



Japan's Security Contribution to South Korea, 1950 to 2023

A Dissertation

Submitted to the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations

by

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March 2024

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Michishita Narushige, Professor Iwama Yoko, and Professor Takenaka Harukata for not only allowing me to pursue the qualification exam but also for guiding me through my doctoral course. Specifically, I am indebted to Professor Michishita Narushige for exemplifying true professionalism, and to Professor Iwama Yoko for inspiring my focus in the field of modern European history.

Reflecting on my PhD journey, it would have been arduous and uninspiring without the constant encouragement from various individuals over the past four years. I extend my heartfelt appreciation to Christopher Alfonso Castro, Danbara Hiroshi, and Kaneko Nanae from the European class; Ariel Stenek, Dee Wu, Ishii Junya, Yoneda Koichi from SIS; MSP colleagues, including Niranjana Pratap Singh and Sakaue Yu; Carl Adams Kopati Gbali and Francis Amankwapoku from the African community; Rocio Paloma, Felice Marquez, and Kevin Christopher Go from the Filipino community; and Manita Noosawat, Kobchai Songsrisanga, and Nat Laohasurayodhin from the Thai community. Special thanks go to Sean Li, Mohd Azlan Idris, and Suga Yosuke for their unwavering friendship and support. Additionally, I express my gratitude to Jang Don-hun and Park Jong-hun for providing valuable military advice.

I extend my thanks to my family; my father, a longtime CEO of a conglomerate, imparted crisis management skills and the principles of greatness, while my mother, a devoted servant of God, consistently offered spiritual guidance and taught me the importance of treating others with kindness. A special acknowledgement goes to my wife, Choi Eun-kyung, and my son, Kim Yu-jin, for their support and decency.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to God for guiding my life's path and showering me with generosity throughout the years. I am committed to fulfilling my assignments and will continue seeking divine guidance.

Abstract

The primary goal of this study is to conduct a thorough examination of the events that unfolded during a 73-year timeframe, spanning from 1950 to 2023, with a focus on Japan's role in contributing to the security of South Korea. By conducting extensive research, including the collection of data from primary and secondary sources such as government documents, public statements, memoirs, and other published materials from the United States, Japan, and South Korea, as well as conducting over 60 interviews with security experts, the following key findings have emerged: (1) Japan extended its security contribution to South Korea when doing so aligned with its efforts to gain favor from the United States; (2) Japan heightened its security contribution to South Korea when it perceived a significant North Korean threat to South Korea; (3) Japan increased its security contribution to South Korea in response to concerns about potential US abandonment. Interestingly, when such concerns diminished, Japan did not necessarily reduce its security contribution to South Korea; (4) throughout the entire period under analysis, spanning from 1950 to 2023, Japan's security contribution to South Korea in the event of a potential full-scale war remained consistently steadfast, even during times of strained or unfavorable relations between Japan and South Korea; (5) Japan's security contributions to South Korea were influenced by the strength or vocal opposition of socialist and communist factions, specifically referring to the Japanese Socialist Party and Japanese Communist Party, throughout the analytical timeframe.

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Note on Transliteration and Style

I present Japanese names by placing the family name first, followed by the given name, such as Yoshida Shigeru instead of Shigeru Yoshida. The same convention is applied to Korean names, where the family name precedes the given name, as seen in Park Chung-hee rather than Chung-hee Park. When typing Korean given names, a hyphen is used in accordance with common Romanization practices.

In contrast, English names follow the convention of placing the given name before the family name, as exemplified by Douglas MacArthur. The transliteration of Korean language adheres to the principles established by the National Institute of the Korean Language, while Japanese language transliteration relies on a Japanese/Kanji to Romaji translator. In transliterating Japanese names with long vowels into English, I have represented them as short vowels. For instance, in my paper, Onuma is used rather than Oonuma to maintain consistency.

For the North Korean names, places, and other entities, I adopt the North Korean usage, while adhering to the South Korean way of spelling out names, places, and so on, predating 1945. Finally, in this paper, the symbol “\$” denotes the United States dollar. In determining the exchange rate between the United States dollar and the South Korean won, I used the annual exchange rates provided by the Bank of Korea. When assessing data over multiple years, I used the average value of the annual exchange rate. Regarding the currency exchange rate between the United States dollar and Japanese yen, I have used the annual exchange rates sourced from the Economic Statistics System, managed by the Bank of Korea.

Regarding the sequencing of countries, the order is United States followed by Japan and South Korea. Within Japan and South Korea, Japan precedes South Korea. When referring to Dokdo and Takeshima, they are presented in alphabetical order with a slash, such as Dokdo/Takeshima. Concerning the body of water known as the East Sea or Sea of Japan, this paper adheres to the prevailing international standard as of January 2024, using the term Sea of Japan.

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List of Acronyms

ABCT	Armored Brigade Combat Team
ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
ADD	Agency for Defense Development
AEW&C	Airborne Early Warning and Control
ANNUALEX	Annual Exercise
ASDF	Air Self-Defense Force
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
CFC	Combined Forces Command
CINCCFC	Commander-In-Chief Combined Forces Command
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief Pacific
CINCUNC	Commander-In-Chief United Nations Command
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CJOEP	Coordinated Joint Outline Emergency Plan
CONPLAN	Concept Plan
CONUS	Continental United States
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EDRD	Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise
EPB	Economic Planning Board
FST	Fleet Synthetic Training
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GHH	Gutehoffnungshütte, Aktienverein für Bergbau und Hüttenbetrieb
GHQ	General Headquarters
GNP	Gross National Product
GSDF	Ground Self-Defense Force
GSOMIA	General Security of Military Information Agreement
HCI	Heavy Chemical Industry
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ITO	Integrated Tasking Order

JCG	Japan Coast Guard
JCP	Japanese Communist Party
JDA	Japan Defense Agency
JEXIM	Export Import Bank of Japan
JNR	Japan National Railway
JSDF	Japan Self-Defense Force
JSP	Japanese Socialist Party
KATUSA	Korean Augmentation to the United States Army
KCIA	Korean Central Intelligence Agency
KCNA	Korean Central News Agency
KEDO	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
KISA	Korea International Steel Association
KIST	Korea Institute of Science and Technology
KRW	South Korean Won
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
LST	Landing Ship Tanks
MINEX	Mine Warfare Exercise
MIRV	Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle
MITI	Ministry of International Trade and Industry
MPS	Maritime Prepositioning Ship
MSDF	Maritime Self-Defense Force
MSE	Missile Segment Enhancement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDPG	National Defense Program Guidelines
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OPCON	Operational Control
OPLAN	Operational Plan
PAC	Patriot Advance Capability
PACOM	Pacific Command
POSCO	Pohang Iron and Steel Company
QUAD	Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
RIMPAC	Rim of the Pacific
ROK	Republic of Korea

SCAJAP	Shipping Control Authority for Japanese Merchant Marine
SCM	Security Consultative Meeting
SDF	Self-Defense Force
SIASJ	Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan
SLOC	Sea Lines of Communication
SM	Standard Missile
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
SUBCOMP	Submarine Competition
TEL	Transporter Erector Launcher
THADD	Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
TPFDD	Time Phase Force and Deployment Data
TTP	Tactics Techniques and Procedures
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNC	United Nations Command
UNC-Rear	United Nations Command Rear
US	United States
USAF	United States Air Force
USCAR	United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands
USD	United States Dollar
USFJ	United States Forces Japan
USFK	United States Forces Korea
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization

Introduction

1.1. Cooperation between Japan and South Korea in the Realm of Security

While it is evident that the defense of South Korea is assured by the US-ROK Mutual Security Treaty, the role of Japan in South Korea's defense remains relatively unclear to general public. From the perspective of most South Koreans, Japan's involvement during the Korean War, where Japan served as a crucial launching pad for UN forces to the Korean peninsula, and the establishment of the Pohang steel mill utilizing the "claims fund"¹ provided by Japan after signing the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations Between Japan and the Republic of Korea, are generally understood as contributions to South Korea's national interest. Nevertheless, these events are often viewed as isolated occurrences, and the idea of Japan's security contribution to South Korea is met with resistance by many Koreans due to the historical issues stemming from Japan's 35-year colonial era, which still elicits strong emotions to this day. Furthermore, the absence of a formal military alliance between Japan and South Korea, along with Japan's constitutional restrictions on maintaining a regular military, has limited the exploration of the comprehensive security cooperation between the two nations or Japan's overall security contribution to South Korea.

Regarding Japan's security contribution to South Korea, numerous questions arise, such as: (1) the nature of these contributions, whether they were one-time events or recurring; (2) the trend of these contributions over time, whether they increased or decreased; (3) the role of the United States in influencing Japan's assistance to South Korea when the need arose; (4) the form in which these security contributions were made, whether they were direct or indirect; (5) the specific types of contributions made; (6) whether North Korea's provocations towards South Korea served as triggers for Japan's security contributions; and most importantly, (7) the key motivations behind Japan's decisions to provide such support to South Korea.

The primary goal of this study is to explore these questions by conducting hypothesis tests and identifying patterns concerning Japan's security contribution to South Korea. I will explore the broader landscape of Japan-Korea security cooperation throughout the analytical timeframe (1950 to 2023) to identify any patterns that may exist in Chapter 1. Additionally, in Chapter 1, I will test the four following hypotheses:

¹ The original 1965 Agreement on the Settlement of Problems concerning Property and Claims and on Economic Co-operation between Japan and the Republic of Korea, also known as the 1965 Claims Agreement, originally mentions Japan's "supply and loans" to South Korea. However, I have added the adjective "claims" to differentiate the distinctive characteristics of the fund.

Hypothesis 1. Japan's commitment to South Korea's security hinges on its desire to gain the approval of the United States. Whenever Japan seeks to garner favor from the United States, it tends to elevate its security contributions to South Korea. Conversely, when Japan does not have the need to gain favor from the United States, it tends to reduce its security commitments to South Korea.

Hypothesis 2. Japan's security support for South Korea is based on its assessment of the North Korean threat to South Korea. When Japan perceives that the North Korean threat to South Korea is significant, it tends to amplify its security contributions to South Korea. Conversely, when Japan assesses that the North Korean threat to South Korea is minor, its inclinations to reduce its security contributions to South Korea becomes more apparent.

Hypothesis 3. Japan's security contribution to South Korea depends on Japan's evaluation of the United States' defense commitment to South Korea. When Japan perceives a less robust US defense commitment to South Korea, it is more likely to increase its security support for South Korea. Conversely, when Japan perceives a strong US defense commitment to South Korea, its inclination to bolster its security contributions to South Korea diminishes.

Hypothesis 4. Japan's security contribution to South Korea is influenced by the strength and vocal opposition of Socialist and Communist factions within Japan to the government's security policies. When these factions hold significant sway and openly challenge Japan's security policies, it tends to limit Japan's security contributions to South Korea. Conversely, when the Socialist and Communist factions do not strongly oppose the Japanese government, Japan's security contributions are less constrained.

After conducting an examination of the notable aspects of Japan's security contribution to South Korea spanning 73 years and conducting hypothesis tests in Chapter 1, I will delve into the specific details of Japan's security contribution in Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5.

1.2. Literature Review, Possible Contribution, and limitation

1.2.1. Literature Review

What I intend to cover

To begin with, I would like to clarify the scope of this study by outlining what it covers and what it does not. Firstly, my intention is not to provide a mere listing of facts or historical events in an encyclopedic manner. Although I will discuss a significant number of events to illustrate what occurred within the analytical timeframe, I will selectively utilize

relevant facts and events. Secondly, I will focus exclusively on security matters. While it is understood that security and non-security issues are often intertwined, I will diligently trace security matters, particularly when an event involves both security and non-security aspects. Thirdly, my analysis will primarily focus on Japan's perspective, interpretation, and understanding that led to this security contribution, although the United States and South Korea played a role in influencing Japan's security participation within the framework of the tripartite security contribution. The primary aim is to delve into Japan's perspective in this context and uncover the reasons behind Japan's decision to assist the South Koreans. Fourthly, I will specifically concentrate on South Korea's net security gains resulting from Japan's contribution, since it is possible that some of Japan's decisions may have benefited the United States more than South Korea.

With this consideration in mind, let us proceed to the literature review. The available literature can be classified into two main categories: (1) comprehensive analyses conducted over an extended period of time, and (2) analyses focusing on specific events. In line with the structure of this study, which prioritizes comprehensive analysis in Chapter 1 followed by the in-depth examination of four cases in Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5, I will review the existing literature accordingly.

On general overview of the Japan-ROK security cooperation

One of the frequently referenced books regarding security cooperation between Japan and South Korea is Victor Cha's *Alignment Despite Antagonism* (2000).² Cha uses the concepts of "abandonment" and "entrapment" from alliance management theory to analyze the security cooperation between Japan and South Korea within the tripartite structure involving the United States. Focusing on the period from 1965 to 1998, Cha characterizes the relationship between Japan and South Korea as a "quasi-alliance." The term "quasi-alliance" reflects the fact that despite the historical tensions between the two countries and the absence of a formal security or defense treaty, they cooperated due to a shared common enemy, such as the Soviet Union, and their respective security agreements with the United States.

Cha's argument is logical when applied to the late 1960s through the early 1980s, covering the period from President Nixon's inauguration to the end of President Carter's tenure. However, the applicability of Cha's model appears to diminish starting from the

² Victor D. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000).

Reagan administration (which spans most of the 1980s). During this time, despite the strong commitment of the United States, Japan and South Korea developed a solid relationship under the leadership of Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro and President Chun Doo-hwan. Furthermore, the publication year of *Alignment Despite Antagonism* in 2000 raises doubts the relevance of Cha's model in the post-Cold War era. While Cha's assertion holds true within a specific timeframe, it remains uncertain whether it can be considered a comprehensive theory capable of convincingly explaining the security cooperation between Japan and South Korea throughout the 73-year period, encompassing the Korean War to the post-Cold War era.

Meanwhile, Kurata Hideya sheds light on the origins of the triangular security cooperation. In his work titled *Nichi bei kan anpo teikei no kigen* (Origins of the Japan-US-Korea Security Alliance, 2005),³ Kurata primarily focuses on the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s, examining the events that took place during the pre-normalization period between Japan and South Korea. By employing the alliance management theory to support his argument, Kurata's work can be seen as a complementary addition to Victor Cha's *Alignment Despite Antagonism*, as Cha did not delve into the pre-normalization era.

Taking a step further than Cha, Kurata introduces two additional alliance management concepts, namely "habamare" (sabotage) and "tsukekomare" (exploitation), in addition to "abandonment" and "entrapment." These concepts provide a more comprehensive understanding of the complex dynamics among the tripartite actors. They not only explain the incentive for Japan and South Korea to cooperate based on the interplay between abandonment and entrapment but also elucidate instances where Japan sabotaged its further commitment to South Korea (habamare), while South Korea sought to exploit Japan's involvement (tsukekomare). Kurata's work allows readers to witness the formation of the triangular security cooperation. It is important to note that Kurata's analysis is predominantly based on legal documents. This methodology proves valuable in comprehending the intricacies of various significant documents, such as the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan (both the 1951 and 1960 versions) and the Agreement Regarding the Status of the United Nations Forces in Japan. By examining these documents, Kurata reveals how the security interconnections between Japan and South Korea were upheld during the Cold

³ Hideya Kurata 倉田秀也, "Nichi bei kan anpo teikei no kigen — "kankoku jōkō" zenshi no kaishaku teki sai kentō" 日米韓安保提携の起源 — 「韓国条項」前史の解釈的再検討 [Origins of the Japan-US-Korea Security Alliance: An Interpretive Reexamination of the Prehistory of the "Korea Clause"], in *nichi kan rekishi kyōdō kenkyū hōkokusho. dai 3 bunka hen gekan* 日韓歴史共同研究報告書. 第3分科篇 下巻 [Japan-Korea History Joint Research Report Part 3, Volume 2], ed. Japan-Korea Cultural Foundation (Tokyo: The Japan-Korea Cultural Foundation, 2005).

War era. Nevertheless, this legalistic approach may exhibit a disparity with reality.⁴ The substantial divergence between actual practices and the provisions outlined in written documents stands out as the primary weakness of Kurata's work.

There are other works that explore the security cooperation between Japan and South Korea without primarily relying on the alliance management theory as their main analytical framework. *In Nichi kan anzen hoshō kankei no hensen* (Changes in Japan-Korea Security Relations, 2006),⁵ Azuma Kiyohiko presents a chronological account of the two countries' security cooperation efforts from 1965 to the post-Cold War era. This article possesses two notable strengths: a narrative focused on major historical events and the challenging of commonly held perceptions on the subject. Despite the complexity of sociopolitical developments involving the United States, Japan, and South Korea, Azuma successfully connects the dots through significant historical events such as the Blue House raid (1968), the Korea Clause (1969), Nixon Doctrine (1969), New Korea Clause (1975), Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), and more. Additionally, the article sheds structural framework established during the Cold War period. Azuma's explanation clarifies that the post-Cold War era security cooperation between Japan and South Korea did not emerge abruptly.

Despite these advantages, the absence of economic data makes it difficult to fully comprehend the extent of South Korea's desperate need for funds to bolster its defense capabilities. Although the article briefly mentions the amount of Japan's economic assistance, the narrative primarily focuses on non-economic evidence. It is generally implied that Japan's economic contribution played a crucial role in compensating for the decrease in US aid and meeting South Korea's growing demands for defense industry development during the 1970s. However, the lack of precise figures makes it challenging to gauge the exact circumstances.

Similar to Kiyohiko Azuma's article, Park Yong-jun's *Han-kuk-oe-kyo-wa han-il-an-po kwan-kye-ūi pyōn-yong, 1965~2015* (South Korea's Diplomacy and the Evolution of Korea-Japan Security Relation, 2015)⁶ aims to provide an interpretation of the overall Japan-

⁴ As an example, Japan's three non-nuclear principles emphasize the requirement of prior consultation before the United States introduces nuclear weapons into Japanese territory. However, in practice, US naval vessels carrying nuclear warheads were able to dock in Japanese ports without undergoing such prior consultation. In other words, without thoroughly examining the practical implementation, the textual analysis alone may render the analysis somewhat inadequate.

⁵ Azuma Kiyohiko 東清彦, "Nichi kan anzen hoshō kankei no hensen: kokkō seijō ka kara reisen go made" [Changes in Japan-South Korea Security Relations: From Normalization of Diplomatic Relations to the End of the Cold War], *The Japan Association for International Security* 33, no.4 (2006): 87-114.

⁶ Park Yong-jun, "hangugoegyowa haniranbo gwangyeui byeonyong, 1965~2015" [South Korea's Diplomacy and the Evolution of Korea-Japan Security Relation], *Korean Journal of Japanese Studies*, no.12 (2015): 134-167.

South Korea relationship in the security domain. By primarily focusing on South Korea's national security and foreign policy principles, this work offers the following key strength: extracting significant patterns while downplaying less crucial factors, and dividing the seemingly extensive timeframe (1965 to 2015) into four distinctive periods.⁷ When examining the relationship between Japan and South Korea, there are enduring contentious issues that can strain the existing bond between the two countries, such as historical and territorial disputes (Dokdo/Takeshima as a notable example). However, following Hans Morgenthau's argument, Park asserts that foreign policy, derived from national security principles, hold the utmost importance. By adopting this approach, the 50-year timeframe appears to exhibit a certain continuity, despite occasional fluctuations caused by spoiler factors. Moreover, dissecting the lengthy period into four segments enables the identification of meaningful changes within the overall continuity. The author's analysis aligns with the distinctions brought about by different presidential terms, considering the South Korean president's authority in shaping key foreign policy principles. In summary Park's structural approach enhances the article's clarity and ease of understanding.

While the logic of Park's article may seem clear-cut, there is a notable weakness in his analysis—the omission of the Chun Doo-hwan era (1980 to 1987). It is acknowledged that significant developments took place during this period characterized by a flourishing tripartite relationship between the United States, Japan, and South Korea, as well as the initiation of robust economic cooperation for defense purpose. The warm rapport between Chun and leaders such as Reagan and Nakasone resulted in policy distinctions from the Park Chung-hee era. If the distinguishing features were relatively minor (or redundancy was the main concern), the author could have easily grouped the Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan eras together, as was done for other presidents in the latter part of the article. However, the exclusion of these eight years from the overall analytical timeframe of 50 years creates a significant gap in Park Yong-jun's article.

While the previously mentioned articles and books predominantly focus on the Cold War period, Jayson Davidson takes a different approach by examining security cooperation between Japan and South Korea in the post-Cold War era. In his book *Japan and South Korea Security Cooperation* (2019),⁸ Davidson identifies China, North Korea, and the United

⁷ While the analytical timeframe of the article spans from 1965 to 2015, the author briefly acknowledges in the introduction that South Korea's pre-1965 era, particularly during President Rhee's tenure, was characterized by a predominantly antagonistic foreign policy towards Japan.

⁸ Jayson Davidson, *Japan and South Korea Security Cooperation: Drivers and Obstacles – Influence and China*,

States as the major international factors influencing the incentivization and disincentivization of security cooperation between Japan and South Korea. In addition to employing key alliance management theories such as “abandonment” and “entrapment,” Davidson incorporates the concepts of “threat perception” and “shared animosity” into his analysis. However, unlike other authors, Davidson asserts that domestic factors, such as the role of the public and the impact of leadership, hold greater significance than structural factors in shaping security cooperation between Japan and South Korea. Nevertheless, akin to Hideya Kurata’s *Nichi bei kan anpo teikei no kigen* (Origins of the Japan-US-Korea Security Alliance, 2005),⁹ the author of this work primarily relies on official documents such as the Japanese and South Korean defense white papers to support their argument. It is important to note, however, that discrepancies may exist between the actual implementation of policies and what is stipulated in official statements, doctrines, or documents, which may not fully capture the reality of the situation.

On Korean War

A significant portion of the literature concerning Japan’s involvement in the Korean War focuses on specific events or activities, such as the minesweeping operation, the cooperation of merchant mariners, the contributions of Japanese volunteers, and other similar aspects.

Regarding the minesweeping operation during the Korean War, Hidetaka Suzuki examines Japan’s demining activities in his article *Chōsen kaiki ni shutsugeki shita nippon tokubetsu sōkai tai* (The Japanese Special Minesweeping Corps that Set Sail in the Korean Waters, 2013).¹⁰ In a descriptive manner, Suzuki explores the origin, development, mission, and operational outcomes of the minesweeping unit. Likewise, Yoichi Hiramata discusses

North Korea and United States, Impact of Public Opinion and Domestic Leaders, Shared Animosity and DPRK Policy (Independently Published, 2019).

⁹ Hideya Kurata 倉田秀也, “Nichi bei kan anpo teikei no kigen — “kankoku jōkō” zenshi no kaishaku teki sai kentō” 日米韓安保提携の起源 — 「韓国条項」前史の解釈的再検討 [Origins of the Japan-US-Korea Security Alliance: An Interpretive Reexamination of the Prehistory of the “Korea Clause”], in *nichi kan rekishi kyōdō kenkyū hōkokusho. dai 3 bunka hen gekan* 日韓歴史共同研究報告書. 第3分科篇 下巻 [Japan-Korea History Joint Research Report Part 3, Volume 2], ed. Japan-Korea Cultural Foundation (Tokyo: The Japan-Korea Cultural Foundation, 2005).

¹⁰ Suzuki Hidetaka 鈴木英隆, “Chōsen kaiki ni shutsugeki shita nippon tokubetsu sōkai tai: sono hikari to kage” 朝鮮海域に出撃した日本特別掃海隊: その光と影 [The Japanese Special Minesweeping Corps that Set Sail in the Korean Waters: The Light and Shadow], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013).

Japan's demining efforts during the Korean War in his work *Chōsen senso ni sansen shita nipponjin* (Japanese Who Participated in the Korean War, 1998).¹¹ This book also provides comprehensive documentation of the level of Japanese participation in this specific role.

Meanwhile, in Ishimaru Yasuzo's *Chōsen sensō to nippon no kakawari* (Japan in Relations with the Korean War, 2008),¹² the author sheds light on the cooperation of Japanese merchant mariners during the Korean War. The focus of the article is not how Japan provided maritime transportation support to the UN forces. Through the use of compelling documentation, the author effectively illustrates the extent of Japan's involvement in maritime transportation, utilizing Japanese merchant ships and dock workers.¹³ Additionally, Ariyoshi Yoshiya's *Senryōka no nippon kaiun* (Japan's Maritime Transportation Under Occupation, 1961)¹⁴ provides a detailed account of the role of Landing Ship Tanks (LST) among Japanese merchant ships. This work highlights the significance of LSTs as essential vessels for delivering heavy military equipment to the remote shores off the Korean peninsula.

Furthermore, the dispatching of Japanese volunteers to the Korean peninsula is extensively discussed in Ko Yeong-ja's book *625 jeon-jaeng-gwa jeon-hu-il-bon* (The Korean War and the Post-War Japan, 2010).¹⁵ While official attempts to enlist Japanese volunteers were unsuccessful, Ko explains how former Japanese soldiers found alternative routes to join the Korean War through Mindan's¹⁶ recruitment of volunteers in July 1950.

¹¹ Hirama Youichi 平間洋一, "Chōsen senso ni sansen shita nipponjin" 朝鮮戦争に参戦した日本人 [Japanese Who Participated in the Korean War], in *Chōsen sensō* 朝鮮戦争 [Korean War: Volume 3], ed. Rekishigunzō henshūbu (Tokyo: Gakken, 1998).

