1.221*	2.815***
	(0.77)	(4.88)	(2.6)	(2.94)	(1.82)	(4.01)
Panel B: Office Supervisors						
Age (years)		-0.009				0.161**
		(-1.74)				(1.96)
Gender (1 = Female)		0.011				-2.125
		(0.22)				(-1.5)
Years of schooling		-0.050*				-1.701**
		(-2.05)				(-2.36)
Tenure in current office (years)		0.013**				0.212***
		(2.75)				(3.48)
Working experience (years)		-0.009				-0.217***
		(-1.35)				(-2.82)
Monthly salary (TZS 000)		-0.026				0.71
		(-0.4)				(0.52)
Communication		-0.102				
		(-1.26)				
Department control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interview control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Observations	189	63	63	63	189	63

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significant level. In all models, Ordered Probit with Z-statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at the organization level. Interview control which include interviewers dummy and interview duration. Position control is a dummy =1 if the worker is supervisor. Dependent variables are punctuality and communication of workers. How frequently do you remind workers about the importance of being on time in your office meetings? **1**. Never. **2**. Rarely **3**. Occasionally. **4**. Often. **5**. Constantly. From your experience, how often do your supervisor keep time in office meetings? **1**. Never. **2**. Rarely. **3**. Occasionally. **4**. Often. **5**. Constantly.

Table 3.8 B: Evaluation of Workers office meeting practices (*continuation)*

	Punctuality		Communication	
	Supervisors only (1)	Workers and Supervisors (2)	Supervisors only (3)	Workers and Supervisors (4)
Panel A: Supervisors				
Age (years)	0.093	-0.048	0.004	-0.155**
	(0.68)	(-0.77)	(0.33)	(-2.25)
Gender (1 = Female)	-0.784	0.756	0.012	-0.984***
	(-1.17)	(0.83)	(0.13)	(-2.67)
Years of formal schooling	0.158	-0.644*	0.042*	-0.248*
	(0.71)	(-1.75)	(2.09)	(-1.88)
Tenure in current office (years)	0.296***	-0.122***	0.005	0.119
	(2.87)	(-2.63)	(0.53)	(1.26)
Working experience (years)	-0.180*	0.001	-0.005	0.090**
	(-1.8)	(0.01)	(-0.59)	(2.12)
Monthly salary (TZS 000)	-3.047	-0.825	-0.001	2.307**
	(-1.18)	(-0.66)	(-0.01)	(2.32)
Communication	-5.919***	1.583	-0.162	-0.528
	(-3.82)	(1.43	(-1.65)	(-0.77)
Punctuality	3.976	-3.096**	0.446*	-4.175**
	(0.98)	(-2.26)	(2.0)	(-2.55)
Incentive/Sanction	-0.179	-0.645	0.02	-0.758
	(-0.16)	(-0.89)	(0.21)	(-1.1)
Office layout (1 = Open)	-2.029	-0.919	0.239***	-0.12
	(-1.34)	(-0.49)	(3.21)	(-0.13)
Panel B: Frontline Workers				
Age (years)		-0.148**		0.197***
		(-2.5)		(2.75)
Gender (1 = Female)		1.290*		1.913**
		(1.84)		(2.11)
Years of formal schooling		-0.402		-0.934***
		(-0.91)		(-3.1)
Tenure in current office (years)		0.215		0.058
		(1.13)		(0.61)
Total years of experience		0.01		0.051
		(0.13)		(0.52)
Monthly salary (TZS 000)		3.487**		-1.284
		(2.03)		(-1.13)
Punctuality				-2.229**
				(-2.32)
Department control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interview control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Observations	63	63	63	63

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significant level. Ordered Probit with Z-statistics in parentheses. In all models, standard errors are clustered at the organization level. Interview control which include interviewers dummy and interview duration. Position control is a dummy =1 if the worker is a supervisor. Dependent variables are punctuality and communication of workers. How often, do people in this office communicate with each other about the importance of being punctual? **1**. Never. **2**. Rarely. **3**. Occasionally. **4**. Often. **5**. Constantly. From your experience, how often do your officers keep time in your office meetings? **1**. Never. **2**. Rarely. **3**. Occasionally. **4**. Often. **5**. Constantly.

Table 3.9: Correlations of office meeting lateness by Different Departments

Dependent Variable	PPD Delay	HRD Delay	SSD Delay
Individual Age	0.021	0.003	-0.029
	(0.75)	(0.07)	(-0.88)
Female	0.122	0.099	0.403
	(0.29)	(0.28)	(1.44)
Years of Schooling	0.183	-0.123	-0.041
	(1.55)	(-0.94)	(-0.4)
Tenure in current office	-0.015	0.075**	-0.017
	(-0.55)	(1.99)	(-0.64)
Total Years of Experience	-0.036	-0.054*	0.028
	(-1.33)	(-1.87)	(1.26)
Monthly Salary (TZS 000)	-0.094	0.404	0.297
	(-0.22)	(0.97)	(0.96)
No of workers	0.042	0.038	0.019
	(0.57)	(0.47)	(0.41)
Leader's communicate	-1.148***	-0.740**	-0.723**
	(-2.78)	(-2)	(-2.4)
Incentive/sanctions	0.394	-0.62	-0.35
	(0.92)	(-1.1)	(-0.75)
Leader 's punctuality	-0.602**	-0.419	-0.17
	(-2.41)	(-1.71)	(-0.61)
Workers punctuality	-0.920***	-0.39	-0.088
	(-2.9)	(-1.02)	(-0.23)
Workers communication	-0.318	-1.301***	-1.047**
	(-0.81)	(-3.04)	-2.55
Office Layout (1=open)	-0.468	-0.241	-0.143
	(-1.47)	(-0.73)	(-0.72)
Interview control	Yes	Yes	Yes
Position control	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	**84**	**84**	**84**

Notes: Departments are used here as unit of analysis. Column (1) data from Policy and Planning Department, Column (2) data from Human Resource Department, and column (3) is data from Sector Specific Department. Dependent variable is meeting lateness, Z-statistics are in parentheses. In all models, standard errors are clustered at the organization level (21 ministries). Interview control which includes interviewers dummy and interview duration. Data used is individual data from both workers and supervisors in which workers status is controlled by Position dummy =1 if the worker is a supervisor. In all columns: ***, **, and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significant level.

Table 3.10: Decomposition of correlates of meeting delay Dependent variable

Dependent variable	(1) Delay	(2) Delay	(3) Delay	(4) Delay	(5) Delay	(6) Delay	(7) Delay	(8) Delay
Variables of interest	**Leader punctuality**	**Leader communication**	**Workers punctuality**	**Workers communication**	**incentive**	**Office size**	**Office layout**	**All correlates**
Department Dummy								
HRD	-0.38**	-0.33**	-0.36**	-0.50**	-0.32*	-0.38**	-0.45***	-0.38
	(-2.54)	(-2.19)	(-2.36)	(-2.83)	(-2)	(-2.54)	(-3.08)	(-1.63)
SSD	-0.062	-0.069	-0.038	-0.067	-0.019	-0.099	-0.016	0.017
	(-0.29)	(-0.34)	(-0.19)	(-0.39)	(-0.1)	(-0.49)	(-0.09)	(0.09)
Leader's punctuality	-0.42							-0.88***
	(-1.39)							(-3.2)
Leader's communication		-0.376						-0.597
		(-0.85)						(-1.49)
Workers punctuality			-0.128					-0.91**
			(-0.38)					(-2.29)
Workers Communication				-1.231***				-1.76***
				(-3.88)				(-4.59)
Incentive/sanction					-0.426			-0.58
					(-0.5)			(-0.85)
Office size						0.041		0.045
						(1.03)		(1.13)
Office layout							-0.288	-0.191
							(-1.17)	(-1.00)
Interview control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.1390	0.1312	0.1148	0.2544	0.1197	0.1350	0.1448	0.568
Offices	**63**	**63**	**63**	**63**	**63**	**63**	**63**	**63**

Notes: In all columns: ***, **, and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significant level. All columns include variables age, female, years of schooling, tenure in the current office, years of working experience, and salary. Dependent variable is lateness which is measured by the meeting lateness. Columns (1) – (7) use individual variables while column (8) includes all variables.

Table 3.11*:* Conditional Probit Marginal Effect – Meeting Lateness

Meeting Delay	less than 10 min (1)	10-20 min (2)	20-40 min (3)	40-60min (4)	More than 1hr (5)
Age	0.001	0.000	-0.001	0.000	0.000
	(0.230)	(0.230)	(-0.230)	(-0.230)	(-0.230)
Female	-0.033	-0.002	0.019	0.010	0.006
	(-0.620)	(-0.560)	(0.620)	(0.610)	(0.620)
Years of Schooling	0.011	0.001	-0.006	-0.003	-0.002
	(0.480)	(0.450)	(-0.480)	(-0.480)	(-0.480)
Tenure in current office	-0.007	0.000	0.004	0.002	0.001
	(-1.170)	(-0.880)	(1.160)	(1.150)	(1.140)
Total Years of Experience	0.004	0.000	-0.003	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.840)	(0.710)	(-0.830)	(-0.830)	(-0.820)
Monthly Salary (TZS)	-0.022	-0.002	0.013	0.006	0.004
	(-0.330)	(-0.320)	(0.330)	(0.330)	(0.330)
No of workers	-0.014	-0.001	0.008	0.004	0.003
	(-1.450)	(-0.980)	(1.430)	(1.390)	(1.390)
Leaders communication	0.221***	0.016	-0.129***	-0.065***	-0.042***
	(3.890)	(1.290)	(-3.500)	(-3.220)	(-2.810)
Incentive/Sanction	0.137	0.010	-0.080	-0.041	-0.026
	(1.630)	(1.030)	(-1.590)	(-1.560)	(-1.520)
Leader's punctuality	0.150***	0.011	-0.088***	-0.044**	-0.029**
	(2.750)	(1.220)	(-2.600)	(-2.470)	(-2.280)
Worker's punctuality	0.180***	0.013	-0.105***	-0.053**	-0.035**
	(2.800)	(1.210)	(-2.620)	(-2.470)	(-2.350)
Workers communication	0.328***	0.024	-0.192***	-0.097***	-0.063***
	(4.920)	(1.290)	(-4.120)	(-3.630)	(-3.200)
Office layout (1=Open)	0.110**	0.008	-0.064*	-0.033*	-0.021*
	(1.920)	(1.110)	(-1.870)	(-1.830)	(-1.740)

Notes: In all columns: ***, **, and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significant level. (.) Z-values.

Marginal effects results show that, leader's communication about punctuality is associated with 22 percent of increased likelihood that the meeting will start between 0-10 min, about 12.9 percent less likely to start between 20 – 40 minutes, and 6.5 percent less likely to start between 40 – 60 minutes late, and 5 percent less likely to start after 1 hour. Similarly, leader's punctuality is associated with 15 percent more likely the meeting will start between 0-10 min, 10 percent less likely to start between

20– 40 minutes, 9 percent less likely to start between 40 – 60 minutes late, and 3 percent less likely to start after 1 hour. Further, workers punctuality is associated with 18% more likely the meeting will start between 0-10 min, 10 percent less likely to start between 20 – 40 minutes, 5 percent less likely to start between 40 – 60 minutes late, and 3.5 percent less likely to start after 1 hour. Interestingly, as shown in the previous results, communication seems to be powerful tool to increase punctuality and reduce meeting delay. Specifically, workers communication is associated with 32.8 percent more likely the meeting will start between 0-10 minutes, 19 percent less likely to start between 20 – 40 minutes, 9.7 percent less likely to start between 40 – 60 minutes late, and 6percent less likely to start after 1 hour. Lastly, office layout when the office is open is 11percent more likely the meeting will start less than 10 minutes, less likely 6.4percent will start between 20-40 minutes, 3.3 percent less likely to be 40-60, and 2 percent less likely to start after 1 hour.

Table 3.12: Relation between of Meeting Lateness and Meeting Effectiveness

Method	Oprobit	Oprobit	Office FE	Workers	Supervisors
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**
Age	0.01	0.01	0.009	0.013	-0.01
	(0.58)	(0.56)	(0.87)	(0.53)	(-0.28)
Female	0.039	-0.012	0.011	0.18	-0.765
	(0.26)	(-0.08)	(0.11)	(0.99)	(-1.54)
Years of schooling	-0.009	-0.021	-0.013	0.039	-0.272*
	(-0.19)	(-0.41)	(-0.32)	(0.73)	(-1.81)
Tenure in the current office	0.025	0.016	0.011	0.046	-0.013
	(1.21)	(0.75)	(1.12)	(1.63)	(-0.55)
Total Years of Experience	-0.017	-0.013	-0.011	-0.038	0.051
	(-0.72)	(-0.49)	(-0.96)	(-1.03)	(1.44)
No of workers	-0.035	-0.041	-0.024	-0.049*	0.037
	(-1.12)	(-1.42)	(-1.33)	(-1.91)	(0.58)
Delay	-0.164***	-0.155***	-0.101**	-0.236***	-0.133
	(-2.97)	(-2.78)	(-2.46)	(-3.41)	(-0.72)
Number of meetings/week		0.236***	0.141**	0.057	0.278*
		(2.62)	2.53	0.43	1.89
Meeting duration		0.003	0.001	0.072	-0.038
		(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.74)	(-0.21)
Agenda distributed		0.247***	0.160***	0.280**	0.21
		(2.85)	(3.23)	(2.41)	(1.38)
Free expression		0.154	0.138*	0.093	0.282
		(1.43)	(1.87)	(0.64)	(1.03)
Opinion (1=considered)		0.295**	0.179***	0.361**	0.313*
		(2.32)	(3.08)	(2.16)	(1.73)
Department Dummy					
HRD (2)	0.584***	0.386**	0.220*	0.327	0.476
	(3.5)	(2.23)	(1.8)	(1.42)	(1.18)
SSD (3)	0.26	0.092	0.029	0.06	0.14
	(0.26)	(0.092)	(0.029)	(0.06)	(0.14)
Position control	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Interview Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	**252**	**252**	**252**	**189**	**63**

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significant level. Dependent Variable is Sufficiency of Information which is constructed from the following question "In your office, do officers tend to get sufficient information and instruction to perform their official duties through routine office plenary meetings?" The answers range from 1 – 5 where: 1. they always get sufficient information, 2. Yes, in many cases they get, 3. It depends on a case by case, 4. most of the time they do not get, and 5. The opposite is the case. All models use individual workers self-report data, t-statistics and z-statistics are in parentheses and standard errors are clustered at the ministry level. Column (1) include only Delay to test its impact on the meeting effectiveness, while column (2) – (5) include other variables which can potentially affect meeting effectiveness.

Table 3.13: Consequences of determinants of Lateness on the Meeting Effectiveness

Specification	Oprobit All	Oprobit All	Office FE All	Oprobit Workers	Oprob Supervisors
	(1)	**(2)**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6)**
Age	0.009	0.008	0.008	0.012	-0.028
	(0.48)	(0.44)	(0.74)	(0.43)	(-0.63)
Female	0.015	-0.049	-0.014	0.141	-0.639
	(0.11)	(-0.35)	(-0.14)	(0.77)	(-1.17)
Years of schooling	-0.013	-0.019	-0.012	0.037	-0.26
	(-0.27)	(-0.38)	(-0.29)	(0.66)	(-1.26)
Tenure in the current office	0.02	0.01	0.007	0.041	-0.04
	(1.02)	(0.47)	(0.72)	(1.43)	(-1.18)
Total Years of Experience	-0.015	-0.008	-0.008	-0.038	0.068*
	(-0.61)	(-0.32)	(-0.68)	(-0.97)	(1.87)
No of workers	-0.043	-0.049*	-0.03	-0.055**	0.044
	(-1.39)	(-1.79)	(-1.57)	(-1.98)	(0.54)
Leader communication	0.378**	0.365*	0.211**	0.447*	0.109
	(1.96)	(1.72)	(1.98)	(1.92)	(0.21)
Leader punctuality	0.114	0.044	0.011	0.161	-0.719
	(0.45)	(0.16)	(0.07)	(0.49)	(-0.99)
Incentive	0.024	-0.063	-0.036	0.033	-0.026
	(0.16	(-0.42)	(-0.36)	(0.15)	(-0.06)
Worker punctuality	0.157	0.228	0.139	0.129	1.103***
	(0.82	(1.17)	(1.17)	(0.51)	(2.64)
Workers communication	0.154	0.176	0.123	0.36	-0.587
	(0.63)	(0.81)	(1.00)	(1.49)	(-1.5)
Number of meetings/week		0.232***	0.139**	0.062	0.284
		(2.6)	(2.37)	(0.48)	(1.55)
Meeting duration		-0.017	-0.014	0.041	-0.187
		(-0.19)	(-0.25)	(0.48)	(-0.72)
Agenda distributed		0.255***	0.163***	0.275**	0.241
		(2.77)	(3.24)	2.13)	1.4)
Free expression		0.211*	0.174**	0.212	0.624
		(1.8)	(2.35)	(1.43)	(1.48)
Opinion consideration		0.274**	0.167***	0.329**	0.317
		(2.28)	(2.84)	(2.15)	(1.37)
Department Dummy					
HR (2)	0.567***	0.368**	0.224*	0.304	0.455
	(3.41	(2.19)	(1.82)	(1.3)	(1.19)
SSD (3)	0.275	0.112	0.063	0.09	0.145
	(1.3)	(0.51)	(0.53)	(0.4	(0.29)
Observations	**252**	**252**	**252**	**189**	**63**

Notes: Regressions in in this table are equivalent specifications to Table 3.12 except Delay variable is replaced with its correlates

Table3:14: Cost Estimation of office meetings

	Items	
A	number of meetings/week	2
B	Average time (hours)	2
C	Total hours per week	4
D	Total hours per month	16
E	Average monthly salary (TZS)	1,768,326
F	Hourly salary (8 hours per day* 5days*4weeks = 160hours)	11,052.04
G	Total cost per worker (time*hour salary)	176,832.64
H	Average office size (6 workers plus supervisor)	7
I	Total office Cost (H*G)	1,237,828.48
J	Total number of workers in the ministries	104777
K	Total cost of staff meetings in the ministries	18527993521
L	35% discount	12,043,195,789
M	**Total annual cost (L*12)**	**144,518,349,465.98**

Source: Salary data form Ministry of Finance

Notes: This are convective analysis of cost of workplace meetings. Time spend for preparation and waiting for meeting is not included in this analysis. 35% percent discount is based on the percent of workers who said that meetings are effective. These are exclusively regular staff meetings which include only office supervisor and workers

Table 3:15: Meeting performance by Ministries

Variable Name	Average meeting time		Meeting Effectivenes		Meeting Lateness	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Ministry of Finance and Planning	3.83	0.94	3.50	0.52	2.25	1.22
Ministry of Water and Irrigation	3.75	0.45	3.83	0.83	1.33	0.65
Ministry of Labour and Employment	3.42	0.90	3.83	0.72	1.83	1.40
Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism	3.25	0.75	3.17	0.83	2.08	1.00
Ministry of Information, Culture, Arts and Sports	4.08	0.67	3.58	1.00	2.08	1.51
Ministry of Lands and Human Settlements	4.50	0.52	3.58	0.90	3.17	1.40
Ministry of Health	4.08	0.90	4.08	0.51	2.08	1.08
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	3.58	0.67	3.83	0.58	1.33	0.65
Ministry of Agriculture	3.75	0.75	3.83	0.58	1.67	0.89
Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment	3.42	1.16	3.67	1.07	2.50	1.00
Ministry of Education	3.92	0.29	3.42	0.90	2.25	1.29
Ministry of Works	4.17	0.94	3.92	0.67	1.83	1.27
Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs	4.08	0.67	3.50	0.80	2.33	0.98
Ministry of Commnication	4.17	0.83	3.83	0.83	2.42	0.67
Ministry of Energy and Minerals	4.08	0.51	3.67	0.89	2.17	1.40
Prime Minister's Office	3.33	0.89	4.00	0.43	2.50	1.09
President's Public Service Mgt	4.17	1.03	3.33	1.30	2.50	1.00
President's Office Local Government	4.42	0.67	3.08	0.67	3.00	1.28
Ministry of Transport	3.00	1.04	3.67	0.89	2.42	1.00
Ministry of Community Development	4.00	0.74	3.83	0.58	2.67	0.98
Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries	4.08	0.79	3.67	0.89	3.00	1.04
Number of Observation	**12**	**12**	**12**	**12**	**12**	**12**

.

