

STATE-SOCIETY COLLABORATION IN PEACEBUILDING IN
NORTHERN GHANA

A Dissertation

Submitted to the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Ph.D. in Advanced Policy Studies

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September 2019

Abstract

Political violence remain a pressing security concern in sub-Saharan Africa. In Ghana, ethno-political conflicts persist in spite of the country's successful democratic development, challenging the popular view among scholars that lack of democratic institutions account for the high levels of political violence in Africa. Liberal peace theories are premised on the assumption that building democratic institutions will lead to less political violence because these institutions produce more accountability and legitimacy, and less grievances.

To protect citizens from political violence, successive governments in Ghana employ various policies, including ad hoc committees, presidential commissions of inquiries, state of emergencies and curfews in an attempt to resolve conflicts among different groups. The persistence of ethno-political conflicts in the country indicates the failure of such policies. This brings up three related questions: (1) why do ethno-political conflicts persist in Ghana, in spite of the country's successful democratization, (2) why do conventional government policies aimed at resolving ethno-political conflicts fail, and (3) why were attempts to resolve the 1994-95 civil war in the Northern Region more successful than other conflicts in the region.

To address these questions, this study focuses on the concept of state-society relations to develop a framework to analyze the effects of government policies on the dynamics of three ethno-political conflicts in Northern Ghana: the Bawku and Dagbon chieftaincy conflicts and the Guinea Fowl war of 1994-95 in the Northern Region. This framework identifies three types of state-society relations that explains the success or failure of policies aimed at resolving ethno-political conflicts. These include (a) peace making state, (b) captured state, and (c) isolated state.

Policies of the peace making state are successful in resolving ethno-political conflicts because they involve a collaboration between an accommodative government, a proactive civil society and a responsive traditional society. An accommodative government recognizes that it needs information from, and participation of, civil and traditional societies to resolve ethno-political conflicts. A proactive civil society actively participates in peacebuilding, rather than merely providing relief goods and services during conflict situations, and a responsive traditional society is receptive to new ideas, perceptions, attitudes, relationships and giving peace a chance. The collaboration between these three players enables the peace making state address the root causes of ethno-political conflicts.

This study contributes to the literature on political violence in Africa by challenging the existing view that the lack of democratic institutions, such as free and fair elections accounts for the persistence of ethno-political conflicts and violence on the continent. In this study, we find that new democracies in Africa are unable to achieve a democratic peace dividend because the policy choices of political leaders are crucial for the resolution of ethno-political conflicts.

Dedication

To my family for prayers and *Patience*

To my professors for enlightening advice and encouragement

To my friends for smiles and support

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Glossary

Term	Definition
Abudu Royal Gate:	One of the two royal families involved in the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict
Acephalous Groups	Ethnic groups not govern by political leaders or hierarchies
Andani Royal Gate:	One of the two royal families involved in the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict
Asantehene	King of the Ashanti Kingdom
Ashanti	A Protectorate of the British Empire annexed in 1896 and an administrative region in the Gold Coast
Avoidance of Discrimination Act	A law introduced by the CPP in December 1957, which proscribed the existence of parties on regional, tribal or religious basis.
Bawku Naba	Paramount Chief of the Bawku Traditional Area
Bugum (fire) Festival	The Bugum festival is a traditional festival of sacrifice to the gods and the ancestors.
Bolin-Lana:	Regent of the late Ya-Na Mahamadu Abudulai IV
Chief Imam	The Chief Imam is the highest Muslim authority in Ghana
Closed Gate:	A closed gate is a family whose members have lost the right to compete for the skin.
Council of State	The Council of State is a small body of prominent citizens, established by the 1992 Constitution of Ghana to counsel the president in the performance of his functions.
Coussey Committee	A representative native committee appointed by the British Government in 1949 to make recommendations for a new constitution to lay the foundation for the granting of independence
Dagbon	The Kingdom of <i>Dagbon</i> is a traditional kingdom in northern Ghana founded by the Dagomba people in the 15th century.
Destoolment	The removal of a chief from office. In normal parlance, chiefs who are removed from office are destooled, not de-skinned because until recently northern chiefs could not be removed from office.

Eid al-Adha festival	Eid al-Adha, also called the "Sacrifice Feast", is the second of two Islamic holidays celebrated worldwide each year.
Flagstaff House	The official seat of the Government of Ghana
Enskinment	The installment of a chief in office in Northern Ghana.
Gate:	The gate, as used in northern Ghana, refers to a royal family that is eligible to contest for a vacant chieftaincy. In Dagbon, there are two gates to the Yendi skin, namely, the Abudu and the Andani gates.
Gate Skins:	The three skins-Karaga, Savelugu and Mion- whose occupants are qualified for election to the Yendi skin.
Gbon Lana (Regent):	The Gbon Lana is usually the eldest son of a deceased chief from the Abudu Royal Gate, and he occupies the position of Regent from the time of the chief's death until a successor is chosen.
Gold Coast	The Gold Coast was a British colony on the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa from 1867 to its independence as the nation of Ghana in 1957.
Governor	An official appointed by the British monarch to head the colonial administration of the Gold Coast.
Gbewaa Palace	The seat of the Ya-Na
Hijab	A hijab is a veil worn by some Muslim women in public
Kampakuya-Naa:	Regent of the late Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II
Karaga Lana:	The chief of Karaga (one of three chiefs who may be elected to the Yendi skin)
Kuga-Na:	The head elder of four soothsayers who until 1948 were responsible for the selection of the Ya-Na.
Kusasi(s)	The Kusasis are one of the two main protagonist in the Bawku Conflict. The Kusasis are the largest ethnic group in Bawku
Majority Ethnic Groups	Ethnic groups, which had no organized political structures before the period of colonization
Mamprusi(s)	The Mamprusis are one of the two main protagonist in the Bawku conflict. The Mamprusis migrated from Nalerigu in the Northern Region

Manhyia Palace	The seat of the Ashanti King
Mion Lana:	Chief of Mion (one of three chiefs who may be elected to the Yendi skin)
Nalerigu	Capital of the Mamprugu Kingdom and seat of the Nayiri
Native Authority	The Native Authority Ordinance empowered traditional authorities with tribunals, treasuries, and local police forces to exercise direct administrative control over their people
Nayiri	Paramount chief and overlord of the Mamprugu traditional area
Northern Region	One of the three regions in Northern Ghana and the largest region in the country
Northern Territorial Council (NTC)	The NTC was a consultative body created in 1946 to advance the interest of the chiefs and people of the Northern Territories
Northern Territories	The Northern Territories was a Protectorate of the British Empire, and an administrative region of the Gold Coast colony. Today the region is known as Northern Ghana, made up of three administrative regions- Upper East, Upper West and Northern Regions
Otumfuo	The title of the king of the Ashante Kingdom
Paramount Chief	The Chief is the head of the traditional council, and presides over sub-divisional and village chiefs.
Regent	The regent is usually the eldest son of the deceased chief, and he occupies the position from the time of the chief's death until a successor is chosen.
Savelugu Naa (Yo-Na):	Chief of Savelugu (one of three chiefs who may be elected to the Yendi skin)
Skin	The skin is the symbol of chiefly authority in northern Ghana. It symbolizes the chieftaincy in much the same way as the throne symbolizes the office of a king
Tamale	The capital of the Northern Territories and capital of present day Northern Region
Tendaana	An earth priest who hold and administer land, and perform various religious duties among ethnic groups without an organized political structure

Upper East Region	The Upper East Region (formerly Upper Region) was carved out of the Northern region at independence as the second administrative region in Northern Ghana. It is located at the northeastern corner of the country
Watson Commission	A Commission of Enquiry instituted by the British Government to investigate the causes of the 1948 riots in the Gold Coast
Ya Na	Paramount chief and Overlord of the Dagbon Traditional Area
Yagbonwura	Paramount chief of the Gonja traditional area
Yendi	The traditional capital of the Dagbon Traditional area
Yo Na	The chief of Savelugu

Abbreviation

<i>Abbreviation</i>	<i>Explanation</i>
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
API	Ambassador for Peace Initiative
BIEPC	Bawku Inter-Ethnic Peace Committee
CCNT	Commissioner and Commandant of the Northern Territories
CDD	Center for Democratic Development
CFI	Civic Forum Initiative
CHRAJ	Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DISEC	District Security Council
DPCs	District Peace Council
EC	Electoral Commission
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
GOYA	Gonja Youth Association
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDEG	Institute of Democratic Governance
I4P	Infrastructure for Peace
KOYA	Konkomba Youth Association
NAYA	Nawuri Youth Association
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NHC	National House of Chiefs
NICs	Newly Industrializing Countries
NLC	National Liberation Council
NORPAC	Northern Regional Peace Advisory Council
NORYDA	Northern Ghana Youth and Development Association

NPC	National Peace Council
NPI	Nairobi Peace Initiative
NPP	New Patriotic Party
NRC	National Redemption Council
NRCC	Northern Regional Coordinating Council
NSC	National Security Council
NTC	Northern Territorial Council
NYA	National Youth Authority
PDCs	Peoples Defence Committees
PNDC	Provincial National Defence Council
PNP	People's National Party
PP	Progress Party
RHC	Regional House of Chiefs
RPCs	Regional Peace Councils
PPNT	Permanent Peace Negotiating Team
RCC	Regional Coordinating Council
REGSEC	Regional Security Council
UGCC	United Gold Coast Convention
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations development Programme
UP	United Party
WANEP	West African Network for Peacebuilding

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.0 Introduction

Ghana is widely lauded for maintaining a stable democracy in an otherwise volatile sub-region. Freedom House ranks the country as the best performing democracy in West Africa. In addition, the Institute for Economics and Peace's Global Peace Index report for 2019 ranks Ghana as the most peaceful country in West Africa, and 44th most peaceful globally (out of 163 countries).¹ Indeed, Ghana enjoys relative national political stability and avoids recurring civil wars and violent national conflicts of the types that occur in neighboring countries. In spite of its successful democratization and relative stability, the country experiences some violent clashes. Unlike, most of its neighbors however, violent clashes in Ghana do not attract the participation of the majority of the citizens, rather they tend to be localized and/or are related to specific issues.

The purpose of this study is to explain why ethno-political conflicts and violence persist in Ghana, in spite of the country's successful democratization. In line with theories of liberal peace that assert that democratization leads to more peaceful societies, Ghanaians expected the reintroduction of multiparty democracy in 1992 to usher in a period of sustained peace and increased respect for human rights.² After almost three decades of relative successful democratization however, Ghana, and especially the three northern regions of the country,

¹ <http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2019/06/GPI-2019-web003.pdf>. The Peace Index scores from 1 to 5 where 1 = most peaceful. Ghana scores 1.796. This ranking is based on analysis derived of a variety of indicator information. The indicators include data on levels of internal violence, internal and external levels of conflict, the security situation, politics and governance, economy, military expenditure and ease of access to weapons of minor destruction, etc.

² See Robert Alan Dahl, *Democracy and its Critics*, (Yale University Press, 1989); Christian Davenport, "The promise of democratic pacification: An empirical assessment," *International Studies Quarterly* 48, no. 3 (2004): 539-560.

continue to witness various kinds of conflicts and violent clashes.³ On a study of conflicts in Northern Ghana, Awedoba observes that conflicts in the region “appears to be increasing in amplitude and frequency and its effects are getting more and more devastating”.⁴ This phenomenon is however not new. The 1981 and 1994 civil wars in the Northern Region occurred under the elected civilian regimes of the Third and Fourth Republics respectively.⁵ At first glance, authoritarian regimes appear to manage ethno-political conflicts better than democratic regimes because less violent ethnic clashes tend to occur under authoritarian regimes.⁶ This directly contradicts the claim that more democratization should lead to less violence, political instability and insecurity.

It will however, be erroneous to use violence during transitions to democracy to discredit the ability of democratic institutions to manage ethno-political conflicts. The 1981 and 1994 civil wars in Northern Ghana occurred shortly after the country’s return to democratic rule in 1979 and 1993 respectively. Harukata Takenaka observes that, the experiences of traditional democracies shows that, democratization is a slow and painful process, unfolding over a long period.⁷ These wars, occurred at a time when the country’s political system was at best a pseudo-democracy,

³ The global democracy index of the Economics Intelligence Unit have rated Ghana as a “hybrid” democracy since 2008, scoring the country 6.86/10 in 2015, whilst Freedom House have consistently rated Ghana as “Free” for over a decade.

⁴ Albert K. Awedoba, *An Ethnographic Study of Northern Ghanaian Conflicts: Towards a Sustainable Peace: Key Aspects of Past, Present and Impending Conflicts in Northern Ghana and the Mechanisms for Their Address*, African Books Collective, 2010, x.

⁵ The Third and Fourth Republics represents the country’s third and fourth attempts, respectively, at republican democratic government since independence in 1957. The Third Republic came into effect on 24 September 1979 with the adoption of the 1979 Republican Constitution and ended on 31 December 1981. The Fourth Republic came into effect on 7 January 1992, with the adoption of the 1992 Republican Constitution.

⁶ Emmanuel Akwetey, "Ghana: violent ethno-political conflicts and the democratic challenge," In *Challenges to the Nation-State in Africa*, ed. Adebayo Olukoshi and Liisa Laakso, 102-135. (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1996).

⁷ Harukata Takenaka, *Failed Democratization in Prewar Japan: Breakdown of a Hybrid Regime*. (Stanford University Press, 2014).

neither exhibiting the full complements of the institutions of a consolidated democracy nor the coercive powers of an authoritarian state.⁸

The first section of this chapter introduces the research questions and main arguments of this study. The second section discusses the types of conflicts in Northern Ghana, and the country as a whole. The third section examines the existing literature on the nature and causes of political violence in Africa, and the potential contribution of this study. The fourth section presents the research framework, including an introduction of the explanatory variables and hypothesis of the study.

1.1 Research Questions and Main Arguments

The purpose of this study is to explain why Ghana has failed to achieve democratic peace in spite of its successful democratization. This study contends that to answer this question, we need to unravel the nature and motive of government policies, and how these policies affect the dynamics of ethno-political conflicts. The primary responsibility of government is to protect citizens from violence. To achieve this, governments often use various policy interventions to resolve conflicts among different groups. Successive governments in Ghana employ various policies, including ad hoc committees, presidential commissions of inquiries, state of emergencies and curfews in an attempt to resolve ethno-political conflicts. The persistence of a number of ethno-political conflicts in Northern Ghana indicates the failure of these policies in the region, bringing up three related questions:

⁸ Håvard Hegre, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Toward a democratic civil peace? Democracy, political change, and civil war, 1816–1992," *American political science review* 95, no. 1 (2001); see also Larry Diamond, "Thinking about hybrid regimes," *Journal of democracy* 13, no. 2 (2002)

1. Why do ethno-political conflicts persist in Ghana, in spite of the country's successful democratization?
2. Why do conventional government policies fail?
3. Why were attempts to resolve the 1994-95 civil war in the Northern Region more successful than other conflicts in the region?

This study argues that Ghana continues to experience various conflicts and episodes of violent clashes because the policy choice of political leaders are crucial for the resolution of ethno-political conflicts and peacebuilding. Democratic institutions are unable to alter the policy choice of political leaders. Similar incentives guide the policy choice of political leaders under both authoritarian regimes and democratic governments that is the desire to win and hold on to power. We further contend that the tendency of successive regimes to use government policy as a political tool to reward supporters and to punish opponents accounts for the failure of such policies.

The 1994-95 civil war in the Northern Region was the most violent and widespread conflict in Ghana in its postcolonial history. Attempts to resolve this conflict were successful ensuring that despite its violent and widespread nature, it has been followed by the longest period of peace in the region, since pre-colonial time. This study argues that the interventions that resolved the war was successful because it involved a collaboration between government, civil society and the warring communities. This collaboration was unique because conventional government policy interventions are imposed from the top with little to no participation by civil or traditional society.

1.2 Why Northern Ghana?

Some scholars claim Ghana represents a unique story in sub-Saharan Africa and that lessons from the country are not applicable to other countries on the continent because of its

relative political and economic success.⁹ However, despite its modest political and economic gains, Ghana continues to face many of the same challenges that confronts other counties in Africa. For example, the persistence of ethno-political conflicts in many parts of country, especially in the three northern regions, highlights the weakness of the state to provide security, maintain law and order, and its inability to transform political progress into tangible dividends in the lives of ordinary citizens.

The persistence of ethno-political conflicts in Northern Ghana in the midst of democracy provides a fascinating example of the inability of third wave democracies to achieve civil democratic peace. A study of ethno-political conflict in the region therefore offers an ideal opportunity to further our understanding of the relationship between democratic institutions and ethno-political violence in Africa and other new democracies with multi ethnic populations.

The study concentrates on the northern part of the country because the region records the most number of violent ethno-political conflicts in the country.¹⁰ The 1981 and 1994-95 Konkomba-Nanumba conflicts in the Northern Region are the only conflicts in the history of post-colonial Ghana that qualify as civil wars. These civil wars claimed at least 1000 and 2000 casualties respectively.¹¹ In addition, several other conflicts in the region including the Bawku, Bimbilla, Dagbon chieftaincy conflicts frequently claim several lives and engages the attention of both local and international media.¹²

⁹Michael Bratton, Robert Mattes, and Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, *Public opinion, democracy, and market reform in Africa*, (Cambridge University Press, 2005).

¹⁰ NPC Conflict Map

¹¹ Dzodzi Tsikata, and Wayo Seini, "Identities, Inequalities and Conflicts in Ghana," (CRISE Working Paper No 30), Department of International Development, University of Oxford 2004.

¹² *BBC News*, "Ethnic clashes in northern Ghana," , December 4, 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1690746.stm>

1.3 Types of Conflicts in Northern Ghana

The most common types of conflicts in Northern Ghana include ethnic, chieftaincy succession, and land conflicts. These conflicts are usually interrelated because they are caused by multifaceted and complex factors, making it almost impossible to delineate the exact cause of any conflict. For instance, although the 1994-95 civil war in the Northern Region was essentially an inter-ethnic conflict, it also involved competition over land rights and had religious connotations.

Table 1.1-4 shows the prevalence of these conflicts in Northern Ghana.

1.3.1 Ethnic Conflicts

Ethnic conflicts are an important component in the history of Northern Ghana. Ethnic conflicts mostly take place between minority and majority groups. The terms minority and majority groups, as used in Northern Ghana, describes the political organization of groups rather than their demography. Majority groups refer to groups with centralized political organizations, whilst minority groups lack centralized authority and administrative machinery systems. Typical examples of ethnic conflicts in the region include the Nanumba-Konkomba wars of 1981, 1994 and 1995, the Gonja conflicts with the Nawuries and Nchumurus in 1991, 1992 and 1994, the Dagomba-Konkomba war in 1994, and the recurring Mamprusi conflict with the Kusasi in Bawku.

These conflicts stem from several decades of, what Brukum describes as the relegation of minority groups to second-rate citizens in traditional and political administration.¹³ During the colonial period, the British administration governed through the existing chiefs because of political expediency and economic necessity. The colonial administration restructured power relations between chiefs of the majority groups and the surrounding unassimilated minority groups. The

¹³ Nana James Kweku Brukum. "Ethnic Conflict in Northern Ghana, 1980-1999: An Appraisal." *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana*, New Series, no. 4/5 (2000): 132. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41406661>.

colonial administration incorporated the paramount chiefs of the few existing states- Dagbon (Ya-Na), Gonja (Yagbonwura), Mamprugu (Nayiri) and Waala (Wa-Na) into the colonial administrative structure.¹⁴ The administration reconstituted the Mamprugu kingdom into the North Eastern Province (present day Upper East Region) with five divisions-Mamprugu, Kusasi, Frafra, Grunshi and Builsa with the Nayiri as paramount chief. In the North Western Province, the administration made the Wa-Na, paramount chief over the Waala, Dagarti and Sisaala. This reorganization also placed numerous small and unassimilated groups such as Nawuri, Nchumuru, Mo, Vagalla under the Yagbonwura, while large numbers of Konkombas and Chokosis became subjects of the Ya-Na. The colonial administration created tribunals for these paramount chiefs to try cases among their subjects (except criminal ones), treasuries into which to collect taxes, and a local police force to compel obedience.

This colonial interference with the existing political structure and ethnic relations created disharmony and conflicts among the ethnic groups because the minority groups largely refused to recognize the authority of the paramount chiefs. Some scholars therefore view ethnic conflicts in Northern Ghana “as wars of emancipation” with “one group of people determined to maintain a decadent status quo and the other fighting to overthrow it.”¹⁵

1.3.2 Chieftaincy Conflicts

Chieftaincy succession is another important source of conflict in Northern Ghana.¹⁶ Many people, including both royals and non-royals compete for the position of the chief because of the enormous benefits associated with the institution. The chieftaincy institution remains central in the governance of the northern regions, and the country as a whole. This is especially so at the

¹⁴ The Paramount chief is the head chief/leader of the traditional council.

¹⁵ Ibid, 139.

¹⁶ NPC, Conflict Map
National Conflict Map, 2013

countryside where the presence of the state is minimal. Chiefs are custodians and administrators of the land, and controls other skin properties such as mineral deposits and traditional regalia.

In addition, the advent of competitive party politics has made the chieftaincy institution even more attractive. Although the Constitution debars chiefs from participating in active party politics, political parties nonetheless compete for the approval of the chief because of the influence he wields among his people. Political parties view chiefs as gatekeepers who hold the key to electoral success in the community.

Chieftaincy conflicts also emanate from the fact that chieftaincy has become an elaborate system of patronage. Successful factions enjoy the distribution of favors, including appointments to the district assembly and other public offices, and access to public facilities. Factions excluded from these pork barrels live in anticipation that they may find a reason to depose the chief and replace him with a candidate friendlier to their cause.

Many scholars recognize colonial interference with existing political structures as the source of these conflicts.¹⁷ The restructuring of the political system, as discussed above, did not only alter the relationship between the chiefs and minority groups, but also the power relations between chiefs and their own people. Chiefs became dictators without any fear of repercussions because the colonial administration replaced the people as the source of the chief's legitimacy.

Many other types of conflicts were expressed in the form of chieftaincy disputes because the chief was the exclusive embodiment of political authority at the community level. Conflicts over land, access to resources, collection and allocation of revenue, attitudes to various ordinances

¹⁷ Ken Ahorsu, and Boni Yao Gebe, "Governance and security in Ghana: The Dagbon chieftaincy crisis." East Legon: *West Africa Civil Society Institute* (2011); Awedoba, *An Ethnographic Study*, (2010); Abudulai Yakubu, *The Abudu-Andani Crisis of Dagbon: a Historical and Legal Perspective of the Yendi Skin Affairs* (Accra: MPC Ltd., 2006).

and other problems played out in the guise of chieftaincy conflicts. This situation did not improve with the attainment of independence. Attempts by the post-independence state to redefine its relationship with the institution resulted in more chieftaincy disputes in the region (chapter 2 discusses these in detail).

1.3.3 Land Conflicts

Land is another important source of conflict in Northern Ghana. There are two main types of land conflicts in the region. The first is inter-ethnic, occurring between rival ethnic groups. For most scholars, the colonial policy of indirect rule is the source of inter-ethnic land conflicts in Northern Ghana.¹⁸ By vesting all lands to the paramount chiefs of the Gonja, Dagomba, Mamprusi, Nanumba and Waala, the policy of indirect rule denied ethnic groups that lacked central political organization any rights to the land. These chiefs demanded tributes from the minority groups for the use of the land, creating disharmony and mistrust between the landlords and their landless subject groups.

Intra-ethnic land conflicts arises from misappropriation of communal land by chiefs. Statutory law entrust communal lands to chiefs to administer for the benefit of their people. Chiefs' rights to administer communal land has become the source of many intra-ethnic conflicts because some chiefs have taken advantage of rising population pressures, growing demand from commercial investors and increases in land values to enrich themselves at the expense of their communities.

¹⁸ Christian Lund, *Local Politics and the Dynamics of Property in Africa*, (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

Table 1. 1: Summary of Types of Conflicts in Northern Ghana

Conflict Type	Northern Region	Upper East Region	Upper West Region	Total
Chieftaincy	14	5	16	35
Land	6	9	-	15
Ethnic	9	5	-	14
Other	5	-	-	5

Source: NPC Conflict Map (2014); Awedoba (2010)¹⁹

Tables 1.1 shows that ethnic and religious configurations are of little relevance to conflicts in Northern Ghana. Frameworks focusing only on ethnicity and religion cannot explain these conflicts because intra-conflicts, that is conflicts between different factions of the same ethnic group, are the most prevalent type of conflicts in the region.

Case Studies

This study analyzes the effects of government policy on the dynamics of three cases from Northern Ghana, the Guinea Fowl War of 1994/95, the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict and the Bawku chieftaincy conflict. The study selects these cases for three main reasons.

Firstly, these cases have attracted a variety of policies because they are the most violent and protracted conflicts in the country's history. The Guinea Fowl War was the most violent and widespread in Ghana since precolonial times. The war covered most of the Northern Region and neighboring parts of other regions, destroyed 441 villages, displaced more than 178,000 people

¹⁹ NPC, Conflict Map (2014); Awedoba, *An Ethnographic Study*, (2010)

and led to the loss of at least 2,000 lives.²⁰ Whilst the Dagbon and Bawku chieftaincy conflicts represents the most protracted violent conflicts in the country. The modern version of the Dagbon conflict began in 1948, whilst the Bawku conflict started in 1957, following independence from colonial rule. These conflicts record recurring episodes of violence, claim hundreds of lives and destroy properties running into several millions of US dollars.²¹ These three cases are therefore helpful for us to understand the relationship between government policies and the dynamics of ethno-political conflicts that occur in several parts of the country, including the Alavanyo-Nkunya conflict in the Volta Region, the Techiman, Ga, and Winneba chieftaincy Conflicts in the Brong-Ahafo, Greater Accra and Central Regions respectively.

Secondly, the three cases represent typical and the most common types of conflicts in Ghana. An analysis of the effects of government policies on the dynamics of these conflicts would therefore have implications for other conflicts in the country. In addition, by studying the nature of these three different types of conflicts in the country, we hope to gain a better understanding of the nature of conflicts in the country, and to generalize from commonalities observed.

Thirdly, various policies have produced contrasting results in the three cases. The Guinea Fowl War, despite its violent and widespread nature, was successfully resolved, whilst the Dagbon and Bawku chieftaincy conflicts persist in spite of numerous attempts by successive government to resolve them.²² A study of the three different cases therefore helps us to

²⁰ While the 1999 Oxfam report estimated that 15,000 lives were lost, 2,000 is the official figure quoted by the InterNGO Consortium and was based on a body count.

²¹ NPC Conflict Map (2014)

²² The last phase of the Dagbon was only resolved at the beginning of this year (2019), so it is too early to conclude that the conflict has definitely been resolved.

understand why some policies are successful at resolving ethno-political conflicts, whilst other policies are less successful.

1.4 Literature Review

Political violence is a critical feature in the history of post-colonial Africa. The region has been the most conflict prone in the world for many decades, with many countries in the region caught-up in vicious cycles of political conflict, insecurity and poverty. The nature and scale of political violence directly affects the lives of millions of people on the continent. Political conflict and violence directly claim millions of lives displace tens of millions and bring untold suffering to hundreds of millions of people. Indeed, since independence in the 1960s, about 30 countries in sub-Saharan Africa or around 65 percent of all states in the region have experienced a form of armed conflict.²³

It is significant to note that most of the conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa take place within rather than between states. Zartman observes that the respect for the territorial borders inherited at independence accounts for the relative inter-state peace on the African continent.²⁴ From the beginning, the OAU insisted that despite the imperfections of national boundaries, it is critical that the boundaries that existed at independence remain inviolate for the stability of the continent. A 1964 resolutions enshrines territorial integrity as a cardinal principle and a basic norm of inter-African relations.

²³ Scott Straus, "Wars do end: Changing Patterns of Political Violence in sub-Saharan Africa," *African Affairs* 111, no. 443 (2012): 179-201.

²⁴ William I. Zartman, The Diplomacy of African Boundaries, in *African in world politics: Engaging a changing global order*, ed. J. W. Harbeson and D. Rothchild, (Boulder: Westview Press. 2013).

1.4.1 The changing Nature of Political Violence in sub-Saharan Africa

An important feature of political violence in Africa is its rapidly evolving nature. In the first three decades following independence, civil war was the most prevalent type of political violence in sub-Saharan Africa. These reached a peak in the 1990s, and thereafter declined significantly. Starting in the early 2000s there were on average about 8 to 10 civil wars in any given year, which was only about half the number recorded in the previous decade.²⁵ This period also witnessed a change in the nature of political violence. The nature of these wars changed significantly from those of the immediate post-independence period. Civil wars on the continent became more brutal, and civilians the main targets of violence. In addition, non-professional recruits made up the majority of rebel forces, who had little commitment to any ideological goals.²⁶ The civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, Northern Uganda and Somalia exemplified this shift. Warlords recruited child soldiers, engaged in unimaginable brutality against their civilian populations, and committed mass murder. These warlords were also more concerned with controlling natural resources (e.g. diamond mines) than controlling and governing populations.²⁷ According to Gettleman, today's wars in Africa "...are not really wars. Not in the traditional sense, at least", and are waged by people only interested in cash, guns, and a license to rampage, but who have no clear goal or ideology.²⁸ These rebels are very different from the freedom fighter of the 1960s and 70s, who typically mobilized and disciplined fighters around a cause and attempted to out-govern the state.²⁹

²⁵ Straus, "Wars do end" (2012).

²⁶ Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); DFID, *The causes of conflict in Africa. Consultation Document*, March, 2001 <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/conflict-africa.pdf>; William Reno, *Warfare in independent Africa*, Vol. 5, (Cambridge University Press, 2011).

²⁷ Straus, "Wars do end" (2012).

²⁸ Jeffrey Gettleman, "Africa's Forever Wars," *Foreign Policy* 178 (2010): 73.

²⁹ Reno, *Warfare in independent Africa*, (2011).

Localized conflicts within and among ethnic groups, and electoral violence characterizes political violence in contemporary Africa.³⁰ Competition for scarce land and water resources in densely populated areas often lead to conflict within, and among, communities. In mineral-rich areas, conflict arises over local complaints that communities do not receive a fair share of the benefits reaped from the exploitation of their resources, or suffers excessively from degradation caused to their natural environment. The conflict in the Niger Delta of Nigeria is a typical example of such conflicts. Acts of sabotage against industrial facilities, kidnapping of employees of oil companies, and deadly clashes between security forces and local militants characterizes the chronic political instability in the Niger Delta.³¹

Electoral violence is increasingly becoming a common phenomenon in many parts of Africa as many states liberalize their political spaces and adopt electoral competitions. Election related violence is directly associated with electoral contest, occurring before, during, or after elections. The 2007 violence in Kenya and the 2011-12 civil war in the Ivory Coast were both the result of disputed elections.³² Electoral violence and the threat of such violence often lead to power-sharing agreements, such as those of Zimbabwe in 2008/2009, and Kenya in 2008. The institutionalization of such power sharing agreements, for the sake of peace, however sets a

³⁰ Straus, "Wars do end" (2012).

³¹ Yvan Guichaoua, "Oil and political violence in Nigeria." In *Governance of Oil in Africa: Unfinished Business*. Edited by Jacques Lesourne and William C. Ramsay (2009): 9-50.

³² Jacqueline Klopp, and Prisca Kamungi. "Violence and Elections: will Kenya Collapse?." *World Policy Journal* 24, no. 4 (2007): 11-18; Susanne D. Mueller, "Dying to win: Elections, Political Violence, and Institutional Decay in Kenya, " *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 29, no. 1 (2011); Straus, "Wars do end" (2012).

dangerous precedence because of their inherent demonstration effects. Such agreements could invariably provide incentives for disputing elections and further political violence in other places.³³

Geo-political changes, including a decline in external state support for insurgencies and the rise of China are some of the factors that explains the changing nature of political violence in sub-Saharan Africa. During the cold war, ideological competition encouraged both Eastern and Western blocs to place a premium on maintaining order and stability among friendly states and allies. Across the continent, undemocratic and oppressive regimes such as those of Ethiopia's Mengistu, Somalia's Siad Barre, Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko, and Liberia's Samuel Doe received support from the United States and the Soviet Union because of the broader goals of these powers.³⁴ Straus argues that with the end of the Cold War, former client states suddenly became vulnerable, initially leading to an increase in the incidence of political violence in Africa in the 1990s.³⁵ In time, however, insurgents and states lost their ability to wage big and prolonged wars.³⁶

In addition, the rise of China and its increasing presence in Africa is an important factor in the changing nature of political violence and warfare on the continent. Although many people are critical of China for supporting non-democratic regimes, Chinese foreign relations philosophy of non-interference, means that, unlike other powers it never supports insurgencies. Chinese support

³³ , Andreas Mehler, "Introduction: Power-Sharing in Africa," *Africa Spectrum*, 44, 3, 2-10 (2009); Denis M Tull, and Andreas Mehler, "The Hidden costs of Power-Sharing: Reproducing Insurgent Violence in Africa." *African Affairs* 104, no. 416 (2005).

³⁴ Kofi Atta Annan, "The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa," *African Renaissance* 1, no. 3 (2004): 9-42.

³⁵ Straus, "Wars do end" (2012).

³⁶ Annan, "The causes of conflict," (2004): 9-42; Gérard Prunier, *Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the making of a Continental Catastrophe*. Oxford University Press, 2008.

invariably goes to the state, shoring up the capability of African states vis-à-vis insurgencies, and diminishes the likelihood that insurgencies can pose any serious challenge to the state.³⁷

1.4.2 The Role of Institutions on Political Violence in Africa

Scholars of liberal peace claim that the absence of strong democratic institutions account for widespread political violence in many countries in Africa.³⁸ In the view of these scholars, democracies decreases the likelihood of domestic conflict and increases the prospects of domestic peace. These claims emanate from theories in International Relations.

1.4.3 Democratic Peace

The democratic peace theory is the foremost theory describing the relationship between democracy and peace. This theory simply states that democracies do not fight each other. The democratic peace theory has its basis in the work of Immanuel Kant. Kant postulates that in a constitutional republic where the decision to go to war or not is taken by all citizens, it is not taken lightly. The prospects for peace are greater because in taking such a decision the citizens will have to contemplate all calamities of war, in which they would have to fight, pay the costs of the war out of their own pockets, and bear all cost related to the reconstruction after the devastation war leaves behind. Proponents of the democratic peace theory claim that democratic political values support honest relations between states and their leaders.

Critics of this theory dispute the perceived peaceful nature of democracies. Walt argues that evidence that democracies do not fight each other is rather scanty, confined to the post 1945

³⁷ Straus, "Wars do end" (2012).

³⁸ Paul Collier, *Wars, guns and votes: Democracy in dangerous places*, (New York: Harper, 2009); Ebrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis. "Why are there so many civil wars in Africa? Understanding and preventing violent conflict." *Journal of African Economies* 9, no. 3 (2000); Hegre, "Toward a democratic civil peace?" (2001).

era.³⁹ Kofi Annan, a proponent of the democratic peace theory admits that there is rather little data on the subject to arrive at such sweeping generalization. He observes that though democratic states do not fight each other, they nonetheless behave as aggressive as autocratic states towards non-democratic states.⁴⁰ The democratic peace theory is unable to explain peace within states because it essentially describes relations between states.

1.4.4 Liberal Peacebuilding and State Building

Liberal peace is the dominant paradigm behind internationally supported peacebuilding efforts in contemporary times. The liberal peace debate mirrors the democratic peace theory, but also involves the proactive promotion of liberal values and principles such as the rule of law and good governance, promotion of human rights, economic and privatization reforms and the formation of institutions associated with modern states.⁴¹ Advocates of liberal peace claim that states with the above characteristics tend to be more peaceful, both in their domestic affairs and in their relations with other states, than states without (illiberal states). The focus of liberal peacebuilding therefore goes beyond managing instability between states, the traditional focus of international relations discipline, to an emphasis on building peace within states based on liberal democracy and market economics. Advocates of liberal peace focus on social engineering meant to constitute the foundation of a stable society rather than the mere absence of violence or war.

The main objective of liberal peacebuilding is the creation of “a self-sustaining peace within... frameworks of liberal governance in which both overt and structural violence are removed and social, economic and political models conform to a mixture of liberal and neo-liberal

³⁹ Stephen M. Walt, "International relations: one world, many theories," *Foreign policy* (1998).

⁴⁰ Kofi Atta Annan, *Prevention of armed conflict: report of the Secretary-General*, United Nations Publications, 2002.

⁴¹ Messner, J.J., Haken, Nate, Hendry, Krista, Taft, Patricia, Lawrence, Kendall, Brisard, Laura and Umaña, Felipe (2014) *Failed States Index 2014: The Book*. Washington DC: The Fund for Peace; The Institute for Economics and Peace (2014) 'Global Peace Index 2014',

international expectations...”⁴². This brings together two previously distinct policy areas with different sets of actors and agencies: development and security. This security-development nexus essentially entails the transformation of societies to fit liberal norms and Western expectations.⁴³

State building emerged in the 1990s as an essential component of liberal peacebuilding. The state building literature analyzes states in terms of state fragility and state failure. According to Francis Fukuyama, state building is an important issue for the international community because weak or failed states hurts everyone, as demonstrated by September 11, when the challenges and problems associated with weak states were exported from the developing world to the West. Fukuyama claims that weak institutions accounts for the problems of developing countries. To overcome these problems, he argues that developing countries must seek good governance and democracy.⁴⁴

The abysmal performance of liberal peacebuilding and state building interventions in many parts of the developing world is the biggest challenge to the theory. These interventions are essentially external solutions to internal problems. Attempts at transferring institutional knowledge and building state capacity from abroad fail because of insufficient domestic demand. Liberal Peacebuilding interventions, more often than not, fail to address the causes of armed conflicts or to respond to local priorities because they are top-down policies based on Western values and principles. Solutions to institutional problems in developing countries have to be local and context specific.

⁴² Jason Franks and Oliver Richmond, “Co-opting Liberal Peace---building: Untying the Gordian Knot in Kosovo”, *Cooperation and Conflict* 43/1 (2008), 83.

⁴³ Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars* (New York: Zed Books, 2001):15

⁴⁴ Francis Fukuyama, *State building: Governance and world order in the 21st century*, (Profile Books, 2017).

1.4.5 Democratic Civil Peace

The theory of democratic civil peace describes the relationship between democracy and peace within states. Proponents of the democratic civil peace hypothesis believe that democracies reduces the risk of political violence in three main ways. First, democracies produce fewer political grievances because democratic regimes are generally more responsive, inclusive, and tolerant.⁴⁵ Democratic institutions reduce grievances by allocating state resources to public goods, by ensuring equitable redistribution, and by granting individuals freedom of choice in religious and cultural issues. Fewer political grievances therefore produces fewer reasons for politically-motivated violence against the state. Secondly, democratic states possess institutional mechanisms to address grievances that arise, in non-violent ways.⁴⁶ Democratic institutions, such as periodic, free, and fair elections, ensures that political opponents can channel their discontent in non-violent ways. Finally, democratic regimes have a higher cost of repression than autocratic regimes.⁴⁷ Periodic, free, and fair elections ensures that citizens reserve the means to punish repressive regimes that trample on their rights. Democratic regimes, wishing to avoid such sanctions and remain in office will therefore be less repressive than autocratic regimes. The experience of ‘third wave’ democratic countries however challenge the proposition that democratization leads to more peace as many of these countries experience increased political violence after their transition from authoritarian rule.

Paul Collier focuses on the quality of elections to explain why some democracies are unable to achieve a peace dividend.⁴⁸ In his view, democracies should experience less political

⁴⁵ Collier, *Wars, guns and votes*, (2009); Ted Robert Gurr, "Ethnic warfare on the wane," *Foreign Affairs* (2000).

⁴⁶ Collier, *Wars, guns and votes*, 2009.

⁴⁷ Rudolph J Rummel, *Power Kills: Democracy as a method of Nonviolence*. (Routledge, 2017).

⁴⁸ Collier, *Wars, guns and votes*, 2009.

violence because they produce more accountability and legitimacy. Democracy produces more accountability because citizens retains the means to punish governments that fail to use the public purse judiciously, that is, in the provision and equitable distribution of public goods and services. Democracy also produces more legitimacy because democratic governments embodies the will of the people, or at least the majority of the people. Consequently, for any given grievance, it will be difficult to persuade people to resort to violence against the government. Collier contends that in poor countries democracy is unable to produce a peace dividend because these countries are unable to hold free and fair elections.⁴⁹ Governments in these countries do not face the unpleasant prospects of losing their hold on power through elections since they are able to manipulate the polls to ensure their continued stay in office. Opponents of these regimes, therefore, have little incentive to refrain from the use of violence against the state.

It is however, significant to note that democratic civil peace continues to elude some relatively well performing democracies in Africa. Ghana continues to grapple with various kinds of ethno-political conflicts and violent clashes despite the country's successful democratization. Elections in Ghana are generally free and fair. Since 1992, the country has held seven largely successful elections, with three peaceful transfers of power. All parties involved in Ghana's elections, including domestic and international observers, accept that outcomes are valid and give all parties a fair chance of achieving political power.⁵⁰ The quality of elections are therefore unable to explain the incidence of ethno-political violence in Ghana. This study argues that in new African democracies, such as Ghana, elections are not a sufficient condition for achieving peace because the policy choice of political leaders are crucial to the resolution of ethno-political conflicts and

⁴⁹ Ibid

⁵⁰ Leslie B. Fox, Hoffman, A. Anyimadu, and M. Keshishian, "Ghana democracy and governance assessment: Final report." *United States Agency for International Development (USAID)* (2011).

peacebuilding. The failures of these liberal peace theories and emphasis on institutions to achieve peace lead scholars in security and peace studies to explore the role of non-state actors in peacebuilding.

1.4.6 The Local Turn in Peacebuilding

In recent times, scholars and experts in peace and conflict studies explore the role of bottom-up approaches and local agency in peacebuilding in response to the failures of the top-down, state-focused liberal peacebuilding projects.⁵¹ This 'local turn' refers to the range of locally based agencies present within a conflict and post-conflict environment, aimed at identifying and creating the necessary processes for peace, and framed in a way in which legitimacy in local and international terms converges.⁵² According to Leonardson, the local "refers to the everyday acts of a diversity of individuals and communities that go beyond elites."⁵³

The emphasis on local customs, cultures, experiences and knowledge in various reports from the United Nations and the World Bank, highlight the adoption of the local turn by the international community. A gradual increase in the assertiveness of local actors is one of the main reasons for the growing prominence afforded to local agency in peacebuilding interventions. Local communities realize that liberal projects fail to trickle down, and liberal prescriptions do not accord with their own identity or norms. Another factor that accounts for the increased prominence of the local in approaches to peace building is the rise of practitioners from the global South (many of them conflict-affected societies) to senior positions in international organizations. This

⁵¹ Oliver P. Richmond, "Missing Links—Peace Infrastructures and Peace Formation." *Peace Infrastructures—Assessing Concept and Practice. Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series* 10 (2012): 25.

⁵² Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver P. Richmond, "The local turn in peace building: A critical agenda for peace." *Third world quarterly* 34, no. 5 (2013).

⁵³ Hanna Leonardsson, and Gustav Rudd., "The 'local turn' in peacebuilding: a literature review of effective and emancipatory local peacebuilding," *Third World Quarterly* 36, no. 5 (2015): 833.

contributes to greater cultural and historical awareness of different identities, and of injustice, of the impact of colonialism, and of the rights of indigenous subjects in the international system.