¹² Ishimaru Yasuzo 石丸安蔵, "Chōsen sensō to nippon no kakawari: wasuresarareta kaijō yusō" 朝鮮戦争と日本の関わり: 忘れ去られた海上輸送 [Japan in Relations with the Korean War: Forgotten Maritime Transport], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013).

¹³ The article provides a chronological account that facilitates a clear understanding of the progression and development of Japan's involvement before and during the Korean War. For example, shortly after the end of World War II, Japan's merchant ships were ordered to be significantly reduced by the GHQ (General Headquarters). However, just four days after the outbreak of the Korean War, the GHQ issued orders to the SCAJAP (Shipping Control Authority for the Japanese Merchant Marine) and the JSU (All Japan Seamen's Union) to fully utilize Landing Ship Tanks (LST). Consequently, under a veil of secrecy, Japanese ships were employed to transport soldiers and civilian evacuees between Japan (primarily Yokohama, Fukuoka, and Sasebo) and the Korean peninsula (mainly Pusan, Incheon, and Cheju Isle).

¹⁴ Ariyoshi Yoshiya 有吉義弥, *Senryōka no nippon kaiun: shūsen kara kōwa hakkō made no kaiun sokumenshi* 占領下の日本海運: 終戦から講和発効までの海運側面史 [Japan's Maritime Transportation Under Occupation: A Side History of Shipping from the End of the War to the Enactment of the San Francisco Treaty] (Tokyo: Kokusai Kaiun Shimbunsha, 1961).

¹⁵ Ko Young-ja, *6-25 jeonjaenggwa jeonhu ilbon: mijeomryeonggiui ganghwa munjewa dokrip hoebok* [The Korean War and the Post-War Japan: The Issue of Peace Treaty Under US Occupation and the Restoration of Independence] (Seoul: Kyunghee University Press, 2010).

¹⁶ Mindan, one of the primary associations representing the Korean community in Japan, maintains strong connections with South Korea and was founded in Tokyo in 1946.

Similarly, Kim Chan-jong's *Zainichi giyūhei kikan sezu* (Foreign Residents in Japan Volunteer Soldiers have not Returned, 2007)¹⁷ provides a detailed account of the recruitment and dispatch of volunteers to the Korean peninsula. In a more grandiose narrative, Fujiwarano Aki's *Chōsen sensō o tatakatta nipponjin* (Japanese Who Fought in the Korean War, 2020)¹⁸ illustrates how Japanese civilians engaged in military operation on the Korean peninsula.

Undoubtedly, there are comprehensive written works that extensively cover Japan's involvement in the Korean War, addressing various aspects of the conflict. Notably, Onuma Hisao's *Chōsen sensō to nippon* (The Korean War and Japan, 2006)¹⁹ and Yamazaki Shizuo's *Shijitsu de kataru chōsen sensō kyōryoku no zenyō* (The Complete History Regarding the Korean War Cooperation, 1998)²⁰ emerge as highly well-researched books on the subject. While there are certain overlapping areas in both works, such as Japan's logistics role, Onuma's book primarily focuses on the minesweeping operation and maritime transportation. On the other hand, Yamazaki's book dedicated a significant portion to the domestic transportation of war materials by train, the provision of hospital services, and the specific measures undertaken by major Japanese prefectures during the Korean War.

On logistic support concerning US bases in Japan

There is a wealth of literature discussing the history and basic information of US bases in Japan, with many of these sources originating from Japan itself. For example, Hiromichi Umebayashi's book *Jōhō kōkaihō de toraeta okinawa no beigun* (US Forces in Japan analyzed through the Freedom of Information Act, 1994)²¹ provides a comprehensive account of the historical facts surrounding US bases in Okinawa. However, when it comes to Japan's logistical support to US bases in Japan, the available literature tends to offer only brief descriptions or focuses on specific periods or events, such as the Korean War. While

¹⁷ Kim Chan-jong 金贊汀, *Zainichi giyūhei kikan sezu : chōsen sensō hishi* 在日義勇兵帰還せず：朝鮮戦争秘史 [Foreign Residents in Japan Volunteer Soldier have not Returned: The Secret History of the Korean War] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2007).

¹⁸ Fujiwarano Aki 藤原和樹, *Chōsen sensō o tatakatta nipponjin* 朝鮮戦争を戦った日本人 [Japanese Who Fought in the Korean War] (Tokyo: NHK Publishing, 2020).

¹⁹ Onuma Hisao 大沼久夫, *Chōsen sensō to nippon* 朝鮮戦争と日本 [The Korean War and Japan] (Tokyo: Shinkansha, 2006).

²⁰ Yamasaki Shizuo 山崎静雄, *Shijitsu de kataru chōsen sensō kyōryoku no zenyō* 史実で語る朝鮮戦争協力の全容 [The Complete History Regarding the Korean War Cooperation] (Tokyo: Honnoizumisa, 1998).

²¹ Hiromichi Umebayashi 梅林宏道, *Jōhō kōkaihō de toraeta Okinawa no Beigun* 情報公開法でとらえた在日米軍 [US Forces in Japan Analyzed Through the Freedom of Information Act] (Tokyo: Kōbunken, 1994)

Edward Drea's *History of the United Command Plan 1946-2012* (2013)²² does address the implications of US bases in Japan over a long timeframe and highlights the importance of the logistical support function, it covers a wide range of issues beyond just the bases, making it somewhat insufficient for a detailed understanding of the logistical function alone. Similarly, articles like Kim Hyen's *Okinawa migungiji janggijudunui giwongwa iyu* (The Origin and Reasons for Long-Term Positioning of the US Bases in Okinawa, 2006)²³ shed light on the logistical function of Okinawa bases in the context of Korean contingencies. However, these articles tend to provide concise details, with a stronger emphasis on non-military aspects such as socio-economic and community elements.

On financial and technical assistance

Chapter 4 of this study will focus on two events, namely the construction of the Pohang steel mill during the 1960s and 1970s and economic cooperation for defense purpose in the 1980s. However, it is important to note that my research scope does not extend to non-defense issues. Therefore, the primary objective of Chapter 4 is to examine and analyze the impact of Japan's financial and technical assistance on South Korea's defense and/or defense industry. While there are numerous written works available on the construction of the Pohang steel mill and the economic cooperation for defense purpose in the 1980s, there is a scarcity of literature specifically addressing the spillover effect of Japan's assistance to South Korea's defense domain. Therefore, the literature review conducted related to Chapter 4 will be focused on works that directly discuss or analyze the spillover effect. Consequently, papers that solely adopt an economic analytical approach will be excluded from the review.

The memoir titled *Han-gug-hyeong gyeong-je-geon-seol: en-ji-ni-eo-ling eo-peu-lo-chi* (Korean Way of Economic Development: Engineering Approach, 1996)²⁴ by O Won-chol delves into the chain reaction triggered by Japan's financial assistance, leading to the development of the Pohang steel mill and the establishment of South Korea's military-industrial complex. O Won-chol, a key figure who closely witnessed South Korea's economic progress in the 1960s and 1970s, served as the senior presidential secretary for economic

²² Edward J. Drea and Ronald H. Cole, *History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-2012* (Washington D.C.: Joint History Office, Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2013).

²³ Kim Hyen, "Okinawa migungiji janggijudunui giwongwa iyu: migugui jeongchaekgyeoljeong 1945~1972 ui bunseok, 1965~2015" [The Origins and Reasons for Long-Term Positioning of the US Bases in Okinawa: An Analysis of the Policy-Making of the United States (1945-1972)], *Korean Journal of Citizen Politics*, no.7 (2006): 91-120.

²⁴ Oh Won-cheol, *Hangukhyeong gyeongjegeonseol enjinieoring eopeurochi 7* [Korean Way of Economic Development: Engineering Approach 7] (Seoul: Korea Institute of Economic Policy, 1999).

affairs under President Park Chung-hee. During his tenure, he held responsibilities related to heavy and military industries, including involvement in South Korea's nuclear development program in the 1970s. While O Won-chul's memoir does not present quantifiable data regarding the economic defense spillover, it effectively illustrates the interconnectedness between Japan's financial assistance, the construction of the Pohang steel mill, and the establishment of South Korea's military-industrial complex.

Choi Kyung-won's work, titled *Reisenki nichi kan anzen hoshō kankei no keisei* (The Formation of the Japan-Korea Security Relationship during the Cold War Period, 2014),²⁵ examines the implications of the Pohang steel mill buildup within the tripartite connectivity. Choi acknowledges that unlike Japan's direct contributions during the Korean War, such as sending minesweepers and voluntary soldiers to the Korean peninsula, the 1970s witnessed a somewhat different approach. However, the dual crisis of 1968, involving a raid by North Korean commandos to assassinate President Park and the abduction of the US naval vessel *Pueblo*, triggered alarm among Japanese and South Korean decision-makers. This led to a concerted effort to enhance security conditions in the Far East, resulting in Japan's financial support and the construction of the Pohang steel mill, ultimately leading to the establishment of South Korea's military-industrial complex.

Similarly, in his article, *Building Bombs, Building a Nation: The State, Chaebŏl, and the Militarized Industrialization of South Korea 1973-1979* (2020),²⁶ Peter Banseok Kwon explores how the decision by the United States to withdraw its troops from South Korea in the early 1970s influenced President Park to embrace a self-reliant defense strategy. This shift ultimately led to the establishment of South Korea's defense industry in the 1970s. Additionally, Kwon delves into President Park's pursuit of full-scale industrialization and defense buildup under the guiding principle of "rich nation, strong military." Kwon's article implies the significance of Japan's decision to permit the South Korean government to use the claims fund for the construction of the Pohang Steel Mill. This decision played a pivotal role in facilitating the subsequent comprehensive industrialization in South Korea.

In Cho Yang-hyun's article *Che-5-kong-hwa-kuk tae-il-oe-kyo-wa han-il-an-po-kyōng-hyōp: an-po-kyōng-hyōp-an-ūi ki-wŏn-e tae-han sil-chŭng-pun-sŏk* (The Fifth

²⁵ Choi Kyung-won 崔慶原, *Reisenki nichi kan anzen hoshō kankei no keisei* 冷戦期日韓安全保障関係の形成 [The Formation of the Korea-Japan Security Relationship during the Cold War Period] (Tōkyō: Keio University Press, 2014).

²⁶ Peter Banseok Kwon, "Building Bombs, Building a Nation: The State, *Chaebŏl*, and the Militarized Industrialization of South Korea, 1973-1979," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 79, no. 1 (2020): 51-75.

Republic of Korea's Diplomacy Towards Japan: Empirical Analysis on the Origin of the Korea-Japan Security-Economic Cooperation, 2017),²⁷ the author provides clear evidence of how the final agreed amount of 4\$ billion was determined based on military considerations. Similarly, Koike Osamu elaborates in his work *Nichi kan anpo keikyō o meguru nichi bei kan kankei* (US-Japan-ROK Relations Concerning the Japan-ROK Security Economic Cooperation, 2012)²⁸ on how the 1983 agreement was reached amid the changing international security environment of the late 1970s.

Komoda Mayumi's work, titled *Han-il an-bo-gyeong-hyeob bun-seog: yeog-sa-jeog jeon-gae-wa i-lon-jeog ham-ui* (Analysis of Korea-Japan Security-Economic Cooperation: Historical Development and Theoretical Implications, 2013),²⁹ delves into the origins and process of the economic cooperation for defense purpose in the 1980s. In her research, she thoroughly documents the dynamics of the negotiation, capturing South Korea's concerns about defense burden and Japan's apprehensions regarding the cooperation and the potential entrapment in a Korean contingency. Komoda's dissertation also sheds light on the security implications of the 1980s economic cooperation for defense purpose, specifically highlighting the momentary decrease in South Korea's defense burden (measured by the ratio of defense budget to GDP) following the implementation of the \$4 billion loans.

On operational support

Itayama Mayumi's research work, titled *Nichi Bei dōmei niokeru kyōdō bōei taisei no keisei: jōyaku teiketsu kara Nichi Bei bōei kyōryoku no tame no shishin sakutei made* (Formation of a Combined Defense System in the US-Japan Alliance: From the Conclusion of the Treaty to the Establishment of the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation, 2020),³⁰ provides insights into the early stages of Japan's operational support in the post-War

²⁷ Cho Yang-hyun, "Je5gonghwaguk daeiroegyowa haniranbogyehyeop anbogyehyeobanui giwone daehan siljeungbunseok" [The Fifth Republic of Korea's Diplomacy Towards Japan – Empirical Analysis on the Origin of the Korea-Japan Security-Economic Cooperation], *The Korean Association of International Studies* 57, no.2 (2017): 169-205.

²⁸ Koike Osamu 小池修, *Nichi kan anpo keikyō o meguru nichi bei kan kankei* 日韓安保経協をめぐる日米韓関係 [US-Japan-ROK Relations Concerning the Japan-ROK Security Economic Cooperation] (Tōkyō: University of Tokyo, 2012).

²⁹ Komoda Mayumi, *Hanil 'anbogyehyeop' bunseok: yeoksajeok jeongaewa ironjeok hamui* [Analysis of Korea-Japan Security-Economic Cooperation: Historical Development and Theoretical Implications] (Seoul: Korea University, 2013).

³⁰ Itayama Mayumi 板山真弓, *Nichi bei dōmei niokeru kyōdō bōei taisei no keisei: jōyaku teiketsu kara "nichi bei bōei kyōryoku no tame no shishin" sakutei made* 日米同盟における共同防衛体制の形成: 条約締結から「日米防衛協力のための指針」策定まで [Formation of a Combined Defense System in the US-Japan Alliance: from the Conclusion of the Treaty to the Establishment of the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense

era. The author highlights the establishment of the Combined Planning Committee in 1952 and the Combined Joint Outline Emergency Plan (CJOEP) in 1955. Itayama also sheds light on the command post exercises conducted by the United States and Japan prior to the formulation of the 1978 Guidelines for the US-Japan Defense Cooperation.

In a similar vein, Hayashi Shigeo's work, *Zenbun Mitsuya sakusen kenkyū* (Full Text, Mitsuya Strategy Study, 1979),³¹ delves into the intricate details of the Three Arrows Study and provides an analysis of its strategic implications. Likewise, Matsueda Tsukasa and George Moore explore the shifting attitudes of Japan towards the military and the correlation between the Three Arrows Study and the evolving expectations placed upon the JSDF during the 1960s in their publication *Japan's shifting attitudes toward the military: Mitsuya Kenkyu and the Self-Defense Force* (1967)³².

Oga Ryohei's publication, titled *Nichi Bei kyōdō sakusen Nichi Bei tai Soren no tatakai shinpojiumu* (US-Japan Combined Operations: Symposium Concerning the Battle Between US-Japan and the Soviet Union, 1982),³³ provides insights into the operation support during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In this work, three veterans of the JSDF engage in a discussion on the potential invasion of Japanese territory by the Soviet Union. Drawing upon the existing combined operation function between the United States and Japan at the time, the authors analyze the vulnerable points and put forth policy recommendations.

Regarding the operation support in the post-Cold War era, Handa Shigeru's book *Jieitai vs. Kitachōsen* (Self-Defense Force vs. North Korea, 2003).³⁴ offers a pragmatic assessment of the potential response by the JSDF in the event of a Korean contingency. Drawing on internal documents from the Japan Defense Agency at the time, the author explores various scenarios, including missile defense, refugee influx from the Korean peninsula, and North Korea commando operations within Japanese territory. Through Handa's book, readers are provided with a glimpse into the somewhat secretive Operation

Cooperation] (Tōkyō: Mineruva Shobo, 2020).

³¹ Hayashi Shigeo 林茂夫, *Zenbun mitsuya sakusen kenkyū* 全文・三矢作戦研究 [Full Text, Mitsuya Strategy Study] (Tōkyō: Banseisha, 1979).

³² Matsueda Tsukasa and George E. Moore, "Japan's Shifting Attitudes Toward the Military: Mitsuya Kenkyu and the Self-Defense Force," *Asian Survey* 7, no. 9 (1967): 614-625.

³³ Oga Ryohei 大賀良平, *Nichi bei kyōdō sakusen: nichi bei tai soren no tatakai shinpojiumu* 日米共同作戦: 日米対ソ連の戦い シンポジウム [US-Japan Combined Operations: Symposium Concerning the Battle Between US-Japan and the Soviet Union] (Tōkyō: Kōjimachi Shobō, 1982).

³⁴ Handa Shigeru 半田滋, *Jieitai vs. kitachōsen* 自衛隊 vs. 北朝鮮 [Self-Defense Force vs. North Korea] (Tōkyō: Shichosha, 2003).

Plan 5055.³⁵

Building upon the findings mentioned earlier, I have arrived at the following conclusions. Regarding the Japan-ROK security relationship, there are several significant works, such as Victor Cha's *Alignment Despite Antagonism* (2000),³⁶ providing a general overview. These works often focus on specific timeframes to identify patterns in the security relationship. When it comes to the Korean War, there is a wide range of literature available, primarily authored by Japanese writers, but often centered around specific issues, such as Japan's demining operations. In terms of logistic support, numerous books and articles shed light on the US bases in Japan, yet the details regarding Japan's logistical assistance are usually mentioned briefly or treated as a minor theme within the broader context. Regarding financial and technical assistance, many existing works primarily emphasize the economic aspects and do not extensively cover the spillover effects of economic support on the defense or military domain. There is a relative scarcity of literature specifically addressing the Pohang steel mill buildup and its impact, as well as the economic cooperation for defense purpose in the 1980s, from the perspective of the spillover effect. However, notable works like O Won-chol's firsthand account of the Pohang steel mill and South Korea's military-industrial complex buildup, and Komoda Mayumi's analysis of the security implications of the economic cooperation for defense purpose in the 1980s, provide valuable insights. On the topic of operational support, many works make use of disclosed secret documents or officially undisclosed materials, as seen in Handa Shigeru's *Jieitai vs. Kitachōsen* (Self-Defense Force vs. North Korea, 2003).³⁷ While the existing literature covers key areas that I intend to address, there are still gaps, disconnections, and areas of insufficient coverage.

1.2.2. Possible Contribution of this Study

The existing "gap"

The deficiencies in the current literature can be categorized into three main areas: (1) a dearth of comprehensive analyses spanning the entire 73-year timeframe, (2) theories with limited applicability, and (3) an absence of scrutiny regarding the economic spillover effect

³⁵ Operation Plan (OPLAN) 5055 pertains to Japan's preparedness to facilitate US troops during a potential military conflict on the Korean peninsula, encompassing the readiness to open ports, military bases and other facilities for their assistance.

³⁶ Victor D. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000).

³⁷ Handa Shigeru 半田滋, *Jieitai vs. kitachōsen* 自衛隊 vs. 北朝鮮 [Self-Defense Force vs. North Korea] (Tōkyō: Shichosha, 2003).

on the security domain. While the existing literature on the Japan-ROK security relationship has its own merits, there are certain gaps that need to be addressed in the context of this study, which aims to comprehensively analyze Japan's security contribution to South Korea over a 73-year timeframe. Existing works predominantly focus on specific timeframes, such as Victor Cha's *Alignment Despite Antagonism*, which covers the period from 1965 to 1998, or Kurata Hideya's work, which sheds light on the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s. Each author presents a general theory to explain the developments and pattern between Japan and South Korea. However, the main issue lies in the limited applicability of these theories when extending the analytical timeframe to encompass the 73-year period. In other words, there is a need to either develop a more comprehensive explanation or revise the existing theories. While there are works that cover the 73-year timeframe, such as Don Oberdorfer's *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (2014),³⁸ they do not primarily focus on Japan-South Korea security cooperation and tend to be descriptive rather than analytically rigorous.

Regarding the Korean War, a significant portion of the existing literature focuses on specific topics, such as minesweeping operations and the involvement of Japanese volunteers. Most of these works are authored by Japanese writers and often center around the revelation of previously unknown secrets or emphasize the dramatic aspects of particular events or facts. However, what I require is a comprehensive overview of Japan's overall security contribution, rather than presenting isolated episodes that may pique reader's interest. For instance, the story of Japanese volunteers joining the Korean War is undeniably intriguing. However, considering that only a small number of Japanese volunteers were deployed to the Korean peninsula, their role in Japan's overall war effort cannot be considered critical. What is lacking in the existing literature is a comprehensive analysis of Japan's security contribution. Due to the works being organized around specific issues, it becomes challenging to visualize the complete picture and ascertain the relative significance of various functions. While authors like Onuma Hisao and Yamazaki Shizuo touch on multiple issues in their books, they still focus on selected aspects, making it difficult to grasp the entirety of the subject matter. Furthermore, determining which functions made a greater contribution than others prove somewhat challenging.

When it comes to logistic support, the majority of existing literature primarily focuses on the US bases in Japan from a non-military perspective, examining socio-economic and

³⁸ Don Oberdorfer and Robert Cartin, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (New York: Basic Books, 2014).

community aspects. Typical subjects include topics like the Okinawa reversion and the impact of US base relocation on local communities in terms of the environment and sovereignty. While some works briefly touch upon the logistic support function of the US bases in Japan, it receives relatively limited attention. Considering that US base relocation occurred over the 73-year timeframe, encompassing both the Cold War era and the post-Cold War period, further research is needed to understand how these events influenced Japan's logistical efforts and identify any enduring elements. In essence, there is a need for discussions that delve deeper than providing mere descriptions of the US base relocation in Japan.

Regarding financial and technical assistance, a significant gap exists in terms of the spillover effect, which is almost non-existent in the literature. While there are ample written works on the Pohang steel mill buildup, covering aspects such as its concept, fundraising, technical assistance from abroad, and construction process, the overall impact of the steel mill buildup on South Korean defense remains poorly documented. Although O Won-chol's memoir provides insights into the correlation between the Pohang steel mill and the establishment of South Korea's defense industry, it does not explore the spillover effect in detail. Similarly, existing literature on the economic cooperation for defense purpose in the 1980s focuses on the process itself: its origin, initial negotiations, the bargaining process leading up to the \$4 billion loans, and the final outcome. However, there is a dearth of books and articles that precisely examine how and to what extent the \$4 billion loans positively influenced South Korea's defense. While Komoda Mayumi briefly mentioned the security implications of the economic cooperation for defense purpose, it is somewhat insufficient to gain a comprehensive understanding of the ramifications.

In terms of operational support, a significant gap exists in the literature regarding the post-Cold War era. While there is ample literature covering the Cold War period, benefiting from the disclosure of secret documents that provide solid data, books and articles on the post-Cold War era tend to be more speculative. This is due to the fact that much of the critical information during this period is either in the developmental phase or classified, making it inaccessible to the public. Books such as Handa Shigeru's *Jieitai vs. Kitachōsen* (Self-Defense Force vs. North Korea, 2003)³⁹ attempt to fill this gap through scenario-based analysis. While such an approach may be intriguing, the speculative nature of the analysis

³⁹ Handa Shigeru 半田滋, *Jieitai vs. kitachōsen* 自衛隊 vs. 北朝鮮 [Self-Defense Force vs. North Korea] (Tōkyō: Shichosha, 2003).

inherently reduces the credibility of the argument.

Extracting patterns within a longer analytical timeframe

Considering the existing “gap,” I will now discuss the contributions that this study can make. First and foremost, it aims to provide readers with a comprehensive understanding of Japan’s security contribution to South Korea over the entire 73-year timeframe. While it may be tempting to divide the periods into separate parts and focus on isolated chunks that appear disconnected from each other, the reality is much more interconnected and complex. Many existing literature pieces I have come across tend to focus on specific events or timeframes, such as the Korean War or particular decades like the 1960s to 1980s or the post-Cold War period. These events and timeframes offer significant material for authors to explore, unlike seemingly “inactive” periods like the time between the end of the Korean War (1953) and the normalization between Japan and South Korea (1965). However, even during seemingly “inactive” periods, there were ongoing developments. Furthermore, Japan’s security contributions did not arise abruptly. With the exception of economic loans, Japan’s logistical and operational support capabilities were the result of cumulative development rather a single event confined to a specific timeframe. Therefore, this study will not only cover the extensive 73-year period but also take a comprehensive approach. By addressing Korean War support efforts, logistical and operational support, financial and technical assistance, and their spillover impacts, readers will gain insight into the relative significance of different features at different points in time, understand the dynamics between various functions, and discern long-term patterns in Japan’s diverse security contributions.

Debunking existing hypothesis

Given that this study spans a 73-year timeframe and aims to identify patterns, it will inevitably engage with the various theories, arguments, and hypotheses put forth in existing literatures. As I mentioned earlier, Victor Cha’s notion of a “quasi-alliance” does not neatly align with the events of the 1980s and the post-Cold War era. To clarify, while “quasi-alliance” may be applicable during the 1960s and 1970s (which Cha primarily focuses on), its relevance diminishes during the other periods that are equally significant in terms of Japan’s security contribution to South Korea. Although my objectives are not to develop a comprehensive theory that applies to the entire 73-year timeframe, my research can evaluate some key hypotheses, thus shedding light on why their applicability is not consistently upheld.

A deeper understanding of Japan's perspective

Essentially, the security contribution of Japan to South Korea is the ultimate result of political interactions among the tripartite (the United States, Japan, and South Korea). Consequently, existing literature interprets events through the lens of this tripartite connectivity. However, this study aims to place greater emphasis on Japan's perception and the decision-making process. I intend to explore how Japan perceived the security environment, what motivated Japanese decision-makers to support South Korea, and why Japan opted for specific measures instead of alternatives. Contrary to some arguments, Japan was not always coerced by the United States to adopt specific measures, even when Japan's policy options were severely limited (as during the Korean War, particularly prior to the ratification of the San Francisco Treaty in 1952). The challenge in understanding Japan's perspective lies in the disparities between its official stance and what occurred behind the scenes. Unlike the United States and South Korea, Japan had Article 9 (this Article asserts that the Japanese government has formally renounced the right to wage war as an exercise of sovereignty and has committed to resolving disputes without resorting to military forces). Within this framework, the establishment of military forces, even under the designation of the JSDF, has been served as an implicit constraint for Japan. and discussions regarding the JSDF's military role, which were undeniably considered taboo. Consequently, many significant decisions were made in a secretive manner. This study aims to uncover Japan's true thoughts and decisions during the specified timeframe. This aspect becomes increasingly important as Japan's economic influence has grown over the years, affording greater policy flexibility to Japanese decision-makers.