Figures

Figure 2 1: Hypothetical coordination game



Figure 2. 2: Office Meetings as a coordination game



Figure.2. 3: Office Filing as a coordination game

		Officer 2's action	
		Effort level needed to achieve good filing	Minimum effort required to avoid punishment
Officer 1's action	Effort level needed to achieve good filing	**A.(3, 3)**	**B**. **(0, 5)**
	Minimum effort required to avoid punishment	**C. (5, 0)**	**D. (1, 1)**

Figure 2.4: Conceptual framework- Correlates of Coordination game in the government offices



Figure 3.1: Workers Reaction on Lateness

Panel A



Panel B



Figure 3.2: Distribution of Meeting Responses







Table 4.1: Distribution of Filing Situation

Panel A: Average file searching time

		All		Supervisors		Workers	
Alternatives	**Codes**	**Freq.**	**Percent**	**Freq.**	**Percent**	**Freq.**	**Percent**
Less than 20 min	1	100	39.68	22	34.92	78	41.27
20 minutes – 30 minutes	2	35	13.89	7	11.11	28	14.81
30 minutes – 45 minutes	3	24	9.52	5	7.94	19	10.05
45 minutes – 60 minutes	4	31	12.3	12	19.05	19	10.05
More than1 hour.	5	62	24.6	17	26.98	45	23.81
	Total	**252**	**100**	**63**	**100**	**189**	**100**

Panel B: Av time spent in searching for proper page

		All		Supervisors		Workers	
Alternatives	Codes	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
At most 10 minutes	1	144	57.14	32	50.79	112	59.26
Between 10 - 20 minutes	2	39	15.48	8	12.7	31	16.4
About 20 – 30 minutes.	3	23	9.13	6	9.52	17	8.99
least 30 min – 1 hour	4	30	11.9	11	17.46	19	10.05
Sometimes pages cannot be found in the file	5	16	6.35	6	9.52	10	5.29
	Total	**252**	**100**	**63**	**100**	**189**	**100**

Panel C: Incidences of missing documents

		All		Supervisor		Workers	
Alternatives	Codes	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
Never experienced such situation	1	76	30.16	13	20.63	63	33.33
Approximately 10% of time	2	73	28.97	17	26.98	56	29.63
About 20% of time	3	46	18.25	12	19.05	34	17.99
30% of time	4	42	16.67	15	23.81	27	14.29
More than 50% of time.	5	15	5.95	6	9.52	9	4.76
	Total	**252**	**100**	**63**	**100**	**189**	**100**

Panel A presents summary data of the average time spent by frontline government office workers and their supervisors searching for working files. The results indicate that, on average, about 46.43 percent of both frontline workers and supervisors reported to normally spend at least 30 minutes to get working office files when they are needed. The results in **Panel B** show that once the file is found, both frontline workers and supervisors, on average spend not less than 10 minutes looking for documents in the file. Finally, **Panel C** presents results of the incidence of misfiling of documents whereby documents are either not filed in the appropriate folder or is totally missing.

Table 4.2: Presents the correlation matrix of government office filing variables

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Panel A: Full sample												
(1)	Tracing time	1											
(2)	Number of workers	0.24*	1										
(3)	Time to find proper page	0.48*	0.34*	1									
(4)	Missing documents	0.46*	0.21*	0.64*	1								
(5)	Filing guideline	-0.16*	-0.22*	-0.28*	-0.22*	1							
(6)	Workers filing Effort	-0.47*	-0.13*	-0.47*	-0.51*	0.18*	1.00						
(7)	if filing is problem	0.21*	0.07	0.16*	0.18*	-0.02	-0.17*	1					
(8)	leaders communication	-0.13*	0.04	-0.07	-0.12*	-0.01	0.03	0.00	1				
(9)	Workers communication	-0.37*	-0.20*	-0.41*	-0.35*	0.31*	0.40*	-0.02	-0.05	1			
(10)	Leader demonstrate filing	-0.14*	0.05	0.00	-0.04	-0.21*	0.12*	-0.16*	-0.14*	-0.09	1		
(11)	incentives	0.01	0.03	-0.13*	-0.10	-0.05	0.04	-0.03	0.05	0.03	0.09	1	
(12)	Office layout	-0.22*	-0.17*	-0.22*	-0.32*	-0.04	0.11*	-0.11*	0.11*	0.07	0.13*	0.20*	1
Number of Observations		**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**
	Panel B: Frontline Workers												
(1)	Tracing time	1											
(2)	Number of workers	0.24*	1										
(3)	Time to find proper page	0.48*	0.39*	1									
(4)	Missing documents	0.46*	0.25*	0.62*	1								
(5)	Filing guideline	-0.17*	-0.24*	-0.27*	-0.22*	1							
(6)	Workers filing Effort	-0.39*	-0.15*	-0.44*	-0.52*	0.16*	1						
(7)	if filing is problem	0.23*	0.10	0.15*	0.20*	-0.01	-0.20*	1					
(8)	leaders communication	-0.05	0.07	0.13*	0.05	-0.10	-0.20*	-0.01	1				
(9)	Workers communication	-0.33*	-0.25*	-0.40*	-0.31*	0.30*	0.32*	0.01	-0.32*	1			
(10)	Leader demonstrate filing	-0.15*	0.12	-0.04	-0.04	-0.17*	0.15*	-0.17*	-0.13*	-0.14	1		
(11)	incentives	0.01	-0.01	-0.08	0.03	-0.16*	-0.02	-0.10	-0.06	-.09	0.14*	1	
(12)	Office layout	-0.21*	-0.21*	-0.25*	-0.35*	0.00	0.14*	-0.08	0.07	0.10	0.32*	0.19*	1
Number of Observations		**189**	**189**	**189**	**189**	**189**	**189**	**189**	**189**	**189**	**189**	**189**	**189**
	Panel C: Supervisors												
(1)	Tracing time	1											
(2)	Number of workers	0.22*	1										
(3)	Time to find proper page	0.47*	0.21	1									
(4)	Missing documents	0.41*	0.12	0.66*	1								
(5)	Filing guideline	-0.13	-0.18	-0.35*	-0.26*	1							
(6)	Workers filing Effort	-0.67*	-0.06	-0.51*	-0.49*	0.23*	1						
(7)	if filing is problem	0.10	-0.10	0.15	-0.04	-0.08	-0.02	1					
(8)	leaders communication	-0.23*	0.00	-0.32*	-0.32*	0.17	0.28*	0.17	1				
(9)	Workers communication	-0.47*	-0.05	-0.42*	-0.45*	0.32*	0.59*	-0.16	0.38*	1			
(10)	Leader demonstrate filing	-0.09	-0.13	0.09	-0.05	-0.35*	0.05	0.18	-0.18	-0.24*	1		
(11)	incentives	0.02	0.09	-0.17	-0.25*	0.10	0.11	0.36*	0.10	0.04	0.03	1	
(12)	Office layout	-0.19	-0.12	-0.01	-0.05	-0.17	-0.09	0.08	-0.05	0.01	0.18	0.01	1
Number of Observations		**63**	**63**	**63**	**63**	**63**	**63**	**63**	**63**	**63**	**63**	**63**	**63**

Notes: Stared coefficients in parentheses are significant at the 5 percent level

Table 4.3: The Descriptive statistics of the government office document filing

	Combined	Average Office Workers	Supervisors	Equality of means
	Mean (std. Dev) **(1)**	Mean (Std. Dev) **(2)**	Mean (Std. Dev) **(3)**	Mean Diff (2)-(3) [t-value] **(4)**
If filing is problem	0.90	0.87	0.97	-0.10**
	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.18)	[-2.16]
Filing guidelines	0.83	0.83	0.84	-0.02
	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.37)	[-0.29]
Other workers' compliance	0.20	0.23	0.13	0.10*
	(0.40)	(0.42)	(0.33)	[1.72]
Leaders filing	0.48	0.48	0.49	-0.01
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	[-0.15]
Leader's communication	0.63	0.44	0.69	-0.25***
	(0.48)	(0.50)	(0.46)	[3.62]
Workers filing	0.66	0.79	0.27	0.52***
	(0.46)	(0.41)	(0.45)	[8.65]
Workers communication	0.53	0.55	0.51	0.04
	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	[0.58]
Incentives/sanction	0.45	0.47	0.40	0.07***
	(0.30)	(0.25)	(0.41)	[3.16]
Office layout(=1 if open office)	0.56	0.70	0.16	0.54***
	(0.50)	(0.46)	(0.37)	[8.45]
Office size	6.00	6.00	6.00	
	(2.61	(2.61)	(2.63)	
Observation	**252**	**63**	**63**	

Note: ***, **, and * indicate significant difference between supervisors and average office workers at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels respectively. Column (1) is individual data from both supervisors' combined and frontline workers. The office average in column (2) is the average data of front line workers $Av.OFF_j = \frac{1}{n}\sum_{(i=n)}^{3} w_{ij} = \frac{1}{3}(w_1+w_2+w_3)$ while column (3) is individual supervisor's data. Therefore we have average values of frontline workers from 63 offices each headed by one supervisor.

Table 4.4: Government office Filing- Descriptive Analysis by Departments

	Departments			Test of Equality of Means		
	DPP Mean (Std.)	HRD Mean (Std.)	SSD Mean (Std.)	(1)-(2) Mean Diff) [t-value]	(1)-(3) Mean Diff [t-value]	(2)-(3) Mean Diff [t-value]
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6)**
If filing is problem	0.92	0.90	0.87	0.01	0.05	0.04
	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.34)	[0.27]	[0.99]	[0.73]
Filing guidelines	0.80	0.88	0.81	-0.08	-0.01	0.07
	(0.40)	(0.33)	(0.40)	[-1.47]	[-0.19]	[1.28]
If observed compliance to the filing guideline	0.166	0.238	0.20	-.071	-0.035	0.035
	(0.37)	(0.43)	(0.40)	[-1.15]	[-0.59]	[0.56]
Leaders filing	0.40	0.54	0.51	-0.13*	-0.11	0.02
	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.50)	[-1.70]	[-1.39]	[0.31]
Leader's communication	0.48	0.43	0.46	0.05**	0.04	-0.03
	(-0.21)	(-0.35)	(-0.28)	[2.12]	[0.93]	[-1.22]
Workers filing	0.69	0.64	0.65	0.05	0.04	-0.01
	(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.48)	[0.65]	[0.49]	[-0.16]
Workers communication	0.595	0.45	0.57	0.14*	0.023	-0.11
	(0.49)	(.50)	(0.497)	[1.9]	[0.31]	[-1.55]
Incentives/sanction	0.93	0.89	0.87	0.04	0.06	0.02
	(0.26)	(0.31)	(0.34)	[0.81]	[1.28]	[0.47]
Office layout(=1 if open office)	0.58	0.49	0.62	0.10	-0.04	-0.13*
	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.49)	[1.24]	[-0.47]	[-1.71]
Office size	5.67	5.71	6.62	-0.05	-0.95**	-0.90**
	(2.71)	(2.09)	(2.89)	[-0.13]	[-2.20]	[-2.33]
Observations	**84**	**84**	**84**			

Note: ****, **, and * in columns (5) – (7) indicate the statistical significance of the difference between the three departments. In each Ministry, three departments were surveyed namely, Policy and Planning Department, Human Resource, and Sector Department. The use of files might somehow differ across these departments depending on their functions. Numbers in parentheses and brackets represents standard deviation and t-values respectively.

Table 4.5: Estimated equations explaining office files tracing time

Type of Regression	Oprobit	OLS	Ologit	GLM	Office FE	Department FE	Ministry FE
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6)**	**(7)**
Age	-0.011	-0.004	-0.018	-0.004	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006
	(-0.6)	(-0.22)	(-0.55)	(-0.23)	(-0.26)	(-0.26)	(-0.27)
female	-0.30*	-0.31	-0.53**	-0.31*	-0.22	-0.22	-0.26
	(-1.91)	(-1.7)	(-1.98)	(-1.78)	(-1.13)	(-1.14)	(-1.44)
Years of schooling	0.063	0.058	0.12	0.058	0.046	0.044	0.02
	(0.82)	(0.66)	(0.95)	(0.69)	(0.55)	(0.53)	(0.26)
Tenure in the current office	-0.006	-0.002	-0.006	-0.002	-0.004	-0.004	0.007
	(-0.31)	(-0.07)	(-0.18)	(-0.08)	(-0.22)	(-0.22)	(0.37)
Years of experience	0.002	-0.004	0.005	-0.004	-0.002	0	-0.015
	(0.08)	(-0.12)	(0.11)	(-0.13)	(-0.07	(-0.02	(-0.68)
Average monthly salary	-0.155	-0.281	-0.365	-0.281	-0.33	-0.331	-0.325
	(-0.45	(-0.73)	(-0.62)	(-0.76)	(-1.13)	(-1.14)	(-1.14)
Number of workers	0.06**	0.08*	0.11**	0.08**	0.08**	0.08**	0.10**
	(2.21)	(2.04)	(2.11)	(2.13)	(2.22)	(2.21)	(2.23)
Workers file	-0.53***	-0.64**	-0.91***	-0.64***	-0.79***	-0.79***	-0.90***
	(-2.68)	(-2.75)	(-2.6)	(-2.88)	(-3.94)	(-3.98)	(-4.63)
Leader demonstrate filing	-0.49***	-0.59***	-0.84***	-0.59***	-0.45**	-0.45**	-0.46**
	(-3.11)	(-2.96)	(-3.21)	(-3.1)	(-2.25)	(-2.26)	(-2.38)
Workers communication	-0.48***	-0.57***	-0.80***	-0.57***	-0.65***	-0.65***	-0.55***
	(-4.06)	(-3.27)	(-3.52)	(-3.42)	(-4.97)	(-4.98)	(-4.3)
leaders communication	-0.66***	-0.79**	-1.032**	-0.79***	-1.08***	-1.08***	-0.98***
	(-2.66)	(-2.58)	(-2.2)	(-2.7)	(-3.03)	(-3.03)	(-2.87)
incentives	-0.16	-0.34	-0.23	-0.34	-0.25	0.26	0.40
	(-0.6)	(-1.07)	(-0.55)	(-1.12)	(0.81)	(0.83)	(1.33)
Filing guideline	-0.24	-0.26	-0.36	-0.26	-0.26	-0.27	-0.35
	(-0.96)	(-0.81)	(-0.76)	(-0.85)	(-0.98)	(-1.00)	(-1.34)
Office Layout (1=Open)	-0.12	-0.13	-0.18	-0.13	-0.49**	-0.48**	-0.38*
	(-0.57)	(-0.48)	(-0.48)	(-0.5)	(-2.21)	(-2.19)	(-1.72)
Department Dummy							
HR (2)	-0.19	-0.21	-0.21	-0.21	-0.25		-0.19
	(-0.96)	(-0.89)	(-0.89)	(-0.93)	(-1.01)		(-0.87)
SD (3)	0.245	0.317	0.317	0.317	0.225		0.264
	(1.39)	(1.51)	(1.51)	(1.58)	(0.95)		(1.22)
Interview Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Workers status Dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Number of Offices					63		
Number of Departments						3	
Number of Ministries							21
Observations	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**

Notes: In all columns: Dependent variable is Office files tracing time. This variable comes from the question "On average, about how many minutes does it normally takes you to find a file that you want to work on?" **1**. Less than 20 minutes **2.** Between 20 minutes – 30 minutes **3.** Between 30 minutes– 45 minutes **4.** 45 minutes – 60 minutes. **5.** More than1 hour. ***, **, and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significant level. Standard errors are clustered at ministry level. All models include controls and variables of interest only and other variables which are likely to influence the quality of filing. Colum (1) is ordered, Column (2) is Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model, column (3) is Ordered Logit model and column (4) presents results of Generalizes Least Model (GLM). Further columns (5), (6) and (7) displays results of office fixed effect, department fixed effect, and ministry fixed effect models respectively.

Table 4.6: Estimated Equations explaining files tracing time using different measures

Type of Regression	Oprobit	Oprobit	Oprobit	Oprobit	Oprobit
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**
Independent variables	Workers Only	Supervisors Only	Average workers	Coworkers	Average office
Age	-0.04	0.12	0.19**	0.03***	-0.02
	(-1.17)	(1.25)	(2.3)	(3.79)	(-0.2)
female	-0.29	-0.63	-0.40	0.152	-0.04
	(-1.53)	(-1.46)	(-1.08)	(0.49)	(-0.08)
Years of schooling	0.06	0.04	0.12	0.074	-0.04
	(0.67)	(0.24)	(1.11)	(0.63)	(-0.15)
Tenure in the current office	-0.03	0.03	0.05	-0.035	-0.08
	(-1.58)	(0.69)	(1.4)	(-0.97)	(-0.92)
Years of experience	0.049	0.13***	0.12***	0.06*	0.06
	(1.36)	(2.92)	(3.18)	(1.9)	(0.83)
Average monthly salary	0.08	-2.06***	-1.71***	-0.237	-0.113
	(0.22)	(-2.75)	(-3.35)	(-0.58)	(-0.14)
Number of workers	0.08*	0.01	0.07	0.10*	0.16***
	(1.87)	(0.11)	(1)	(1.69)	(2.64)
Workers file	-0.50***	-1.63***	-1.40***	-1.22***	-1.31**
	(-2.68)	(-2.85)	(-2.91)	(-3.75)	(-1.99)
Workers communication	-0.45***	-0.89***	-0.76***	-0.67***	-0.54*
	(-3.13)	(-3.84)	(-3.06)	(-2.92)	(-1.69)
leaders communication	-1.21***	-0.11	-0.81*	-1.69***	-2.67***
	(-2.97)	(-0.26)	(-1.8)	(-2.76)	(-2.58)
Leader demonstrate filing	-0.43**	-1.17***	-1.25***	-0.27	-0.16
	(-2.37)	(-2.84)	(-2.92)	(-1.08)	(-0.31)
incentives	-0.11	-0.23	-0.60	-0.19	-0.83
	(-0.25)	(-0.47)	(-1.61)	(-0.25)	(-0.68)
Filing guideline	-0.17	-0.47	-0.45	-0.06	-0.36
	(-0.55)	(-1.15)	(-1.24)	(-0.12)	(-0.37)
Office Layout (1=Open)	-0.09	-0.87	-1.03*	-0.27	-0.32
	(-0.32)	(-1.32)	(-1.73)	(-1.19)	(-0.69)
Department Dummy					
HR (2)	-0.46	-1.36**	-0.63	-0.66*	-1.04**
	(-1.59)	(-2.08)	(-1.24)	(-1.66)	(-2.2)
SD (3)	0.121	1.671**	1.148**	-0.382	0.192
	(0.53)	(2.58)	(2)	(2.58)	(0.65)
Observations	**189**	**63**	**63**	**189**	**63**

Notes: In all columns: ***, **, and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significant level. Z-statistics in parentheses. In all models, standard errors are clustered at the organization level (21 ministries). In all models, Dependent variable is File Tracing Time, interview control in all models. Column (1) presents only frontline workers, column (2) supervisors' results, column (3) contains data of average of frontline office workers excluding supervisor to investigate how office workers on average perceive office filing practices, column (4) uses data of coworkers' perception on the office filing, and column (5) office average.

Table 4.7: Decomposition of correlates of filing Tracing Time

Variable of interest	(1) Office size	(2) Workers filing	(3) Workers communication	(4) leaders communication	(5) Leader filing	(6) incentives	(7) Office Layout	(8) All
Department								
HR (2)	-0.369**	-0.315*	-0.211	-0.374**	-0.266	-0.345*	-0.389**	-0.173
	(-1.97)	(-1.83)	(-0.97)	(-2.06)	(-1.36)	(-1.84)	(-2.19)	(-0.9)
SD (3)	0.11	0.192	0.254	0.172	0.29	0.207	0.206	0.218
	(0.64)	(1.14)	(1.41)	(0.96)	(1.64)	(1.16)	(1.1)	(1.27)
Number of workers	0.073**							0.051*
	(2.26)							(1.74)
Workers file		-0.261***						0.170**
		(-3.66)						(2.21)
Workers communication			-0.454***					-0.402***
			(-3.68)					(-3.01)
leaders communication				-0.305				-0.510*
				(-1.16)				(-1.91)
Leader demonstrate filing					-0.444***			-0.518***
					(-2.81)			(-3.56)
incentives						-0.052		0.167
						(0.15)		(0.58)
Office Layout (1=Open)							-0.342	-0.161
							(-1.34)	(-0.64)
Observations	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**

Notes: Dependent variable is File Tracing Time. In all columns: ***, **, and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significant level. All columns include variables age, female, years of schooling, tenure in the current office, years of working experience, and salary. Columns (1) – (7) use individual variables while column (8) includes all variables. Interview and workers status control.