Proponents of the local turn argue that peacebuilding should aim to restore and establish the political framework by being as inclusive as possible. Peacebuilding projects that only focus on state institutions risk alienating locals, who are likely to resist and reject such interventions.⁵⁴ Local communities are the most important resource in the resolution of local conflicts because they understand the causes and nature of these conflicts better than international actors do. The inclusion and participation of local communities in peacebuilding gives such projects increased legitimacy and accountability.

The local turn in peacebuilding faces several challenges. One obstacle is that it contradicts the universalism that lies at the heart of liberal optimism and notions of universal rights. Critics of the local turn contend that awarding legitimacy to local norms and practices, some of which significantly deviate from liberal norms, undermines the legitimacy of universal projects.⁵⁵ In addition, the role of local agency in peacebuilding brings up questions over the disposition of local actors to peace. Local communities may involve hierarchies and power relations, which relies on conflict to reinforce their positions. Furthermore, local actors may be partisan, discriminatory, exclusive or violent which does not augur well for building sustainable peace.

1.4.7 The Role of Civil Society and CSOs in Peacebuilding

Scholars and practitioners in the field of security and peacebuilding recognizes the importance of civil society and CSOs in peacebuilding. Many multilateral agencies and bilateral donors are increasingly adjusting their policy frameworks and operational support to civil society groups in peacebuilding in recognition of the importance of these actors in peacebuilding processes.

⁵⁴ Anne M. Brown and Alex Freitas Gusmao, "Peacebuilding and political hybridity in East Timor," *Peace Review* 21, no. 1 (2009): 61.

⁵⁵ Mac Ginty and Richmond, "The local turn in peace building" (2013)

In September 2005, the United Nations (UN) Security Council highlighted the comparative advantage of civil society in facilitating dialogue and providing community leadership.⁵⁶ A UN-Civil Society conference on the role of civil actors in peacebuilding further established the issue on the international policy agenda.⁵⁷

Civil society refers to an arena, or sphere where diverse societal values and interests interact, where people come together to debate, discuss, associate, and seek to influence society and political processes. Civil society falls between other key societal spheres: political (state), economic (companies and markets) and private (family). The boundaries between these spheres are however, often blurred and overlap.⁵⁸

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are the “wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations.”⁵⁹ The term goes beyond the narrower category of development-oriented NGOs, and depicts a broad range of organizations, such as community groups, women’s association, labor unions, indigenous groups, youth groups, charitable organizations, foundations, faith-based organizations, political groups, independent media, professional associations, think tanks, independent educational organizations and social movements. International development organizations such as the World Bank and the UN provide valuable support to domestic CSOs,

⁵⁶ UN, “UN Security Council Presidential Statement,” S/PRST/2005/42 (2005).

⁵⁷ Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, New York, July 19-21, 2005.

⁵⁸ World Bank, *Civil society and peacebuilding: potential, limitations and critical factors (English)*. (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007): 3-4.
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/875891468136195722/Civil-society-and-peacebuilding-potential-limitations-and-critical-factors>

⁵⁹ Ibid,3

and promote issues such as public service delivery, good governance and participatory decision-making. In many cases however, these are not considered as part of that country's civil society.

CSOs play numerous roles in peacebuilding during various phases of conflict. The Civil Society and Peacebuilding research project (2006-2010) identifies seven peacebuilding functions played by civil society. These include (1) protection of citizens against violence from all parties; (2) monitoring of human rights violations, the implementation of peace agreements, etc.; (3) advocacy for peace and human rights; (4) socialization to values of peace and democracy as well as to develop in-group identity of marginalized groups, often via peace education; (5) inter-group social cohesion: bringing people together from adversarial groups often in dialogue projects; (6) facilitation of dialogue at the local and national level between all kinds of actors; and (7) service delivery to create entry points for peacebuilding.⁶⁰

The emergence of the conflict transformation approach, in place of conflict management and conflict resolution approaches, as the focus of peacebuilding accounts for the emphasis on the role of civil society in peacebuilding. The main contribution of the conflict transformation approach is its shift in focus from international to local actors, with an emphasis on civil society and ordinary people. In addition, growing recognition of the potential adverse effects of humanitarian and development aid on conflict reinforces interest in peacebuilding by CSOs and international NGOs in a number of ways.⁶¹ First, humanitarian and development actors are intent on developing ways to make their programs conflict-sensitive and conducive to peacebuilding.

⁶⁰ Thania Paffenholz, *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment*. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010): 7

⁶¹ See Thania Paffenholz, "Peace and Conflict Sensitivity in International Cooperation. An Introductory Overview," *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft*, 4/2005, 63-82 (2005).

Second, donors and international NGOs fund or implement interventions directly aimed at peacebuilding.

The role of civil society and CSOs in peacebuilding encounters legitimacy and accountability challenges because of the nature of the sector and its relations to stakeholders. CSOs tend to be accountable to diverse stakeholders: to donors for their resources, to clients for delivery of goods and services, to allies for performance of joint activities, to staff and members for meeting their expectations, and to government agencies for complying with regulations. Dealing with diverse accountability claims is extremely difficult, and may be impossible where stakeholders have different or contradictory interests. Dependence on international donors may lead to a shift from local and national constituencies to international NGOs and donors.⁶²

In addition, the emphasis on the role of civil society in peacebuilding tends to downplay the role of the state. The logic of civil society interventions in peacebuilding downplays the capacity of the state, emphasizing instead state weaknesses. This directly undermines the capacity of state institutions. More so, in the absence of the political commitment from the national level, a community based consultation process “may remain a mere façade...and so remain vulnerable to spoilers.”⁶³ We argue in this study in favor of collaborations between the state and civil society in peacebuilding. The concept of state-society relations provides insights and benefits of such collaboration.

⁶² World Bank, *Civil Society and Peacebuilding* (2007): 26; Paffenholz, *Civil Society and Peacebuilding* (2010).

⁶³ Ulrike Hopp-Nishanka, "Giving Peace an Address: Reflections on the Potential and Challenges of Creating Peace Infrastructures," In *Peace Infrastructures: Assessing Concept and Practice*. Edited by Barbara Unger, Stina Lundström, Katrin Planta and Beatrix Austin. Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series No. 10, (2013): 10.

1.4.8 State Society Relations

As discussed above, there are two predominant views on peacebuilding. The first emphasizes the role of state institutions in peacebuilding, whilst the second discuss the role of society. The two groups however, tend to ignore the potential benefits of collaboration between state institutions and society in peacebuilding. In this section, we adopt the concept of state-society relation to develop a framework to analyze state-society collaboration in peacebuilding.

Peter Evans is one of the leading proponents of the concept of state-society relations.⁶⁴ In his seminal work, 'Embedded autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation', Evans uses the concept of the state-society relations to explain why some states achieve industrial transformation and other states fail.⁶⁵ Evans claims that this relationship is important because it can either hinder or support economic transformation, producing two extreme type of states: predatory and developmental states. According to Evans, Zaire is archetype of a predatory state because it preys on its citizenry, terrorizing them, despoiling their common patrimony, and providing little in the way of services in return.⁶⁶ The Zairean state lacks the ability to prevent individual incumbents from pursuing their own goals at the expense of the state because personal ties are the only source of cohesion, and individual maximization takes precedence over pursuit of collective goals. Ties to society are ties to individual incumbents, not connections between constituencies and the state as an organization.

In contrast, Evans argues that embedded autonomy characterizes the internal organization of developmental states such as Japan, South Korea and Singapore.⁶⁷ Embedded autonomy, in the

⁶⁴ Peter B. Evans, *Embedded autonomy: States and industrial transformation*, (Princeton University Press, 1995).

⁶⁵ Ibid

⁶⁶ Ibid, 45

⁶⁷ Ibid

view of Evans refers to the combination of corporate coherence and state-society connectedness. Corporate coherence means that state agencies are autonomous of private interest, which protects them from manipulation by powerful rent-seeking groups outside the state. Embeddedness on the other hand enables the state to retain ties with society, so that government agencies can continually negotiate and renegotiate goals and policies with non-governmental actors. Though corporate coherence and connectedness may appear contradictory, Evans insists that the joining of the two are vital if a state is to be successful in playing an active role in industrial transformation.⁶⁸ This combination ensures that the state continuously acquires the information needed to formulate long-term goals and to implement these goals. Either side of the combination by itself would not be ideal. To Evans “only when embeddedness and autonomy are joined together can a state be called developmental.”⁶⁹

In between predatory and developmental states are intermediary states such as India and Brazil. Evans claims that such states exhibit partial and imperfect approximations of embedded autonomy because their structures do not categorically preclude effective involvement, but they do not predict it either. He argues that intermediate states enjoy inconsistent but occasionally striking success in promoting industrial transformation.

At the turn of the century, Evans and other scholars proposed a three-fold transformation of state-society relations to reflect the evolution in development theory and the gap between the requirements of the 20th century and 21st century developmental states. The evolution in development theory involves a shift from the emphasis on capital accumulation to expansion in human capability as the main driver of economic growth and development.

⁶⁸ Ibid

⁶⁹ Ibid, 12

First, Evans insists that embeddedness in the 21st century must encompass ties with a broad-cross section of civil society to achieve capability expansion.⁷⁰ In the 20th century, embeddedness ensured that the state had access to information, and the state and private actors jointly implemented projects. The state cultivated ties with industrial elites because industrialization was the goal. These ties enabled the state to figure out which industrial projects were feasible and what kind of incentives would encourage relevant firms to participate in these projects. The 21st century developmental state focused on capability expansion must create effective ties with a broad cross-section of civil society because the need for information and engagement with societal partners is even greater.

Secondly, Evans insists that the requirement of competent, coherent public bureaucracies are even more important for the 21st century developmental state because without them, states would not be able to design and deliver capability-expanding public services.⁷¹ Analysts of the successful transformation of the East Asian Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) agree overwhelmingly that bureaucratic capacity is one of its institutional keystones. Public bureaucracies in these countries when compared with those of developing countries in other regions, more closely approximate the ideal-typical Weberian bureaucracy. Meritocratic recruitment promotes competence and instills in bureaucrats “a sense of esprit de corps and belief in the worthiness of their profession”, whilst long-term career rewards based on performance

⁷⁰ Peter Evans and Patrick Heller. "Human development, state transformation and the politics of the developmental state." In *The Oxford handbook of transformations of the state*. ed. Stephan Leibfried, Evelyne Huber, Matthew Lange, Jonah D. Levy, Frank Nullmeier, and John D., 707.(Oxford University Press, USA, 2015).

⁷¹ Evans. "Human development, state transformation," 696

ensures that the public service is able to retain its personnel.⁷² Delivering on capability expansion requires more state capacity because the contemporary developmental state needs to play a key role in ensuring growth results in human capability expansion, and that this would intend induce more growth. The developmental state requires multiple channels through which it can source accurate information and collect feedback from multiple stakeholders to inform relevant policies. In the absence of accurate information and feedback from stakeholders, the state may commit its resources to unproductive ventures.

Thirdly, scholars on state-society relations argue that democracy is a necessary component of the 21st century developmental state because of the ability of democracy to mobilize society and to build consensus around its policies.⁷³ The remarkable economic performance of the NICs under authoritarian political conditions suggest that development and democracy are incompatible.⁷⁴ As a result, scholarly work on the developmental state tend to emphasize the technical and administrative capacity of the state and remain largely apolitical. Scholars of the 21st century developmental state however recognize that the form of the state's mediation with society is central to translating growth into capacity expansion. If the engagement takes an authoritarian form, in which the state resorts to the use of coercion to enforce cooperation, the absence of checks and balances would limit the effectiveness of the relationship between the state and society. The absence of countervailing forces would also discourage cooperation and the exchange of

⁷² Peter Evans, "Constructing the 21st century developmental state: potentialities and pitfalls," In *Constructing a democratic developmental state in South Africa*, ed. Omano Edigheji, 45 (Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council Press, 2010)

⁷³ Omano Edigheji, "Constructing a democratic developmental state in South Africa: potentials and challenges." In *constructing a democratic developmental state in South Africa*. ed. Omano Edigheji. (Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council, 2010).

⁷⁴ Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy," *American political science review* 53, no. 1 (1959): 69-105; Thomas Carothers, "The "sequencing" fallacy," *Journal of democracy* 18, no. 1 (2007): 12-27.

information essential in building effective forms of intervention. Where the engagement is democratic, and the state negotiates the terms of its intervention with civil society and local communities, embeddedness is “...much more successful in the long term in developing synergistic relations with society...”⁷⁵ A democratic relation with society gives government policies legitimacy because it engenders both transparency and accountability. The importance of collecting information and feedback from society makes deliberation with civil society a key component of government policies.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

1.5.1 Variables and Hypothesis

This study identifies the *Peace Making State*, a unique state-society relationship between government, civil society and traditional society, which explains the success or failure of policies aimed at resolving ethno-political conflicts (see Figure 1.1 below). This unique relationship includes two independent variables- an accommodative government and a proactive civil society, and an intermediate variable- a responsive traditional society.

- An accommodative government: In the *Peace Making State* government is accommodative maintaining active ties with civil and traditional societies for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of policies. Government is accommodative because it recognizes that it needs information and feedback from, and the participation of civil and traditional societies in peacebuilding.
- A proactive civil society: Civil society is proactive in the prevention of violent conflicts and peacebuilding. Civil society in the *peace making state*, including CSOs, NGOs and

⁷⁵ Evans, "Human development, state transformation" 708

indigenous self-help groups are proactive in peacebuilding because they recognize that in the absence of peace there can be no meaningful development. These groups therefore extend their interventions from their conventional role of relief and development assistance to promoting harmonious relationships among communities.

- A responsive traditional society: Traditional society in the *Peace Making State* is responsive to peacebuilding, choosing peace over violence because it recognizes that it has little to gain from the continuation of violence. The responsiveness of traditional society depends largely on the behaviour of government. If government is accommodative and collaborates with civil and traditional societies to produce objective policies, traditional communities would be responsive to such policies. If however, government imposes bias policies, traditional communities would choose to use violence to achieve their goals. In the *peace making state*, traditional society is responsive because government is accommodative.

Policies of the Peace Making State involve a collaboration between an accommodative government, a proactive civil society and a responsive traditional society. The combination of these characteristics produces the most conducive environment for peacebuilding and achieving positive peace.⁷⁶

This leads us to the first hypothesis of this study:

- An accommodative government, a proactive civil society and a responsive traditional society are successful in resolving ethno-political conflicts.

⁷⁶ Johan Galtung (1964) defines positive peace as the absence of structural violence. We use the term in this study to refer to the resolution of the root causes of a conflict.

In contrast to policies of the *Peace Making State*, there are two other types of policies designed and implemented under state-society relationships less ideal for peacebuilding:

The first of these are top-down policies introduced by an isolated government with little or no participation from civil and/or traditional society. These policies mostly involve the use of coercion to enforce peace. These policies may be able to restore calm (negative peace)⁷⁷, but ultimately fail to address the root causes of conflicts.⁷⁸ We hypothesize that:

- Top-down policies imposed on society without participation from civil and traditional societies fail to resolve ethno-political conflicts.

The third type of policies are captured by either political elements from civil society or traditional elites and used to promote partisan interest rather than the interest of the state. These policies are captured because state-society relations are limited to ties to individual incumbents, and to selected groups from either civil society or traditional society. We hypothesize that:

- Captured policies fail to resolve ethno-political conflicts.

Democratic institutions are a necessary condition for the transformation of states into peace making states. Elections, for instance, encourages government to be accommodative, and to collaborate with civil and traditional societies to resolve ethno-political conflicts because violence and insecurity are key issues in elections. Citizens will use the polls to punish governments that fail to fulfil their mandate of providing security and protecting citizens from violence. In addition,

⁷⁷ Johan Galtung (1964) defines negative peace as the absence of direct violence. In this study however, we use negative violence to describe a situation where violence clashes has been contained but the root causes of a conflict remain unresolved.

⁷⁸ Root causes/underlying cause of a conflict involve an intricate set of historical, religious, cultural, political, and economic issues perceived by a group as central to their existence. This sense of threat often pervades the everyday lives of the parties involved and overrides their ability to recognize any shared concerns they might have.

the liberalization of political spaces encourages civil and traditional societies to be more proactive and responsive to policymaking and implementation. The more stakeholders participate, the more democratic the policy making process becomes.⁷⁹

Since this study examines the relationship between government policies and ethno-political conflicts, each case-study chapter will look at the nature of the relationships under which policies are introduced and how these relationships influences the outcome of such policies.

⁷⁹ Michels, Ank, and Laurens De Graaf. "Examining citizen participation: Local participatory policy making and democracy." *Local Government Studies* 36, no. 4 (2010): 477-491.


Figure 1.1: Analytical Framework

Key

Government

Civil Society

Traditional Society



1.6 Methodology

This study adopts a case study method with comparative perspectives and process tracing to explain conflict evolution, transformation and resolution in Northern Ghana. The focus on three cases enables the study to acquire rich, descriptive and complementary accounts to analyze the dynamics between ethno-political conflicts and government policy interventions, and the implications of these for broader theoretical issues.

This study relies mainly on written primary data from the Conflict Map of the National Peace Council (NPC).⁸⁰ The NPC produced the Conflict Map to highlight conflict zones in the country. The Map undertakes a comprehensive analysis of all conflicts in Ghana. It analyzes the spatial dynamics of conflicts, examine their underlying causes, and explore appropriate policy response interventions for their resolution. The Conflict Map identifies all conflict sites in the northern regions, relevant stakeholders, and analyzes the substantive interests of parties in these conflicts.

The study also examines other written primary data including legal instruments on the three cases, reports of presidential commissions of inquiries and ad hoc committees, reports from the Regional Houses of chiefs, police reports and ministerial documents and communications. We also examine secondary written sources including newspaper articles, and other relevant publications on conflicts in Northern Ghana.

The study collects written sources from agencies including the Public Records Administration and Archives Department in Accra and Tamale, Regional Houses of Chiefs

⁸⁰ NPC, Conflict Map (2014).

(RHCs), Regional Coordinating Councils (RCCs), secretariats of the National Peace Council and Regional Peace Councils, Ministry of the Interior, and Ministry of Chieftaincy Affairs. We also obtain written sources from some Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) including the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), Center for Democratic Development (CDD); and the Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG).

The study uses a combination of semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions to collect data from the three northern regions and the three conflict areas- Bawku, Bolgatanga and Tamale. We use a combination of purposeful and snowball sampling techniques to select respondents for interviews. The study adopts purposive sampling to select initial respondents from the Regional Peace Councils and other organizations engaged in conflicts preventions and peacebuilding in the regions. The study then uses snowball sampling to contact other potential respondents with the help of the initial respondents.

1.7 Structure of Study

This study consist of six chapters. Each chapter addresses a specific question and contributes to answering the main research questions of the study.

Chapter 2 discusses the prevalence of ethno-political conflicts in Northern Ghana within the context of the region's historical development. This chapter looks at the history and general overview of ethnic relations in the region, and the effects of British colonial policies and southern influences on ethnic relations and the development of the region. This chapter examines why ethno-political conflicts are so prevalent in Northern Ghana.

Chapter 3 analyzes the 1994-95 civil war in the Northern Region of Ghana (the Guinea Fowl War). This chapter examines why attempts to resolve the Guinea Fowl war were more successful than other conflicts in the region. The chapter examines the effects of government policies on the dynamics of the Guinea Fowl War and some of the Konkomba conflicts that preceded it- the 1981 Konkomba-Nanumba war and the 1991-92 conflict in the East Gonja District.

Chapter 4 and 5 analyzes the protracted Dagbon and Bawku Chieftaincy conflicts respectively. We argue that in order to understand why these chieftaincy conflicts have defied several government interventions, we need to unravel the role of political interventions in altering the dynamics of these conflicts. We demonstrate in these two chapters that the tendency of successive governments to use policy interventions as a political tool to reward supporters and punish opponents accounts for the failure of such interventions.

Chapter 6 provides a conclusion for the study and makes recommendation for policy alternatives.

Chapter Two

HISTORY OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND ETHNIC RELATIONS IN NORTHERN GHANA

2.0 Introduction

This chapter examines the prevalence of ethno-political conflicts in Northern Ghana within the context of the region's historical development. The chapter analyzes the relationship between the region's historical development and ethno-political conflicts to determine why these conflicts are so prevalent in this part of the country. Northern Ghana is not only a geographic concept but also a political concept shaped by peculiar historical, political, economic and social conditions. Under British colonial rule, the three northern administrative regions-Upper East, Upper West and Northern Regions- constituted the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast colony.

The Northern Territories were distinct from the rest of the country (Ashanti and the Colony) in two main ways. In the first place, in contrast to the latter two, the British acquired the Northern Territories for strategic reasons rather than for any intrinsic value. The British brought the Northern Territories under their control to prevent their European rivals from establishing themselves in the region, over concerns of losing out on the interior trade.⁸¹ Secondly, the British implemented different policies here to those in Ashanti and the Colony. The British colonizers sought to preserve the Northern Territories from so-called disruptive influences from Ashanti and the Gold Coast Colony. In these two latter territories, colonial

⁸¹ Nana James Kweku Brukum. "Studied neglect or lack of resources? The socio-economic underdevelopment of Northern Ghana under British Colonial Rule." *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana* 2 (1998).

policies, especially the expansion of education produced a wave of nationalism and agitation for self-rule.⁸²

We argue in this chapter that the discriminatory colonial policies combined with the region's peculiar political conditions to create deep ethnic divisions and tensions. Prior to the arrival of the European colonizers, most ethnic groups in the region practiced a loose political system devoid of any centralized hierarchical structures. Only a few ethnic groups possessed centralized systems of governance. Attempts by the colonial administration to reorganize the non-centralized groups under existing centralized political structures proved problematic and created tensions between these groups. The discriminatory colonial policies did not only create and reinforce ethnic tensions, but also held back the economic and political development of the region.

This chapter consist of seven main sections. The first section looks at the history of ethnic relations and political organization in the Northern Territories in the pre-colonial period. The second section examines the conditions under which the region became a British protectorate. Section 3 and 4 examines the peculiar colonial policies implemented in the Northern Territories, and the impact of these on the social, economic and political developments of the region. The fifth section examines the factors that led to the end of the policy of isolation of the North, and the challenges that arose from the integration of the

⁸²David Kimble, *A Political History of Ghana*. The rise of Gold Coast Nationalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963); Nana James Kweku Brukum, "Underdevelopment and the dilemma of independence: Northern Ghana in nationalist politics, 1946-1956," *Institute of African Studies Research Review* 14, no. 1 (1998): 17

region with the rest of the country. The sixth section analyzes the emergence of regionalism and party politics in the Northern Territories, and their effects on ethnic relations and the development of the region. The final section analyzes chieftaincy-state relations in the post-independence period.

2.1 The Nature of Political and Ethnic Relations in Pre-colonial Times

In the pre-colonial period, two distinct political systems existed among ethnic groups in Northern Ghana. On the one hand were ‘majority’ ethnic groups with centralized systems organized around chieftaincy structures that had a hierarchy from lower level chiefs to divisional chiefs and paramount chiefs.⁸³ In contrast to this centralized system was a decentralized system among ‘minority’ ethnic groups with no semblance of any hierarchical structures.⁸⁴ Instead, these groups had an ‘earth priest,’ known as a ‘Tendaana’, who held and administered land in trust for the people, and performed various religious duties to obtain the goodwill of the earth gods.⁸⁵ The vast majority of societies in Northern Ghana lived under the latter system in the pre-colonial period. The two political systems largely remained distinct despite centuries of contact, with majority and minority groups living peacefully side-by-side for the most part.⁸⁶

⁸³ George T. Stride and Caroline Ifeka, *Peoples and Empires of West Africa: West Africa in History, 1000-1800*. (Africana Publishing Corporation, 1971).

⁸⁴ The terms ‘majority and minority ethnic’ groups, as defined by the British colonizers, and still used in the Northern Regions have nothing to do with population. It instead connotes the political organizations of these ethnic groups in the past. In fact some minority ethnic groups such as the Konkombas far outnumber most of the majority ethnic groups, and together the ‘minority ethnic group outnumber the ‘majority ethnic groups’.

⁸⁵ Steve Tonah, *Ethnicity, Conflicts, and Consensus in Ghana*, (Accra: Woeli Publishing Services, 2007).

⁸⁶ Awedoba, *An Ethnographic Study*, 2010

The exact nature of the relationship between the centralized and decentralized groups, in the time before the arrival of the European colonizers, is a source of much dispute. Majority groups such as Dagombas, Gonjas, Nanumbas and Mamprusis claim that the minority groups were under their control. Most minority groups such as the Konkombas, Kusasis, Nawuris, and Sisaalas however, reject such claims.⁸⁷ These conflicting frequently led to several violent clashes, such as the Cow war in September 1940 between Dagombas and Konkombas.

2.2 The British Protectorate of the Northern Territories

The Northern Territories formally became a British Protectorate in early 1901.⁸⁸ The British brought the Northern Territories under their control to prevent their European rivals from establishing themselves in the region, over concerns of losing out on the interior trade.⁸⁹ The British acquired the Northern Territories through a series of treaties signed with various chiefs during the latter years of the 19th century.⁹⁰

The nature of these treaties reflected the British general lack of interest in the area. Unlike treaties with groups in other parts of the country, the British colonial administration in the Gold Coast sent an African agent-George Ekem Ferguson to secure and sign treaties with groups in the Northern Territories on behalf of the British Government. From 1892-

⁸⁷ Holger Weiss, "Contested Historical and Geographical Narratives: Succession Disputes, Contested Land Ownership and Religious conflicts in Northern Ghana," *Studia Orientalia Electronica* 101 (2007): 467.

⁸⁸ Colonial Reports. *Annual report on the social and economic progress of the people of the Gold Coast, 1934-35*. Report No. 1748. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1936; Jeff D. Grischow "A History of Development in the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, 1899-1957," PhD thesis, Queens University, Kingston, Ontario, 1999.

⁸⁹ Brukum, "Studied neglect," *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana*, 117.

⁹⁰ Brukum, "Underdevelopment," *Institute of African Studies Research Review*, 16; Julia Jonsson. "The Overwhelming Minority: Traditional Leadership and Ethnic Conflict in Ghana's Northern Region" (CRISE Working Paper No. 30, 2007, 264).

1894, George Ekem Ferguson signed treaties with, amongst others, the chiefs of Bole, Daboya, Yendi, Bimbilla, Wa and Gambaga.⁹¹ These treaties granted the British free access to the areas concerned, the right to build houses, possess property and carry out trade and industry.

The British also reached international agreements with France and Germany, two European rivals who also coveted the region, through the Anglo-French Convention of June 1898 and the Anglo-German Agreement of November 1899.⁹² These agreements delineated the territorial boundaries of the new ‘possession’. The ‘Northern Territories Order in Council, of 26 September 1901’ established the Protectorate, and provided for an administration formally distinct from those of Ashanti and the Gold Coast Colony. In contrast to the ‘Ashanti and Gold Coast Orders in Council of 6 September 1901’, the Northern Territories Order in Council provided for ‘protection’ rather than ‘annexation’.

The colonial administration divided the Northern Territories into three administrative units- the Northern, North Eastern and North Western Provinces, with Tamale, Bolgatanga and Wa as their respective capitals. The independent government under the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) administration maintained the Northern Province as the Northern Region, and combined the Northern Eastern and North Western Provinces to form the Upper

⁹¹ Jonsson, “The Overwhelming Minority,” 7.

⁹² Colonial Report, *Annual report on the social and economic progress of the people of the Gold Coast, 1934-35*. Report No. 1748. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1936; Paul André Ladouceur. *Chiefs and Politicians: The Politics of Regionalism in Northern Ghana*. (London, Longman, 1979, 40).

Region with Bolgatanga as its capital. In 1983, government returned the Upper Region to its colonial divisions to form the Upper East and Upper West Regions. The Northern, Upper East and Upper West Regions form present day Northern Ghana. Figure 2.1 is a map of Northern Ghana depicting the three administrative regions.

Figure 2. 1: Map of Northern Ghana



Source: Antwi et al. (2014, 77)⁹³

⁹³ Antwi, E. K., Otsuki, K., Saito, O., Obeng, F. K., Gyekye, K. A., Boakye-Danquah, J., ... & Asubonteng, K. O. Developing a community-based resilience assessment model with reference to Northern Ghana, (2014): 77.

2.3 The Colonial Policy of Isolation Transforms Political and Ethnic Relations

The British colonial policies in the Northern Territories differed significantly from Ashanti and the Colony because of the British resolve to isolate the region from the rest of the country.⁹⁴ Two factors influenced this colonial policy of isolation. In the first place, the colonial administration intended to maintain a minimum administrative presence and limit its expenditure in the region to the barest minimum because they did not believe it contained any intrinsic value.⁹⁵ Secondly, the colonial administration sought to protect the new territory from what they regarded as disruptive influence from Ashanti and the Colony.⁹⁶ In Ashanti and the Colony, political agitations and demands for self-government overwhelmed the British Colonial administration. Agitations for self-rule in these latter two territories started as early as 1868, following the formation of the Fante Confederation.⁹⁷ The educated elites, labelled as the “Young Nationalist” were behind these agitations.⁹⁸ The composition and nature of these agitations influenced the kind of colonial policies implemented in the Northern Territories, especially on the nature of local administration and the development of education.

2.3.1 Indirect Rule

The British colonial administration formally introduced the policy of ‘indirect rule’ in 1932, as part of efforts to preserve the Northern Territories from so-called disruptive

⁹⁴ Kimble, *A Political History of Ghana*, 554.

⁹⁵ Weiss, “Contested Historical” (2007).

⁹⁶ Kimble, *A Political History of Ghana*

⁹⁷ The kings of the Fante kingdoms, Denkyera and other southern states established the Fante Confederacy in early 1868 as a self-governing state to challenge European domination. The Fante Confederation had an executive council, a judiciary, an army, taxes, and a written constitution.

⁹⁸ Weiss, “Contested Historical” (2007): 466.

outside influences. Indirect rule involved the fostering of traditional values and institutions. The British colonial administration adopted indirect rule in the territory with the claim that it would permit the gradual transfer of modern skills of administration to the traditional rulers to enable them exercise greater degree of political authority.⁹⁹

The colonial administration viewed centralized groups as culturally superior to non-centralized groups, a view justified by cultural Darwinist discourses as well as the practical consideration that they could more easily incorporate the former into an indirect rule superstructure.¹⁰⁰ Their chiefs became the intermediaries of the colonial political order, charged with representing the interests of their people and adjoining non-centralized groups to the colonial administration, and colonial interests to their people.¹⁰¹ When Lieutenant Colonel Northcott, the first British Commissioner and Commandant of the Northern Territories arrived in the region in 1897, he found only a skeletal colonial staff. Taking a cue from the success of indirect rule in Northern Nigeria, he decided to incorporate chiefs into the colonial administrative structure.¹⁰² This position subsequently became the official policy of the colonial administration in the Northern Territories.

The implementation of indirect rule in the Northern Territories encountered two main challenges. First, the British found limited political centralization among the peoples of the

⁹⁹ Brukum, "Underdevelopment," *Institute of African Studies Research Review*, 17.

¹⁰⁰ Igor Kopytoff, *The African Frontier: The Reproduction of Traditional African Societies*, (Indiana University Press, 1987).

¹⁰¹ Benjamin A. Talton, "The Past and Present in Ghana's Ethnic Conflicts: British Colonial Policy and Konkomba Agency, 1930-1951," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 38, no. 2-3 (2003).

¹⁰² See Mary Bull, "Indirect rule in northern Nigeria, 1906–1911," *Essays in Imperial Government* (1963).

Northern Territories. Even among the few kingdoms in the region- Dagomba, Mamprusi, Gonja and Waala, political authority was highly decentralized, with divisional chiefs operating, more or less, independently of their paramount chiefs. To overcome this challenge, the colonial administration attempted to consolidate the power and territorial limits of the four kingdoms in the region. The administration put acephalous groups under the jurisdiction and administration of chiefly groups in the hope that they would eventually amalgamate with them and develop into more advanced forms of governance. In 1921, Governor Sir Gordon Guggisberg argued that the colonial policy “must be to maintain any Paramount chiefs that exist and gradually absorb under these any small communities scattered about. What we should aim at is that someday the Dagombas, Gonjas and Mamprusi should become strong native states.”¹⁰³ The attempts to formalize the native states into large administrative units created further challenges. In most cases, the smaller groups refused to recognize the authority of their new paramount chief. The Kasena, Nankanni and Builsa in the Northeast, for instance, refused to recognize the Nayiri as their overlord.¹⁰⁴

The second main challenge indirect rule encountered was the realization that most ethnic groups in the region had no real chiefs at all. This was particularly the case in the Northwest and in the Frafra and Kusasi areas to the Northeast. Thus in addition to the general policy of supporting local chiefs, the British created village and divisional chiefs in certain areas, frequently as a reward for loyalty or service to the colonial officers.¹⁰⁵ In this way,

¹⁰³ Quoted in Martin Staniland, *The Lions of Dagbon: political change in northern Ghana*. No. 16. (Cambridge [Eng.]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975): 58.

¹⁰⁴ Ladouceur, *Chiefs and Politicians*, 1979, 44.

¹⁰⁵ Awedoba, *An Ethnographic Study*, 2010, 3

individuals handpicked as representatives or spokesmen of the local people found themselves elevated to chieftaincy positions frequently displacing more senior and much more respected elders. This practice created tension in many communities.¹⁰⁶

2.3.2 Isolation from Participation in National Politics

The British colonial policy of isolation in the Northern Territories found its most profound expression in the exclusion of the region from participation in national politics.¹⁰⁷

The colonial administration deliberately blocked the natives of the region from participating in national politics to forestall the development of political consciousness and demands.

Whereas Ashanti and the Colony elected their first representatives to the Legislative Council as early as 1850, the North had to wait for another century to get any representation in the Assembly. The region made little political development because of the failure of the colonial administration to integrate the territory with Ashanti and the Colony and to allow the people of the region participate in the rapidly evolving politics in the country. As late as 1944, the official view remained that political consciousness in the region had yet to lead to the emergence of public opinion, or a “demand for participation in the Legislative Council...”¹⁰⁸

2.3.3 Restriction on Educational Development

The colonial administration also adopted a strict control on educational development in the Northern Territories to preserve the region from outside influences. To achieve this the colonial administration limited missionary access to the region. Christian missions were largely behind the significant advances in educational development in Ashanti and the

¹⁰⁶ Ladouceur, *Chiefs and Politicians*, 1979, 42-43.

¹⁰⁷ Brukum, "Underdevelopment," *Institute of African Studies Research Review*, 17.

¹⁰⁸ William Malcolm Hailey Baron Hailey, *Native administration and political development in British tropical Africa*. Vol. 6. Kraus Reprint, 1979, 138.

Colony (see Table 2.1 below). In the Northern Territories however, they were unable to replicate such success because the colonial administration strictly controlled their access to the area.

The White Fathers and the Wesleyan Missions were the only missions allowed to operate in the Northern Territories.¹⁰⁹ The White Fathers Mission opened the first school in the region in Navrongo, in December 1909, 380 years after the introduction of education in the Colony. The first school in the Colony was opened in 1529. The White Fathers Mission was unable to make any significant impact in the Northern Territories because it operated in an atmosphere of suspicion and outright hostility from the colonial administration.¹¹⁰ Table 2.1 below shows the contributions of missions to educational development in Ashanti and the Colony from 1900 to 1920, at a time the Northern Territories had only one Mission school.

Table 2. 1: Contribution of Missions to Education in the Gold Coast 1900-1920

Denomination	1900	1910	1915	1920
A. M. E. Zionist Mission	1	4	4	5
Basel Mission	61	63	67	88
Bremen Mission	-	13	15	27
Church of England Mission	-	3	4	5
Government	6	9	13	19
Mohammedan	1			-
Roman Catholic Mission	12	23	29	31
Wesleyan Mission	55	48	34	41
	138	165	167	217

Source: Colonial Reports 1900-1920¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ Brukum, "Underdevelopment," *Institute of African Studies Research Review*, 17.

¹¹⁰ Ladouceur, *Chiefs and Politicians*, 1979, 49-50.

¹¹¹ Colonial Reports, 1900-1920

The colonial administration claimed that the strict control on educational development in the Northern Territories was to protect the region from the breakdown of traditional authority. They insisted that the breakdown of traditional authority in Ashanti and the Colony was the result of misdirected educational expansion.¹¹² The agitation of the educated elites against colonial rule in Ashanti and the Colony defeated the colonial intension of using the school system to train intermediaries to facilitate the control of the native population.¹¹³

The colonial administration passed a separate Ordinance for the development and assistance of education in the Northern Territories- 'Education (Northern Territories) Ordinance of 1st January, 1928. This differed significantly from the 'Education (Colony and Ashanti) Ordinance of 1st January, 1927', and clearly demonstrated the intension of the British colonial administration to restrict access to education in the territory. Article 10 of the Ordinance, insisted that:

No new school or other educational institution shall be opened in the protectorate without the approval in writing of the Minister first had and obtained; nor shall any such school or other educational institution be opened unless and until the Director of Education is satisfied...

In addition, the Education (Northern Territories) Ordinance, 1928 failed to make any provision for native participation on the "Board of Education" tasked to advise the Director

¹¹² Brukum, "Underdevelopment," *Institute of African Studies Research Review*, 17.

¹¹³Corinne Segura, "Lost in Translation: Why the Structures of Formal Schooling are not translating in Rural Ghana," PhD Dissertation, 2009.

of Education on all educational matters.¹¹⁴ In contrast, the Education (Colony and Ashanti) Ordinance, 1927 insisted that the following natives were to serve on the board to protect the interest of natives:¹¹⁵

- Three African members one of whom shall be a Paramount Chief and one shall represent Ashanti.
- One African member to represent the teaching profession.

Table 2.2 compares educational development in the Northern Territories with Ashanti and the Colony by looking at the growth in the number of schools (Government schools and government assisted missionary schools), and number of pupils between 1910 and 1940.¹¹⁶ The Table depicts the slow introduction of education into the Northern Territories. In 1910, almost a decade after the region had become a British protectorate; there was just one primary school in the region, with 66 pupils. Over the next three decades this increased slowly to 16 schools, with the number of pupils only exceeding a thousand when the colonial administration handed over responsibility of the schools to the Native Authorities in 1935. In contrast, in 1910 Ashanti and the Colony together had nine government schools, 146 mission schools receiving government support and 227 non-assisted mission schools. The number of pupils increased relatively rapidly in Ashanti and the Colony exceeding 30,000 by 1925.

¹¹⁴ Education (Northern Territories) Ordinance, 1928, Article 3, sec. 1

¹¹⁵ *Education (Colony and Ashanti) Ordinance 1927*. Article 3.

¹¹⁶ Colonial Reports

Table 2. 2: Education Statistics of the Gold Coast, 1910-40

Year	Northern Territories		Asante and the Colony	
	Number of Schools	Number of Pupils	No. of Schools	No. of Pupils
1910	1	66	155(227)	17,504
1915	2	95	166 (276)	20,586
1920	4	185	213	28,395
1925	6	508	221 (593)	31,953
1930	7	595	330 (259)	(5,552)*
1935	9	919	379 (259)	(5,303)*
1940	16	1,430	424	(5,738)*

Source: Colonial Reports 1910-1940

()*= No. of pupils in only government schools

() =No. of non-assisted schools

2.3.4 The North as a Pool of cheap labor

The colonial administration sought to preserve the Northern Territories as a source of cheap labor for industries and plantations in Ashanti and the Colony. British colonial officials saw little justification for investing colonial money in the North because of its lack of minerals and other natural resources. As early as 1899, it was obvious that the colonial administration had little interest in developing this part of the country. Frederick Hodgson, Governor of the Gold Coast Colony, pointed out at the time that:

As the trade value of the Northern Territories are not favorable as to their future, and lead me to the opinion that they possess no mineral wealth, it is destitute of timber, and does not produce either rubber or kola nuts or indeed any products

of any value. I would not at present spend on the Northern territories a single penny more than is absolutely necessary.¹¹⁷

The decision of the colonial administration to make the economy of the Northern Territories subservient to that of Ashanti and the Colony shaped its attitude towards the social and economic development of the region. The colonial administration saw investments in the North as counterproductive and a hindrance to its interest in the South. In 1909, the Prime Minister ordered Sir Arthur Hutton, Chairman of the British Cotton Growers Association, to terminate its project in the Northern Territories. The colonial administration was not happy that the project was taking away labor from the more lucrative agricultural industries in the South. This was in spite of the fact that cotton exports from the region increased significantly, when the British Cotton Growers Association entered the region.

2.4 The Enduring Impact of Colonial Policies in Northern Ghana

The peculiar colonial policies implemented in the Northern Territories had several important implications for the development of the region, not least on ethnic relations and the region's social and economic underdevelopment.

2.4.1 Ethnic Relations

The colonial policies introduced in the Northern Territories had a profound effect on the relationship among ethnic groups. In 1932, as indirect rule became official policy, the Native Authority Ordinance defined the local rulers of Dagbon, Gonja, Mamprugu and Wa as 'Native Administrations' incorporating them into the colonial administrative structure.

¹¹⁷ Quoted in Brukum, "Studied neglect," *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana*, 119-120.

The ordinance empowered these chiefs to make by-laws, and with tribunals, treasuries, and local police forces.¹¹⁸ This restructured and legitimized relation between centralized ethnic groups and acephalous groups in the region. In the North Eastern Province, the colonial administration made such acephalous groups as the Kusasi, Grunshi, Frafra and Builsa subjects of the Nayiri (Paramount Chief of Mamprugu). In the North Western Province Waala, Dagarti and Sisaala came under the Wa-Na (Paramount chief of Wa). Several unassimilated ethnic groups such as Nchummuru, Nawuri, Mo, Vagala were subsumed under the Gonja Chiefs. The Ya-Na, of the Dagomba Kingdom, became the Paramount chief of the Konkombas and Chokosis.

Indirect rule left an indelible mark on ethnic relations in Northern Ghana. The new colonial ordinances reinforced and formalized the traditional domination of the centralized group over the acephalous societies. The 1932 Native Authority Ordinance made the chiefs government officials and non-cooperation with them illegal.¹¹⁹ Whilst centralized groups found these new arrangements congenial to their perception of cultural superiority, acephalous groups appreciated them less. The policy soon proved problematic, when it became obvious that the centralized groups' claim of political dominance over acephalous groups had little credence on the ground. Few decentralized ethnic groups in the North acknowledged the rulers of Dagbon, Mamprugu, Gonja or Wa as their overlords. In spite of these challenges, the British persisted with indirect rule until the coming into effect of the

¹¹⁸ Jonsson, "The Overwhelming Minority," 7.

¹¹⁹ Ibid

1951 Local Government Ordinance in 1952.¹²⁰ These colonial policies left in their wake strained relations and protracted conflicts between various ethnic groups, including the Kusasis and Mamprusis, the Konkombas and Dagombas, the Konkombas and Gonjas, among others.¹²¹

2.4.2 Impact on Socio-Economic Development

The discriminatory colonial policies ensured that from the onset, the development of the North lagged behind the rest of the country. Plange argues that the common assumption that the relative paucity of natural resources in Northern Ghana accounts for its underdevelopment is not valid.¹²² For him the origin of the underdevelopment of the region is the colonial economy. He points out that prior to the arrival of the Europeans and the advent of colonialism, the North was at the heart of the 19th century trade routes and food production and its economic situation was not so dire.