Better grasping the economic spillover effect to the security arena

Another aspect that could be viewed as a potential contribution is the analysis of the economic spillover effect on security matters, specifically focusing on the Pohang steel mill buildup during the 1970s and the economic cooperation for defense purpose in the 1980s. Existing literature provides a hint that the Pohang steel mill construction aided in the establishment of South Korea's defense industry, while economic cooperation for defense purpose alleviated South Korea's defense burden in the mid-1980s. However, my main inquiry is: "To what extent?" Without a thorough examination of the spillover effect, discussions regarding Japan's economic support will always be open to interpretation. For instance, within South Korean political circles, the consequences of Japan's economic

assistance during the 1970s and 1980s are seen as a contentious issue. While the conservatives argue that it genuinely enhanced South Korean security and economy, the progressives downplay the positive impact and contend that it further deepened South Korea's economic reliance on Japan. From this perspective, closely scrutinizing the spillover effect will shed light on the role of Japan's economic support for South Korea defense and help determine whether it was an exaggerated myth or a significant form of assistance.

In that context, this study aims to make the following contributions. Firstly, I intend to extract patterns within a longer analytical timeframe by conducting a comprehensive analysis that encompasses various aspects of Japan's security contribution to South Korea. This comprehensive approach will enable the identification of recurring trends and patterns. Secondly, I aim to challenge and debunk important hypotheses and arguments. Through a long-term analysis, I will assess the applicability of existing arguments and investigate the reasons behind any discrepancies between these arguments and the real-world scenarios they aim to explain. Thirdly, I strive to provide a deeper understanding of Japan's perspective and behavior during the examined timeframe. Considering Japan's limited policy flexibility, exploring the viewpoints of Japanese decision-makers will significantly enhance our comprehension of Japan's security contribution to South Korea. Lastly, this study will delve into the economic spillover effect on the security sphere. By examining how Japan's economic support during the 1970s and 1980s influenced South Korea's defense sector, I aim to ascertain the extent to which it played a critical role.

Overall, through these contributions, this study seeks to fill the identified gaps in the existing literature and provide valuable insights into Japan's security contribution to South Korea.

1.2.3. Limitations of this Study

Discrepancies between Japan's official stance and the practice

While it is an intriguing endeavor to uncover the disparities between the official stance of the JSDF and their actual practices, there are limitations to conducting such research, primarily due to the scarcity of disclosed documents, particularly in the post-Cold War period. Thanks to the diligent efforts of other authors, many secret documents have been well-documented in their works. However, in the case of the post-Cold War period, numerous crucial documents remain classified. As mentioned earlier, authors like Handa Shigeru have attempted to utilize internal documents from the Japan Defense Agency and fill the gaps by

presenting hypothetical scenarios. While such works may satisfy reader's curiosity, these sources cannot be regarded on par with other primary sources.

To compensate for this lack of information, I have conducted interviews as part of my research. However, it is important to note that personal opinions obtained through interviews cannot entirely substitute for documentary evidence. Hence, although I have incorporated interviews to enhance the existing data, I acknowledge that they possess inherent limitations when it comes to presenting a comprehensive overview.

1.3. Research Method

Given that the topic involves three key players, namely the United States, Japan, and South Korea, my research primarily relies on government documents, public statements, memoirs, and other books and articles published by these three countries. Through the collection of data from these primary and secondary sources, I have assembled them in a coherent and chronological manner. The main objective of this task is to conduct factual investigation and identify patterns within a timeframe of over 70 years. However, depending on the specific topic being addressed, the emphasis on which sources to utilize has been adjusted.

For instance, when examining issues related to the Korean War, I predominantly relied on written materials in Japanese, as the majority of relevant sources were produced by Japanese authors. Conversely, when exploring Japan's contribution to the establishment of the Pohang steel mill and the economic cooperation for defense purposes in the 1980s, I made use of numerous materials written by South Koreans. This approach allowed me to consider the assessment made by the South Koreans regarding the impact of Japan's financial and technical assistance to South Korea. Moreover, in matters concerning Japan's logistics support for US bases in Japan, I referred to materials written by US authors, as the United States was responsible for the operation of these bases and the related facilities located in Japan. By employing these various sources, I aim to gather a comprehensive understanding of the topic at hand and provide a well-rounded analysis.

Furthermore, I have conducted interviews to complement the literature, particularly regarding Japan's potential operational support in relation to the United States' military efforts in the event of a Korean contingency. Due to the classification of many documents pertaining to the JSDF's tasks and responsibilities in an event of a Korean contingency, such as Operational Plan (OPLAN) 5055, I have engaged in interviews with Japanese defense

experts. These interviews aim to explore the potential actions that the JSDF or Japan could undertake in such a crisis. Additionally, I have conducted interviews with South Korean defense experts to assess Japan's potential role in and around the Korean peninsula in the scenario of an all-out war. These interviews provide valuable insights into the perspectives and assessments of experts regarding Japan's involvement in a high-intensity conflict.

1.4. Structure of this Study

This study comprises five main chapters, each focusing on different aspects of the topic. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the historical development of security cooperation between Japan and South Korea, spanning from the post-War era to the present day. Chapter 2 delves into Japan's contributions during the Korean War, examining their involvement and actions. In Chapter 3, the focus shifts to Japan's logistics support, covering the period from the agreement of the Korean Armistice to the present. Moving on to Chapter 4, it explores Japan's financial and technical support, specifically analyzing the establishment of the Pohang steel mill and economic cooperation for defense purposes in the 1980s. Lastly, Chapter 5 examines Japan's operational support to the US forces, encompassing the timeframe from the 1950 up to the present day.

Chapter 1 of this study examines the period from 1950 to 2023, encompassing five distinctive phases. These phases are defined as follows: phase I (1950 to 1953), phase II (1954 to 1968), phase III (1969 to 1995), phase IV (1996 to 2015), and phase V (2015 to 2023). The categorization into distinct phases, driven by noteworthy international and/or domestic events affecting both Japan and South Korea, ultimately influenced the formulation or reformulation of Japan's security policy.

As an example, the transition from phase I to phase II is punctuated by the signing of the Korean Armistice. The pivotal juncture that demarcates phase II from phase III encompasses events that posed a significant existential threat to South Korea, prominently exemplified by the Blue House raid and the declaration of the Nixon Doctrine. The shift from phase III to phase IV is instigated by the first North Korean nuclear crisis and the growing imperative to formulate measures countering the emerging threats in the Far East within the post-Cold War context. The division between phase IV and phase V coincides with Japan's enactment of security legislations in 2015. Within each phase, this study delves into Japan's reactions to the changing security landscape and scrutinizes Japan's efforts in enhancing South Korea's security during each of these phases. Moreover, I will test the four hypothesis across these five time periods.

Chapter 2 begins by providing the background on how the United States and Japan determined Japan's role in the Korean War. Subsequently, a comprehensive account of Japan's security contribution is presented, organized into two categories: logistics and operational support. The discussion on "bases" focuses on the utilization of US bases in Japan for ground, air, and naval operations during the Korean War. The section on operational support delves into Japanese minesweeping operations conducted in both the Eastern and Western regions shores of the Korean peninsula. Additionally, it describes the participation of Japanese volunteers as combatants during the war. Furthermore, various aspects of Japan's involvement are examined, including maritime and railway transportation provided, regeneration, repair, and upgrading of military equipment, production of general-purpose equipment, and the provision of medical support. Chapter 2 concludes with an evaluation of Japan's overall contribution during the Korean War, providing an assessment of the significance and impact of their involvement.

Chapter 3 of this study begins by exploring the structure of US military bases in Japan following the agreement of the Korean Armistice in 1953. The crucial role of the US Forces Japan (USFJ) in the Korean contingency is then discussed, focusing on the USFJ's responsibilities in the event of an all-out war on the Korean peninsula. Chapter 3 primarily highlights how the US bases in Japan would serve as a launching pad for the USFJ and the reinforcement coming from the US mainland. It examines Japan's role in protecting these bases against potential North Korean attacks. In that context, Japan's missile and air defense structure and its efforts to counter North Korean guerrilla infiltration aimed at neutralizing the US bases in Japan is discussed. Furthermore, Chapter 3 addresses specific issues related to US bases in Japan. It discusses the security implications of US bases in Okinawa and the introduction of the prior consultation function into the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960. Additionally, it delves into the 1960 Secret Agreement, which effectively nullified the prior consultation function. In the final section of Chapter 3, an evaluation of Japan's logistical support contribution is presented, providing an assessment of its effectiveness and impact within the context of the US bases in Japan.

Chapter 4 begins by providing an overview of the security environment in the late 1960s and examining the initial attempts to establish direct security cooperation between Japan and South Korea. The chapter then focuses on two significant events: the construction of the Pohang steel mill in the 1960s and 1970s, as well as the economic cooperation for defense purposes in the 1980s. Regarding the construction of the Pohang steel mill, the discussion explores the reasons behind the necessity of building an integrated steel mill for

both South Korea's defense and economy. It examines the decision made by the Japanese to grant the South Koreans the use of the "claims fund" to construct the steel mill, highlighting the importance of this decision in not only establishing the Pohang steel mill but also South Korea's defense industry in the early 1970s. Shifting to the economic cooperation for defense purposes in the 1980s, Chapter 4 delves into the conception of the idea and the process leading to the finalized \$4 billion loan. It explores how the loan was utilized to support South Korea's infrastructure development, thus alleviating the defense burden on the South Korean government. In the final segment of Chapter 4, an evaluation of Japan's contribution in terms of financial and technical assistance is presented, assessing the impact the effectiveness of Japan's support within the context of these initiatives.

Chapter 5 examines various issues related to Japan's operational support for US war efforts in the event of a Korean contingency. The chapter follows a chronological approach, covering the following topics: First, the origin of the US-Japan combined planning and exercises is discussed. This is followed by a detailed analysis of the Mitsuya Study. The chapter then delves into the creation of the three Guidelines (1978, 1997, and 2015) that govern the US-Japan defense cooperation. The Concept Plan and OPLAN 5055 are explored next, highlighting how they were formulated and their significance. The discussion then moves on to the establishment of Japan's security legislation in 2015 and its implications. Furthermore, the chapter addresses other security laws, including the Law Ensuring Peace and Security in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan. Subsequently, the chapter explores the types of operational support that Japan would provide to US forces in the current period if a full-fledged war were to occur on the Korean peninsula. This includes the protection of US bases in Hawaii and Guam, dispatching minesweepers into North Korean waters, anti-air and anti-submarine warfare, strike operations against targets in North Korea, protection of the Maritime Pre-positioning Ship Squadron, and involvement in ship inspection, rescue, and search operations. The stance of South Korea regarding Japan's potential role in providing operational support to the US forces during a Korean contingency is also discussed. In the final segment of Chapter 5, the focus shifts to the US-Japan combined military exercises in the post-Cold War era, examining their significance and impact.

Chapter 1: Dynamics of the Japan-ROK Security Cooperation

1.1 Introduction

Before delving into the specific intricacies of Japan's security contribution to South Korea, it is essential to grasp the broader context. In this chapter, I aim to provide an overview of the Japan-ROK relationship spanning over 70 years. While the subsequent chapters are organized into four distinct sections, each focusing on specific types of contributions, including logistics, economic and technological assistance, operational contributions, and wartime contributions (referring to Japan's involvement in the Korean War, a significant instance of Japan aiding South Korea during a full-scale conflict on the Korean peninsula), this chapter presents a chronological exploration of the evolving security landscape in the Far East. Covering the period from 1950 to 2023, its purpose is to offer readers a comprehensive overview spanning 73 years, which will help provide context for a better understanding of Japan's various security contributions detailed in the following chapters.

In this chapter, we will explore how the Japan-ROK relationship fluctuated between periods of tension and improvement throughout the analytical timeframe. The volatility observed can be attributed to various factors, including shifts in public sentiment, changes in leadership dynamics, structural shifts in the international landscape, and more. Yet it is worth noting that Japan's contribution to security remained a constant presence over the 73-year timeframe, albeit with varying levels of involvement.

The primary emphasis of this chapter has been to investigate the influence of the shifting international landscape on the security domain, specifically in relation to the actions and responses of Japan and South Korea. Furthermore, I have segmented the 73-year timespan into five distinctive periods, each highlighting shifts in Japan's security involvement or its potential contribution to South Korea during these respective phases: (1) phase I (1950 to 1953); (2) phase II (1954 to 1968); (3) phase III (1969 to 1995); (4) phase IV (1996 to 2014); and (5) phase V (2015 to 2023). The rationale behind this division into time periods is explained at the outset of each period in this chapter. Furthermore, in the concluding section of this chapter, I have tested the four hypotheses outlined in this study's introduction and assessed the outcomes of the various types of contribution (namely, logistics, economic and technological assistance, and operational contribution), throughout these five distinctive periods.

1.2. Phase I: 1950 to 1953

Phase I spans from 1950 to 1953, coinciding with the Korean War period. Despite Japan being under US occupation and regaining its independence in 1952 (which might have limited its policy options during 1950 to 1952), this three-year timeframe holds a unique significance regarding Japan's security contribution for South Korea. It stands out as the sole instance in the post-war era when an all-out war erupted on the Korean peninsula. During Phase I, Japan made substantial contributions in terms of logistics and operational support to South Korea. In order to offer a more comprehensive context for understanding the importance of Japan's role in supporting South Korea during the Korean War, I will briefly outline the historical background of how both Koreas came into existence in the late 1940s, as well as the emergence of modern Japan in the post-war era.

1.2.1. Birth of Modern Nations

Establishment of the two Koreas

Following 35 years of colonization, the Korean peninsula liberated itself from Japanese rule. In August, the declaration of Japanese surrender, conveyed through the Jewel Voice Broadcast, rendered Japanese authority ineffective in the region. However, contrary to hopes of immediate self-governance, Korea experienced administrative division in 1945. The United States assumed control over the southern part of the peninsula, while the Soviet Union took charge of the northern part along the 38th parallel. Discord between the United States and the Soviet Union regarding joint trusteeship led to the establishment of two separate Koreas.⁴⁰ The Republic of Korea was formed in August 1948, under the presidency of Syngman Rhee, while the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, led by Kim Il-sung, emerged in September 1948.⁴¹ This division paralleled the situation in Germany at the time. Despite domestic movements advocating the Korean reunification, the ideological differences between the two camps proved insurmountable. Additionally, the onset of the Cold War in 1947 rendered the idea of a unified Korea largely impractical. Instead of pursuing peaceful unification, both South Korean and North Korean leadership contemplated more forceful means of achieving their desired reunification.

Japan, GHQ, and the San Francisco Treaty

⁴⁰ Lee Chong-sik, "Korean Partition and Unification," *Journal of International Affairs* 18, no.2 (1964): 221-233.

⁴¹ B. C. Koh, "The Two Koreas," *Current History* 58, no.344 (1970): 209-216.

During the occupation of Japan by the Allied Powers following their acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, significant reforms were introduced under the guidance of the General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP). Led by General Douglas MacArthur, the GHQ/SCAP held authoritative control over the pacification mission in Japan, allowing for comprehensive implementation of various reforms encompassing demilitarization, democratization, and societal changes. Among the wide-ranging reforms, including welfare programs revision, land reform, addressing war crimes, and media censorship, the most significant one was the drafting of a new constitution. Although primarily influenced by a small group of Americans, with partial input from Japanese constitutional scholars, the new constitution of Japan took effect in May 1947. Notably, Article 9, situated within the chapter on Renunciation of War, became a symbolic element of post-War Japan, particularly regarding security matters. Article 9 explicitly stated that the Japanese people renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and reject the use of force as a means to settle international disputes.⁴² Furthermore, it declared that Japan would never maintain land, sea, air force, and any other war potential. Despite recommendations from the United States to amend Article 9 due to the escalating tensions of the Cold War in the late 1940s, Japan chose to retain the original wording, creating a discrepancy between the constitutional provisions and the evolving reality.

During the rule of the US-led General Headquarters, one of Japan's primary objective was to reintegrate into the international community and fully restore its sovereignty. This goal was eventually realized through the signing of the San Francisco Treaty in 1951, which facilitated Japan's reentry onto the global stage.⁴³ With the treaty coming into effect in 1952, the US-led occupation officially ended, and Japan acknowledged the judgements rendered by the Allied War Crimes Courts and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Additionally, the treaty stipulated that Japan provide compensation to those who had suffered from Japanese war crimes during World War II. Furthermore, Article 2 of the San Francisco Treaty, which states that "Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title, and claim to Korea, including the island of Quelpart, Port Hamilton, and Dagelet," marked the beginning of the Dokdo/Takeshima territorial dispute, which continues to persist to this day.⁴⁴

⁴² Shoichi Koseki, "Article 9 of Japan's Constitution," *Peace Research* 37, no.2 (2005): 31-32.

⁴³ Hara Kimie, "50 Years from San Francisco: Re-Examining the Peace Treaty and Japan's Territorial Problems," *Pacific Affairs* 74, no.3 (2001): 361-382.

⁴⁴ Bong Young-shik, "Sixty Years After the San Francisco Treaty: Its Legacy on Territorial and Security Issues in East Asia," *Asian Perspective* 35, no.3 (2011): 309-314.

1.2.2. Early Interactions between Japan and South Korea

Given the lingering memories of the colonial era, the newly established South Korean government maintained a distant and sometimes openly hostile stance towards the Japanese government. President Syngman Rhee's personal animosity towards Japan played a role in shaping the state-to-state relationship. Additionally, Rhee's longstanding friendship with General MacArthur allowed him to bypass Japan and engage directly with the GHQ, at least until MacArthur's dismissal in 1951.⁴⁵ Meanwhile, Japan was primarily focused on domestic reforms and establishing favorable relations in conjunction to the San Francisco Treaty. However, amidst these circumstances, the outbreak of the Korean War made Japan, or rather its territory, an integral part of the US forces' war effort.

The outbreak of the Korean War

Recognizing the unlikelihood of achieving peaceful reunification, both South and North Korean leaders expressed their willingness to pursue unification through force if necessary. President Rhee continuously stressed the significance of retaking the northern section of the 38th parallel to his counterparts in the United States. He went as far as urging General John R. Hodge, the US occupation commander, to utilize the leverage of their nuclear monopoly to compel the Soviets to withdraw from the northern half of the Korean peninsula.⁴⁶ Simultaneously, Kim Il-sung requested Stalin's approval for a military offensive on the Korean peninsula, and Stalin granted authorization for the plan.⁴⁷ Throughout the spring of 1950, a series of small-scale military skirmishes took place in and around the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). However, the most pivotal incident occurred on a Sunday morning in June 1950. Backed by Soviet-made tanks, a large-scale North Korean force crossed the DMZ, officially marking the beginning of the Korean War.

In contrast to Kim Il-sung's initial expectation that the United States would not intervene, President Truman promptly made the decision to counter the aggressors. Sixteen countries rallied under the US flag and participated in the Korean conflict. Due to their close

⁴⁵ Due to the escalation of tensions following the arrest of over a thousand Japanese fishermen by South Korea, Prime Minister Yoshida and President Rhee held an unofficial meeting in January 1953. However, rather than bridging the gap between Japan and South Korea, this meeting further deepened the divide between the two countries. Manfred Kittel, *Nach Nürnberg und Tokio: Vergangenheitsbewältigung in Japan und Westdeutschland 1945 bis 1968* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), 80.

⁴⁶ Victor D. Cha, "Informal Empire: The Origins of the US-ROK Alliance and the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty Negotiations," *Korean Studies* 41 (2017): 221-252.

⁴⁷ Some scholars, such as William Stueck and Donggil Kim, contend that it was, in fact, Stalin who instigated the Korea the Korean War as a means to draw the United States into the conflict, thereby involving the United States in the military conflict in the Korean peninsula. However, it was Kim Il-sung who advocated for war against South Korea and sought the support of Mao and Stalin.

geographical proximity, the initial responders to the situation were the Task Force Smith, who were airlifted to Pusan utilizing the Itazuke Air Base in Japan.⁴⁸ Underestimating North Korea's military capabilities, the US troops faced a significant defeat at the Battle of Osan. Subsequently, South Korean and US forces defended the Nakdong River, with the Republic of Korea controlling only a small portion of territory in the Pusan area. In order to reverse the situation, General MacArthur devised the Incheon landing operation, which was successfully executed through an amphibious assault in September 1950. After a year of intense fighting, armistice talks were initiated, leading to two more years of ongoing skirmishes. Finally, on July 27, 1953, the United States, China, and North Korean delegates signed the armistice.

Throughout the Korean War, Japan played a crucial role by providing bases for the launching and training of UN and South Korean forces.⁴⁹ Japanese minesweepers were deployed to clear waters around the Korean peninsula, enabling effective operations of UN ships and amphibious landing forces.⁵⁰ Japan also accommodated troops and materials from the US mainland, while its transportation system, including railways and ports, played a vital role in supporting the war efforts.⁵¹ In response to the substantial loss of armaments experienced by US forces, especially in the war's initial phase, Japanese factories revitalized and effectively repaired upgraded damaged military equipment, subsequently reintroducing them to the frontlines.⁵² From 1952 onward, Japanese manufacturers were granted permission to produce weapons and ammunition, which were then shipped to the Korean peninsula.⁵³ In addition to material support, substantial medical services were provided, with Japanese doctors and nurses offering treatment to the wounded in UN rear hospitals in Japan.⁵⁴

⁴⁸ William M. Leary, *Anything, Anywhere, Anytime Combat Cargo in the Korean War* (Pennsylvania: DIANE Publishing Company, 2008), 1.

⁴⁹ Nam Ki-jeong, *Kicikwukkaury thansayng ilponi chilun hankwukcencyng* [The Birth of a Base-State: Japan's Korean War] (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2016), 121. Despite not formally deploying troops under the UN flag, Japan's security contribution received significant recognition from notable figures such as General MacArthur, General Matthew Ridgway, and Admiral Arleigh Burke. The Korean War unequivocally underscored the strategic significance of Japan in the global struggle against communism.

⁵⁰ Suzuki Hidetaka 鈴木英隆, "Chōsen kaiki ni shutsugeki shita nippon tokubetsu sōkaitai: sono hikari to kage" 朝鮮海域に出撃した日本特別掃海隊: その光と影 [The Japanese Special Minesweeping Corps that Set Sail in the Korean Waters: The Light and Shadow], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 12-32.

⁵¹ Ishmaru Yasuzo, "The Korean War and Japanese Ports: Support for the UN Forces and Its Influences," *NIDS Security Reports*, no. 8 (2007): 55-70. Yamasaki Shizuo 山崎静雄, *Shijitsu de kataru chōsen sensō kyōryoku no zenyō* 史実で語る朝鮮戦争協力の全容 [The Complete History Regarding the Korean War Cooperation] (Tokyo: Honnoizumisa, 1998), 111.

⁵² James A. Huston, *Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War* (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1989), 137.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 130.

⁵⁴ Yamasaki Shizuo 山崎静雄, *Shijitsu de kataru chōsen sensō kyōryoku no zenyō* 史実で語る朝鮮戦争協力の

Furthermore, although unofficially, Japanese volunteers actively engaged in combat against communist forces.⁵⁵

Declaration of the Rhee Syng-man Line and the fisheries issue

While Japan served as a crucial launchpad for the UN forces during the Korean War, tensions between South Korea and Japan escalated due to fisheries issues. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, General MacArthur declared a maritime security area surrounding the Korean peninsula, imposing restriction on foreign ships entering the designated zone.⁵⁶ This effectively granted South Korean fisherman exclusive access to the area for fishing purposes. However, with the knowledge that the signing of the San Francisco Treaty would render MacArthur Line obsolete, South Korea sought to extend its validity through negotiations with the United States. Unfortunately for Rhee, the United States declined the request and eventually abolished the MacArthur Line when the San Francisco Treaty came into effect in April 1952. The decision further heightened the conflict over fisheries between Japan and South Korea.

In the meanwhile, in February 1952, three months prior to the implementation of the San Francisco Treaty, President Rhee unilaterally declared the Peace Line (it is also referred to “Rhee Syng-man Line”), which asserted a broad maritime sovereignty encompassing Dokdo/Takeshima and its surrounding waters.⁵⁷ This declaration aimed to demonstrate South Korea’s firm stance on territorial claims. As a show of determination, Rhee ordered the seizure of Japanese fishing vessels entering the designated area, leading to several confrontations that involved gunfire and resulted in the deaths (44 in total) of Japanese fishermen.⁵⁸ This unexpected development contradicted Japan’s anticipation of unrestricted fishing activities in the Korean waters following the abolishment of the MacArthur Line. The incidents caused an uproar within the Japanese fishing industry and exacerbated diplomatic tensions between Japan and South Korea. In addition to the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute, the fisheries matter emerged as a substantial impediment to bilateral relations, particularly during

全容 [The Complete History Regarding the Korean War Cooperation] (Tokyo: Honnoizumisya, 1998), 147.

⁵⁵ Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Post-War Warriors: Japanese Combatants in the Korean War,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 10, no.1 (2012): 1-19.