Table 4.8: Estimated equations explaining time to find proper page

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Type of Regression	Oprobit	OLS	Ologit	Office FE	Department FE	Ministry FE
Age	-0.032	-0.026	-0.052	-0.026	-0.026	-0.203
	(-1.25)	(-1.11)	(-1.11)	(-1.53)	(-1.53)	(-1.44)
female	-0.355**	-0.332**	-0.611**	-0.332**	-0.329**	-0.043**
	(-2.4)	(-2.46)	(-2.27)	(-2.26)	(-2.23)	(-2.52)
Years of schooling	-0.024	-0.021	-0.052	-0.021	-0.017	-0.04
	(-0.32)	(-0.4)	(-0.43)	(-0.33)	(-0.26)	(-0.67)
Tenure in the current office	-0.001	-0.006	-0.004	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006
	(-0.08)	(-0.38)	(-0.13)	(-0.37)	(-0.38)	(-0.44)
Years of experience	0.014	0.013	0.025	0.013	0.014	0.030*
	(0.68)	(0.7)	(0.67)	(0.73)	(0.76)	(1.67)
Average monthly salary	-0.147	-0.144	-0.26	-0.144	-0.141	-0.075
	(-0.77)	(-0.77)	(-0.67)	(-0.65)	(-0.63)	(-0.34)
Number of workers	0.115**	0.114*	0.172**	0.114***	0.115***	0.089***
	(2.36)	(1.99)	(1.99)	(3.98)	(4.03)	(2.64)
Workers file	-0.679***	-0.555***	-1.198***	-0.555***	-0.546***	-0.460***
	(-3.1)	(-3.25)	(-2.98)	(-3.65)	(-3.59)	(-3.04)
Workers communication	-0.547***	-0.489***	-0.925***	-0.489***	-0.504***	-0.361***
	(-3.41)	(-3.42)	(-3.1)	(-4.89)	(-5.09)	(-3.62)
leaders communication	-0.201	-0.363	-0.378	-0.363	-0.37	-0.292
	(-0.82)	(-1.39)	(-0.82)	(-1.33)	(-1.36)	(-1.1)
Leader demonstrate filing	-0.127	-0.07	-0.202	-0.07	-0.07	0.046
	(-0.62)	(-0.4)	(-0.54)	(-0.46)	(-0.46)	(0.31)
incentives	-0.424*	-0.476*	-0.747*	-0.476**	-0.492**	-0.409*
	(-1.93)	(-1.83)	(-1.75)	(-1.99)	(-2.06)	(-1.75)
Filing guideline	-0.546**	-0.541**	-0.979**	-0.541***	-0.532***	-0.365*
	(-2.25)	(-2.32)	(-2.33)	(-2.65)	(-2.61)	(-1.82)
Office Layout (1=Open)	-0.292	-0.242	-0.59	-0.242	-0.26	-0.232
	(-1.17)	(-0.93)	(-1.29)	(-1.44)	(-1.56)	(-1.35)
Department Dummy						
HR (2)	0.3	0.176	0.604	0.176		0.045
	(1.32)	(0.97)	(1.45)	(0.94)		(0.26)
SD (3)	0.209	0.145	0.443	0.145		0.109
	(1.01)	(0.7)	(1.13)	(0.81)		(0.65)
Number of Offices				63		
Number of Departments					3	
Number of Ministries						21
Observations	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**

Notes: The Dependent variable is Time to find proper page. It is constructed from the question which asked that "On average, how much time do you normally spend searching in the file and a get page(s) with the information you need at the right moment when you need it?" **1.** It takes at most 10 minutes **2**. It takes between 10 minutes - 20 minutes. **3**. It takes about 20 minutes – 30 minutes. **4.** It takes at least 30 minutes – 1 hour **5.** More than 1hour. Interview and workers status are controlled, GLM is eliminated from the table as it gives almost similar coefficients to OLS.

Table 4.9: Estimates of correlates of Time to find proper page - Different Specifications

Type of Regression	Oprobit	Oprobit	Oprobit	Oprobit	Oprobit	Oprobit
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6)**
Independent variables	Individual data	Workers Only	Supervisors Only	Average workers	Coworkers	Average office
Age	-0.032	-0.027	-0.045	-0.015	-0.023*	0.03
	(-1.25)	(-1.03)	(-1.16	(-1.22	(-1.85	(0.4
female	-0.355**	-0.550***	-0.038	-0.365**	-0.279*	-0.701
	(-2.4)	(-3.36)	(-0.09)	(-2.18)	(-1.89)	(-0.91)
Years of schooling	-0.024	0.072	0.146	0.319*	0.250**	0.239
	(-0.32)	(0.66)	(1.16)	(1.68)	(2.56)	(0.57)
Tenure in the current office	-0.001	0.011	-0.015	0.071*	0.046*	0.152*
	(-0.08)	(.57)	(-0.43)	(1.74)	(1.72)	(1.89)
Years of experience	0.014	-0.004	-0.001	-0.111***	-0.084***	-0.180*
	(0.68)	(-0.15)	(-0.03)	(-3.03)	(-3.13)	(-1.75
Av. monthly salary	-0.147	-0.065	-0.61	0.573	0.622*	-0.585
	(-0.77)	(-0.22)	(-1.12)	(1.6)	(1.73)	(-0.75)
Number of workers	0.115**	0.132***	0.071	0.159***	0.149***	0.117*
	(2.36)	(2.61)	(0.91)	(4.26)	(2.99)	(1.77
Workers file	-0.679***	-0.628**	-1.164***	-0.452	-0.111	-0.208
	(-3.1)	(-2.13)	(-3.1)	(-1.62)	(-0.33)	(-0.28)
Workers communication	-0.547***	-0.611***	-0.326	-0.774**	-0.382	-1.444***
	(-3.41)	(-3.05)	(-1.07)	(-2.54)	(-1.48)	(-3.09)
leaders communication	-0.201	0.182	-0.593	-1.147*	-0.735	-2.624**
	(-0.82)	(0.31)	(-1.48)	(-1.81)	(-1.28)	(-2.31)
Leader demonstrate filing	-0.127	-0.35	-0.450*	-0.836**	-0.567*	-2.077**
	(-0.62)	(-1.3)	(-1.75)	(-2.19)	(-1.79)	(-2.32)
incentives	-0.424*	-0.59	-0.128	-1.286	-0.162	-0.432
	(-1.93)	(-1.41)	(-0.3)	(-1.47	(-0.26)	(-0.36)
Filing guideline	-0.546**	-0.004	-1.236**	0.455	0.148	-1.761
	(-2.25)	(-0.02)	(-2.1)	(1.13)	(0.55)	(-1.23)
Office Layout (1=Open)	-0.292	-0.247	-0.441	-0.102	-0.336	-0.145
	(-1.17)	(-0.84)	(-0.87)	(-0.37)	(-1.17)	(-0.42)
Department Dummy HR (2)	0.3	0.472*	-0.271	0.513	0.277	0.999
	(1.32)	(1.73)	(-0.59)	(1.6)	(1.05)	(1.26)
SD (3)	0.209	0.387	-0.412	0.195	0.198	0.728
	(1.01)	(1.58)	(-1.04)	(0.77)	(0.85)	(1.24)
Observations	**252**	**189**	**63**	**63**	**189**	**63**

Notes: The Dependent variable is Time to find proper page in all models. Column (1) contains only Individual data, Column (2) Workers Only. Column (3) Supervisors Only, column (4) Average workers, column (5) Coworkers, and column (6) Average office.

Table 4.10: Estimated equations explaining missing documents – main regressions

Type of Regression	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Oprobit	OLS	Ologit	OfficeFE	DepartmentFE	MinistryFE
Age	-0.043***	-0.002	-0.013	-0.003	0.002	-0.007
	(-2.7)	(-0.11)	(-0.43)	(-0.18)	(0.11)	(-0.37)
female	-0.127	-0.136	-0.185	-0.13	-0.118	-0.114
	(-0.61)	(-0.67)	(-0.5)	(-0.91)	(-0.83)	(-0.8)
Years of schooling	-0.039	-0.039	-0.064	-0.031	-0.026	-0.044
	(-0.75)	(-0.85)	(-0.79)	(-0.51)	(-0.42)	(-0.74)
Tenure in the current office	-0.027*	-0.024*	-0.045*	-0.025*	-0.025*	-0.027*
	(-1.91)	(-1.82)	(-1.82)	(-1.68)	(-1.71)	(-1.84)
Years of experience	0.009	0.008	0.015	0.009	0.008	0.007
	(0.6)	(0.53)	(0.57)	(0.65)	(0.58)	(0.52)
Average monthly salary	-0.27	-0.313	-0.423	-0.307	-0.189	0.007
	(-1.21)	(-1.57)	(-1.11)	(-1.51)	(-1.09)	(0.04)
Number of workers	0.053**	0.048*	0.092**	0.050*	0.050*	0.048
	(2.15)	(1.91)	(2.25)	(1.82)	(1.82)	(1.43)
Workers file	-0.663***	-0.633***	-1.104***	-0.615***	-0.624***	-0.582***
	(-3.24)	(-3.72)	(-3)	(-4.19)	(-4.26)	(-3.83)
Workers communication	-0.381***	-0.390***	-0.657***	-0.416***	-0.414***	-0.308***
	(-3.39)	(-3.74)	(-3.26)	(-4.37)	(-4.34)	(-3.05)
leaders communication	-0.508**	-0.493**	-0.865**	-0.506*	-0.540**	-0.491*
	(-2.25)	(-2.2)	(-2.23)	(-1.93)	(-2.07)	(-1.85)
Leader demonstrate filing	-0.042	-0.066	-0.158	-0.066	-0.047	-0.025
	(-0.31)	(-0.52)	(-0.63)	(-0.45)	(-0.32)	(-0.17)
incentives	-0.153	-0.213	-0.279	-0.241	-0.238	-0.124
	(-0.62)	(-0.98)	(-0.66)	(-1.04)	(-1.03)	(-0.53)
Filing guideline	-0.490**	-0.489**	-0.897**	-0.473**	-0.450**	-0.451**
	(-2.12)	(-2.33)	(-2.2)	(-2.41)	(-2.31)	(-2.27)
Office Layout (1=Open)	-0.486***	-0.497***	-0.834***	-0.530***	-0.578***	-0.623***
	(-3.6)	(-3.76)	(-3.5)	(-3.27)	(-3.7)	(-3.72)
Department Dummy						
HR (2)	0.304	0.269	0.547		0.244	0.175
	(1.44)	(1.4)	(1.49)		(1.36)	(1.01)
SD (3)	-0.028	-0.035	0.019		-0.03	-0.068
	(-0.16)	(-0.22)	(0.06)		(-0.17)	(-0.4)
Observations	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**

Note: In all columns: ***, **, and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significant level. The Dependent variable is the missing documents. It comes from the question "When you open the file you expect to find a page, how often are you unable to find a proper page in the file or you find misplaced pages?" **1**. Never experienced such situation **2**. Approximately 10 percent of the time **3**. About 20 percent of the time **4**. 30 percent of the time **5**. More than 50 percent of the time. Regressions are run with robust options to minimize problems and error clustered around ministries. Interview and status control included in columns (1)-(3)

Table 4.11: Estimates of correlates of Misfiling – Different Specifications

Type of Regression	Oprobit	Oprobit	Oprobit	Oprobit	Oprobit	Oprobit
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6)**
Explanatory Variable	Individual data	Workers Only	Supervisors	Average workers	Coworkers	Average office
Age	-0.043***	-0.074***	-0.058**	-0.037**	0.019	-0.02
	(-2.7)	(-3.1)	(-2.28)	(-2.32)	(0.82)	(-0.31)
female	-0.118	-0.146	0.147	-0.138	0.224	0.352
	(-0.57)	(-0.64)	(0.42)	(-0.56)	(0.69)	(0.57)
Years of schooling	-0.005	-0.06	0.199	-0.08	0.041	0.266
	(-0.08)	(-0.86)	(1.18)	(-0.4)	(0.26)	(1.05)
Tenure in the current office	-0.031**	-0.029*	-0.097***	0.018	-0.072**	0.035
	(-2.18)	(-1.87)	(-3.09)	(0.67)	(-2.57)	(0.55)
Years of experience	0.040*	0.077***	0.03	0.03	-0.087***	-0.045
	(1.9)	(2.82)	(0.89)	(0.76)	(-2.95)	(-0.68)
Av. monthly salary	0.073	-0.092	-0.992*	-0.026	0.508	-0.084
	(0.4)	(-0.38)	(-1.96)	(-0.08)	(1.33)	(-0.09)
Number of workers	0.060**	0.049	0.002	0.037	0.072*	0.127**
	(2.45)	(1.46)	(0.02)	(1.3)	(1.96)	(2.44)
Workers file	-0.658***	-0.757***	-0.890**	-0.900***	-0.268	-1.865*
	(-3.45)	(-3.6)	(-2.15)	(-2.62)	(-1.00)	(-1.91)
Workers communication	-0.421***	-0.337**	-0.732**	-0.562***	-0.348*	-1.213***
	(-3.73)	(-2.52)	(-2.18)	(-2.58)	(-1.93)	(-3.76)
leaders communication	-0.544**	-0.086	-0.092	-1.042	-0.988*	-2.646**
	(-2.21)	(-0.2)	(-0.19)	(-1.37)	(-1.83)	(-2.42)
Leader demonstrate filing	-0.002	0.063	-0.791**	-0.178	-0.269	-0.633
	(-0.02)	(0.32)	(-2.29)	(-0.52)	(-1.14)	(-0.99)
incentives	-0.171	0.14	-0.34	-0.293	-1.005*	-1.265*
	(-0.65)	(0.39)	(-0.64)	(-0.44)	(-1.8)	(-1.68)
Filing guideline	-0.391*	-0.435	-0.568	-0.585	0.091	-0.835
	(-1.78)	(-1.64)	(-1.3)	(-1.14)	(0.3)	(-0.95)
Office Layout (1=Open)	-0.582***	-0.608***	0.571	-0.458***	-0.291	-0.322
	(-4.45)	(-3.07)	(1.01)	(-3.19)	(-1.15)	(-0.91)
Department Dummy						
HR (2)	0.235	0.477*	0.211	0.650**	0.535*	0.649
	(1.2)	(1.78)	(0.64)	(2.01)	(1.71)	(1.06)
SD (3)	-0.087	0.028	-0.405	-0.072	-0.263	-0.233
	(-0.48)	(0.1)	(-1.11)	(-0.27)	(-0.92)	(-0.53)
Observations	**252**	**189**	**63**	**63**	**189**	**63**

Notes: The Dependent variable is the misfiling of office document. Columns reports the estimates of the correlates on incidences of misfiling in different models using different measurements. Column (1) contains only Individual data, column (2) Workers Only. Column (3) Supervisors Only, column (4) Average workers, column (5) Coworkers, and column (6) Average office.

Table 4.12: Decomposition of correlates of missing documents

Variable of interest	(1) Office size	(2) Workers filing	(3) Workers communication	(4) leaders communication	(5) Leader filing	(6) incentives	(7) Filing guideline	(7) Office Layout	(8) All
Department Dummy									
HR (2)	0.117	0.197	0.326	0.094	0.144	0.129	0.193	0.058	0.252
	(0.64)	(0.88)	(1.57)	(0.45)	(0.68)	(0.62)	(1.01)	(0.29)	(1.25)
SD (3)	-0.234	-0.056	-0.041	-0.174	-0.127	-0.142	-0.139	-0.077	-0.062
	(-1.2)	(-0.34)	(-0.24)	(-0.92)	(-0.67)	(-0.78)	(-0.76)	(-0.42)	(-0.35)
Number of workers	0.097**								0.054**
	(2.41)								(2.23)
Workers file		-0.713***							-0.653***
		(-3.69)							(-3.43)
Workers communication			-0.524***						-0.397***
			(-4.51)						(-3.69)
leaders communication				-0.428*					-0.556**
				(-1.77)					(-2.46)
Leader demonstrate filing _					-0.052				-0.009
					(-0.35)				(-0.07)
incentives						-0.28			-0.176
						(-1.12)			(-0.74)
Filing guideline							-0.595**		-0.435**
							(-2.46)		(-2.03)
Office Layout (1=Open)								-0.705***	-0.576***
								(-4.68)	(-4.3)
Observations	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**	**252**

Notes: In all columns: ***, **, and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significant level. To conserve space, all columns include variables age, female, years of schooling, tenure in the current office, years of working experience, and salary which coefficients are not reported here. Dependent variable is lateness which is measured by the meeting lateness. Columns (1) – (7) use individual variables while column (8) includes all variables.

Figure 4.1: Filing situation in the government offices







Appendix Table A2.1: List of surveyed government organization

	Preliminary Survey		Actual Field Survey
1	Ministry of Education	**1**	Ministry of Education
2	Ministry of Finance and Planning	**2**	Ministry of Finance and Planning
3	Prime Minister's Office	**3**	Prime Minister's Office
4	Ministry of East Africa Corporation	**4**	Ministry of Water and Irrigation
5	State House – Presidents Delivery Bureau	**5**	Ministry of Labour and Employment
6	Haki Elimu – Non Governmental Organization	**6**	Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism
7	Ilala Municipal Council – Local Government	**7**	Ministry of Information, Culture, Arts and Sports
8	Kinondoni Municipal Council – Local Government	**8**	Ministry of Lands and Human Settlements
9	Small Industries Development Organization (SIDO)	**9**	Ministry of Health
10	Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Office in Tanzania	**10**	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
11	Japanese Embassy in Tanzania	**11**	Ministry of Agriculture
		12	Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment
		13	Ministry of Works
		14	Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs
		15	Ministry of Communication
		16	Ministry of Energy and Minerals
		17	President's Public Service Management
		18	President's Office Local Government
		19	Ministry of Transport
		20	Ministry of Community Development
		21	Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries

Note: Plenary survey are organization which were visited before actual field survey while actual surveyed organization is where data for quantitative analysis of this study.

Appendix Table A2 2: Variable definitions

Variable label	Variable definitions
Panel A: Office and Workers Characteristics	
age	the age of the i-th individual,
Gender	1= female, 0 = Male
Education attainment	the number of years of schooling completed by the i-th individual.
Tenure in the current office	Years of working in the same office
Total experience	Total years of working experience
Monthly Salary	The average logarithms of the monthly net salary (after PAYE)
Number of workers	Office size
Office layout	1=open office, 0 = Closed
Panel B: Office Meetings	
Average meeting time	Average time spent in a typical office meeting
Agenda distribution	Written meeting agenda distributed before the meeting
Meeting time prescribed	Starting and ending meeting time indicated in invitation
Meeting delay time	Average time meeting start after agreed time
Free expression of opinion	Workers are free to express their opinions in meetings
Opinion considered	Workers opinions are considered
Leader communication	Leader communicated about punctuality (1= yes, 0=No)
Leader's demonstrate	If leader lead by example by be punctual (1= yes, 0=No)
Incentive	If incentive or fair sanctions can increase punctuality
Workers communication	Coworkers communication about punctuality (1= yes, 0=No)
Meeting time to discuss office issues	Percentage of meeting time used to discuss office meeting.
Leaders punctuality	Leadership by example (leader keep meeting time)
Panel C: Office Filing	
Filing tracing time	Average time normally takes worker to find a file when they want to work on file
Time proper page	Time spent searching page(s) with information needed to perform workers duty
Misfiling	Incidence that workers cannot find a proper page or find miss placed pages
Filing guideline	Presence of official standing rules or written instruction to guide office filing (1= yes, 0=No)
Workers communication	Frequency of workers communicate each other about adherence to filing standard (1= yes, 0=No)
Leaders communication	Frequency of supervisor communicate to workers about adherence to filing standard (1= yes, 0=No)
incentive	If incentive/sanctions will increase conformity to filing standards
Leaders demonstration	Leader demonstrate filing

Figure 2 5: Flow Chart showing how typical central government ministries work



Source: Prepared by the author based on interview and experience in the government office

Notes: Figure portrays the workflow of how offices in the government ministries (policy making organizations) receive information and discharge their mandates. When government clients (e.g., individuals, public organizations, and private entities) submit their issues to the ministry, they normally follow this flow[40]. There are few exceptions, though. Normally, messages flows following steps all the way down the hierarchy from the top to the frontline level, and, by the same token, information flows up from the frontline level to the Minister which is minimum of 18 steps. In reality, the technical work is done at the shop-floor level by the frontline workers. The analytical work is done in the official files. The frontline workers receive written instructions from supervisor either in the file or loose document. In any case, frontline officers must work in a relevant file and sometimes they need archived files for reference. Workers might provide technical advice alone or advice supervisor to organize a technical meeting to discuss and propose policy actions. The proposed policy actions flows back form frontline workers to the permanent secretary and Minister for decision making. Once the policy decision is made at (18), the feedback is communicated through meetings (18) where implementation is discussed. In many cases this process is not a once-and-done process. Therefore there is backward and forward movement of document files and in most cases different workers with different issues are working on the same file. Each responsible department then discuss implementation plans in staff meetings. The records of the meetings and technical reports are kept in the files for reference and accountability. From this figure it can clearly be seen why effective communication, coordination, and leadership is necessary for the effectiveness of government offices. This flow is important for determining efficiency and accountability in the government offices.

[40] One of the possible reason of researchers not studying how government work is difficult in quantifying the process of decision making in the public sector.

Figure 2.6: Sample structure of the studied organizations



Source: *Prepared by the Author based on the general structure of government ministries in Tanzanian.*

Note: Traditionally, public sector working places are mostly organized in a hierarchical way. Leaders delegate part of their tasks to their immediate subordinates up to technical officers who perform technical work. Some ministries have more administrative layers than others depending on the size and functions but this study focused on the lowest level of administration in each of the surveyed ministries. In each ministry, three offices are surveyed. These offices are selected from Policy and Planning Department; Human Resource Department; and Sector Specific Department. From each department, the sample involved one supervisor (Assistant Directors/Assistant commissioners) and three officers under working under the selected supervisor as portrayed by dotted marks.