The colonial policy of limiting expenditures and investment in the Northern Territories delayed the opening up of the area.¹²³ The failure of the colonial administration to develop a reliable system of transport linking the Northern Territories with the rest of the country was a major factor that stifled the region's economic development.¹²⁴ The need to extend the railway to the North was apparent as early as 1896 when George Ferguson made his

¹²⁰Jonsson, "The Overwhelming Minority," 8; Weiss, "Contested Historical" (2007): 466.

¹²¹ Christian Lund, "'Bawku is still volatile': ethno-political conflict and state recognition in Northern Ghana," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 41, no. 4 (2003).

¹²² Nii-K Plange, "Underdevelopment in Northern Ghana: Natural Causes or Colonial Capitalism?" *Review of African Political Economy* 6, no. 15-16 (1979): 4-14.

¹²³ Brukum, "Studied neglect," *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana*, 120

¹²⁴ Ibid, 126; Inez Sutton, "Colonial agricultural policy: The non-development of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 22, no. 4 (1989).

expedition to the region. The railway line reached Kumasi in 1903, but the colonial administration rejected calls to extend it to the North. In 1913, Governor Hugh Clifford pointed out in the Legislative Assembly that:

In this matter (railway), however, the Northern Territories must be content to wait its turn. At the present time...many of the richest and most developed districts in Ashanti and the Colony are still without any efficient means of transporting their produce to the coast; and it is not until these districts have been opened up that the railway extensions to the Northern Territories can be regarded as practical politics.¹²⁵

Proponents of the extension of the railway to the North, pointed to Northern Nigeria as an example of a railway that stimulated production in a region similar to the Northern Territories. In just three years of the extension of the railway to Kano in 1912, the exports of groundnuts, hides and skins increased from 89, 000 pounds to 737, 000 pounds. By 1919, exports reached 1,999,604,000 pounds.¹²⁶ The failure to extend the railway to the North affected the cost of getting northern products to the railhead at Kumasi or to the coast, and the developments of these products.¹²⁷

Many scholars dispute the claims that the Northern Territories were a drag on the economy of Ashanti and the Colony. Brukum points out that the large number of laborers from the North, who went down to work in the cocoa and mining industries in the South,

¹²⁵ Quoted in Brukum, "Studied neglect," *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana*, 127.

¹²⁶ *Ibid*, 128

¹²⁷ Sutton, "Colonial Agricultural Policy," (1989).

created the bulk of the wealth of the country.¹²⁸ In addition, the Northern Territories was not without any potential to create its own wealth. A group of experts commissioned by the Commissioner and Commandant of the Northern Territories (CCNT), Lt. Col. Northcott to investigate the natural resources of the North reported that with some care, the North could cultivate tobacco, indigo and cotton on commercial scales. These experts also found that the area had a comparative advantage in the production of rice, shea nut, groundnut and cattle breeding.¹²⁹ The colonial administration, however, failed to develop any of these because of the discriminatory policies adopted in the region.

2.5 The End of Isolation and the Dilemma of Independence

In spite of efforts to protect the Northern Territories from influences from rest of the country, the first recorded signs of political agitation in the region invariably came from influences linked to the Colony. In 1914, the colonial administration permitted the first batch of Northerners to travel to the Colony to train as teachers at the Accra Training College. The number of Northerners that made the trip to the colonial capital to train as teachers increased significantly with the opening of the Achimota College in 1927. The returning teachers from Achimota began to criticize the policies of the colonial administration in the territory.

In 1936, the first agitations against colonial policies emerged in Tamale, in the form of an association to demand an improvement in the slow pace of educational development in the Northern Territories.¹³⁰ The exposure of these teachers to the social and economic

¹²⁸ Brukum, "Studied neglect," *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana*, 121.

¹²⁹ Brukum, "Studied neglect," *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana*.

¹³⁰ Ladouceur, *Chiefs and Politicians*, 1979, 79.

developments in the South frustrated them over their region's comparative lack of development. Between 1936 and 1938, the colonial administration opened four schools in the Protectorate in response to the activities of the association. The agitations of the association however spooked officials in the North, who moved to disband it with the imposition of hefty penalties on members and transfers of the teachers involved.¹³¹

2.5.1 The Northern Territorial Council

In 1946, the colonial administration created the Northern Territories Council (NTC) to preempt any further agitations. The NTC was a consultative body for the advancement of the interest of the chiefs and people of the Northern Territories. This became imperative following calls for constitutional change and greater native representation on the Legislative Assembly. Lord Hailey first recommended the creation of such a body in 1944, as the first step towards the creation of a central legislature for all three administrative units of the Gold Coast.¹³² The NTC, however, had limited powers, and existed simply on the invitation of the Chief Commissioner. Its functions were purely advisory in nature:¹³³

1. To discuss matters of common interest to the Native Authorities in the Northern Territories and to make recommendations thereon to the Chief Commissioner;
2. To advise the Chief Commissioner as to the expenditure of the joint funds of the Native Authorities in the Northern Territories and as to the distribution of Government grants.

¹³¹ Brukum, "Underdevelopment," *Institute of African Studies Research Review*, 18-19

¹³² Hailey, *Native administration 1979*. Lord Hailey wrote a report on the working of the systems of local rule in Africa, issued for official use under the title of *Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa*, in 1941, following journeys undertaken in 1939 and 1940.

¹³³ Ladouceur, *Chiefs and Politicians*, 1979, 72.

The NTC was initially a 'Chiefs Council' because members were all chiefs, selected by the Native Authorities. This was in line with the British aim of eventually devolving political power to the natural leaders of the people- 'the Chiefs'. The British colonial administration intended the NTC to be a platform to train chiefs on modern methods of administration so that in time they could play a role in colony-wide affairs. According to Brukum, "the NTC was regarded by the British as a training school where future representatives of the central legislature would learn the art of debates, rules of procedure and other traditions associated with the Westminster form of government".¹³⁴

2.5.2 The Watson Commission makes Recommendations for Political Independence

In the late 1940s, a series of events in the South affected the pace of political development in the Northern Territories. In February and March 1948, a series of riots rocked commercial centers in Ashanti and the Colony over general discontent caused by high prices of imported goods. The colonial response to these events influenced subsequent political developments in the Northern Territories and the country as a whole. The British Government instituted a Commission of Inquiry under the Chairmanship of Aiken Watson, a Member of the British Parliament, to inquire into the causes of the riots. The report of the Watson Commission, presented in June 1948, made recommendation for constitutional reforms to prepare the grounds for self-government.

¹³⁴ Brukum, "Underdevelopment," *Institute of African Studies Research Review*, 19

2.5.3 The Coussey Committee Ends the Isolation of the North

The British Government appointed a representative local committee to make recommendations for an independent constitution in August 1948. The committee consisted of 40 native members, with Justice Henley Coussey as Chairman. The appointment of the Coussey Committee formally ended the policy of isolation of the Northern Territories from the rest of the country because its 40 native members included five representatives from the Northern Territories. The northern representatives included three chiefs: Yakubu Tali (the chief of Tali in Dagomba), J.A. Karbo (the Lawra chief from the North-West) and J.A. Braimah (a chief from Gonja), a trained teacher- J.A.A. Salaam, and an Assistant Agricultural officer- N. Yenli.

The participation of the northern representatives on the Coussey Committee highlighted the gulf between the North and the rest of the country on their respective attitudes towards independence. Whereas most of the Committee members favored immediate self-government, the northern representatives were reluctant to support such demands. The northern representatives favored a much slower and cautious approach to government reforms. The Northern representatives argued that the lack of political consciousness among people in the North, paucity of educational facilities, and the lack of an educated class required a more cautious approach.¹³⁵ The main concern of the northern representatives was the implication of independence for their future development. Though the North was not in principle opposed to independence, the northern representatives had concerns over the future development of the region under a southern dominated government. The NTC argued that

¹³⁵ Brukum, "Underdevelopment," *Institute of African Studies Research Review*, 20.

the North would not be ready for independence for another ten to fifteen years because the Crown had yet to be fulfill its treaty obligations to the region.¹³⁶


The inclusion of Northerners in colony-wide politics produced new challenges for the independence movement. The participation of the more conservative northern representatives on the Coussey Committee produced a unique challenge for the Committee. The Committee had to come up with flexible solutions so that the new constitution could both cater for the demands of the pro-independence forces in the South, and allay the concerns held by the northern representatives. One way the Committee tried to achieve this was through the creation of regional councils. Figure 2.2 show that in the North, the regional council retained the seventeen members of the NTC plus ten elected members. In contrast, the other regional councils included two-third elected members and one-third traditional members.¹³⁷ This different composition reflected the concern of the northern members of the Coussey Committee on safeguarding the interest of northern traditional institutions in the new constitutional arrangements. The recommendations of the Coussey Committee led to the adoption of the 1951 Constitution. The 1951 Constitution gave the Executive Council an African majority and created an 84-member Legislative Assembly. The Coussey Constitution

¹³⁶ Nana James Kweku Brukum, "The Northern Territories of the Gold Coast under British Colonial Rule, 1897-1956: A study in Political Change," (PhD Thesis, Department of History, University of Toronto, 1997): 332.

¹³⁷Reproduced from Sebastiaan Robbert Soeters, "Tamale 1907-1957: between colonial trade and colonial chieftainship," (PhD Dissertation, Institute for History, Faculty of the Humanities, Leiden University, 2012): 189.

of 1951 made the Gold Coast, the first colony in sub-Saharan Africa to achieve native control of both the executive council and legislature.

Figure 2. 2: Constitution of Regional Councils: North vs. South



Source: (Reproduced from Soeters, 2012, 189)

2.5.4 The Emergence of New Elites

The introduction of political reforms under the 1951 Constitution resulted in the emergence of new political elites in the Northern Territories. Educated elites replaced traditional rulers as the representatives of the people on the NTC and in the Legislative Assembly. The mostly illiterate chiefs readily took a back seat because they saw no fundamental conflict of interest between themselves and their educated advisors who took

over from them.¹³⁸ In addition, the chiefs realized that they could not cope with modern legislative responsibilities, elections and political parties. They had difficulties following debates in the Legislative Assembly and so passed the leadership of the NTC to literates who were in most cases their own sons.¹³⁹

The new leadership came from a small group of educated northerners concentrated in two principal occupations, teaching and local administration (the Native Authority clerks, treasurers and court registrars). Table 2.3 and 2.4 depicts the division of members of the NTC, and northern members of the Legislative Assembly between chiefs and non-chiefs. The Tables shows that chiefs yielded decisively to non-chiefs during the early 1950s. The chiefs who remained members of the NTC and the Legislative Assembly were all literates. In the case of the latter, the illiterate chiefs had no choice in the matter, since only literates could serve in the Legislative Assembly. Table 2.5, shows that the new elites who replaced the chiefs were mostly sons or some other relations of traditional rulers. Table 2.5 also shows that between 1951 and 1956, the most educated Northern representatives in the Legislative Assembly were teachers from the Local Authority Schools, who had no High School Education. The low educational achievement of the northern politicians was a reflection of the region's relative lack of development. Although in relative terms, the northern politicians were well educated in terms of the general population of the North their educational achievement was incomparable to that of their counterpart southern politicians.

¹³⁸ Brukum, "Underdevelopment," *Institute of African Studies Research Review*, 19-20.

¹³⁹ Ladouceur, *Chiefs and Politicians*, 1979, 85.

Table 2. 3: Status of Members of NTC

	March 1948	Dec. 1950	Feb. 1953	Jan. 1958
Chiefs	13	13	6	5
Non-chiefs	3	3	16	17

Source: Ladouceur (1979, 84)¹⁴⁰

Table 2. 4: Status of Northern Members of the Legislative Assembly

	1951	1954	1956
Chiefs	8	3	3
Non-chiefs	11	23	23

Source: Ladouceur (1979, 84)¹⁴¹

Table 2. 5: Profile of Northern Territories Politicians, 1951-56

	Leg. Assembly, 1951	NTC 1953	Leg. Assembly, 1953	Leg. Assembly, 1956
Education (Highest Level Attained)				
Standard VII	7	4	4	5
Teacher Training Cert. 'B'	3	8	6	7
Teacher Training Cert. 'A'	5	7	12	9
Other post-primary	1	0	2	3
Not Known	3	3	2	2
Total	19	22	26	26

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, 84.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

Occupation

Teacher	8	13	15	14
Local authority official	6	3	7	6
Other government	1	1	1	3
Trader	1	2	1	1
Farmer	1	0	1	1
Imam	1	0	1	0
Not Known	1	3	0	1
Total	19	22	26	26

Trad. Status

Chief	8	5	3	3
Imam	1	0	1	0
Son of Chief	5	13	16	16
More distant relative	1	0	3	3
Commoner	1	3	2	1
Not known	3	1	1	3
Total	19	22	26	26

Source: Ladouceur (1979, 86)¹⁴²

¹⁴² Ibid, 86.

2.6 The Emergence of Regionalism and Party Politics in the Northern Territories

In April 1954, northern elites formed the Northern People's Party to promote the development of the Northern Territories as the country prepared for independence. The Northern People's Party was an attempt to form a united front to promote the interest of the North because of the realization that colonial rule largely neglected the region.¹⁴³ The Northern People's Party had its roots in traditional political institutions and shared an almost identical leadership to the NTC.¹⁴⁴ In 1951, the northern representatives entered the Legislative Assembly with great expectations because of the promises they received as part of the concessions for independence. However, the commitment shown by the Assembly towards the development of the North left them disillusioned. For example, the 'Revised Ten Year Development Plan, 1951' allocated only 7.3 per cent of the funds earmarked for educational development to the region despite the fact that it was common knowledge that educational development in the North lagged behind the rest of the country.¹⁴⁵ The northern elites became increasingly concerned that the British colonial administration would hand them over unprepared to a southern dominated government unsympathetic to their development.

Table 2.6 shows that the Northern People's Party, formed only two months prior to the 1954 general elections, won 15 out of the 26 seats in the North, making it the second

¹⁴³ Brukum, "Underdevelopment," *Institute of African Studies Research Review*, 24.

¹⁴⁴ Angela Howard, "When the People Decide: A Study of the Independence Movement in Ghana." (1999).

http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1076&context=african_diaspora_isp; Soeters, "Tamale 1907-1957," 2012, 199.

¹⁴⁵ Brukum, "Underdevelopment," *Institute of African Studies Research Review*, 23.

largest political party in the Legislative Assembly, after the Convention People's Party (CPP).¹⁴⁶

Table 2. 6: 1954 Election Results

Party	Colony		Ashanti		TVT		North		Total	
	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes
CPP	38	178,226	18	95,845	8	46,547	8	71,199	72	
NPP	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	68,709	15	68,709
MAP	0	4,003	0	5,454	0	675	1	11,040	1	
GCP	0	17,310	1	14,858	-	-	-	-	1	
TC	-	-	-	-	3	25,214	-	-	3	25,214
AYO	-	-	-	-	1	7,375	-	-	1	7,375
GNP	0	3,579	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	3,579
GAP	0	285	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	285
Inds.	6	60,404	2	46,897	1	7,375	2	41,725	12	
Total	44	263,807	21	163,054	13	87,186	26	192,673	104	513,866

Source: Austin (1964, 244). CPP- Convention Peoples Party; NPP- Northern Peoples Party;

MAP-Moslem Association Party; GCP-Ghana Congress Party; TC-Togoland Congress;

AYO-Anlo Youth Organization; GNP-Ghana National Party; GAP- Ghana Action Party;

Inds.- Independent candidates; TVT- Transvolta Togoland¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁶ Dennis Austin, *Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960*. Vol. 242, (Oxford University Press, 1964): 244.

¹⁴⁷ The trust territory formed by the division between France and Britain in 1919 of the former German colony. The northern section of the United Kingdom trust territory was administered as part of the Northern Territories; the southern section formed part of the Gold Coast Colony until 1952 when it

The success of the Northern People's Party in the 1954 elections confirmed its popularity in the North, but put the party in a rather awkward situation. The main goal of the Party was to seek the accelerated development of the North by playing a neutral role between the government and the opposition. The Northern People's Party instead, found itself as the largest opposition party in the General Assembly. The Party therefore had to assume the mantle of leader of the opposition and serve as a unifier of the opposition to the CPP Government.¹⁴⁸

The introduction of party politics, specifically the establishment of a CPP branch in Tamale in 1948 presented a serious challenge to the dominance of the Northern People's Party and traditional leaderships in the politics of the Northern Territories. This new development significantly tested the unity of purpose between northern elites. The CPP with its appeal as the ruling party easily attracted local leaders and challenged the dominance of the Northern People's Party.¹⁴⁹ The CPP had to overcome many obstacles in its attempts to expand in the North, including suspicion and hostility from the Native Authorities and colonial officials. By early 1952, the CPP had thirty-five branches in northern towns and villages, the largest being in Tamale, with nearly 2,000 members.¹⁵⁰

From the late 1940s, the conservative Northern People's Party and revolutionary CPP embodied the different types of politics evolving in the Northern Territories. The NTC/

was amalgamated with the small Colony chiefdoms east of the Volta River to form a TransVolta-Togoland region.

¹⁴⁸ Suzuko Morikawa, "Kwame Nkrumah's Contribution to Pan-Africanism: An Afrocentric Analysis," *Western Journal of Black Studies* 37, no. 1 (2013).

¹⁴⁹ Austin, *Politics in Ghana*, 1964.

¹⁵⁰ Ladouceur, *Chiefs and Politicians*, 1979, 83.

Northern People's Party received strong support from the Native Authorities, whilst the Northern CPP had its roots in the nationalist politics of the South. The Northern CPP challenged the pro-chieftaincy dominance of politics in the North and the right of the NTC/Northern People's Party to represent the views of the region. Conflicts between CPP and Northern People's Party supporters within the NTC and in the North as a whole became commonplace after the 1954 elections.

The relationship between the Northern People's Party and the CPP Government reached its lowest ebb following the formation of the National Liberation Movement (NLM) by dissidents of the CPP and pro-Ashanti elements, and the emergency of the federal question. The NLM argued that a federal constitution would allow each region to conduct its own affairs with minimum interference from the central government. The Northern People's Party saw in the federal option a political structure that would safeguard local interests by inhibiting the regional power of the central government. The Northern People's Party supported the federal option not because they believed it was the best option for the region's development, but mainly because they had become resigned to the fact that the CPP Government was unsympathetic to northern interests.¹⁵¹ The Northern People's Party felt that the North would be better off if it retained some regional autonomy, and was likely to receive more support for its development under the NLM than under the CPP.¹⁵²

The alliance between the Northern People's Party and the NLM and the emergence of the federal debate significantly changed the political landscape. To resolve these new

¹⁵¹ Soeters, "Tamale 1907-1957," 2012, 201.

¹⁵² Ladouceur, *Chiefs and Politicians*, 1979, 143.

issues, the British Government agreed to a call for fresh elections before the country proceeded to independence.¹⁵³ The Togoland Congress joined the NLM- Northern People's Party alliance for the elections.¹⁵⁴ The general elections held on 17 July 1956, resulted in a victory for the CPP and its position of central government over federal configurations. As shown in Table 2.7, the CPP won 71 of the 104 seats contested countrywide. A more encouraging showing for the CPP in the North significantly weakened the dominance of the Northern People's Party in the region. The CPP victory in the 1956 general elections paved the way for the country to gain for independence from British colonial rule.

¹⁵³ Soeters, "Tamale 1907-1957," 2012, 201.

¹⁵⁴ The Togoland Congress campaigned for the unification of the Ewe people in British Togoland and French Togoland as a separate Ewe state. The party however ultimately failed in the May 1956 UN plebiscite held in British Togoland which resulted in the unification of British Togoland and the Gold Coast.

Table 2. 7: 1956 Election Results

Party	Colony		TVT		Ashanti		North		Total	
	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes
CPP	44	179,024	8	55,508	8	96,968	11	66,641	71	398,141
NPP ¹⁵⁵	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	72,440	15	72,440
NLM	0	26,124	-	-	12	119,533	-	-	12	145,657
MAP	0	1,814	-	-	1	7,565	0	1,732	1	11,111
TC	-	-	2	20,352	-	-	-	-	2	20,352
FYO	0	1,230	1	5,617	-	-	-	-	1	6,847
WAY	0	3,898	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	3,898
Inds.	0	9,536	2	20,107	0	503	0	8,665	2	38,811
Total	44	221,626	13	101,584	21	224,569	26	149,478	104	697,257

Source: Austin (1964, 244)¹⁵⁶

CPP- Convention Peoples Party; NPP- Northern Peoples Party; the National Liberation Movement; MAP-Moslem Association Party; TC-Togoland Congress; Federated Youth Organization; Inds.- Independent candidates; WYA- Wassa Youth Association

2.6.1 The End of Regionalism and the Demise of the United Northern Front

The attainment of independence did not resolve the constitutional question of the relations between central government and the regions. Indeed, regional opposition intensified

¹⁵⁶ Austin, *Politics in Ghana*, 1964, 354.

immediately after independence. First, there was a minor revolt in the Volta Region, which the government was able to suppress quickly. Secondly, there emerged a new and militant political party at the very heart of the capital- the ‘Ga Adamgme Shifimo Kpee’ (the Ga Steadfast Association) - by the Ga community. These events among other strengthened the resolve of the government to put an end to regional politics. In December 1957, the government passed the Avoidance of Discrimination Act, which proscribed the existence of parties on regional, tribal or religious basis.¹⁵⁷

The Avoidance of Discrimination Act effectively deprived the Northern People’s Party and the other opposition parties of the basis of their support in the regions. It “forbade organizations whose purpose was the benefit or advancement of any community or religious faith from taking part in any elections.”¹⁵⁸ The passage of the Avoidance of Discrimination Act effectively ended regional politics, and with it the hope of northerners to present a united front to promote northern interest. The various regional parties: Northern People’s Party, NLM, Muslim Association Party (MAP), Togoland Congress (TC), the Anlo Youth Organization (AYO), and the Ga Shifimo Kpee came together to form the United Party (UP). With its fusion into the UP, the Northern People’s Party ceased to be a political party, and instead became the northern branch of the UP, signaling the end of a distinctively northern political entity.

The demise of the Northern People’s Party ended efforts by northern elites to promote the development of the region. Northern elites realized shortly after independence that, the

¹⁵⁷ Austin, *Politics in Ghana*, 1964, 377.

¹⁵⁸Quoted in Ladouceur, *Chiefs and Politicians*, 1979, 164

concessions they received prior to independence were not worth much. They agreed to go along on independence based on two main concessions: the institution of regional organs of government with significant powers, and a rapid increase in development spending in the North. On the former, the government made a series of amendments to the Regional Assemblies Bill submitted by the Regional Constitutional Commission. The independence constitution set up this commission to examine the question of devolution to regional assemblies. The amendments introduced by the government effectively turned the regional assemblies into advisory bodies.

The CPP administration also reneged on its promise to establish a special development fund for the North with a loan of 30 million pounds from Britain to facilitate the rapid development of the region. After independence, Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah argued that it would not be in Ghana's interest to continue to rely on her former colonizers for its development needs.¹⁵⁹ The extension of the railway line to the North was a central component of the promise to develop the region. Government assured the North that it would extend the railway to the region to open it up for rapid investment and development. The Legislative Assembly committed 10 million pounds for the construction of the Northern Territories' railway and the purchase of locomotives and rolling stock in the revised Ten-Year Development Plan in 1950-51. Government however abandoned this project soon after the attainment of independence.¹⁶⁰ The Minister of Finance reaffirmed the suspicion of

¹⁵⁹ Ladouceur, *Chiefs and Politicians*, 1979, 167-168

¹⁶⁰ Brukum, "Studied neglect," *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana*, 117.

northern elites that government was intent on concentrating its resources on the development of the South. In responding to questions on the Ten-Year Development Plan in the Legislative Assembly, he pointed out that:

...a great number of speeches especially from the Hon. Members from the Northern Territories...have complained that there is not a fair distribution of our wealth in order to improve their lot in the Northern Territories.... But I do invite their attention to the fact that the end of the world will not come at the end of this Development Plan and that there will be every prospect for providing for them on a more material basis as and when we have developed our services such as ports, railways and roads....¹⁶¹

The dissolution of the Northern People's Party and the united northern front effectively ended the desire of northerners to control their own affairs. When it became obvious that the government was unwilling to follow through on its promises to the North, the northern opposition was hardly in any position to challenge it. In addition to the dissolution of the Northern People's Party, the governing party induced majority of the northern members of the opposition in the National Assembly through a variety of mechanisms to cross over to the majority side. By the close of 1958, only six of the original 15 Northern People's Party members remained on the opposition side, and by mid-1960, more deflections left the number at just four. As members of the government, they all but abandoned their insistence on the need for the accelerated development of the North. Kwame

¹⁶¹Quoted in Brukum, "Studied neglect," *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana*, 147.

Nkrumah faced little resistance when he later insisted that he could not accept a British loan for any purpose because he wanted independence without strings. Members of the Northern CPP agreed with him that as a united country, there was no need for a separate development plan for the North.¹⁶²

2.6.2 The Emergence and Consolidation of a Two Party Tradition

The introduction of the Avoidance of Discrimination Act in December 1957 defined the foundations of the broad lines of a dominant two party tradition in Ghana—one linked to the CPP and the other to the UP. The ban on regional based parties forced these parties to band together to form the UP to challenge the ruling CPP. The CPP-UP dichotomy subsequently became the basis for a dominant two party system.

The CPP political tradition has its roots in the ideology of Ghana's first president, Kwame Nkrumah and his CPP Government. The CPP was a revolutionary party, with left-wing socialist ideology. The CPP committed to the re-ordering of the Ghanaian society including the complete abolition of the chieftaincy institution. The hostility of the CPP to the chieftaincy institution appealed it to the common people who had become disillusioned with the existing authority structure, making it a mass based party.

The Up political tradition combined elements from the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), and the conservative regional based parties. The UGCC was the first major political party formed in the Gold Coast. The UGCC espoused a moderate liberal ideology because merchants, businessmen, and intellectuals dominated its core membership.

¹⁶² Ladouceur, *Chiefs and Politicians*, 1979, 167.

The UP political tradition insisted on the need to preserve the sanctity of traditional institutions, including chieftaincy, reflecting its traditional heritage. This faction is also referred to as the Danquah-Busia-Dombo political tradition, after its principal founders.

These distinct political traditions have remained stable through diverse political changes, economic challenges, changing state-society relations, and ethno-regional conflicts to maintain reasonably consistent ideological formulations and stable alignments. These two political traditions have successfully absorbed ephemeral factions with short histories and limited visibility, scope, and influence.¹⁶³ All regimes in the country's history (both civilian and military) have been aligned to one of these two traditions.¹⁶⁴

Minion Morrison uses recruitment of party leadership and membership to determine the political alignment of political parties in the post-independence period.¹⁶⁵ He claims that the overall recruitment of party leaders and core members has remained stable, with each group tapping from its traditional base. Following in the steps of the UGCC and UP, parties aligned to this political tradition appeal to merchants, intellectuals, professionals and traditional elements. In contrast, Nkrumah and his successors tapped mobilizing oppositional forces including a new generation of politicized claimants, such as unemployed youth (verandah boys), veterans, farmers, and market women. Military regimes also reflected these two cleavages. The leaders of the 1966 coup clearly reflected the class and liberal ideological

¹⁶³ Richard Rose and Thomas Mackie, "Do Parties Persist or Fail?," in Kay Lawson and Peter Merkl, eds., *When Parties Fail* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988)

¹⁶⁴ Minion K. C. Morrison, "Political parties in Ghana through four republics: a path to democratic consolidation," *Comparative Politics* (2004): 441.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid*

biases of the UP political tradition. These leaders were mostly professional soldiers trained in Britain. The leaders of the National Liberation Council (NLC), Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) were quite different in status and ideology. These were younger, lower ranking soldiers largely locally trained militia and influenced overwhelmingly by Nkrumah's ideas.

Table 2. 8: Alignments of Ruling Parties/Regimes to Two Political Traditions

Government	Date in office	Political Tradition
CPP	1957 to 1966	Nkrumaist
NLC	1966 to 1969	UP
PP	1969 to 1972	UP
NRC (SMC)	1972 to 1979	Nkrumaist
AFRC	1979 to 1979	Nkrumaist
PNP	1979 to 1981	Nkrumaist
PNDC	1981 to 1993	Nkrumaist
NDC	1993 to 2000	Nkrumaist
NPP	2001 to 2008	UP
NDC	2009 to 2016	Nkrumaist
NPP	2017 to present	UP

Source: Morrison (2004)¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁶ Morrison, "Political parties in Ghana," (2004)

2.7 Transformation and Accommodation of Chieftaincy in the Post-Colonial Period

The Ghanaian state and the chieftaincy institution have endured a complex and an uneasy relationship since independence in 1957. In the run up to independence, the chieftaincy institution was able to compete with the nationalist movement for control of the political landscape because it enjoyed the support of the colonial administration. After independence however, the nationalist movement that assumed the reins of government used its newfound power to undermine the institution, transforming it in the process. The revolutionary CPP committed itself not only to the expulsion of the British colonial administration but also the re-ordering of the Ghanaian society including the complete abolition of the chieftaincy institution. The party viewed the chiefs "... as imperialist stooges, and raged about the arbitrary quality of a rural order dominated by those qualified to rule by birth rather than by achievement."¹⁶⁷

This anti-aristocratic stance appealed the party to many people in the countryside. In most cases, however, support for the CPP represented antipathy to individual chiefs rather a disillusion with the chieftaincy institution as a whole. Most of this support simply represented embittered and losing chiefly factions, who saw membership of the CPP as an opportunity to use the relatively sophisticated resources of local party branches to harass, oust and replace incumbent chiefs. The formation of rural branches of the CPP usually coincided with a long-standing rural struggle for a chieftaincy, and support for the party was strongest in towns and villages, which were hostile to incumbent chiefs. This led to the polarization of many

¹⁶⁷ Rathbone, *Nkrumah & the chiefs*, (2000): 53

chieftaincy disputes in the country along party lines because beleaguered chiefs, in turn, aligned themselves with opposition political parties.¹⁶⁸

The plans of the CPP to abolish the chieftaincy institution encountered several challenges. First, the CPP found its drastic proposals difficult to implement because the 1951 Constitution protected the institution. The Constitution created a permanent position for the institution in the reforms of local government. Under the new local government structure, nominees of Chiefs' councils retained 30 percent of the seats in the Regional Councils, and 60 percent in the case of the Northern Regional Council. The Coussey Committee warned,

The whole chieftaincy institution is so closely bound up with the life of our communities that its disappearance would spell disaster. Chiefs and what they symbolize in the society are so vital that the subject of their future must be approached with the greatest caution. No African of the Gold Coast is without some admiration for the best aspects of chieftaincy and all would loathe doing violence to it.¹⁶⁹

Secondly, the new local councils proved as inefficient and corrupt as the old Native Authority system under indirect rule. The hope of the CPP that the newly elected councils will be more efficient and propel the development of the countryside was not to be because the councils were unable to perform even basic functions. In most cases, the local councils were unable

¹⁶⁸ Ibid

¹⁶⁹ Quoted in Osagyefo Amoatia Ofori Panyin, "Chiefs and Traditional Authorities and their role in the Democratic Order and Governance," *Constitutional Review Series 9*. IEA Ghana (2010): 7.

to run smoothly because of hostility between the elected members, mainly CPP members and incumbent chiefs. This resulted in the breakdown of local government administration in many local government areas. Central government had to subsidize local expenditure in many places.

Thirdly, the above problems also thwarted attempts by the CPP to reform the local justice system. The CPP Government decided to scrap and replace the Native Courts because it these were inefficient and corrupt. Attempts to replace the Native Courts with lay magistrates' courts, however failed because of a shortage of lawyers. The attempts only succeeded in replacing chiefs and royals on judicial panels with a large numbers of local CPP clients with little experience or interest in the administration of justice.

As the country approached independence, the CPP abandoned its initial ambition of abolishing the chieftaincy institution and instead adopted a policy of actively courting the support of chiefs. The CPP abandoned its hostility towards chiefs because it recognized the importance of the institution in controlling the countryside. In line with this recognition, the Independence Constitution guaranteed chieftaincy as established by customary law and usage, a precedent followed by successive constitutions. The CPP also recognized the critical role chiefs could play in assisting the party to attract support from the countryside. The CPP used a combination of inducements and coercion to court chiefs to its cause. The party used the provision of infrastructure and handouts to attract the support of chiefs, and threats to withhold these from chiefs who failed to support it. Where these threats failed, government used the weight of its local party organization to support rival chiefly claimants.

In the immediate post-independence period, the governing CPP introduced the Chief (Recognition) Act of 1958. This Act vested in central government the power to determine who legally became or remained a chief. Only chiefs recognized by the state as gazetted could continue to carry out their functions.¹⁷⁰ This allowed the CPP to de-recognize and remove all those traditional rulers who opposed the government. In their place, the CPP elevated party clients to replace them. The CPP Government de-recognized and removed hundreds of chiefs throughout the country. At a meeting with the Joint Provincial Council of Chiefs in August 1958, the Minister of Local Government reminded them “‘what the Chiefs forget is the fact that a Chief is a Chief partly because the Government recognizes him as such.’”¹⁷¹

Following the overthrow of the CPP Government in 1966, the military regime of the NLC also targeted the chieftaincy institution for the purpose of political mobilization. After ousting the CPP Government in a military coup in February 1966, the NLC attempted to galvanize support for its rule by reaching out to chiefs and other groups aggrieved by the previous regime. The NLC regime dismissed all of those chiefs installed or promoted by the CPP Government, re-instating those deposed by the previous government.¹⁷² The NLC Government passed ‘NLC Decree 112’, which restored traditional rulers deposed, and chiefly hierarchies altered under the Chief (Recognition) Act of 1958.¹⁷³

¹⁷⁰ Louise Müller, *Religion and Chieftaincy in Ghana: An Explanation of the Persistence of a Traditional Political Institution in West Africa*. Vol. 2. LIT Verlag Münster, 2013.

¹⁷¹ Rathbone, *Nkrumah & the chiefs*, (2000): 61-62.

¹⁷² Ibid

¹⁷³ , Paul Nugent, *Africa since independence*, (Palgrave Macmillan. 2012): 127.

The 1969 Second Republican Constitution attempted to consolidate the position of the chieftaincy institution through the creation of Regional Houses of Chiefs and a National House of Chiefs, and representation in local administration.¹⁷⁴ The National House of Chiefs was however, only given an advisory role on issues relating to chieftaincy. Ultimate jurisdiction on chieftaincy issues remained with government. The constitution also made provisions for the accommodation of chiefs into the state apparatus at the regional and district levels. It gave the traditional councils the responsibility of electing one-third of the membership of the local government councils.¹⁷⁵ The Regional Councils were also to include not more than two representatives from the Regional House of Chiefs.¹⁷⁶

The 1979 Third Republican Constitution consolidated the independence of the chieftaincy institution by revoking the power of the state to determine the status of chiefs. The Regional Houses of Chiefs and National House of Chiefs systems received sovereignty over all chieftaincy affairs, including all decisions over their position.¹⁷⁷ The Constitution entrusted all chieftaincy matters to the traditional councils, the Regional Houses of Chiefs, and the National House of Chiefs.

The independence of the chieftaincy institution suffered a setback following the overthrow of the PNP Government and the suspension of the 1979 Constitution on December 31, 1981. The PNDC regime justified its military intervention on the basis that there was the urgent need to sanitize and rid the political landscape of corrupt ‘big men’, including chiefs

¹⁷⁴ Republic of Ghana 1969, Art 154.1

¹⁷⁵ Republic of Ghana 1969: Art 158.b

¹⁷⁶ Republic of Ghana 1969: Art 159.b.

¹⁷⁷ Müller, *Religion and Chieftaincy in Ghana*, 2013.

who were accused of wielding absolute power.¹⁷⁸ The PNDC regime set up the Peoples Defence Committees (PDCs) to replace the local governments. The PDCs however found it almost impossible to function, especially in the areas of dispute resolution, development and the maintenance of law and order because the local population preferred to rely on the chiefs for these services. The failure of the PDCs forced the PNDC regime to recognize the relevance of the chieftaincy institution. In the second half of the 1980s, the regime moved away from attempts to forge an entirely new political system to one that blended traditional and modern structures of governance, as was the case during the colonial period.¹⁷⁹

The 1992 Constitution drew a boundary between the chiefs and central government to protect the independence of the chieftaincy institution from political interference and control. Central government no longer reserved the power to formally recognize chiefs.¹⁸⁰ The constitution entrusted the traditional councils, Regional Houses of Chiefs and the National House of Chiefs with the authority to deal with all matter pertaining to chiefs and the institution of chieftaincy.¹⁸¹ Article 277 defined a chief as a person, who hailing from the appropriate family and lineage, has been validly nominated, elected or selected and enstooled, enskinned or installed as a chief or queen mother in accordance with the relevant customary

¹⁷⁸ Paul Nugent, *Big Men, Small Boys and Politics in Ghana: Power, Ideology and the Burden of History, 1982-1994* (Pinter Pub Ltd, 1995): 217.

Ibid, 219.

¹⁷⁹ Setriakor Dzivenu, "Chieftaincy-state relations: making political legitimacy in Ghana's fourth republic." (PhD Dissertation, The University of Edinburgh, 2011)

¹⁸⁰ Republic of Ghana 1992 Constitution, Art 270.3.b)

¹⁸¹ Ibid, Art 273 & 274

law and usage.¹⁸² Under the 1992 Constitution, the state in effect, surrendered its sovereignty over chieftaincy because the powers and functions of the chief was rooted outside the state.¹⁸³

The 1992 Constitution also retained the traditional powers for customary arbitration by chiefs in their communities. Although customary arbitrations requires the consent of the parties involved, they are enforceable in the court of law as an *ex parte* motion because the constitution recognizes customary law and practices as interpreted by chiefs.¹⁸⁴ Through the 1992 Constitution, chiefs and the chieftaincy institution regained their place and position in society. The institution today enjoys a semblance of an autonomous status equivalent to the independence guaranteed to other state institutions, such as the Judiciary. Ghana therefore provides a good example of what Sklar refers to as a “mixed polity” – a democracy that combines both democratic and oligarchic features.¹⁸⁵ Englbert claims that African states that are able to incorporate indigenous with liberal institutions are more likely to establish and maintain political legitimacy.¹⁸⁶

2.8 Conclusion

The prevalence of ethno-political conflicts in Northern Ghana must be understood from the perspective of the region’s peculiar political, social, economic and historical development. This chapter shows that discriminatory colonial policies implemented in the

¹⁸² Ibid, Art 277

¹⁸³ Dzivenu, "Chieftaincy-state relations" (2011)

¹⁸⁴ Republic of Ghana 1992 Constitution, Article 125.

¹⁸⁵ Sklar, Richard L. The Premise of Mixed Government in African Political Studies. In *Indigenous Political Structures and Governance in Africa*. Edited by O. Vaughan . (Ibadan: Sefer Books Ltd. 2003).

¹⁸⁶ Pierre Englebert, "Patterns and Theories of Traditional Resurgence in Tropical Africa." *Mondes en développement* 2 (2002).

Northern Territories were influential in producing strained ethnic relations and holding back the political and socio-economic development of the region. The chapter finds that the British acquired the Northern Territories because of its strategic value rather than any intrinsic interest in the area. This influenced the nature of the policies (discriminatory) the colonial administration introduced in the region. The discriminatory policies distorted ethnic relations and the development of the region and explains the prevalence of ethno-political conflicts in the region.

Chapter Three

THE END OF INTER-ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN THE NORTHERN REGION

3.0 Introduction

The Guinea Fowl war of 1994-95 in the Northern Region represented the biggest test to Ghana status as a stable country and the ability of the state to protect citizens against violence. This war was the latest phase of a series of long running conflicts between majority and minority ethnic groups in the region. The war, which involved majority ethnic groups such as the Nanumba, Dagomba and Gonja on one side, and on the other minority groups including the Konkomba, Nawuri, Basare and Nchumuru,¹⁸⁷ was the bloodiest and most widespread in Ghana since independence. The war covered most of the Northern Region and neighboring parts of other regions, destroyed 441 villages, displaced more than 178,000 people and led to the loss of at least 2,000 lives.¹⁸⁸ In spite of its widespread and violent nature, the Guinea Fowl war has been followed by the longest period of peace in the region's post-colonial history. This leads this chapter to focus on examining why attempts to resolve it were more successful than attempts to resolve other conflicts in the region.

The challenges related to the resolution of ethno-political conflicts in Northern Ghana has led various scholars to seek to gain and provide a better understanding of the factors that

¹⁸⁷ The terms 'majority and minority ethnic' groups describes the political organizations of these ethnic groups, rather than the size of their populations. In fact some minority ethnic groups such as the Konkombas far outnumber most of the majority ethnic groups, and together the 'minority ethnic group outnumber the 'majority ethnic groups'.

¹⁸⁸ While the 1999 Oxfam report estimated that 15,000 lives were lost, 2,000 is the official figure quoted by the InterNGO Consortium and was based on a body count. However, it is important to note that many NR inhabitants believe the actual death toll to have been higher. The final number is difficult to verify, especially because of the Konkomba custom of taking their dead with them from the battlefield for burial.

contributed to the resolution of the Guinea Fowl War. Three schools of thoughts attempts to account for the peace in the Northern Region. A first group of scholars claims that Ghana's burgeoning democracy is the reason for the peace in the Northern Region.¹⁸⁹ Proponents of this view argue that the institutionalization of competitive democracy indirectly resolved ethnic grievances that were at the root of the numerous inter-ethnic conflicts in the region, especially those concerning subordination in the sphere of traditional politics. According to Creamer, a competitive two-party democracy diminished the political saliency of ethnic identity by providing an alternative access to political resources at the national level.¹⁹⁰ The diminished saliency of ethnicity accompanies a newfound saliency of socioeconomic cleavages expressed through party politics, revealing a political landscape in which minority and majority groups are no longer necessarily adversaries. This claim however cannot explain the persistence of inter-ethnic conflicts in other parts of the country. In Bawku, competitive party politics did not diminish the saliency of ethnicity. In fact, the reintroduction of electoral democracy coincided with an increase in violent clashes between the Kusasis and Mamprusis over chieftaincy.

The second school argues that the peace in the Northern Region is only but a temporal one because the grievances that caused the Guinea Fowl War remain unresolved.¹⁹¹ Proponents of this school are less impressed with the contribution of the peace settlement,

¹⁸⁹ Robert Creamer, "What Went Right? The Role of Democracy in Ghana's Puzzling Ethnic Peace," PhD diss., McGill University Libraries, 2015; Benjamin Talton, *Politics of Social Change in Ghana: The Konkomba Struggle for Political Equality*, (Taylor & Francis Limited, 2010).

¹⁹⁰ Creamer, "What Went Right? 2015.