⁵⁶ Pak Chi-young, *The Korean Straits* (Hague: Nijhoff, 1989), 15. The primary objective of the MacArthur Line was to deter the Japanese from engaging in the uncontrolled depletion of fishery resources.

⁵⁷ P. Allan Dionisopoulos, “Japanese-Korean Relations: A Dilemma in the Anti-Communist World,” *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 1, no.1 (1957): 60-76.

⁵⁸ These fatalities occurred while detaining and confining 3,929 Japanese fisherman and 328 Japanese fishing boats.

Phase I. It underscores the strained state of Japan-ROK relations, which deteriorated when the “Rhee Syng-man Line” was declared and implemented in the midst of the Korean War, at a time when Japan was making significant contributions to the UN forces’ war efforts.

1.3. Phase II: 1954 to 1968

Phase II encompasses a 14-year period, ranging from 1954 to 1968. During this time, the Japan-Korea relationship underwent significant changes, particularly following the shift in South Korean leadership after the 1961 coup led by Park Chung-hee, which ultimately led to the normalization of Japan-ROK relations in 1965. However, it is important to note that Japan’s security contributions notably decreased during Phase II, primarily because there was no Korean War-like all-out conflict during this period.

To be sure, there were structural arrangements that laid the groundwork for Japan to assist the US forces in the event of a Korean contingency. These arrangements include the relocation of the United Nations Command (UNC) headquarters from Japan to South Korea and the establishment of the UNC rear in Japan in 1957. Additionally, the US-Japan 1960 secret agreement enabled the US Forces Japan to be deployed to South Korea during a Korean contingency without Japan’s objection. Japan also made efforts to enhance its forces’ interoperability with the US Forces Japan, keeping in mind the possibility of a Korean contingency, as evidenced by the establishment of the Coordinated Joint Outline Emergency Plan in 1955 and the 1963 Mitsuya Study.

However, it is important to emphasize that the level of Japan’s security contribution during Phase II was significantly reduced compared to Phase I due to the absence of a major security crisis. The security incidents of 1968, notably the Blue House Raid and the abduction of the *USS Pueblo*, raised alarms among Japanese leaders. Consequently, they decided to increase their contributions to their South Korean counterparts, starting in 1969, marking the transition from Phase II to Phase III.

1.3.1. Creating a Security Link between Japan and South Korea via the UNC and UNC-Rear

While Japan and South Korea did not have official diplomatic relations during Phase I, significant structural developments took place following the signing of the 1953 Korean Armistice. The US-Japan Security Treaty and the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty were respectively signed in 1951 and 1953. In July 1957, the UNC headquarters was relocated from Tokyo to Seoul, and the UNC rear headquarters was established in Zama, Kanagawa

prefecture, to uphold the provisions of the 1954 UN-Japan Status of Forces Agreement.⁵⁹ Under this agreement, seven bases in Japan were designated for use by UNC member countries. The primary mission of the UNC rear headquarters is to maintain the 1954 Status of Forces Agreement during peacetime and provide support for UNC operations during wartime. In that sense, it is evident that these bases would be utilized in the event of a contingency in the Korean peninsula.⁶⁰ Moreover, the composition of the US Forces Japan (USFJ) primarily comprised the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, while the US Forces Korea (USFK) had a predominant focus on the Army. With their distinct attributes, the US Forces Japan and the US Forces Korea started to play complementary roles in defending South Korea. To fulfill this purpose, the USFJ and USFK have established and consistently maintained close coordination.

Meanwhile, the United States and Japan adopted a secret agreement in 1960 that effectively permitted the unrestricted deployment of US Forces Japan to the Korean peninsula in the event of a Korean contingency. While the 1960 version of the US-Japan security treaty introduced the concept of “prior consultation,” requiring the United States to consult with Japan beforehand if USFJ engaged in combat operations beyond Japan,⁶¹ the 1960 secret agreement negated the prior consultation provision.

Thanks to such arrangements, the two nations were linked for security purposes, despite the lack of a formal security pact or diplomatic normalization between Japan and South Korea until 1965, forming an efficient defense system in preparation for a potential North Korean military invasion of South Korea.

1.3.2. Normalization between the Two Nations

During phase I, Japan and South Korea found themselves in a state of conflict. Despite their shared objective of preserving peace and stability in the region, there existed a strong anti-Japanese sentiment among Koreans, while Japan held a generally negative view towards the South Koreans due to issues such as the Rhee Syng-man Line and the seizure of Japanese fishermen and vessels. Despite multiple attempts to address the matter through negotiations between 1952 and 1961, the absence of formal diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea, coupled with negative domestic sentiments, further complicated the

⁵⁹ Annual History Report, Headquarters United States Forces Korea (1974), 16.

⁶⁰ Michishita Narushige, “Signing a Peace Agreement: Issues for Consideration,” *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies* 19, no. 1 (2010): 29-63.

⁶¹ Ishii Yurika, *Japanese Maritime Security and Law of the Sea* (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2021), 81-82.

resolution process.⁶² The possibility of a prompt normalization was indefinitely postponed when Kanichiro Kubota, the chief Japanese delegate, made a statement indicating that Japanese colonial rule had resulted in benefits for Koreans, thereby implying that Japan had no obligation to provide reparations.⁶³ This seemingly unbreakable impasse witnessed a significant change when Park Chung-hee rose to leadership in South Korea in 1961.⁶⁴

During the 1950s, the significant industrial capability disparity between the two Koreas was perceived as a threat to South Korea. Notably, North Korea's reconstruction of the Gyeongju steel mill in the late 1950s served as both a propaganda tool for its regime and a catalyst for the development of heavy industry, enabling the successful implementation of its first five-year economic plan (1957-1961).⁶⁵ As a result, South Korea faced the urgent need to swiftly develop its own economy and, to do so, open relationship with Japan.

Recognizing the inevitability of normalization, Park Chung-hee engaged in discussion with Japanese Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda to seek Japan's cooperation in this matter. This led to an agreement between Kim Jong-pil from the Korean Central Intelligence Agency and Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira, primarily focusing on Japan's economic compensation to South Korea. Despite facing strong domestic opposition due to concerns that the amount offered was relatively small considering the 35 years of suffering, Park deemed it necessary as urgent funding for economic development was required. Eventually, in 1965, the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea was signed, effectively resolving the settlement issue between the two countries.⁶⁶ As a result of the treaty, South Korea received much-needed funding, including a \$300 million grant in economic aid, \$200 million in loans, and an additional \$300 million in private trust loans for its 5-year economic

⁶² Although the Eisenhower and Kennedy administration made efforts to encourage South Korea to improve its relations with Japan, South Koreans found the aid they received from the United States to be satisfactory until the early 1960s. Between 1945 and 1968, the economic assistance provided by the United States to South Korea exceeded \$3.6 billion, leading to a cumulative effect. B. C. Koh, "The Two Koreas," *Current History* 58, no.344 (1970): 209-216. In the meantime, Japan primarily concentrated on domestic reforms while under the occupation of the United States from 1945 to 1952. Although the San Francisco Treaty officially established Japan as an independent participant in international affairs, its main focus continued to be its relationship with the United States, which served as a crucial partner in Japanese diplomacy. Normalizing relations with South Korea was not considered an immediate priority.

⁶³ Lynn Hyung-gu, "Systemic Lock: The Institutionalization of History in Post-1965 South Korea-Japan Relations," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 9, no.1/2 (2000): 55-84.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* While Park Chung-hee initially emphasized the need for an official apology from Japan prior to normalization, he soon recognized the importance of bolstering the South Korean economy. Consequently, he shifted his focus towards emphasizing economic assistance rather than nationalist objectives and autonomy.

⁶⁵ "The Five-Year Plan for People's Economic Development," *Encyclopedia of Korean Culture*, accessed July 16, 2022, <http://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/Contents/Item/E0070247>. *A Comparative Study of South and North Korea* (Seoul: National Unification Board, 1988), 109.

⁶⁶ J. Mark Mobius, "The Japan-Korea Normalization Process and Korean Anti-Americanism," *Asian Survey* 6, no.4 (1966): 241-248.

plan.⁶⁷ Furthermore, Park was relieved from the pressure exerted by the United States to strengthen the relationship between Japan and South Korea.

1.3.3. Vietnam War

While preparations for Japan-South Korea normalization talks were underway in 1964, the Gulf of Tonkin incident occurred, drawing the direct involvement of the United States in the Vietnam War. Taking place within the context of the Cold War, the Vietnam War emerged as the largest military conflict since the Korean War. Driven by the “domino theory,” US policymakers saw involvement in the Southeast Asian region as necessary. Even prior to the official declaration of war, North Vietnam’s violations of the 1954 Geneva accords were evident, with guerrilla warfare initiated against South Vietnam, invasions of Laos, and the establishment of the Ho Chi Minh Trail for infiltration. Consequently, the US sent military advisors to the region. By 1963, North Vietnam had deployed approximately 40,000 soldiers to South Vietnam, further escalating the situation. Despite the contentious nature of the Gulf of Tonkin incident, subsequent developments made US military intervention increasingly inevitable. Similar to the Korean War, the Vietnam War took on the characteristics of a proxy war, with China and the Soviet Union providing material support to North Vietnam, while the US deployed significant forces on behalf of South Vietnam. To bolster legitimacy, the US sought to form a multinational coalition, leading to the participation of South Korea.

South Korea’s troop dispatch to Vietnam

While the formal request for South Korean troop deployment was initiated by the United States in 1964, South Korea had been consistently providing military assistance since 1954. Concerned about the possible redeployment of US forces in South Korea to South Vietnam, President Rhee proposed sending South Korean troops to support South Vietnam.⁶⁸ However, before the Gulf of Tonkin incident, President Eisenhower declined the offer, fearing it could provoke the Soviets and Chinese unnecessarily.⁶⁹ The US plan to address the Vietnam issue through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization also failed due to objections

⁶⁷ Oda Shigeru, “The Normalization of Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea,” *The American Journal of International Law* 61, no.1 (1967): 35-56. During the negotiations, the Japanese government initially could not identify a legal foundation for the South Korean claims beyond an approximate sum of \$20 million. In contrast, reports indicated that South Korea estimated its claims to be around \$800 million.

⁶⁸ Kim Byung-kook and Ezra F. Vogel, *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011), 408.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 408.

from France and Pakistan. Shortly after that, President Johnson officially requested South Korea's troop dispatch.

Consequently, South Korea responded by deploying its initial troops to Vietnam in 1964, and from 1966 onwards throughout the duration of the war, South Korea maintained a force of over two divisions, comprising approximately 50,000 combat personnel, in South Vietnam.⁷⁰ South Korea had two main reasons for this decision. Firstly, it served as security insurance. With only 11 years separating the outbreak of the Vietnam War from the signing of the 1953 armistice, the possibility of a second military invasion by North Korea was not completely ruled out. Given the similarities between Vietnam and the Korean peninsula, where the terrain was being used as a proxy was between the communist bloc and the Free World, Vietnam served as a test case for South Korea. By demonstrating its commitment to the Free World, South Korea aimed to secure full support from its allies in the event of a war on the Korean peninsula and deter communist infiltration in the region.

Secondly, South Korea saw the Vietnam War as an opportunity for economic development. As US grant gradually decreased over time, South Korea needed to secure funding to support the implementation of consecutive 5-year economic development plans. The grants and loans provided by the Japanese government as part of the 1965, along with US economic assistance based on the Brown Memorandum, which compensated South Korea for its commitment to the Vietnam War, significantly contributed to South Korea's economic development from the 1960s to the early 1970s.

Japan and the Vietnam War

Notwithstanding the presence of the US-Japan security treaty, the peace constitution of Japan prohibited the deployment of the JSDF to Vietnam. However, Japan provided assistance to the US war effort, albeit to a lesser extent compared to the Korean War. US military bases, particularly those in Okinawa, served as crucial logistical hubs. For example, B-52 bombers took off from Kadena Air Base in Okinawa to conduct bombing missions in Southeast Asia.⁷¹ Additionally, the military port in Naha, the capital of Okinawa, handled 75 percent of all supplies for the conflict, including fuel, food, and ammunition. The port also

⁷⁰ Kwak Tae-yang, "The Nixon Doctrine and the Yusin Reforms: American Foreign Policy, the Vietnam War, and the Rise of Authoritarianism in Korea, 1968-1973" *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 12, no.1/2 (2003): 33-57.

⁷¹ James Llewelyn, "Balancing Okinawa's Return with American Expectations: Japan and the Vietnam War 1965-75" *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 10, no.2 (2010): 305-342.

dealt with surplus and damaged materials from the war zone.

The Japanese people themselves made more direct contributions to the war effort. In ammunition depots, Okinawans assisted in packing explosive and processing faulty munitions. At Makiminato, they participated in printing Vietnamese language propaganda materials for the US Army's 7th Psychological Operations Group. In the Northern Training Area, Okinawans were hired for \$1 a day to stimulate enemy forces in war games conducted in mock Vietnamese villages. Some Okinawans were sent to South Vietnam to drive buses within US bases, while others worked aboard American ships transporting supplies in Vietnamese waters and lost their lives in the process. Vietnam was geographically distant and seemingly unrelated to Japan's national security concerns. However, the presence of US bases and troops in Japan made Japan's involvement, albeit indirect, inevitable.

US-Japan preparation in response to a Korean contingency

While the United States was deeply engaged in the Vietnam War, there were concerns about the potential depletion of US security readiness in the Far East. Against this backdrop, North Korean leader Kim Il-sung contemplated launching another all-out war in the Korean peninsula in 1965.⁷² Although the United States was unaware of these intentions at the time, it sought to prepare for a potential Korean contingency in collaboration with Japan. Although the establishment of the JSDF initially aimed to safeguard Japan's territorial integrity against external threats, combined planning and exercises between the United States and Japan commenced in the mid-1950s, considering possible contingencies in the region. Starting from the inception of the Coordinated Joint Outline Emergency Plan in 1955, Japanese defense policymakers consistently acknowledged the possibility of a Korean contingency and its potential consequences.⁷³ Furthermore, the Mitsuya Study, also known as the 1963 Comprehensive Defense Tabletop Study, incorporated a scenario centered around a Korean contingency.⁷⁴

⁷² "Jin Richeng Zongli he Zhongguo zhu Chao Dashi Hao Deqing Jilu," [Records of Premier Jin Richeng and Chinese Ambassador to Chao, Ambassador Hao Deqing] *Zhongguo Waijiaobu Danganguan* [Declassified Document No.: 106-01480-07].

⁷³ Itayama Mayumi 板山真弓, *Nichi bei dōmei niokeru kyōdō bōei taisei no keisei: jōyaku teiketsu kara "nichi bei bōei kyōryoku no tame no shishin" sakutei made* 日米同盟における共同防衛体制の形成: 条約締結から「日米防衛協力のための指針」策定まで [Formation of a Combined Defense System in the US-Japan Alliance: from the Conclusion of the Treaty to the Establishment of the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation] (Tōkyō: Mineruva Shobo, 2020), 71.

⁷⁴ Koji Murata, "The Origin and Evolution of the Korean-American Alliance: A Japanese Perspective," Stanford University Asia-Pacific Center, America's Alliances with Japan and Korea in a Changing Northeast Asia Project

Even though the 1960 version of the US-Japan security treaty introduced the notion of “prior consultation,” requiring the United States to consult with the Japanese government beforehand if the USFJ were to engage in combat operations outside of Japan,⁷⁵ the United States and Japanese governments signed a confidential agreement known as the Korea Minute in 1960.⁷⁶ This agreement acknowledged the possibility of scenarios where prior consultation would not be applicable.⁷⁷ In essence, Japan’s commitment to the defense of South Korea remained intact despite the introduction of the prior consultation concept, thanks to the Korea Minute. Considering the US military’s use of bases in Japan as launch pads during the Vietnam War,⁷⁸ it can be inferred that the prior consultation concept would have imposed minimal constraints on US military operations in the event of an all-out war in the Korean peninsula.

1.3.4. Security Crises in 1968

As the conflict in the South East Asian jungle escalated, North Korea engaged in two aggressive actions—the Blue House Raid, and the abduction of the *USS Pueblo*—in 1968, causing instability in the Far East region.⁷⁹ Recognizing that the United States was preoccupied with the Vietnam War, the North Korean leadership sought to test the limits of US commitment in the Korean peninsula. These incidents sought to raise concerns for both South Korea and Japan on two fronts: first, the audacity displayed by North Korea, and second, the seemingly varied US response to the Blue House Raid and the abduction of the *USS Pueblo*. In essence, these events indicated that the US deterrent might not be fully reliable in a scenario involving low-intensity conflict, revealing a potential misalignment of interests between the United States on one hand, and South Korea and Japan on the other. Alongside the declaration of the Nixon doctrine, these developments served as catalysts for

Discussion Paper, August 1998, 9.

⁷⁵ Ishii Yurika, *Japanese Maritime Security and Law of the Sea* (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2021), 81-82.

⁷⁶ Cho Jin-gu, “Hanmidongmaenggwa miildongmaenge isseoseoui ‘sajeonhyeobui’ui uimiwa silje” [Prior Consultations of the US-ROK Alliance and the US-Japan Alliance: The Meaning and Practice], *Korean Institute for Defense Analysis, Defense Policy* 32, no.3 (2016): 9-41

⁷⁷ Haruna Mikio 春名幹男, *Chōsenhantō yūji to jizen kyōgi* 朝鮮半島有事と事前協議 [Prior Consultation and the Korean Contingency] from *Iwayuru “mitsuyaku” mondai nikansuru yūshikisha inkai hōkokusho* 2010 いわゆる「密約」問題に関する有識者委員会報告書 [2010 Expert Committee Report on the So-Called “Secret Agreement” Issue], 51.

⁷⁸ For instance, B-52 bombers were deployed from Okinawa, while and F-4 fighters scrambled from Iwakuni.

⁷⁹ Lee Jae-hak, “Bakjeonghui jeongbuui gukbangoegyoe daehan yeongu” [A Study on the Park Chung Hee Administration’s Defense Diplomacy], *Military History*, no.78 (2011): 205-234.

fostering security cooperation between Japan and South Korea.⁸⁰

Blue House Raid

Upon realizing that internal resistance had little chance of overthrowing President Park Chung-hee, North Korean leaders, led by Kim Il-sung, established Unit 124 of the Korean People's Army with a specific mission: to assassinate the South Korean president.⁸¹ In January 1968, after infiltrating the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), 31 North Korean commandos advanced close to the South Korean presidential residence, known as the Blue House.⁸² The gunfight in between ROK military/police and North Korean commandos led to the loss of 26 South Korean soldiers and two American troops.⁸³

Following the incident, Park aimed to initiate a significant retaliatory strike against North Korea in the aftermath of the Blue House Raid. However, US Ambassador to South Korea William J. Porter explicitly conveyed that US forces would neither partake in nor permit a military retaliation.⁸⁴ Given that the Tet Offensive had just commenced in January 1968, the US faced significant challenges in providing military support for retaliatory action on two fronts. This predicament made it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for the United States to endorse immediate military action against North Korea. However, South Korean policymakers perceived the US response to be too lenient, particularly in light of the subsequent *USS Pueblo* abduction incident that occurred a mere two days after the failed assassination attempt on the South Korean president. The emphasis on resolving the *USS Pueblo* incident instead of prioritizing a strong stance against North Korea left the South Koreans dissatisfied.

Abduction of the USS Pueblo

⁸⁰ These events acted as wake-up calls for Japan and South Korea, underscoring the necessity for strengthened measures to uphold regional stability. It is important to highlight that both the *USS Pueblo* and EC-121 originated from US bases in Japan. Considering the provisions of Article IV in the US-Japan security treaty, which calls for consultation between the parties regarding treaty implementation and addressing threats to Japan's security or international peace and security in the Far East, Japan acknowledged the significance of close cooperation with South Korea to protect its own interests.

⁸¹ B. C. Koh, "The Pueblo Incident in Perspective," *Asian Survey* 9, no.4 (1969): 264-280.

⁸² B. C. Koh, "The Two Koreas," *Current History* 58, no.344 (1970): 209-216.

⁸³ Kwak Tae-yang, "The Nixon Doctrine and the Yusin Reforms: American Foreign Policy, the Vietnam War, and the Rise of Authoritarianism in Korea, 1968-1973" *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 12, no.1/2 (2003): 33-57.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

On January 23, 1968, the *USS Pueblo*, a reconnaissance ship operated by the US Navy, came under attack and was subsequently captured by North Korean forces. The *USS Pueblo* had departed from its base in Yokosuka in early January with the mission to conduct surveillance of Soviet activities in and around the Tsushima Strait, as well as gather signal and electronic intelligence from North Korea. While sailing in the high seas north of the 42th parallel, a North Korean submarine chaser ordered the *Pueblo* to halt. As the North Koreans reinforced their presence with MiG-21 aircraft and several torpedo ships, the crew of the *USS Pueblo* made the decision to surrender. The ship was then taken to the port of Wonsan, and the crew was relocated to prisoner-of-war camps.

Upon confirmation of the *Pueblo*'s abduction, President Lyndon Baines Johnson directed naval assets, including the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier *USS Enterprise* and three destroyers, to stand by near Wonsan. Additionally, 14,000 Navy and Air Force reservists were urgently mobilized. On January 28, 1968, the US deployed two additional aircraft carriers, one destroyer, and six submarines to the Korean peninsula.⁸⁵ Diplomatic negotiations through the Soviet Union were pursued but proved unsuccessful. As a result, the United States entered into negotiations with North Korea, a move that faced significant resistance from the South Korean government. Eventually, through these negotiations, the captured US crew members were released in December 1968. The actions taken by the United States, which involved urging South Korean counterparts to exercise restraint in retaliating against North Korea while engaging in negotiations for the release of the captured sailors of *USS Pueblo*, added to the frustrations experienced by the South Korea.⁸⁶

South Korea's attempt for a direct security cooperation with Japan

During the same year as the Blue House raid and the *USS Pueblo* abduction, efforts were made to initiate direct security cooperation between Japan and South Korea. Recognizing that the existing defense mechanism, where the US and South Korean combined forces would only employ military strength in an all-out war scenario, posed uncertainties regarding their ability to effectively counter North Korean guerrilla infiltration, South Korea sought to enhance its anti-guerrilla capabilities. To address this security gap, special envoy Cyrus Vance visited South Korea in February 1968, and subsequently, the US Department of

⁸⁵ Bill Streifer and Irek Sabitov, "In the Wake of the Pueblo Incident" *American Intelligence Journal* 35, no. 2 (2018): 128-143.

⁸⁶ Michishita Narushige, *Bukhanui byeorangkkeut oegyosa 1966-2013* [The History of North Korea's Brinkmanship Diplomacy, 1966-2013] (Paju: Hanul Academy, 2014), 73-76.

State approached Japan to provide anti-guerrilla equipment to South Korea, leading to a confidential discussion between the Japanese and South Korean governments.⁸⁷ However, the delivery of such equipment did not materialize. Opposition from Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry and conflicting views among relevant Japanese ministries were among the factors contributing to this outcome.⁸⁸ Nonetheless, Japanese Prime Minister Sato displayed interest in strengthening relations with his South Korean counterpart. While South Korea's request to Japan for anti-guerrilla equipment did not come to fruition, the security crisis of 1968 served as a wake-up call for the Japanese, prompting them to boost their security support for South Korea during Phase III (1969-1995).

1.4. Phase III: 1969 to 1995

Phase III spans a 26-year period, from 1969 to 1995. During this time, in response to the security crisis of 1968 and the declaration of the 1969 Nixon Doctrine, South Korea took steps to establish its own defense industry with the aim of acquiring self-reliant defense capabilities. In this context, Japan played a pivotal role by permitting South Korea to use claims funds for the creation of the Pohang Steel mill in the 1960s and 1970s, while also providing \$4 billion in the 1980s under the guise of economic cooperation for security purposes. This means that Japan's security contribution primarily took the form of economic and technological assistance, and this was particularly unique to Phase III.

Conversely, there was no notable increase in logistics and operational contributions during Phase III, especially in the latter category. The demand for Japan's contributions in logistics and operational support became evident during the first North Korea nuclear crisis of 1993-1994. These issues were addressed during Phase IV, which spanned from 1996 to 2014. This Phase saw the revision of the US-Japan Defense Guidelines in 1997 and the introduction of other domestic legislations in the late 1990s.

⁸⁷ Choi Kyung-won 崔慶原, *Reisenki nichi kan anzen hoshō kankei no keisei* 冷戦期日韓安全保障関係の形成 [The Formation of the Korea-Japan Security Relationship during the Cold War Period] (Tōkyō: Keio University Press, 2014), 37.

⁸⁸ Choi Kyung-won 崔慶原, “Nichi kan anzen hoshō kankei no keisei bundan taiseika no anpo kiki e no taiō, ichi kyū roku hachi nen” 日韓安全保障関係の形成 分断体制下の「安保危機」への対応、一九六八年 [The Formation of the Korea-Japan Security Relationship: Response to the 1968 Security Crisis under the Divided System], *Kokusai seiji* 国際政治 170 (2012): 141-155.