ANNEX: OTHER RESULTS

Annex Table A3 1: Effect of office meetings and filing practices on the performance

Dependent Variable: Achieved Target	**Office performance (2016/17) (1)**	**Office Performance (2016/17) (2)**	**Office Performance (2016/17) (3)**	**Office Performance (2016/17) (4)**
Effective ness	0.175**		0.136*	
	(2.47)		(1.66)	
Lateness		-0.138**	-0.116*	
		(-2.51)	(-1.85)	
File Tracing time				-.131***
				(-2.81)
Office Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Workers Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Position Dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Enumerators Dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	252	252	252	252

Notes: In all columns: ***, **, and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significant level, the robust t-statistics are in parenthesis, standard errors clustered at ministries level. The dependent variably is achieved office target and the right hand variables are meeting effectiveness, average amount of meetings lateness time, and average amount of time workers spend searching for the working files. In all regression are OLS I control for office characteristics which includes office size and office layout, department type. Workers characteristics which include gender, education level, work experience, and status. Objective is to capture the impact of office meetings and filing practices. Results show that office meeting effectiveness is positively and significantly associated with office performance. Contrarily, Meeting lateness and file tracing time is negatively associated with office performance.

TABLES FOR MEETING EFFECTIVENESS

Annex Table A3 2: Correlations between Government Office Meeting Lateness Determinants –All

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
(1)	Information sufficiency	1														
(2)	lateness	-0.22*	1													
(3)	Individual age	0.11*	-0.06	1												
(4)	Female	0.01	-0.04	-0.13*	1											
(5)	Years of schooling	0.08	-0.08	0.45*	-0.02	1										
(6)	Tenure in the current office	-0.02	0.02	0.42*	-0.17*	0.30*	1									
(7)	Total years of experience	0.09	-0.05	0.86*	-0.12*	0.44*	0.57*	1								
(8)	Monthly Salary (TZS 000)	0.13*	-0.09	0.69*	-0.12*	0.44*	0.24*	0.62*	1							
(9)	Number of meetings per week	0.24*	-0.12*	0.29*	0.034	0.28*	0.12*	0.31*	0.43*	1						
(10)	Meeting duration	-0.07	0.20*	0.04	0.04	-0.01	0.03	0.03	0.04	-0.05	1					
(11)	Receive agenda in advance	0.32*	-0.14*	-0.08	0.09	-0.06	-0.02	-0.11*	-0.11*	-0.09	-0.15*	1				
(12)	Receive minutes of the meeting	0.27*	-0.13*	-0.01	0.08	-0.02	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.13*	-0.04	0.21*	1			
(13)	Free expression	0.24*	-0.16*	-0.04	0.11*	-0.10	-0.04	-0.09	0.08	-0.004	0.01	0.30*	0.24*	1		
(14)	Opinion consideration	0.29*	-0.06	0.12*	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.13*	0.17*	0.04	-0.02	0.31*	0.25*	0.28*	1	
(15)	No of workers	-0.10	0.04	0.06	0.004	0.05	0.018	0.05	-0.03	0.04	0.13*	0.06	-0.04	-0.08	-0.10	1

Annex Table A4. 1: Decomposition of correlates - Time to find proper pages:

Variable of interest	(1) Office size	(2) Workers filing	(3) Workers communication	(4) leaders communication	(5) Leader filing	(6) incentives	(7) Filing guideline	(7) Office Layout	(8) All
Age	-0.028	-0.019	-0.035	-0.021	-0.02	-0.02	-0.018	-0.021	-0.034
	(-0.98)	(-0.88)	(-1.41)	(-0.9)	(-0.89)	(-0.93)	(-0.76)	(-0.95)	(-1.35)
female	-0.236	-0.267*	-0.416***	-0.275*	-0.282*	-0.278*	-0.262*	-0.258	-0.342**
	(-1.46)	(-1.87)	(-2.71)	(-1.82)	(-1.91)	(-1.82)	(-1.92)	(-1.63)	(-2.26)
Years of schooling	-0.062	-0.015	0.025	-0.028	-0.031	-0.046	-0.028	-0.047	-0.012
	(-1)	(-0.26)	(0.43)	(-0.49)	(-0.52)	(-0.72)	(-0.46)	(-0.68)	(-0.17)
Tenure in the current office	-0.011	-0.008	-0.012	-0.009	-0.009	-0.008	-0.002	-0.008	-0.003
	(-0.62)	(-0.47)	(-0.67)	(-0.54)	(-0.55)	(-0.49)	(-0.1)	(-0.43)	(-0.15)
Years of experience	0.02	0.008	0.022	0.013	0.013	0.014	0.013	0.007	0.017
	(0.93)	(0.5)	(1.07)	(0.73)	(0.73)	(0.85)	(0.78)	(0.39)	(0.86)
Av. monthly salary	0.376*	0.235	0.164	0.293*	0.293*	0.231	0.176	0.239	-0.024
	(1.86)	(1.36)	(1.02)	(1.83)	(1.75)	(1.31)	(1.04)	(1.29)	(-0.11)
Number of workers	0.148***								0.116**
	(3.08)								(2.35)
Workers file		-0.752***							-0.666***
		(-3.25)							(-3)
Workers communication			-0.723***						-0.562***
			(-4.43)						(-3.52)
leaders communication				-0.163					-0.243
				(-0.5)					(-0.94)

Variable of interest	(1) Office size	(2) Workers filing	(3) Workers communication	(4) leaders communication	(5) Leader filing	(6) incentives	(7) Filing guideline	(7) Office Layout	(8) All
Leader demonstrate filing _					-0.053				-0.118
					(-0.27)				(-0.58)
incentives						-0.377			-0.432**
						(-1.58)			(-2.02)
Filing guideline							-0.787***		-0.518**
							(-3.63)		(-2.06)
Office Layout (1=Open)								-0.593***	-0.35
								(-2.87)	(-1.6)
Department Dummy									
HR (2)	-0.077	0.028	0.226	-0.072	-0.048	-0.068	0.048	-0.122	0.262
	(-0.44)	(0.13)	(1.05)	(-0.35)	(-0.23)	(-0.34)	(0.26)	(-0.61)	(1.17)
SD (3)	-0.08	0.174	0.204	0.053	0.075	0.059	0.076	0.123	0.186
	(-0.46)	(0.91)	(1.05)	(0.27)	(0.39)	(0.31)	(0.41)	(0.65)	(0.91)
Interview Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Workers status Dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	252	252	252	252	252	252	252	252	252

Notes: In all regressions, dependent variable is Time to find proper page

Annex Table A3 3: Correlations between Government Office Meeting Lateness Determinants –Workers Only

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
(1)	Information sufficiency	1														
(2)	lateness	-0.27*	1													
(3)	Individual age	-0.02	-0.01	1												
(4)	Female	0.10	-0.11	-0.13*	1											
(5)	Years of schooling	0.03	-0.09	0.39*	-0.01	1										
(6)	Tenure in the current office	-0.02	0.06	0.55*	-0.15*	0.36*	1									
(7)	Total years of experience	-0.07	0.01	0.84*	-0.13*	0.39*	0.70*	1								
(8)	Monthly Salary (TZS 000)	-0.04	-0.07	0.62*	-0.09	0.30*	0.29*	0.52*	1							
(9)	Number of meetings per week	-0.14*	-0.14*	0.04	0.07	0.11	0.10	0.08	0.09	1						
(10)	Meeting duration	-0.09	0.26*	0.02	0.03	-0.06	-0.02	0.03	0.02	-0.06	1					
(11)	Receive agenda in advance	-0.41*	-0.16*	-0.01	0.09	-0.06	0.02	-0.08	-0.05	-0.01	-0.15*	1				
(12)	Receive minutes of the meeting	-0.26*	-0.15*	-0.04	0.13*	-0.0	0.07	-0.01	0.01	0.18*	-0.09	0.17*	1			
(13)	Free expression	-0.24*	-0.21*	-0.04	0.18*	-0.10	-0.07	-0.12	0.08	-0.06	-0.03	0.28*	0.26*	1		
(14)	Opinion consideration	0.29*	0.02	0.07	0.06	0.00	-0.02	0.04	0.08	-0.06	-0.01	0.35*	0.25*	0.31*	1	
(15)	No of workers	-0.15*	0.07	0.09	-0.03	0.05	0.03	0.09	-0.04	0.05	0.09	0.01	-0.07	-0.12	-0.10	1

Annex Table A3 4: Correlations between Government Office Meeting Lateness Determinants –Supervisors Only

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
(1)	Information sufficiency	1														
(2)	lateness	-0.04	1													
(3)	Individual age	-0.02	-0.17	1												
(4)	Female	-0.17	0.14	0.01	1											
(5)	Years of schooling	-0.12	0.07	0.10	0.09	1										
(6)	Tenure in the current office	-0.11	-0.07	-0.09	-0.15	-0.05	1									
(7)	Total years of experience	0.13	-0.23*	0.61*	0.08	0.08	0.17	1								
(8)	Monthly Salary (TZS 000)	0.13	0.06	-0.04	-0.08	0.06	0.29*	-0.14	1							
(9)	Number of meetings per week	0.29*	0.05	0.02	0.11	0.10	-0.12	0.05	0.03	1						
(10)	Meeting duration	-0.10	0.04	0.04	0.08	0.08	0.13	-0.08	-0.06	-0.19	1					
(11)	Receive agenda in advance	0.23*	-0.11	-0.15	0.05	0.13	-0.08	-0.02	-0.02	-0.11	-0.12	1				
(12)	Receive minutes of the meeting	0.25*	-0.08	-0.03	-0.08	-0.11	-0.16	-0.05	0.03	-0.08	0.04	0.36*	1			
(13)	Free expression	0.27*	-0.01	-0.21	-0.18	-0.19	-0.01	-0.17	0.08	0.16	0.12	0.46*	0.17	1		
(14)	Opinion consideration	0.19	-0.27*	-0.09	-0.09	-0.05	0.09	0.08	0.12	-0.06	-0.08	0.28*	0.27*	0.17	1	
(15)	No of workers	0.05	-0.04	-0.09	0.11	0.13	-0.03	-0.14	-0.12	0.09	0.22*	0.28*	0.02	0.04	-0.10	1

Appendix

Appendix 1: Questionnaires for Office Supervisors

GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL SURVEY IN TANZANIA 2017

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SUPERVISORS

Interview Details
Organization ID:_____
Office ID:_____
Respondent ID:_____
Enumerator's Name:_____
Date (DD/MM/YY):_____/_____/ _____
Interview Starting Time (hr: min):_____:_____
Interview Ending time (hr: min): _____:_____
Respondent Phone:_____
Respondent Email_____

2.0 Office Target

2.1. Does your office have any performance target? **1** yes. **2** no **3.** Don't know- (*if 2 or 3 skip to 2.6*)

2.2. Could you mention at most three main targets of your office?

1._____

2._____

3._____

(*Enumerator please rate the description of office target if they are SMART)* [Rating: **1**. unclear and unachievable target (s). **2**. Target (s) is clear but not measurable. **3**. The target(s) is Specific, measurable, unachievable, .**4**. The target (s) is Specific, measurable, achievable, and relevant. **5** the target (s) is Specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-based

2.3. How would you rate, in percentage, the achieved target(s) in relation to the planned target(s) for the fiscal year 2015/16? **1**. Don't know. **2**. Less than 50% **2**. 50% to 80% **4**. 81% to 100% **5**. Above 100%

2.4. In your opinion do you think your office can perform better than its current performance, given the available resources. **1**. Yes **2**. No

2.5. Based on the nature of your office targets, to what extent does your office require cooperation among office members to achieve the planned office targets **1**. Little collaboration (0%-10%). **2**.

Sometimes need collaboration (11%-50%). **3**. Need collaboration (51%-100%). **4** very much needed (71% - 100%).

2.6. From your schedule of duties, to what extent do workers in this office know about the work you do? **1**. They knows nothing (0%-10%). **2**. They know little (11 – 50%). **3**. They know some (51-70%). **4**. They know a lot (71-99%). **5**. They know everything (100%)

2.7. From your schedule of duties, to what extent do you know about the work that other workers are doing? **1**. I knows nothing (0%-10%). **2**. I just little (11 – 50%). **3**. I know some (51-70%). **4**. I know a lot (71-99%). **5.** I know everything they are doing (100%)

2.8. To what extent workers in your office depend on each other in terms of obtaining information and advice in order to achieve planned office performance? **1**. Workers never depend on information and advice from their colleagues to accomplish their tasks (0%-10%). **2**. workers rarely depend on inputs from their colleagues for the completion of their work (11%-50%) **3**. Workers occasionally have to obtain inputs from their colleagues in order to complete their office duties (51%-70%). **4**. Often workers have to check or work with others (71-99%). **5**. Always workers have to obtain information and work with others to accomplish their office duties (100%)

2.9. Do you think your office could perform better than its current performance, given the available resources if office level management practices (filing system, time management, leadership practice and work place communication) is improved? **1**. Yes. **2**. No

3.0 OFFICE MEETINGS

3.1. Plenary meetings

The following questions are about meetings between you as supervisor and all most all your office workers to discuss office issues. This type of meeting is called **plenary meetings**.

3.1.1. Does your office have plenary meetings regularly? **1**. Yes **2**. No

3.1.2. How many plenary meetings does your office have in a week on average? **1**. After a couple of weeks. **2**. Once a week **3**. At most twice a week **4**. At least twice **5**. Daily

3.1.3. On average, about how much time do your office people spend in a typical plenary meeting?
1. More than 2hr **2**. 1hr – 2hr **3**. 45 min – 1hr **4**. 30 – 45 min **5**. Less than 30 min

3.1.4. Out of the meeting time, what percentage of time is spent during plenary meetings on talking

about issues related to office activities? _____

3.1.5. Are you informed of the agenda of the next meeting well in advance so that you can prepare for the meeting? **1**. Not receive agenda in advance. **2**. Rarely get meeting agenda in advance **3**. Mostly receive agenda in the meeting. **4** Receive agenda shortly before the meeting. **5** Receive agenda well in advance

3.1.6. At plenary meetings, do you usually give your officers sufficient information that you ought to give for them to perform their duties? **1**. The information I give is always far from sufficient (0-10%). **2.** The information I give mostly not sufficient (11%-50%). **3**. I give just basic information (51%-70%). **4**. Information I give to some extent are sufficient (71%-99%). **5**. Yes, almost always I give sufficient information (100%)

3.1.7. Do you usually receive minutes (or any written record) summarizing in a convenient way the important information discussed in a meeting soon after the meeting? **1** Do not receive any record soon after the meeting. **2**. Rarely receive. **3**. Sometimes I receive. **4**. Usually receive but with delay. **5**. Immediately after the meeting I receive well summarized records.

3.1.8. At plenary meetings, can workers usually convey their opinion or message to you or their colleagues or both as much as they need to do or want to do? : **1**. Only supervisor gives instruction about office issues. **2**. They rarely have a chance to express their opinion. **3**. Sometimes they can express their opinion **4**. Yes they can express their opinion but with caution **5** Yes, they can express their opinion freely.

3.1.9. In your opinion, to what extent does workers opinions are considered by your office? **1**. (0%-10%). **2**. (11%-50%). **3**. (51%%-70%). **4**. (71-99%) **5**. (100%)

3.2. Small meetings

Small meetings are meeting between you as supervisor with a small part of the office member (including one-on-one dialogue) discussing about office issues.

3.2.1. How often do you conduct small meetings with your frontline workers in span of a week to discuss office work? **1**. not every week. **2**. Once a week. **3**. Twice a week **4**. Almost every day **5**. Daily (***if 1 go to 3.2.3)***

3.2.2. On average, about how many minutes do you allow for a typical small meeting with your

frontline workers?

1. More than 1 hr. **2**. 45 – 60 min **3**. 30 – 45 min **4**. 20 – 30 min. **5**. less than 20 min

3.2.3. In your ministry in general (not necessarily at your office), do officers tend to get sufficient information and instruction to perform their duties through plenary meetings and any small meetings? **1.** The opposite is the case, **2.** most of the time they don't get. **3.** It depends on case by case. **4** Yes in many cases they get. **5**. They always get sufficient information

3.3. Punctuality

3.3.1. In your career, have you ever experienced a work environment in which everyone comes to most meetings in time and is usually ready to start meetings on time? **1**. Yes. **2**. No

3.3.2. Do you think that the high level of punctuality just described is always observed in your ministry? **1** never observed or heard. **2**. Rarely observed. **3**. Observed several times. **4**. Most of the time is observed. **5**. Very commonly observed.

3.3.3. Does a typical plenary meetings in your organization (not only in your office) usually start on time? **1**. Yes **2**. No (***if Yes go to 3.3.5)***

3.3.4. (***If the answer is no***), about how many minutes is the start delayed on average? **1**. More than 1 hour. **2.** 40 – 60 min. **3.** 20– 40 min. **4.** 10 – 20 min. **5**. Less than 10 min

3.3.5. In your organization (not necessary your office) do you normally need quorum to start a meeting at the appointed time? **1**. Yes, normally requires minimum number of attendees **2**.No Meeting can start regardless of how many participants are still missing

3.3.6. How late is consider as tolerable in your opinion? **1**. 1- 10 minutes **2**. 11-20 min **3**. 21-30 min **4**. About an hr. **5.** More than hour

3.3.7. How do you feel when others are late? **1**. Neutral. **2**. disappointed **3**. Irritated. **4**. Angry

3.3.8. Please tell me from your experience in this organization including your office, how the meeting time is prescribed in your invitations? **1**. Neither starting time nor end time is indicated. **2**. Rarely the starting time is clearly set. **3**. Occasionally the starting time is clearly set. **4**. Often both starting time and ending time are clearly set. **5.** always meetings start & end time is communicated

3.3.9. From your experience in this office, to what extent can you be certain that when you have

plenary meeting everyone will be on time? **1**. I cannot be certain at all (0 – 10%. **2**. 11- 50% certain. **3**. 50% to 75% certain. **4**. 75% to 90% certain. **5**. 90 to 100% certain.

3.3.10. To what extent does your colleagues in your ministry (not necessarily at your office) tend to believe that meetings would start on time? **1** they believe the opposite very strongly (0-10%) **2**. they believe the opposite (11-50%). **3**. they somehow believe so (51-70%). **4**. Majority believe so (71- 99%). **5.** All workers believe so very strongly (100%)

3.3.11. How frequently do you remind your officers about the importance of been on time in your office meetings? **1**. Never. **2**. Rarely **3**. Occasionally. **4**. Often. **5**. Constantly

3.3.12. Do you believe lateness is a problem that needs to be addressed and one that could make the meetings more efficient? **1**. Absolutely, it is a problem if solved would gain so much time. **2**. Yes, it is a problem, but I don't think it really needs much attention.**3**. No, it's not a problem, we are fine as we are right now

3.3.13. Based on your experience in this office, among the following statements, which one do you mostly agree with? **1**. Almost all workers would come to the meetings on time if they are sure that other attendees would come on time. **2**. Some workers would come late no matter how they expect the other attendees to behave.

3.3.14. Based on your experience in this office, among the following statements, which one do you mostly agree with? **1**. Almost all people would come to the meetings on time if they are sure that their supervisor would come on time 2. workers would come late no matter how they expect the supervisor show up

3.3.15. Based on your experience in this office, among the following statements, which one do you mostly agree with? **1**. Almost all people would come to the meetings on time if acceptable incentives are introduced **2**. workers would still come late even if incentives are introduced

3.3.16. Based on your office experience, among the following statements, which one do you mostly agree with? **1**. Almost all people would come to the meetings on time if they are repeatedly reminded about keeping time **2**. Workers would still come late even if they are constantly reminded to keep meeting time.

4.0 FILING

4.1. General Files

The following questions are about working in paper files and filing office documents. This section deals with files which are kept by the organization and shared by other offices in your ministry. This type of files are called general files (including open and confidential files).