¹⁹¹ Julia Jonsson, "Voices of Reason: a Ghanaian Practice-Based Vision of Peacebuilding." (CRISE Working Paper No. 68. 2009); Martijn Wienia, *Ominous calm. Autochtony and Sovereignty in Konkomba/Nanumba Violence and Peace, Ghana*. African Studies Centre, Leiden, 2009.

signed at the end of the war, to the peace in the region. Wienia describes the peace in the Northern Region as an ‘ominous calm’.¹⁹² According to him, the mechanisms that triggered previous episodes of violence remain outstanding because the peace settlement only succeeded in suppressing the violence. For Jönsson, the peace settlement failed to address basic grievances such as the ethnic exclusiveness of neo-traditional institutions.¹⁹³ Jönsson maintains that the basic grievances of chieflessness and political underrepresentation remains just as salient as ever.¹⁹⁴ The claim that peace in the Northern Region is on borrowed time is, however, unfounded because in spite of the challenges faced in the operationalization of the peace settlement, the region is presently enjoying its longest period of inter-ethnic peace since pre-colonial times.

The third school credit the intervention by a consortium of NGOs and the Kumasi Peace Accord for the peaceful settlement of the Guinea Civil War.¹⁹⁵ Van der Linde and Naylor claim that the consortium played an important role in promoting peace in the region because the facilitation of a participatory process was crucial in tackling some of the major causes of the conflict.¹⁹⁶ Kaye and Beland also observe that the peace process facilitated by the consortium was successful because it adopted conflict resolution and transformation

¹⁹² Wienia, *Ominous calm*. 2009, 196.

¹⁹³ Jonsson, “The Overwhelming Minority,” 38.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid

¹⁹⁵ Hizkias Assefa, *Coexistence and reconciliation in the northern region of Ghana*, (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books), 2001; Mathias Awonnatey Ateng, and Joseph Abazaami, "Civil Society Organisations and peacebuilding in Northern Ghana. Understanding the factors that have facilitated the successful entry of Civil Society Organizations in conflict zones" *Conflict & Communication* 15, no. 1 (2016); Ada Van der Linde, and Rachel Naylor, *Building Sustainable Peace: Conflict, Conciliation, and Civil Society in Northern Ghana*, (Oxfam GB, 1999).

¹⁹⁶ Van der Linde, *Building Sustainable Peace* (1999).

strategies to generate dialogue and interdependence among constituents of the communities in conflict.¹⁹⁷ These scholars however fail to recognize the role of government in the peace process. Scholars such as Assefa and Jonsson criticize the role of the government, and particularly the Permanent Peace and Negotiation Team (PPNT) in the peace process.¹⁹⁸ The analysis of the Kumasi Peace process in isolation and the failure to recognize the role of government in the peace process denies an important component of the peace process-the collaboration between government, civil society and the warring communities in the peace the settlement.

We argue in this chapter that the peace process in the Northern Region was successful because it participatory process with government, civil society and the warring communities collaborating to facilitate it. The peace process adopted a bottom-up approach with government playing an accommodative role, allowing civil society and the warring factions to assume the center stage in the negotiation process. This collaboration ensured that the peace process enjoyed legitimacy both at the national level and at the grassroots. Legitimacy from the grassroots particularly proved invaluable to the survival of the accord because the warring communities accepted that it represented the best chance for them to live in peace.

We also argue that accommodation by government was key to the successes of the peace process. Criticism of government's role in the peace process stems from the failure to

¹⁹⁷ Julie Kaye, and Daniel Béland, "The politics of ethnicity and post-conflict reconstruction: The case of Northern Ghana" *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 27, no. 2 (2009): 177-200.

¹⁹⁸ Assefa, *Coexistence and reconciliation*, 2001; Jonsson, "Voices of Reason." 2009.

recognize the value of this accommodative role in the success of the Kumasi Accord. The accommodative role of government in the peace process proved significant in the success of the process in two main ways. First, it created the necessary space for the process to proceed unencumbered over a two-year period. One of the main challenges facing peace initiatives undertaken by civil society is lack of space to work systematically over a sufficient period. As soon as such processes begin to show signs of progress, it attracts competition including politicians who are eager to claim credit for any potential peace. There are many instances in Africa where signs of progress in a peacebuilding process triggers government interventions.¹⁹⁹ These interventions prematurely takes over, and risk politicizing the process to its detriment. Secondly, the decision of central government to assume an accommodative and passive role in the Kumasi Peace Process protected the process from accusations of political interferences and favoritism. Successive regimes therefore had no pretext to review the Peace Accord.

This chapter comprises seven main sections. The first section looks at ethnic diversity and conflicts in the Northern Region. This section also discusses the main precursors to the 1994-95 civil war- the 1981 Konkomba-Nanumba war, the 1991/92 East Gonja conflict and the Konkomba petition for traditional autonomy. The second section discusses the circumstances surrounding the outbreak of the 1994-95 civil war. The third section analyzes initial government response to the outbreak of the 1994 war. Section four, discusses the main stages of the peace process that ended the 1994-95 civil war. This section analyzes the role

¹⁹⁹ Assefa, *Coexistence and reconciliation*, 2001.

of government, civil society and local communities in the various phases of the peace process. The fifth section looks at parallel projects implemented by various parties to support the peace process. The sixth section reviews the new traditional order created by this collaborative peace process. The final section presents a comparative analysis of the various policy interventions on inter-ethnic conflicts in the Northern Region.

3.1 Ethnic Diversity and Conflicts in the Northern Region

The Northern Region is the most ethnic diverse administrative region in the country. The region is home to about 17 ethnic groups, categorized into four main groups: the Mole Dagbon, (52.2%), the Gurmas, (21.8%), the Akan (17.3) and the Guan (8.7%). Among the Mole-Dagbon, the largest sub-groups are the Dagomba and the Mamprusi, while the Konkomba are the largest of the Gurma group. Among the Akan and Guan, the Chokosi and the Gonja are the main sub-groups respectively. Of the sub-groups, the Dagomba and Konkomba are the two largest, with the former alone constituting about a third of the population of the entire region.²⁰⁰

These ethnic groups are also categorized based on their political organizations. The Dagomba, Nanumba, Gonja and Mamprusi are normally referred to as majority groups because they possess centralized traditional political organizations, with a hierarchy of chiefs from lower level chiefs to divisional chiefs as well as paramount chiefs. The other ethnic groups are organized on clan basis, and lack centralized political structures. Scholars refer to these groups as minority or acephalous groups.

²⁰⁰ Ghana districts.com)

Inter-ethnic conflicts in the Northern Region mostly take place between minority and majority groups. These conflicts stem from several decades of, what Brukum describes as the relegation of minority groups to second-rate citizens in traditional and political administration.²⁰¹ During the period under colonial rule, the British administration governed through the existing chiefs because of political expediency and economic necessity. The colonial administration incorporated the paramount chiefs of the Dagomba, Gonja, Mamprusi, and Nanumba into the colonial administrative structure and brought surrounding unassimilated minority groups under their control. Some scholars therefore view these conflicts “as wars of emancipation” with “one group of people determined to maintain a decadent status quo and the other fighting to overthrow it.”²⁰² The most important inter-ethnic conflicts in the region include the 1981 Pito War, the 1991-92 East Gonja Conflict and the Guinea Fowl War of 1994-95.

From the beginning of the 1980s, a series of inter-ethnic conflicts besieged the area around the Oti River along the Ghana-Togo border. These conflicts had two distinctive features. First, they occurred between majority and minority ethnic groups. Secondly, although these series of conflicts occurred in different places with different opponents, they all involved members of one ethnic group in particular, the Konkomba. In 1981, Konkomba groups fought against the Nanumba ethnic group in the Nanumba District; in 1992, they aligned with the Nawuri to fight the Gonja in the East Gonja District; and in 1993, they

²⁰¹ Nana James Kwaku Brukum, "Ethnic conflict in northern Ghana, 1980-1999: An appraisal." *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana* 4/5 (2000): 132.

²⁰² *Ibid*, 139

demanded traditional autonomy and lands rights from the Dagomba. The failure of government to address the underlying causes of these conflict heightened tensions between the Konkombas and their majority, chiefly neighbors, which eventually set the stage for the Guinea Fowl war of 1994-95.

3.1.1 The Pito War and the Failure of Top-Down Government Policies

The Pito War of 1981 between the Konkomba and Nanumba ethnic groups was the first large-scale inter-ethnic conflict in Ghana in the post-colonial period. The conflict displaced thousands of people and destroyed properties running into several millions of dollars. Estimates of the number of fatalities in the war range from 1,000 to 2,000.²⁰³ Most scholars on conflicts in Northern Ghana trace the source of the 1981 conflict to the formation of the Konkomba Youth Association (KOYA) in the late 1977 by young Konkomba intellectuals.²⁰⁴ KOYA challenged the right of Nanumba chiefs to claim tributes from Konkombas and encouraged their kin to start adjudicating their disputes under their own headmen.²⁰⁵ The actions of KOYA and the Konkombas denied Nanumba chiefs an important source of income. The Nanumba paramount chief ordered all the new Konkomba headmen to leave the region citing their actions as acts of rebellion to Nanumba status as landowners. KOYA denounced the order of the Nanumba chief, arguing that as citizens of Ghana, they have a right to settle in any district and to appoint leaders amongst themselves to manage

²⁰³ Tsikata, "Identities, Inequalities and Conflicts in Ghana," 2004, 30.

²⁰⁴ Artur Bogner, "The 1994 civil war in northern Ghana: the genesis and escalation of a 'tribal conflict,'" In *Ethnicity in Ghana*, ed. Carola Lentz & Paul Nugent. (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2000), 183-203; Peter Skalnik, *Nanumba Chieftaincy facing the Ghanaian State and Konkomba 'Tribesmen': An Interpretation of the Nanumba-Konkomba war of 1981*, (Les cahiers du CEDAF 2, 1986).

²⁰⁵ Bogner, "The 1994 civil war in northern Ghana" 2000, 188

their disputes. This created tensions, which came to a head on April 23, 1981 following the death of a Nanumba man in a fight with a Konkomba over a woman in a pito²⁰⁶ bar in Bimbilla, the capital of Nanumba Traditional Area. In response to the death of their kin, Nanumba warriors attacked and destroyed a Konkomba village- Kabuliya. The violent clashes quickly spread to Kpasaland, the heart of Konkomba settlements, where Konkomba warriors either massacred or forced Nanumba residents to flee.

Government implemented two interventions in response to the violent clashes between the Konkomba and Nanumba. First, government sent in a police task force from Tamale (the regional capital) to contain the violence. This intervention was successful in containing the violent classes (Negative Peace), but could do little to resolve the differences between the warring factions. Government subsequently set up a Committee of Inquiry, under the Chairmanship of Justice Lamptey, to determine the underlying causes of the conflict and make recommendations for its resolution. The Justice Lamptey Committee was, however, unable to complete its work because of the ouster of the PNP administration by the military coup of December 31, 1981. The new PNDC regime was content to enforce the stalemate. This left a simmering sense of anger and humiliation amongst the majority Nanumbas, and tensions with the Konkomba minority ethnic group.

3.1.2 The 1991-92 Conflict in East Gonja

The 1991-92 conflict in East Gonja district was another conflict that created tensions between Konkombas and a second majority ethnic group-the Gonja. This conflict was also

²⁰⁶ A locally brewed beer from sorghum popular in Northern Ghana

instrumental in setting the stage for the 1994-95 civil war in the Northern Region. The East Gonja conflict initially involved the Gonja and the Nawuri as the main protagonist. The Nawuri, a minority ethnic group in the East Gonja District challenged the Gonja's claims of traditional control over them. Nawuri chiefs claimed to be independent and were the legitimate landowners of the area around Kpandai (east of Salaga) because the Gonja had never conquered them. Tensions between the two groups escalated at the beginning of 1991 when the Gonja Youth Association (GOYA), decided to hold their annual meeting in Kpandai- the traditional capital of the Nawuri and the seat of the highest Nawuri chief. The Nawuri interpreted this as an intentional provocation and petitioned government to intervene.

Government responded to the mounting tensions in the area by banning meetings of all youth associations in the area. This intervention however failed to resolve the conflict as the tensions degenerated into violent clashes in April 1991 over a double allocation of a piece of land. The Nawuri chief allocated the land to the Catholic Church to put up an agricultural station, whilst the Gonja chief allocated the same piece of land to a Gonja man. During the first phase of fighting, the Gonja drove the Nawuri out of Kpandai. The Nawuri regrouped under the leadership of the Nawuri Youth Association (NAYA) to recapture Kpandai in June 1992 during the second phase of the clashes. In the third phase of fighting in May 1992, Konkomba warriors joined forces with the Nawuri to repeal reassembled Gonja warriors from retaking Kpandai. According the Konkombas, they intervened to protect Konkombas settlers who had been targeted by Gonja warriors during the previous assault on Kpandai. The Gonja blamed their defeat on the Konkomba intervention, which contributed to tensions and mutual suspicions between the two groups.

Government introduced two policies in an attempt to resolve the East Gonja conflict. First, the Northern Regional Security Committee (REGSEC) negotiated a ceasefire and disarmament agreement with representatives of the Nawuri and the Gonja on June 7, 1991.²⁰⁷ This ceasefire however failed to end the conflict because it lacked legitimacy at the grassroots. The ceasefire signed with the representatives of the two ethnic groups failed to filter to the grassroots. The conflict and the security in the area remained acute because of a series of persistent attacks against the Gonja in Kpandai.

Central Government also set up the Justice Ampiah Committee to investigate the causes of the conflict and to submit recommendation for its resolution. The Committee concluded that allodial land rights, traditional political arrangements and other social exigencies in the Kpandai area were the main causes of the conflict.²⁰⁸ The Committee rejected the Gonja claims to ownership rights to the area and recommended that government consider the Nawuri demands for the creation of an independent district.²⁰⁹ The Committee was however unable to resolve the conflict because it lacked legitimacy among the factions and the support of government. The Gonjas rejected the recommendations of the Committee.²¹⁰ The PNDC military regime also refused to implement the recommendations

²⁰⁷ DISEC, "Memoranda Presented to the Committee of Inquiry into the Gonja/Nawuris and Nanjuros Conflict by the District Security Committee (DISEC)," East Gonja District Assembly, 1991.

²⁰⁸ Justice Ampiah, *Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Gonjas, Nawuris and Nanjuro Dispute*. 1991.

²⁰⁹ Bogner, "The 1994 civil war in northern Ghana" 2000.

²¹⁰ Brilliant Hushie, "Do not accept Ampiah Report," *Daily Graphic*, April 8, 1994, 3.

of the Committee because of concerns over its electoral chances as the country prepared for a return to democratic rule.²¹¹

3.2 The Guinea Fowl War of 1994-95

3.2.1 Proximate Cause: The Konkomba Petition for Traditional Autonomy

Many people consider KOYA demands for traditional autonomy and land rights as the proximate cause of the 1994-95 civil war in the Northern Region.²¹² The Konkombas are an acephalous group with no semblance of a political hierarchy. In contrast to their more centralized neighbors, including the Dagomba, Nanumba, Gonja and the Mamprusis, the Konkomba have no ruling nobility above the village level. In pre-colonial times, Konkomba political organization centered on districts inhabited by clans and an earth shrine. An earth priest who tended this shrine represented the clan. The heartland of the Konkombas in Ghana is the eastern parts of the Northern Region. This area came under German colonization in the late 19th century but after the German defeat, a UN Trusteeship entrusted it to Britain in 1919 as part of the British Togoland. In 1956, the area became part of the Northern Region following the decision of the British Togoland to join independent Ghana.

By placing Konkombas in the Northern Region under the custodianship of the Ya-Na, the Dagomba paramount chief, the British colonial policy of indirect rule confirmed Konkomba as settlers. This included the inhabitants of both the areas previously conquered by the Dagomba, and of the neighboring parts controlled by Konkomba clans. This policy

²¹¹ Cletus Kwaku Mbowura, One Conflict, Three Resolution Mechanisms: The Dilemma of Resolving the Inter-Ethnic Conflict between the Nawuri and the Gonja of Northern Ghana. *The International Journal of Humanities & social studies*. Vol. 2. Issue 7 (2014).

²¹² Bogner, "The 1994 civil war in northern Ghana" 2000.

denied the Konkomba any autonomous land rights because it entrusted all lands in the region to the Ya-Na to administer on behalf of his subjects. Indirect rule therefore empowered Dagomba chiefs to claim various client obligations from the Konkomba in exchange for the use of the land.

Beginning in the 1930s, a significant number of Konkombas migrated southward to settle in areas including Nanun and Gonja because of land pressure caused by soil degradation and population increases. The Konkomba are predominately subsistence farmers, who cultivate yams on a long-term shifting basis. They settle on a piece of land and cultivate it until its soil fertility is exhausted, at which point they move to a new piece of land. This southward migration brought Konkomba into contact with and under the control of the paramount chiefs of the Nanumba and Gonja. This created a situation whereby in addition to the Dagomba, tensions developed between the Konkomba and the Nanumba and Gonja majority ethnic groups.

In June 1993, KOYA sent a petition to the president of the National House of Chiefs requesting the creation of an autonomous paramountcy for Konkombaland. The petition requested the elevation of the Chief of Saboba, the most prominent Konkomba chief, to the status of an independent paramount chief with autonomous land rights. The Konkomba request for an independent paramountcy sought to liberate them from the Dagomba and other majority ethnic groups, grant them the right to live in a clearly defined area of their own and the right to determine their own traditional affairs.²¹³ KOYA argued that contrary to

²¹³ Awedoba, *An Ethnographic Study*, (2010); Ibrahim Mahama, *Ethnic Conflicts in Northern Ghana*, (Cyber Systems, 2003).

Dagomba claims, Konkombas are not migrants to the area around the Oti Basin because they inhabited the entire basin as early as the seventieth century. KOYA also argued that Konkomba settlers in Nanun and Gonja reserve the right to settle their own disputes and demanded the end to the payments of tributes, but stopped short of demanding autonomous landownership in these places.²¹⁴The National House of Chiefs directed KOYA to re-submit the petition to the Ya-Na as specified in the 1992 Constitution. According to the Constitution, such a petition should have been made through the Ya-Na, who has jurisdiction over the Konkomba.

The Dagomba Traditional Council rejected Konkomba demands for an independent paramountcy, describing it as a revolt, an illegitimate claim to Dagomba lands and an attempt to undermine Dagomba integrity.²¹⁵ The petition also heightened tensions between Konkombas and the Nanunba and Gonja majority groups because it brought back memories of the former's conflicts with these groups over analogous issues.

3.2.2 The Outbreak of the Guinea Fowl War

The Guinea Fowl War in the Northern Region started with a breakdown of law and order in Bimbilla, following a mob attack on security personnel and the burning down of the local police station on January 25, 1994. The Nanumba mob blamed the attack on the interception and seizure of smuggled ammunitions into the town by the police; at a time, they alleged the Konkombas were stockpiling arms. The mob made away with 500 rifles, AK47s, four submachine guns, 5 Mark 4s, 50 tear gas and 300 packets of ammunitions from the

²¹⁴ S. S. Tampuri, *Gonja: The Mandingoes of Ghana*, (Xlibris: Indiana. 2016).

²¹⁵ Awedoba, *An Ethnographic Study*, (2010), 226.

police armory. The mob chased the police out of the town and prevented them from reentering it.²¹⁶

The death of a Nanumba man a week later, from a quarrel with a Konkomba man over the price of a Guinea Fowl at Nakpayili sparked violent clashes between Nanumbas and Konkombas, which quickly spread to Bimbilla, Lungi, Kparisa, Wulensi, Chamba, Bakpa and Nanka townships. Bands of Nanumba and Konkomba warriors attacked villages and towns belonging to the other side, setting them aflame.²¹⁷ The underlying causes of the conflict became apparent when majority groups including Dagombas and Gonjas aligned with the Nanumbas to attack the Konkombas, whilst minority groups such as the Basare, Nawuri, and Nchumuru joined forces with the Konkomba.

The interventions by these majority and minority groups took the conflict to major towns including Yendi, Salaga and Tamale and across the Northern Region. Fighting in and around Tamale, forced over 5000 Konkombas to flee the regional capital. Another 2700 took refuge at the Kamina Military Barracks. Whilst Gonja warriors intercepted and massacred hundreds of Konkombas fleeing from the capital.²¹⁸ An estimated 5,000 refugees, made up of 3,940 children, 755 women and 174 men crossed the border into Togo.²¹⁹

The 1994-95 civil war proved to be the most devastating and widespread in Ghana's post-colonial history. According to some estimates it claimed over 2000 lives, destroyed at

²¹⁶ *Daily Graphic*, "Bimbilla is calm," January 31, 1994, 1 & 3; *Daily Graphic*, "Situation in Bimbilla still tense," January 29, 1994, 1 & 3.

²¹⁷ *Daily Graphic*, "Fighting erupts between Konkombas and Nanumbas," February 3, 1994, 8 & 9

²¹⁸ Kwame Asare Boadu, "Carnage at Buipe Bridge," *Daily Graphic*, February 11, 1994, 1.

²¹⁹ Margaret Amuzu, "5,000 Refugees flee to Togo," *Daily Graphic*, February 19, 1994, 1.

least 441 villages and left 178,000 people internally displaced.²²⁰ Fighting also spilled over into other regions, especially among settlers from the warring factions. In the Volta Region, Konkombas clashed with Nanumbas in Damanko and Krachi.²²¹ In the national capital-Accra, a grenade exploded at the Konkomba market on March 1, 1994 injuring at least three people.²²²

3.3 Initial Government Response: Top-Down Government Policies

This section analyzes various policies instituted by government, in the wake of the outbreak of the Guinea Fowl war, to contain the violent clashes and resolve the conflict. Following the outbreak of the war, government imposed a couple of top-down policies to arrest the violence and resolve the conflict, including the imposition of a state of emergency and the Permanent Peace Negotiation Team (PPNT) to negotiate a ceasefire and a permanent peace deal.

3.3.1 State of Emergency and Peacekeeping

The first phase of the peace process involved a state of emergency and a joint-military peacekeeping intervention. The President declared a three-month state of emergency in all seven districts involved in the conflict on February 10, 1994 upon the recommendation of the Council of State.²²³ The affected districts included Yendi, Nanumba, Gushiegu-Karaga,

²²⁰ Joe Bradford Nyinah and brilliant Hushie, “Carnage in the North...As refugees flee Ethnic strife,” *Daily Graphic*, February 14, 1994, 1 & 3.

²²¹ *Ghanaian Times*, “Ejura Area saved from Diasaster,” February 17, 1994, 1 & 5; See also Tim Dزامboe, “Four Women subjected to atrocities at damanko,” *Daily Graphic*, 1.

²²² Efam Awo Dovi, “3 Injured in Grenade Blast,” *Daily Graphic*, March 2, 1994, 1; Refworld, *Chronology for Mossi-Dagomba in Ghana*. Minorities at Risk Project, 2004. Accessed December 9, 2018, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/469f388f1e.html>.

²²³ Debra Fynn and Nana Dompseh Boadu, “State of Emergency Declared in seven Northern Districts,” *Daily Graphic*, February 11, 1994, 1, 8, & 9.

Saboba-Chereponi, Zabzugu-Tatale, East Gonja, and the Tamale Municipality. Government subsequently deployed a joint Military Task Force to enforce the state of emergency in the seven districts, and other 12 villages where the tensions was highest to prevent any further fighting.

Government's immediate response to the outbreak of the war had mixed outcomes. First, the warring factions accused government of being complicit in the conflict because of its delayed response. After the outbreak of the violent clashes on January 31, 1994, there was a period of 11 days before the imposition of the state of emergency. According to Jonsson, many people believed that "... the government had sought to give their opponents a free run to ethnically cleanse their area and only intervened when it was clear that this was not going to be possible."²²⁴ Secondly, several media outlets accused the military of committing various excesses during the state of emergency. The March 3, 1994 edition of the *Daily Graphic*, for instance, reported the killing of nine people and wounding of a dozen others when the military opened fire to disperse a crowd in Tamale.²²⁵ Despite these concerns, the peacekeeping operation as a whole was generally considered as "effective and judicious."²²⁶

3.3.2 The Permanent Peace Negotiation Team

Government appointed the Permanent Peace Negotiation Team (PPNT) to find a solution to the inter-ethnic conflicts in the region. The PPNT consisted of respected high-profile individuals, including chiefs, academics, religious leaders, and members of the

²²⁴ Jonsson, "Voices of Reason." 2009, 31.

²²⁵ *Daily Graphic*, "9 Killed at Tamale," March 3, 1994, 1, 8, & 9.

²²⁶ Van der Linde, *Building Sustainable Peace* (1999): 30; See also *Daily Graphic*, "Task Force makes Strides," April 22, 1994, 1; Anthony Tawiah, "Military Task Force Commended," *Daily Graphic*, March 22, 1994, 1.

Council of State.²²⁷ The PPNT held several talks with chiefs and opinion leaders from the warring ethnic groups in Tamale, the district capitals, and Accra. The team invited four representatives each from of the factions to present their case. The PPNT adopted a dual strategy of shuttle diplomacy and conflict freezing because of its inability to convene a common meeting with these leaders. Despite these challenges, the PPNT negotiated and supervised the signing of a peace treaty between the warring factions on June 9, 1994.²²⁸ The factions agreed to lay down their arms and to submit to the security agencies. This peace treaty was however short-lived as fighting broke out again in 1995 March.²²⁹

The PPNT failed because of two main reasons. First, the strong link between the PPNT and government inhibited its ability to perform its mandate. The PPNT was unable to tackle the root causes of the conflict because of accusations of partiality and political bias by the various ethnic groups involved in the conflict. All parties accused government of supporting its opponents. The majority groups accused the PNDC administration of encouraging the Konkomba and other minority groups to revolt. In a speech in Tamale in 1991, Jerry John Rawlings, the Head of State warned that no group of people have any inalienable right to the land because “No one came to the world with a piece of land.”²³⁰ The majority interpreted such statements as a threat to their status as landowners and an encouragement to their tenants to revolt. The minority groups on the other hand saw

²²⁷ The Council of State is a small body of prominent citizens, established by Articles 89 to 92 of the 1992 [Constitution of Ghana](#), to advise the President on national issues.

²²⁸ *Daily Graphic*, “Factions renounce violence,” April 14, 1994, 1; Samuel Sarpong, “Two Factions sign ceasefire Pact,” *Daily Graphic*, June 10, 1994, 1.

²²⁹ Brilliant Hushie, “Fresh fighting between Konkombas and Nanumbas,” *Daily Graphic*, March 14, 1995, 1;

²³⁰ *The Statesman*, “Northern Region on fire,” February 20, 1994, 1.

government as the protector of the majority groups.²³¹ KOYA accused Ibn Chambas, a senior member of the government and the First Deputy Speaker of Parliament of arming the Nanumbas.²³² As an initiative of government, the PPNT therefore found it difficult to engage with issues relating to the conflict because the factions were suspicious of its true intentions.

Secondly, the PPNT negotiated peace deal lacked legitimacy at the community level. The assumption by the PPNT that an agreement among high-level representatives would trickle-down to the communities failed to materialize. Inter-communal tensions remained acute, making inter-ethnic interactions and the return to normal everyday life impossible.²³³ Unidentified assailants ambushed and killed a number of Konkombas who attempted to access public facilities (including hospitals, schools, and government offices) located in Nanumba towns. Konkombas blamed Nanumbas for the attacks, and retaliated killing 18 Nanumbas. The violence quickly degenerated into an all-out war spreading to a number of surrounding towns and villages.²³⁴ Renewed fighting claimed about 150 lives and torched 14 villages before another military intervention restored calm. Respondents complained that government refused to pay heed to unresolved tensions and reported skirmishes, but rather insisted on claiming credit for negotiating the cease-fire and peace agreements.²³⁵

²³¹ Wienia, *Ominous calm*. 2009.

²³² *Daily Graphic*, "Chambas denies allegations," February 17, 3.

²³³ Siisi Quainoo, "Insecurity at Dambai?" *Daily Graphic*, February 25, 1994, 1, 8, & 9; Emmy Toonen, "Ghana: Mediating a way out of Complex Ethnic Conflicts." In *Searching for Peace in Africa: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Management Activities*. ed. M. Mekenkamp, P. van Tongeren and H. van de Veen. Utrecht, (European Centre for Conflict Prevention. 1999).

²³⁴ *Daily Graphic*, "36 killed in renewed fighting," March 17, 1995, 3.

²³⁵ Tamale Youth, Focus Group Discussion, Tamale, July 6, 2017.

3.4 A Collaborative Peace Process Produces the Kumasi Peace Accord

The Kumasi Peace Accord was the product of a government-civil society-local community collaboration. These partners realized that in order to achieve peace on a sustainable basis, there was the need to supplement the military enforced peace with a negotiated peace deal.²³⁶ Previous failures to resolve the root causes of ethnic conflicts in the region such as the 1981 Pito War and the 1991-92 Conflict in East Gonja directly contributed to the 1994-95 conflict.

Following the cessation of hostilities, government made a passionate appeal to NGOs and international organizations resident in the country for assistance to provide relief to the affected villages and displaced persons. President Jerry John Rawlings and the Minister of the interior, Col. E. M. Osei-Owusu (rtd) also called on traditional leaders, local opinion leaders, and CSOs for assistance to finding a permanent solution to recurring ethnic conflicts in the Northern Region and other parts of the Country.²³⁷ In response to this appeal, several NGOs temporarily abandoned their development programs to provide relief to affected communities.²³⁸

NGOs operating in the region came together to form an InterNGO consortium in 1994 to facilitate the coordination of relief efforts. Initially, individual NGOs provided relief independently with little coordination amongst them. This strategy however proved problematic as relief failed to reach many people and communities affected by the violence.

²³⁶ *Daily Graphic*, "Use Political means to end conflict...says Lt-Col Debrah," March 22, 1994, 1.

²³⁷ Debrah Fynn, "Intensify efforts to resolve conflict," *Daily Graphic*, March 19, 1994, 1, 8 & 9; *Daily Graphic*, "Chiefs urged to check ethnic violence," February 14, 1994, 1 & 3.

²³⁸ Siisi Quainoo, "UNHCR donate items to conflict victims," *Daily Graphic*, April 30, 1994, 1.

To overcome these challenges, the NGOs formed the consortium to provide a center for the coordination of relief services. The consortium divided different aspects of aid delivery and reconstruction among its constituent members, according to organizational expertise. The consortium charged the Catholic Relief Service and World Vision with delivering water and relief aid, and CARE with repairing boreholes and burnt-out schools.

The InterNGO consortium initiated the Kumasi Peace Process in September 1994. The objective was to promote sustainable peace in the long term, through changing perceptions, attitudes, and building new relationships among the various ethnic groups in the region. The NGOs were concerned that “...in the absence of real peace, there can be no meaningful development in the region...”²³⁹ The intervention of the NGOs highlights Barnes’ (2006) observation that CSOs are increasingly diverting their energies and creativity to finding alternatives to violence because of the increase in the cost of conflicts to ordinary citizens.²⁴⁰

On their part, the governing NDC was concerned that the violence in the Northern Region and its potential spillage into other parts of the country will damage its chances of retaining power in the 1996 General Elections.²⁴¹ In addition, government conceded that it lacked the necessary facilitation skills to mediate a successful peace treaty as was evident by

²³⁹ NPI and Inter-NGO Consortuim, 1995, 1

²⁴⁰ Catherine Barnes, “Civil society organisations, peacebuilding and the power of partnership”. In *Joint action for prevention: Civil society and government cooperation on conflict prevention and peacebuilding*, ed. Paul Van Tongeren and Christine van Empel (AN Den Haag: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 2006), 11-15.

²⁴¹ Salifu Damma, telephone interview by author, July, 16, 2019

the failure of the PPNT to bring the warring factions together.²⁴² District and regional government officials admitted they did not know how to handle the situation of senseless hostility.²⁴³

The InterNGO consortium invited the Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI) to provide technical assistance in the development of a comprehensive response mechanism to the violence in the Northern Region. The consortium turned to the NPI, an NGO with extensive experience in conflict mediation in East Africa, because most of its constituent members lacked peacebuilding experience.²⁴⁴ In response to this request, the NPI sent a two-member team to Ghana in November 1994 to assess the situation and to help the consortium to develop an appropriate response plan.

The Inter-NGO/NPI team held extensive consultations with local government officials in the Northern Region, and with central government officials in Accra, including the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Employment and Social Welfare and the PPNT. The local government officials were especially grateful for the involvement of the NGOs in the peace process because they had become disconcerted by recurrent conflicts in the region.²⁴⁵ Central government and the PPNT also approved the interventions by the InterNGO/NPI team but cautioned it to proceed carefully because of the delicate nature of the situation in the region.²⁴⁶

²⁴² Van der Linde, *Building Sustainable Peace*, (1999).

²⁴³ NPI and Inter-NGO Consortium, 1995, 5

²⁴⁴ Assefa, *Coexistence and reconciliation*, 2001.

²⁴⁵ Van der Linde, *Building Sustainable Peace* (1999).

²⁴⁶ Assefa, *Coexistence and reconciliation*, 2001.

In April 1995, the InterNGO/NPI Negotiation Team held public and private consultations with chiefs, opinion leaders, and various other people in all the conflict areas. The main purpose of these meetings was to gain a firsthand perspective on the effects of the war and causes of the conflict. These meetings were also an opportunity to identify open-minded individuals who were willing to consider new ideas and to give peace a chance. These individuals were to be the initial participants in the peace process and in time would become bridge-builders between the warring communities. The negotiation team envisaged that this expanding engagement would gradually permeate the different communities and lead to changing perceptions, attitudes, and building new relationships among them.

The negotiation team invited the individuals identified from the grass root consultation to a meeting in Kumasi in May 1995. The team chose Kumasi because of its central location, neutrality and the fact that it would not generate the kind of attention normally associated with activities in the capital, Accra. The team subsequently held six rounds of meetings with various representatives from the warring communities in Kumasi, culminating in the signing of the 'Kumasi Peace Accord'.

3.4.1 Kumasi I

The negotiation team convened the first Kumasi meeting from May 16-18, 1995. The objective of this meeting was to bring open-minded individuals from the different ethnic communities together so that they could explore their respective claims and demands. The aim was to encourage interaction between representatives from the warring communities to defuse the conflict.²⁴⁷ For this first Kumasi meeting, the negotiation team invited four

²⁴⁷Jonsson, "Voices of Reason," 2009, 21.

representatives each from the main factions in the conflict (Konkombas, Dagombas, Nanumbas, and Gonja). The atmosphere at the beginning of the meeting was very tense because this was the first official meeting between representatives of the groups since the war.

The negotiation team employed ground rules to ensure that discussions did not become confrontational (see Appendix 1). The team gave each group an opportunity to share their perception of the conflict and losses suffered from the war. The aim was to arrive at a common understanding of the effects of the conflict on the development of the region as a whole. This produced a deep sense of loss and regret among the various representatives.

Kumasi I was successful in affirming that dialogue between the warring communities was possible. Representatives agreed on the need to continue the process initiated in the first Kumasi meeting and to expand the process to include many more people. Kumasi I created a Peace and Reconciliation Follow-up Committee consisting of two representatives each from the four groups represented. The meeting charged members of the committee to go back to their respective communities and find ways of sharing the insights gained from their experience from the meeting in Kumasi. In addition, the committee was to identify representatives for a follow-up meeting.

3.4.2 Kumasi II

The second Kumasi meeting was held from June 26-29, 1995. This meeting brought together local leaders including chiefs, local government officials, members of parliaments, and youth leaders to discuss the main issues that underlay the conflict. The presence of chiefs in this meeting created an imbalance between representatives because the Konkombas had

no chiefs. The representatives from the chiefly groups therefore outranked the Konkomba representatives. This created a problem because the chiefs tended to talk down on the Konkomba representatives. To resolve this challenge the mediation team took the representatives through a discussion of reconciliation and the importance of respecting all views. This led a change in the style of the interactions, and the Konkomba representatives were given an equal opportunity to contribute to the discussions. This second meeting succeeded in providing a platform for representatives to discuss the main issues at the roots of the conflict.

At the end of the meeting, representatives resolved to talk to other leaders in their respective communities about their experiences in Kumasi and to mobilize people for reconciliation. Representatives also agreed that the peace process needed to bring on board members of minority groups such as the Nawuris, Nchomurus, and Basares who played varying roles in the conflict.

3.4.3 Kumasi III

The third Kumasi meeting held from December 16-19, 1995 focused on national-level youth association leaders, divisional chiefs, and representatives from the minority groups excluded from the previous two rounds of meetings. Kumasi III attracted esteemed traditional leaders including the Ucha Bobo of Saboba- the highest-ranking traditional leader from the Konkomba side, and the Mion Lana- the second highest-ranking Dagomba chief. The presence of the Mion Lana was very significant because it ensured that the meeting was able to discuss the Konkomba demand for paramountcy from the Dagomba Tradition Council. The inclusion of Nchumuru, Nawuri and Basari delegations in this round of talks broadened

the talks from the specific concerns of the Konkombas for paramountcy, to the local minority-majority dichotomy more generally. This was important to the peace process because it extended the remit of the negotiation to the resolution of the root causes of the conflicts in the region.

At the end the meeting, the Mion Lana agreed to lobby the Dagomba Tradition Council to reconsider the Konkomba petition. Kumasi III set aside three months to raise awareness and to extend the discussion of new developments to the larger towns. This third Kumasi meeting also set up an inter-ethnic team made up of one volunteer from each delegation to lead a peace campaign. This team travelled from village to village to disseminate the progress of the Kumasi process. The presence of the team challenged the conflict narrative by physically demonstrating that inter-ethnic collaboration was possible. The inter-ethnic peacebuilding team also served as a guarantee against the misrepresentation of decisions reached in Kumasi.

3.4.4 Kumasi IV

Kumasi IV held from February 26-29, 1996 focused on the question of how the communities could achieve peaceful and meaningful co-existence. This meeting sought to build on the progress made from the earlier rounds of meetings and seek consensus on the main issues. The mediation team invited the representatives of the various groups to the PPNT mediation process to this round of talks. The team also invited a number of women leaders from the various factions to add new insights to the process. The women representatives was significant because it recognized the important role played by women in sustaining peace processes. According to the International Peace Institute, when women

participate in peace processes, the resulting agreement is 35 percent more likely to last at least 15 years.²⁴⁸

Representatives at Kumasi IV agreed on various compromises, producing the ‘Kumasi Draft Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in the Northern Region of Ghana’. This was a set of agreements on identified issues of contention. Representatives returned to their respective communities for a final round of consultation to ensure that the final agreement would represent the concerns of the entire community.

3.4.5 Kumasi V

The representatives returned to Kumasi from March 27-29, 1996 for the signing of a final peace accord. The representatives came with the feedback from the consultations in their respective communities, which in some cases required renegotiation of some sections of the draft agreement. Although the public consultation process strengthened the legitimacy of the agreement, it also led to deadlocks on a number of issues. The Nawuri and Gonja representatives were unable to find a compromise over land issues outstanding from their 1991-92 war. In spite of these challenges, representatives eventually reached a final agreement, signing the ‘Kumasi Accord on Peace and Reconciliation between the Ethnic Groups in the Northern Region of Ghana’ on March 30, 1996 (See Appendix 2 for a full text of the Accord). The peace accord consisted of a series of separate agreements between different delegations on general issues including land disputes, chieftaincy and paramountcy, religious tolerance and the management of tensions.

²⁴⁸ Marie O’Reilly, Andrea Ó. Súilleabháin, and Thania Paffenholz. "Reimagining Peacemaking: Women’s Roles in Peace Processes," *New York: International Peace Institute* (2015): 12.

3.4.6 Kumasi VI

The mediation team convened the final Kumasi meeting from October 11-13, 1996 to consider the progress of the peace accord and the formation of an inter-ethnic youth association. The peace accord recommended the setting up of an inter-ethnic youth association to serve as a forum for continued dialogue to prevent future conflict. Representatives to the Kumasi meetings felt that an umbrella multi-ethnic youth association would be the solution to the tendency of youth associations to articulate and mobilize exclusive ethnic identities. Youth associations play a central role in the politicization of ethnicity in Northern Ghana, and are the main platforms used to organize combatants for violence.²⁴⁹

By forming a regional youth association, the representatives sought to maintain the spirit of collaboration engineered by the Kumasi Peace Process. Leaders of the various ethnic youth associations met in August 1996 to approve a draft constitution for the 'Northern Ghana Youth and Development Association' (NORYDA). Thirty-one chiefs and youth leaders representing all 12 ethnic groups in the Northern Region met at Kumasi VI and ratified NORYDA's first constitution on 13 October 1996. The creation of NORYDA was very significant in the peace process because it became the vehicle used to sustain the peace accord. NORYDA successfully launched several peacebuilding campaigns, promoting non-violence, and contributed to the settlement of several disputes.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁹ Wienia, *Ominous calm*, (2009).

²⁵⁰ Van der Linde, *Building Sustainable Peace* (1999).

Table 3. 1: Kumasi Meetings and Outcomes

Meeting	Date	Venue	Representatives	Outcome
Kumasi I	16-18/05/1995	Miklin Hotel	Four open-minded representatives each from Konkombas, Dagombas, Nanumbas, and Gonja ethnic groups	Peace and Reconciliation Follow-up Committee created
Kumasi II	26-29/06/1995	Miklin Hotel	Local leaders (chiefs, local government officials, MPs, and youth leaders)	Decision to include representatives of other minority groups
Kumasi III	16-19/12/1995	Miklin Hotel	National-level youth leaders, divisional chiefs, and representatives from Nawuris, Nchomurus, and Basares	Set up an inter-ethnic team to lead a peace campaign.
Kumasi IV	26-29/02/1996	Miklin Hotel	Representatives that represented the warring factions on the PPNT mediation process	Draft peace agreement
Kumasi V	27-30/03/1996	Miklin Hotel	Representatives of both majority and minority ethnic groups	Peace Accord signed
Kumasi VI	11-13/10/1996	Miklin Hotel	Thirty-one chiefs and youth leaders representing all 12 ethnic groups in the Northern Region	NORYDA created

Source: Literature Review

3.5 Parallel Peace Projects

A number of NGOs and religious groups in the Northern Region undertook various initiatives at the community level to complement the Kumasi Peace Process. These projects were important because they ensured that the peace process was not just limited to participants attending the Kumasi meetings but was an active process in the communities. These projects were able to involve persons who did not get the opportunity to attend the Kumasi meetings in the peace process. Constituent members of the InterNGO consortium, including the Catholic Church, ActionAid and the Local Council of Churches, undertook the most important of these projects.

3.5.1 Catholic Church

The Catholic Church has various development and education programs in all districts in the Northern Region. In the aftermath of the 1994-95 violent clashes, the Catholic Bishop of Yendi established the Yendi Peace Center to undertake various interventions to complement the Kumasi Peace Process. The Yendi Peace Center was an inter-religious organization and included Imams, pastors, traditional rulers and politicians. The Center initiated various peace education programs in Yendi, Tamale, Damango and other communities. The Peace Center also brought together youths from majority groups including Dagomba and Nanumba and minority groups such as the Konkomba and Basare. The center took these youth through various capacity building training in peace and reconciliation. According to the secretary of the Yendi Peace Center, these interventions played an important role in the peace process because it led to decreased tensions and increased interactions between the warring communities.²⁵¹

3.5.2 ActionAid

ActionAid used its development programs to contribute to increased cooperation and interaction between the warring communities. ActionAid supports the basic needs and rights of poor

²⁵¹ Peter Atia, interview by author, Yendi, November 12, 2018.

communities in Northern Ghana, with an emphasis on human rights, women's rights, land rights and the right to education. As part of its educational development program, ActionAid supported the rebuilding of schools destroyed during the war. In the Saboba-Chereponi district, ActionAid used its Sunsun project to engender cooperation between Dagomba and Konkomba communities. ActionAid provided building materials to support the rebuilding of schools affected by the war, whilst the beneficiary Dagomba and Konkomba communities had to come together to support the project with the provision of labor. This project became a symbol of reconciliation in the region.