1.4.1. US Policy of Détente and South Korea's Self-Reliant Defense

Despite possessing superior material and technological resources, the United States faced numerous obstacles that prevented a decisive victory in Vietnam. These obstacles included the domestic antiwar movement in the United States, Hanoi's stubbornness and willingness to sacrifice its own forces, the US' self-imposed limitations on escalation, and the incompetence of South Vietnamese government. Given these challenging circumstances, the United States chose to withdraw from Vietnam with a desire for "peace and honor." This decision, along with the Nixon Doctrine announced in 1969, signaled a shift in US policy towards regional conflicts, indicating a reduced level of direct involvement and a great reliance on the affected countries themselves. This shift, along with the US policy of détente towards the Soviet Union and China, raised apprehension among South Korean policymakers. In response to this perceived risk, President Park underscored the importance of South Korea cultivating self-reliant defense capabilities and launched a domestic defense industry development efforts in the early 1970s.⁸⁹ Meanwhile, Japan's decision to allow South Korea to use the claims fund for constructing the Pohang Steel mill facilitated South Korea's extensive industrialization efforts, ultimately bolstering the defense sector and contributing to South Korea's achievement of self-reliance defense.

The shootdown of the EC-121

Just four months after the resolution of the Pueblo incident, the US Navy's EC-121 aircraft was shot down by a North Korean MiG-21 fighter jet over the Sea of Japan. The plane crashed approximately 90 miles off the North Korean coast, resulting in the tragic loss of all 31 American crew members. This incident marked the largest single loss of US aircrew during the Cold War. Despite staging a naval demonstration in the Sea of Japan, the Nixon administration chose not to retaliate against North Korea. Instead, the United States took measures to enhance security for future flights over international waters in the region by activating Task Force 71.⁹⁰

From the perspective of South Korea, the shootdown incident raised doubt about the extent to which the United States could fully uphold its commitment in the event of North Korean aggression. With the United States heavily involved in the Vietnam War, it was

⁸⁹ Park Bong-su, "1970nyeondae hanguk jajugukbangjeongchaek yeongu" [A Study on the Self-Reliant Defense Policy of the ROK in the 1970s], *Military History*, no.78 (2011): 169-203.

⁹⁰ Malcolm Muir, *Black Shoes and Blue Water: Surface Warfare in the United States Navy, 1945-1975* (Washington D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1996), 165.

practically unfeasible to open a second front in the Far East. This realization prompted President Park to prioritize the development of a domestic defense industry as a means of strengthening South Korea's defense capabilities.⁹¹ Additionally, the declaration of the Nixon Doctrine further reinforced this decision-making process.

Declaration of the Nixon Doctrine

Acknowledging the near-impossibility of achieving victory in the Vietnam War, President Nixon of the United States implemented the idea of "Vietnamization" and proclaimed the Nixon Doctrine in July 1969. By promoting a more equitable distribution of responsibilities among allies, the Nixon Doctrine stipulated that each allied nation assumed the primary responsibility for its own security. This doctrine pursued two objectives: firstly, easing tensions between the United States and the communist bloc, namely the Soviet Union and China, to facilitate the success of the détente policy in global conflict zones; secondly, alleviating financial burdens on the United States.

The Nixon Doctrine yielded significant outcomes, including the announcement of a considerable reduction in the extensive American military presence in South Korea, which had been maintained since the Korean War: the Nixon Doctrine led to the withdrawal of the 7th Infantry Division from South Korea in 1971, while the 2nd Infantry Division was subsequently relocated from the Demilitarized Zone to a rear position.⁹² Furthermore, the Nixon-Sato communique in November 1969, advocating for the return of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty by 1972, was deemed a component of the Nixon Doctrine. Consequently, it became increasingly apparent that Japan was assuming responsibilities previously handled by American force stationed in Japan. This notion simultaneously raised concerns for President Park and served as a strong motivation for the development of a self-sufficient defense industry.

To attain an independent national defense capability for South Korea, external funding became a necessity. While the scale of economic assistance from the United States,

⁹¹ Moon Chung-in, "The Political Economy of Defense Industrialization in South Korea: Constraints, Opportunities, and Prospects," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* 5, no. 2 (1991): 438-465.

⁹² The United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Human Rights in South Korea Implication for U.S. Policy: Hearings before the Subcommittees on Asian and Pacific Affairs and on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress, Second Session, July 30, August 5, and December 20, 1974* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1974), 177. Lee Jae-hak, "Bakjeonghui jeongbuui gukbangogyoe daehan yeongu" [A Study on the Park Chung Hee Administration's Defense Diplomacy], *Military History*, no.78 (2011): 205-234.

particularly in the form of grants, was diminishing, Japan emerged as the most suitable candidate for financial aid. Even after President Nixon's resignation in 1974, the fundamental principles of the Nixon Doctrine remained largely unchanged throughout the 1970s. In the meantime, a series of events occurred that reinforced President Park's resolve to establish an independent defense capability. These events included the fall of Saigon in 1975, Kim Il-sung's comment regarding a potential military invasion of South Korea, and President Carter's stance on the presence of US Forces in Korea. Together, these factors further solidified President Park's determination to establish a self-reliant defense capability.⁹³

While the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine primarily unsettled South Korea due to its direct confrontation with North Korean forces, Japan recognized the security ramifications and potential impact on its national interests that could arise from the thorough implementation of the Nixon Doctrine to South Korea. The communization of the Korean peninsula resulting from an all-out war initiated by North Korea or a North Korea-China alliance would eliminate the buffer zone between the communist countries and Japan, thereby positioning Japan as the frontline of the free world in the Far East. In this regard, a prosperous and militarily capable South Korea, capable of providing a security buffer for Japan, was an essential requirement for the Japanese. Thus, the security of South Korea was undeniably linked to the security of Japan, a perspective shared by Prime Minister Sato.⁹⁴ Within this context, the Nixon-Sato Joint Statement was issued in November 1969, underscoring that South Korea's security was "essential to Japan's own security," a mere two weeks after the declaration of the Nixon Doctrine.⁹⁵

Construction of the Pohang steel mill

In 1970, President Park expressed the belief that South Korea's future security should be ensured through self-reliance rather than dependence on US policies.⁹⁶ As part of his vision to achieve a self-reliant defense capability, President Park considered implementing

⁹³ Park Bong-su, "1970nyeondae hanguk jajugukbangjeongchaek yeongu" [A Study on the Self-Reliant Defense Policy of the ROK in the 1970s], *Military History*, no.78 (2011): 169-203.

⁹⁴ Roger Dingman, "The Dagger and the Gift: The Impact of the Korean War on Japan," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 2, no. 1 (1993): 29-55.

⁹⁵ Ayumi Teraoka 寺岡亜由美, "Gaiatsu ga hagukumu nichi kan anzen hoshō kyōryoku: 2012 nen nichi bei kan gōdō gunji enshū jitsugen no yōin bunseki" 外圧が育む日韓安全保障協力 2012年日米韓合同軍事演習実現の要因分析 [Korea-Japan Security Cooperation Fostered by External Pressure — Factor Analysis of the 2012 US-Korea-Japan Joint Military Exercise], *Seijigaku kenkyū* 政治学研究 49 (2013): 135-171.

⁹⁶ Elizabeth Thurbon, *Developmental Mindset: The Revival of Financial Activism in South Korea* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016), 56.

the “four core plants plan,” which aimed to enhance domestic defense equipment production.⁹⁷ Consequently, in July 1970, Park issued an order to construct factories capable of producing weapons beyond small arms, such as pistols and rifles, in line with the four core plants plan.⁹⁸ Unfortunately, the plan did not succeed due to a lack of funding.

Rather than constructing specialized factories for weapons production, President Park made the strategic decision to integrate the development of the defense industry with the construction of an integrated steel mill. However, securing funding for the buildup of the Pohang steel mill posed challenges in the late 1960s. President Park eventually approached Japan and requested financial assistance for the steel mill construction. Japan approved the use of the claims fund for the Pohang steel mill project.⁹⁹ Undoubtedly, Japan faced several challenges when deciding to financially support Korea’s plan to construct an integrated steel mill. The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) exhibited hesitancy due to doubts regarding the economic viability of the Pohang steel mill. Similarly, the Japanese Finance Ministry expressed concerns about Japan’s own financial state, fearing that allocating funds to such a massive project could lead to a budget shortage.¹⁰⁰ Nevertheless, Prime Minister Sato made the decision to provide funding to the Koreans, driven by his belief that the security of South Korea was crucial for Japan’s own security, as exemplified in the 1969 Nixon-Sato statement.¹⁰¹ This decision proved crucial, as it allowed South Korea’s steel production to surpass that of North Korea in the mid-1970s.¹⁰²

South Korea’s defense industry buildup

While the construction of the Pohang steel mill was underway, President Park reached

⁹⁷ “The Construction Plans for the Four Core Plants,” National Archives of Korea, accessed March 1, 2022, <https://www.archives.go.kr/next/search/listSubjectDescription.do?id=007283&pageFlag=A&sitePage=1-2-1>.

⁹⁸ Nishino, Junya, “Ilbon modereseo hangukjeok hyeoksineuro: 1970nyeondae junghwahakgonggeophwareul dulleossan jeongchaekgwajeong,” [From ‘Japan Model’ to Innovation: South Korean Policymaking Process on Heavy and Chemical Industrialization in the 1970s], in *Detangteuwa bakjeonghui* [Détente and Park Chung Hee], ed. Institute of International Studies Seoul National University (Seoul: Nonhyung, 2011), 167-206.

⁹⁹ Songok H. Thornton and William H. Thornton, *Development Without Freedom: The Politics of Asian Globalization* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), (Need to check the book version).

¹⁰⁰ Kim Byung-kook and Ezra F. Vogel, *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 333.

¹⁰¹ Ayumi Teraoka 寺岡 亜由美, “Gaiatsu ga hagukumu nichi kan anzen hoshō kyōryoku: 2012 nen nichi bei kan gōdō gunji enshū jitsugen no yōin bunseki” 外圧が育む日韓安全保障協力 2012年日米韓合同軍事演習実現の要因分析 [Korea-Japan Security Cooperation Fostered by External Pressure — Factor Analysis of the 2012 US-Korea-Japan Joint Military Exercise], *Seijigaku kenkyū* 政治学研究 49 (2013): 135-171. The 1969 Nixon-Sato joint statement underscored Japan’s profound gratitude for the United Nation’s peacekeeping endeavors in the region and recognized the indispensable nature of South Korea’s security to Japan’s own security.

¹⁰² *A Comparative Study of South and North Korea* (Seoul: National Unification Board, 1988), 109.

the conclusion that achieving complete industrialization was essential for sustained economic growth and the development of the domestic defense industry. This commitment to industrialization was exemplified in the third Five-Year Plan (1972-1976), where South Korea dedicated itself to investing in and developing heavy, chemical, and arms industries.

A notable milestone occurred in 1973 with the introduction of the Heavy Chemical Industry Development Plan, which aimed to transition South Korea's production from light manufacturing to heavy industry. This encompassed sectors such as shipbuilding, automobiles, steel products, machinery, non-ferrous metals, textiles, and petrochemicals. It is worth mentioning that the motivation behind the HCI plan stemmed from security concerns arising from the partial withdrawal of US troops from South Korea.

To support the growth of the defense industry, several military reforms were implemented. Among these measures was the establishment of the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) in 1970, which played a crucial role. Additionally, in 1974, the Special Law on the Promotion of Defense industry, National investment Fund, and Yulgok Plan were enacted, further aiding the development of the defense industry.¹⁰³

Given the circumstances, Japan's financial assistance played a pivotal role in bolstering South Korea's heavy industry, particularly the construction of the Pohang Steel Mill, which in turn facilitated the growth of the defense industry.

1.4.2. Era of the New Cold War

The 1970s witnessed a flourishing period of détente, characterized by significant security agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. These agreements encompassed crucial treaties such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.¹⁰⁴ Noteworthy diplomatic achievements were also made, including the landmark Helsinki Accords, which fostered cooperation between the West and the East. Furthermore, President Nixon's opening of China in 1972 and the Four Power Agreement on Berlin in 1973 were significant milestones. However, this trend came to a halt with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,

¹⁰³ Ji Il-yong, and Lee Sang-hyun, "Bangwisaneop hubalgugui chugyeokgwa baljeonpaeteon hangukgwa iseuraerui saryeyeongu" [The Patterns of Catch-up and Development in the Latecomer Countries' Defense Industry: The Case of Korea and Israel], *The Quarterly Journal of Defense Policy Studies* 31, no.1 (2015): 133-170. Choi Sung-bin, Ko Byung-sung, and Lee Ho-suk, "Hanguk bangwisaneobui 40nyeon baljeongwajeonggwa seonggwa" [The Development Process & Achievement of the Korean Defense Industry for Last 40 Years], *The Quarterly Journal of Defense Policy Studies* 26, no.1 (2010): 73-117.

¹⁰⁴ Abraham D. Sofaer, "The ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initiative," *Harvard Law Review* 99 no. 8 (1986): 1972-1985

marking the onset of the new Cold War era. This event froze many of the previous détente efforts and resulted in a confrontational shift in West-East relations. Naturally, this shift in mood had implications in the Far East as well. In this context, the potential threat of a Soviet landing operation in Hokkaido triggered them to engage in combined military exercises with the United States.

Soviet's invasion of Afghanistan

In 1979, the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan with the aim of bolstering the newly formed pro-Soviet government in Kabul. By the middle of December 1979, an estimated 10,000 armed Russians were present in Afghanistan, serving in capacities such as advisers or members of specialized force units.¹⁰⁵ The response from the Afghan population was swift and widespread, leading to a rebellion. The Soviet forces responded harshly, engaging in brutal tactics against the Mujahideen rebels and their supporters, even resorting to destroying entire villages to prevent them from serving as safe havens for the rebels. This Soviet incursion violated the existing status quo and effectively reversed the thawing trend that had characterized US-Soviet relations during the 1970s, essentially resetting the relationship to its starting point: as a result, the United States promptly declared economic sanctions and expressed its intention to boycott the Olympics. Subsequently, the Carter Doctrine was articulated, with the aim of dissuading any further expansionist actions by the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁶ The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which marked the beginning of the new Cold War era, served as a wake-up call for the countries of the Free World in the Far East.

The 1978 Defense Guidelines and combined military exercise between United States and JSDF

As the new Cold War intensified, concerns regarding a potential Soviet landing in Hokkaido grew.¹⁰⁷ Meanwhile, during the late 1970s, the Soviet Union commenced the expansion of its Pacific Fleet by augmenting the number of ballistic missile submarines and surface ships: such buildup resulted in the Pacific Fleet becoming the largest among the four

¹⁰⁵ Richard S. Newell, "Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan," *The World Today* 36 no. 7 (1980): 250-258.

¹⁰⁶ Joseph J. Collins, "The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Methods, Motives, and Ramifications," *Naval War College Review* 33 no. 6 (1980): 53-62.

¹⁰⁷ Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," *International Security* 17 no. 4 (1993): 84-118. However, in the 1980s, the Japanese public did not perceive a significant threat from the Soviet Union. This perception was primarily influenced by two factors. Firstly, the majority of Japanese people were skeptical about any substantial change from the existing status quo during that period. Second, there was a prevailing sentiment among the Japanese public that did not hold the JSDF in high regards.

Soviet fleets, further deteriorating Japan's security environment.¹⁰⁸ Consequently, the idea of conducting military exercises between the United States and the JSDF gained significant traction. The foundation for such cooperation can be traced back to the 1978 Defense Guidelines for US-Japan defense cooperation. These Defense Guidelines stipulated that the US forces and the JSDF should engage in necessary combined exercise and training to facilitate coordinated operations for the defense of Japan in a smooth and effective manner. Following the decision on the 1978 Defense Guidelines, the combined exercises and training between the United States and Japan progressed earnestly. Furthermore, it is noteworthy to highlight that the 1978 Defense Guidelines addressed on promoting cooperation between the United States and Japan in scenarios occurring in the Far East region outside of Japan that would significantly impact Japan's security, including potential contingencies involving the Korean peninsula.¹⁰⁹

Initially, the combined exercise between the United States and Japan was carried out separately within each segment of the JSDF. However, over time, it evolved into a comprehensive exercise that involved the Ground, Maritime, and Air JSDF, along with the participation of the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. While some argue that Japan's involvement in the RIMPAC exercise was the first symbolic combined exercise after the 1978 Defense Guidelines, it was the US-Japan combined field exercise of 1986 that truly demonstrated comprehensiveness.

The exercise, known as Keen Edge 10/86, aimed to establish an unified response to shared threats by testing the interoperability between the US forces and the JSDF. It took place in and around Hokkaido, involving approximately 13,000 personnel, 100 aircraft, and 20 naval vessels.¹¹⁰ Notably, Keen Edge 10/86 also incorporated US aircraft from bases in South Korea, effectively forging a connection between Japan's defense and that of South Korea through the partnership with the United States.

The pivotal objective of the 1986 exercise was to thwart any potential Soviet attempts to carry out landing operations in Hokkaido by utilizing the full strength of the JSDF until reinforcements from the United States could be deployed from Hawaii. This sequence of events—Soviet landing operation, JSDF resistance, and US reinforcement—aligned with the principle outlines in the 1978 Defense Guidelines, which stated that Japan would, in principle,

¹⁰⁸ Lind, Jennifer. "Japan's Security Evolution." Cato Institute, 2016. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep04907>.

¹⁰⁹ Japanese Ministry of Defense, *The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, 1978*.

¹¹⁰ R. Mark Bean, *Cooperative Security in Northeast Asia: A China-Japan-South Korea Coalition Approach* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1990), 117.

defense itself against limited, small-scale aggression. If repelling such aggression proved challenging, Japan would do so in collaborating with the United States.¹¹¹

The combined military exercise between the United States and the JSDF fostered increased interoperability between the two forces, transforming the JSDF from a passive observer to a more proactive participant in terms of sharing the burden of defense. The sequence of exercises conducted during the 1980s played a vital role in establishing a robust coordination mechanism between both sides. This effectively bolstered their capacity to respond to potential threats, enhanced their overall defense capabilities, and ultimately improve their readiness to handle any contingencies that may arise on the Korean peninsula. However, in Phase III, there were constraints on precisely determining Japan's role in a Korean contingency. For example, in the early 1980s, the United States developed a preliminary plan known as OPLAN 5052, which anticipated a Korean peninsula contingency spilling over to Japan. When the United States requested Japan's participation in refining this draft plan, the Japanese side declined to adopt OPLAN 5052 as an agenda, deeming it politically sensitive.¹¹²

1.4.3. Strengthening of the Triangular Relationship in the 1980s

During the early 1980s, as the US forces and the JSDF were improving their interoperability and readiness for potential contingencies involving Korean peninsula, notable political shifts occurred within the tripartite relationship of the United States, Japan, and South Korea. President Carter lost the presidential reelection, and his successor, President Reagan, emerged as a steadfast anti-communist leader, assuming the role of leading the free world. Likewise, Prime minister Nakasone, newly appointed in Japan, was known for his unconventional approach, openly expressing his views on Japan's defense and advocating for greater involvement in international affairs. Additionally, President Chun, a strong proponent of triangular security cooperation, assumed the presidency in South Korea.

The emergence of these three influential figures brought about a harmonization of the tripartite cooperation. One of the notable accomplishments during this period was the successful implementation of a 4 billion-dollar security-economic cooperation agreement

¹¹¹ Japanese Ministry of Defense, *The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation*, 1978.

¹¹² Fukuda Takeshi 福田毅, "Nichi bei bōei kyōryoku niokeru tsu no tenki: 1978 nen gaidorain kara nichi bei dōmei no henkaku made no dōtei" 日米防衛協力における3つの転機: 1978年ガイドラインから日米同盟の変革までの道程 [Three Turning Points in the US-Japan Security Cooperation: The Journey from the 1978 Defense Guidelines to the Transformation of the US-Japan Alliance], *Reference レファレンス* 7 (2006): 143-172.

between Japan and South Korea. As the tripartite alliance experienced a golden age, the cracks within the communist bloc became increasingly evident, ultimately leading to the end of the Cold War era in 1991.

President Reagan, Prime Minister Nakasone, and President Chun

Renowned for his close friendship with Reagan, Nakasone gained significant attention upon assuming office when he expressed his intention to transform Japan into an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” for US forces in the event of a war, effectively restricting the movements of the Soviet Navy.¹¹³ Additionally, Nakasone disregarded as unwritten rule that limited the annual defense budget to 1 percent of the gross national product.

In a landmark development, Nakasone became the first Japanese prime minister to make an official visit to South Korea in 1983, which played a vital role in mending bilateral relations.¹¹⁴ During the visit, President Chun and Prime Minister Nakasone agreed, as stated in a joint communique, that fostering close cooperative relations would be mutually beneficial for the South Korean and Japanese peoples. Simultaneously, President Reagan extended an invitation to President Chun, making him the first guest of honor at the White House during Reagan's initial term. This gesture not only enhanced President Chun's legitimacy but also solidified the strength of the US-ROK friendship and alliance.¹¹⁵

In essence, the close interactions among these three key figures played a crucial, if not dominant, role in facilitating the tripartite cooperation between the United States, Japan, and South Korea. The personal connections and diplomatic efforts of Reagan, Nakasone, and Chun were instrumental in strengthening the alliance and fostering closer ties among the three nations.¹¹⁶

¹¹³ Mike Mochizuki, “Japan’s Foreign Policy,” *Current History* 84, no. 506 (1985): 401-404, 435.

¹¹⁴ Lee Chae-jin, “South Korea in 1983: Crisis Management and Political Legitimacy,” *Asian Survey* 24, no. 1 (1984): 112-121.

¹¹⁵ While President Carter prioritized human rights as a criterion for the relationship between the United States and South Korea, President Reagan acknowledged the legitimacy of President Chun, even in the aftermath of the 1980 incident in Gwangju. Reagan emphasized the strong bond between the United States and South Korea within the context of the new Cold War.

¹¹⁶ The reconfirmation of a strong commitment and enhanced relationship with the United States did not undermine the ties between Japan and South Korea. Instead, it ushered in a golden age for the Japan-South Korea relationship, resulting in substantial security and economic cooperation valued at 4 billion dollars.

The 4 billion-dollar security-economic cooperation aid package

Upon assuming office in 1980, President Chun Doo-hwan confronted a range of challenges, including: (1) legitimacy of his presidency; (2) the 1980 drought that negatively impacted the South Korean economy; (3) North Korea as an existential threat; (4) heavy burden of the defense budget (5.69 percent of the GDP).¹¹⁷ To address these pressing issues, President Chun reached out to Japan, seeking their potential contribution. He believed that South Korea was shouldering an undue responsibility in deterring the communist regime on behalf of both the Republic of Korea and Japan. Chun perceived Japan's defense budget, which amounted to less than 1 percent of its GDP, as an unjust practice.¹¹⁸

The proposed amount of security-economic cooperation was initially put forward by former Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei in December 1980. During discussions with the Korean envoy, he emphasized the necessity of assisting South Korea and highlighted the importance of providing a financial contribution equivalent to “stationing two divisions in South Korea.” This suggestion drew upon the historical fact that two Japanese divisions were stationed on the Korean peninsula during the colonial era.¹¹⁹ President Chun, utilizing this as a reference point, independently calculated the total cost to be around \$10 billion, assuming the maintenance cost of a single division to be \$1 billion over a 5-year period.¹²⁰ Eventually, the Japanese government agreed to South Korean request and approved 4\$ billion in 1983.¹²¹ The economic cooperation for security in the 1980s did not manifest as direct burden sharing

¹¹⁷ Chun Doo-hwan, *Jeonduhwan hoegorok. 2 cheongwadae sijeol (1980-1988)* [Memoir of Chun Doo-hwan 2: Blue House Years (1980-1988)] (Seoul: Jajaknamusup, 2017), 295.

¹¹⁸ Lee Pil-jung, “Hanguk gukbangyesanui soyowa baebune gwanhan yeongu(1953-hyeonjae)” [A Study on Requirements and Allocations of the ROK's Defense Budget (1953-Present)], *The Quarterly Journal of Defense Policy Studies* 32, no.3 (2016): 185-224.

¹¹⁹ Hwang Ki-hyung, “Ilboni hangugui anbo yeokhare hyetaegeul bondaneun ‘muimseungcharon’i jegidwaessda” [A “Free-Rider Theory” has been Raised, Claiming that Japan Benefits from South Korea's Security Role], *Iryoseoul*, April 17, 2020.

¹²⁰ Chun Doo-hwan, *Jeonduhwan hoegorok. 2 cheongwadae sijeol (1980-1988)* [Memoir of Chun Doo-hwan 2: Blue House Years (1980-1988)] (Seoul: Jajaknamusup, 2017), 303.

¹²¹ While it is challenging to determine the exact allocation of these funds in the defense sector, several implications can be inferred. Firstly, security-economic cooperation provides some relief to South Korea's concerns regarding the unpredictable stance of the United States. The memory of President Carter's plans to withdraw US forces from Korea was still fresh in the minds of South Korean leaders, and the financial support from Japan served as a form of insurance to mitigate uncertainty. Secondly, the security-economic cooperation between South Korea and Japan paved the way for enhanced tripartite security coordination. President Chun's perception that the “Korea-Japan relationship shares the same fate and requires vigilant defense against North Korea” helped the Japanese view North Korea as a greater threat. Thirdly, the security-economic cooperation helped alleviate South Korea's defense burden. Following the influx of \$4 billion from Japan starting in 1983, South Korea experienced a reduction of more than 1 percent in its defense budget as a percentage of GDP (from 5.49 percent to 4.25 percent). While a more detailed analysis is necessary, the security-economic cooperation incentivized South Korea to lessen its defense burden by slowing down the rate of defense budget increase, with the belief that Japan would support South Korea in return.

in the defense realm, such as covering South Korea's defense expenses. Instead, it was channeled through economic and social avenues. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that money is interchangeable, and the \$4 billion loan granted South Korea provided significant financial flexibility for the government.¹²² This allowed them to allocate funds towards various initiatives, including defense projects like the Second Yulgok Project, which was implemented during the 1980s.