4.1.1. In your career, have you ever experienced a working environment in which everyone properly files documents and return files to its original place (designated shelves or registry) immediately after finish using the file? **1**. Yes. **2**. No

4.1.2. From your experience in this office, how often have you observed such level of compliance with filing rules just described? **1**. Never observed or heard. **2**. Rarely observed. **3**. Occasionally observed. **4**. Most of the time observed. **5**. very commonly observed

4.1.3. Does your office have any standing rules or any written instructions that outline or regulate different aspects of office filing? **1**. Yes. **2**. No **3**. I don't know

4.1.4. In your office duties, do you usually perform your office duties in paper documents and files which are also used by other workers? **1**. I do not work in files which are used by your colleagues. **2**. Rarely work in paper files. **3**. Sometimes work in shared paper files. **4**. Mostly I work in shared paper files. **5** Always I work in paper files used by other workers (***if 1 go to 4.2.8)***

4.1.5. On average, about how many minutes does it normally take you to find general file that you want to work on? **1**. More than1 hour **2**. 45 – 60 min. **3**. 30 – 45 min **4**. 20 – 30 min. **5**. Less than 20 min

4.1.6. On average, how much time do you normally spend searching in the file and a get page with the information you need at the right moment when you need it? .**1.** It takes more than 1 hour and sometimes pages cannot be found in the file. **2**. It takes at least 30 min – 1 hour. **3.** It takes about 20 – 30 minutes. **4**. Sometimes it takes between 10 - 20 min. **5**. It take at most 10 minutes

4.1.7. Describe situation more vividly when you open the file you expect to find a page, how often you cannot find a proper page or you find misplaced pages? **1**. More than 50% of times **2**. 30% of times **3**. 20% of time. **4**. 10% of time. **5**. Never experienced such situation

4.1.8. Do your workers in your ministry (not necessarily at your office) tend to believe that everyone will properly file documents and return files to its designated place on immediately after using it? **1**. Yes, they believe so very strongly (100%). **2**. Yes, they believe so (71- 99%). **3**. Some

believe so but not all (51-70%). **4**. No, they believe the opposite (11-50%). **5.** No, they believe the opposite very strongly (0-10%) .

4.2. Specialized files

This section deals with files which are used only in the office (including flimsy and office reports). This type of files is called specialized files.

4.2.1. On average, how long does it take to locate a relevant working file or document used only by members of your office? **1**. More than 1hour < 2. 45 – 60 min **3**. 30 – 45 min **4**. 20 – 30 min. **5**. less than 20 min

4.2.2. From your experience in this office, how would you rate effort and commitment of individual workers in making sure that they properly file their work and return office files in its original place? **1**. normally don't file(0-10%) 2. minimum effort (11-9%). **3**. Average effort (50-80%). **4.** High effort (81-100%).

4.2.3. Suppose a worker in your office try to make effort to file documents systematically and try to make files in a way friendlier to others but others do not make effort to file documents, would that worker continue to do it if others are not doing it? **1**. Yes **2**. No

4.2.4. Imagine if a worker knows that (s)he can benefit from not filing because others will file and the same worker knows that (s)he can suffer by filing while others don't file which would be the best action for such a worker? **1**. Will not file regardless of others action. **2**. Will file or not file depending on others action **3**. Will file regardless of others action

4.2.5. From your experience in this office, to what extent can you be certain that every individual worker will file documents and return file to its designated place? **1**. I cannot certain at all (0-10%) . **2** between 11-49% certain **3**. Between 50% - 75% certain. **4**. Between 76% - 90% certain. **5**. Between 90 - 100% certain that everyone will file.

4.2.6. Do you believe that current filing practice is a problem that needs to be addressed and one that could make the office more efficient if all workers adhere to the filing standard? **1**. Absolutely, it is a problem if solved would gain easy work. **2**. Yes, it is a problem, but I don't think it really needs much attention. **3**. No, it's not a problem, we are fine as we are right now

4.2.7. How frequently do communicate with your frontline workers about the compliance to the filing guideline in your office? **1.** Never. **2** Rarely **3** Occasionally **4**. Often **5**. Constantly

4.2.8. Do people in this office communicate each other accurately about the adherence of filing standard? **1**. Never. **2**. Rarely. **3**. Occasionally. **4**. Often. **5**. Constantly

4.2.9. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the following are reasons for workers not filing properly (file document in sequence, return pages when they remove them for use, and return file to its original place immediately after using).

		Strongly Disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Don't known (3)	Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)	Refuse to answer (6)
i	Workers don't file because others tend not to file						
ii	workers don't file because they know others will file for them						
iii	workers don't file because they don't know how to file						
iv	workers don't file because they feel the importance of filing as insignificant and inconsequential						

4.2.10. From your experience in this office, among the following statements, which one do you mostly agree with? **1**. Almost all workers would conform with filing standards if they are sure that their supervisor is concerned with poor filing and demonstrate filing **2**. Most people would not conform with filing standards no matter how the supervisor demonstrate filing

4.2.11. Considering your office situation, among the following statements, which one do you mostly agree with? **1.** Almost all workers would conform with filing standards if monitoring mechanism and incentives are introduced **2**. Most workers would not conform with filing standards even if incentive is introduced

4.2.12. Based on your office experience, among the following statements, which one do you mostly agree with? **1.** Almost all workers would conform with filing standards if they are repeatedly reminded about filing. **2**. Most workers would not conform with filing standards even if they are

constantly reminded about filing

5.0 Office layout

Enumerator determine based on visual inspection (and by asking some questions) whether office layout is of office sharing or separate office whether the office is a closed door or open door and whether there are basic signs such as exit sign and direction sign.

Enumerators please observe and mark

5.1. *Office layout*: **1**. Closed office. **2.** Open office

5.2. *Sharing of office*: **1**. Supervisor shares an office with workers **2.** Supervisor has own office located next to workers **3** Supervisors office is located far from workers

5.3. Signs: [Presence of basic signs such as **1**. exit sign **2**. direction signs **3**.Name plates **4** no signs

6.0 Training

6.1. Have you received short-term training related to the current job **1**. Yes **2**. No

6.2. Have you received any training related to the use of office documents and filing **1**. Yes **2**. No

6.3. Have you received any training related to time management? **1**. Yes **2**. No

6.4. What other kind of training have you received in this office? **1**. Leadership **2.** Management **3**. Communication skills **4**. Specialization **5**.Others – (*Multiple selection is possible)*

7.0 INCENTIVES

7.1. What motivated you to be a public servant? **1.** Salary and allowances **2**. Pension **3**. Training opportunity **4**. Job security **5**. Serve the public **6**. Patriotism **7**. Government was main employer. **8** others _____

7.2. Is the salary sufficient for the work you do? **1**. Yes **2**. No

7.3. Are there additional allowances aside from salary?

7.4. If yes, what kind of allowances? 1. Cash 3. In kind

7.5. On average, how much is your monthly allowances? _____

7.6. Is the average monthly allowance sufficient for the work you do? **1**. Yes **2.** No

7.7. Please share with us, how much is your monthly salary (after tax)? _____

7.8. Do you think that your office could perform better than currently does without increasing monetary incentives for officers if office meeting and filing practices are improved? **1**. Yes **2**. No

Questionnaires for Office Supervisors (Swahili Version)

UTAFITI KUHUSU UFANISI WA SEKTA YA UMMA TANZANIA 2017

DODOSO KWA MAOFISA

TAARIFA ZA DODOSO	**1.0 TAARIFA ZA OFISI/MHOJIWA**
Utambulisho: – Jina, unatokea wapi, nk Tafiti hii ni sehemu ya mradi wa Taasis ya Taifa ya Sera ya Japani (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies - GRIPS). Mradi unagharamiwa na Serikali ya Japan kupitia Wizara ya Elimu chini ya program ya Kuandaa Viongozi wa Siku Zijazo (Future Leaders). Lengo la tafiti hii ni kuangali namna ya kuweza mazingira mazuri ya utendaji kazi serilini katika kuboresha mazingira ya kazi kwa lengo la kuhakikisha Serikali inatoa huduma kwa ufanisi na kwa wakati. ● **Majibu yako ni siri** na hayatatolewa kwa mtu yeyote yule ambae hausiki na utafiti huu. Tunaahidi kuwa taarifa zozote utakazotupatia zitakuwa siri na hazitaonesha zimetolewa na nani. Taarifa hizi zitatumika kwa ajili ya utafiti tuu na si vinginevyo. Taarifa zitakazotolewa kwenye matokeo ya utafiti huu ni za ujumla na wastani na sio za mtu moja mmoja hivyo hazitaonesha zimetolewa na nani na wala taasisi iliyotoa. Tunashukuru sana kwa ushirikiano wako. ● **Lengo**: Lengo la utafiti huu ni kujifunza juu ya ufanisi wa sector ya umma ya Tanzania katika uzalishaji na utoaji huduma za umma. ● **Sababu**: Tunajifunza ufanisi wa sekta ya umma kwa sababu ndio msingi wa ufanisi wa sekta nyingine za uzalishaji au mtu mmojamoja na hivyo kuamua au kuchangia maendeleo ya nchi. Taasisi Na.:_____ Kitengo:_____ Mhojiwa:_____ Mhojaji:_____ Tarehe (siku/mwezi/mwaka):____/_____/ _____ Muda wa kuanza mahojiano (saa:dk):_____:____ Muda wa kumaliza mahojiano (saa:dk):_____:____ Namba ya Simu ya Mhojiwa _____ Barua Pepe:_____	1.10. Umri (Miaka):_____ 1.11. Jinsia **1**. Ke **2**. Me 1.12. Miaka ya elimu rasmi: ____ 1.13. Kiwango cha juu cha elimu: **1**. Cheti **2**. Stashahada **3**. Shahada **4**. Shahada ya uzamili **5**. Uzamifu 1.14. Je, umewahi kufanya kazi sehemu nyingine kabla ya kujiunga na ofisi yako ya sasa? **1**. Ndio **2**. Hapana (***Kama hapana > 1.7***) 1.15. Kama ndio, ni sekta gani na muda? (***zaidi ya moja***) **1**. Umma ____ **2**. Binafsi ___ **3**. AZAKI._____ **4**. Nyingine_____ 1.16. Muda uliofanya kazi kwenye ofisi ya sasa (miaka): _____ 1.17. Muda uliotumikia cheo cha sasa (miaka):_____

2.0 MALENGO YA KIUTENDAJI YA OFISI

2.10. Je, ofisi yenu inamalengo ya kiutendaji? **1** Ndio. **2** Hapana **3**. Sijui- (***kama 2 au 3 > 2.6***)

2.11. Tafadhali naomba unitajie na ufafanue kwa ufupi malengo ya ofisi yako yasiyozidi matatu ya mwaka huu wa fedha.

1._____

2._____

3._____

(*Mhojaji tafadhali tathmini ufafanuzi wa malengo*)

1. Malengo hayapo wazi na hayatekelezeki. **2**. Malengo yapo wazi lakini hayapimiki na hayatekelezeki **3**. Malengo yapo wazi, yanapimika na yanafikika. **4**. Malengo yapo wazi, yanapimika, hayatekelezeki, na yanaendana na uhalisia. **5**. Malengo yapo wazi, yanapimika, yanatekelezeka, yanaendana na uhalisia na muda

2.12. Tafadhali naomba kufahamu ni kwa kiasi gani mlifikia malengo ya kiutendaji ya ofisi kwa mwaka wa fedha 2015/16 (wastani %)? **1.** Sijui **2** Chini ya 50% **3**. Kati ya asilimia 50 na 80 **4**. Kati ya asilimia 81 na 100 **5**. Zaidi ya asilimia 100.

2.13. Naomba unieleze kwa maoni yako, je unafikiri ofisi yenu inaweza kufanya vizuri zaidi kwa kutumia rasilimali zilizopo? **1**. Ndio. **2**. Hapana

2.14. Kwa kuzingatia malengo ya ofisi yenu, je ni kwa kiasi gani unahitajika ushirikiano kati ya mtumishi na mtumishi ili kufikia malengo ya ofisi?: 1. ushirikiano kidogo (0%-10%). **2**. Ushikiano kiasi (11%-50%). **3**. Ushirikiano mkubwa unahitajika (51%-70%). **4**. Ushirikiano unahitajika sana (71-100%).

2.15. Kutokana na majukumu yako ya kazi unazofanya, je ni kwa kiasi gani watumishi wenzako kwenye kitengo chako wanafahamu kazi unazofanya? **1**. Hawafahamu (0%-10%). **2**. Wanafahamu kidogo (11%-50%). **3**. Baadhi wanafahamu (51%-70%). **4**. Wengi wanafahamu (71-99%). **5**. Wote wanafahamu (100%).

2.16. Kutokana na majukumu yako ya kazi unazozifanya, ni kwa kiwango gani unafahamu kazi ambazo watumishi wenzako wanafanya? **1**. Sifahamu (0%-10%). **2**. Nafahamu kidogo (11%-50%). **3**. Nafahamu kwa baadhi (51%-70%). **4**. Nafahamu kwa kiasi kikubwa (71-99%). **5**. Nafahamu kila mmoja anachokifanya (100%).

2.17. Ni kwa kiasi gani watumishi kwenye ofisi hii mnategemeana kwa kupeana taarifa na ushauri katika kufikia malengo ya ofisi? **1**. Hatutegemeani (0%-10%) **2**. Tunategemeana kwa kiasi kidogo (11%-50%). **3**. Tunategemea (51%-70%) **4**. Tunategemeana kwa kiasi kikubwa (71-99%). **5**. Tunategemeana kwa kiasi kikubwa sana (100%).

2.18. Je, unadhani ofisi yako inaweza kufanya vizuri zaidi ikiwa mfumo wa mafaili, matumizi ya muda, uongozi na mawasiliano kati ya mtumishi na mtumishi mahala pa kazi yakiboreshwa? **1**. Ndio. **2**. Hapana.

3.0 MAWASILIANO MAHALA PAKAZI

3.4. Vikao Rasmi

Sehemu hii inahusu maswali yanayohusiana na vikao rasmi vya ofisi vikiwa kama mojawapo ya njia kuu ya mawasiliano mahala pakazi kwa lengo la kujadili mambo yanayohusu utendaji wa ofisi. Vikao hivi vinahusisha kiongozi na maofisa wote.

3.1.10. Je, ofisi yenu hufanya vikao rasmi mara kwa mara? **1**. Ndio **2**. Hapana

3.1.11. Ni mara ngapi huwa mnafanya vikao rasmi vya kiofisi katika kipindi cha wiki moja kujadili maswala ya kazi ya kitengo chenu? **1**. Baada ya wiki kadhaa. **2**. Mara moja kwa wiki **3**. Walau mara mbili kwa wiki **4**. Zaidi ya mara mbili kwa wiki **5**. Kila siku.

3.1.12. Kwa wastani, mnatumia muda kiasi gani kwenye vikao rasmi? **1**. Zaidi ya masaa mawili. **2**. Kati ya saa 1 na masaa 2. **3**. Kati ya dakika 45 na saa moja. **4**. Kati ya dakika 30 - 45. **5**. Chini ya dakika 30.

3.1.13. Je, unafikiri kati ya muda ulioutaja hapo juu (3.1.3) ni asilimia ngapi ya muda unatumika kujadili shughuli za ofisi au kikao husika _____

3.1.14. Je, ni wakati gani, huwa unapata ajenda za kikao? **1**. Ajenda hazitolewi kabla. **2**. Mara chache kupata ajenda kabla **3**. Mara nyingi napata agenda kwenye kikao **4**. Napata ajenda muda mfupi kabla ya kikao **5**. Ajenda hutolewa muda mrefu kabla kikao.

3.1.15. Je, ni kwa kiasi gani taarifa unazozipata kwenye vikao rasmi vya ofisi zinatosheleza kutekeleza majukumu yako? **1**. Taarifa hazitoshi kabisa (0-10%) **2**. Taarifa hazitoshi (11%-50%) **3**. Napata taarifa za msingi (51%-70%) **4**. Kwa kiasi fulani napata taarifa za kutosha (71-99%) **5**. Mara zote taarifa zinatosha (100%).

3.1.16. Je, kwa kawaida ni mara ngapi huwa unapata kumbukumbu za vikao (mukhutasari) wenye taarifa muhimu zilizojadiliwa kwenye vikao mara tuu baada ya vikao? **1**. Huwa sipati kumbukumbu. **2**. Napata mara chache. **3**. Napata wakati mwingine. **4**. Kawaida napata. **5**. Mara zote huwa napata.

3.1.17. Kwenye vikao rasmi, je, ni kwa kiasi gani kwa kawaida unapata nafasi ya kutoa mchango au maoni yako kwa uhuru kadri utakavyo? **1**. Mwenyekiti tu huwa anatoa maagizo. **2**. Mara chache wanapata nafasi ya kuchangia. **3**. Wakati mwingine wanapata fursa ya kuchangia. **4**. Wanaweza kuchangia lakini kwa umakini. **5**. Wana uhuru wa kuchangia bila kikwazo.

3.1.18. Kwa mtazamo wako, ni asilimia ngapi ya maoni yako ambayo huwa unayatoa kwenye kikao yanafanyiwa kazi? **1**. (0%-10%). **2**. (11%-50%). **3**. (51%%-70%). **4**. (71-99%). **5**. (100%).

3.5. Vikao Visivyo Rasmi

Sehemu hii inahusu vikao baina ya yako kama kiongozi na mtumishi mmoja mmoja au watumishi wachache kama njia ya mawasiliano mahala pa kazi kwa lengo la kujadili mambo yanayohusu utendaji wa ofisi.

3.2.4. Je, kwa wiki ni mara ngapi huwa una kikao na kiongozi wako kujadili masuala ya kazi? **1**. Huwa sina vikao. **2**. Sio kila wiki. **3**. Walau mara moja kwa wiki. **4**. Karibu kila siku. **5**. Kila siku. (***Kama jibu 1 > 3.2.3***).

3.2.5. Kwa wastani, ni muda kiasi gani huwa unatumia na kiongozi wako kwenye vikao hivyo? **1**. Zaidi ya saa moja. **2**. Dakika 45 hadi 60. **3**. Nusu saa hadi dakika 45. **4**. Dakika 20 hadi nusu saa. **5**. Chini ya dakika 20.

3.2.6. Kwenye wizara yenu kwa ujumla, (sio lazima kwenye kitengo chenu), je ni mara ngapi maofisa huwa mnapata taarifa za kutosha kutoka kwa wasimamizi wao kuhusiana na kazi mnazozifanya? **1**. Hatupati taarifa za kutosha **2**. Mara nyingi hatupati **3**. Kawaida huwa tunapata **4**. Mara nyingi tunapata **5**. Mara zote tunapata.

3.6. Matumizi ya Muda

3.3.17. Kwa uzoefu wako, je, umewahi kukutana na mazingira ya kazi ambayo kila mmoja anafika kwenye kikao bila kuchelewa na kuanza kikao kwa wakati? **1**. Ndio. **2**. Hapana.

3.3.18. Je, kwa uzoefu wako ni mara ngapi umewahi kushuhudia hali kama hiyo ya watumishi kufika na kuanza vikao kwa wakati kwenye ofisi yenu? **1**. Sikuwahi kushuhudia. **2**.

Nimeshuhudia mara chache **3**. Nimeshuhudia mara kadhaa **4**. Nimeshuhudia mara nyingi **5**. Ni kawaida ni meshuhudia.

3.3.19. Je, kwa uzoefu wako vikao katika wizara yenu huanza kwa muda uliopangwa? **1**. Ndio . **2**. Hapana (***kama jibu ni Ndio > 3.3.5)***

3.3.20. (***Kama jibu ni Hapana***), huwa vinachelewa kwa wastani wa dakika ngapi? **1**. Zaidi ya saa moja. **2**. Dakika 40 - 60. **3**. Dakika 20 - 40. **4**. Kati ya dakika 10 - 20. **5**. Chini ya dakika 10.

3.3.21. Kwenye Wizara yenu (sio lazima kwenye kitengo chako), je, huwa kwa kawaida mnahitaji akidi itimie (idadi ya wajumbe wanaotakiwa) ili kikao kiweze kuanza kwa muda uliopangwa? **1**. Ndio, kwa kawaida inahitaji kuwa na idadi iliyokubalika (akidi). **2**. Hapana, kikao kinaweza kuanza bila kujali idadi ya wajumbe ambao hawajafika.

3.3.22. Kwa maoni yako unafikiri ni muda kiasi gani unavumilika ikiwa mtumishi amechelewa kwenye kikao? **1**. Dakika 1- 10 **2**. Dakika 11-21 **3**. Dakika 21-30 **4**. Kama saa moja **5**. Hata zaidi ya saa]

3.3.23. Wakati maofisa wanachelewa kwenye vikao, binafsi wewe huwa unajisikiaje **1**. Sijali. **2**. Kukatisha tamaa. **3**. Kuchukia **4**. Kasirika.

3.3.24. Kutokana na uzoefu wako, kwenye mialiko ya vikao vya Wizara pamoja na kitengo, ni muda gani huwa unaonyeshwa yaani muda wa kuanza na kumaliza vikao? **1**. Hakuna muda wa kuanza wala wa kumaliza. **2**. Mara chache muda wa kuanza unajulikana. **3**. Mara zote muda wa kuanza unaoneshwa. **4**. Mara nyingi muda wa kuanza na kumaliza unaoneshwa. **5**. Mara zote muda wa kuanza na kumaliza unaoneshwa.

3.3.25. Kutokana na uzoefu wako kwenye ofisi hii, ni kwa kiasi gani unaweza kuwa na uhakika kuwa wakati mnakikao kila mmoja atafika kwa wakati? **1**. Sina uhakika. **2**. chini ya asilimia 49. **3**. Asilimia 50 - 75. **4**. Asilimia 76 - 90. **5**. Asilimia 91 - 100

3.3.26. Je, ni kwa kiasi gani, maofisa wenzako huwa wanakawaida ya kuaamini kuwa vikao vitaanza kwa wakati? **1**. hawaamini (0%-10%) . **2**. Kwa kiasi fulani wanaamini hivyo (11%-50%). **3**. Wanaamini (51%%-70%). **4**. Wengi wanaamini (71-99%). **5**. Wote wanaamini (100%).