3.5.3 Local Council of Churches

The Local Council of Churches also made significant contribution to the peace process. The Council organized a number of peace events on themes including reconciliation, the role of the local communities in peacebuilding, and women in conflict. These events brought together members of various ethnic groups and contributed to easing tensions in the region. The Council also organized dialogue between Christians and Muslim youth organizations, and joint prayer meeting between Christian and Muslim communities.

3.6 A New Traditional Order

The Kumasi Peace Accord created a new traditional order in the Northern Region. The most significant agreements from the accord concerned chieftaincy. Majority groups recognized the right of minority groups for paramountcy. The Dagomba Traditional Council subsequently conferred paramountcy on three Konkomba chiefs- Saboba, Sanguli and Nambiri chiefs.²⁵² The creation of paramountcy for minority groups granted them rights to own land through these chiefs and thereby contributed significantly to addressing the two main underlying causes of conflicts in the region – traditional self-determination and competition for land. The recognition of the rights

²⁵² Awedoba, *An Ethnographic Study*, 2010

to and land ownership enhanced the social, political and economic status of the Konkombas and other minority groups.

Minority groups however did not attain equal political status under this new order. In the implementation of the accord, “chiefs from the majority groups insisted that if a minority chief was to be elevated, any divisional chiefs in the Northern Region that had ranked above this minority chief must themselves be elevated to avoid disequilibrium in the system.”²⁵³ The status of the paramount chiefs of the Dagomba, Gonja, Nanumba and Mamprusi were subsequently raised to that of overlords with the power to appoint and preside over other paramount chiefs. According to Awedoba, the decision of the Ya-Na to create three paramountcies for the Konkombas, instead of the one they petitioned for was a divide and rule tactic.²⁵⁴ The Konkomba request for paramountcy was to re-organize all Konkombas into a centralized state under the leadership of a single chief. The creation of three paramountcies defeated the above objective because it led to an intra-Konkomba dispute over the modalities for the sharing of traditional power and authority. The new traditional order also failed to create independent traditional councils for the minority groups. Instead, the new paramount chiefs joined the traditional councils of the majority groups to form a commonwealth of ethnic groups under the leadership of an overlord. The Konkombas and Basares joined the Dagomba Traditional Council, under the leadership of the Ya-Na.

3.7 Comparative Policy Evaluation

Table 3.2 evaluates the various policies instituted in attempts to resolve inter-ethnic conflicts in the Northern Region. The table shows that top-down policies designed and introduced by government in isolation fail to address the underlying causes of conflicts. Some of these policies,

²⁵³ Jonsson, “The Overwhelming Minority,” 29.

²⁵⁴ Awedoba, *An Ethnographic Study*, 2010

especially those on security enforcement may be successful in containing violent clashes in the short term (negative peace), but ultimately fail to prevent a return to violence because of their inability to address the root causes of the conflicts.

The table shows that captured policies also fail to address the causes of inter-ethnic conflicts in the region for one of two reasons.

1. Lack of Government support: The Justice Lamptey and Justice Ampiah Committees of Inquiries lacked the support and commitment of government. The PNDC military government refused to implement the recommendations of the Justice Ampiah Committee because of concerns over its electoral chances as the country prepared for a return to democratic rule.
2. Lack of legitimacy at the community level: The ceasefires supervised by the PPNT and in the East Gonja conflict failed to hold because they lacked support at the grassroots. These ceasefires were negotiated with the leaders of the warring factions but expectations that they will filter to the community level failed to materialize. These negotiations failed to involve the youth associations who were instrumental in mobilizing the youth for violence.

Table 3.2 also shows that policies designed and implemented by a collaboration among government, civil society and the warring factions (Peace Making State), such as the humanitarian intervention and the Kumasi Peace Accord are successful in producing desired outcomes. The Kumasi Peace Process was able to resolve the underlying issues, which led to the Guinea Fowl War because its bottom-up approach ensured that it enjoyed legitimacy from the grassroots. The bottom-up approach created a forum for the grassroots to understand the conflict, visualize

alternatives, and articulate preferences. The Peace Accord was then able to survive several challenges because the communities accepted it as a product of their concessions and preferences.

Table 3. 2: Summary of Government Policies and Outcomes in the Northern Region

Conflict	Government Policy (Intervention)	Type of Policy	Evaluation	Reason(s)
Pito (1981)	Peace Enforcement	Top-Down	Negative peace	Failed to resolve underlying causes of the conflict
	Justice Lamptey Commission	Captured Policy	Failed	Unable to complete its work because of a military overthrow
East Gonja Conflict (1991/92)	Ban on Youth Association	Top-Down	Failed (Violence)	Failed to resolve underlying causes of the conflict
	Ceasefire	Captured Policy	Failed (Violence)	Lacked legitimacy at the community level
	Justice Ampiah Committee	Captured Policy	Failed	Lack of government support
Guinea Fowl War of 1994-95	State of Emergency and Peace keeping	Top-Down	Negative Peace	Failed to resolve underlying causes of the conflict
	Humanitarian Intervention	Peace Making State	Successful	Relief efforts were based on the needs of the communities
	PPNT (ceasefire)	Captured Policy	Failed (Violence)	Lack of legitimacy at the grassroots
	Kumasi Peace Accord	Peace Making State	Positive Peace	Legitimacy at grassroots

Source: Author

3.8 Conclusion

This chapter found that the peace process in the Northern Region was successful because it was the product of collaboration between an accommodative government, a proactive civil society and responsive local communities. The proactive role played by civil society was critical to the success of the peace process because it protected it from accusations of political interferences usually levelled against government led conflict resolution efforts. The PPNT was unable to address the main issues relating to the conflict because of accusations by both majority and minority groups that government favored their opponents. The role of civil society also protected the peace settlement from revisions by successive regimes. Government led peace settlements often fail because of the tendency of successive regimes to revise them. For instance, L.I. 59 of 1960, failed to resolve the Yendi succession conflict because of the decision by the NLM regime to revoke it. The central role played by civil society in the Peace Process ensured that the peace settlement was able to survive regime changes because subsequent governments had no pretext to revise it.

The bottom-up approach adopted by the Kumasi Peace Process was unique because it ensured that the process enjoyed legitimacy from the grassroots. Peace settlements imposed from the top are fraught with acceptability issues at the community level. Many attempts to resolve conflicts in Northern Ghana fail because government imposes them from the top with little or no participation by the local communities. These attempts often fail to address the underlying causes of the conflicts. For instance, the PPNT negotiated peace settlement held little sway at the community level because it focused on top-level representatives and failed to address the basic grievances that triggered the 1994 conflict. Legitimacy from the grassroots ensured that the warring communities accepted the outcome of the Peace Accord. The Accord subsequently survived several challenges because the communities accepted that it represented the best chance

for them to live in peace. In addition, the participatory approach created a forum for the grassroots to understand the conflict, visualize alternatives, and articulate preferences. The momentum created at the grassroots for peace eventually put pressure on some community leaders who were resistant to a peace settlement to join the peacebuilding process.

Chapter Four

REGIME CHANGES AND THE NATURE OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES IN DAGBON

4.0 Introduction

The March 27, 2002 massacre in Yendi highlighted the pervasive nature of chieftaincy conflicts in Northern Ghana and brought to fore the question of the ability of the state to manage such conflicts. This massacre, which claimed the lives of 41 people including Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II, was the latest phase in the protracted chieftaincy succession conflict between members of the Abudu and Andani Royal Gates (families) of Yendi (the traditional capital of the Dagbon kingdom). The Dagbon Chieftaincy conflict has attracted the attention of all governments since independence because of the importance of the Dagbon Traditional State to peace and stability in Northern Ghana and the country as a whole. Successive governments have employed various policies in an attempt to find a permanent solution to the succession dispute. The persistence of the conflict indicates the failure of these policies. This chapter examines why policies of successive governments in Dagbon have failed to resolve the chieftaincy succession dispute.

Most scholars trace the source of the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict to colonial interferences and manipulations by post-colonial governments. These factors however are unable to explain why the conflict persist in the face of numerous policies by successive governments to resolve it. This chapter argues that in order to understand the failure of these policies and the protracted nature of the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict, we need to analyze the role of government policies and political interventions in altering the dynamics of the conflict. The chapter argues that the tendency of successive regimes to use government policy as a political tool to reward supporters and punish opponents accounts for the failure of such policies and the protraction of the conflict.

The first section of this chapter provides a brief background to the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict. The second examines various attempts in the literature to account for its protracted nature. The third section identifies and examines four phases of the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict. A change of regime, defined here as a change in government from one political tradition to another, causes the outbreak of new phases of the conflict. We argue in this section that attempts by successive governments to use policy interventions to reward Abudus and the Andanis for their support causes the outbreak of new phases of the conflict. Sections 4-7 looks at the four phases of the conflict, and analyzes the effects of various policies by successive governments on the dynamics of the conflict. The final section discusses institutionalization of collaboration for peacebuilding.

4.1 Background to the Dagbon Chieftaincy Conflict

Dagbon is the largest of three Mossi-Dagomba states established in the Volta basin of Northern Ghana between the 14th and 15th century. A band of horse riding warriors from the sahelian region established the state following the defeat of non-centralized indigenous groups who occupied the area.²⁵⁵ The people of Dagbon are known as Dagombas (also pronounced Dagbamba). Present day Dagbon is a multi-ethnic society with a population of 1,254,476, about half the total population of the Northern Region.²⁵⁶ In addition to the autochthon population, Dagbon is home to many Mamprusi, Gonja, Dagaaba, Akan and migrants from other parts of the country. The traditional state remains overwhelmingly rural, with a few important urban settlements including Tamale, Yendi, Gushiegu, Savelugu and Karaga.

The chieftaincy institution is central to the political organization of the Dagbon Traditional State. The intensity of the Dagbon Chieftaincy conflict reflects the importance of the institution

²⁵⁵ Steve Tonah, "The Politicisation of a Chieftaincy Conflict," *Nordic Journal of African Studies* 21, no. 1 (2012): 5

²⁵⁶ Ghana Statistical Service, *Population & Housing Census*, 2010.


among the people of Dagbon. Awedoba describes the chieftaincy institution as “the heart-beat of Dagbon” and “the climax of a man’s aspirations”.²⁵⁷ There are several grades of chiefships in Dagbon that both royals and non-royals may aspire to, which all culminates with the seat of the Ya-Na (the Overlord of the Dagbon Kingdom) at the apex. Immediately beneath the Ya-Na, are three principal divisional chiefships occupied by sons of former Ya-Nas – Karaga Na (chief of Karaga), Mion Lana (chief of Mion), and Yo-Na (chief of Savelugu). These chiefships are known as the ‘Gate Skins’ of Yendi because only occupants of these skins can ascend to the Yendi skin (the seat of the Ya-Na). These divisional chiefs also have under them other sub-chiefs, who intend have sub-divisional and village chiefs under them, as depicted in Figure 4.1. Chiefs at each level of the hierarchy owe allegiance to the appointing chief at the next level of the system. Brukum describes the political system in Dagbon as a rotating chieftaincy in which chiefs at each level aspire for promotion to the next level and ultimately to the position of the Ya-Na.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁷ Awedoba, *An Ethnographic Study*, 2010, 203.

²⁵⁸ Nana James Kweku Brukum, "Traditional Constitutions and Succession Disputes in the Northern Region of Ghana," (Working Papers on Ghana: Historical and Contemporary Studies, No. 4, 2004).

Figure 4. 1: Line of Succession to the Yendi Skin

Figure 1: Line of succession to the Yendi Skin



Source: Constructed by author

Dagombas consider an unsuccessful bid to occupy a vacant skin an affront to one's dignity because of the importance attached the chieftaincy institution. It is particularly disgraceful to allow a chieftaincy pass away from one's family or as in local parlance, 'to allow one's gate to close'.²⁵⁹ Issues related to succession in Dagbon tend to be volatile, frequently degenerating into violent

²⁵⁹ The closing of a gate means that members of the gate can never aspire to occupy that particular chieftaincy anymore.


clashes because the rules of succession are flexible and allow a number of candidates to contest.²⁶⁰ The office of the Ya-Na is the most fiercely contested because of its central position in the lives of people of Dagbon. The system, which makes chiefs at each level the appointing authority for chiefs at the next lower level, means that the family that occupies the position of the Ya-Na controls the entire society. In addition, the Ya-Na is one of the most important chiefs in the country, and controls considerable economic, social and political resources.

In precolonial times, Dagombas adopted a rotational system to regulate succession to the Yendi skin between members of the Abudui and Andani Royal Gates. This system arose following the death of Ya-Na Yakubu I in 1849. Ya-Na Yakubu I had two sons from different mothers. After his death Abudulai (1849-1876), the eldest succeeded him. Andani (1876-1899), the youngest son subsequently succeeded Abudulai following the passing away of the latter. On the death of Ya-Na Andani I in 1899, a conflict arose on whether his own son or the son of his late elder brother should succeed him. The king makers decided that the son of Abudulai should succeed his uncle-Ya-Na Andani I, thus establishing a rotational system amongst the two gates. The two royal gates accepted this rotation system and it worked relatively successfully even though they failed to codify it.²⁶¹

²⁶⁰ Paul Ladouceur, "The Yendi Chieftaincy Dispute and Ghanaian Politics," *Canadian Journal of African Studies/La Revue canadienne des études africaines* 6, no. 1 (1972): 98-99.

²⁶¹ Tsikata, "Identities, Inequalities and Conflicts in Ghana," 2004, 33.

Figure 4. 2: Ethnic Map of Northern Ghana showing Dagomba



Source: Asiedu (2008, 51)²⁶²

²⁶² Asiedu, "Examining the State's Capacity," (2008):51

4.2 Literature Review

A number of scholars examine the Dagbon conflict, raising various factors to explain its protracted nature. A first group of scholars traces the source of the conflict to colonial interferences.²⁶³ According to these scholars, the Dagbon conflict has its roots in attempts by the British colonial administration to remold it in line with precepts of modern public administration. These scholars claim that the interference by the colonial administration in the selection process of the Ya-Na typifies such attempts. The selection of the Ya-Na was historically the responsibility of a committee of four soothsayers. The committee consulted oracles to determine the identity of the next Ya-Na. In 1948, the British colonial administration reconstituted the selection committee with the inclusion of seven divisional chiefs. The reconstituted selection committee decided on the identity of the next Ya-Na by a majority decision instead of deferring to the gods. It is however important to note that such modernization projects did not create conflicts everywhere in Northern Ghana. In the Builsa traditional area, the British colonial administration introduced an electoral college, made up of heads of all households, to select the Paramount chief of the area. This colonial intervention resolved the dispute over the selection of the chief by the Nayire (Paramount chief of Nalerigu).

A second group of scholars claims that the source of the protracted Dagbon conflict is the complex provisions guiding succession to the Yendi skin. Brukum argues that contrary to eliminating competition, the provision that only sons of former occupants of the Yendi skin can occupy it does not reduce competition because chiefs tend to have many sons.²⁶⁴ These sons compete among themselves, and against their uncles and cousins. He concludes that although the succession procedure may look simple, in practice it is complex and accounts for the recurring

²⁶³ Ahorsu and Gebe, "Governance and security in Ghana" (2011); Awedoba, *An Ethnographic Study*, 2010; Yakubu, *The Abudu-Andani Crisis of Dagbon*, 2006.

²⁶⁴ Brukum, "Traditional Constitutions," 2004.

conflict. Awedoba also points out that this provision makes competition for the Yendi skin particularly fierce because a prince fights not only for his own right to the Yendi skin but also for the rights of his sons and grandsons.²⁶⁵ The descendants of a prince who fails in his bid to occupy the Yendi skin would forever lose the right to occupy it. These succession provisions are however not peculiar to Dagbon. Other paramountcies in the region, such as Nalerigu and Gongga remain stable despite similar complex succession rules.

For a third group of scholars, the source of the protracted Dagbon conflict is its politicization.²⁶⁶ Ladouceur was the first scholar to point to the politicization of the Dagbon conflict in his seminal article on the 1969 crisis.²⁶⁷ The 1969 succession crisis, the first in the post-colonial period, claimed at least 23 lives. Ladouceur concludes that the Yendi conflict is the result of a clash of political interests and traditional practices of a people who were hitherto comfortable with their own conflict resolution mechanisms.²⁶⁸ The view that the actions and/or inactions of political elites continues to fuel the Dagbon conflict enjoys a central position in recent literature. Scholars argue that the position of the Ya-Na is of great interest to politicians because he enjoys strong allegiance from his people, who are among the most numerous in the country.²⁶⁹ According to the Report of the 'Wuaku Commission of Inquiry', one of the main causes of the 2002 massacre in Yendi was the intrusion of national politics into the chieftaincy dispute.²⁷⁰ This latter view

²⁶⁵ Awedoba, *An Ethnographic Study*, 2010

²⁶⁶ Isaac Olawale Albert, "From 'Owo Crisis' to 'Dagbon Dispute': Lessons in the Politicization of Chieftaincy Disputes in Modern Nigeria and Ghana," *The Round table* 97, no. 394 (2008): 47-60; Wyatt MacGaffey, "Death of a King, Death of a Kingdom? Social Pluralism and Succession to High Office in Dagbon, Northern Ghana." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 44, no. 1 (2006): 79-99; Tonah, "The Politicisation of a Chieftaincy Conflict," (2012).

²⁶⁷ Ladouceur, "The Yendi Chieftaincy." *Canadian Journal of African Studies*.

²⁶⁸ Ibid

²⁶⁹ Asiedu, "Examining the State's Capacity," (2008).

²⁷⁰ Republic of Ghana, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry [Yendi events] C.I. 36/2002 Wuaku Commission, presented to H.E. President John Agyekum Kufuor at the Castle on Wednesday 6th November*, (Accra: Ghana Publishing Corporation, Assembly Press. 2002)

however cannot explain the various cycles of violence and stability in Dagbon. The Dagbon traditional area remained stable from 1972 to 2000 although that period, especially the first decade, coincided with the most unstable period in the country's political history. From 1972 to 1982 alone, there were six coup d'états and changes of government.

This chapter argues that to understand the protracted nature of the conflict and the various cycles of violence in Dagbon, we need to analyze the relationship between regime changes and government policies aimed at resolving the conflict. We argue that the tendency of successive regimes to use government policy as a political tool to reward supporters and punish opponents accounts for the failure of such policies. In line with the above, this chapter examines why government policies aimed at resolving the Dagbon Chieftaincy conflict fail.

4.3 Four Phases of the Dagbon Chieftaincy Conflict

This section identifies and examines four phases of the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict. A change of regime, defined in this study as a change in government from one political tradition to another, causes the outbreak of a new phase of the conflict. The main factions in the Dagbon conflict, the Abudu and Andani Royal Gates, have since the 1950s aligned themselves with political parties on opposite sides of the national political divide. Andanis supported the CPP and political parties that inherited the Nkrumaist political tradition after 1966, whilst Abudus supported the UP and later versions of that political tradition.²⁷¹ Political parties aligned to the two traditions, in turn, reward the Abudus and the Andanis for their support by introducing policies to support their respective claims to the Yendi skin.

²⁷¹Ebenezer Ofori Asiedu, "Examining the State's Capacity in the Management of the Dagbon crisis in Ghana: Is there a role for ECOWAS?" *African Leadership Center, Kings College* (2008); M. H. A. Bolaji, "Beneath politicization: the unacknowledged constitutional crisis in the Dagbon succession conflict in Ghana," *The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law* 48, no. 2 (2016): 273-301.

Table 4.1 shows that each phase of the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict starts with a change of regime. A regime change leads to a change in traditional leadership in Yendi, and inevitably reopens the chieftaincy succession conflict between the Abudu and Andani Royal Gates. The Andani Royal Gate aligned to the Nkrumaist political tradition benefits from government policies when a party from that political tradition comes to power. The only exceptions being under the CPP Government from 1957 to 1966, and the National Democratic Congress (NDC) from 2008 to 2016. Under the first instance, the CPP had no incentive to replace Ya-Na Abudulai III (Abudu) because he defected to support the party. In the second case, the Yendi skin remained vacant because the NDC government, like the New Patriotic Party (NPP) government before it, was unable to resolve the murder of Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II. The Abudu Gate similarly benefits from the rise of the UP political tradition to power. When the PP came to power in 1969, it replaced Ya-Na Mahama Andani III, from the Andani Royal Gate with a member of the Abudu Royal Gate, Ya-Na Mahamadu Abudulai IV. The only exception in this instance being the installation of Ya-Na Abubakari Mahama II, earlier this year during the tenure of an NPP government. It is however important to point out that the process that led to the selection and installation of the new paramount chief was unique because it involved a collaboration between government, civil society and the warring factions.

The table also shows that ethnic and religious differences are of little relevance to the conflict in Dagbon. Regime changes and policy interventions accounts for the various cycles of violence and stability in Dagbon. For instance, Dagbon traditional area remained stable from 1972 to 2000 because of a succession of parties from the Nkrumaist political tradition in government. This was in spite of the fact that this period was the most unstable in the country's post-independence history.

Table 4. 1: Phases of the Dagbon Chieftaincy Conflict

Phase	Government	Political Tradition	Ya-Na	Ruling Gate	Immediate Dispute	Gov't Intervention	Violence
Phase I (1948 – 1966)	CPP (1954-1966)	Nkrumaist	Abudulai III (1954-1967)	Abudu	Andanis petition gov't to remove Ya-Na	Opoku-Afari Committee/ L.I. 59	
Phase II (1966-1972)	NLC (1966-1969)	UP Political Traditional			Abudus petition gov't to review L.I. 59	Siriboe Committee/ NLC Decree 296	
			Mahama Andani III (1968-1969)	Andani	Selection of Ya-Na	Mate Kole Committee/ Derecognizes Ya-Na Andani III	
	PP (1969-1972)		Mahamadu Abudulai IV (1969-1974)	Abudu		Recognizes Ya-Na Abudulai IV	
						Enforces installation of Ya-Na Abudulai	63 dead
Phase III (1972-2001)	NRC (1972-1975)	Nkrumaist			Andanis petition gov't to re-examine dispute	Ollennu Committee/ Derecognizes Ya-Na	
			Yakubu Andani II (1974-2002)	Andani		Recognizes Ya-Na Andani II / NRCD 299	
	SMC I (1975-1978)						

Phase	Government	Political Tradition	Ya-Na	Ruling Gate	Immediate Dispute	Gov't Intervention	Violence
Phase III	SMC II (1978-1979)	Nkrumaist	Yakubu Andani II (1974-2002)	Andani			
	AFRC (1979-1979)						
	PNP (1979-1981)						
	PNDC (1981-1993)					Yendi Skin Affairs / Rulings by Appeals and Supreme Courts	
	NDC (1993-2000)						
Phase IV (2001 to date)	NPP (2001-2009)	UP Political tradition			Murder of Ya-Na Andani	State of Emergency/ Wuaku Commission/ CEC	41 dead Gbewaa palace burnt
	NDC (2009-2017)	Nkrumaist	---	---		Fast track Court discharges suspects/ CEC	
	NPP (2017 to present)	UP Political Tradition	Abubakari Mahama (2019)	Andani		Selection of new Ya-Na	

4.4 The First Phase of the Dagbon Conflict (1948 to 1966)

4.4.1 A challenge to the Rotational System

The modern version of the Dagbon conflict started in 1948 following the death of Ya-Na Mahama II (1838-1948), a member of the Andani Royal Gate. After the death of Ya-Na Mahama II, his son Andani became regent but contrary to the spirit of the rotational system put up his candidature to succeed his deceased father as the paramount chief of Dagbon. This coincided with colonial attempts to codify the rules and procedures of succession to the Yendi skin. The British colonial administration expanded the membership of the selection committee to eleven with the addition of seven divisional chiefs. The selection of the Ya-Na previously rested in the hands of four soothsayers headed by an elder known as the Kuga-Na, and three other elders: the Zohe-Naa, Tugri Nam, and Gagbindana. The reconstituted selection committee elected Ya-Na Mahama III from the Abudu Gate as the paramount chief of Dagbon. The regent, having failed in his attempt to succeed his father, became the Mion Lana (chief of Mion, one of the three Gate Skins of Yendi). His failed attempt however sowed the seed of discord between the two gates leading to several decades of succession disputes.²⁷²

Following the death of Ya-Na Mahama III in 1954, the Mion Lana once again put forward his candidature for election to the Yendi skin. The Andani Gate expected that per the rotational system of succession it was their turn to occupy the skin. The Abudu Gate however argued that the attempt by the regent of Ya-Na Mahama II to succeed his father meant that the rotational system was no longer valid. The eleven-member selection committee accepted the argument of the Abudu Gate because it subsequently elected the Gbon Lana (son and regent of the deceased Ya-Na Mahama III) to succeed his father as Ya-Na Abudulai III in March 1954. This was in spite of

²⁷² Asiedu, "Examining the State's Capacity," (2008):22; Tsikata, "Identities, Inequalities and Conflicts in Ghana," 2004, 33.

the fact that the Gbon Lana did not occupy any of the Gate Skins. The selection of Ya-Na Abudulai III was clearly contrary to the aged-old rotational system.²⁷³

The Andani Gate humiliated by the decision of the selection committee to overlook their gate and to allow the Abudu Gate to retain the Yendi skin for a second consecutive time challenged the legitimacy of the committee. They argued that “even though the committee system was agreed upon in the presence of the Colonial District Commissioner at Yendi at the time, the committee system with all due respect, was given powers by neither legislation nor custom to select a Ya Na”.²⁷⁴

4.4.2 The Dagbon Conflict becomes embroiled in Nationalist Politics

The succession dispute in Dagbon became entangled with politics at the national level. The Andani frustration and dissatisfaction coincided with the introduction of nationalist politics into the Northern Territories. The year 1954 was also an election year in the Gold Coast, and the Northern Territories participated in national election for the first time. The election in the North was mainly between the CPP and the Northern People’s Party. The latter enjoyed the support of northern traditional authorities, including the Ya-Na. The CPP became disillusioned with the traditional leaders for their support of the opposition regional parties and threatened to undermine chiefs who continued to oppose it.²⁷⁵ The Andani Gate therefore threw their support behind the CPP in the hope that a CPP Government will help them rectify the supposed injustice of the selection committee. The CPP secured the most seats in the Legislative Assembly to form the

²⁷³ Asiedu, "Examining the State’s Capacity," (2008):23

²⁷⁴ S.M. Sibidow cited in Ladouceur, "The Yendi Chieftaincy," *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 108.

²⁷⁵ Rathbone, *Nkrumah & the chiefs*, (2000).

independence government, but in the North, it won only eight seats to the Northern People's Party 15.²⁷⁶

Following independence, members of the Andani Gate petitioned the CPP administration to remove Ya-Na Abudulai III and to elevate the head of the Andani family, the Mion Lana, to the Yendi skin. The Andani Gate accused Ya-Na Abudulai III of being unfit to sit on the Yendi skin because he was physically deformed. Abudulai was blind in one eye and had six toes on one foot, both of which disqualified him from sitting on the Yendi skin. The Andani Gate also accused him of lacking legitimacy because his election failed to meet the accepted customary procedures.

A minister of state and a member of the Andani Royal Gate, J. H. Allassani championed the campaign against Ya-Na Abudulai III. In 1958, he sparked a major riot in Yendi when he claimed, at a party rally, that the government was going to remove the Ya-Na Abudulai III.²⁷⁷

The attempt to remove Ya-Na Abudulai III was however alien to Dagbon because Dagomba custom frowns on the removal of chiefs. The Andani petition demonstrated the contradictory nature of Dagomba custom. Although it debars physically deformed persons from sitting on the Yendi skin, it also prohibit the removal of chiefs. Ladouceur points out that, "In the pre-colonial period the opposing factions might have had recourse to warfare, and whoever won out would have held the key to the correct interpretation of tradition".²⁷⁸ During the colonial period, the British administration played the role of outside mediator stepping in to settle such disputes to prevent the outbreak of violence and to maintain law and order. The independent state assumed this role after 1957.

²⁷⁶ Austin, *Politics in Ghana*, 1964, 224.

²⁷⁷ Ladouceur, "The Yendi Chieftaincy," *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 102.

²⁷⁸ Ibid

4.4.3 The CPP Produces Negative Peace

In response to the Andani petition, the CPP Government introduced two main policies in an attempt to resolve the Dagbon succession conflict. These included the institution of a Commission of Inquiry and the introduction of Legislative Instrument (L.I.) 59.

4.4.3.1 The Opoku-Afari Commission of Inquiry

The CPP Government instituted the Opoku-Afari Commission of Inquiry to investigate the issues raised against Ya-Na Abudulai III and make recommendation for the resolution of the succession conflict in Yendi. The Commission, under the Chairmanship of Appeal Commissioner S.D. Opoku-Afari, was however unable to resolve the conflict because government rejected its recommendations. The Commission recommended the removal of Ya-Na Abudulai III because it agreed with the Andani claims that his installation failed to meet Dagomba custom.²⁷⁹

The CPP administration rejected this recommendation because of two main reasons. First, a number of prominent CPP supporters from the North advised the Prime Minister, Kwame Nkrumah, against such an action because they believed the party stood to suffer a considerable loose of popularity in the region if it removed the Ya-Na. Secondly, Ya-Na Abudulai III defected to the CPP. Faced with the threat of removal, Ya-Na Abudulai III and the Abudu Gate decided to declare for the CPP. In December 1958, they instructed Yakubu Tali, the last Abudu MP on the opposition bench in the Legislative Assembly, to cross to the majority side. The Secretary of the traditional council wrote:

I am directed by all the sub-divisional chiefs and the Ya-Na, Abudulai III, to inform you officially from the State Council Office that you should resign from

²⁷⁹ Mustapha Abdul-Hamid, "Islam, Politics and Development: negotiating the future of Dagbon," *Journal of African Culture & Civilisation*, Vol 4, (2011): 47-62; Ahorsu and Gebe, "Governance and security in Ghana" (2011).

the United Party and cross the carpet to the government side which is the Convention People's Party...It is a fervent desire by all the chiefs to you to do this, for you are representing the chiefs and people of the Dagomba State...²⁸⁰

The decision of the CPP administration to maintain the status quo in Yendi disappointed the Andani Gate. In one last attempt to convince the government to adopt the report of the Opoku-Afari Commission, the Mion Lana sent a letter to Kwame Nkrumah in which he spelt out the predicament of his family. The Mion Lana claimed, "If I happen to die without reaching the Yendi skin all my children shall be excluded from occupying it. Again if after my death none of my brothers is appointed to the Mion skin to qualify to occupy the Yendi skin, our gate shall be closed forever."²⁸¹ He concluded by persuading the Prime Minister to act to save his family from, what he termed, an impending tragedy.

4.4.3.2 Legislative Instrument (L.I.) 59

In a response to the petition from the Mion Lana, Kwame Nkrumah introduced L.I. 59 of 1960, a compromise meant to protect both the Andani's claim to the Yendi skin and the CPP's popularity in the North. "Instead of exploring the detailed precedents regarding eligibility and selection, the government simply laid down, in L.I. 59, an order of succession to the Yendi skin and provided mechanisms for its continuation."²⁸²

L.I. 59 reinstated the rotational system of succession to the Yendi skin, but inserted clauses to ensure that the Andani Royal Gate achieve parity with the Abudu Gate. The new instrument stipulated that "candidates from the Abudulai family having twice in succession occupied the Ya Na skin, candidates from the Andani family shall occupy the skin twice in succession beginning

²⁸⁰ Cited in Parliamentary debates, 18 December, 1958.

²⁸¹ Cited from a letter on Dagomba Affairs by J.H. Allasanni, 10 October 1970

²⁸² Staniland, *The Lions of Dagbon* (1975): 147.

with the death of Ya Na Abudulai III and thenceforth the customary law of succession by rotation shall proceed in the normal way.... To protect the Andani family, L.I. 59 added that, “Whenever the present Mion Lana dies his sons shall be regarded as the sons of a former or deceased Ya Na and thereby qualified for the Ya Na skin... irrespective of whether or not he occupied the Ya Na skin before his death”.²⁸³ L.I. 59 effectively recognized the Mion Lana as the next Ya-Na and at the same time as a former Ya-Na if he died before the sitting Ya-Na, to qualify his sons for the Yendi skin. With the passage of L.I. 59, peace gradually returned to Yendi but any hope of the instrument resolving the conflict ended with the overthrow of the CPP administration in February 1966.

The compromised L.I. 59 faced an impossible task from the onset because the Abudu Royal Gate viewed it as an imposition by the CPP Government to protect the interest of their friends in the Andani Gate. The Abudu faction believed that they had no option but to accept L.I. 59 because of the threat from the report of the Opoku-Afari Commission. The overthrow of the CPP administration and the rise of elements from the UP political tradition to power provided an opportunity for the Abudu Royal Gate to challenge L.I. 59.

4.5 Phase Two of the Dagbon Chieftaincy Conflict (1966-1972)

The second phase of the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict began in 1966, following the overthrow of the CPP Government by the National Liberation Council (NLC). The NLC consisted of a group of officers from the Ghana Armed Forces and the Ghana Police Service aligned to the UP political tradition. The removal of the CPP Government represented a significant shift in the official ideology of the state. The NLC criticized the degradation of traditional values and institutions caused by interference by the CPP Government and promised to revive the dignity of

²⁸³ Legislative Instrument (L.I.) 59, Declaration of Customary Law (Dagomba State) Order, 1960. Accra

the chieftaincy institution. The willingness of the new government to revisit decisions taken by the previous government on traditional matters encouraged the Abudu Gate to petition it for a review of L.I. 59.

The Dagomba State Council argued that the pre-determination of the next Ya-Na by L.I. 59 violated the norms of Dagomba Custom because "... no successor to any skin is known or should be determined during the reign of its incumbent".²⁸⁴ The Dagomba State Council is composed of about twenty important chiefs and elders appointed by the Ya-Na. Supporters of the Abudu Gate dominated the Council after two successive Ya Na's from that family. Soon after this petition, Ya-Na Abudulai III died on 14 September 1967. The death of the chief created tensions in Yendi because his eldest son Mahamadu who became regent immediately declared his intention to vie for the Yendi skin, a violation of L.I. 59. The Mion Lana, the head of the Andani Gate, once more put forward his candidature.

4.6 The NLC Regime Revises CPP Policies on Dagbon

4.6.1 L.I. 596/NLC Decree 281/NLC Decree 296

The NLC Government's first attempt to resolve the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict consisted of a series of inconsistent declarations. First, the regime responded to the petition from the Dagomba State Council by repealing L.I. 59, and replacing it with L.I. 596 Declaration of Customary (Dagomba State) (Revocation) Order, 1968. The repeal of L.I. 59 provoked a series of protests in Yendi and other parts of the Northern Region by supporters of the Andani Royal Gate. These protests forced the NLC regime to revoke L.I. 596 with NLC Decree 281 of 17

²⁸⁴ "Petition of the Electoral Committee of the Dagomba State Council - Enskin- ment L.I. 59 1960", dated at Yendi, 25 May 1967.

September 1968, which reinstated L.I. 59. The reinstatement of L.I. 59 led to the outbreak of a fresh round of protests, this time by supporters of the Abudu Gate.

4.6.2 The Justice Siriboe Committee

In response to the failure of its legal instruments to resolve the Yendi crisis, the NLC regime set up the Justice Siriboe Committee to study the dispute and advise it accordingly. The Committee, under the Chairmanship of Justice Siriboe of the Chieftaincy Secretariat, recommended the repeal of L.I. 59 because it found that its introduction was flawed. In the opinion of the Committee, the CPP Government passed L.I. 59 without recourse to the Northern Regional House of Chiefs, as required by the Act under which it was introduced. The NLC accepted the report of the Committee and subsequently issued NLC Decree 296 of 15 October 1968, to repeal L.I. 59.

The recommendation of the Justice Siriboe Committee failed to end the crisis in Yendi because it did not make a determination on the issues surrounding the selection the new Ya-Na. Following the final funeral rites of Ya-Na Abudulai III on November 7, 1968, the four soothsayers (the original Selection Committee) selected the Mion Lana as the new Ya-Na, whilst the seven divisional chiefs selected the Gbon Lana, the son and regent of the deceased Ya-Na. The District Security Committee suspended both installations to avert any violent clashes. The Andani Gate with the support of some local units of the army and the police service were however able to enskin the Mion Lana on November 21, 1968 as Ya-Na Mahama Andani III. The Abudu Gate taken aback by this development protested to government to intervene.

4.6.3 Mate Kole Committee

The NLC Government set up yet another ad hoc committee, the Mate Kole Committee, to determine whether the selection and installation of Ya-Na Mahama Andani III satisfied Dagomba customs. This Committee was under the Chairmanship of Nene Azzu Mate Kole (a paramount

chief from the Eastern Region) and had Nana Obiri Yeboah and Jatoe Kaleo as members. The Mate Kole Committee commenced sitting on December 17, 1968 in Tamale, but were unable to conclude its work before the death of Ya-Na Mahama Andani III in March 1969. Yakubu Andani as the eldest son of the deceased chief became his regent.

The Mate Kole Committee eventually rejected the selection of Ya-Na Mahama Andani III by the committee of four soothsayers, claiming that it was repugnant to Dagomba custom and therefore null and void. The Committee instead recognized the selection of the Gbon Lana, Mahamadu Abudulai by the committee of seven divisional chiefs and recommended his enskinment as Ya-Na as soon as possible.²⁸⁵

The chieftaincy crisis in Yendi coincided with the 1969 General Elections and the return to civilian rule. The Yendi conflict became a major issue in the electoral campaign in the North, and especially in the seven seats in Dagbon. It was widely believed that the Progress Party (PP), from the UP political tradition, aligned itself to the Abudu Gate whilst the National Alliance of Liberals from the Nkrumaist political tradition, was sympathetic to the Andanis. Thus in Dagbon "a vote for the Progress Party was equated with support for the Abudulai, and a vote for the National Alliance of Liberals with support for Andani."²⁸⁶

The victory of the PP in the elections became a triumph for the Abudu Gate as the new government immediately accepted the recommendations of the Mate Kole Committee. The PP Government's decision to accept the recommendations sparked violence clashes in many parts of Dagbon. On September 9, 1969, an altercation between the security services and a crowd of

²⁸⁵ Republic of Ghana, Report of the Mate Kole Committee of Inquiry, 1969, 3

²⁸⁶ Ladouceur, "The Yendi Chieftaincy Dispute", 1972, 111.

demonstrators trying to prevent the installation of Gbon Lana Mahamadu Abudulai resulted in the death of 23 persons and the arrest of 700 others. Calm eventually returned to Dagbon following the enskinment of Ya-Na Abudulai III and the passage of a new decree exiling four important Andani chiefs from Yendi. This enforced peace was short-lived, collapsing immediately following the overthrow of the PP administration by a group of army officers with leanings towards the Nkrumaist political tradition in January 1972.

4.7 Phase Three of the Dagbon Chieftaincy Conflict

The third phase of the Dagbon Chieftaincy conflict began with the overthrow of the PP Government by the National Redemption Council (NRC) in 1972. The new government of the NRC, aligned to the Nkrumaist political tradition, reopened the investigation into the Yendi conflict following a petition from the Andani Gate.

4.8 The NRC Regime Revises NLC Policies on Dagbon

4.8.1 The Ollenu Committee

The NRC administration set up the Ollenu Committee to re-examine the issues surrounding the latest phase of the Dagon conflict. This committee was under the Chairmanship of Justice Nii Amaa Ollenu with Sir Tsibu Darki IX, Nana Atakora Amaniampong II and Togbe Adja Tekpor VI as members. The NRC administration charged the Ollenu Committee to ascertain the procedure for the selection and enskinment of the Ya-Na; inquire about the circumstances leading to the abrogation of L.I. 59; the destoolment Ya-Na Andani III; and the enskinment of Ya-Na Mahama IV. Contrary to the findings of the Mate Kole Committee, the Ollenu Committee rejected the selection and installation of Ya-Na Mahamadu Abudulai IV because in its view it failed to meet the basic tenants of Dagomba custom. In addition, the Committee found that the election of the late Ya-Na Andani III was in accordance with Dagomba custom. The Ollenu Committee therefore recommended that since no eligible member of the Andani Royal Gate

occupied any of the gate skins, Yakubu Andani, the eldest son and regent of the late Ya-Na Mahama Andani II be enskinned as Ya- Na.

The NRC Government issued a white paper accepting the findings and recommendations of the Ollennu Committee on April 23, 1974.²⁸⁷ The government subsequently invited Ya-Na Mahamadu Abudulai IV to Accra, where it detained and prevented him from returning to Yendi. The NRC regime also forcefully ejected Ya-Na Mahamadu Abudulai IV's household from the Gbewaa Palace (the king's Palace) to pave way for the performance of the funeral of the late Ya-Na Andani III. The kingmakers led by the Kuga-Na, thereafter, installed Yakubu Andani as Ya-Na.

4.8.2 Yendi Skin Affairs Act-1974 (NRCD 299)

The NRC regime's second main policy intervention in Dagbon involved the passage of the 'Yendi Skin Affairs Act-1974.²⁸⁸ This Act declared the nomination, selection and enskinment of Mahamadu Abudulai as Ya-Na and Paramount Chief of Dagbon as null and void.²⁸⁹ The Yendi Skin Affairs Act also barred all courts in the country from adjudicating on the Dagbon conflict.²⁹⁰ By this enactment, the NRC Government closed all avenues for the Abudu Gate to seek redress, leaving them with no choice but to bide their time for the return of a regime more sympathetic to their cause. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) replaced the NRC in another coup on June 4, 1979, and returned the country to civilian rule by handing power to the elected government of the People's National Party (PNP) on 25 September 1979. Both the AFRC and PNP

²⁸⁷ Republic of Ghana. *White Paper on the Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Yendi Skin Affair*. Accra: Ghana Publishing Corporation, Assembly Press. 1974.

²⁸⁸ Yendi Skin Affairs Act-1974: National Redemption Council Decree 299.

²⁸⁹ Ibid, Section 1

²⁹⁰ Ibid, Section 4

Governments who drew their core support from the Nkrumaist political tradition also rejected Abudu petitions to reopen investigations into the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict.

4.9 PNDC Interventions Produce Negative Peace

The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) military regime replaced the PNP administration in the country's fifth coup on December 31, 1981. The PNDC's main policy intervention in the Yendi conflict involved the passage of Yendi Skin Affairs (Appeal) Law of 1984. This law was an attempt to find a more lasting solution to the Dagbon chieftaincy succession conflict. The Yendi Skin Affairs (Appeal) Law repealed NRC Decree 299 and allowed aggrieved parties in the conflict to seek redress through the judiciary system.