The dissolution of the communist bloc and the end of the Cold War

Meanwhile, in the late 1980s, the communist bloc started displaying signs of disintegration, ultimately leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, which occurred from 1991 to 1992 involved an internal disintegration process characterized by growing unrest in its constituent republics. This unrest escalated into a persistent political and legislative conflict between the republics and the central government. Eventually, the leaders of the three primary republics declared the Soviet Union defunct, and this was later followed by 11 additional republics. As a result, President Mikhail Gorbachev was forced to resign, and the remaining members of the Soviet parliament formally acknowledged the already transpired dissolution. Despite some former Soviet republics maintaining strong ties with Russia and establishing multilateral organizations like the CIS, the Eurasian Economic Community, the Union State, the Eurasian Customs Union, and the Eurasian Economic Union, the USSR ceased to exist officially, marking the end of the Cold War era. Immediately, this event provided strategic advantages to the United States, Japan, and South Korea as the diminished Russian presence in the region contributed in isolating North Korea further from the international community.

1.4.4. The Gulf War and Japan's Contribution

During the post-cold War era, the first significant international conflict unfolded in the Middle East. The Persian Gulf War was triggered by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Saddam Hussein, the leader of Iraq, ordered the invasion and occupation of Kuwait with the objective of gaining control over its vast oil reserves, setting a large debt owed to Kuwait, and expanding Iraqi influence in the region. On August 3, the United Nations

¹²² Lee Chae-jin, "South Korea in 1983: Crisis Management and Political Legitimacy," *Asian Survey* 24, no. 1 (1984): 112-121. South Korea's major construction projects during the Fifth Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan were financed by the \$4 billion loan. In other words, these funds played a crucial role in supporting and financing the development of South Korea's important infrastructure initiatives.

Security Council demanded Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, followed by a global trade embargo imposed on Iraq on August 6. The invasion by Iraq and the potential threat it posed to Saudi Arabia, the world's largest oil producer and exporter, prompted the United States and its NATO allies in Western Europe to swiftly deploy troops to Saudi Arabia as a deterrent against possible attacks. Japan, constrained by constitutional limitations on the right of collective self-defense, opted to provide financial support amounting to \$13 billion rather than deploying troops to the region. Despite these efforts, there were views suggesting that Japan did not fulfill the expectations of the United States.¹²³ This experience led Japan to recognize that its contribution during international crises was expected to extend beyond financial assistance.¹²⁴

1.4.5. The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and the 1997 Defense Guidelines

Following the United States' announcement in September 1991 to withdraw approximately one hundred nuclear weapons from South Korea as part of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which limits the deployment of offensive nuclear weapons abroad, South and North Korea reached an agreement. The agreement stipulated that both countries would refrain from testing, manufacturing, producing, receiving, possessing, storing, deploying, or using nuclear weapons. It also included a ban on nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities, with a commitment to utilizing nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes. However, the mood of reconciliation faced an unexpected obstacle when North Korea inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and declared its intent to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1993. As tensions escalated, the United States considered military options while North Korea remained unyielding. In the midst of the escalating crisis on the Korean peninsula, former US President Jimmy Carter made a historic visit to North Korea, where he held talks with Kim Il-sung. This visit laid the groundwork for a bilateral agreement between the United States and North Korea, resulting in the signing of the 1994 Agreed Framework. Under this agreement, North Korea committed to freezing its illicit plutonium weapons program and suspending the construction of nuclear reactors. In return, the United States pledged sanctions relief, aid, oil, and the provision of two light-water reactors for civilian use. To oversee the implementation

¹²³ Thomas L. Wilborn, *International Politics in Northeast Asia: The China-Japan-United States Strategic Triangle* (Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1996), 33.

¹²⁴ Paul Midford, Robert D. Eldridge, *The Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force: Search for Legitimacy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2017), 204.

of the 1994 Agreed Framework and manage the financing and construction of the two light-water reactors, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was established by the United States, Japan, and South Korea. The first North Korean nuclear crisis was resolved relatively quickly with the Agreed Framework, but it underscored the potential threat posed by North Korea in the post-Cold War era.

Meanwhile, the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis exposed significant flaws in the 1978 Defense Guidelines, which limited the actions of JSDF to its own self-defense rights.¹²⁵ The Defense Guidelines proved inadequate as they did not account for the severity of the crisis. If a full-scale war were to break out on the Korean peninsula, it was expected that a considerable number of US troops, approximately 52,000 would be killed or injured.¹²⁶ However, the Japanese government struggled to fully comply with the demands of their US counterparts due to domestic circumstances within Japan.¹²⁷ This response raised concerns among the US government. Secretary William Perry, for instance, remarked that if Japan had merely stood by as a passive observer while US troops were being killed during a Korean contingency, it would have effectively spelled the end of the US-Japan alliance.¹²⁸ The disparity between Japan's reluctance to participate in a Korean contingency, constrained by its peace constitution, and the US' expectation for Japan to support US war efforts under the US-Japan security treaty, was set to be resolved in the subsequent phase, Phase IV, spanning from 1996 to 2014.

1.4.6. Japan-ROK Dispute on Historical Issues

After the tensions caused by North Korea significantly diminished due to the signing of the Agreed Framework, historical issues emerged as the primary focus in relations between Japan and South Korea.¹²⁹ President Kim Young-sam, a staunch advocate of democracy, was determined to eradicate the remnants of the colonial era. Under his leadership, the former Japanese General Government Building, known as the capital hall, was demolished. However,

¹²⁵ Funabashi Yoichi, *Alliance Adrift* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), 283-284.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 281-282.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 282-283.

¹²⁸ Jonathan D. Pollack, *Asia Eyes America – Regional Perspectives on US Asia-Pacific Strategy in the Twenty-First Century* (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 2007), 140.

¹²⁹ In Phase IV, a noticeable strain emerged in the relationship between Japan and South Korea. The departure of influential figures who had played pivotal roles during the prosperous period was noteworthy: President Reagan concluded his term in 1989, while Prime Minister Nakasone and President Chun's terms came to an end in 1987 and 1988, respectively. Furthermore, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which had been the primary regional threat, played a part in altering the dynamics. With the absence of this significant threat, Japan and South Korea were able to confront longstanding political and historical issues that had persisted for many decades.

the most significant development was President Kim's emphasis on territorial issues, particularly regarding Dokdo/Takeshima, which further strained the relations between Japan and South Korea. This strained relationship persisted throughout Kim Young-sam's presidency, but was partially addressed with the Japan-South Korean Joint Declaration of 1998. The Japan-South Korea Joint Declaration, titled "A New Japan-Korea Partnership towards the Twenty-first Century," was announced in October 1998. It was a declaration made by Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and South Korea President Kim Dae-jung to reaffirm friendly relations between the two countries and express their commitment to discussing Japan and South Korea for the benefit of both nations.¹³⁰

1.5. Phase IV: 1996 to 2014

Phase IV encompasses an 18-year period, spanning from 1996 to 2014. Recognizing the necessity of aligning United States and Japan's expectations regarding Japan's contributions, particularly in logistics and operational support, the two nations embarked on a series of actions during this phase. These actions included the formulation of the US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security in 1996, followed by subsequent measures such as the revision of Defense Guidelines in 1997, the enactment of the 1999 Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan law,¹³¹ and the implementation of the Ship inspection law in 2000.¹³²

Notably, North Korea emerged as a heightened security threat to Japan during Phase IV. With its nuclear development and missile capabilities, North Korea gained the capacity to directly target Japan in the event of a contingency. In response, Japan proactively initiated measures to address these new threats, such as collaborating with the United States to developing a missile defense system. Consequently, Japan's potential for contributing to US war fighting efforts in terms of logistical support significantly improved during Phase IV.

1.5.1. The 1996 US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security and the 1997 Defense Guidelines

Although the first North Korean nuclear crisis of 1993-1994 did not escalate into a full-scale war and was somewhat resolved through the 1994 Agreed framework, it prompted

¹³⁰ Lee, chung-min, "The Prerequisites for Sustained US-South Korean-Japanese Cooperation," *Prospects for US-South Korean-Japanese Trilateral Security Cooperation: In an Era of Unprecedented Threats and Evolving Political Forces*. Atlantic council (2018): 16-24. The summit meeting in 1998 between Obuchi Keizo and Kim Dae-jung represented the pinnacle of post-1965 bilateral relations and could be considered the peak of Japanese-South Korean ties.

¹³¹ The complete title of the law is the "Act Concerning the Measures for Peace and Safety of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan."

¹³² The full name of the law is the "Act on Ship Inspection Operations in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan."

the United States and Japan to seriously consider Japan's role in a potential Korean contingency. Naturally, both sides recognized the need to update the 1978 Defense Guidelines, which appeared inadequate for Japan to fully participate in a Korean contingency. While Article 6 of the US-Japan Security Treaty did allow Japan to respond to contingencies in the Far East, the 1978 Defense Guidelines constrained the JSDF to actions within the boundaries of Japan's self-defense rights—individual, not collective, in line with the Japanese constitution.

Although discussions on revising the Defense Guidelines commenced in 1995, the vulnerability of the US-Japan alliance itself became evident following the Okinawa rape incident in the same year. Consequently, the primary focus shifted towards strengthening the alliance in the post-Cold War context. Additionally, negotiations concerning the reorganization, consolidation, and reduction of US military bases in Okinawa took precedence as critical issues. Subsequently, Bill Clinton and Hashimoto Ryutaro formulated the 1996 US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security, with the Defense Guidelines being revised a year later in 1997.

In the 1997 Defense Guidelines, Japan assumed a more defined role in “situations in areas surrounding Japan” (SIASJ)—which held significant implications for its peace and security—and was authorized to provide rear-area support to its US counterparts in regional contingencies. The inclusion of “situations in areas surrounding Japan” in the 1997 Defense Guidelines not only paved the way for Japan to enact domestic laws to comply (as seen in the 1999 SIASJ law and the 2000 ship inspection law) but also expanded the scope the US-Japan defense planning beyond Article 5 of the US-Japan security treaty, which specifically addressed the defense of Japan in certain contingencies. This expansion widened the scope of the alliance's considerations to encompass regional contingencies (including the potential scenario involving the Korean peninsula), as outlined in Article 6 of the US-Japan security treaty.¹³³

1.5.2. The North Korean Factor

Until the late 1990s, North Korea was perceived as a vulnerable entity expected to collapse in the near future, given its status as a remnant of communist countries. The combination of natural disasters like floods and a severe famine in the mid-1990s, along with

¹³³ Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, *The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region* (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 1998), 20.

the dissolution of the communist bloc, further exacerbated North Korea's already fragile state. Despite these challenges, North Korea managed to survive and continued to advance its nuclear and missile capabilities. The launch of the taepodong-1 missile by North Korea in 1998 served as a wake-up call for Japan, raising concerns about its security.¹³⁴ Moreover, the revelation of North Korea's clandestine development of nuclear weapons and its subsequent nuclear tests transformed North Korea from an eccentric case to a significant regional risk factor. In response to this growing threat, Japan initiated missile defense construction in collaboration with the United States and also revised domestic security-related legislation. The shift in perception regarding North Korea, from being considered a weak spot to a formidable concern, prompted Japan to take proactive measures to address the emerging security challenges posed by North Korea's nuclear and missile advancements.

The launching of the Taepodong-1 and the 1999 SIASJ Law

On August 31, 1998, North Korea made an announcement that they had successfully launched the Taepodong-1, a three-stage technology demonstrator rocket, to launch their inaugural satellite Kwangmyongsong-1 from a launch pad situated on the Musudan-ri peninsula. The trajectory of the rocket was directed eastward, traversing over Japan at an altitude surpassing 200km. The second stage of the rocket descended into the Pacific Ocean approximately 60km beyond Japan, while some part of the rocket landed around 600km past Japan. As previously mentioned, during the Cold War era, Japan's primary concern revolved around the Soviet Union, particularly the potential threat of an amphibious operation in Hokkaido, with North Korea considered a secondary issue. However, the extended missile range demonstrated by North Korea expanded their capability to project power and encompass the Japanese island. The launch of the Taepodong-1 brought about a shifting reality that compelled Japan to perceive North Korea as the primary threat.

The launch of the Taepodong-1 missile by North Korea raised concerns among the Japanese, leading to the enactment of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (SIASJ Law) in 1999. This law, in conjunction with the 1997 Defense Guidelines, required Japan to establish domestic legislation to effectively fulfill its role in providing rear area support to the US forces.¹³⁵

¹³⁴ Leszek Buszynski, "Japan's Security Policy in the Koizumi Era," *Security Challenges* 2, no. 3 (2006): 93-107.

¹³⁵ Katsuhiko Musashi and Robert Eldridge, *The Japan Self-Defense Forces Law — Translation, History, and Analysis* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2019), 7.

Consequently, the 1999 SIASJ law allowed the JSDF to offer limited rear area support, although they were prohibited from directly using force to assist in the defense of their US counterparts.¹³⁶

US-Japan missile defense buildup and Operation Plan 5055

When the North Korea publicly disclosed its covert nuclear development, the 1994 Agreed Framework was officially abandoned. In 2003, North Korea withdrew from the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, leading to the onset of the second nuclear crisis. From 2006 onwards, the country conducted a series of six nuclear tests, demonstrating an increasing level of proficiency, which consequently resulted in the imposition of sanctions. It is projected that by the year 2027, North Korea will likely have acquired a total of 242 nuclear weapons.¹³⁷ This development solidified North Korea's status as a nuclear-armed nation, thus constituting a significant and even more severe ramification than the initial North Korean nuclear crisis.

The presence of long-range missile capabilities, combined with North Korea's potential possession of nuclear weapons, was viewed by Japanese policymakers as a substantial threat. In response to this threat, Japan made the decision to commence joint technical research on ballistic missile defense (BMD) with the United States in 1999.¹³⁸ Subsequently, in December 2003, the Japanese government announced its intention to adopt BMD systems. Furthermore, in December 2005, the US-Japan joint technical research progressed to a joint development initiated focused on BMD interceptor missiles (SM-3) to be deployed on Aegis ships: consequently, the initial batch of SM-3 missiles was deployed on the Aegis destroyer Kongo.¹³⁹ While Japan aligned itself with the United States and accelerated the establishment of its missile defense system, the South Korean President Kim Dae-jung declined the offer from the United States to extend the missile defense to South Korea. Rather than collaboratively establishing an integrated missile defense system alongside the United States and Japan, South Korea chose to pursue its own approach to

¹³⁶ Kazuya Sakamoto, "What is the Strengthened Japan-US Alliance for? Defending and Advancing the Liberal World Order," in *Postwar Japan: Growth, Security, and Uncertainty Since 1945*, ed. Michael J. Green and Zack Cooper (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2017), 9.

¹³⁷ Asan Institute for Policy Studies, "Regrouping to Fight Again: North Korea's Deepening Nuclear Capability and Totalitarian Control," *Asan International Security Outlook* (2021): 33-42.

¹³⁸ Leszek Buszynski, "Japan's Security Policy in the Koizumi Era," *Security Challenges* 2, no. 3 (2006): 93-107.

¹³⁹ John Liang, "US, Japan Challenged in Cooperation on Aegis BMD," *Inside Missile Defense* 13, no. 22 (2007): 1, 6-7.

intercepting North Korean missiles.¹⁴⁰

In parallel with the establishment of its missile defense system, the increasing nuclear and missile capabilities of North Korea compelled the United States and Japan to develop a comprehensive operation plan to address potential contingencies involving the Korean peninsula. This plan aimed to seamlessly align with the operation plan of the US-ROK combined forces. Given that North Korea's nuclear-tipped missiles posed a direct threat to USFJ and Japan, it became imperative to solidify the operational preparedness to effectively respond to such a scenario. The common belief is that in the event of a full-scale war on the Korean peninsula, the US-ROK combined forces would engage in combat in accordance with the Operation Plan 5027. This plan, initially developed in 1974 and regularly updated since then, incorporates Japan as a crucial component of US war efforts.¹⁴¹ However, despite the presence of the 1997 Defense Guidelines (later replaced by the 2015 Defense Guidelines), the specific details of US-Japan combined operations were not clearly outlined until the mid-2000s.¹⁴² To address this issue, the United States and Japan worked together to establish Operation Plan 5055 after the first North Korean nuclear test in 2006.¹⁴³ While the contents of Operation Plan 5055 are classified, it is understood to encompass various areas such as situational awareness, operational execution, logistics, and command control that could be applied in a situation in which Japan is not directly attacked.

1.6. Phase V: 2015 to 2023

Phase V spans an 8-year period from 2015 to 2023. What sets Phase V apart from Phase IV (1996-2014) is the implementation of security legislation in 2015, enabling Japan to engage in collective self-defense and providing the legal foundation for the JSDF to conduct operations beyond Japan's borders, including the Korean peninsula. These legal measures undertaken by Japan during Phase V allowed Japan to contribute to South Korea's defense,

¹⁴⁰ Park Hwee-rhak, "The Ballistic Missile Defense Construction Strategies of South Korea and Japan: Self-reliance versus Cooperation with the US," *Journal of International and Area Studies* 25, no.2 (2018): 87-106. Since the early 1990s, South Korea has made efforts to establish its own ballistic missile defense system under the name of the Korea Air and Missile Defense. The motivation behind this initiative stemmed from the significant casualties witnessed during the Gulf War in 1991 due to Iranian missile attacks. However, the progress and extent of actual BMD construction have been relatively sluggish and restricted when compared to the rapid pace of North Korean nuclear and missile developments. Meanwhile, after North Korea conducted its fifth nuclear test in 2016, South Korea declared the development of the Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system as a component of its broader initiatives to establish a Three-Axis system. Jung Doyeong, "South Korea's Revitalized "Three-Axis" System," *Council on Foreign Relations*, Jan 4, 2023.

¹⁴¹ Paik Nak-chung, *The Division System in Crisis: Essays on Contemporary Korea* (Berkeley: Global, Area and International Archive, University of California Press, 2011), 243.

¹⁴² Funabashi Yoichi, *Alliance Adrift* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), 284.

¹⁴³ *Asahi Shimbun*, January 4, 2007.

encompassing actions like safeguarding US naval vessels, without Japan being militarily attacked by outside aggressors. Consequently, Japan's potential to offer operational support to US military efforts in a Korean contingency saw a significant upswing. It is noteworthy that this transformation occurred during Phase V, coinciding with the Moon Jae-in administration (2017-2022), a period when Japan-South Korea relations reached a low point. While Japan's potential logistic support in a Korean contingency increased during Phase IV, its potential operational support experienced a substantial boost during Phase V.

1.6.1. Japan's 2015 Security Legislation and 2015 Defense Guidelines

In 2015, Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party spearheaded legislation, which was passed on September 19, 2015, despite facing some opposition from the public. This legislation aimed to permit JSDF to engage in foreign conflicts, marking a departure from its previous stance of solely acting in self-defense. As per the Japanese constitution, the use of arm was limited to defensive actions. However, the newly enacted legislation reinterpreted the relevant provisions, granting the JSDF the ability to engage in collective self-defense operations to support allies overseas.¹⁴⁴ In other words, the 2015 security legislation expanded the operational scope of the JSDF beyond non-combat areas. As a result of these modifications, the JSDF now has the ability to take a more proactive stance in responding to Korean contingencies.¹⁴⁵

Simultaneously, the 1997 Defense Guidelines underwent revision in 2015 to account for the evolving security environment. The inclusion of the concept of collective self-defense in the 2015 Defense Guidelines enabled Japan to provide defense for US forces. Specifically, the JSDF were empowered to exercise collective self-defense rights in various areas, including air and missile defense, as well as the defense of Japan across land, sea, and air.¹⁴⁶ In essence, the 2015 Defense Guidelines reinforced the commitment of the United States and Japan to the defense of South Korea.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁴ Lind, Jennifer. "Japan's Security Evolution." Cato Institute, 2016. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep04907>.

¹⁴⁵ "Assessing the Impact of Abe Era Security Reforms on Japan-NATO Relations," The Japan Institute of International Affairs, accessed July 12, 2021, https://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/fellow_report/190527Policy_Brief-Japan_NATO_Security_Cooperation.pdf

¹⁴⁶ Japanese Ministry of Defense, *The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, 2015*.

¹⁴⁷ Michishita Narushige 道下徳成 and Higashi Akihiko 東清彦, "Chōsenhantō yūji to nippon no taiō" 朝鮮半島有事と日本の対応 [Contingency in the Korean Peninsula and Japan's Response], in *Chōsenhantō to higashijia* 朝鮮半島と東アジア [Korean Peninsula and East Asia], ed. Tadashi Kimiya 木宮正史 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2015), 197.

1.6.2. Frictions between Japan and Korea Stemming from Varying Threat Perceptions

While Japan endeavored to enhance and broaden the capabilities and operational reach of its JSDF, the prospective military support to the US-ROK combined forces during a Korean contingency grew. Nevertheless, South Koreans began to harbor concerns about the potential for JSDF operations in proximity to the Korean peninsula. Criticism arose specifically regarding the comprehensive and vague language used in the 2015 Defense Guidelines, which did not explicitly address the position of the Korean government. The South Korean government maintained that Japan should seek prior consultation if the JSDF were to engage in missions in the vicinity of the Korean peninsula.¹⁴⁸

Such unease grew further during the Moon Jae-in administration. Typically, when a candidate from the progressive party wins the presidential election in South Korea, there is a great emphasis on improving relations between South and North Korea. However, this approach may not align with the perceptions of the United States and Japan regarding North Korea. The divergent views on North Korea can be attributed in part to the fundamental principles of the Sunshine policy, which were initially introduced by President Kim Dae-jung and subsequently pursued by his successors, including Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in.¹⁴⁹ For instance, the creation of General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) was primarily driven by the growing threat from North Korea. By late 2014, the United States, Japan, and South Korea had reached an agreement to exchange information related to North Korean nuclear and missile activities. However, the absence of a GSOMIA between Japan and South Korea hindered direct interaction between the two nations. Instead, they relied on the United States as an intermediary. Consequently, obtaining specific details about the actions and plans of the United States and South Korea posed challenges for Japan until the establishment of GSOMIA. Finally, in 2016, the signing of GSOMIA provided a legal framework enabling direct information sharing between Tokyo and Seoul. Yet the political

¹⁴⁸ “Jawidae jigu eodiseodeun jakjeon, hanguk jugwon jonjunghajiman sajeondongui eodiro?” [SDF Can Operate Anywhere Around the Globe, But What About Prior Consultation?], *JTBC News*, April 28, 2015.

¹⁴⁹ Under the leadership of President Kim Dae-jung, the South Korean government implemented a policy of reconciliation towards North Korea, famously known as the “Sunshine Policy.” This approach, which extended into the presidencies of Roh Moo-hyun, and Moon Jae-in, aimed to strike a delicate balance between aligning with the United States (and Japan) and fostering reconciliation between the two Koreas. Within this framework, South Korea made the strategic decision to abstain from participating in the US-led missile defense system. Instead, it actively pursued the six-party talks and took proactive measures to sustain the operations of the Kaesong Industrial Region, even in the face of intermittent crises that posed challenges to South-North relations.

friction between Japan and South Korea almost dissolved the GSOMIA in 2019.¹⁵⁰ Although the decision to not extend GSOMIA was ultimately reversed at the eleventh hour, it exposed the existing disparities within the trilateral relationship involving the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Despite the efforts of President Yoon Seok-youl, who took office in May 2022 from the conservative party, to promote tripartite security cooperation by narrowing the perception gap among its members, such endeavors are susceptible to change or a complete reversal if a progressive party candidate succeeds in winning a future presidential election.¹⁵¹

1.6.3. Rising China

While North Korea had been the primary focus in the region, the resurgence of China took center stage during phase V. Over the past three decades, China had consistently achieved remarkable economic growth, setting new standards for speed and sustainability. Since at least the mid-1990s, China's economic indicators, including trade, investment, and demand for raw materials, have reached significant proportions, positioning China as a consequential player in the global economy and a decisive force in the Far East region. However, as China translated its economic prosperity into military capabilities, its rapid military expansion and assertive behavior raised doubts about the notion of its peaceful rise. In response, the United States initiated the Indo-Pacific strategy and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), aiming to counter China's assertive actions in the region. Simultaneously, South Korea pursued an equidistance policy between the United States and China, particularly during the Moon Jae-in presidency, which created some level of discord within the tripartite cooperation. As a result, while North Korea remained a concern, the reemergence of China and its economic and military prowess shifted the attention and dynamics in the region during phase V.

When the QUAD was established to counter China's military and diplomatic influence in the South China Sea, Japan, an original member of the QUAD, stressed the

¹⁵⁰ In 2019, Japan implemented bilateral economic restrictions on South Korea, marking the first such action since the normalization of their relations in 1965. These restrictions involved tightening export controls on crucial materials necessary for South Korea's semiconductor and display production. While Japan claimed that these measures were driven by security concerns, South Korea interpreted them as a response to its Supreme Court rulings. Consequently, a wave of anti-Japanese sentiment surged among the South Korean public, and there were concerns about the potential non-extension of the GSOMIA.

¹⁵¹ Although there was a certain level of security collaboration during the conservative administrations of President Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, South Korea encountered domestic challenges that impeded direct security dialogue among the three parties. Meanwhile, Japan predominantly focused on strengthening its security ties with the United States. Whether President Yoon's efforts to reestablish the positive relationship with the United States and Japan observed in the 1980s (Phase III) represent a departure from the current trend remains to be seen and requires further time for confirmation.

significance of a rules-based maritime order in the Far East and South China Seas as a countermeasure against China's maritime claims. The joint statement by the QUAD,¹⁵² widely seen as an attempt to curb China's expanding power, faced criticism from China's foreign ministry, which accused the QUAD of sowing discord among regional powers in Asia. While Japan openly embraced the United States-led Indo-Pacific strategy and actively participated in the QUAD, South Korea opted not to join these initiatives led by the United States.¹⁵³ This decision was primarily motivated by concerns that such participation could provoke China and strain their bilateral relationship.