3.3.27. Je, ni mara ngapi kiongozi wako amekuwa akiwakukumbusha kuhusu umuhimu wa kuzingatia muda wa kikao? **1**. Kamwe. **2**. Mara chache. **3**. Wakati mwingine. **4**. Mara kwa

mara. **5**. Kila mara.

3.3.28. Je, unaamini kuwa uchelewaji kwenye vikao ni tatizo, na kama likifanyiwa kazi litaongeza ufanisi wa vikao? **1**. Ni tatizo kama likitatuliwa litaongeza ufanisi. **2**. Ndio ni tatizo lakini sioni kama linahitaji ufumbuzi. **3**. Hapana, sio tatizo tupo sawa kwa sasa.

3.3.29. Kwa mazingira ya ofisini kwako ni ipi kati ya sentensi mbili zifuatazo unakubaliana nayo zaidi? **1**. Watumishi wengi watafika kwenye kikao kwa wakati endapo wanauhakika wengine watafika kwa wakati. **2**. Baadhi ya maofisa hawatafika kwenye kikao kwa wakati hata kama wanategemea wengine watafika kwa wakati.

3.3.30. Kwa mazingira ya ofisini kwako ni ipi kati ya sentensi mbili zifuatazo unakubaliana nayo zaidi? **1**. Watumishi wengi watafika kweye kikao kwa wakati kama wanategemea kiongozi wao atafika kwa wakati. **2**. Watumishi wengi watachelewa bila kujali kiongozi wao atafika kwa wakati au utachelewa

3.3.31. Kwa mazingira ya ofisini kwako ni ipi kati ya sentensi mbili zifuatazo unakubaliana nayo zaidi? **1**. Watumishi wengi watafika kwenye vikao kwa wakati kama motisha itatolewa. **2**. Watumishi wengi watafika kwenye vikao kwa wakati bila kujali kama motisha itatolewa

3.3.32. Kwa mazingira ya ofisini kwako ni ipi kati ya sentensi mbili zifuatazo unakubaliana nayo zaidi? **1**. Karibia kila mtumishi atawahi kwenye kikao kama akikumbushwa mara kwa mara kuhusu kuzingatia muda **2**. Watumishi wengi bado watachelewa kwenye vikao hata kama watakumbushwa mara kwa mara kuhusu umuhimu wa kuzingatia muda wa vikao.

4.0 MAFAILI

4.3. Mafaili ya Jumla

Maswali yafuatayo yanahusu utumiaji mafaili na uwekaji wa nyaraka kwenye mafaili (mfumo wa utunzaji mafaili). Kuna mafaili ya jumla ambayo yanatumiwa na idara mbali mbali. Mafaili haya yanajumuisha mafaili ya masijala ya siri na wazi.

4.1.9. Kwa uzoefu wako, je, umewahi kukutana na mazingira ya kazi ambayo kila mmoja anatunza kumbukumbu vizuri kwenye mafaili na kurudisha faili husika mahala pake mara tuu baada ya kumaliza kulifanyia kazi? **1**. Ndio. **2**. Hapana

4.1.10. Kwa uzoefu wako kwenye ofisi hii, ni mara ngapi umeona hali ya kila mtumishi kuweka nyaraka vizuri kwenye faili na kurudisha faili mahala pake mara baada ya kumaliza

kulitumia? **1**. Sijawahi kuona. **2**. Mara chache nimeona. **3**. Mara kwa mara. **4**. Mara nyingi. **5**. Mara zote

4.1.11. Je, ofisi yenu ina kanuni au muongozo unaosimamia utunzaji wa nyaraka na kumbukumbu? **1**. Ndio. **2**. Hapana. **3**. Sijui

4.1.12. Katika kutekeleza majukumu yako, je, kwa kawaida huwa unafanya kazi za ofisi kwa kutumia nyaraka na mafaili ambayo pia yanatumiwa na watumishi wengine? **1**. Situmii mafaili. **2**. Mara chache natumia na wengine. **3**. Wakati mwingine natumia majalada yanayotumiwa na wengine. **4**. Mara nyingi nafanya kazi kwenye majalada yanayotumiwa na watu wengine. **5**. Siku zote natumia mafaili yanayotumiwa na wengine (***Kama jibu ni 1 > 4.2.8***).

4.1.13. Kwa wastani, unatumia muda gani kupata faili ambalo unataka kulifanyia kazi? **1**. Zaidi ya saa moja. **2**. Kati ya dakika 45 na saa moja. **3**. Kati ya nusu saa na dakika 45 .**4**. Kati ya dakika 20 na nusu saa. **5**. Chini ya dakika 20.

4.1.14. Kwa wastani, unatumia muda gani kutafuta taarifa kwenye faili na kupata nyaraka zenye taarifa unazozitaka? **1**. Natumia zaidi ya saa moja kupata ukurasa napengine nyaraka isipatikane. **2**. Inanichukua walau dakika 30. **3**. Inachukua dakika 20. **4**. Wakati mwingine inachukua kati ya dakika 10 had 20. **5**. Inachukua walau dakika 10.

4.1.15. Tafadhali naomba unieleze, kutokana na uzoefu wako, wakati unafungua mafaili na unatarajia kupata taarifa, ni mara ngapi umekuta nyaraka zinakosekana au haziko kwenye mpangilio? **1**. Mara nyingi sana (> 50). **2**. Mara nyingi (Asilimia 30). **3**. Mara chache (Asilimia 20). **4**. Mara chache sana (Asilimia10). **5**. Haijawahi kunitokea

4.1.16. Je, watumishi wenzako kwenye Wizara (sio lazima kwenye kitengo chako) wanakawaida ya kuamini kuwa kila mmoja ataweka nyaraka kwa kufuata utaratibu na kurudisha faili mahala pake kwa wakati? **1**. Ndio, wanaamini hivyo **2**. Ndio, baadhi wanaamini hivyo. **3**. Hapana hawaanaamini hivyo.

4.4. Mafaili ya Ndani

Maswali yafuatayo yanahusu utumiaji mafaili na uwekaji wa nyaraka kwenye mafaili ambayo yanatumiwa na idara tu (ikijumuisha flimsy).

4.2.13. Kwa wastani unatumia muda gani kutafuta faili au nyaraka zinazotumika ndani ya kitengo chako? **1**. Zaidi ya saa moja. **2**. Kati ya dakika 45 na saa moja. **3**. Kati ya nusu saa na dakika 45. **4**. Kati ya dakika 20 na nusu saa. **5**. Chini ya dakika 20.

4.2.14. Kutokana na uzoefu wako kwenye ofisi hii unamaoni gani kuhusu jitihada za kila mtumishi katika kuhakikisha kuwa nyaraka zinahifadhiwa kwenye majalada husika na kurudishwa mahala pake kwa wakati? **1**. Hawajitahidi kabisa (Asilimia 0-10) **2**. Wanajitahidi kidogo (Asilimia 11-49). **3**. Wanajitahidi Kiasi (Asilimia 50-80) **4**. Wanajitahidi sana (Asilimia 81-100).

4.2.15. Chukulia mfanyakazi anajaribu kufanya jitihada za kufaili nyaraka vizuri na kurudisha faili mahala pake ili na wengine waweze kulitumia lakini maofisa wengine kwenye ofisi hiyo ambao wanatumia pamoja faili hilo hawajali kufaili na hawarudishi mafaili mahala pake kwa wakati, je unadhani huyo mtumishi ataendelea kufaili kama wenzie hawafaili? **1**. Ndio **2**. Hapana

4.2.16. Chukulia kuwa mfanyakazi anajua wazi kuwa anaweza kunufaika kama wenzake watafaili na pia anajua kuwa hata nufaika kama yeye ndie anafaili lakini wenzake hawafaili, je unadhani ni yapi yatakuwa maamuzi ya huyo mtumishi? **1**. Hata faili . **2**. Atafaili hata kama wenzake hawafaili. **3**. Hatafaili hata kama wenzake watafaili au hawata faili.

4.2.17. Tafadhali nieleze kutokana na uzoefu wako kwenye ofisi hii, ni kwa asilimia ngapi unaweza kuwa na uhakika kuwa kila mtumishi atatumia faili na kulirudisha sehemu husika kwa wakati mara amalizapo kulitumia? **1**. Sina uhakika (01-10). **2**. Chini ya asilimia (11-49). **3**. Uhakika kati ya asilimia 50 na 75%. **4**. Uhakika kati ya asilimia 76 na 90. **5**. Uhakika kati ya asilimia 91 na 100.

4.2.18. Je, unaamini kuwa utunzaji wa mafaili ni tatizo ambalo linahitaji kufanyiwa kazi ili kuongeza ufanisi wa ofisi za serikali? Jibu **1**. Ndio ni tatizo kama litatafutiwa ufumbuzi litarahisisha utendaji. **2**. Ndio ni tatizo lakini sidhani kama linahitaji kuhangaika nalo. **3**. Hapana sio tatizo kwa sasa tupo sawa.

4.2.19. Je, ni mara ngapi kiongozi wako amekuwa anaongelea umuhimu wa kufuata muongozo wa kutunza nyaraka kwenye ofisi yenu? **1**. Kamwe. **2**. Mara chache. **3**. Mara kwa mara **4**. Wakati wote.

4.2.20. Ni kwa kiasi gani watumishi wa ofisi hii wanawasiliana kwa ufasaha kuhusu kuzingatia muongozo wa utunzaji wa kumbukumbu? **1**. Kamwe. **2**. Mara chache. **3**. Mara kwa mara. **4**. Kila mara

4.2.21. Ni kwa kiasi gani unakubaliana au kutokubaliana na sababu zifuatazo kwa watumishi kutokutunza mafaili kwa mujibu wa muongozo (kuweka nyaraka kwa mpangilio, kurudisha nyaraka mara umalizapo kuitumia kwenye faili husika, kurudisha jalada mahala linapotakiwa kuwepo mara tu wamalizapo kulitumia).

		Sikubaliani kabisa (1)	**Sikubaliani (2)**	**Sijui (3)**	**Nakubali (4)**	**Nakubali sana (5)**
i	Watumishi hawafaili kwa sababu wengine hawafaili?					
ii	Watumishi hawafaili kwa sababu wanajua wengine watafaili					
iii	watumishi hawa faili kwasababu hawajui jinsi ya kufaili					
iv	watumishi hawafaili kwa sababu wanafikiri hakuna umuhimu wa kufaili na haina madhara					

4.2.22. Kwa mazingira ya ofisini kwako ni ipi kati ya sentensi mbili zifuatazo unakubaliana nayo zaidi? **1**. watumishi wengi wangezingatia muongozo wa utumiaji wa mafaili kama wangekuwa na uhakika kuwa kiongozi wao haridhiki na utunzaji mbaya wa mafaili. **2**. Watumishi wengi hawata faili hata kama kiongozi anajali utunzaji bora wa mafaili na kuonesha mfano.

4.2.23. Kwa mazingira ya ofisini kwako ni ipi kati ya sentensi mbili zifuatazo unakubaliana nayo zaidi? **1**. Watumishi wengi watazingatia muongozo wa kutunza mafaili kama hatua zitachukuliwa. **2**. Watuishi wengi bado hawatafaiili hata kama motisha itatolewa.

4.2.24. Kwa mazingira ya ofisini kwako ni ipi kati ya sentensi mbili zifuatazo unakubaliana nayo zaidi? **1**. Watumishi watazingatia taratibu za kufaili nyaraka kama watakuwa wanakumbushwa mara kwa mara. **2**. Watumishi wengi hawatazingatia muongozo wa kutunza mafaili hata kama watakumbushwa mara kwa mara.

5.0 MUONEKANO WA OFISI

Mdadisi tafadhali angalia muonekano wa ofisi na kisha tia alama

5.4. ***Muonekano wa ofisi*: 1**. Ofisi iliyofungwa **2** ofisi iliyowazi

5.5. ***Mpangilio wa Ofisi*: 1**. Msimamizi na maofisa wanatumia ofisi moja. **2**. Msimamizi anaofisi yake ambayo ipo karibu na za maofisa. **3**. Msimamizi ana ofisi yake ambayo haipo karibu na za maofisa.

5.6. **Alama:** Alama zozote zinazoonyesha maeneo muhimu mfano **1**. Ishara ya kuingia au kutoka, **2**. Ramani ya ofisi, **3**.Vibao vya majina kwenye milango. **4**. Hakuna alama yeyote.

6.0 MAFUNZO YA MUDA MFUPI (CHINI YA MWAKA 1)

6.5. Je, umepata mafunzo ya muda mfupi kuhusiana na kazi unayofanya? **1**. Ndio. **2**. Hapana.

6.6. Umewahi kupata mafunzo ya namna ya kutumia nyaraka na mafaili ya ofisi? **1**. Ndio. **2**. Hapana.

6.7. Umewahi kupata mafunzo ya matumizi sahihi ya muda? **1**. Ndio. **2**. Hapana.

6.8. Ni aina gani nyingine ya mafunzo ambayo umewahi kuyapata hapa ofisini? **1**. Hakuna **2**.Uongozi. **3**. Usimamizi. **4**. Mawasiliano. **5**. Taaluma. **6**.Nyinginezo (***jibu zaidi ya moja***)

7.0 MOTISHA

7.9. Ni nini hasa kilichokusukuma kufanya kazi katika sekta ya umma? **(*jibu zaidi ya moja*) 1**. Mshahara na marupurupu **2**. Pensheni **3**. Nafasi ya Mafunzo. **4**. Uhakika wa ajira **5**. Kuhudumia umma **6**. Uzalendo **7**. Ndio mwajiri mkuu **8**. Nyingine_____

_____

_____

7.10. Je, mshahara unaopata unatosha ukilinganisha na kazi unayofanya?
1. Ndio **2**. Hapana.

7.11. Je, kuna posho na marupurupu mengine unayopata mbali na mshahara?
1. Ndio **2**. Hapana. (***kama jibu 2 > 7.7***)

7.12. Kama ndio, ni aina gani ya posho na marupurupu *(zaidi ya moja)?* **1**. Fedha. **2**. Sio fedha. (***kama jibu 2 tu, > 7.7***)

7.13. Kwa wastani, jumla ya posho na marupurupu yanaweza kufika kiasi gani kwa mwezi?

_____

_____

7.14. Je, marupurupu unayoyapata yanatosha ukilinganisha na kazi unazozifanya?
1. Ndio. **2**. Hapana.

7.15. Tafadhali naomba unishirikishe ni kiasi gani unapokea kama mshahara kwa mwezi baada ya makato ya kodi? _____

_____

7.16. Je, unadhani kuwa ofisi yako inaweza kuongeza ufanisi wa utendaji kazi endapo mfumo wa utumiaji wa mafaili, uendeshaji wa vikao, na uratibu wa kazi ukiboreshwa hata pasipo kuongezewa motisha ya fedha? **1**. Ndio. **2**. Hapana.

Appendix 2: Questionnaires for Frontline Workers

GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL SURVEY IN TANZANIA 2017

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR FRONTLINE WORKERS

Interview Details	**1.0 Office and Respondent's Information**
Organization ID:_____ Office ID:_____ Respondent ID:_____ Enumerator's Name:_____ Date (DD/MM/YY):_____/_____/ _____ Interview Starting Time (hr: min):_____:_____ Interview Ending time (hr: min): _____:_____ Respondent Phone:_____ Respondent Email_____	1.18. Age (Years):_____ 1.19. Gender: **1**.Female **2**. Male 1.20. Years of formal schooling:_____ 1.21. Highest Level of education qualification: **1**. Certificate **2**. Diploma **3**. Bachelor **4.** Master Degree **5.** PhD _____ 1.22. Did you work anywhere before joining the current office? **1**. Yes **2**. No (*go to number1. 7*) 1.23. If yes, which sector(s) and number of years? [*multiple]* **1**. Public ____ **2.** Private _____ **3.** NGO ____ **4**. Others_____ 1.24. Tenure in the current job (years): _____ 1.25. Tenure in the current post (years):_____

2.0 Office Target

2.19. Does your office have any performance target? **1** yes. **2** No **3**. Don't know- (*if 2 or 3 skip to 2.6*)

2.20. Could you mention at most three main targets of your office?

1._____

2._____

3._____

(*Enumerator please rate the description of office target if they are SMART)* [Rating: **1**. unclear and unachievable target (s). 2. Target (s) is clear but not measurable. **3**. the target(s) is Specific, measurable, unachievable, .**4**. the target (s) is Specific, measurable, achievable, relevant. **5** the target (s) is Specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time based

2.21. How would you rate, in percentage, the achieved target(s) in relation to the planned target(s) for the fiscal year 2015/16? **1**. Don't know. **2**. Less than 50% **2**. 50% to 80% **4**. 81% to 100% **5**. Above 100%

2.22. In your opinion do you think your office can perform better than its current performance, given the available resources? 1. Yes. **2**. No

2.23. Based on the nature of your office targets, to what extent does your office require cooperation among office members to achieve the planned targets **1**. Little collaboration (0%-10%). **2**. Sometimes need collaboration (11%-50%). **3**. Need collaboration (51%-100%). **4** very much needed (71% - 100%).

2.24. From your schedule of duties to what extent do workers in this office know about the work you do? **1**. They knows nothing (0%-10%). **2**. They know little (11 – 50%). **3**. They know some (51-70%). **4**. They know a lot (71-99%). **5**. They know everything (100%)

2.25. From your schedule of duties to what extent do you know about the work that other workers are doing? **1**. I knows nothing (0%-10%). **2**. I know just little (11 – 50%). **3**. I know some (51-70%). **4**. I know a lot (71-99%). **5.** I know everything they are doing (100%)

2.26. To what extent workers in your office depend on each other in terms of obtaining information and advice in order to achieve the planned office performance?: **1**.workers never depend on information and advice from their colleagues to accomplish their tasks (0%-10%) **2**. workers rarely depend on inputs from their colleagues for the completion of their work (11%-50%) **3**. Workers occasionally have to obtain inputs from their colleagues in order to complete their office duties (51%-70%). **4**. Often workers have to check or work with others (71-99%). **5**. Always workers have to obtain information and work with others to accomplish their office duties (100%)

2.27. Do you think your office could perform better than its current performance, given the available resources if office level management practices (filing system, time management, leadership practice and work place communication) is improved? **1**. Yes. **2**. No

3.0 OFFICE MEETINGS

3.7. Plenary meetings

The following questions are about meetings between your manager and all most all office workers to discuss office issues. This type of meeting is called **plenary meetings**.

3.1.19. Does your office have plenary meetings regularly? : **1**. Yes **2**. No

3.1.20. How many plenary meetings does your office have in a week on average? **1**. After a couple

of weeks. **2**. Once a week **3**. At most twice a week **4**. At least twice **5**. Daily

3.1.21. On average, about how much time do your office people spend in a typical plenary meeting? **1**. More than 2hr **2**. 1hr – 2hr **3**. 45 min – 1hr **4**. 30 – 45 min **5**. Less than 30 min

3.1.22. Out of the meeting time, what percentage of time is spent during plenary meetings on talking about issues related to office activities? _____

3.1.23. Are you informed of the agenda of the next meeting well in advance so that you can prepare for the meeting? **1**. Not receive agenda in advance. **2**. Rarely get meeting agenda in advance **3**. Mostly receive agenda in the meeting. **4** Receive agenda shortly before the meeting. **5** Receive agenda well in advance

3.1.24. At plenary meetings, do you usually get sufficient information that you ought to get from the manager and your colleagues to perform your duties?: **1**. The information I get is always far from sufficient (0-10%). **2.** The information I get mostly not sufficient (11%-50%) **3**. I get just basic information (51%-70%). **4**. Information I get to some extent are sufficient (71%-99%). **5**. Yes, almost always I get sufficient information (100%)

3.1.25. Do you usually receive minutes (or any written record) summarizing in a convenient way the important information discussed in a meeting soon after the meeting? **1** Do not receive any record soon after the meeting. **2**. Rarely receive. **3**. Sometimes I receive. **4**. Usually receive but with delay. **5**. Immediately after the meeting I receive well summarized records

3.1.26. At plenary meetings, can you usually convey your opinion or message to the supervisor or your colleagues or both as much as you need to do or want to do? : **1**. Only supervisor gives instruction and the others are silent. **2**. I rarely have a chance to express opinion. **3**. Sometimes I can express my opinion **4**. Yes I can express my opinion but with caution **5** Yes, I can express my opinion freely

3.1.27. In your opinion, to what extent does your opinions are considered by your office? **1**. (0%-10%). **2**. (11%-50%). **3**. (51%%-70%). **4**. (71-99%) **5**. (100%)

3.8. Small meetings

Small meetings are meeting with the manager, in which the manager and a small part of the office members meet (including one-on-one dialogue).