In response to the passage of the Yendi Skin Affairs (Appeal) Law, the deposed Ya-Na Mahamadu Abudulai from the Abudu Gate filed a motion in the Court of Appeal, requesting the court to set aside the report of the Ollenu Committee. The Court ruled in favor Mahamadu Abudulai, reinstating him as Overlord of Dagbon. The Andani family appealed this decision at the Supreme Court. In 1986, the Supreme Court overturned the decision of the Court of Appeal by a six to one majority. The Supreme Court however recognized Mahamudu Abudulai as a former Ya-Na, a ruling that made his sons eligible for appointment to the Yendi skin. The Supreme Court further ruled that in order to give effect to the rotational system one gate should not occupy all three gate skins at a time.²⁹¹

The recognition of Mahammad Abudulai by the Supreme Court as a former Ya-Na raised several challenges because the situation was unprecedented in Dagomba custom. The passing away

²⁹¹ Abdul-Hamid, "Islam, Politics and Development," *Journal of African Culture & Civilisation*, 47-62; Yakubu, *The Abudu-Andani Crisis of Dagbon*, 2006.

of Ya-Na Mohammad Abudulai in 1988, during the reign of Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II took Dagbon into unchartered territory. This inevitably led to heightened tensions, as the rival gates could not agree on the arrangements for the performance of the final funeral rites of the deceased Ya-Na. The Abudu Royal Gate insisted on performing his funeral at the Gbewaa Palace because the palace is the ritual center of the kingdom where the royal ancestors reside. Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II and the Andani Gate refused to vacate the palace for the funeral because “this ritual is usually the prologue to the enskinment of a new king and would confirm Abdullah’s status as a Ya-Na and a royal ancestor.”²⁹² Unable to perform the funeral of the late Ya-Na Abudulai, the frustration of the Abudu Gate festered as they bide their time for the return of a government more friendly to their cause.²⁹³

Dagbon enjoyed its longest period of political stability during the reign of Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II (1972-2002), from the Andani Gate. This was in spite of the fact that his reign coincided with the most unstable period in the country’s political history. During the first decade of his reign, there were as many as five changes of governments, including four military interventions. The decision of the NRC regime to recognize Yakubu Andani II as Ya-Na was allowed to stand because the SMC I & II, AFRC, PNP, PNDC, and NDC governments that followed the NRC all belonged to the Nkrumaist political tradition, and therefore had little incentive to revisit the Dagbon conflict. This however changed when the New Patriotic Party (NPP), aligned to the UP political tradition came to power after it prevailed in the 2000 General Elections.

²⁹² MacGaffey, "Death of a King," 86.

²⁹³ Tonah, "The Politicisation of a Chieftaincy Conflict." (2012): 8.

4.10 Phase Four of the Dagbon Chieftaincy Conflict

The recent phase of the Dagbon conflict began following the NPP victory in the 2000 General Elections. The Dagbon succession conflict was a central campaign issue in the elections. In the run up to the elections, there were rumors that an NPP Government would remove Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II and assist the Abudu Gate to perform the funeral of their deposed king, Ya-Na Mahama Abudulai III.²⁹⁴ The NPP's disclaimer to these rumors failed to dispel tensions in the area. The appointment of several members of the Abudu Royal Gate to sensitive security positions in the new government only served to fuel the rumors that it was intent on supporting the family to reclaim the Yendi Skin. *The Ghanaian Chronicle* in its editorial of May 7, 2002 claimed that almost the entire top echelon of the National Security apparatus was composed of members of the Abudu Gate. A situation it described as incredulous and a recipe for disaster.

4.11 The 2002 Yendi Crisis

The Yendi massacre in March 2002 defined the fourth phase of the Dagbon conflict. This massacre was a culmination of Abudu impunity in the aftermath of the NPP victory. The Abudu Gate saw the return of the UP political tradition to government as an opportunity to resuscitate the demand for the performance of the funeral of the deceased Ya-Na Mahamadu Abudulai IV.²⁹⁵ The appointment of several members of the gate to government also emboldened them to openly challenge and attempt to undermine the authority of the reigning Overlord, Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II. The Bolin Lana, son and regent of the late Mahamadu Abudulai constituted his own traditional council and began to act as a rival Ya-Na. He organized and sponsored religious and traditional festivals, a right reserved only for the sitting Ya-Na.

²⁹⁴ MacGaffey, "Death of a King." *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 86; Tonah, "The Politicisation of a Chieftaincy Conflict." (2012): 10-11.

²⁹⁵ Tonah, "The Politicisation of a Chieftaincy Conflict." (2012): 8.

In March 2002, an attempt by the Bolin Lana to organize a parallel Bugum (Fire) festival²⁹⁶ to the official one by Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II led to tensions in Dagbon. The government, acting upon the recommendations of the District Security Council (DISEC), cancelled the celebration of the festival and imposed a curfew on Yendi.²⁹⁷ The Andani Royal Gate viewed the imposition of the curfew and the ban on the official celebration of the Bugum festival as an attempt by the NPP administration to prevent Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II from performing his official duties. Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II therefore prevailed on the Northern Regional Minister, Prince Imoru Andani to lift the curfew with assurances that there would be no disturbances during the celebration of the festival. The general mistrust and tensions between the rival factions however came to a head during the festival resulting in widespread violent clashes in Yendi and other parts of Dagbon. Three days of fighting between supporters of the Abudu and Andani rival gates resulted in the death of Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II and 40 of his supporters as well as the destruction of the Gbewaa Palace.²⁹⁸

Members of the Andani Royal Gate accused the NPP administration of complicity in the murder of Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II.²⁹⁹ The gate accused several Abudus holding key government positions of complicity in the attacks on the Gbewaa Palace and the murder of the Ya-Na. The accused included the Minister of the Interior and Member of Parliament for Yendi, Malik Alhassan Yakubu; the National Security Advisor, General Joshua Hamidu; the Regional Minister, Imoro Andani; and a member of the National Security Council, Major Abubakar Sulemana.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁶ The Bugum festival is a traditional festival of sacrifice to the gods and the ancestors.

²⁹⁷ Zakaria Alhassan, "Curfew at Yendi," *Daily Graphic*, March 26, 2002, 1 & 3; Republic of Ghana, *Report* (2002).

²⁹⁸ *Daily Graphic*, "Ya-Na Killed-In violence at Yendi" March 28, 2002, 1 & 3; *Daily Graphic*, "Yendi death toll now 30" April 13, 2002, 1 & 3; Republic of Ghana, *Report* (2002).

²⁹⁹ Focus Group Discussion with Andani Youth (June 27, 2017).

³⁰⁰ *Daily Graphic*, "Major Sulemana denies allegation," April 8, 2002, 1&3.

4.12 NPP Government Respond with Top-Down Policies

The immediate response of the NPP Government to the Yendi crisis intensified suspicion of its complicity in the massacre. Despite widespread reports in the media of ongoing fighting, government officials denied that there was any trouble in Yendi.³⁰¹ The Government only woke from its slumber after the third day of fighting to announce the death of Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II.³⁰² The response of the security services also disappointed many people. The police and the military stationed only 300m and 500m respectively from the chief's palace failed to intervene when violence broke out on March 25. The police claimed it was unsafe for them to do so, whilst the military complained that their armoured car was not in good condition.³⁰³

Government reassured the factions that it would act swiftly to identify, apprehend and bring to justice the perpetrators of the heinous crimes in Yendi.³⁰⁴ Government also accepted the resignation of officials accused of complicity in the Yendi violence.³⁰⁵ The rival gates and the main opposition party, NDC however called for an independent judicial enquiry to bring the perpetrators of the massacre to justice because of suspicions that the NPP administration might shield its officials culpable in the violence.³⁰⁶

³⁰¹ *Ghanaweb*, "The Dagbon Clashes: Ghana's Worst Nightmare," January 1, 2003. Accessed May 1, 2018, <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/The-Dagbon-Clashes-Ghana-s-Worst-Nightmare-31122>

³⁰² *Ghana News Agency*, "Ya-Na Confirmed Dead" March 28, 2002. Accessed May 15, 2018, <https://www.modernghana.com/news/21505/ya-na-confirmed-dead.html>; *Daily Graphic*, "Ya-Na Killed. In violence at Yendi," March 26, 2002, 1 & 3.

³⁰³ Republic of Ghana, *Report* (2002).

³⁰⁴ *Daily Graphic*, "Government will get to the bottom of matter," April 1, 2002, 1 & 3

³⁰⁵ *Daily Graphic*, "President accepts resignation of two ministers" April 1, 2002, 1 & 3

³⁰⁶ Albert K. Salia, "Call for independent commission of inquiry," *Daily Graphic*, April, 2002, 1 & 3; *Daily Graphic*, "Abudu Gate supports call for judicial enquiry," April 6, 2002, 1 & 3; *Daily Graphic*, "NDC will co-operate to probe conflict," April 3, 2002, p. 3.

4.12.1 State of Emergency

The first official policy adopted by the NPP administration in an attempt to resolve the Yendi crisis was the imposition of a State of Emergency. The President imposed a State of Emergency on the Dagbon traditional area to contain the violent clashes on 27 March 2002.³⁰⁷ By the State of Emergency, government banned the procurement and possession of all offensive weapons in the area, and deployed a large contingent of military and police forces to enforce peace in the conflict area.³⁰⁸ The State of Emergency was effective in ending the violence and restoring some semblance of calm to the conflict area, but tensions remained acutely high for a long time. It was not until October the following year that government was able to relax the State of Emergency by lifting it in four districts including Tolon-Kumbungu, Savelugu-Nanton, Gushiegu-Karaga and Zabzugu-Tatale.³⁰⁹

4.12.2 The Wuaku Commission of Inquiry

In response to the calls for an independent judiciary inquiry, the President acting in consultation with the Council of State appointed a three-member Commission of Inquiry to probe the violent clashes in Yendi between March 25 and 27, 2002.³¹⁰ The membership of the Committee included Justice Wuaku (Chairman), a retired Supreme Court Judge; Prof. Kwesi Yankah of the University of Ghana; and Mrs. Florence Brew, an educationist. The Commission was charged to, among other things, investigate the violent clashes, identify those responsible, and to recommend appropriate actions against such persons. The Commission collected public testimonies of witnesses, memoranda, and briefings from the security agencies to inform its work.

³⁰⁷ *Daily Graphic*, "President declares State of Emergency," March 28, 2002, 1 & 3; Joe Okyere and Salome Donkor, "State of Emergency on Dagbon: House extends period." *Daily Graphic*, April 5, 2002, 1 & 3.

³⁰⁸ *BBC Monitoring*, March 27, 2002; Zakaria Alhassan, "The military will ensure law, order in Dagbon," *Daily Graphic*, April 5, 2002, 3.

³⁰⁹ *BBC Monitoring*, October 22, 2003

³¹⁰ A.B.A Fuseini, "3 to probe Yendi crisis," *Daily Graphic*, April 26, 2002, 1 & 3

The Wuaku Commission concluded that the events that took place in Yendi from 25-27 March 2002 were criminal acts of an act of war fought between the Abudu and Andani Royal Gates.³¹¹ In the view of the Commission, the violent clashes were the result of three main factors. First, the unfettered acquisition of local and sophisticated weapons by the two rival gates. Second, the insistence of the Abudu Gate to celebrate certain festivals previously held solely under the auspices of the Ya-Na, and thirdly, the hasty lifting of the ban imposed on the celebration of the Bugum Festival by the Regional Minister, Prince Imoru Andani. In relation to this third finding, the Commission recommended that the Regional Minister be charged for criminal negligence. On the attacks on the Gbewaa Palace, the Commission found that Abudu fighters were responsible for the deaths of Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II and all those killed within the Palace and its environs.

In relation to these findings, the Commission recommended the arrest and prosecution of two Abudu fighters, Yidana Sugri and Iddrisu Gyamfo, for the murder of Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II.³¹² The two were seen parading the streets of Yendi on 27 March with severed parts of the deceased king. The Commission also recommended the arrest and prosecution of several other individuals for their alleged involvement in offences such as conspiracy to murder, attempted murder, causing unlawful damage, assault, arson, illegal possession of weapons, and unlawful military training. The NPP Government issued a White paper on December 23, 2002 accepting the general findings of the Wuaku Commission.³¹³

³¹¹ Republic of Ghana, *Report* (2002).

³¹² Boahene Asamoah, "2 arrested over yendi crisis," *Daily Graphic*, April 5, 2002, 1 & 3.

³¹³ Republic of Ghana, *White Paper on the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Yendi Disturbances of 25th-27th March 2002*, (Accra: Ghana Publishing Corporation, Assembly Press. 2002).

The Wuaku Commission was challenged from the onset because one of the main parties to the conflict, the Andani royal family, rejected its independence.³¹⁴ The Andani Gate accused the NPP administration of attempting to use the Commission to whitewash the crimes of key government officials and members of the Abudu Gate in the murder of Ya-Na Andani II.³¹⁵ Members of the family described the work of the Commission as a circus, with no intention of unmasking the real perpetrators of the massacre. The Andani Gate rejected the conclusion of the Commission that the violent clashes in Yendi from 25-27 March 2002 was a three-day war. They described it as “indeed strange and incredible...” and pointed out that any attempt to “...to charge Yidana Sugri and Iddrisu Jahinfo as the presumed murderers of the Ya-Na will be an exercise in futility. ...” because the two could not have waged what the Commission described as a three-day war by themselves.³¹⁶ For the Andani Gate, the decision of an Accra High Court to dismiss the charges brought by government against Yidana Sugri and Iddrisu Gyamfo and 13 others accused of complicity in the murder of the Ya-Na for lack of evidence, vindicated their stance.³¹⁷

4.13 Government adopts a Collaborative Approach

The failure of the state of emergency and the Wuaku Commission to resolve the Yendi crisis presented government with a serious challenge. In the first place, the conflict in Dagbon

³¹⁴ *Ghana News Agency*, “Witness discounts Wuaku Commission proceedings,” September 28, 2010, Accessed March 1, 2019, <http://www.ghananewsagency.org/human-interest/witness-discounts-wuaku-commission-proceedings--20897>.

³¹⁵ Alber K. Salia, “Andani family worried,” *Daily Graphic*, April 20, 2002, 1 & 3; Ghanaweb, “Andanis Reject Govt White Paper On Wuaku Report,” January 9, 2003, Accessed November 12, 2018, <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Andanis-Reject-Govt-White-Paper-On-Wuaku-Report-31317>

³¹⁶ Andani Royal Family, “Statement on Government White Paper on the Report of the Wuaku Commission,” *Press Release*, January 9, 2003. Accessed May 3, 2018. <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Andanis-Reject-Govt-White-Paper-On-Wuaku-Report-31317>

³¹⁷ *Ghanaweb*, “Court frees Ya Na Andani's alleged killer,” July 24, 2003. Accessed May 4, 2018, <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=39820>

posed a threat to the security and peace status of the country as a whole. There was a risk that the resumption of violence in Yendi would spill into other parts of the country. Secondly, the crisis in Yendi threatened the prospect a peaceful election in 2004. The Electoral Commission (EC) was unable to organize the August 2002 District Level Elections in the Dagbon Traditional Area because of insecurity and the State of Emergency. The opposition NDC warned that it would reject the outcome of the 2004 presidential and parliamentary elections, if the EC postponed the elections in the Dagbon Traditional Area. The party stressed that any national elections conducted without the participation of the people of Dagbon would be unacceptable because it will lack the required legitimacy as being the sovereign will of the people of the country.³¹⁸ Thirdly, the NPP administration was concerned that the violence in Dagbon would cause irreparable damage to its fortunes in the 2004 General Elections. Efforts by government and party functionaries to distance the administration from the massacre proved very difficult, especially given the inability of the administration to find and bring the perpetrators of the heinous crimes to justice. The Yendi crisis became a major campaign issue in the run up to the elections.³¹⁹ These challenges forced the NPP government to adopt an alternative approach for the resolution to the crisis and the succession conflict.

Taking a cue from of the success of collaboration in the resolution of the Guinea Fowl War in the Northern Region, President John Kufuor requested support from some civil society groups to explore the development of an effective program to arrest the crisis. These groups included the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), the Yendi Peace Center, and various religious

³¹⁸ *Ghanaweb* (2004, October 13). "NDC to reject result of elections if..." <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/politics/NDC-to-reject-result-of-elections-if-67695>

³¹⁹ Tonah, "The Politicisation of a Chieftaincy Conflict." (2012): 11; National Democratic Congress (2008). *Manifesto for a Better Ghana*. 2008, 3.

organizations. These consultations also extended to some international organizations resident in the country, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the European Union (EU). These consultations produced two important outcomes: the setting up of the Northern Regional Peace Advisory Council and the Committee of Eminent Chiefs.

4.13.1 The Northern Regional Peace Advisory Council (NORPAC)

The consultation with civil society concluded that in order to design an effective program to arrest the crisis in Yendi, it was necessary to situate it within a broader initiative for the prevention of violent conflicts and the strengthening of mechanisms for building peace and security. This initiative found expression in the form of NORPAC. The Regional Coordinating Council (RCC) set up NORPAC in May 2004, to among other things, manage the crisis in Yendi. NORPAC consisted of 24 members appointed from traditional authorities, religious bodies, women groups, civil society organizations, political parties, youth groups and the media. The RCC charged NOTPAC to defuse tensions in the region in the run-up to the 2004 general elections. The objectives of NORPAC was to prevent the further outbreak of fighting; to bring about peace and reconciliation among people of the Northern Region with special reference to Dagbon; and to inculcate in the people the virtues of tolerance, mutual recognition and peaceful co-existence.³²⁰

NORPAC undertook activities including peace education, sensitization, capacity building in conflict resolution and peace building practice, mediation between various groups in conflict, community peace rallies, and consultations with District Chief Executives in the region. NORPAC undertook these activities in partnership with stakeholders such as Women in Peacebuilding Movement, Ghana Network for Peacebuilding, House of Chiefs, Electoral Commission, National

³²⁰ Martin Alamisi Amidu, *The History and Rational for A National Architecture for Peace in Ghana and a National Peace Council Bill* (Accra: Corporate Design House Ltd), 2010; Emmanuel Wekem Kotia, and Festus Kofi Aubyn. "Building National Infrastructures for Peace in Africa: Understanding the Role of the National Peace Council in Ghana," 2013. http://works.bepress.com/emmanuel_kotia/10/

Commission for Civic Education, and the media.³²¹ NORPAC was successful in achieving a measure of reconciliation and improving the general security situation of the conflict area. This enabled government to lift the State of Emergency on August 16, 2004, two and half years after its imposition.³²² NORPAC was also instrumental in creating an enabling environment for peaceful elections at the end of 2004.³²³

4.13.2 The Committee of Eminent Chiefs (CEC)

Government's consultation with civil society also concluded that in order to find a lasting solution to the Dagbon succession dispute there was the need to adopt traditional African diplomacy based on the application of customs, norms and traditional ethics in the mediation of the conflict. The consultation agreed that the Asantehene (Ashanti king), Nayiri (Mamprusi king) and Yagbonwura (Gonja king), three of the most eminent traditional rulers in the country should lead this process.³²⁴ The immediate responsibility of the CEC was to resolve the disputes relating to the performance of the traditional rituals necessary for the settlement of the Yendi conflict: the burial of Ya-Na Andani II, and the performance of the funerals of the two deceased paramount chiefs.

The CEC in consultation with the two rival gates drew-up and signed a 'Roadmap to Peace' on March 30, 2006. The roadmap recognized five major benchmarks in the peace building process.

³²¹ Rasheed Draman, Janet A. Mohammed, Peter Woodrow, *The conflict prevention and resolution portfolio of UNDP Ghana. Evaluation Report*. November, 2009, Assessed October, 11, 2017. <https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/download/4036>.

³²² *Ghanaweb*. "Government lifts state of emergency in Dagbon," August 16, 2004, Accessed May 23, 2018, <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Government-lifts-state-of-emergency-in-Dagbon-64104>

³²³ Amidu, *The History and Rational*, 2010

³²⁴ William A. Awinador-Kanyirige, "Ghana's National Peace Council." *Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect Policy Brief*, August (2014): 2001-2008. Accessed August 11, 2017. <http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/awinador-ghana-national-peace-council.pdf>; Salome Donkor and Nehemia Owusu Achiaw, "3 chiefs to mediate" *Daily Graphic*, April 3, 2002, 1 & 3

These included: (1) burial of the late Ya-Na Andani II; (2) installation of the regent of the late king; (3) performance of the funeral of the deposed Ya-Na, Mahamadu Abudulai IV; (4) performance of the funeral of Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II; and finally, (5) selection and enskinment of a new Ya-Na.³²⁵ The Committee supervised the burial of the late Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II and installation of his son, Kankupya Na Abudulai Andani as regent on April 10, 2006, realizing the first two benchmarks in the roadmap.³²⁶ The implementation of the remaining benchmarks however met several challenges as the rival gates failed to agree on exact modalities.

The CEC and the two gates reached a 'Final Peace Agreement' on November 18, 2007 to resolve the challenges that arose in relation to the implementation of the Roadmap to Peace.³²⁷ This agreement condemned the elections of regents to the Yendi skin and encouraged all parties to stick to the requirement that all candidates for the Yendi skin must first learn the art of statecraft from one of the gate skins. To facilitate the realization of the remaining provisions of the Roadmap, the Final Peace Agreement specified conditions for the performance of the funerals of the deceased paramount chiefs and the selection of a successor to the Yendi skin by April 30, 2008. Despite this agreement, the peace process made no further progress because of continuing disagreement between the factions on the performance of the final funeral rites of the late Ya-Na Mahamadu Abudulai.³²⁸

³²⁵ Committee of Eminent Kings, *Roadmap to Peace*, March 30, 2006. Accessed May 29, 2018, <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=144533>.

³²⁶ Kwaku Sakyi-Addo, "Ghana king's burial ends long feud," *BBC News.*, April 13, 2006, Accessed May 4, 2018, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4906764.stm>

³²⁷ Committee of Eminent Kings, *Final Peace Agreement on the Dagbon Chieftaincy Conflict, November 18, 2007*. Accessed May 29, 2018,

³²⁸ Afua Hirsch, "Ghana's Rival Dagbon Royals Risk Pulling the Country Apart." *The Guardian.*, July 5, 2012, Accessed May 8, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/05/ghana-royal-rivalry-threatens-violence>

A regime change at the beginning of 2009 magnified the disagreements between the two rival gates and adversely affected the work of the CEC. In the run up to the 2004 and 2008 General Elections, the Yendi crisis became a major campaign issue. The largest opposition party, the NDC criticized government policies on the Yendi crises, describing these as attempts by the NPP administration to whitewash the situation.³²⁹ The NDC promised to “set up a truly non-partisan, competent independent commission...” to re-examine the Yendi massacre of March 2002.”³³⁰ The NDC Government reopened the investigations into the Yendi massacre in 2009 after it defeated the NPP in the December 2008 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections. The new NDC administration arrested and charged 15 members of the Abudu Royal Gate for the murder of Ya-Na Andani II. The government’s prosecution was however unable to establish a prima facie case against the accused persons leading to the acquittal and discharge of all 15 persons on March 29, 2011 by an Accra Fast Track High Court.³³¹ The NDC administration however reneged on its promise to set up a new presidential commission to re-examine the Yendi massacre.

The CEC continued to engage with the rival gates over the peaceful resolution of the Yendi conflict in spite of the above challenges. In December 2018, the Committee and the two gates signed a ‘Final Roadmap for Peace’. This roadmap drew up specific guidelines for the performance of the funerals of the two deceased paramount chiefs, and the elections a new Ya-Na.³³² In line with this roadmap; the Abudu Royal Gate was granted permission to perform the final funeral rites

³²⁹ Tonah, “The Politicisation of a Chieftaincy Conflict.” (2012): 11.

³³⁰ National Democratic Congress (2008). *Manifesto for a Better Ghana. 2008, 3.*

³³¹ *Daily Graphic*, “Accused Persons in Ya-Na’s Murder Case Freed,” March 31, 2011. Accessed May 9, 2018, from <https://www.modernghana.com/news/322532/1/accused-persons-in-ya-na039s-murder-case-freed.html>

³³² *Daily Guide*, “Dagbon Peace sealed; Otumfup Presents Raodmap to Nana,” November 22, 2018. Accessed March 2, 2019, <https://dailyguidenetwork.com/dagbon-peace-sealed-otumfuo-presents-roadmap-to-nana/>

of the late Ya-Na Mahamadu Abudulai IV at the Gbewaa Palace from December 14-28, 2018.³³³ The Andani Royal Gate intend performed the funeral of the late Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II from January 4-18, 2019.³³⁴ The selection and enskinment of the chief of Savelugu from the Andani Royal Gate, as Ya-Na Abubakari Mahama II ended this phase of the conflict.³³⁵

4.14 Comparative Evaluation of Policies

Table 4.2 evaluates the various policies introduced by successive governments in an attempt to resolve Dagbon chieftaincy conflict. The table shows that regime types cannot explain the divergent outcomes of policies in the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict. Policies introduced by both military and democratic regimes either fail or succeed based on level of participation and collaboration.

The table shows that top-down policies designed and introduced by government in isolation fail to address the underlying causes of the conflict. L.I. 59 introduced by the CPP administration failed to find a sustainable solution to the succession conflict because it failed to explore the detailed precedents regarding eligibility and selection in Dagbon. The peace it enforced (negative peace) collapsed with the removal of the Kwame Nkrumah and the CPP administration in February 1966.

Captured policies also fail to address the succession conflict because they are perceived as bias, used by successive governments to reward supporters and punish opponents. The contrast

³³³ Yakubu Alhassan, Dagbon: Royals climax funeral of late Yaa-Naa Mahamadu Abudulai IV, *Diamondfmonline*, December 28, 2018. Accessed March 2, <http://diamondfmonline.com/dagbon-abudu-royals-climax-funeral-of-late-yaa-naa-mahamadu-abdulai-iv/>

³³⁴ Mohammed Aminu Alabira, Yaa-Naa Yakubu Andani funeral ends today after massive display of culture, *Citi Newsroom*, January 18, 2019. Accessed March 2, 2019, <https://citinewsroom.com/2019/01/18/yaa-naa-yakubu-andani-funeral-ends-today-after-massive-display-of-culture/>

³³⁵ Albert Futukpor, "Dagbon get new Ya-Na," *Ghana News Agency*, January 18, 2019. Accessed March 2, 2019, <http://www.ghananewsagency.org/social/dagbon-gets-new-ya-na-144254>

between the findings and recommendations of Mate Kole Committee with that of Ollennu Committee highlights the bias nature of such policies. The Mate Kole Committee, set up by the NLM regime aligned to the Abudu Gate, found that the selection and enskinment of Ya-Na Mahama III from the Andani Gate failed to meet accepted standards of Dagomba custom. In contrast, the Ollennu Committee set up, only a few months later, by the NRC aligned to the Andani Gate, rejected the findings of the Mate Kole Committee, and insisted that the selection of Ya-Na Mahama III was in accordance with Dagomba custom.

Table 4.2 also shows that policies designed and implemented by a collaboration between government, civil society, and traditional society (peace making state) are successful because they are able to address the underlying causes of the conflict. The CFC successfully negotiated the performance of the funerals of the deceased paramount chiefs and selection a new Ya-Na because it involved collaboration between government, civil society, traditional leaders and the rival gates.

Table 4. 2: Evaluation of Government Policies in Dagbon

Phase	Gov't Policy	Type of Policy	Evaluation	Reason (s)
Phase I	Opoku-Afari Commission	Captured Policy	Failed	Gov't refused to implement recommendations
	L.I. 59	Top-Down	Negative Peace	Failed to consider precedents on eligibility and selection
Phase II	L.I. 596/ NLCD 281/296	Top-Down	Failed	Lacked understanding on the conflict
	Justice Siriboe Committee	Captured Policy	Failed	Failed to address selection dispute
	Mate Kole Committee	Captured Policy	failed	Viewed as attempt to reward Abudus
	White Paper	Captured Policy	Violence	Viewed as attempt to reward Abudus
	Exile of 4 Andani Chiefs	Top-Down	Negative Peace	Failed to resolve root causes
Phase III	Ollennu Committee	Captured Policy	Failed	Viewed as attempt to reward Andanis
	Yendi Skin Affairs Act-1974	Top-Down	Negative Peace	Failed to address root causes
	Yendi Skin Affairs (Appeal) Law-1984	Top-Down	Negative Peace	Failed to address root causes
Phase IV	State of Emergency	Top-Down	Negative Peace	Failed to address root causes
	Wuaku Commission of Inquiry	Captured Policy	Failed	Rejected by the Andanis
	NORPAC	Peace Making State	Successful	Achieved reconciliation
	CEC	Peace Making State	Peace	Legitimacy at grass roots

Source: Author

4.15 Institutionalizing Collaboration for Peacebuilding

Following the success of NORPAC, civil society groups and the UNDP encouraged government to replicate the concept of an independent conflict resolution mechanism throughout the country. These groups sought to ensure that future governments would not abandon collaboration with society in the design and implementation of policies for conflict resolution and peacebuilding. This was also to engage government and civil society in the proactive prevention of conflicts and peacebuilding instead of the usual reactive mechanisms employed.

Government and civil society set up a national peace architecture to institutionalize collaboration between them for peacebuilding.³³⁶ The Ministry of the Interior, in partnership with the UNDP organized a stakeholders' workshop in 2006, to explore the concept of a National Infrastructure for Peace (I4P) in the country. Participants at this workshop included government officials, security coordinators, civil society organizations and religious leaders. Government and these stakeholders developed the National Architecture for Peace as a Policy framework document for conflict studies, conflict resolution and building sustainable peace in the country. The National Architecture for Peace subsequently became the official government policy document, which aimed to facilitate the development of mechanisms for cooperation among all stakeholders in peace building in the country.³³⁷

The National Architecture for peace envisaged to provide a framework for collaboration between government, civil society and local communities to monitor, and report signs of emerging conflicts for timely interventions. The architecture intended to build the capacity of all sections of the society, including chiefs, women, the youth, public and private institutions and civil society organizations as participants in promoting and maintaining peace. The National Peace Architecture

³³⁶ The Ministry of Interior National, *Architecture for Peace in Ghana*.

³³⁷ Ibid

envisaged the enactment of a legislative instrument to implement its policy objectives through peace councils at the national, regional, and district levels.

4.15.1 The Establishment of the National Peace Council

Government set up the National Peace Council as part of the national architecture for peace, in August 2006. Government appointed eleven members to serve on the council. The membership came from varied backgrounds and institutions such as academia, religious/faith groups, business community, women, and traditional rulers. The council brought together renowned, independent and respected Ghanaians of distinction to discharge the mandate of the council in an impartial and non-partisan manner. Members of the council unanimously elected Cardinal Peter Appiah Turkson; Archbishop of the Cape Coast Roman Catholic Diocese, as its Chairman.³³⁸

The Council aimed to foster national cohesion through peacebuilding and the provision of mechanisms through which Ghanaians could resolve their differences peacefully. The Council developed and pursued the following four objectives for the attainment of its vision.³³⁹

- The creation of platforms for dialogue, negotiation, mediation and reconciliation between various stakeholders to build inter group trust and confidence, and promote the peaceful and non-violent resolution of conflicts.
- The collation, processing and analyses of relevant information from all available sources, and provide strategic advice to government, relevant institutions and stakeholders at all levels with the view to consolidating peace and stability, as well as initiate effective, proactive and timely responses to potential sources of violent conflicts within the country.

³³⁸ Amidu, *The History and Rational*, 2010; Kotia, "Building National Infrastructures" 2013.

³³⁹ Amidu. *The Histroy and Rational*, 2010, 20

- Monitor the implementation of recommendations made to government and other relevant stakeholders on actions taken to promote trust and confidence between groups and the agreements and resolutions reached.
- Liaising and monitoring the Regional and District Peace Councils to formulate and implement proactive strategies for communities at risk of violent conflicts.

The enactment of the legislative instrument to establish peace councils at the national, regional, and district levels encountered prolonged delays because of the need for extensive consultation with various stakeholders. The Ghanaian Parliament eventually received the National Peace Council Bill in November 2010. This Bill was the result of extensive collaboration by government, experts in conflict resolution and peace building, and stakeholders from various sections of society. The wide consultation and input on the bill ensured that it received support from all parties in the House. Parliament passed the National Peace Council Act (818) in May 2011.

4.15.2 The National Peace Council Act 2011 (Act 818)

The National Peace Council Act 2011 (Act 818) established the National Peace Council (NPC), Regional Peace Councils (RPCs), and District Peace Councils (DPCs). The Act also established a governing body known as the Board, consisting of thirteen eminent persons from various fields of endeavor (See Table 4.3). The composition of the RPCs and DPCs follow the same representational pattern as the National Governing Board. The National Governing Board appoints the members of the RPCs and DPCs in consultation with the RCCs and the District Assemblies respectively (See membership of the nine Regional Peace Councils in Appendix 4).³⁴⁰

³⁴⁰ National Peace Council Act 2011 (818), (Sections 10 & 13).

Table 4. 3: Composition of the Governing Board of the National Peace Council.

Christian Gps	Muslims Gps	Traditional Bodies	Others
Catholic Bishops Conference	Ahmadiyya Muslim Mission	Practitioners of African Traditional Religion	Two presidential Nominees (one of whom shall be a woman)
Christian Council	Al-Sunnah Muslims	National House of Chiefs	Two other persons nominated by Identifiable Groups
Ghana Pentecostal Council	Tijaaniya Muslim Group		

National Council for Christian and Charismatic Churches

Source: National Peace Act 2011(Act 818)

4.16 Embedded Autonomy: Unique Position of the NPC

The NPC was set up mainly to rectify issues related to the failures of traditional government policies in managing ethno-political conflicts. Traditional government policies aimed at resolving these conflicts frequently fail because one of two reasons. First, they fail to address local grievances and the root causes of these conflicts because government formulate and imposes them from the top, with little or no participation by local communities. Secondly, rival factions often perceive and accuse these policies of lacking objectivity and bias towards groups aligned to the government. NPC Act (Act 818) recognized that if the NPC is to avoid similar challenges it needs

to achieve a kind of embedded autonomy. This means that the NPC needs to create and operate from a space that enables the council to both maintain ties with society (embeddedness) and insulates it from political capture and manipulation (corporate coherence). Embeddedness would enable the NPC to retain ties with civil society and local communities, so that it can continually negotiate and renegotiate policies that address the grievances of people at the grassroots. Whereas, corporate coherence would insulate the NPC from political capture and manipulation by groups outside the state. A politicized process will inevitably lead to a legitimacy crises as conflict parties and citizens as a whole will lose trust in the objectivity of the NPC and thus compromise its ability to realize its mandate. The Act establishing the NPC put in place a number of mechanisms to enable it achieve these seemingly contrasting goals.

4.16.1 Collaboration with Society

The unique composition of the NPC institutionalizes collaboration by promoting ties with society to ensure it can source accurate information and collect feedback from multiple stakeholders to inform its policies. The NPC comprises a governing body known as the Board, consisting of thirteen eminent persons from various fields of endeavor. These members are people who enjoy high levels of trust; moral standing, respect and professional integrity in society (see Appendix 4). The president, in accordance with article 70 of the Constitution of Ghana, which prescribes the category of public officials appointed by the president, appoints the members of the Board who serve for a term of four years.³⁴¹ Significantly, the president only serves as the

³⁴¹ National Peace Council Act 2011, Section 4 (3); Article 70 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana prescribes appointments by the president. According to the article the President, acting in consultation with the Council of State, shall appoint the following

- a. the Commissioner for Human Rights and Administrative Justice and his Deputies;
- b. the Auditor-General;
- c. the District Assemblies Common Fund Administrator;
- d. the Chairmen and other members of
 - i. the Public Services Commission;
 - ii. the Lands Commission;

appointing body. The various institutions represented on the Board make nominations for appointment by the president. The members elect one amongst them to serve, as Chairman. The NPC Act 2011 provides for the nomination of members of the NPC Board by the following religious and organized groups:

Table 4.3 above shows that Christian bodies are entitled to four nominations, whilst Muslim and traditional groups have three and two respectively. This reflects the relative strength of these three religions among the population. According to the 2010 Population Census, 71.2 percent of the population profess the Christian faith, followed by Islam (17.6%), with only (5.2%) adhering to traditional religion.³⁴² Religious bodies have the most representation on the Council because religion is very important in the lives of most Ghanaians, who hold religious leaders in high esteem. The 2010 Population Census found 94% of the population to be religious, and in another study, a staggering 90 per cent of Ghanaians say their religion is very important in their lives.³⁴³ In addition, Ghanaians perceive religious leaders as impartial, non-partisan and capable of bridging political divides.³⁴⁴ The remaining four members of the Board include two nominations by the president (one of whom must be a woman) and two nominations from identifiable groups.

The wide representation on the NPC ensures that it is able to maintain ties with various segments of society. This provides the council with multiple channels through

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- iii. the governing bodies of public corporations;
 - iv. a National Council for Higher Education howsoever described; and
 - e. the Chairman, Deputy Chairmen, and other members of the Electoral Commission
 - f. the holders of such other offices as may be prescribed by the Constitution
- or by any other law not inconsistent with the Constitution.

³⁴¹ Ghana Statistical Service, *Population & Housing Census: Summary Report of Final Results*, 2010, Accessed October, 11, 2017, http://www.statsghana.gov.gh/docfiles/2010phc/Census2010_Summary_report_of_final_results.pdf

³⁴² Ghana Statistical Service, *Population & Housing Census: Summary Report of Final Results*, 2010, Accessed October, 11, 2017, http://www.statsghana.gov.gh/docfiles/2010phc/Census2010_Summary_report_of_final_results.pdf

³⁴³ Global Attitudes Survey 2015 by the Washington-based Pew Research Centre.

³⁴⁴ Kotia, "Building National Infrastructures" 2013.

which it can source accurate information and collect feedback to address the root causes of ethno-political conflicts. In designing policies to prevent, manage, resolve and transform ethno-political conflicts, the NPC is able to make use of local experiences, knowledge, customs and cultures of persons serving on the various councils at the national, regional and district levels.

4.16.2 Maintaining Autonomy

The NPC Act 2011 contains a number of provisions that protects the independence of the Council. First, the composition of the NPC doubles as a safeguard against political capture and manipulations. The unique composition of the NPC ensures that no one body can capture it to promote its peculiar interest. Critics of the NPC however point to the presence of nominees of the president on the Council as having the potential to compromise its independence and non-partisanship. In addressing such concerns, the Chairman of the NPC, Emmanuel Asante argues that:

Even though it is said that the president appoint members of the council, the members are nominated by various institutions that cannot be influenced by the government. The president appoint only two people to the Board, and these people are not guaranteed any official positions on the council. When it comes to the chair of the Board, the members elect their own Chairman, who is then appointed by the president.³⁴⁵

Secondly, the NPC Act proscribes any interferences in the work of the NPC: “Except as provided in the Constitution, the Council is not subject to the direction, control of any person or authority in the performance of its functions”.³⁴⁶ In addition, section 32 of the Act forbids members

³⁴⁵ Emmanuel Asante, interview by author, Accra, July 17, 2017

³⁴⁶ National Peace Council Act 2011, Section 30

of the Board and Councils from participating in active party politics. Members of the governing board and regional and district council cannot join a political party, accept an appointment to any political position or engage in canvassing support for or against a political party or a candidate standing for a public election. This shields the NPC from potential capture by political interest groups and perceptions of such capture.

Thirdly, the NPC Act 2011 established a Peace Fund to secure the financial security of the NPC.³⁴⁷ Financial security is an important mechanism for protecting the corporate coherence of state agencies because dependence on third parties for funding leave these agencies vulnerable to capture by such parties. The NPC Act therefore established a National Peace Fund to insulate the NPC from foreign influences and interferences. According to the Executive Secretary of the NPC, “the Peace Fund is seen as the best approach to obviate dependency on government...it is the fund that can make the NPC functional in its preventive approach to conflict management”.³⁴⁸ Unfortunately, however the NPC has so far been unable to start the Peace Fund because of the inability of the council to secure the necessary resources to operationalize the Fund.³⁴⁹

4.16.3 Threats to the Autonomy of the NPC

Despite the above strengths, the NPC faces a number of challenges that threaten to compromise its autonomy and hence its ability to remain relevant in the prevention, management, resolution and transformation of ethno-political conflicts.


First, the NPC lacks the conditions to develop a robust internal structure and to enable its personnel retain a sense of corporate coherence. The Public Service Commission recruits staff of the NPC on conditions similar to other public sector agencies. The NPC is therefore neither able

³⁴⁷ Ibid, Section 20

³⁴⁸ Francis Azuimah, interview by author, Accra, July 27, 2017

³⁴⁹ George Amoh, interview by author, Accra, June 15, 2017

to attract nor retain the highest qualified personnel- a necessary condition to promote competence and instilled in bureaucrats “a sense of esprit de corps and belief in the worthiness of their profession.”³⁵⁰ In addition, the NPC is unable to offer long-term career rewards based on performance to ensure that it is able to retain its staff. The uncompetitive working conditions at the NPC coupled with the shortage of logistics to facilitate the work of staff at the secretariats leave staff disillusioned, as reflected in the high turnover of staff. Figure 4.2 shows that in just 5 years the council lost 24 percent of staff recruited in 2012 to work at the national and regional secretariats.³⁵¹



Source: NPC Reports

Secondly, the dependence of the NPC on government support and external funding is a threat to the autonomy of the council. Dependence on financial allocations from the

³⁵⁰ Evans. “Constructing the 21st century,”45

³⁵¹ National Peace Council Reports.

Ministry of Finance, through the Ministry of the Interior leaves the process vulnerable to manipulation and possible cooptation by government. The inability to start the Peace Fund leaves the NPC process dependent on external funding, which is unhealthy for the sustainability of the NPC process. The overdependence of the NPC on the UNDP leaves the process susceptible to UNDP fund reallocations. In 2016, the NPC received a combined amount of 2,701,843.80 Ghana Cedis from the UNDP and the EU, compared to just 300,000 Ghana Cedis from government.³⁵² This reliance on donors for funding challenges the very concept of giving agency and ownership of peace programs back to local people. This poses the risk of a loss of legitimacy and resistance from local communities because principles espoused by these Western donors may become the most important consideration in policy formulation.

Thirdly, the prominent role of state elites and external actors in the establishment and interventions of the NPC makes the process static, vertical and technocratic. The I4P process was meant to be a departure from the Western liberal peacebuilding and neoliberal state-building projects based on the rule of law, institution building, and the market economy. The process should emerge from local communities for the communities because it should be grounded in local values, customs and culture. The establishment of the NPC however adopted an approach similar to the liberal peacebuilding and neoliberal state-building projects. Richmond and Mac Ginty contends, “Peace infrastructures remain part of the liberal peacebuilding and neoliberal state building project if they are driven by external actors or even state elites, rather than embedded in local peace formation dynamics.”³⁵³

³⁵² NPC, Report 2016.

³⁵³ Oliver P. Richmond, "Missing Links—Peace Infrastructures and Peace Formation. In *Peace Infrastructures—Assessing Concept and Practice*, ed. Barbara Unger, Stina Lunström, Katrin Planta & Beatrix Austin, (Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series 10 (2012)): 23.

Consequently, the NPC process remain fragile because it is dependent on both state elites and external support.

4.17 Conclusion

This chapter makes two important findings: First, we find that the tendency of successive regimes to use government policies as a political tool to reward supporters and punish opponents accounts for the failure of such policies. Government policies introduced by regimes from the Nkrumaist political tradition mostly benefits their friends in the Andani Gate, whilst the Abudu Gate benefits from the rise of the UP political tradition to power. The gulf between the findings and recommendations of the Mate Kole Committee under the NLM with those of the Ollenu Committee under the NRC highlights the bias nature of these policies. Whilst the Mate Kole Committee claimed the selection of Ya-Na Mahama Andani III was repugnant to Dagomba custom, the Ollenu Committee found that his selection was in accordance with Dagomba custom. This tendency means that government policies are predisposed to fail because the parties in the conflict do not perceive them as neutral or objective. In addition, the tendency of successive regimes to review government policies introduced by previous regimes undermines government policies as a whole because they are temporal. Parties not satisfied with a policy introduced by any regime, are less likely to accept it because they can wait it out, in expectation that the next regime will give them a better deal.