South Korea's inclination towards toward an equidistance approach was evident during the introduction of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) by the US Forces Korea. South Korea announced its intention to deploy THAAD by the end of 2017 as part of its efforts to strengthen its defense against North Korean ballistic missiles.¹⁵⁴ In response, the Chinese government utilized official media channels to encourage its citizens to express dissatisfaction and animosity towards South Korea for this decision. To avoid intense opposition from China, the Moon Jae-in administration prolonged the THAAD deployment.¹⁵⁵ The introduction of THAAD in South Korea proved to be a complex process due to the country's policy of maintaining a balanced approach between the United States and China. This created challenges and contentious issues surrounding the deployment of THAAD, ultimately leaving both the Americans and the Chinese unsatisfied. Despite these obstacles, THAAD was eventually deployed. This incident stands in contrast to Japan's deployment of SM-3 missiles.

After taking office in May 2022, President Yoon Seok-youl made the decision to strengthen the tripartite security cooperation, departing from the equidistance approach previously adopted by his predecessor.¹⁵⁶ Nonetheless, the South Korean leadership encounters considerable obstacles in their endeavor to achieve close coordination among the

¹⁵² This refers to the joint statement titled "The Spirit of the Quad" issued in 2021.

¹⁵³ Despite not being a formal member of the Quad, South Korea participated in the Quad-plus meeting. The Quad committed to cooperating in the face of the Covid-19 pandemic and broadened its involvement by convening the inaugural Quad-plus meeting, which involved representatives from South Korea, New Zealand, and Vietnam.

¹⁵⁴ In October 2013, the South Korean military made an initial request to the Pentagon for information regarding the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system. THAAD, an American antiballistic missile defense system, is designed to intercept and destroy a wide range of ballistic missiles during their terminal phase.

¹⁵⁵ Park Hwee-rhak, "The Ballistic Missile Defense Construction Strategies of South Korea and Japan: Self-reliance versus Cooperation with the US," *Journal of International and Area Studies* 25, no.2 (2018): 87-106. To be sure, in early 2018, the US Forces in Korea effectively deployed their THAAD battery in South Korea. However, South Korean President Moon Jae-in urged for a temporary halt in the installation of additional components and requested an environmental impact assessment to be conducted.

¹⁵⁶ Jean-Yves Colin, "Nouvelle Phase de Tensions dans la Péninsule Coréenne," *Diplomaqtie*, no. 119 (2023): 38-39.

United States, Japan, and South Korea, primarily due to structural elements like economic interdependence and geographical proximity to China. While the escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait and the potential for a Chinese military intervention in Taiwan are anticipated to strengthen the relationship between the United States and Japan, motivating Japan to adopt measures aligned with those of the US (as evidenced by the release of three new strategic documents in 2022), South Korea will find itself with fewer options. South Korea may have to either align more closely with the United States (and Japan) or move toward closer cooperation with China (this complicates its pursuit of a balanced policy between the United States and China). As of 2023, President Yoon has chosen the former path, but South Korea's stance could potentially shift if the progressive party wins the 2027 presidential election. Only time will reveal the outcome.

1.7. Three Types of Contributions Throughout the Analytical Timeframe

Based on the information presented above, it becomes evident that Japan has made significant contributions to security over a span of 73 years. To gain a deeper understanding of these contributions, it is beneficial to categorize them based on their attributes. Therefore, I have categorized Japan's security contributions into three main groups: (1) logistic support, (2) financial and technological support, and (3) operational support.

Firstly, logistic support involves the provision of essential resources, materials, and services to sustain military operations. It encompasses activities related to infrastructure, supply chains, and services crucial for the effective functioning of troops and equipment. In this study, this category includes Japan's efforts to offer its territory as bases for US Forces and its commitment to safeguarding these US installations in Japan. Additionally, it encompasses Japan's comprehensive involvement in procurement, transportation, storage, equipment maintenance, medical services, and catering for US military. In essence, logistic support encompasses Japan's endeavors to ensure that US forces fighting for South Korea has the necessary supplies to operate, including provision like ammunition, fuel, spare parts, and medical care, etc.

Secondly, financial and technological support takes various forms, including grants, loans, investment, donations, or budget allocations. These resources are allocated to a wide range of activities, spanning from economic development to infrastructure projects. In this study, financial and technological support specifically refers to instances such as Japan granting permission for South Koreans to use claims fund for constructing the Pohang steel mill and the \$4 billion fund provided from Japan to South Korea during the 1980s, ostensibly

for economic cooperation for security purpose.

Thirdly, operational support pertains to assistance provided during active military operations to achieve specific mission objectives. It encompasses a broad spectrum of activities that directly contribute to the success of military missions. In this study, this category primarily involves Japan's efforts to expand the scope for the JSDF to provide operational support to the US forces.

While financial and technological support can be readily defined, distinguishing between logistics and operational support can sometimes be challenging. Two key elements that differentiate these two types of contributions are the nature of the activities involved and the duration. For instance, logistic support consists of non-combat activities vital for the overall functioning of the military, whereas operational support encompasses combat-related activities essential for the success of particular military operations. Moreover, logistic support tends to be more enduring and continuous, covering the entire duration of military deployments. Conversely, operational support is often time-sensitive and directly linked to specific missions or operations. In summary, logistic support focuses on sustaining the military forces with supplies and services, whereas operational support is oriented toward achieving mission objectives during active military operations. Both types of support are integral to the effectiveness of a military forces and complement each other in the context of defense contributions. Meanwhile, it is worth mentioning that Japan visible display of logistics and operational support occurred notably during the Korean War, which coincided with Period I (1950 to 1953). However, due to the absence of an all-out war akin to the Korean War on the Korean peninsula during Periods II, III, IV, and V, there is no quantifiable evidence of Japan's logistics and operational support during these times. Therefore, when delving into the discussion of Japan's logistics and operational contributions from 1954 to 2023 in this study, the focus predominantly revolves around the potential for such contributions in a hypothetical Korean contingency scenario. As a result, I have examined various actions taken by Japan, including the 1960 secret agreement (pertaining to logistic support) and the 1963 Mituya Study (relevant to operational support), in order to achieve a holistic insight into Japan's potential contributions within the realms of logistics and operations in the period following the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement.

The subsequent section will offer a concise overview of trends in these three types of contributions within the analytical timeframe. Detailed information can be found in Chapter 3 (logistic support), Chapter 4 (financial and technological support), and Chapter 5 (operational support).

1.7.1. Logistic Support

The peak of Japan's logistic support to the UN forces was evident in the comprehensive and diverse assistance provided during the Korean War. From 1954 to 1968, Japan continued to offer bases to the US forces. Despite the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, which was partially driven by domestic pressures in Japan to amend the unequal 1951 US-Japan Security Treaty, resulting in the introduction of the prior consultation function (this provision mandated that the United States must engage in prior consultation with Japan in situations where, for instance, significant alterations in the deployment of US military forces in Japan take place) Japanese policymakers agreed to sign a secret agreement in 1960 that nullified the prior consultation function for Korean contingencies. Furthermore, during a press conference at the National Press Club on November 21, 1969, Prime Minister Sato stated that "the Government of Japan will decide its position positively and promptly" if prior consultation was requested in an event of Korean contingency.¹⁵⁷ The statement indicated that Japan would not use prior consultation as a veto.

However, Japan's level of logistic support during Period (1969-1995) is assessed to be moderate, as Japan aimed to proceed with the reversion of Okinawa. Nevertheless, Japan's logistic support presumably improved during both Period IV (1996-2014) and Period V (2015-2023). Throughout these timeframes, Japan bolstered its capacity to safeguard US bases in Japan against North Korean ballistic missiles, airborne intrusions involving fighters and bombers, and guerrilla infiltrations conducted by special operations forces. For instance, in 1998, Japan made the decision to initiate joint technical research on ballistic missile defense system, aiming to be fully prepared for any potential response against North Korean missiles. Furthermore, in 2002, a combined concept plan between the United States and Japan, designed to address a Korean contingency, was drafted and signed. This plan, subsequently elevated to OPLAN 5055, delineated Japan's provision of logistical support to the United States, encompassing the protection of US bases in Japan against North Korean special operations forces.

In summary, Japan's logistical contributions peaked during the Korean War (occurring in Phase I) and decreased after the signing of the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement, spanning the entirety of Phase II and Phase III. However, such decrease was not as pronounced as the reduction in operational field during the same period. This is because

¹⁵⁷ Kitaoka Shinichi, "The Secret Japan-US Security Pacts: Background and Disclosure," *Asia-Pacific Review* 17, no. 2 (2010): 10-25.

Japan enabled the potential for logistical support to the United States Forces Japan in the event of a Korean contingency, which remained feasible through various measures such as the 1960 secret agreement and the continued presence of US bases in Okinawa even after its reversion in 1972. Meanwhile, Japan’s potential capability for logistical contributions continued to grow (during Phase IV and Phase V), especially following the signing of the 1996 US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security. From 1996 to 2023, Japan also proactively took measures to safeguard US bases in Japan, exemplified by its development of anti-ballistic missile defense system during this period. This outcome is represented in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Trend of Contribution in the Logistics Field (1950-2023)

1.7.2. Financial and Technological Assistance

While discussions regarding Japan’s financial support to South Korea emerged among US policymakers during Period II (1954-1968), particularly after the normalization of relations between Japan and South Korea in 1965, actual financial assistance from Japan for security purposes occurred only on two occasions, during Period III (1969-1995). Apart from using the claims fund in the late 1960s and early 1970s and obtaining \$4 billion during the 1980s, President Park also attempted to secure additional funds from Japan to implement his “four core plants plan,” in 1970. However, this latter attempt did not come to fruition. The use of the claims fund for constructing the Pohang steel mill and the allocation of \$4 billion as economic cooperation for security purpose occurred solely during Period III (1969-1995).

In summary, Japan’s contribution in the financial and technological sphere took place between 1970 and 1973 (related to the claims fund used for constructing the Pohang steel mill)

and from 1982 to 1989 (the seven-year period during which the \$4 billion fund was pledged). There was no contribution in this domain during Phases I, II, IV, and V. Such result can be shown as Figure 2.




Figure 2. Trend of Financial and Technological Contribution (1950-2023)¹⁵⁸

1.7.3. Operational Support

The deployment of Japanese minesweepers in the early stages of the Korean War 1950 serves as a tangible example, though relatively limited, of Japan's operational support during Period I (1950-1953). Evaluating the extent of Japan's operational support in the post-Korean War period is challenging. However, it can be argued that Japan's operational support was somewhat lacking, even though there is evidence to suggest that Japan consistently made preparations and improved its interoperability with US forces in anticipation of a potential Korean contingency during Period II. This included the establishment of the Coordinated Joint Outline Emergency Plan in 1955 and the Mitsuya Study in 1963.

Similar to the period following the Korean War in Period II, Japan's operational support in Period III (1969-1995) remained largely theoretical. While Japan was committed

¹⁵⁸ Regarding Japan's technological assistance for the Pohang Steel mill in South Korea, such assistance extended from 1970 to 1982. Over this period, encompassing four phases of Pohang Steel mill construction, Japan's technological support was consistently provided. Between 1970 and 1983, a total of 32 instances of technological transfer from Japan took place. This includes providing technological instruction from Kawasaki Steel and Nippon Steel Corporation. The initial technological assistance occurred in 1970 (involving Yawata Steel, Fuji Steel, and Nippon Steel Corporation under the Japan Group), and the final technological support from Kawasaki Steel took place in 1983. Song Sung-soo, *Pohangjecheorui gisulneungryeok baljeongwajeonge gwanhan gochal* [A Survey of the Historical Development of Technological Capabilities in POSCO] (Sejong: Science and Technology Policy Institute, 2000), 105-110.

to defending against a potential Soviet invasion, as indicated by the 1978 Defense Guidelines, further development of plans specific to a Korean contingency did not progress (as evidenced by the Japanese government’s refusal to create OPLAN 5052). This passiveness was criticized by their US counterparts during the 1993-1994 North Korean nuclear crisis. These factors were taken into account during Period IV (1996-2014).

After reconciling in 1996 through the US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security, Japan’s potential for operational support increased due to the 1997 revised Defense Guidelines and the 1999 Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and Operation Plan 5055, etc. This trend continued into Period IV (2015-2023) with Japan’s 2015 security legislation, and the 2015 Defense Guidelines. The extent to which Japan can provide operational support to its US counterparts with these changes is not yet clear, but the potential has notably increased, particularly since 2015.

In sum, Japan’s operational contribution reached to a moderate level during the Korean War (occurring in Phase I) but dwindled from the signing of the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement until 1995, spanning the entire Phase II and Phase III periods. However, Japan’s potential for operational support saw a resurgence after the signing of the 1996 US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security (Phase IV), and it further escalated from 2015 when Japan enacted Security legislation (Phase V). This outcome is represented in Figure 3.




Figure 3. Trend of Contribution in the Operational Field (1950-2023)

1.7.4. Japan’s Overall Security Contribution to South Korea (1950-2023)

Taking into consideration all three types of contributions, it can be summarized as depicted in Figure 4. In Phase I (1950-1953), logistics and operational contributions were

high, and moderate, respectively, while financial and technological contributions were minimal. During Phase II (1954-1968), logistic support reached a moderate level, operational support was negligible, while financial and technological contributions remained negligible. Phase III (1969-1995) witnessed a peak in financial and technological contributions (specifically during 1970 to 1973 and 1982 to 1989), with logistic support and operational support maintaining moderate and negligible levels, respectively. In Phase IV (1996-2014), logistic support was high, operational was moderate, while financial and technological contributions remained negligible. In Phase V (2015-2023), both logistics and operational contributions were high, while financial and technological support remained negligible.




Figure 4. Trend of three types of contributions (1950-2023) I

The transformation of the chart (Figure 4) into matrix format is illustrate in Table 1. In Table 1, the highest type of contribution for each phase is emphasized by bolding the corresponding letters. Consequently, it becomes evident that even during Phase II, a period when Japan’s contribution appeared somewhat lower compared to other phases, there was still a moderate level of contribution in the logistics field. Similarly, during Phase III, when Japan’s financial and technological support was absent (specifically referring to the years 1969, 1974 to 1981, and 1990 to 1995), a moderate level of contribution existed in the logistical field. In summary, it can be concluded that throughout the 73-year timeframe, Japan’s contribution occurred consistently, with at least a moderate level of involvement in at least one type of contribution.

Table 1. Trend of Three Types of Contributions (1950-2023) II

Phase \ Types of contribution	Logistic support	Financial and technological support	Operational support
Phase I (1950-1953)	High	Negligible	Moderate
Phase II (1954-1968)	Moderate	Negligible	Negligible
Phase III (1969-1995)	Moderate	High	Negligible
Phase IV (1996-2014)	High	Negligible	Moderate
Phase V (2015-2023)	High	Negligible	High

Meanwhile, Japan's selection of specific contributions during various phases can be attributed to structural reasons. In Phase I (1950-1953), logistical support emerged as the primary instrument chosen by the Japanese government for contributing to South Korea. This decision was influenced by the fact that the United Nations forces, predominantly comprised of US forces, used Japan as a launching pad and primary supply depot for operations in the Korean Peninsula. Meanwhile, financial and technological support from Japan was negligible during this phase, as the bulk of such contribution came from the United States in the form of aid. Additionally, the lack of normalization between Japan and South Korea posed difficulties for Japan to provide substantial financial and technological support. Operational support from Japan during Phase I involved sending minesweepers to Korean waters, but Japan refrained from dispatching volunteer ground units to the Korean front due to domestic and international constraints. Hence, Japan's operational support during this phase could be characterized as neither high nor negligible.

In Phase II (1954-1968), following the signing of the Korean Armistice, Japan's operational support naturally dwindled. Despite the normalization of relations between Japan and South Korea in 1965, US aid continued to play a major role in meeting South Korea's economic needs. Consequently, South Korea did not seek financial and technological support from Japan during Phase II. While logistic support decreased compared to Phase I, it remained notable among the three types of contributions during Phase II, as Japan continued to play a major role in meeting the needs of US bases in Japan in the event of a Korean contingency.

During Phase III (1969-1995), logistic and operational support levels remained largely unchanged from Phase II due to similar overall conditions. However, South Korea actively

sought Japan's financial and technological support for constructing the Pohand steel mill in the late 1960, as US aid restrictions in heavy industry and a lack of international financing presented challenges for South Korea. In the early 1980s, South Korea requested defense burden sharing, but due to domestic political constraints, Japan refrained from providing military hardware and instead offered a \$4 billion loan during Phase III.

In Phase IV (1996-2014), Japan's financial and technological support diminished as South Korea's economic growth rendered such contributions unnecessary. Operational support increased from a negligible level in Phase III to a moderate level in Phase IV, thanks primarily to the 1997 Defense Guidelines and the 1999 SIASJ Law. Logistic support during Phase IV saw a substantial increase, driven by the launch of a North Korean ballistic missile over Japan in 1998, prompting Japan to enhance measures protecting US bases from various threats.

During Phase V (2015-2023), Japan's financial and technological support remained negligible due to South Korea's sufficient economic growth. However, logistic and operational support increased as the Japanese government took additional measures to protect US bases and expanded the role of the JSDF during potential Korean contingencies. Further details are provided in the subsequent Chapters (2, 3, 4, and 5).

1.8. General Findings

Before delving into the testing of hypotheses, as outlined in the introduction, I would like to present the overarching discoveries that have emerged from the specific contribution made during the 73-year period. These findings hold particular significance as they challenge two commonly held beliefs concerning Japan's security contribution to South Korea.¹⁵⁹ These beliefs are as follows: firstly, that Japan's security contributions to South Korea would be heavily influenced by the state of Japan-ROK relations, and secondly, that Japan's security contribution to South Korea are predominantly correlated to the level of US security commitment to South Korea.

1.8.1. Japan's Security Contribution Despite the State of Japan-ROK Relations

Throughout the entire analytical period spanning from 1950 to 2023, Japan's security contribution to South Korea in the potential event of a full-scale war remained relatively steady and consistent. There are indications that this contribution may have increased during

¹⁵⁹ Such "common beliefs" became apparent in my discussions about Japan's security contributions with the individuals I encountered over the past couple of years.

phases of positive relationships between Japan and South Korea. However, it is important to note that Japan's security commitment remained largely unaffected even during periods of strained or unfavorable relations between the two countries.

In Phase I (1950 to 1953), when formal diplomatic relations were absent between Japan and South Korea, Japan provided extensive assistance to the United States' war efforts during the Korean War. It is important to highlight that this contribution remained consistent throughout the three-year duration of the war, despite President Rhee, who held anti-Japanese sentiment, declaring the Peace Line and eliciting negative reactions from the Japanese side. Furthermore, even after regaining independence through the signing of the San Francisco Treaty, the Japanese government wholeheartedly committed to supporting the US forces. While, the consistent commitment can be partially attributed to the economic benefits arising from the "special demand," (the United States engaged in specific acquisitions of war materials and logistical assistance from Japan during the Korean War, which had a positive economic impact on Japan) it was also driven by the Japanese leadership's recognition that safeguarding South Korea from communist aggression is closely intertwined with Japan's own security. During the post-Korean War era (from 1954 to 1961, following the signing of the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement until General Park Chung-hee assumed power in 1961 and actively sought to improve Japan-ROK relations), the interactions between Japan and South Korea were marked by a lack of friendliness. Ongoing discussions related to fisheries and compensation for colonial era failed to yield substantial results during this period, which aligns closely with Phase II (1954-1968). However, it was during this period that the military structure in the Far East was established. While the US-Japan Security Treaty and the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty were signed in 1951 and 1953 respectively, Japan hosted the United Nations Command-rear, and South Korea hosted the United Nations Command headquarters. This arrangement ensured that Japan served as a vital launchpad for both US Forces Japan and reinforcements from the continental United States in the event of an all-out war on the Korean peninsula. With such a defense structure in place, the United States and Japan began their combined planning and exercises in the mid-1950s, in conjunction with the Coordinated Joint Outline Emergency Plan, to prepare for potential military conflicts in the Korean peninsula.

In Phase III (1969 to 1995) Japan consistently made security contributions to South Korea, despite some negative events that temporarily strained public opinion between the two countries. It was during these two phases that most significant tangible contributions occurred: (1) Japan's decision to allow the South Koreans to use claims funds to build the Pohang steel

mill, and (2) providing a \$4 billion loan as part of economic cooperation for security purposes. Additionally, preparations for a potential Korean contingency progressed on the Japanese side, albeit discreetly. For instance, the 1963 Comprehensive Defense Tabletop Study included a scenario focused on a potential Korean contingency. As planning continued, Japan actively explored avenues to enhance combined military exercises with the United States to effectively respond to regional crisis, including a potential Korean contingency. These efforts resulted in the implementation of various comprehensive US-JSDF combined military exercises throughout the 1980s. It is important to note that although incidents such as the abduction of Kim Dae-jung (1973),¹⁶⁰ Moon Se-gwang's attempt to assassinate President Park (1974),¹⁶¹ and the Japanese textbook issue (1982)¹⁶² had a cooling effect on the overall relationship between Japan and South Korea during Phase III, they did not disrupt the existing defense mechanism established by the three parties—the United States, Japan, and South Korea—since the Korean Armistice, nor did they impede the ongoing US-Japan efforts to prepare for a potential Korean contingency. The stability observed during Phase III can be attributed to the authoritarian rule in South Korea, which effectively suppressed negative public sentiment that could have significantly impacted security cooperation. Given their military backgrounds, all three presidents—Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan, and Roh Tae-woo—had a clear understanding of the security implications for South Korea in relation to Japan, particularly in the context of a potential all-out war situation.

Unlike the majority of Phase III (1969 to 1992), in the later portion of Phase III (from 1993, when Kim Young-sam assumed the South Korean Presidency, to 1995), as well as in Phase IV (1996 to 2014) and Phase V (2015 to 2023), public opinion became a prominent factor in South Korea. This shift was a result of the democratization process that unfolded in the late 1980s. It can be observed that during the early 1990, when President Kim Young-sam implemented a hostile policy towards Japan, including territorial issues concerning Dokdo/Takeshima,¹⁶³ Japan's security contribution appeared to decrease on the surface. However, this period coincided with the United States and Japan adjusting to the changing

¹⁶⁰ Hahn Bae-ho, "Korea-Japan Relations in the 1970s," *Asian Survey* 20, no.11 (1980): 1087-1097. The occurrence deepened the rift between Japan and South Korea, and the subsequent year witnessed further deterioration in their relations due to Moon Se-gwang's assassination attempt on President Park.

¹⁶¹ Han Sung-joo, "South Korea in 1974: The "Korean Democracy" on Trial," *Asian Survey* 15, no.1 (1975): 35-42. Following the assassination attempt on President Park by Moon, a Korean resident of Japan, the relations between Japan and South Korea became significantly strained and reached a critical point.

¹⁶² Kenneth B. Pyle, "Japan Besieged: The Textbook Controversy: Introduction," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 9, no.2 (1983): 297-300. The textbook controversy of 1982 ignited intense debate as South Korea perceived it as a disclosure of the Japanese government's unapologetic militarist intentions.

¹⁶³ I have alphabetically arranged the two distinct names.

dynamics of the post-Cold War era, triggered by the collapse of the communist bloc. Despite some novel approaches, such as the withdrawal of US tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, the initial North Korean nuclear crisis incentivized the tripartite (United States, Japan, and South Korea) to maintain the Cold War defense structure in the Far East.

Consequently, Japan implemented measures during Phase IV and Phase V to enhance its ability to contribute to its US counterpart in the event of a Korean contingency. Notable examples of these measures are the 1997 Defense Guidelines and the 1999 SIASJ Law. During Phase IV and V, particularly under the administrations of Presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in, historical issues related to Japan's colonial rule were frequently exploited to strain the relationship between the two countries. Additionally, attempts were made to pursue an equidistance diplomacy, prioritizing the reconciliation between the two Koreas and taking a step back from tripartite security cooperation. For instance, President Kim Dae-jung opted not to participate in the establishment of the US missile defense in the Far East, which contrasted with Japan's eagerness to work in unison with its US counterpart. However, it is important to note that Japan's potential security contribution concerning a Korean contingency actually increased during Phase IV and Phase V. This was achieved through various measures aimed at enhancing the capabilities of the JSDF and expanding their role, enabling them to provide operational support to US forces in the event of a Korean contingency. These measures include the 2015 security legislation, the 2015 Defense Guidelines, and the US-Japan Operation Plan 5055, which incorporated a scenario for a Korean contingency.

1.8.2. Fear of US Abandonment Is Not a Sole Factor When It Comes to Japan's Contribution

During the entire analytical timeframe from 1950 to 2023, a notable trend emerges: when the United States' security commitment to South Korea decreased, Japan's security contribution to South Korean defense increased. However, it is important to highlight that Japan's security contribution did not diminish even when the United States heightened its security commitment to South Korea. This aspect stands in direct opposition to Victor Cha's theory, which suggests that Japan and South Korea would align less when the United States had a strong defense commitment in the Far East.

