

博士論文審査結果報告
Report on Ph.D. / Doctoral Dissertation Defense
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)
Professor KIJIMA, Yoko

審査委員会を代表し、以下のとおり審査結果を報告します。

On behalf of the Doctoral Thesis Review Committee, I would like to report the result of the Doctoral Dissertation Defense as follows.

学位申請者氏名 Ph.D. Candidate	Md. Rajibul Alam		
学籍番号 ID Number	PHD15405		
プログラム名 Program	GRIPS Global Governance Program (G-cube)		
審査委員会 Doctoral Thesis Review Committee	主査 Main referee	木島 陽子 KIJIMA, Yoko	主指導教員 Main Advisor
	審査委員 Referee	ESTUDILLO, Jonna P.	副指導教員 Sub Advisor
	審査委員 Referee	高木 佑輔 TAKAGI, Yusuke	博士課程委員会委員長代理 Acting Chairperson of the Doctoral Programs Committee
	審査委員 Referee	加治佐 敬/KAJISA, Kei (青山学院大学 国際政 治経済学部 教授 /Aoyama Gakuin University, Professor)	外部審査委員 External Referee
論文タイトル Dissertation Title (タイトル和訳)※ Title in Japanese	Essays on incentive policies for improving the Bangladesh public sector Bangladesh public sector improvement-oriented incentive policy evaluation		
学位名 Degree Title	博士 (政策研究) / Ph.D. in Advanced Policy Studies		
論文提出日 Submission Date of the Draft Dissertation	2020年6月22日	論文審査会開催日 Date of the Doctoral Thesis Review Committee	2020年7月20日
論文発表会開催日 Date of the Defense	2020年7月20日	論文最終版提出日 Submission Date of the Final Dissertation	2020年8月19日
審査結果 Result	合格 Pass		
	不合格 Failure		

※ タイトルが英文の場合、文部科学省に報告するため、和訳を付けてください

Please add a Japanese title that will be reported to MEXT.

1. 論文要旨 **Thesis overview and summary of the presentation.**

Governments in developing countries have been said to be inefficient though the governments play a critical role in delivering services to the poor and for developing the nation. One of the reasons is often pointed to the low salary and non-performance pay. Many governments keep the base salary lower than private-sector jobs since economic incentives such as high salary can attract those who are not interested in serving the public, which worsens the public service delivery. In recent years, an increasing number of studies investigate empirically if incentive policies (either financial or non-financial rewards) can improve the absenteeism of school teachers and healthcare workers. The evidence on the relative effectiveness of the policies is inconclusive. Furthermore, unlike the private sector workers and frontline workers of the public sector, the performance of elite civil service officers is hard to be measured because of their multi-faceted and elusive tasks. It is often found that unintended consequences of incentive policies when performance is not accurately measured. There have been, therefore, few empirical studies on how incentive policies affect elite civil service officers.

The dissertation consists of two main chapters as well as an introduction and conclusion. The first main chapter examines how pay-scale reform (doubling the base salary) affect the characteristics (public service motivation, pro-sociality, personality, academic performance, and family backgrounds) of applicants who took the exam for the Bangladesh Civil Service (Public Administration cadre who are engaged in major policymaking at a national level) before and after the pay-scale reform. Since these data are not publicly available, the survey was conducted by the candidate. Although interviewing incumbent bureaucrats requires special permission from the government, this became possible since the candidate worked for BCS (Public Administration cadre). The regression analyses show that pay-scale reform successfully increased the academic performance of the applicant pool on average without deteriorating their public service motivation and pro-sociality. Those who passed the exam

(incumbent bureaucrats) after the pay-scale reforms have higher public service motivation than those before the reforms. Since the increased salary attracted more applicants but the number of posts remained the same, the reform was successful for hiring not only academically but also pro-socially capable ones to serve the county. This chapter was published in one of the public administration journals.

The second main chapter examines what kind of incentives (financial rewards and non-financial rewards to the best performers and inspection to the worst performers) enhance the service delivery of agricultural extension workers, especially among worst performing ones. The candidate succeeded to convince the government offices to conduct a randomized control trial to incumbent extension workers. By setting different kinds of incentives as treatments, the candidate attempted to estimate the relative effectiveness of the incentive policies. To enhance the chance that poor performing agents get rewards, the performance is measured by the improvement from the pre-treatment period, not the absolute level, in some treatment arms following the predictions of Tournament theory. The regression analyses show that all the treatments enhance the average performance while non-financial rewards to the best performers and inspection to the worst performers are more effective than financial rewards on average. Poor performers tend to put more effort when the better performers are handicapped. To improve the performance of poor performers, inspection is the most effective than the other treatments. The candidate conducts further analyses to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects due to office size and initial performance variation within the office as well as robustness checks.

2. 審査報告 Notes from the Doctoral Thesis Review Committee (including changes required to the thesis by the referees)

Among the members of the doctoral thesis review committee, there was a consensus about the uniqueness of the data and the value of the research topics and the main chapters of the thesis

had significant contributions to the literature. The members also shared the impression that both the dissertation and the presentation at the defense were well-organized and clear.

The members made several critical questions and comments as follows:

1. How and why the results of analyses can be interpreted as stated in Chapter 2 should be added and elaborated. Especially the candidate needs to explain why the pay-scale reform did not change the characteristics of the applicant pool but those of the qualified candidates (civil service officers). The candidate should add more detailed explanations that increased salary not change in the selection process results in hiring ones with higher public service motivation.
2. The survey data collected by the candidate are unique and contribute to the literature. This point should be highlighted as a contribution.
3. The policy implication part of the dissertation should be strengthened by reformulating it into concrete proposals to the Bangladesh government. Specifically for increasing female elite bureaucrats and agricultural extension officers and improving the performance of female agricultural extension workers, what kind of policies can be combined with incentive policies?

The members of the committee reached conclusions that revisions should be made following these comments and that the members would check a revised version within about a week after its submission.

3. 最終提出論文確認結果 Confirmation by the Main Referee that changes have been done to the satisfaction of the referees

About two weeks after the defense, the revised version submitted by the candidate was sent to the committee members. They checked the new version and found that the revisions were made appropriately and satisfactory.

4. 最終審查結果 Final recommendation

The doctoral thesis review committee recommends that GRIPS award the degree of Ph.D. in Advanced Policy Studies to Mr. Md. Rajibul Alam.