Secondly, we find that most government policies aimed at resolving the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict have failed because they are imposed from the top (central government), with little or no participation by civil and traditional society. These policies lack legitimacy at grassroots and fail to address the underlying causes of the conflict. In contrast, the CEC was successful in

resolving the fourth phase of the conflict because it was the product of collaboration between an accommodative government, a proactive civil society and the rival gates. The proactive role played by civil society was critical to the success of the process because it protected it from accusations of political interferences usually levelled against policies imposed from the top.

Chapter Five

REGIME CHANGES AND THE NATURE OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES IN BAWKU

5.0 Introduction

The protracted chieftaincy conflict and recurring violence between the Kusasi and Mamprusi ethnic groups in Bawku highlights the effects of changing regimes and government policies on the dynamics of ethno-political conflicts. The protracted and violent nature of this conflict has put Bawku on the national agenda since the 1950s, attracting policies interventions from successive governments. The persistence of the conflict indicates the failure of these policies. This chapter examines why policies of successive governments have failed to resolve the Bawku chieftaincy conflict, and the effects of these policies on the dynamics of the conflict.

Scholars on conflicts in Northern Ghana often cite colonial manipulations of the native administrative structures,³⁵⁴ and political interferences by Kwame Nkrumah and his CPP administration to explain the Bawku chieftaincy conflict.³⁵⁵ These factors are however unable to account for the failure of successive government policies aimed at resolving it. We argue in this chapter that to understand the protracted nature of the Bawku chieftaincy conflict we need to unravel the role of government policies in altering the dynamics of the conflict. This chapter hypothesizes that the tendency of successive regimes to use government policies as a political tool

³⁵⁴ Bukari Kaderi Noagah, "The peace process in the Bawku conflict in Ghana: Challenges and prospects," *Conflict & Communication* 12, no. 2 (2013); Patrick Osei-Kufuor, Stephen B. Kendie, and Kwaku Adutwum Boakye, "Conflict, peace and development: A spatio-thematic analysis of violent conflicts in Northern Ghana between 2007 and 2013," *Conflict & Communication* 15, no. 2 (2016).

³⁵⁵ .F. Y. T. Longi, "If Nkrumah and the CPP did not come on to the scene, the Mamprusi Kusasi conflict may not have occurred": Politicisation of the Bawku chieftaincy conflict" *The International Journal of Humanities & Social Studies* 3, no. 1 (2015): 27-33; Lund, "'Bawku is still volatile'," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, (2003).

to reward supporters and punish opponents accounts for the failure of such policies and the protracted nature of the conflict.

The first section of this chapter provides a brief background to the Bawku chieftaincy conflict. The second examines various attempts in the literature to account for the protracted nature of the conflict. Section 3 identifies and examines five phases of the conflict in Bawku. We argue in this section that attempts by successive governments to use policy interventions to reward Kusasis and Mamprusis for their support causes the outbreak of new phases of the conflict. Sections 4-8 looks at the five phases of the conflict, and analyzes the effects of government policies by successive regimes on the dynamics of the conflict. The final section examines the intervention by the National Peace Council to revive the Bawku Inter-Ethnic Peace Committee and the Bawku peace process.

5.1 Background to the Bawku Conflict

The Bawku conflict is both a chieftaincy conflict and an ethnic conflict because the conflict is a struggle for traditional political authority (chieftaincy) and ethnic superiority between the Kusasi and Mamprusi ethnic groups. The Kusasis and the Mamprusis are the predominant ethnic groups in Bawku. Other minority ethnic groups in the area include the Bissas, Dagombas, Frafras and Moshies. Bawku also has a large number of migrants from other parts of the country and neighboring countries because of its commercial importance as a trading town. Ethnic heterogeneity has implications for harmony in the municipality.

Bawku is located at the northeastern most corner of Ghana, where the country shares international borders with Togo and Burkina Faso. Government carved the Bawku District (formerly Kusasi District) from the Mamprusi District in 1958. In 1988, an administrative reform split the Bawku District into two: Bawku East and Bawku West Districts, with Bawku and Zebilla

as their respective capitals. In 2004, another administrative reform, Local Government Instrument, 2004 (L.I. 1769) further carved the Garu-Tempene District from the Bawku East District with Garu as the capital of the new district. L.I. 1769 also elevated the Bawku East District into a Municipal Assembly.³⁵⁶ In 2012, government introduced legislative instrument, (L.I 2144) which created two new districts: Binduri and Pusiga districts from the Bawku East Municipality. These five administrative districts all come under the Bawku traditional area, with the chief of Bawku (the Bawku Naba) as the paramount chief of the area (see Map below).

³⁵⁶ The Local Government Act of 1993, Act 462 describe a Municipal Assembly as a one-town assembly with population over 95,000, and a District Assembly as a group settlement with a minimum population of 75,000 and a maximum of 95,000.

Figure 5. 1:1 District Map of the Upper East Region



Source: Ghana Distircts.com

Figure 5. 2: Map of Ghana showing Bawku



Source: BBC Africa³⁵⁷

³⁵⁷ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1690746.stm>

Kusasis claim to be the indigenes of Bawku and the owners of the land because they lived in the area for many centuries before the arrival of Mamprusis and other ethnic groups. About 200 years ago, the Nayiri, the king of the Mamprugu kingdom to the south, sent his son, Prince Ali to establish a military post in Bawku because of one of two reasons. According to the Kusasis, they sought the protection of the Nayiri from persistent raids from bands of Busasi robbers. Mamprusis however claim that the establishment of the military post was to protect their trade route between Nalerigu and Gambaga in the south, and Tenkudugu and Wagadugu in the north from Kusasi robbers. The Nayiri appointed Prince Ali as the first chief of Bawku (Bawku Naba), and all subsequent Bawku Nabas (until after independence). The Nayiri also appointed all other divisional and village chiefs in Bawku. In 1931, the colonial administration impressed on the Nayiri to delegate to the Bawku Naba, who had been elected by an electoral college of divisional and village chiefs as the head (paramount) chief of the area, the power to appoint divisional and village chiefs in the Bawku area.³⁵⁸ The Nayiri however retained the power to appoint the Bawku Naba.

5.2 Literature Review

A first group of scholars uses colonial manipulations of the native administrative structures to explain the Bawku chieftaincy conflict.³⁵⁹ Kendie insist that the root of the Bawku chieftaincy conflict was the attempts by the British colonial administration to reorganize the area for colonial expediency.³⁶⁰ The Kusasis and Mamprusis largely lived together peacefully in precolonial times in spite of the fact that the two groups possessed distinct systems of governance and practiced different livelihood strategies. The Mamprusis practiced a centralized political system organized

³⁵⁸ Letter from District Commissioner's Office, 30.3.1931 (ADM. 56/1/198).

³⁵⁹ Noagah, "The peace process in the Bawku" (2013); Osei-Kufuor, "Conflict, peace and development," (2016).

³⁶⁰ Stephen Kendie, *Conflict Management and Peace Building for Poverty Reduction*. (Tamale: GILLBT Press, 2010).

around chiefs appointed by the Nayiri. The Kusasis on the other hand possessed a decentralized system with no centralized political authority. The Kusasis instead possessed 'Tendaanas' who held and administered the land on behalf of the community.³⁶¹ The Colonial administration interfered with this peaceful co-existence when it reorganized the territory for administrative purposes. The colonial administration brought the acephalous Kusasis under the control of the Nayiri, through the Mamprusi Bawku Naba. Proponents of this view contend that by putting the acephalous Kusasis under the secular Mamprusis, the colonial administration inadvertently sowed the seed of discord between the two groups leading to several decades of conflict between them. This claim is unable to account for the protracted nature of the conflict, or the inability of successive government policies to resolve it. It is also important to note that attempts by the colonial administration to modernize local administration did not always lead to violent conflict. In the Builsa traditional area the British colonial administration introduced an electoral college, made up of heads of all households, to select the Paramount chief of the area. This colonial intervention resolved the dispute over the selection of the chief by the Nayire.

A second group of scholars traces the source of the Bawku conflict to political interferences by Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana's first prime minister) and attempts by the CPP Government to weaken the political base of the Northern People's Party in the north.³⁶² Proponents of this view contend that the extreme partisan approach adopted by the CPP Government and its attempts to undermine the political influence of the Nayiri are the source of the conflict between Kusasis and Mamprusis in Bawku. The CPP blamed the Nayiri for its abysmal performance in the 1954 and

³⁶¹ Staniland, *The Lions of Dagbon* (1975); Stride, *Peoples and Empires of West Africa* (1971).

³⁶² Ladouceur, *Chiefs and Politicians*, 1979; Longi, "If Nkrumah and the CPP" *The International Journal of Humanities & Social Studies*; Lund, "'Bawku is still volatile'," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, (2003)

1956 elections in the Mamprugu area. The party won only a single seat in 1954 and none of the 10 seats in 1956 in the Mamprugu area, where the Nayiri instructed all divisional, sub-divisional and village chiefs to campaign for the Northern People's Party. According to Ladouceur, the CPP sought to undermine the power and political influence of the Nayiri and to gain a political base in the Mamprugu area by granting traditional independence to the Kusasis in Bawku.³⁶³ This view cannot however explain why Frafra paramountcies such as Zaurungu and Bongo avoided conflicts despite similar interventions by the CPP administration.

This chapter argues that to understand the protracted nature of Bawku chieftaincy conflict and why it persists in spite of attempts by successive regimes to resolve it, we need to analyze the relationship between regime changes and government policies aimed at resolving the conflict. We argue that the tendency of successive regimes to use government policies as a political tool to reward supporters and punish opponents accounts for the failure of such policies and the recurring nature of the conflict.

5.3 Five Phases of the Bawku Chieftaincy Conflict

The section identifies and examines five phases of the Bawku chieftaincy conflict. A change of regime causes the outbreak of a new phase of the conflict. The Kusasis and Mamprusis have since the beginning of the conflict in the 1950s aligned themselves with political parties on opposite sides of the national political divide. The Kusasis supports the Nkrumaist political tradition, whilst Mamprusis are aligned to the UP political tradition.³⁶⁴ Political parties aligned to

³⁶³ Ladouceur, *Chiefs and Politicians*, 1979, 118-119; Lund, "'Bawku is still volatile'," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, (2003).

³⁶⁴ Lund, "'Bawku is still volatile'," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, (2003).

the two traditions, in turn, reward the rival groups for their support by introducing policies to support their respective claims to the Bawku skin.

Table 5.1 identifies the five phases of the Bawku Chieftaincy conflict. The table shows that each phase starts with a change of regime and renewed violent clashes. The table also shows that a change of regime leads to a change in traditional leadership, which inevitably reopens the chieftaincy conflict between the Kusasi and Mamprusi ethnic groups. We find that this is as a result of successive regimes using government policies to reward supporters and punish opponents. The Kusasis aligned to the Nkrumaist political tradition benefits from government policies when a party from that political tradition comes to power, whilst Mamprusis similarly benefits from the rise of the UP political tradition to power.

The table shows that the only exception to this general trend occurred under the NRC, AFRC and PNP governments from 1972 to 1981. The latter two governments did not influence the Bawku conflict because they were in power for relatively short periods of time, three months and two years respectively. The NRC, a regime with little ideological underpinnings, did not alter the status quo in Bawku because it had no interest in altering the structure of chieftaincy in the country. In Dagbon, the regime intervened because of the mounting tensions in the area, which threatened to undermine the security of the North as a whole.

Although the ethnicity and religion are common divisions between Kusasis and Mamprusis, the table shows that explanations focusing on ethnic and religious frameworks cannot account for the conflict. Changes of political regimes at the national level and political interventions explain the protracted nature of the conflict and the recurring violence in Bawku.

Table 5. 1: Phases of the Bawku Chieftaincy Conflict

Phase	Government	Political Tradition	Bawku Naba	Ruling Ethnic Gp	Immediate Trigger	Gov't Policies
Phase I (1957 – 1966)	CPP (1954-1966)	Nkrumaist	Abugurago Azoka	Kusasis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Death of incumbent Mamprusi Bawku Naba • The elections of two rival chiefs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chief (Recognition) Act • Elevation of Bawku as an indep. paramouncy • The Opoku-Afari Com. • Recognition of Abugurago Azoka • Deportation of Mahama Yerimiah
Phase II (1966-1981)	NLC (1966-1969)	UP	Adam Azangbeo	Mamprusis	Mamprusi and other groups petition gov't to review Chief (recognition) Act	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NLC Decree 112 • De-recognition of Abugurago Azoka • <i>Enskinment</i> of Adam Azangbeo as Bawku Naba
	PP (1969-1972)					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local Gov't Act 1971 • Chieftaincy Act 1971
	NRC (1972-1975)	Nkrumaist				
	AFRC (1979-1979)					
	PNP (1979-1981)					

Phase	Government	Political Tradition	Bawku Naba	Ruling Ethnic Gp	Immediate Trigger	Gov't Policies
Phase III (1981-2001)	PNDC (1981-1992)	Nkrumaist	Abugurago Azoka II	Kusasis	Kusasi elites petition Gov't to re-examine NLC 112	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PNDC Law 75 (The restoration of the Chiefs Law) • Restores Bawku as an independent Paramountcy • Restores Kusasis to the Bawku <i>Skin</i> • Removal of all Mamprusi chiefs • Minyilla Committee
	NDC (1993-2000)					
Phase IV (2001 to 2008)	NPP (2001-2008)	UP			Mamprusi put pressure on Gov't to revise PNDC Law 75	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A dusk-to-dawn curfew • The deployment of an Airborne Force • Political Appointments
Phase V (2009 to Present)	NDC (2009-2016)	Nkrumaist			Violent Clashes	Curfew BIEPC I
	NPP (2017 to present)	UP				BIEPC II

Source: Author

5.4 The First Phase of the Bawku Chieftaincy Conflict (1957-1966)

The first phase of the Bawku conflict started in 1957 following independence from colonial rule and the CPP's assumption of the reins of government. Two events combined in 1957 to give rise to the conflict. First, following independence from colonial rule, many Kusasi young men argued that independence should not stop at liberation from foreign domination, but needed to extend to Mamprusi control and domination over affairs in their traditional area. For these young men, "...colonialism and imperialism meant not only British rule, but also subjugation to an alien African ruler-the Nayiri."³⁶⁵ On June 7, 1957, the Kusasis met in full strength at Bawku to elect Abugurago Azoka as chief of Bawku.³⁶⁶

Secondly, the death of the Mamprusi Bawku Chief- Naba Awuni led to a dispute between various Mamprusi princes. The Nayiri selected one Mahama Yerimiah as the new Bawku Naba, which enraged several Mamprusis princes because they believed he was too old, blind and unpopular with the people. Upon their return to Bawku, the sons of the deceased Naba Awuni refused to hand over the regalia of the chief to Mahama Yerimiah, but instead gave them to the sandal bearer of the late chief, Abugurago Azoka, who had been elected by Kusasis as chief of Bawku.³⁶⁷ The elections of both Abugurago Azoka and Mahama Yerimiah as chiefs of Bawku, directly pitched the Kusasis against the Mamprusis leading to several violent confrontations.

5.5 The CPP Produces Negative Peace

5.5.1 The Opoku-Afari Committee of Inquiry

The CPP Government instituted the Opoku-Afari Committee of Inquiry, as its first major policy intervention into the Bawku conflict, to investigate the causes of the 1957 disturbances and

³⁶⁵ Ladouceur, *Chiefs and Politicians*, 1979, 124.

³⁶⁶ Opoku-Afari Committee of Inquiry. *Report of the Committee appointed by His Excellency the Acting Governor-General to inquire and report its findings on the claim of Abugurago Azoka to have been elected or appointed and installed as Chief of the Kusasi Area*, 1958, 2.

³⁶⁷ Mahami Salifu, interview by author, Accra, June 17, 2017.

make recommendations for the resolution of the conflict. Members of the Committee included S. K. Opoku (Chairman), Nana Yaw Agyeman Badu (paramount chief of Dormaa) and Lure Kanton III (Tumukuro). The Committee received submissions from both Abuguragu Azoka and Mahama Yerimiah as representatives of their respective ethnic groups. Abuguragu Azoka argued that he was a descendant of the first settlers on the land. He further claimed to be Tendaana of the area, and supported this claim with a letter from the British colonial administration from 1954 that recognized him as such. Abuguragu Azoka also maintained that the Nayiri never appointed Kusasi chiefs and that Kusasi chiefs elected by their own kin merely visited the Nayiri to receive his blessing as a formality. Mahama Yerimiah in contrast, argued that Mamprusis were the rightful occupants of the Bawku skin, and had occupied it since the creation of the town as a military post 150 years earlier.

The Opoku-Afari Committee found in favor of the Kusasi claim and upheld the installation of Naba Abugurago Azoka as legitimate and in accordance with Kusasi tradition. The committee after studying the submissions from the two rival ethnic groups concluded that, “the Nayiri’s practice of selecting and installing a Mamprusi prince as chief of the Kusasi area was undemocratic and dictatorial.”³⁶⁸

Not satisfied with the findings of the committee, the Mamprusi faction filed a writ in a divisional court requesting the court to overturn the report of the committee. The Mamprusis argued that the committee overstepped its Terms of Reference. The committee report, published in the Ghana Gazette on November 2, 1957, concluded that “Abugurago Azoka was customarily elected and installed as the chief of Bawku”, and not just the Kusasi area as contained in its Terms

³⁶⁸ Opoku-Afari, 1958, 13

of Reference.³⁶⁹ Though the court granted these requests, the Court of Appeal subsequently overturned the divisional court's ruling.³⁷⁰

The findings of the Opoku-Afari Committee failed to resolve the Bawku conflict because the Mamprusi faction rejected it. The Mamprusis accused the CPP administration and Kusasi elites of attempting to use the Committee to legitimize Abugurago Azoka as chief of Bawku because it was obvious his claim had no traditional merit. They argued that the establishment of a committee to investigate a purely traditional affair amounted to executive interference because the crisis came under the jurisdiction of the Nayiri, who had already initiated steps to resolve the impasse.³⁷¹ The Committee, in the view of the Mamprusi faction, was part of the efforts employed by Nkrumah and the CPP administration to undermine the Nayiri because of his refusal to support the party.

5.5.2 Recognition of Abugurago Azoka as Bawku Naba

The CPP Government's second main policy in Bawku involved the official recognition of Abugurago Azoka as the chief of Bawku, through the Chief (Recognition) Act of 1958.³⁷² The Chief (Recognition) Act of 1958 vested in government the power to determine who legally became or remained a chief. Only chiefs recognized by government as gazetted could continue to carry out their functions as chiefs.³⁷³ Government's recognition of Abugurago Azoka transferred the Bawku skin and traditional political authority to the Kusasis for the first time. The transfer of the Bawku skin led to heightened tensions and violent clashes between Kusasis and Mamprusis.

³⁶⁹ Ghana Government Gazette. 2.11.1957

³⁷⁰ Emmanuel Bombande, "Conflicts, civil society organizations and community peace building practices in Northern Ghana," In *Ethnicity, conflicts and consensus in Ghana*, ed. Steve Tonah. Woeli Publishing Services, Accra. 2007, 196–228; Kaderi Noagah Bukari, "Exploring indigenous approaches to conflict resolution: The Case of the Bawku Conflict in Ghana," *Journal of Sociological Research* 4, no. 2 (2013): 86.

³⁷¹ 17NRG8/2/138, Telegram from Mamprusi state council to the territorial office in Tamale, 22nd October 1957

³⁷² Ghana Government Gazette no. 21, March 1, 1958.

³⁷³ Müller, *Religion and Chieftaincy in Ghana*, 2013.

The elevation of Abugurago Azoka to the Bawku skin endeared the CPP to the Kusasis who returned the favor with their unflinching support in subsequent elections. In the 1958 Local Government Elections, the CPP won 26 out of the 29 seats in Kusasi areas only two years after the party failed to win a single seat in the area in the 1956 elections.³⁷⁴

5.5.3 Deportation of Mahama Yerimiah and Detention of other Mamprusi Chiefs

The CPP Government's third main policy in Bawku involved the deportation of Mahama Yeremiah and the detention of other Mamprusi chiefs. The government argued that the deportation of Mahama Yeremiah to Togo was necessary to restore law and order in the area following several violent clashes between the rival factions. Mamprusis however viewed the deportation as an attempt to undermine his traditional legitimacy by severing the bond between him and the chiefs he enskinned, including Kusasi chiefs. In August 1962, the CPP Government arrested and detained a large number of Mamprusis indefinitely, including all 18 Mamprusis sub-chiefs destooled in 1958 and their families. The government blamed them for an assassination attempt on Kwame Nkrumah at Kulungungu, a village near Bawku because they were widely known to bear a grudge against the prime minister.³⁷⁵ Although the deportation of Mahama Yerimiah was successful in containing the violent clashes, it failed to resolve the chieftaincy conflict. The enforced peace therefore ended with the overthrow of the CPP Government in 1966.

5.6 The Second Phase of the Bawku Chieftaincy Conflict (1966-1980)

The second phase of the Bawku chieftaincy conflict began in 1966 following the overthrow of the CPP Government by the NLC. The NLC consisted of a group of officers from the Ghana Armed Forces and the Ghana Police Service aligned to the UP political tradition. The ouster of the CPP Government raised concerns among Kusasi CPP activists and chiefs of the likely

³⁷⁴ Ladouceur, *Chiefs and Politicians*, 1979, 170

³⁷⁵ Ladouceur, *Chiefs and Politicians*, 1979, 207.

repercussions of the change of government on their positions. Kusasi chiefs saw the removal of Nkrumah and the CPP as a direct threat to them because of how closely they perceived chieftaincy as connected to government policy. Immediately after the coup, a group of CPP activist organized a secret meeting with chiefs in the Bawku area to rally support for Nkrumah's return. Azonkor Assibi, a CPP activist, addressing the chiefs reminded them that:

You know Nkrumah installed you as chiefs. You were loyal to him and I believe you will still be loyal to him. A section of the Army has deposed Nkrumah during his absence from home. I want to assure you that Nkrumah still enjoys the support of the country and will surely return to the country. I want you to realize that without Nkrumah you will lose the positions and titles you now hold. It is therefore our duty to help the rest of Nkrumah's friends in the country to make his return possible. Therefore, those of us in Bawku have thought over the matter very carefully and the Bawku-Naba (Abugurago) has approved that every (divisional) chief should contribute 4 cattle [sic] and village chiefs should pay £ 5 and a sheep each. These animals shall be sold and the proceeds shall be directed to channels that will help Nkrumah to return here.³⁷⁶

The NLC regime restored traditional authority in Bawku to the Mamprusis as part of efforts to galvanize support for its rule. The new regime attempted to galvanize support for its rule by appealing to groups aggrieved by the policies of the previous government. Traditional rulers were one important group that fell out with the CPP Government. During its reign, the CPP Government used destoolment, deportation, arrest, the appointment of new chiefs, and the reconstitution of

³⁷⁶ Quoted in Lund, "Bawku is still volatile," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, (2003): 115.

chieftaincies to undermine the power of traditional rulers.³⁷⁷ The NLC criticized the degradation of traditional values and institutions caused by interference by the CPP Government and promised to revive the dignity of the chieftaincy institution.

5.7 The NLC Regime Revises CPP Policies

5.7.1 Restoration of Mamprusis to the Bawku Skin

The first major policy intervention of the NLC in Bawku involved the restoration of Mamprusis to the Bawku skin, under NLC Decree 112. NLC Decree 112 sought to restore the dignity of traditional values and institutions by restoring traditional rulers deposed and chiefly hierarchies altered under the Chief (Recognition) Act of 1958.³⁷⁸ The new instrument placed all paramountcies created under the Chief (Recognition) Act of 1958 under their former paramount chiefs, which meant that the Bawku Traditional Council once again came under the tutelage of the Nayiri. The NLC removed Abuguragu Azoka as Bawku Naba and subsequently enskinned a Mamprusi prince, Adam Azangbeo as Bawku Naba following the official funeral of Mahama Yerimiah who had died in exile in 1962. The NLC administration also reinstated all former Mamprusi divisional and village chiefs who lost their positions under the CPP.

The introduction of NLC Decree 112 renewed tensions between the Kusasis and the Mamprusis and led to several violent clashes and reprisal attacks in Bawku. In September 1969, the NLC led a transition to democratic rule, handing power to the elected government of the PP led by Kofi Abrefa Busia, a founding member of the UP political tradition.

The triumph of the PP in the 1969 elections became a triumph for the Mamprusi cause because the PP Government introduced a number of policies that strengthened the ethnic group's

³⁷⁷ Richard Rathbone, *Nkrumah & the chiefs: the politics of chieftaincy in Ghana, 1951-60*, (Ohio State University Press, 2000); David E. Skinner, "Nkrumah & the Chiefs: The Politics of Chieftaincy in Ghana 1950-60." *Africa Today* 48, no. 4 (2001).

³⁷⁸ Nugent, *Africa since independence*, (2012): 127.

hold on traditional political authority in Bawku. The PP Government introduced two main policies in Bawku that affected the balance of traditional political authority. First, the PP administration introduced Local Government Act 1971 (Act 359) that changed the name of the district from Kusasi District to Bawku District. Secondly, the new government passed Chieftaincy Act 1971 (Act 370) changing the name of the traditional council from Kusasi Traditional Council to Bawku Traditional Council. The Kusasi Youth Association criticized the move as an attempt to deny their history and traditions. They argued that other traditional councils, such as Frafra, Mamprisis, Ga, took names after the group of people whose tradition the council protected and that Bawku should not be an exception. Although the Kusasis petitioned the PP government and subsequent governments to review the position of NLC Law 112 on the Bawku Chieftaincy, the Mamprisis retained the Bawku skin until the emergence of the PNDC administration in 1981.

5.8 The Third Phase of the Bawku Chieftaincy Conflict (1981-1999)

The third phase of the Bawku chieftaincy conflict began in 1981 following the military coup that brought the PNDC to power. The PNDC overthrew the democratically elected government of the PNP in 1981. The PNDC was aligned to the Nkrumaist political tradition as most PNDC stalwarts venerated Nkrumah as the spiritual grandfather of the new regime.³⁷⁹ The new government of the PNDC responded more favorably to the petitions by the Kusasis to revisit the Bawku issue. Following the death of Bawku Naba Adam Azangbeo in 1981, the PNDC administration prevented Mamprisis from performing his funeral and the enskinment of a successor. The PNDC subsequently introduced a number of new policies that affected traditional political authority in Bawku.

³⁷⁹ Lund, *Local Politics*, (2008); Nugent, *Big Men*, (1995): 51.

5.9 PNDC Interventions leads to Violence

5.9.1 PNDC Law 75 (The Restoration of Status of Chiefs Law)

The PNDC's first major policy intervention involved the reinstatement of Bawku as a Kusasi paramountcy under a newly introduced law in 1983-PNDC Law 75 (the Restoration of Status of Chiefs Law). PNDC Law 75 reversed NLC Decree 112 and restored all paramountcies affected by the latter to their former status as independent paramountcies. The new law reinstated Ninchema Abugurago Azoka II, son of the late Naba Abugurago Azoka as the second Kusasi Bawku Naba.³⁸⁰ PNDC Law 75 also removed Adam Azangbeo posthumously and all 18 Mamprusi divisional chiefs.

This intervention produced renewed tensions and violent clashes as Kusasi chiefs and the Kusasi Youth Association took advantage of their newfound power to carry out reprisal attacks on Mamprusis and their sympathizers. Members of the Kusasi Youth Association confiscated farmlands and market stalls belonging to Mamprusis, and Kusasis perceived as Mamprusi loyalist. They re-allocated these farmlands and market stalls to Kusasis. The action of the Kusasi Youth Association produced a tense atmosphere, which degenerated into widespread violence a few months later in 1984. The violence spread throughout Bawku destroying houses and other properties.³⁸¹

5.9.2 The Minyilla Committee

The PNDC Government instituted the Minyilla Committee in response to the 1983 and 1984 violent clashes. The administration charged the committee to inquire into the causes of the violent clashes and to make recommendations for the permanent resolution of the Bawku crisis. The committee found that the confiscation of farmlands and market stalls by the Kusasi Youth Association were the main causes of the violence. The committee implicated the Regional

³⁸⁰ Local Government Bulletin, 5.9.1986: 119

³⁸¹ Bukari, "Exploring indigenous approaches" 2013.

Secretary (Minister), John Ndebugre in the illegal actions of the Kusasi Youth Association. The committee recommended the return of all confiscated farmlands to their rightful owners.³⁸²

The work and recommendations of the Minyilla Committee were unable to resolve the conflict because of the failure of the PNDC administration to implement them. The PNDC administration rejected the recommendation to return all confiscated farmlands and market stalls to their rightful owners. It also failed to apply any meaningful sanctions against the Regional Secretary, instead transferring him from the region to the office of the Head of State in Accra.

5.10 The Fourth Phase of the Bawku Chieftaincy Conflict (2000 to 2008)

The fourth phase of the Bawku conflict began in 2000 in the run up to the general elections at the end of that year. The incumbent NDC and the opposition NPP were the main contenders in the 2000 elections. The PNDC reorganized itself into the NDC in 1992 when the country transitioned from military to democratic rule, whilst elements from the UP political tradition regrouped to form the NPP. The NPP enjoyed the support of the Mamprusis because of the party's UP heritage. Mamprusis hoped that with the return of a regime with historical sympathies to their cause, the Bawku skin would once again revert to them. On the other hand, there were concerns among Kusasis that the return of elements from the UP political tradition to power could once again signal an end to their reign on the Bawku skin. The decision by the presidential candidate of the NPP to pay a courtesy call on the Mamprusi regent (claimant to the Bawku skin) during his campaign tour of the area stroked suspicions that if the opposition prevailed in the elections they would indeed reward the Mamprusis with the Bawku skin.

The 2000 elections turned out to be a very tense affair in Bawku resulting in a number of violent skirmishes. On 7 December, the day of election a minor disagreement between NDC and

³⁸² Minyilla Committee of Inquiry, *The Report of the Committee to investigate the Bawku Lands Dispute*, 1984.

NPP party functionaries degenerated into violent clashes as Kusasi and Mamprusi youth clashed on the streets, and there were widespread destruction of property and gunfights.³⁸³ The NPP's presidential candidate, John Kufuor defeated the NDC's Evans Atta Mills in the presidential elections, whilst the party won a majority in parliament. In the Bawku Central constituency, the NPP's parliamentary candidate, Hawa Yakubu, obtained a comfortable victory. Following the inauguration of the new NPP Government, the Mamprusis applied pressure on the administration to revise PDNC Law 75 and to reinstate them on the Bawku skin. Although the NPP resisted the pressure to revise PNDC Law 75,³⁸⁴ it introduced a number of policies that affected the dynamics of the conflict.

5.11 NPP Interventions leads to a New Round of Violence

5.11.1 The Imposition of a District Chief Executive

An attempt by the NPP administration to impose a District Chief Executive (DCE) on the Bawku East Municipality in 2001 resulted in the outbreak of a new round of violent clashes between the Kusasi and Mamprusi ethnic groups. The president appoints the DCE of each district in the country, subject to the approval of not less than two-third majority of the members of the District Assembly.³⁸⁵ In 2001, President John Kufuor nominated Rahaman Gumah, a Mamprusi youth activist and member of the NPP for the position of DCE in Bawku. Rahaman Gumah however failed to secure the approval of the assembly because of his role in the violent clashes the previous year. To fill the void left by the inability of the assembly to approve his designated

³⁸³ Joe Okyere, "12 in custody over political violence," *Daily Graphic*, December 13, 2000, 1 & 3; *Daily Graphic*, "Three die in violence at Bawku" December 9, 2000, 1.

³⁸⁴ Kofi Akosah-Sarpong, "Chieftaincy affairs and Ghana's development" September 4, 2005, *Ghanaweb*, Accessed December 22, 2017. <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/artikel.php?ID=89442>; *Modern Ghana*, "President Kufuor addresses durbar at Bawku," October 11, 2002. Accessed December, 22, 2017, Kojo Sam, "President receives Bawku chiefs," *Daily Graphic*, April 10, 2000, 1 & 3.

³⁸⁵ Section 20 (1), Local Government Act, 2016 (Act 936)

nominee, the president delegated the Regional Minister, Mahami Salifu, also a Mamprusi to act as DCE for Bawku until he could find a more acceptable candidate. Mahami Salifu thereafter appointed Rahaman Gumah as his special assistant and intend delegated him to act as DCE in Bawku on his behalf, providing him with the official residence and vehicle of the DCE. This created a tense situation in Bawku that soon degenerated in violent clashes in December 2001.³⁸⁶ The clashes resulted in the death of more than 50 people, the maiming of about 150 people, and the burning of houses and other properties.

5.11.2 A Dusk-to- Dawn Curfew

The NPP administration imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew to curb the violent clashes that engulfed the Bawku Traditional Area on December 1, 2001. Government deployed an Airborne Force from Tamale to reinforce security personnel stationed in Bawku.³⁸⁷ As part of the curfew, government imposed a ban on all persons (civilians) in the Bawku Municipal Area, Zabugu and Garu and their environs from carrying arms, ammunitions or any offensive weapons. The deployment of police and military reinforcements made several arrest and intervened to stop the feuding factions clashing any further.

Upon the recommendation of the Regional Security Committee (REGSEC), government reduced the curfew to three hours (2am to 5am) on December 24,³⁸⁸ and eventually lifted it on September 16, 2003.³⁸⁹ The curfew and reinforcement of security personnel were successful in

³⁸⁶ *Ghana Review International*, “Remove acting DCE from Bawku-MPs” December 14, 2001. Accessed March 8, 2019, <http://www.ghanareview.com/int/bawku.html#r>

³⁸⁷ *BBC News*, “Ethnic clashes in northern Ghana,” December 4, 2001. Accessed December 26, 2017, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1690746.stm>

³⁸⁸ *Ghana Review International*, “Bawku curfew period reviewed” December 24, 2001. Accessed March 8, 2019, <http://www.ghanareview.com/int/bawku.html#t>

³⁸⁹ *Ghanaweb*, “People of Bawku make merry over lifting of curfew” September 19, 2003, Accessed April 5, 2019, <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/regional/People-of-Bawku-make-merry-over-lifting-of-curfew-43313>

containing the violence, but failed to address the underlying causes of the conflict including the issues related to the disputed claims to the Bawku skin and confiscated farmlands. In the run up to the 2008 general elections, these issues resurfaced leading to a new round of violent clashes.

5.12 The Fifth Phase of the Bawku Chieftaincy Conflict (2009 to Present)

The fifth phase of the Bawku chieftaincy conflict began in the run up to the 2008 General Elections. The 2008 elections were the most fiercely contested in the history of the country, and the period coincided with widespread and prolonged violence in Bawku. The Bawku traditional area recorded renewed violent clashes between the rival Kusasi and Mamprusi ethnic groups, which claimed hundreds of lives, left thousands of people injured, and destroyed properties worth millions of dollars.³⁹⁰ In response to this crisis, government re-imposed a curfew on the area indefinitely.³⁹¹

5.12.1 Imposition of Curfew

Government imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew (1800 to 0600 hours) from January 1, 2008, in response to the renewed violence.³⁹² This curfew became the longest in the history of the country, eventually spanning a period of two and a half years. The Minister of the Interior, upon the advice of the Upper East Regional Security Council, renewed the curfew on a weekly basis, and reviewed it as and when the security situation necessitated such an intervention (see Table 4.2 below). As part of the curfew, government deployed security reinforcement from Tamale and Wa, and

³⁹⁰ *IRIN*, "Ghana: Deadly ethnic clashes in the north," May 6, 2008, Accessed <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4822b3ef2.html> [accessed 8 March 2019]

³⁹¹ Kwesi Kpodo, "Ghana sets curfew after five killed in tribal clash" *Reuters*. May 6, 2008). Accessed March 8, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL05587581>

³⁹² Mary Mensah and Samuel Abaane, "Curfew At Bawku , Following Communal Violence And killings," *Daily Graphic*, January 2, 2008. Accessed September 14, 2018, <https://www.modernghana.com/news/152058/1/curfew-at-bawku-following-communal-violence-and-ki.html>

imposed a ban on all persons (civilians) in the Bawku Municipal Area, Zabugu and Garu and their environs from carrying arms, ammunitions or any offensive weapons.

In February 2010, the Ministry of Defence in collaboration with the Ghana Armed Forces, established a permanent military barracks at Baazua in the Bawku East Municipality to help stamp out the recurrent violence in the area.³⁹³ The curfew and security reinforcement were however unable to contain the violent clashes for any sustained period, as the area continued to record frequent episodes of violence. According to the District Police Commander, the rival factions were able to devise ways of getting around the curfew because of the frequent curfews imposed on the area over the years. The Regional Minister, Mark Woyongo however blamed the inability of government, to act decisively to deal with the crisis, for the recurring violence in the area.³⁹⁴

³⁹³ *Ghanaweb*, “Bawku gets military barracks” February 3, 2010, Accessed March 9, 2019, <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Bawku-gets-military-barracks-176123>

³⁹⁴ *Ghanaweb*, “Minister Accuses Gov’t of Dragging it’s Feet” November 2, 2009, Accessed March 9, 2019, <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Minister-Accuses-Gov-t-Of-Dragging-It-s-Feet-171245>

Table 5. 2: Curfew (2008-2011)

Date	Status	Affected Areas	Hours	Causes
1 Jan. 2008	Imposed	Bawku, Zabzugu and Garu	1800-0600	33 dead with 159 houses burnt
7 Jan. 2008	Reviewed	Bawku, (Zabzugu and Garu)	1800-0600 (2000-0500)	8 dead, 16 injured, 127 houses burnt
14 Jan. 2008	Reviewed	Bawku (lifted in other towns)	1800-0600	4 houses burnt/Improved security
21 Jan. 2008	Reviewed	Bawku	2000-0500	Improved security
13 Feb. 2008	Reviewed	Bawku	1700-0600	1 dead, 3 arrested
10 Mar. 2008	Reviewed	Bawku	2000-0500	Improved security
11 Mar. 2008	Reviewed	Bawku, Zabzugu, Garu	1500-0700	Renewed violence, 2 dead
23 Mar. 2008	Reviewed	Bawku, Zabzugu, Garu	2000-0500	Improved Security
7 April, 2008	Reviewed	Bawku, Zabzugu, Garu	2200-0400	Improved security
28 April, 2008	Reviewed	Bawku, Zabzugu, Garu	2400-0400	Improved security
5-6 May, 2008	Reviewed	Bawku, Zabzugu, Binduri, Pusiga, Zoosi	0900-0700	Ethnic clashes, 5 dead, 32 arrested
7 May, 2008	Reviewed	Bawku, Zabzugu, Binduri, Pusiga, Zoosi	1500 -0700	Improved security
19 May, 2008	Reviewed	Bawku, (Pusiga)	1800-0600 (1200-0600)	Renewed tensions in Pusiga
27 May, 2008	Reviewed	Bawku (Pusiga)	1800-0600 (1800-0600)	
23 Jun. 2008	Reviewed	Bawku, Pusiga,	1800 to 0600	Renewed violence, 12 dead

Date	Status	Affected Areas	Hours	Causes
30 Jun. 2008	Reviewed	Bawku, Pusiga,	1400-0800	Increased tensions
7 July	Reviewed	Bawku	1800-0600	Improved security
1 Sept. 2008	Reviewed	Bawku	2200-0400	Improved security
8 Oct. 2008	Reviewed	Bawku	2400-0400	Improved security
15 Dec. 2008	Renewed	Bawku	2400-0400	Continuing tensions
1 June, 2009	Reviewed	Bawku	1000-0700	3 dead, 14 arrested
3 June, 2009	Reviewed	Bawku	1600-0600	Improved security
22 June, 2009	Reviewed	Bawku	2200-0500	Improved security
20 July	Reviewed	Bawku	2400-0400	Improved Security
6-7 September	Reviewed	Bawku	1300-0600	Renewed violence, 3 dead, 12 injured
2-3November	Reviewed	Bawku	1400-1800	Renewed violence
5 November, 2009	Reviewed	Bawku	1800-0600	Improved security
8 December	Reviewed	Bawku	2400-0400	Improved security
April 2, 2010	Reviewed	Bawku	1600-0600	Renewed violence
19 July, 2010	Reviewed	Bawku.	2200-0500	Improved security
23 August, 2010	Reviewed	Bawku	2300-0400	Improved security
29 June, 2011	Lifted	Bawku		Improved Security

Source: Archives Ghanaweb.com

5.13 Government Attempts a New Approach

5.13.1 The Bawku Inter-Ethnic Peace Committee

The NDC defeated the NPP in the 2008 General Elections with a promise to improve the security situation in the country and to introduce innovative measures to resolve various conflicts around the country, including the Bawku chieftaincy conflict.³⁹⁵ The new NDC administration, as part of efforts to find a sustainable solution to the recurring violence in Bawku, established the Bawku Inter-Ethnic Peace Committee (BIEPC) in 2009. The BIEPC was an attempt to replicate lessons from the CEC intervention in Dagbon by adopting a collaborative approach to create a platform to engage the major parties in the conflict for reconciliation. The BIEPC was a 23-member committee made up of six members each from the Kusasi and Mamprusi ethnic groups, two members each from the Bissa, Moshie, Hausa and Dagomba ethnic groups, an officer of the District Assembly, a representative from civil society and a facilitator. Two prominent elders, one each from the Kusasi and Mamprusi sides, co-chaired the BIEPC.

The BIEPC initiated the Bawku Peace Process in 2009. The BIEPC successfully performed traditional pacification rites in 23 out of the 25 communities, which suffered the loss of a life from the recurring violent clashes. These pacification rites were meant to appease the gods and the spirits of the earth for the spillage of human blood on the land. The people viewed the inability to perform these rites as an impediment to achieving peace in the area.³⁹⁶ The BIEPC also started negotiations towards the resolution of the disputes over farmlands.

The BIEPC process however involved very little participation from civil society groups. CSOs had only one representative on the BIEPC. In addition, the BIEPC had no power to implement its decisions; instead, it relied on the REGSEC to implement its agreements. The

³⁹⁵ National Democratic Congress (2008). *Manifesto for a Better Ghana*. 2008.