3.2.7. How often do you conduct small meetings with your supervisor in span of a week to discuss office work?: **1**. not every week. **2**. Once a week. **3**. Twice a week **4**. Almost every day **5**. Daily (*if 1 go to 3.2.3)*

3.2.8. On average, about how many minutes does your supervisor allow for a typical small meeting with you?

: 1. More than 1 hr. **2**. 45 – 60 min **3**. 30 – 45 min **4**. 20 – 30 min. **5**. less than 20 min

3.2.9. In your ministry in general (not necessarily at your office), do officers (you and your colleagues) tend to get sufficient information and instruction to perform their duties through plenary meetings and any small meetings? : **1.** The opposite is the case, **2.** most of the time we don't get. **3.** Depends on case by case. **4** Yes in many cases. **5**. always we get sufficient information

3.9. Punctuality

3.3.33. In your career, have you ever experienced a work environment in which everyone comes to most meetings in time and is usually ready to start meetings on time? : **1**. Yes. **2**. no

3.3.34. Do you think that the high level of punctuality just described is always observed in your ministry? : **1** never observed or heard. **2**. Rarely observed. **3**. Observed several times. **4**. Most of the time is observed. **5**. very commonly observed

3.3.35. Does a typical plenary meeting in your organization (not only in your office) usually start on time? **1**. Yes **2**. No (*if Yes go to 3.3.5)*

3.3.36. (*If the answer is no*), about how many minutes is the start delayed on average? **1**. More than 1 hour. **2.** 40 – 60 min. **3.** 20– 40 min. **4.** 10 – 20 min. **5**. Less than 10 min

3.3.37. In your organization (not necessary your office) do you normally need quorum to start a meeting at the appointed time? **1**. Yes, normally requires minimum number of attendees **2**. No Meeting can start regardless of how many participants are still missing

3.3.38. How late is consider as tolerable in your opinion? **1**. 1- 10 minutes **2**. 11-20 min **3**. 21-30 min **4**. About an hr. **5.** More than hour

3.3.39. How do you feel when others are late? **1**. Neutral. **2**. disappointed **3**. Irritated. **4**. Angry

3.3.40. Please tell me from your experience in this organization including your office, how the meeting time is prescribed in your invitations: **1**. neither starting time nor end time is indicated. **2**. Rarely the starting time is clearly set. **3**. Occasionally the starting time is clearly set. **4**. Often both starting time and ending time are clearly set. **5.** always meetings start & end time is communicated

3.3.41. From your experience in this office, to what extent can you be certain that when you have plenary meeting everyone will be on time? **1**. I cannot be certain at all (0 – 10%. **2**. 11- 50% certain. **3**. 50% to 75% certain. **4**. 75% to 90% certain. **5**. 90 to 100% certain.

3.3.42. To what extent does your colleagues in your ministry (not necessarily at your office) tend to believe that meetings would start on time? **1** they believe the opposite very strongly (0-10%) **2**. they believe the opposite (11-50%). **3**. They somehow believe so (51-70%). **4**. Majority believe so (71- 99%). **5.** All workers believe so very strongly (100%)

3.3.43. How frequently does your supervisor remind you about the importance of been on time in your office meetings? **1**. Never. **2**. Rarely **3**. Occasionally. **4**. Often. **5**. Constantly

3.3.44. Do you believe lateness is a problem that needs to be addressed and one that could make the meetings more efficient? **1**. Absolutely, it is a problem if solved would gain so much time. **2**. Yes, it is a problem, but I don't think it really needs much attention.**3**. No, it's not a problem, we are fine as we are right now

3.3.45. Based on your office experience, among the following statements, which one do you mostly agree with? **1**. almost all people would come to the meetings on time if they are sure that other attendees would come on time. **2**. Some workers would come late no matter how they expect the other attendees to behave.

3.3.46. Based on your experience in this office, among the following statements, which one do you mostly agree with? **1**. Almost all people would come to the meetings on time if they are sure that their supervisor would come on time 2. workers would come late no matter how they expect the supervisor show up

3.3.47. Based on your experience in this office, among the following statements, which one do you mostly agree with? **1**. Almost all people would come to the meetings on time if acceptable incentives are introduced **2**. workers would come late even if incentives are introduced

3.3.48. Based on your experience in this office, among the following statements, which one do you mostly agree with? **1**. Almost all people would come to the meetings on time if they are repeatedly reminded about keeping time **2**. Workers would still come late even if they are constantly reminded to keep meeting time.

4.0 FILING

4.5. General Files

The following questions are about working in paper files and filing office documents. This section deals with files which are kept by the organization and shared by other offices in your ministry. This type of files are called general files (including open and confidential files).

4.1.17. In your career, have you ever experienced a working environment in which everyone properly files documents and return files to its original place (designated shelves or registry) immediately after finish using the file? **1**. Yes. **2**. No

4.1.18. From your experience in this office, how often have you observed such level of compliance with filing rules just described? **1**. Never observed or heard. **2**. Rarely observed. **3**. Occasionally observed. **4**. Most of the time observed. **5**. very commonly observed

4.1.19. Does your office have any standing rules or any written instructions that outline or regulate different aspects of office filing? **1**. Yes. **2**. No **3**. I don't know

4.1.20. In your office duties, do you usually perform your office duties in paper documents and files which are also used by other workers? **1**. I do not work in files which are used by your colleagues. **2**. Rarely work in paper files. **3**. Sometimes work in shared paper files. **4**. Mostly I work in shared paper files. **5** Always I work in paper files used by other workers (***if 1 go to 4.2.8)***

4.1.21. On average, about how many minutes does it normally take you to find general file that you want to work on? **1**. More than1 hour **2**. 45 – 60 min. **3**. 30 – 45 min **4**. 20 – 30 min. **5**. Less than 20 min

4.1.22. On average, how much time do you normally spend searching in the file and a get page with the information you need at the right moment when you need it? **1.** It takes more than 1 hour and sometimes pages cannot be found in the file. **2**. It takes at least 30 min – 1 hour. **3.** It takes about 20 – 30 minutes. **4**. Sometimes it takes between 10 - 20 min. **5**. It take at most 10

minutes

4.1.23. Describe situation more vividly when you open the file you expect to find a page, how often you cannot find a proper page or you find misplaced pages? **1**. More than 50% of times **2**. 30% of times **3**. 20% of time. **4**. 10% of time. **5**. Never experienced such situation

4.1.24. Do your colleagues in your ministry (not necessarily at your office) tend to believe that everyone will properly file documents and return files to its designated place on immediately after using it? **1**. Yes, they believe so very strongly (100%). **2**. Yes, they believe so (71- 99%). **3**. Some believe so but not all (51-70%). **4**. No, they believe the opposite (11-50%). **5.** No, they believe the opposite very strongly (0-10%) .

4.6. Specialized files

This section deals with files which are used only in the office (including flimsy and office reports). This type of files is called specialized files.

4.2.25. On average, how long does it take to locate a relevant working file or document used only by members of your office? **1**. More than 1hour < 2. 45 – 60 min **3**. 30 – 45 min **4**. 20 – 30 min. **5**. less than 20 min

4.2.26. From your experience in this office, how would you rate effort and commitment of individual workers in making sure that they properly file their work and return office files in its original place? **1**. normally don't file(0-10%) **2**. minimum effort (11-9%). **3**. Average effort (50-80%). **4** High effort (81-100%).

4.2.27. Suppose a worker in your office try to make effort to file documents systematically and try to make files in a way friendlier to others but others do not make effort to file documents, would that worker continue to do it if others are not doing it? **1**. Yes **2**. No

4.2.28. Imagine if a worker knows that (s) he can benefit from not filing because others will file and the same worker knows that (s) he can suffer by filing while others don't file which would be the best action for such a worker? **1**. Will not file regardless of others action. **2**. Will file or not file depending on others action **3**. Will file regardless of others action

4.2.29. From your experience in this office, to what extent can you be certain that every individual worker will file documents and return file to its designated place? **1**. I cannot be certain at all (0-10%) . **2** between 11-49% certain **3**. Between 50 - 75% certain. **4**. Between 76- 90% certain.

5. Between 90 - 100% certain that everyone will file.

4.2.30. Do you believe that current filing practice is a problem that needs to be addressed and one that could make the office more efficient if all workers adhere to the filing standard? **1**. Absolutely, it is a problem if solved would gain easy work. **2**. Yes, it is a problem, but I don't think it really needs much attention. **3**. No, it's not a problem, we are fine as we are right now

4.2.31. How frequently does your supervisor communicate with you about the compliance to the filing guideline in your office? **1.** Never. **2** Rarely. **3.** Occasionally. **4**. Often. **5**. Constantly

4.2.32. Do people in this office communicate each other accurately about the adherence of filing standard? **1**. Never. **2**. Rarely. **3**. Occasionally. **4**. Often. **5**. Constantly

4.2.33. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the following are reasons for workers not filing properly (file document in sequence, return pages when they remove them for use, and return file to its original place immediately after using)

		Strongly Disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Don't known (3)	Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)	Refuse to answer (6)
i	Workers don't file because others tend not to file						
ii	workers don't file because they know others will file for them						
iii	workers don't file because they don't know how to file						
iv	workers don't file because they feel the importance of filing as insignificant and inconsequential						

4.2.34. From your experience in this office, among the following statements, which one do you mostly agree with? **1**. Almost all workers would conform with filing standards if they are sure that their supervisor is concerned with poor filing and demonstrate filing **2**. Most people would not conform with filing standards no matter how the supervisor demonstrate filing

4.2.35. Considering your office situation, among the following statements, which one do you mostly agree with? **1.** Almost all worker would conform with filing standards if monitoring mechanism and incentives are introduced **2**. Most workers would not conform with filing standards even if incentive is introduced

4.2.36. Based on your office experience, among the following statements, which one do you mostly agree with? **1.** Almost all workers would conform with filing standards if they are repeatedly reminded about filing. **2**. Most workers would not conform with filing standards even if they are constantly reminded about filing

5.0 Office layout

Enumerator determine based on visual inspection (and by asking some questions) whether office layout is of office sharing or separate office whether the office is a closed door or open door and whether there are basic signs such as exit sign and direction sign.

Enumerators please observe and mark

5.7. *Office layout*: **1**. Closed office. **2.** Open office

5.8. *Sharing of office*: **1**. Supervisor shares an office with workers **2.** Supervisor has own office located next to workers **3** Supervisors office is located far from workers

5.9. Signs: [Presence of basic signs such as **1**. exit sign **2**. direction signs **3**.Name plates **4** no signs

6.0 Training

6.9. Have you received short-term training related to the current job **1**. Yes **2**. No

6.10. Have you received any training related to the use of office documents and filing **1**. Yes **2**. No

6.11. Have you received any training related to time management? **1**. Yes **2**. No

6.12. What other kind of training have you received in this office? **1**. Leadership **2.** Management **3**. Communication skills **4**. Specialization **5**.Others – (*Multiple selection is possible)*

7.0 INCENTIVES

7.17. What motivated you to be a public servant? **1.** Salary and allowances **2**. Pension **3**. Training opportunity **4**. Job security **5**. Serve the public **6**. Patriotism **7**. Government was main employer. **8** others _____

7.18. Is the salary sufficient for the work you do? **1**. Yes **2**. No

7.19. Are there additional allowances aside from salary?

7.20. If yes, what kind of allowances? 1. Cash 3. In kind

7.21. On average, how much is your monthly allowances? _____

___

7.22. Is the average monthly allowance sufficient for the work you do? **1**. Yes **2.** No

7.23. Please share with us, how much is your monthly salary (after tax)? _____

7.24. Do you think that your office could perform better than currently does without increasing monetary incentives for officers if office meeting and filing practices are improved? **1**. Yes **2**. No

Questionnaires for Frontline Workers (Swahili Version)

UTAFITI KUHUSU UFANISI WA SEKTA YA UMMA TANZANIA 2017

DODOSO KWA WASIMAMIZI

TAARIFA ZA DODOSO	**1.0 TAARIFA ZA OFISI/MHOJIWA**
Utambulisho: – Jina, unatokea wapi, nk Tafiti hii ni sehemu ya mradi wa Taasis ya Taifa ya Sera ya Japani (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies - GRIPS). Mradi unagharamiwa na Serikali ya Japan kupitia Wizara ya Elimu chini ya program ya Kuandaa Viongozi wa Siku Zijazo (Future Leaders). Lengo la tafiti hii ni kuangali namna ya kuweza mazingira mazuri ya utendaji kazi serilini katika kuboresha mazingira ya kazi kwa lengo la kuhakikisha Serikali inatoa huduma kwa ufanisi na kwa wakati. ● **Majibu yako ni siri** na hayatatolewa kwa mtu yeyote yule ambae hausiki na utafiti huu. Tunaahidi kuwa taarifa zozote utakazotupatia zitakuwa siri na hazitaonesha zimetolewa na nani. Taarifa hizi zitatumika kwa ajili ya utafiti tuu na si vinginevyo. Taarifa zitakazotolewa kwenye matokeo ya utafiti huu ni za ujumla na wastani na sio za mtu moja mmoja hivyo hazitaonesha zimetolewa na nani na wala taasisi iIiyotoa. Tunashukuru sana kwa ushirikiano wako. ● **Lengo**: Lengo la utafiti huu ni kujifunza juu ya ufanisi wa sector ya umma ya Tanzania katika uzalishaji na utoaji huduma za umma. ● **Sababu**: Tunajifunza ufanisi wa sekta ya umma kwa sababu ndio msingi wa ufanisi wa sekta nyingine za uzalishaji au mtu mmojamoja na hivyo kuamua au kuchangia maendeleo ya nchi. Taasisi Na.:_____ Kitengo:_____ Mhojiwa:_____ Mhojaji:_____ Tarehe (siku/mwezi/mwaka):____/_____/ _____ Muda wa kuanza mahojiano (saa:dk):_____:____ Muda wa kumaliza mahojiano (saa:dk):_____:____ Namba ya Simu ya Mhojiwa _____ Barua Pepe:_____	1.26. Umri (Miaka):_____ 1.27. Jinsia **1**. Ke **2**. Me 1.28. Miaka ya elimu rasmi: ____ 1.29. Kiwango cha juu cha elimu: **1**. Cheti **2**. Stashahada **3**. Shahada **4**. Shahada ya uzamili **5**. Uzamifu 1.30. Je, umewahi kufanya kazi sehemu nyingine kabla ya kujiunga na ofisi yako ya sasa? **1**. Ndio **2**. Hapana (***Kama hapana > 1.7***) 1.31. Kama ndio, ni sekta gani na muda? (***zaidi ya moja***) **1**. Umma ____ **2**. Binafsi ___ **3**. AZAKI._____ **4**. Nyingine_____ 1.32. Muda uliofanya kazi kwenye ofisi ya sasa (miaka): _____ 1.33. Muda uliotumikia cheo cha sasa (miaka):_____ 1.34. Kwenye kitengo chako una maofisa wangapi?_____ _____

2.0 MALENGO YA KIUTENDAJI YA OFISI

2.28. Je, ofisi yako inamalengo ya kiutendaji? **1** Ndio. **2** Hapana 3. Sijui- (***kama 2 au 3 > 2.6***)

2.29. Tafadhali naomba unitajie na unifafanulie malengo ya ofisi yako yasiyozidi matatu ya mwaka huu wa fedha

1._____

2._____

3._____

(*Mhojaji tafadhali tathmini ufafanuzi wa malengo*)

1. Malengo hayapo wazi na hayatekelezeki. **2**. Malengo yapo wazi lakini hayapimiki na hayatekelezeki **3**. Malengo yapo wazi, yanapimika na yanafikika. **4**. Malengo yapo wazi, yanapimika, hayatekelezeki, na yanaendana na uhalisia. **5**. Malengo yapo wazi, yanapimika, yanatekelezeka, yanaendana na uhalisia na muda

2.30. Tafadhali naomba kufahamu ni kwa kiasi gani mlifikia malengo ya kiutendaji ya ofisi kwa mwaka wa fedha 2015/16 (wastani %)? **1.** Sijui **2** Chini ya 50% **3**. Kati ya asilimia 50 na 80 **4**. Kati ya asilimia 81 na 100 **5**. Zaidi ya asilimia 100.

2.31. Naomba unieleze kwa maoni yako, je unafikiri ofisi yako inaweza kufanya vizuri zaidi kwa kutumia rasilimali zilizopo? **1**. Ndio. **2**. Hapana

2.32. Kwa kuzingatia malengo ya ofisi yenu, je ni kwa kiasi gani unahitajika ushirikiano kati ya mtumishi na mtumishi ili kufikia malengo ya ofisi? : 1. usirikiano kidogo (0%-10%). **2**. Ushikiano kiasi (11%-50%). **3**. Ushirikiano mkubwa unahitajika (51%-70%). **4**. Ushirikiano unahitajika sana (71-100%).

2.33. Kutokana na majukumu yako ya kazi unazofanya, je ni kwa kiasi gani maofisa wa kitengo chako wanafahamu kazi unazofanya? **1**. Hawafahamu (0%-10%). **2**. Wanafahamu kidogo (11%-50%). **3**. Baadhi wanafahamu (51%-70%). **4**. Wengi wanafahamu (71-99%). **5**. Wote wanafahamu (100%).

2.34. Kutokana na majukumu yako ya kazi unazozifanya, ni kwa kiwango gani unafahamu kazi ambazo maofisa wako wanafanya? **1**. Sifahamu (0%-10%). **2**. Nafahamu kidogo (11%-50%). **3**. Nafahamu kwa baadhi (51%-70%). **4**. Nafahamu kwa kiasi kikubwa (71-99%). **5**. Nafahamu kila mmoja anachokifanya (100%).

2.35. Ni kwa kiasi gani watumishi kwenye ofisi hii mnategemeana kwa kupeana taarifa na ushauri katika kufikia malengo ya ofisi? **1**. Hatutegemeani (0%-10%) **2**. Tunategemeana kwa kiasi kidogo (11%-50%). **3**. Tunategemea (51%-70%) **4**. Tunategemeana kwa kiasi kikubwa (71-99%). **5**. Tunategemeana kwa kiasi kikubwa sana (100%)

2.36. Je, unadhani ofisi yako inaweza kufanya vizuri zaidi ikiwa mfumo wa mafaili, matumizi ya muda, uongozi na mawasiliano kati ya mtumishi na mtumishi mahala pa kazi yakiboreshwa? **1**. Ndio. **2**. Hapana.

3.0 MAWASILIANO MAHALA PAKAZI

3.10. Vikao Rasmi

Sehemu hii inahusu maswali yanayohusiana na vikao rasmi vya ofisi vikiwa kama mojawapo ya njia kuu ya mawasiliano mahala pakazi kwa lengo la kujadili mambo yanayohusu utendaji wa ofisi. Vikao hivi vinahusisha kiongozi na maofisa wote.

3.1.28. Je, ofisi yako hufanya vikao rasmi mara kwa mara? **1**. Ndio **2**. Hapana

3.1.29. Ni mara ngapi huwa mnafanya vikao rasmi vya kiofisi katika kipindi cha wiki moja kujadili maswala ya kazi ya kitengo chenu? **1**. Hakuna vikao **2**. Baada ya mwezi. **3**. Baada ya wiki kadhaa **4**. Mara moja kwa wiki **3**. Walau mara mbili kwa wiki **4**. Zaidi ya mara mbili kwa wiki **5**. Kila siku.

3.1.30. Kwa wastani, mnatumia muda kiasi gani kwenye kikao rasmi? **1**. Zaidi ya masaa mawili. **2**. Kati ya saa 1 na masaa 2. **3**. Kati ya dakika 45 na saa moja. **4**. Kati ya dakika 30 - 45. **5**. Chini ya dakika 30.

3.1.31. Je, unafikiri kati ya muda ulioutaja hapo juu (3.1.3) ni asilimia ngapi ya muda unatumika kujadili shughuli za ofisi au kikao husika _____

3.1.32. Je, ni wakati gani, huwa unapata ajenda za kikao? **1**. Ajenda hazitolewi kabla. **2**. Mara chache napata ajenda kabla **3**. Mara nyingi napata agenda kwenye kikao **4**. Napata ajenda muda mfupi kabla ya kikao **5**. Ajenda hutolewa muda mrefu kabla kikao.

3.1.33. Je, ni kwa kiasi gani taarifa unazozipata kwenye vikao rasmi vya ofisi zinatosheleza kutekeleza majukumu yako? **1**. Taarifa hazitoshi kabisa (0-10%) **2**. Taarifa hazitoshi (11%-50%) **3**. Napata taarifa za msingi (51%-70%) **4**. Kwa kiasi fulani napata taarifa za kutosha (71-99%) **5**. Mara zote taarifa zinatosha (100%).

3.1.34. Je, kwa kawaida ni mara ngapi huwa unapata kumbukumbu za vikao (mukhutasari) wenye taarifa muhimu zilizojadiliwa kwenye vikao mara tuu baada ya vikao? **1**. Huwa sipati kumbukumbu. **2**. Napata mara chache. **3**. Napata wakati mwingine. **4**. Kawaida napata. **5**. Mara zote huwa napata.

3.1.35. Kwenye vikao rasmi, je, ni kwa kiasi gani kwa kawaida watumishi wako wanapata nafasi ya kutoa mchango au maoni yao kwa uhuru kadri watakavyo? **1**. Mwenyekiti tu huwa anatoa maagizo. **2**. Mara chache wanapata nafasi ya kuchangia. **3**. Wakati mwingine wanapata fursa ya kuchangia. **4**. Wanaweza kuchangia lakini kwa umakini. **5**. Wana uhuru wa kuchangia bila kikwazo.

3.1.36. Kwa mtazamo wako, ni asilimia ngapi ya maoni ambayo watumishi hutoa kwenye kikao yanafanyiwa kazi? **1**. (0%-10%). **2**. (11%-50%). **3**. (51%%-70%). **4**. (71-99%). **5**. (100%).

3.11. Vikao Visivyo Rasmi

Sehemu hii inahusu vikao baina ya yako kama kiongozi na mtumishi mmoja mmoja au watumishi wachache kama njia ya mawasiliano mahala pa kazi kwa lengo la kujadili mambo yanayohusu utendaji wa ofisi.

3.2.10. Je, kwa wiki ni mara ngapi huwa unakutana na watumishi wako mmoja mmoja au wachache kujadili masuala ya kazi? **1**. Huwa sina vikao. **2**. Sio kila wiki. **3**. Walau mara moja kwa wiki. **4**. Karibu kila siku. **5**. Kila siku. (***Kama jibu 1 > 3.2.3***).

3.2.11. Kwa wastani, ni muda kiasi gani huwa unatumia na maofisa wako kwenye vikao hivyo? **1**. Zaidi ya saa moja. **2**. Dakika 45 hadi 60. **3**. Nusu saa hadi dakika 45. **4**. Dakika 20 hadi nusu saa. **5**. Chini ya dakika 20.

3.2.12. Kwenye wizara yenu kwa ujumla, (sio lazima kwenye kitengo chenu), je ni mara ngapi maofisa huwa wanapata taarifa za kutosha kutoka kwa viongozi kuhusiana na kazi mnazozifanya? **1**. Hawapati taarifa za kutosha **2**. Mara nyingi wanapatai **3**. Kawaida huwa wanapata **4**. Mara nyingi wanapata **5**. Mara zote wa6napata.

3.12. Matumizi ya Muda

3.3.49. Kwa uzoefu wako, je, umewahi kukutana na mazingira ya kazi ambayo kila mmoja anafika kwenye kikao bila kuchelewa na kuanza kikao kwa wakati? **1**. Ndio. **2**. Hapana.

3.3.50. Je, kwa uzoefu wako ni mara ngapi umewahi kushuhudia hali kama hiyo ya watumishi kufika

na kuanza vikao kwa wakati kwenye ofisi yenu? **1**. Sikuwahi kushuhudia **2**. Nimeshuhudia mara chache **3**. Nimeshuhudia mara kadhaa **4**. Nimeshuhudia mara nyingi **5**. Ni kawaida ni meshuhudia.

3.3.51. Je, kwa uzoefu wako vikao katika wizara yenu huanza kwa muda uliopangwa? **1**. Ndio . **2**. Hapana (***kama jibu ni Ndio > 3.3.5)***

3.3.52. (***Kama jibu ni Hapana***), huwa vinachelewa kwa wastani wa dakika ngapi? **1**. Zaidi ya saa moja. **2**. Dakika 40 - 60. **3**. Dakika 20 - 40. **4**. Kati ya dakika 10 - 20. **5**. Chini ya dakika 10.

3.3.53. Kwenye Wizara yenu (sio lazima kwenye kitengo chako), je, huwa kwa kawaida mnahitaji akidi itimie (idadi ya wajumbe wanaotakiwa) ili kikao kiweze kuanza kwa muda uliopangwa? **1**. Ndio, kwa kawaida inahitaji kuwa na idadi iliyokubalika (akidi). **2**. Hapana, kikao kinaweza kuanza bila kujali idadi ya wajumbe ambao hawajafika.

3.3.54. Kwa maoni yako unafikiri ni muda kiasi gani unavumilika ikiwa mtumishi amechelewa kwenye kikao? **1**. Dakika 1- 10 **2**. Dakika 11-21 **3**. Dakika 21-30 **4**. Kama saa moja **5**. Hata zaidi ya saa.

3.3.55. Wakati maofisa wanachelewa kwenye vikao, binafsi wewe huwa unajisikiaje **1**. Sijali. **2**. Kukatisha tamaa. **3**. Kuchukia **4**. Kasirika.

3.3.56. Kutokana na uzoefu wako, kwenye mialiko ya vikao vya Wizara pamoja na kitengo, ni muda gani huwa unaonyeshwa yaani muda wa kuanza na kumaliza vikao? **1**. Hakuna muda wa kuanza wala wa kumaliza. **2**. Mara chache muda wa kuanza unajulikana. **3**. Mara zote muda wa kuanza unaoneshwa. **4**. Mara nyingi muda wa kuanza na kumaliza unaoneshwa. **5**. Mara zote muda wa kuanza na kumaliza unaoneshwa.

3.3.57. Kutokana na uzoefu wako kwenye ofisi hii, ni kwa kiasi gani unaweza kuwa na uhakika kuwa wakati mnakikao kila mmoja atafika kwa wakati? **1**. Sina uhakika. **2**. chini ya asilimia 49. **3**. Asilimia 50 - 75. **4**. Asilimia 76 - 90. **5**. Asilimia 91 - 100

3.3.58. Je, ni kwa kiasi gani, maofisa wako huwa wanakawaida ya kuaamini kuwa vikao vitaanza kwa wakati? **1**. hawaamini (0%-10%) . **2**. Kwa kiasi fulani wanaamini hivyo (11%-50%). **3**. Wanaamini (51%%-70%). **4**. Wengi wanaamini (71-99%). **5**. Wote wanaamini (100%).

3.3.59. Je, ni mara ngapi umekuwa ukiwakumbusha maofisa wako kuhusu umuhimu wa kuzingatia

muda wa kikao? **1**. Kamwe. **2**. Mara chache. **3**. Wakati mwingine. **4**. Mara kwa mara. **5**. Kila mara.

3.3.60. Je, unaamini kuwa uchelewaji kwenye vikao ni tatizo, na kama likifanyiwa kazi litaongeza ubora wa vikao? **1**. Ni tatizo kama likitatuliwa litaongeza ufanisi. **2**. Ndio ni tatizo lakini sioni kama linahitaji ufumbuzi. **3**. Hapana, sio tatizo tupo sawa kwa sasa.

3.3.61. Kwa mazingira ya ofisini kwako ni ipi kati ya sentensi mbili zifuatazo unakubaliana nayo zaidi? **1**. Watumishi wengi watafika kwenye kikao kwa wakati endapo wanauhakika wengine watafika kwa wakati. **2**. Baadhi ya maofisa hawatafika kwenye kikao kwa wakati hata kama wanategemea wengine watafika kwa wakati. .

3.3.62. Kwa mazingira ya ofisini kwako ni ipi kati ya sentensi mbili zifuatazo unakubaliana nayo zaidi? **1**. Watumishi wengi watafika kweye kikao kwa wakati kama wanategemea wewe kama kiongozi utafika kwa wakati. **2**. Watumishi wengi watachelewa bila kujali wewe kama kiongozi wao utafika kwa wakati au utachelewa

3.3.63. Kwa mazingira ya ofisini kwako ni ipi kati ya sentensi mbili zifuatazo unakubaliana nayo zaidi? **1**. Watumishi wengi watafika kwenye vikao kwa wakati kama motisha itatolewa. **2**. Watumishi wengi watafika kwenye vikao kwa wakati bila kujali kama motisha itatolewa

3.3.64. Kwa mazingira ya ofisini kwako ni ipi kati ya sentensi mbili zifuatazo unakubaliana nayo zaidi? **1**. Karibia kila mtumishi atawahi kwenye kikao kama akikumbushwa mara kwa mara kuhusu kuzingatia muda **2**. Watumishi wengi bado watachelewa kwenye vikao hata kama watakumbushwa mara kwa mara kuhusu umuhimu wa kuzingatia muda wa vikao.

4.0 MAFAILI

4.7. Mafaili ya Jumla

Maswali yafuatayo yanahusu utumiaji mafaili na uwekaji wa nyaraka kwenye mafaili (mfumo wa utunzaji mafaili). Kuna mafaili ya jumla ambayo yanatumiwa na idara mbali mbali. Mafaili haya yanajumuisha mafaili ya masijala ya siri na wazi.

4.1.25. Kwa uzoefu wako, je, umewahi kukutana na mazingira ya kazi ambayo kila mmoja anatunza kumbukumbu vizuri kwenye mafaili na kurudisha faili husika mahala pake mara tuu baada ya kumaliza kulifanyia kazi? **1**. Ndio. **2**. Hapana

4.1.26. Kwa uzoefu wako kwenye ofisi hii, ni mara ngapi umeona hali ya kila mtumishi kuweka

nyaraka vizuri kwenye faili na kurudisha faili mahala pake mara baada ya kumaliza kulitumia? **1**. Sijawahi kuona. **2**. Mara chache nimeona. **3**. Mara kwa mara. **4**. Mara nyingi. **5**. Mara zote

4.1.27. Je, ofisi yenu ina kanuni au muongozo unaosimamia utunzaji wa nyaraka na kumbukumbu? **1**. Ndio. **2**. Hapana. **3**. Sijui

4.1.28. Katika kutekeleza majukumu yako, je, kwa kawaida huwa unafanya kazi za ofisi kwa kutumia nyaraka na mafaili ambayo pia yanatumiwa na watumishi wengine? **1**. Situmii mafaili. **2**. Mara chache natumia na wengine. **3**. Wakati mwingine natumia majalada yanayotumiwa na wengine. **4**. Mara nyingi nafanya kazi kwenye majalada yanayotumiwa na watu wengine. **5**. Siku zote natumia mafaili yanayotumiwa na wengine (***Kama jibu ni 1 > 4.2.8***).

4.1.29. Kwa wastani, unatumia muda gani kupata faili ambalo unataka kulifanyia kazi? **1**. Zaidi ya saa moja. **2**. Kati ya dakika 45 na saa moja. **3**. Kati ya nusu saa na dakika 45 .**4**. Kati ya dakika 20 na nusu saa. **5**. Chini ya dakika 20.

4.1.30. Kwa wastani, unatumia muda gani kutafuta taarifa kwenye faili na kupata nyaraka zenye taarifa unazozitaka? **1**. Natumia zaidi ya saa moja kupata ukurasa napengine nyaraka isipatikane. **2**. Inanichukua walau dakika 30. **3**. Inachukua dakika 20. **4**. Wakati mwingine inachukua kati ya dakika 10 had 20. **5**. Inachukua walau dakika 10.

4.1.31. Tafadhali naomba unieleze, kutokana na uzoefu wako, wakati unafungua mafaili na unatarajia kupata taarifa, ni mara ngapi umekuta nyaraka zinakosekana au haziko kwenye mpangilio? **1**. Mara nyingi sana (> 50). **2**. Mara nyingi (Asilimia 30). **3**. Mara chache (Asilimia 20). **4**. Mara chache sana (Asilimia10). **5**. Haijawahi kunitokea

4.1.32. Je, watumishi wenzako kwenye Wizara (sio lazima kwenye kitengo chako) wanakawaida ya kuamini kuwa kila mmoja ataweka nyaraka kwa kufuata utaratibu na kurudisha faili mahala pake kwa wakati? **1**. Ndio, wanaamini hivyo (100%). **2**. Ndio, baadhi wanaamini hivyo (71-99%). **3**. Kiasi wanaamini hivyo (51-70%). **4.** Wachache wanaamini hivyo (11-50%). **5.** Hapana hawaanaamini hivyo kabisa (0-10%)

4.8. Mafaili ya Ndani

Maswali yafuatayo yanahusu utumiaji mafaili na uwekaji wa nyaraka kwenye mafaili ambayo yanatumiwa na idara tu (ikijumuisha flimsy).

4.2.37. Kwa wastani unatumia muda gani kutafuta faili au nyaraka zinazotumika ndani ya kitengo chako? **1**. Zaidi ya saa moja. **2**. Kati ya dakika 45 na saa moja. **3**. Kati ya nusu saa na dakika 45. **4**. Kati ya dakika 20 na nusu saa. **5**. Chini ya dakika 20.

4.2.38. Kutokana na uzoefu wako kwenye ofisi hii unamaoni gani kuhusu jitihada za kila mtumishi katika kuhakikisha kuwa nyaraka zinahifadhiwa kwenye majalada husika na kurudishwa mahala pake kwa wakati? **1**. Hawajitahidi kabisa (Asilimia 0-10) **2**. Wanajitahidi kidogo (Asilimia 11-49). **3**. Wanajitahidi Kiasi (Asilimia 50-80) **4**. Wanajitahidi sana (Asilimia 81-100).

4.2.39. Chukulia mfanyakazi anajaribu kufanya jitihada za kufaili nyaraka vizuri na kurudisha faili mahala pake ili na wengine waweze kulitumia lakini maofisa wengine kwenye ofisi hiyo ambao wanatumia pamoja faili hilo hawajali kufaili na hawarudishi mafaili mahala pake kwa wakati, je unadhani huyo mtumishi ataendelea kufaili kama wenzie hawafaili? **1**. Ndio **2**. Hapana

4.2.40. Chukulia kuwa mfanyakazi anajua wazi kuwa anaweza kunufaika kama wenzake watafaili na pia anajua kuwa hata nufaika kama yeye ndie anafaili lakini wenzake hawafaili, je unadhani ni yapi yatakuwa maamuzi ya huyo mtumishi? **1**. Hata faili. **2**. Atafaili hata kama wenzake hawafaili. **3**. hatafaili hata kama wenzake watafaili au hawata faili.

4.2.41. Tafadhali nieleze kutokana na uzoefu wako kwenye ofisi hii, ni kwa asilimia ngapi unaweza kuwa na uhakika kuwa kila mtumishi atatumia faili na kulirudisha sehemu husika kwa wakati mara amalizapo kulitumia? **1**. Sina uhakika (01-10). **2**. Chini ya asilimia (11-49). **3**. Uhakika kati ya asilimia (50–75). **4**. Uhakika kati ya asilimia (76- 90). **5**. Uhakika kati ya asilimia 91 na 100.

4.2.42. Je, unaamini kuwa utunzaji wa mafaili ni tatizo ambalo linahitaji kufanyiwa kazi ili kuongeza ufanisi wa ofisi za serikali? Jibu **1**. Ndio ni tatizo kama litatafutiwa ufumbuzi litarahisisha utendaji. **2**. Ndio ni tatizo lakini sidhani kama linahitaji kuhangaika nalo. **3**. Hapana sio tatizo kwa sasa tupo sawa.

4.2.43. Je, ni mara ngapi ukiwa kama kiongozi umekuwa unaongelea umuhimu wa kufuata muongozo wa kutunza nyaraka kwenye ofisi yenu? **1**. Kamwe. **2**. Mara chache. **3**. Mara kwa mara **4**. Wakati wote.

4.2.44. Ni kwa kiasi gani watumishi wa ofisi hii wanawasiliana kwa ufasaha kuhusu kuzingatia muongozo wa utunzaji wa kumbukumbu? **1**. Kamwe. **2**. Mara chache. **3**. Mara kwa mara. **4**. Kila mara

4.2.45. Ni kwa kiasi gani unakubaliana au kutokubaliana na sababu zifuatazo kwa watumishi kutokutunza mafaili kwa mujibu wa muongozo (kuweka nyaraka kwa mpangilio, kurudisha nyaraka mara umalizapo kuitumia kwenye faili husika, kurudisha jalada mahala linapotakiwa kuwepo mara tu wamalizapo kulitumia).

		Sikubaliani kabisa (1)	**Sikubaliani (2)**	**Sijui (3)**	**Nakubali (4)**	**Nakubali sana (5)**
i	Watumishi hawafaili kwa sababu wengine hawaifali?					
ii	Watumishi hawafaili kwa sababu wanajua wengine watafaili					
iii	watumishi hawafaili kwasababu hawajui jinsi ya kufaili					
iv	watumishi hawafaili kwa sababu wanafikiri hakuna umuhimu wa kufaili na haina madhara					

4.2.46. Kwa mazingira ya ofisini kwako ni ipi kati ya sentensi mbili zifuatazo unakubaliana nayo zaidi? **1**. watumishi wengi wangezingatia muongozo wa utumiaji wa mafaili kama wangekuwa na uhakika kuwa kiongozi wao haridhiki na utunzaji mbaya wa mafaili. **2**. Watumishi wengi hawata faili hata kama kiongozi anajali utunzaji bora wa mafaili na kuonesha mfano.

4.2.47. Kwa mazingira ya ofisini kwako ni ipi kati ya sentensi mbili zifuatazo unakubaliana nayo zaidi? **1**. Watumishi wengi watazingatia muongozo wa kutunza mafaili kama hatua zitachukuliwa. **2**. Watuishi wengi bado hawatafaiili hata kama motisha itatolewa.

4.2.48. Kwa mazingira ya ofisini kwako ni ipi kati ya sentensi mbili zifuatazo unakubaliana nayo

zaidi? **1**. Watumishi watazingatia taratibu za kufaili nyaraka kama watakuwa wanakumbushwa mara kwa mara. **2**. Watumishi wengi hawatazingatia muongozo wa kutunza mafaili hata kama watakumbushwa mara kwa mara.

5.0 MUONEKANO WA OFISI

Mdadisi tafadhali angalia muonekano wa ofisi na kisha tia alama

5.10. ***Muonekano wa ofisi*: 1**. Ofisi iliyofungwa **2** ofisi iliyowazi

5.11. ***Mpangilio wa Ofisi*: 1**. Msimamizi na maofisa wanatumia ofisi moja. **2**. Msimamizi anaofisi yake ambayo ipo karibu na za maofisa. **3**. Msimamizi ana ofisi yake ambayo haipo karibu na za maofisa.

5.12. **Alama:** Alama zozotezinazoonyesha maeneo muhimu mfano **1**. Hakuna alama yeyote **2**. Ishara ya kuingia au kutoka, **3**. Ramani ya ofisi, **4**.Vibao vya majina kwenye milango.

6.0 MAFUNZO YA MUDA MFUPI (CHINI YA MWAKA 1)

6.13. Je, umepata mafunzo ya muda mfupi kuhusiana na kazi unayofanya? **1**. Ndio. **2**. Hapana.

6.14. Umewahi kupata mafunzo ya namna ya kutumia nyaraka na mafaili ya ofisi? **1**. Ndio. **2**. Hapana.

6.15. Umewahi kupata mafunzo ya matumizi sahihi ya muda? **1**. Ndio. **2**. Hapana.

6.16. Ni aina gani nyingine ya mafunzo ambayo umewahi kuyapata hapa ofisini? **1**. Hakuna **2**.Uongozi. **3**. Usimamizi. **4**. Mawasiliano. **5**. Taaluma. **6**.Nyinginezo (***jibu zaidi ya moja***)

7.0 MOTISHA

7.25. Ni nini hasa kilichokusukuma kufanya kazi katika sekta ya umma? **(*jibu zaidi ya moja*) 1**. Mshahara na marupurupu **2**. Pensheni **3**. Nafasi ya Mafunzo. **4**. Uhakika wa ajira **5**. Kuhudumia umma **6**. Uzalendo **7**. Ndio mwajiri mkuu **8**. Nyingine_____

_____

_____

7.26. Je, mshahara unaopata unatosha ukilinganisha na kazi unayofanya?

1. Ndio **2**. Hapana.

7.27. Je, kuna posho na marupurupu mengine unayopata mbali na mshahara?

1. Ndio **2**. Hapana. (***kama jibu 2 > 7.7***)

7.28. Kama ndio, ni aina gani ya posho na marupurupu *(zaidi ya moja)* **1**. Fedha. **2**. Sio fedha? (***kama jibu 2 tu, > 7.7***)

7.29. Kwa wastani, jumla ya posho na marupurupu yanaweza kufika kiasi gani kwa mwezi?

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7.30. Je, marupurupu unayoyapata yanatosha ukilinganisha na kazi unazozifanya?

1. Ndio. **2**. Hapana.

7.31. Tafadhali naomba unishirikishe ni kiasi gani unapokea kama mshahara kwa mwezi baada ya makato ya kodi? _____

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7.32. Je, unadhani kuwa ofisi yako inaweza kuongeza ufanisi wa utendaji kazi endapo mfumo wa utumiaji wa mafaili, uendeshaji wa vikao, na uratibu wa kazi ukiboreshwa hata pasipo kuongezewa motisha ya fedha? **1**. Ndio. **2**. Hapana.