³⁹⁶ See Bukari, "Exploring indigenous approaches" 2013.

reliance of the BIEPC on government compromised its collaborative approach. The peace process initiated by the BIEPC collapsed in March 2011 following the withdrawal of the Mamprusi faction from the committee.³⁹⁷ The Mamprusis accused the NDC administration and REGSEC of open bias against them and interferences in the peace process. In a press release to serve notice of their intention to withdraw from the BIEPC, the Mamprusis chronicled their concerns on the posturing of government on attempts to resolve the conflict:

It is on record that the Government has been denying the Mamprusis their rights and liberties to practice their cultural festival as enshrined in Article 26 (1) of the 1992 Constitution since 2010. We wish to call upon the central Government to see the Mamprusis and Kusasis as true citizens of Ghana and give equal treatment to all...If you permit the Kusasis to observe the Samanpiid festival, also permit the Mamprusis to observe the Damba festival. This single move will go a long way to promote and improve our quest to restore peace in the municipality. Any other move contrary to this will only deepen the mistrust and disunity and send us far away from the peace we are yearning to obtain.³⁹⁸

5.14 Intervention by the National Peace Council (NPC)

The NPC intervened in the impasse between the Mamprusi faction and government to revive the BIEPC. Upon its reconstitution in 2011, the NPC identified the Bawku chieftaincy crises as one of the conflicts that required immediate attention. The NPC and its partners including the

³⁹⁷ *Daily Graphic*, "Mamprusi reps quits ethnic peace committee" September 11, 2009. Accessed July 12, 2017, <http://www.peacefmonline.com/pages/local/news/200909/26525.php>

³⁹⁸ Mamprusis Youth Group, "Statement on the Mediation Process," December 30, 2014. *Press Conference*, Accessed November 06, 2017, <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Mamprusis-accuse-Gov-t-of-bias-340919>

UNDP, the Office of the Chief Imam,³⁹⁹ and the Ghana National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons decided to intervene to revive the BIEPC because they recognized the pivotal role the committee played in the Bawku Peace Process. The NPC's intervention involved a number of processes including a pre-mediation phase; meetings of a High Level Mediation Team with elders and representatives of the feuding factions in Bawku and Bolgatanga; and with Kusasi and Mamprusi youth in the diaspora (in the cities of Accra and Kumasi).

5.14.1 Pre-Mediation Phase

An Advanced Technical Team from the NPC undertook a visit to Bawku from the September 4-9, 2011 to evaluate the crisis. The advanced team found that there was a desire among all sides, including the Mamprusis, for the revival of the BIEPC because the people believed that the committee represented the best chance for peace in area. The residents of Bawku viewed the BIEPC as the most viable platform available to the various parties to engage in efforts towards resolving the conflict. The visit of the Advanced Technical Team informed the decision of the NPC and its partners to constitute a High Level Mediation Team to visit the area to engage the parties on the revival of the BIEPC.⁴⁰⁰

5.14.2 The Mediation Team

The NPC instituted a High Level Mediation Team charged with exploring ways of reviving the BIEPC and the Bawku Peace Process. The mediation team consisted of three members of the Governing Board of the NPC, a representative from the Office of the Chief Imam, the Executive Secretary of NPC and the Regional Executive Secretary of the UERPC. In putting together the mediation team, the NPC sought to achieve a good mix of impartiality, neutrality, and independence because of the need for trust between the team and the feuding factions. The

³⁹⁹ The Chief Imam is the highest Muslim authority in Ghana

⁴⁰⁰ National Peace Council, Annual Report, 2013.

independence and neutrality of the team was especially paramount because the accusations of political interferences and bias that led to the collapse of the BIEPC. It was also critical that the team understood the context of the conflict and the possible interaction between that context and its intervention in order to avoid negative impacts, whilst maximizing positive outcomes.

5.14.3 The Mediation Process

The mediation process consisted four main parts. First, the mediation team made two visits to Bawku and Bolgatanga (the regional capital) from November 12-16, 2013, to hold consultations with the following: the Upper East Regional Minister; REGSEC; the Bawku Naba and Kusasis Elders; and the Mamprusi Regent and Elders. The mediation team shuttled between these parties, to hear their grievances and to encourage all sides to return to the BIEPC to facilitate the resumption of the peace process. Though all sides insisted that they were in favor of the resumption of the peace process, it was obvious mistrust ran deep between them. The Kusasis blamed the refusal of the Mamprusi to recognize Abugurago Azoka II as the Paramount Chief of Bawku as the main obstacle to the peace process. On their part, the Mamprusi faction accused the Kusasis of conniving with government to deny them various rights, including the right to celebrate the Damba festival. The Mamprusi argued that they would return to the BIEPC only on condition that government would first grant them permission to celebrate the Damba Festival as a sign of its commitment to the peace process. The mediation team communicated these concerns to government through the Upper East Regional Minister.

The second part of the mediation process consisted of a meeting between the President- John Mahama, the Chairman of the NPC and the leadership of the Mamprusi faction at the Flagstaff House (the official seat of government), in Accra. The President and the Chairman of the NPC organized this meeting to allay the concerns of the Mamprusi and to reaffirm government's

commitment to the Bawku Peace Process. The Mamprusis leadership, agreed at this meeting, to return to the committee because of the appeals and assurances from the president of government's commitment to the peace process. The Mamprusis leadership however could not honor this promise because upon their return to Bawku, the Mamprusi youth rejected the appeals of the president. The youth insisted that the president should first demonstrate his commitment to the peace process by instructing the police to grant them the necessary permit to celebrate the Damba. They argued that government had failed to honor similar promises in the past.

The third part of the mediation process consisted of a follow-up visit by the mediation team to Bawku from July 22-26, 2014 to engage with the Mamprusis to address the concerns of the Mamprusi youth. The mediation team assured the youth of the NPC's commitment to work closely with the BIEPC, government and the security services to ensure that all groups would be able to celebrate their various traditional and religious festivals in a peaceful atmosphere. The mediation team also informed the youth of the intention of the NPC to collaborate with its partners to organize capacity trainings for members of the committee, to enable it facilitate the amicable resolution of the various disputes at the heart of the conflict.

Finally, the Mediation Team held two consultative meetings with citizens of Bawku in the diaspora to impress upon them the importance of reviving the BIEPC and the Bawku peace process as a whole. Despite residing outside the conflict area, citizens living in the big cities of Kumasi and Accra exert an important influence on the conflict in Bawku. The mediation team therefore met the Bawku diaspora in Kumasi on December 17, 2014, and in Accra on December 20, 2014, to solicit their support on reviving the peace process in Bawku.

The intervention of the NPC paid off when the Mamprusi faction announced their intention to return to the BIEPC and the Bawku Peace Process in March 2015.⁴⁰¹

5.14.4 The Post Mediation Phase

The NPC in partnership with REGSEC and the various ethnic groups in Bawku reconstituted the BIEPC (BIEPC II) following the decision of the Mamprusi faction to return to the committee and the Bawku Peace Process. The reconstitution of the committee was necessary to replace members who had either resettled outside the traditional area or died. There was also the need to ensure that the committee reflects new developments in the conflict. The reconstituted BIEPC II consists of 25 members, with two new additions from the Upper East Regional Peace Council (UERPC). The UERPC leads the BIEPC II process with government playing an accommodative role.

The BIEPC II has become an important mechanism for preventing violent clashes in the municipality because it is a crucial Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System. Through the representatives of the ethnic groups on the committee, the BIEPC II is able to pick up signals of emerging tensions and to engage youth from all sides to prevent such tensions from escalating into violent clashes. The BIEPC II successfully facilitated the celebrations of the Samanpiid and the Damba festivals in December 2016, and March 2017 respectively without any violent altercations.⁴⁰² The BIEPC II was able to navigate the concerns of both the Kusasis and the Mamprusis by shuttling between the leadership of both sides to arrange for the peaceful celebration

⁴⁰¹ Mary Mensah, “Mamprusis to rejoin inter-ethnic peace talks.” *Graphic online*. March 14, 2015, Accessed November 23, 2017, <https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/mamprusis-to-rejoin-inter-ethnic-peace-talks.html>; National Peace Council, Annual Report, 2015.

⁴⁰² Ali Anankpieng, interview by author, Bolgatanga, July 4, 2017; Jerry Azanduna, “Damba festival celebrated in Bawku,” *Ghana News Agency*., January 5, 2017, Accessed November 18, 2017, <http://www.ghananewsagency.org/social/damba-festival-celebrated-in-bawku-111972>

of the festivals. The BIEPC II is also leading discussions on the return of confiscated farmlands to their owners.

5.15 Comparative Evaluation of Policies

Table 5.3 below evaluates various policies introduced by successive governments in an attempt to resolve the Bawku chieftaincy conflict. The table shows that regime types cannot explain the nature of policies. In Bawku, successive governments, including both military and democratic regimes, have preferred top-down policies to collaborative approaches. Out of 13 main policy interventions on the conflict, successive government imposed nine without any form of collaboration from civil society and/or the local community (9/13). Democratic governments and military regimes introduced 5 and 4 top-down policies respectively.

The table also shows that regime types cannot explain the divergent outcomes of policies in Bawku. Policies introduced by both military and democratic regimes either fail or succeed based on level of participation and collaboration. Top-down policies fail to address the underlying causes of the conflict including the succession dispute and access to farmlands because they involve little or no participation from civil society and the traditional communities. At best, these top-down policies produce enforced peace (negative peace), which frequently collapse with a change of regime.

Table 5.3 also shows that policies designed and implemented by a collaboration between government and society are more useful in addressing the underlying causes of the conflict. The BIEPC II has been successful in addressing the protracted issues relating to farmlands and the celebration of traditional festivals because it enjoys the support of the various ethnic groups. The collapse of BIECP I however shows that in order to protect such collaborations from political interferences and perceptions of such interferences, it is important to limit the role of government

to an accommodative role. The proactive role of the NPC and civil society in the BIEPC II protects the process from accusations of political interference.

Table 5. 3: Evaluation of Government Policies in Bawku

Phase	Gov't Policy	Type of Policy	Evaluation	Reason(s)
I	Opuku-Afari Committee	Captured Policy	Failed (violence)	Government accused of interference
	Recognition of Abugurago Azoka	Top-Down	Failed	Viewed as reward for Kusasis
	Deportation of Mahama Yerimiah	Top-Down	Negative Peace	Viewed as punishment of Mampruis
	Detention of Mampruis chiefs	Top-Down	Negative Peace	Viewed as punishment of Mampruis
II	NLC Degree 112	Top-Down	Failed	Viewed as rewards for Mampruis
	Local Gov't Act 1971 (Act 359)	Top-Down	Failed	Failed to address underlying cause of the conflict
III	PNDC Law 75	Top-Down	Failed	Viewed as rewards for Kusasis
	Minyilla Committee	Top-Down	Failed	Lack of gov't support
IV	Imposition of DCE	Captured Policy	Violence	Lack of gov't appreciation of the conflict
	Curfew	Top-Down	Negative Peace	Failed to address underlying cause of the conflict
	BIEPC I	Captured Policy	Failed	Strong gov't influence, withdrawal of Mampruis
V	Curfew	Top-Down	Failed	Government interferences
	BIEPC II	Peace Making State	Continuing	Embedded and democratic

Source: Author

5.15 Conclusion

This chapter makes two main findings. First, we find that the tendency of successive regimes to use government policies as a political tool to reward supporters and punish opponents accounts for the failure of such policies and the protracted nature of the Bawku chieftaincy conflict. Government policies introduced by regimes from the Nkrumaist political tradition tends to benefit the Kusasi ethnic group, whilst the Mamprusis ethnic group benefits from policies introduced by political parties from the UP political tradition. The CPP and PNDC used the introduction of the Chief (Recognition) Act of 1958 and PNDC Law 75 respectively, to recognize the Kusasi claim to the Bawku skin, whilst the NLC rewarded the Mamprusis for their support by introducing NLC Decree 112 to reinstate the latter on the Bawku skin.

Secondly, we find that most conventional government policies aimed at resolving the Bawku chieftaincy conflict have failed because government imposes such policies from the top, with little or no participation from civil society nor the local communities affected by such policies. These policies lack legitimacy at the grassroots and therefore fail to resolve the underlying causes of the conflict. The bottom-up approach adopted by the BIEPC II process enables it to negotiate the resolution of issues related to the disputes over farmlands and the celebration of traditional festivals because it enjoys the support of the various ethnic groups. In addition, the proactive role of the NPC and civil society in the BIEPC II protects the process from accusations of political interference that affects conventional government interventions.

Chapter Six

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Research Focus

The predominant view among scholars is that the absence of strong democratic institutions accounts for political violence in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa.⁴⁰³ In the view of these scholars, democracy decreases the likelihood of domestic conflict and increases the prospects of domestic peace. Paul Collier contends that democracies in Africa are unable to achieve a peace dividend because of their inability to hold free and fair elections.⁴⁰⁴ Governments in these countries do not face the risk of losing their hold on power through elections since they are able to manipulate the polls to ensure their continued stay in office. Opponents of these regimes, therefore, have little incentive to refrain from the use of violence against the state.

This view is however unable to explain why Ghana continues to grapple with various kinds of ethno-political conflicts and violent clashes despite the country's successful democratization. Elections in Ghana are generally free and fair. Since 1992, the country has held seven largely successful elections, with three peaceful transfers of power. All parties involved in Ghana's election, including domestic and international observers, accept that outcomes are valid and give all parties a fair chance of achieving political power.⁴⁰⁵

This study sought to contribute to the literature on political violence in Africa by examining the persistence of ethno-political conflicts in Northern Ghana. This study analyzes the effects of government policies on the dynamics of three conflicts in Northern Ghana, to explain why the

⁴⁰³ Collier, *Wars, guns and votes*, 2009; Elbadawim, "Why are there so many civil wars in Africa?" *Journal of African Economies*: 244-269; Hegre, "Toward a democratic civil peace?" (2001).

⁴⁰⁴ Collier, *Wars, guns and votes*, 2009.

⁴⁰⁵ Fox, "Ghana democracy and governance assessment".

country has failed to achieve democratic peace in spite of its successful democratization, and why conventional governments policies aimed at resolving ethno-political conflicts often fail.

We focus on the concept of state-society relations to develop a framework to analyze the effects of government policies on the dynamics of three ethno-political conflicts in Northern Ghana: the Bawku and Dagbon chieftaincy conflicts and the Guinea Fowl war of 1994-95 in the Northern Region. This framework identifies three types of state-society relations that explains the success or failure of policies aimed at resolving ethno-political conflicts. These include (a) peace making state, (b) captured state, and (c) isolated state.

Policies of the peace making state are successful in resolving ethno-political conflicts because they involve a collaboration between an accommodative government, a proactive civil society and a responsive traditional society. An accommodative government recognizes that it needs information from, and the participation of, civil and traditional societies to resolve ethno-political conflicts. A proactive civil society actively participates in peacebuilding, rather than merely providing relief goods and services during conflict situations, and a responsive traditional society is receptive to new ideas, perceptions, attitudes, relationships and giving peace a chance. The collaboration between these three players enables the peace making state address the causes of ethno-political conflicts.

6.2 Key Findings

We find in this study that frameworks focusing on ethnicity and religion alone cannot explain conflicts in Northern Ghana, contrary to popular perception. Intra-ethnic conflicts, that is conflicts between different factions of the same ethnic group, are the most prevalent type of conflicts in the region. These conflicts mostly centers on chieftaincy succession and competition over land.

We also find that regime types cannot explain the nature or divergent outcomes of policies aimed at resolving ethno-political conflicts in the region. Both military and democratic regimes introduce similar policies, which either fail or succeed based on level of participation and collaboration.

6.2.1 Why has Ghana failed to achieve democratic peace in spite of its successful democratization?

In this study, we find that various ethno-political conflicts persist in many parts of Ghana, in spite of the country's successful democratization because policy choices by politicians are crucial for the resolution of ethno-political conflicts.

6.2.2 Why do conventional government policies fail?

This study finds that conventional government policy interventions fail to resolve ethno-political conflicts because of two main reasons:

1. They are imposed from the top with little or no participation from civil society or local communities affected by such policies. These top-down policies fail because they lack the support of local communities and are unable to address their concerns.
2. They are captured and used to promote partisan interest.

6.2.3 Why were attempts to resolve the 1994-95 civil war in the Northern Region more successful than other conflicts in the region?

We found that Ghana was able to resolve the Guinea Fowl war of 1994-95 in the Northern Region because government collaborated with civil society and the warring communities to address issues related to traditional autonomy and land rights that were at the core of recurring inter-ethnic conflicts in the region. Government assumed an accommodative role in the peace process, allowing civil society and the warring factions to take the center stage in the negotiation process. The proactive role played by civil society protected the peace process from accusations of political interferences usually levelled against government led conflict resolution efforts.

Collaboration between government, civil society and the various groups involved in the Guinea Fowl war protected the Kumasi Peace Process from potential capture by any group. The peace settlement signed at the end of the process endured because it was the outcome of compromises by all groups involved.

6.2.4 The Transformation of the Ghanaian State into a Peace Making State

Ghana was able to resolve the Guinea Fowl war of 1994-95 in the Northern Region and the Yendi crisis because it was able to transform itself into a peace making state. Government collaborated with civil and traditional societies to resolve these conflicts. Government assumed an accommodative role, allowing civil society and the local communities concerned to take the lead role in the peace processes.

6.2.4.1 Why did government become accommodative?

We found in this study that elections played a key role in the decision of government to adopt an accommodative role in the interventions that led to the resolution of the Guinea Fowl War and the Dagbon crisis. The NDC Government first invited civil and traditional societies for a collaboration in peacebuilding in the Guinea Fowl War in 1995 because of concerns over the effects of the war on its electoral fortunes in the 1996 General Elections. These elections were the first in the history of the country where an elected government was seeking re-election. In addition, the governing NDC faced a reorganized and more formidable opposition, which had at least six years to build its party infrastructure across the country. According to a peacebuilding and security expert in the Northern Region, the failure to resolve the Guinea Fowl War in 1994 left the NDC administration frustrated and concerned that the continuation of the violence in the Northern Region and any spillage into other parts of the country will damage its chances in the 1996 elections.⁴⁰⁶ The administration, therefore reached out to civil society and traditional leaders in the

⁴⁰⁶ Salifu Damma, telephone interview by author, July, 16, 2019

country to help it contain the violence and find a permanent solution to the recurring inter-ethnic conflicts in the region.

In Dagbon, the NPP administration also became disconcerted by the failure of its initial policies, including the state of emergency and the Wuaku Commission, to resolve the Yendi crisis. To boost the chances of the administration in the 2004 General Elections and to ensure the peaceful conduct of the elections, President Kufuor requested support from some civil society groups in the country to explore the development of an effective program to arrest the crisis. Elections are however not a sufficient condition, and had to be supplemented by a proactive role by civil society and a responsive traditional society.

6.2.4.2 Why did Civil Society become Proactive?

Civil society and CSOs also played a key role in the transformation of the Ghanaian state into a Peace Making State to resolve the Guinea Fowl War and the Dagbon crisis. Civil society groups were initially involved in development assistance in Northern Ghana. There are many development based CSOs and NGOs operating in the region because of its relative lack of development. Following the outbreak of the Guinea Fowl War in 1994, these organizations had to abandon their development interventions to provide relief, and saw many years of their work destroyed by the violence. The NGOs in the region came together to form the InterNGO consortium to coordinate the provision of relief.

The InterNGO consortium initiated the Kumasi Peace Process to negotiate the permanent resolution of the conflict with the warring communities because of the realization that there can be no meaningful development in the absence of peace.⁴⁰⁷ The proactive role played by civil society

⁴⁰⁷ NPI and Inter-NGO Consortium, 1995, 1

protected the peace process from accusations of political interferences usually levelled against government led conflict resolution efforts.

Civil society was left disappointed in 2002, when following the Yendi massacre, government abandoned collaboration, and instead reverted to the imposition of top-down policies. CSOs responded to government's subsequent invitation for assistance in the development of a mechanism to resolve the Dagbon crisis following the failure of its top-down policies. These CSOs proposed a new collaboration and the adoption of traditional African diplomacy based on the application of customs, norms and traditional ethics to tackle the traditional rituals at the heart of the conflict. Civil society groups and the UNDP subsequently encouraged government to set up a national peace architecture to institutionalize collaboration for peacebuilding. The peace architecture sought to ensure that future governments would not abandon collaboration with society in the policy process for peacebuilding. This was also to engage government and civil society in the proactive prevention of conflicts and peacebuilding instead of the usual reactive mechanisms employed. In Bawku, the NPC is leading the negotiation between the rival ethnic groups to find a permanent solution to the chieftaincy succession conflict.

6.2.4.3 Why did Traditional Society become Responsive?

Thanks to the accommodation by government and the proactive role of civil society, traditional society responded positively to the collaborative peace initiatives by abandoning hostile attitudes, relations and violence, in favor of new perceptions, attitudes and peaceful relationships. The factions in the Guinea Fowl War, encouraged by the Inter-NGOs/NPI negotiation team overcame their mutual distrust to negotiate the terms of the Kumasi Peace Accord. The accord subsequently survived several challenges because the local communities accepted it as a product of their own concessions and compromises, and represented the best chance for them to live in peace.

In Dagbon, the inability of the Abudu and Andani rival gates to rely on government support to reclaim the Yendi skin-the former on the NPP from 2001 to 2008, and the latter on the NDC from 2009 to 2016, convinced them that there was little to gain from the continuation of violence. The rival gates therefore collaborated with government and the CEC in the selection and enskinment of a new paramount chief. Similarly, in Bawku the accommodative role assumed by government convinced the rival ethnic groups to engage with the NPC and the BIEPC on finding a local solution to six decades of chieftaincy succession conflict in the area.

6.3 Contribution to Literature and Policy Recommendations

This study contributes to the literature on political violence in Africa by challenging the existing view that the lack of democratic institutions, such as free and fair elections accounts for the persistence of ethno-political conflicts and violence on the continent.⁴⁰⁸ In this study, we find that new democracies in Africa are unable to achieve democratic peace because democratic institutions are a necessary condition for the resolution of ethno-political conflicts, but they are not a sufficient condition because the policy choice of political leaders are crucial for the resolution of these conflicts.

- Policy intervention for peacebuilding must involve collaboration between government, civil society and traditional communities.
- Government needs to be accommodative in collaborating with civil and traditional societies in peacebuilding.
- Government should encourage civil society to be more proactive in peacebuilding rather than simply providing relief during violent conflicts.

⁴⁰⁸ Collier, *Wars, guns and votes*, 2009.

- Government should encourage traditional society to be more responsive to peacebuilding. The behavior of traditional society depends on the behavior of government. If government gives any indication of partiality in its policy interventions, traditional society is likely to reject such policies. If however government policies are objective, traditional society would be responsive to them. Government should therefore always be accommodative.

Appendix

Appendix 1: Ground rules for Kumasi Workshop

- Each person should have adequate time to express his views and perspective.
- Being sensitive to give others a chance and time to express their views also.
- Listening with respect, even if we do not agree. Avoid derogatory remarks.
- This meeting is *not a negotiation meeting*. The aim is to *understand* and not to debate.
- Everyone is acting in his individual capacity and not in the name of an organisation.
- Punctuality

Appendix 2: Text of Kumasi Peace Accord

KUMASI ACCORD ON PEACE AND RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE VARIOUS ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE NORTHERN REGION OF GHANA

INTRODUCTION

Since November 1994 the inter-NGO Consortium and the Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI) have been organising and facilitating a series of peace and reconciliation consultations and workshops among the warring ethnic groups in Northern Ghana.

Follow-up and Planning committees were formed from the different ethnic groups in the region to work the NPI and the Consortium. Between May 1995 and April 1996 five meetings and consultations were organised in Kumasi as well as numerous others in Bimbilla, Gushegu/Karaga,

Saboba, Salaga, Yendi, and Zabzugu/Tatale aimed at creating consensus on the need for peace and reconciliation, building confidence among the warring ethnic communities, as well as searching for solutions to the outstanding issues of conflict underlying the wars.

At the fourth Kumasi meeting, 48 delegates from seven ethnic groups constituting chiefs, PPNT delegates, opinion and youth leaders were invited to work towards the search for durable resolution to the conflicts in the Northern Region of Ghana. The NPI facilitated a series of bilateral and multilateral negotiations aimed at identifying the issues clearly and finding solutions that are acceptable to all the parties involved. On February 29, 1996, the delegates severally and jointly agreed to a draft document which outlined the agreements reached on the contentious issues presented in the negotiations.

The draft agreement was then taken by the delegates to their respective communities for extensive consultation, discussion and feedback with all segments of their community. After four weeks, the delegates returned to Kumasi to report on the outcome of their consultation processes, to incorporate into the draft agreement the feed-back and amendments generated by the consultations, as well as, when necessary, to renegotiate the draft agreement. After these processes, on March 30th 1996, the delegates signed the following document which was called the Kumasi Accord on Peace and Reconciliation Between The Various Ethnic Groups In The Northern Region of Ghana.

PREAMBLE

WE, the Bassare, Dagomba, Gonja, Konkomba, Nanumba, Nawuri and Nchumuru delegations:

MEETING together at the Peace and Reconciliation Consultations held in Kumasi in February and March 1996;

HAVING heard, considered, discussed and debated the demands each group had against each other as adversaries during the Northern Region conflict;

BELIEVING that all ethnic communities have a crucial role to play in the building of peace;

DETERMINED to resolve all outstanding issues between us and to lay the foundation for a durable and stable peace for sustainable development;

CONVINCED that it is in the best interest of our respective people that we create an enabling atmosphere of peace that will foster social reintegration, mobility, economic cooperation and development as individuals and as groups;

ACCEPTING that our individual and group aspirations of development can only be achieved in an atmosphere of forgiveness, moderation, compromise, cooperation and the peaceful resolution of our differences;

NOW AGREE as follows:

AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE DAGOMBAS, KONKOMBAS AND BASSARES

1. The present scheme of land tenure in Dagbon reflected in the customary laws, usages and practices is non-discriminatory and satisfies the aspirations of all citizens of Dagbon regardless of ethnic background. It is recognised that the Ya-Na holds the allodial title to all Dagbon lands and he holds same as a trustee in trust for all the citizens of Dagbon. The divisional chiefs whether they are Dagombas, Konkombas, Bassares etc are the caretakers of the land and all citizens through their respective divisions have a birth-right of equal and unimpeded access to the land in accordance with customary law. In this context the term "citizens" refers to all persons claiming and reputed to be indigenous persons and

recognised as such. Currently Dagombas, Konkombas, Bassares, Anufos etc. are generally known as citizens.

2. We are appreciative of the Ya-Na's gesture to confer paramountcy on Dagomba, Konkomba, Bassare etc. chiefs and note with satisfaction that the conditions attached to the elevation to paramountcy are as applicable to Dagomba chiefs as they are to Konkomba and Bassare chiefs in the same situation.
3. We note with satisfaction that even before the conflict Konkomba, Bassare and Anufo chiefs had representation in the Dagbon Traditional Council. We also note that the participation of these chiefs in the Dagbon Traditional Council was interrupted when the conflict broke out. We agree that the said chiefs ought to resume their active participation in the work of the Traditional Council.
4. We declare and affirm our acceptance and observance of the rules, customs, practices and usages regarding the institution of chieftaincy in Dagbon and that without discrimination all chiefs in Dagbon, be they Dagombas, Konkombas, Bassares, Anufos, etc. are entitled to exercise all powers, jurisdiction and authority reserved for chiefs under customary law. In particular we affirm that all chiefs in Dagbon, save and except as custom or the law may limit, are entitled to exercise all rights and powers in the following matters, namely:- the creation and approval of new settlements in the area of jurisdiction enskinments of lesser chiefs or headmen in the area of jurisdiction the prerogative to adjudicate upon certain disputes in the area of jurisdiction entitlement to jurisdictional allegiance from subjects in the area of jurisdiction.
5. We will respect and be sensitive to the respective religious subscribed to by our people and we shall do nothing that will directly or indirectly offend, impugn or ridicule each other's religion.

6. We decry the spiral of arms and ammunition build-up in the Northern Region and affirm our readiness and determination to stem their flow into the region.
7. We declare that we shall cooperate fully in bringing about and facilitating a complete reconciliation of our people in accordance with the tenets of our customs. We note in particular the restrictions on the movement of Konkombas and Bassares in Tamale and other areas in the Region and agree that we shall implement such appropriate measures as may be found efficacious to ease the problem.
8. As an assurance to our continued peaceful coexistence and collaborative relations we undertake to cease all provocative acts, utterance and particularly publications in the media that may inflame passions and lead to breaches of security in our areas.
9. We recognise and accept the value of confidence-building in our efforts to structure and entrench peace and we therefore agree that in all our dealings with each other we shall demonstrate absolute good faith, sincerity and commitment to peace.

AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE KONKOMBAS AND NANUMBAS

1. Nanumbas, who are indigenous and sole owners of the land in Nanun, do recognise the Konkombas as an important non-Nanumba community and brothers in development who seek the well-being of the district and whose status, rights, duties and obligations are traditionally recognised and defined under Nanun customary law and usage.
2. Konkombas shall be allowed to freely choose their headmen to be blessed by the Bimbilla-Naa or his delegated divisional authority, provided this will not conflict with the interest of the Bimbilla-Naa and/or the Princes of Nanun.
3. Representation at administrative and political decision-making processes shall be by merit and following due process.

4. We declare that we shall cooperate fully in bringing about and facilitating a complete reconciliation of our people in accordance with the tenets and practices of our traditions. We note in particular the restriction on the movement of our peoples in Nanun and all the other areas in the Region and agree that we shall implement appropriate measures as may be found efficacious to ease the problem.
5. Land ownership is not in dispute with the Bimbilla-Naa as the paramount chief and allodial owner of all land in Nanun as accepted by the Konkombas.
6. Paramountcy is the preserve of eligible Nanumbas.
7. We shall accept regulations from the Nanumba Traditional Council with Konkomba representation, which, with the help of ecological experts, regulates land use, land tenure and settlement patterns for purposes of preservation of the ecology for future generations.
8. Customary pacification in respect of river gods, land gods and groves should only be performed by the recognised land and fetish priests or Tindanas of Nanun.
9. We agree to refrain from the practice of ethnicising individual criminal behaviour; that is, from blaming an entire ethnic group for the criminal conduct of an individual who is a member of that ethnic group.
10. For purposes of assuring security and the avoidance of recurrent inter-communal violence, the parties agree to create committees composed of Nanumbas and Konkombas whose tasks will consist of the following:
 - a. identifying people in Nanun communities that foment or incite ethnic animosity and violence and ensure that appropriate legal actions are taken against such people in order to stop or deter their behaviour.

- b. Identifying particularly conflict-sensitive areas and travelling to those areas jointly (Konkombas and Nanumbas together) to educate people about peaceful coexistence and to resolve problems in the areas peacefully so that inter-communal violence does not erupt.
11. On the issue of the 365 self-styled chiefs and separatists, we the Konkomba delegation will undertake, with the assistance of the Nanumba delegation, to verify and ascertain the position of such chiefs and in consultation with our Nanumba counterparts seek a solution that will be satisfactory to both sides.
12. We decry the spiral of arms and ammunition build-up in the Northern Region and affirm our readiness and determination to stem their flow into the region.

AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE GONJAS AND NCHUMURUS

1. The Nchumurus have appealed to the Gonjas not to frustrate Nanjuro-Wura's application for paramountcy. Gonjas have agreed to cooperate.
2. Gonjas have accepted in principle that the Nanjuro-Wura's status had been established as equivalent to a divisional chief. It was circumstances that made him opt out of the Gonja chieftaincy system.
3. Gonjas will allow the Nanjuro-Wura's application through Government, for paramountcy to go through at the National House of Chiefs.
4. The Gonjas also agree to support a subsequent creation of separate Nchumuru Traditional Council.
5. The Nchumurus will have representation on Northern Region House of Chiefs.

6. In order to facilitate these agreements, the following steps have been agreed upon by the two sides:
 - a. The Gonja delegation will immediately brief the Yagbon-Wura and the Kpembe-Wura on Nchumura proposals and demands.
 - b. The Tuluwe-Wura will liaise with the Mion-Lana (AA Ziblim) who has agreed to act as an intermediary between Nchumuru and Gonja.
 - c. In consequence of item (b) above, the Mion-Lana and Tuluwe-Wura have scheduled to visit the Yagbon-Wura on the 15th of March to concretise the Gonja-Nchumuru peace process.
 - d. The Mion-Lana will give a feedback, subsequent to which Nchumuru will propose a tentative date to meet with the Yagbon-Wura. The date should allow sufficient notice to enable the Yagbon-Wura to assemble his divisional chiefs.
7. A preliminary meeting between Gonja and Nchumuru at the highest Traditional Level should open the avenues for the formulation of Peace-Awareness groups/meetings/workshops at the community levels.
8. Both ethnic groups will commence organizing their peoples for reintegration, resettlement and reconstruction.
9. The follow-up Committee will be invited to facilitate the plans/expectations above.

AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE KONKOMBAS AND GONJAS

1. We commit ourselves to express respect to each other and refrain from activities that debase or insult each other's people, elders, customs and traditions.

2. Konkombas have no claim to Gonja land or to paramountcy in the same area. However, where there is a large Konkomba community, the Gonja paramount or divisional chief may confer a leadership title that he deems fit on any Konkomba who will serve under him.
3. We agree that when conflicts erupt or rumours about conflicts circulate, the chiefs and leaders from the Gonja and Konkomba communities will take initiatives to approach each other to investigate the matter and arrest the escalation through respectful discussions.
4. The Konkombas agree to undertake an independent investigation of the causes for the 1994 war between them and the Gonjas and share their findings so that both parties could learn from the mistakes that might have been committed by any side and put mechanisms in place to ensure that the same mistakes are not committed again.
5. In order to encourage free movement in the conflict areas as an element of reconciliation between Gonjas and Konkombas, we agree:
 - a. That we shall ask our respective chiefs, headmen, elders, youth association leaders to ensure safe movement of members of the other ethnic group within their communities.
 - b. That if anyone from another ethnic group is attacked we agree to hold the chief or leader accountable to apprehend the culprit or be held accountable themselves.
 - c. That working groups made up of representatives of all ethnic groups in the area follow up at the community levels and educate citizens on the need for peaceful coexistence and free movement,
 - d. A peace conference will be organised in Salaga before the commencement of the farming season involving all ethnic groups in the Salaga area.

AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE BASSARES AND GONJAS

1. Both sides recognise that the investigation of the Buipe Bridge incident is an essential ingredient in the reconciliation process between Bassares and Gonjas.
2. The Gonjas agree to undertake an independent investigation into the matter and share the findings so that both parties could learn from the mistakes that might have been committed by any side and to put mechanisms in place to ensure that the same mistake is not committed again.
3. Bassares have no claim to Gonja land or to paramountcy in the same area. However, where there is a large Bassare community, the Gonja paramount or divisional chief may confer a leadership title that he deems fit on any Bassare who will serve under him.

AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE NAWURIS AND GONJAS

1. The Nawuris and the Gonjas recognise that there are several outstanding issues of dispute between them that require peaceful resolution. The Kumasi meetings have helped both delegations to articulate and identify these issues.
2. The two delegations agree to continue the dialogue that has begun in Kumasi in order to create a conducive environment and understanding that would lead to the resolution of the outstanding issues.
3. To that effect, the Nawuris agree to intensify their confidence-building and peace education activities to encourage peaceful ethnic co-existence in their respective communities with the assistance of the Peace Awareness Committee.

4. The Nawuris agree to assist, in whatever way possible, in resettling the Gonjas displaced from Kpandai due to the war between the two ethnic groups in 1991, back in the places from which they were displaced.

AGREEMENT ON REGIONAL ASSOCIATION

To underline our commitment to this Accord, and to enshrine the sense of unity that the Accord generates among us signatories and our peoples in the Northern Region of Ghana, as well as to give an institutional embodiment to the spirit of this Accord which can enhance the implementation of the Accord's provisions, we have hereby agreed to create a region-wide association that will be composed of representatives from all the ethnic communities which currently live in the Northern Region. The specific nature and functions of such an association shall be determined at a meeting of representatives of youth associations from all ethnic communities in Northern Ghana and this meeting shall be organised to take place immediately subsequent to the signing of this Accord.

IN FULL AGREEMENT with the above paragraphs, we the delegates from the seven ethnic communities in the Northern Region of Ghana have signed this Accord on this 30th day of March, 1996 in Kumasi, the capital of the Ashanti Region of Ghana. (34 signatures follow)

Appendix 3: Present and past members of the Governing Board of the NPC

<i>No.</i>	<i>Institution</i>	<i>2011 to 2015</i>	<i>2016 to date</i>
<i>1</i>	Christian Council	© Most Rev. Prof. Emmanuel Asante	Rev. Dr Ernest Adu Gyamfi
<i>2</i>	National Council for Christian and Charismatic Churches	Rev. Gideon Titi-Ofei	Arc Bishop Nicholas Duncan Williams
<i>3</i>	Ghana Pentecostal Council	Apostle Dr. Opoku Onyinah	Apostle Dr. Opoku Onyinah
<i>4</i>	National House of Chiefs	Nana Susubribi Krobea Asante	Nana Susubribi Krobea Asante
<i>5</i>	Catholic Bishops Conference	Most Rev. Dr. Joseph Osei-Bonsu	Rev. Vincent Sowah Boi Nai
<i>6</i>	Ahamadiyya Muslim Mission	Maulvi Dr. Wahab Adam	Maulvi Mohammed Bin Salih
<i>7</i>	Al-sunnah Muslims	Sheikh M. Gedel	Sheikh M. Gedel
<i>8</i>	Tijaaniya Muslims	Alhaji A. M. Abubakar	Imam Awal Shibu
<i>9</i>	Practitioners of African Traditional Religion	Nii Otokunor Sampah	Osofo Kofi Atabuatsi
<i>10</i>	Identifiable Groups	Mr. Shaibu Abubakr	Mr. Shaibu Abubakr
<i>11</i>	Identifiable Groups	Mr. Mumuni Abudu Seidu	Rev. Dr. Nii Amoo Darku
<i>12</i>	President's Nominee	Mrs. Florence M. Hutchful	Nana Agyeakuma Dafia II
<i>13</i>	President's Nominee	Rev. Dr. Nii Amoo Darku	© Most Rev. Prof. Emmanuel Asante

(© Chairman Source: National Peace Council Annual Report 2016)

Appendix 4: Members of Regional Peace Councils (Chairpersons in bold)

No	Institution	Upper East Region	Upper West Reg.	Northern Reg.	Volta Reg.	Central Reg.
1	CBS	George A. Asigre	John Kuupiel	Philip Naameh	A. Kofi Anane Kornu	M. Eghan
2	CC	Esmond W. Nagba	Charles Kusaah	S. Sule-Saa	Francis Amenu	E. Entsi Williams
3	GPC	Betty Ayagiba	B. Anchebah	D. W. Akonsi	S. P. Joseph	C. Kwaku Fosu
4	CCC	Eric Adjei Nmai	George Apasera	R. Kassim	Charity Agbeley	A. Duku
5	AMM	J. J. D. Lambon	A. R. Haruna	N. Moomen	I. U. Zahid	M. K. Essuman
6	AM	A. S. Abdul-Rahaman	A. Y. Sheikh	M. A. W Gumdilana	Alfa Idrisu	A. Ibrahim
7	TM	Sumaila Issaka	Ismail Saakah	A. Ansuare	Saeed Anass	H. Ahmed Tijani
8	ATR	Anyema R. Abiuro	S. Abdul-Rashid	A. Adingtingah	T. Kodzo Deyegbe	S. Kweku Gyesei
9	RCC	Dominic Akudago	Ben Dere	Hajara Telly	Lena Alai	Amba Eyiaba
10	RCC	Melaine Kasise	Charity Batuure	A. Alhassan	W. A.K. Akpesey	L. Owusu-Ansah
11	IG	Agnes Atayila	Nana Asomah	J. C. Adama	L. Kujo Sikatse	K. S. Aikins ©
12	IG	Oscar Mac Avomah	A. Nuolabong	Z. Abdul-Rahaman	A. D. E. Agbolosoo	G. Baiden-Koomson
13	RHC	Naba Sigri Bewong	K. B. Limann	Yamyia Tooka II	M. Besemuna III	K. Ewusi VII

No	Institution	Ashanti Reg.	Western Reg.	Eastern Reg.	B. A. Reg.
1	CBS	Rev. Patrick Osei – Poku	C. Armah-Brako	A. Dunyo	William Kyere
2	CC	K. Amfo- Akonnor	J. Ernest Kwofi	D. K. Danso	M. A. Amamkwah
3	GPC	J. Smith- Gyimah	E. Botwey	J. Amoah	Mosses Sansa
4	CCC	Rev. Victor Osei	B. Asare	Dorothy Ofori	Richard Owusu
5	AMM	Mr. H. Baidoo	E. Y. K. Gyampson	Hasan Carbo	Abubakar Alhassan
6	AM	M. K. Mohammed	S. Hamid Jallo	S. M. Rabiw	M. M. Gado
7	TM	Ustaz Ahmed Seidu	I. Zakaria	S. S. Ahmed	M. Ishaak
8	ATR	Baffour Kogyawoasu Ababio II	E. Kodu II	N. Afua Tabiri	Baah Brentu
9	RCC	Prof. S. O Asiana	R. Effiba Dadzie	E. S. Sedzro	Yaa Nyamaa II
10	RCC	Dr. Dorothy Danso	A. Eshun	K. B. Acheapong	Opoku Worae
11	IG	Ms Harriet Takyi	M. Asare-Bediako	Twum-Baah	Vida Korang
12	IG	Nana B. Ababio	Owusu-Sekyere	Nana Oponwaa	Peter B. Subaab

No	Institution	Ashanti Reg.	Western Reg.	Eastern Reg.	A. A. Reg.
13	RHC	Barima Akwasi Okogyeeasuo II	N. K. Agyeman	Nene Sakitey II	Nana Baah Brentu

Note: **CBC: Catholic Bishops Conference; CC: Christian Council; GPC: Ghana Pentecostal Council; CCC: National Council for Christian and Charismatic Churches; AMM: Ahamadiyya Muslim Mission; AM: Al-sunnah Muslims; TM: Tijaaniya Muslims; RCC: Regional Coordinating Council; IG: Identifiable Groups; RHC: National House of Chiefs**

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Selected Interview List⁴⁰⁹

No.	Name	Date	Position	Org./ Affiliation
1.	George Amoh	June 15, 2017	Director, Programmes	National Peace Council
2.	Abubakar Jibreel Ustaz	June 16, 2017	Member	BIEPC
3.	Mahami Salifu	June 17, 2017	Former Upper East Regional Minister	RCC
4.	Francis Azuimah	June 27, 2017	Executive Secretary	National Peace Council
5.	Fr. Thaddeus Kuusah	June 27, 2017	Regional Executive Sec.	Northern Regional Peace Council
6.	Thomas Abiola	July 1, 2017	Regional Secretary	NDC, Upper East Region
7.	Elvis Figo Awonekai	July 1, 2017	Regional Secretary	NPP, Upper East Region
8.	Ayinbila Asaah	July 13, 2017	Youth	Kusasi
9.	Maxwell Asiibi	July 14	Youth	Kusasi Youth Association
10.	Abubakari Mahama	July 14, 2017	Youth	Mamprusi Youth Association
11.	David Kanga	July 15, 2017	Retired Deputy Commissioner	Electoral Commission
12.	Emmanuel Asante	July 17, 2017	Chairman	National peace Council
13.	Justice Agbezuge	July 17, 2017	Peace Analyst	UNDP
14.	Randy Aganah	July 19, 2017	Communication Director	NPP, Upper East Region
15.	Nicholas Okai	July 20, 2017	Senior Research fellow	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training center
16.	Peter Atiah	November 12, 2018	Secretary	Yendi Peace Centre
17.	Henry Okai	December 19, 2018	Senior Programmes manager	National Peace Council
18.	Semefa Asemenu	December 29, 2018	Senior Programmes Manager	National Peace Council
19.	George Amoh	December 20, 2018	Ag. Executive Secretary	National Peace Council
20.	Elijah Fant Kombian	January 3, 2019	Coordinating Director	Damango District Assembly
21.	Salifu Damma	January 5, 2019	Educationist and Peacebuilding Expert	Tamale

⁴⁰⁹ The names of respondents listed here are those who gave consent for their names to be used for the purpose of writing this thesis.