During the 1980s (within Phase III), the United States commitment to South Korea notably strengthened under President Reagan, resulting in a reduction of the fear of abandonment among Japan and South Korea. Simultaneously, Japan's commitment to South

Korea's defense increased, as evidenced by Prime Minister Nakasone's stance and the provision of a \$4 billion loan for economic cooperation for security purpose. In this context, Japan's decisions during the 1980s are more accurately described as aligning with South Korea due to a shared perception of the threat (related to the potential of an all-out North Korean attack on South Korea), rather than alignment driven primarily by the perceived weakening of US commitment to South Korea. In other words, Japan's perception of the threat played a crucial role in its decision to reinforce South Korean defense during the 1980s, rather than being solely motivated by the fear of abandonment stemming from the US commitment.¹⁶⁴

In that sense, it can be argued that when the fear of abandonment intensifies due to a decreased in US commitment to South Korea, Japan is motivated to strengthen South Korean defense. However, when the US commitment increases, Japan's incentive to contribute to South Korean defense arises only when Japan perceives North Korea as a threat to South Korea. This clarifies why Japan consistently heightened its commitment to South Korea, bolstering the capabilities of its JSDF and expanding their role in the event of a Korean contingency during Phase IV and Phase V.

This trend persisted even during periods when South Korea prioritized reconciliation with North Korea, as observed during the presidencies of Kim Dae-jung (1998 to 2003), Roh Moo-hyun (2003 to 2008), and Moon Jae-in (2017 to 2022). The reason for this persistence was North Korea's nuclear development, along with the development of long-range missiles, which posed a direct threat to Japan. Additionally, there was the concern about the potential for North Korea to engage in an all-out war against South Korea, leveraging its nuclear capabilities as a significant threat. It is important to note that Japan's contribution was voluntary and not coerced by the United States, except during the Korean War, specifically until 1952 when Japan was under US occupation. From this perspective, Japan's security contribution to South Korea is expected to increase in the future, even if the US commitment remains strong, due to North Korea's ongoing development of missiles and nuclear weapons, which pose direct and indirect threats to Japan's national security.

1.9. Hypothesis Test

In light of the general findings and the tangible contributions—including logistical

¹⁶⁴ Another potential motive for Nakasone to assist the South Koreans could have been to gain favor with the United States.

support, financial and technological assistance, and operational support—observed during the analyzed period, I intend to examine four hypotheses outlined in the introduction. These hypotheses are as follows:

1. Japan's commitment to South Korea's security hinges on its desire to gain the approval of the United States. Whenever Japan seeks to garner favor from the United States, it tends to elevate its security contributions to South Korea. Conversely, when Japan does not have the need to gain favor from the United States, it tends to reduce its security commitments to South Korea.
2. Japan's security support for South Korea is based on its assessment of the North Korean threat to South Korea. When Japan perceives that the North Korean threat to South Korea is significant, it tends to amplify its security contributions to South Korea. Conversely, when Japan assesses that the North Korean threat to South Korea is minor, its inclinations to reduce its security contributions to South Korea becomes more apparent.
3. Japan's security contribution to South Korea depends on Japan's evaluation of the United States' defense commitment to South Korea. When Japan perceives a less robust US defense commitment to South Korea, it is more likely to increase its security support for South Korea. Conversely, when Japan perceives a strong US defense commitment to South Korea, its inclination to bolster its security contributions to South Korea diminishes.
4. Japan's security contribution to South Korea is influenced by the strength and vocal opposition of Socialist and Communist factions within Japan to the government's security policies. When these factions hold significant sway and openly challenge Japan's security policies, it tends to limit Japan's security contributions to South Korea. Conversely, when the Socialist and Communist factions do not strongly oppose the Japanese government, Japan's security contributions are less constrained.

1.9.1. Hypothesis 1

The significant instances of Japan seeking favor from the United States were particularly noteworthy in the early years of the Korean War (1950-1952). This objective was evident in Prime Minister Yoshida's endeavors to secure favorable terms for the San Francisco

Treaty, a stance observed by high-ranking officials like Okubo Takeo.¹⁶⁵ It was also implied in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' report titled "The Korean War and Our Stance." A similar position was reflected in the publication "Our Stance on the Korean War" by Doyukai (Japan Association of Corporate Executives) in August 1950.¹⁶⁶ Despite Japan's official policy of cooperation with the United Nations and offering full support to the United States, this cooperation was selective. For instance, Japanese political leaders strongly opposed the idea of sending Japanese volunteers to the Korean front. In July 1950, Yoshida firmly stated that Japan had renounced the right to engage in belligerent actions and emphasized Japan's commitment to peace. In this context, Yoshida instructed that the minesweeping operation be conducted discreetly, with a low-profile approach, and without public knowledge.

Another instance of Japan seeking favor from the United States can be observed in the late 1960s to early 1970s when Japan pursued the return of sovereignty over Okinawa. Prime Minister Sato recognized the importance of Okinawa's reversion and made it a major political issue, emphasizing that the return of Okinawa to its homeland was crucial to concluding the post-war period for Japan.¹⁶⁷ However, this approach raised concerns in both the United States and South Korea regarding potential limitations on the US forces' use of Okinawa as a launching and logistic pad in the event of a Korean contingency. Eventually, in 1969, Prime Minister Sato acknowledged the significance of South Korea to Japan's security and promised that Tokyo would respond "positively and promptly" to requests from the United States to use bases in Japan, including Okinawa, in a Korean contingency. Despite critics in Japan (this group encompasses members of the Socialist Party, including figures like Saburo Eda, as well as residents of Okinawa) arguing that allowing Okinawa's bases to be used in a Korean contingency was too high a price for the reversion, the US presence was maintained, and Okinawa continued to serve as a crucial launching pad for US forces in the Far East.

Considering these two cases, it can be said that Japan provided security contribution to South Korea when Japan aimed to secure favor from the United States, even though it involved a calculate tradeoff. This tradeoff meant that Japan selectively determined the type of contribution it would provide, without fully complying with all of the US' demands or

¹⁶⁵ Okubo Takeo served as the director of the Maritime Safety Board (MSB) when the Korean War began, and during his tenure, the Japanese minesweeping flotilla was deployed to Korean waters in October 1950.

¹⁶⁶ Doyukai, also known as Keizai Doyukai with its English name as the Japan Association of Corporate Executives, is a nonprofit and nonpartisan organization established in 1946 by 83 business leaders who shared a collective vision of aiding in the reconstruction of Japan's economy in the post-war period. In South Korea, a counterpart to this organization is the Federation of Korean Industries.

¹⁶⁷ Priscilla Clapp, and Morton H. Halperin, *United States-Japanese Relations: The 1970s* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 135.

expectations. For example, during the Korean War, Prime Minister Yoshida decided to support the US war efforts on the Korean peninsula as a means to negotiate favorable terms in the San Francisco Treaty. However, Yoshida chose not to send Japanese volunteers as combatants and maintained a low profile when dispatching minesweepers to Korean waters.¹⁶⁸ In the case of the Okinawa reversion, Japan’s ideal outcome would have been the reduction of US military bases and troops, along with complete withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons, from Okinawa. This would have led to a reduced overall extent of Japan’s logistical support provided to South Korea compared to what actually happened (see “Alternate Path” in Figure 5). Nevertheless, Prime Minister Sato prioritized the Okinawa reversion and reached a compromise by allowing US forces to continue using US Forces Japan bases in Okinawa in the post-1972 era. This outcome, of course, contributed to South Korean security, as opposed to the complete or partial withdrawal of US forces and/or the complete or partial relocation of US bases in Okinawa.




Figure 5: Trend of Three Types of Contributions and Hypothesis 1 Test

1.9.2. Hypothesis 2

When the Korean War occurred, Japan took the threat posed by North Korea to South Korea very seriously. For instance, in July 1950, Prime Minister Yoshida mentioned during a session of the Japanese Diet that South Korea was currently in chaos and that communists were advancing toward Japan’s vicinity. Moreover, the report titled “The Korean War and Our Stance,” published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in August 1950, depicted the considerable advancements of North Korean forces into South Korean territory.¹⁶⁹ It also

¹⁶⁸ Roger Dingman, “The Dagger and the Gift: The Impact of the Korean War on Japan,” *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 2, no.1 (1993): 29-55.

¹⁶⁹ Onuma Hisao 大沼久夫, *Chōsen sensō to nippon* 朝鮮戦争と日本 [The Korean War and Japan] (Tokyo: Shinkansha, 2006), 136.

outlined the threat posed by the aggressors and emphasized the imperative for Japan to support the Free World's endeavor to repel the aggressors. Even after the signing of the 1953 Armistice Agreement, Japan continued to view the possibility of an all-out war from North Korea against South Korea with great concern. For example, the 1963 Comprehensive Defense Tabletop Study (Mitsuya Study) envisaged a full-scale attack by North Korea on South Korea.¹⁷⁰ Against the backdrop of the 1960s when Japanese citizens protested against the unequal US-Japan security treaty (1951 version), fearing that Japan could be drawn into regional conflicts by the United States, the disclosure of the Mitsuya Study received highly unfavorable responses. However, the Japanese government emphasized that, like any sovereign nation, Japan had the right to defend itself against external aggression, and the JSDF should be adequately prepared to safeguard the country in any potential scenario. This indicated that Japan genuinely believed that the conventional threat posed by North Korea to South Korea was not an exaggerated idea. This perception continued during the period from 1969 to 1995. While an all-out war did not occur after the signing of the 1953 Armistice Agreement, two incidents in 1968—the Pueblo abduction and the Blue House raid—led Prime Minister Sato to emphasize that such North Korean provocations posed a serious threat to South Korean defense, which in turn was closely related to Japan's national interest. Despite Sato's and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' intention to cooperate with the South Korean government, Japan did not fulfill South Korea's request for counter-guerrilla equipment.¹⁷¹ The Ministry of International Trade and Industry opposed the idea, and conflicting views emerged at the working-level review meeting between relevant Japanese ministries regarding the possibility of arms exports in light of the Three Principles on Arms Export. It could be said that despite Japan's perception of North Korea as a serious threat to South Korea, Japan preferred to adhere to its pacifist constitution and avoided contributing to South Korea's security directly.

During the 1970s, specifically under the leadership of Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, Miki Takeo, and Fukuda Takeo, there was a brief period when Japan perceived the threat posed by North Korea against South Korea as not significant.¹⁷² This perspective was

¹⁷⁰ Hayashi Shigeo 林茂夫, *Zenbun mitsuya sakusen kenkyū* 全文・三矢作戦研究 [Full Text, Mitsuya Strategy Study] (Tōkyō: Banseisha, 1979), 26-27.

¹⁷¹ Choi Kyung-won 崔慶原, “Nichi kan anzen hoshō kankei no keisei bundan taiseika no anpo kiki e no taiō, ichi kyū roku hachi nen” 日韓安全保障関係の形成 分断体制下の「安保危機」への対応、一九六八年 [The Formation of the Korea-Japan Security Relationship: Response to the 1968 Security Crisis under the Divided System], *Kokusai seiji* 国際政治 170 (2012): 141-155.

¹⁷² Shin Jung-hyun, “Japanese-North Korean Relations in the 1970's: From a Linkage Politics Perspective,” *Asian Perspective*, 4, no. 1 (1980): 74-96. While Tanaka served as prime minister, several conservative politicians

exemplified in a statement made by Japanese Foreign Minister Kimura Toshio in August 1972 during a session of the Japanese Diet, suggesting that the North Korean threat was negligible to a vague interpretation of the Korean Clause.¹⁷³ In 1974, Kimura went as far as to propose the consideration of recognizing North Korea.¹⁷⁴ This atmosphere persisted during Prime Minister Fukuda's tenure (1976-1978) and was aligned with Japan's policy of omnidirectional peaceful diplomacy, which aimed to foster enhanced relations with countries in the communist bloc. To be sure, there were incidents in the 1970s when Japan viewed North Korea's threat towards South Korea with concern. As an illustration, during Prime Minister Miki's visit to Washington in August 1975 (which took place several months after the fall of Saigon in April 1975), he reaffirmed the importance of the "Korea Clause" and emphasized that the security of South Korea was closely linked to Japan's own security. Nevertheless, Japan's understanding of the threat posed by North Korea to South Korea during the 1970s was largely influenced by the mood of détente.

However, Japan modified its perception of North Korean threat and came to consider North Korea as a serious threat to South Korea during the 1980s. It is important to note that prior to President Chun proposing the concept of economic cooperation for security purposes, former Prime Minister Tanaka initiated discussions on the idea of Japan shouldering a greater burden by compensating South Korea. Shortly after President Chun assumed office, Tanaka met with South Korean Army General Jeong Ho-yong in 1981 and expressed the view that Japan needed to contribute more economic aid to South Korea. Tanaka emphasized that, considering the precedent of two divisions being stationed during the colonial period, Japan should provide economic assistance to South Korea equivalent to the cost of "maintaining two divisions."¹⁷⁵ This demonstrates that Japanese leaders recognized the efforts made by South Korea in defending against the possibility of all-out aggression by North Korea, which was considered a genuine threat by Japan.

Following the partial resolution of the first North Korean nuclear crisis through the

strongly advocated for increased government flexibility in its policy towards North Korea. They went as far as suggesting that, in light of the evolving international atmosphere driven by détente, there should be considered for the renunciation of the 1969 Nixon-Sato joint communique (which had officially affirmed the interconnectedness of Japan's security with that of South Korea).

¹⁷³ Kim Hong-N., "Japanese-South Korean Relations in the Post-Vietnam Era," *Asian Survey*, 16, no. 10 (1976): 981-995.

¹⁷⁴ Ko Seoung K., "North Korea's Relations with Japan Since Detente," *Pacific Affairs*, 50, no. 1 (1977): 31-44.

¹⁷⁵ Hwang Ki-hyung, "Ilboni hangugui anbo yeokhare hyetaegeul bondaneun 'muimseungcharon'i jegidwaessda" [A "Free-Rider Theory" has been Raised, Claiming that Japan Benefits from South Korea's Security Role], *Iryoseoul*, April 17, 2020.

Agreed Framework in 1994, Japan's perception of the North Korean threat to South Korea somewhat diminished. Akiyama Masahiro¹⁷⁶ highlighted in his memoir that while the Agreed Framework did not yield complete success due to the United States' mishandling, a major war did not erupt during the 1990s.¹⁷⁷ Akiyama further noted that despite incidents like the 1996 Gangneung submarine infiltration, the South Korean military effectively managed such provocations. This suggests that the combined forces of the United States and South Korea possessed sufficient conventional power to deter all-out conventional aggression from North Korea. Nevertheless, in Phase V (2015-2023), Japan witnessed a rise in its perception of the North Korean threat to South Korea. While Japan acknowledges that North Korea's conventional forces are significantly inferior to those of the US Forces Korea and South Korea, Japan believes that North Korea's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and missile presents a grave and immediate risk to the security of South Korea (as implied in the Japanese annual defense white paper, 2023 edition).

Taking this information into account, it can be stated that Japan heightened its security contributions to South Korea when it perceived a significant North Korean threat to South Korea. Whenever an incident or development triggered by North Korea was seen as detrimental to South Korean security from the Japanese standpoint, Japan initiated a contribution (see Figure 6). However, the specific type of contribution selected by the Japanese government varied over time. For example, when Yoshida expressed his concerns at the outset of the Korean War, he opted to provide the highest level of contribution in the logistical and operational fields. Conversely, when North Korea attempted to assassinate President Park in 1968, the Japanese did not supply anti-guerrilla weapons but offered financial and technological assistance. Such decision enabled South Korea to build the Pohang steel mill and subsequently pursue full-scale industrialization. Similarly, when President Park was assassinated, and President Chun came into power, and when South Korea was perceived to be vulnerable to North Korean provocation, political figures like Tanaka Kakuei emphasized the importance of support South Korea, at least through financial and technological assistance. This ultimately led to Japan's decision to provide a \$4 billion fund to South Korea, starting in 1982. Fast forward to when North Korea demonstrated its nuclear capabilities by conducting nuclear tests in the 2000s, Japan became concerned about the implications for South Korean security. Consequently, Japan notably increased its potential capabilities in both the operational and logistical fields, revising the Defense Guidelines and

¹⁷⁶ Akiyama Masahiro served as Japan's former Vice Defense Minister.

¹⁷⁷ Akiyama Masahiro, email message to author, June 21, 2023.

domestic security legislations in 2015 to better respond in the event of a Korean contingency. It is noteworthy that numerous sources suggest a broad consensus among Japanese leaders in the post-war era regarding the concept of security, despite individual variations in interpretation. Such consensus centers on the recognition that South Korea plays a pivotal role as a strategic buffer contributing to Japan's security.¹⁷⁸ Hence, it is logical that based on this perspective, supporting South Korea in resisting North Korean provocations and averting a Korean peninsula under communist occupation is of paramount importance.




Figure 6. Trend of Three Types of Contributions and Hypothesis 2 Test

1.9.3. Hypothesis 3

Regarding Japan's perception of the US commitment to South Korean defense, two notable instances stand out—the declaration of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969 and the assumption of the US presidency by Carter in 1977. During these occasions, Japan perceived a weakening of US commitment to South Korean defense. However, beyond these cases, concrete evidence indicating Japan's serious concern about US commitment to South Korea was limited.

Before the complete withdrawal of the US Seventh Infantry Division from South Korea in March 1971, in line with the Nixon Doctrine, the Japanese government did express concerns. For example, in July 1970, Prime Minister Sato conveyed to Secretary of State William Rogers that the reduction of US military presence would have a substantial impact, emphasizing the delicate timing of such a decision. Additionally, on July 13, 1970, Nakasone, the head of the Defense Agency, voiced negative sentiments about the reduction of US military presence in South Korea in the Japanese Diet. Similarly, on July 30, 1970, the

¹⁷⁸ Nathan White, "Japan's Security Interests in Korea," *Asian Survey* 16, no. 4 (1976): 299-318.

Japanese Foreign Ministry requested the United States to reconsider the reduction of US Forces Korea (USFK). Japanese Ambassador Shimoda Takeso emphasized that the reduction should not be solely judged by numerical figures and that it could undermine South Korea's psychological confidence. However, Japan ultimately accepted the US troop reduction and considered providing economic assistance to South Korea. Yet Japan decided against directly contributing to South Korea's defense.

Similar patterns were observed when Carter became US president in 1977. In March 1977, Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda expressed opposition to the withdrawal of USFK, citing concerns about stability on the Korean peninsula during a discussion with President Carter. However, during Fukuda's meeting with Vice President Walter Mondale that year, Fukuda changed his stance from staunch opposition to a neutral stance (treating the USFK withdrawal as a matter between the United States and South Korea). Fukuda also hesitated to provide direct military support to South Korea. This indicates that while Japan had concerns about US commitment to South Korea during both instances, Japan preferred to adhere to the boundaries of the Yoshida Doctrine and remained hesitant to directly contribute to South Korea's defense sector.

Since President Reagan assumed office in 1981, Japan held the perception that the United States had a relatively robust commitment to the defense of South Korea. However, this perception weakened during the Trump administration. In April 2018, when President Trump suggested reducing or completely withdrawing the US forces in South Korea, Prime minister Abe opposed the idea, fearing it would upset the military balance in East Asia. During that time, the Japanese government expressed concern that a significant reduction or complete withdrawal of US forces in South Korea would hinder the US' ability to respond quickly in the event of a Korean contingency. Nonetheless, Japan's perception of US commitment to South Korea during the Trump administration (Phase V: 2015-2023) was "moderate." In contrast, Japan's perception of US commitment to South Korea during the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations was deemed "weak," as it appeared to be a consistent pattern based on Nixon Doctrine rather than just the fleeting decision of a single president.

With respect to Hypothesis 3, it aligns with the late 1960s and 1970s, as during that period, Japan was more inclined to increase its security support for South Korea when it perceived a weaker US defense commitment. However, this alignment is not as strong in the 1980s and 2010s, as Japan's inclination to bolster its security contributions to South Korea did not decreased even when it perceived a strong US defense commitment. While it is evident that the declaration of the Nixon Doctrine cause concerns among Japanese

policymakers and motivated them to assist South Korea in the early 1970s, it was during the Reagan administration, a period when the United States' defense commitment was indisputably at its strongest in modern history, that Japan chose to engage in economic cooperation for security purposes in the 1980s (see Figure 7). Additionally, Japan's significant enhancement of its potential in the operational and logistical fields took place during the Obama administration, a time when US defense commitment was at a moderate level (although it may have been weaker than during the Reagan administration, it was nowhere near the level during the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations).




Figure 7. Trend of Three Types of Contributions and Hypothesis 3 Test

1.9.4. Hypothesis 4

Both the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) and Japanese Communist Party (JCP) consistently adhered to their stance, at least during the Cold War period, which emphasized strict compliance with Article 9 of the Constitution and the dissolution of the JSDF since their inception. Additionally, both parties vehemently opposed the US-Japan Security Treaty. Essentially, both the JSP and JCP strongly objected to Japan's involvement in security contributions to South Korea, particularly in the logistic and operational sectors, as these activities were closely linked to the presence of US military bases in Japan and the expanded role of the JSDF in the event of a Korean contingency. Naturally, the JSP and JCP criticized any form of security cooperation with the United States and made multiple noteworthy attempts to influence Japanese government's security policies during the post-war period.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁹ In the post-Cold War period, the stances of both the JSP and JCP underwent notable shifts. The JSP was dissolved in 1996 after experiencing internal divisions: it merged with a more moderate faction to form the Social Democratic Party of Japan, which adopted a more pragmatic approach to defense issues. Meanwhile, the JCP

For example, just before the outbreak of the Korean War in 1949, when US troops were on the process of complete withdrawal from South Korea, there were domestic communist efforts to disrupt the Yoshida cabinet as a protest against the US occupation. The Japan Communist Party spread rumors of an imminent revolution that would establish a people's government, and the secretary of the Japanese Communist Party predicted the overthrow of the Yoshida cabinet by September 1949.¹⁸⁰ Furthermore, during the renewal negotiations of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, the JSP, along with the JCP, played a significant role in organizing mass protest and demonstrated against the treaty. These actions resulted in political turmoil and increased pressure on the government. Meanwhile, in the 1970s, the JSP and JCP gained significant influence in the Diet. For example, in the 1972 general election, the JSP won 118 seats, while the JCP secured 39 seats (out of 491), making them the two largest opposition parties at the time. They actively sought to shape defense politics during this period. For example, in 1973, the JSP effectively secured sufficient votes to prevent the inclusion of inflight refueling systems on Japanese F-4 Phantom jets: these additions were seen as potentially conferring offensive capabilities, which would have violated Article 9.¹⁸¹

Meanwhile, Some might argue that these incidents did not significantly impact Japan's defense policy—and Japan's security contribution to South Korea—as a whole. For instance, in the case of the Communist Party's sabotage attempt in 1949, aimed at creating chaos and demonstrating the incompetence of the Yoshida cabinet, the Japanese government swiftly cracked down in communist movements and restored domestic stability.¹⁸² Subsequently, neither the Japanese Communist Party nor the Japanese Socialist Party could sway Yoshida's decision to fully cooperate with the US war efforts on the Korean peninsula. Similarly, although the 1960 protest may have played a role in Prime Minister Kishi's resignation,¹⁸³ the US-Japan Security Treaty was revised as planned, and the 1960 secret agreement between the United States and Japan ensured Japan's commitment to providing logistic support in the event of a Korean contingency. Moreover, while the JSP gained

maintained a relatively consistent stance, continuing to oppose the SDF and the US-Japan Security Treaty. However, it is worth noting that the JCP's current policy is not fundamentally opposed to the existence of the SDF: in 2000, the JCP stated that it would accept its use in the event of a defensive response to an external attack.

¹⁸⁰ Wada Haruki, *A Korean War: An International History* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 33.

¹⁸¹ Karl W. Eikenberry, "The Japanese Defense Debate: A Growing Consensus," *Parameters* 12, no.1 (1982): 69-78.

¹⁸² Wada Haruki, *A Korean War: An International History* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 33.

¹⁸³ Sarah Kovner, "The Soundproof Superpower: American Bases and Japanese Communities, 1945-1972," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 75, no. 1 (2016): 87-109.

prominence in the Diet during the 1970s (until the 1990 election), it achieved only minor victories, such as preventing the inclusion of refueling systems on Japanese F-4 Phantom Jets. However, it could not prevail in majority of matters: for instance, in 1978, the JSP could not gather enough support to thwart the introduction of F-15 fighter jets.¹⁸⁴ In a similar vein, when Murayama Tomiichi from the JSP served as the Japanese Prime Minister from 1994 to 1996, his defense policies were not significantly different from those of the Liberal Democratic Party: this suggest that if the first North Korean nuclear crisis had escalated into a full-scale war during Murayama's time in office, Japan's response might have closely resembled that of a Prime Minister from the liberal Democratic Party.¹⁸⁵

Nevertheless, one cannot easily conclude that Japan's security assistance to South Korea remained unaffected by the influence or vocal opposition of socialist and communist factions. For example, numerous security-related agreements and documents had to be kept confidential, especially during the Cold War era, due to prevailing public sentiments influenced by anti-war and pacifist ideologies associated with socialist and communist factions. Certain security documents, including the 1960 Secret Agreement, were not disclosed to the public. When their existence was leaked, as seen in the Mitsuya Study, the Prime Minister had to assure the public that it was not a government-sanctioned project and would not be integrated into the official defense plan. While having such contingency plans is not unusual for a sovereign nation, the necessity for secrecy was driven by the prevailing anti-war sentiments.

Similar tendencies persisted into the post-Cold War era, even as socialist and communist factions diminished in influence. Although security agreements and documents were crafted and released to the public during this period, such as the Defense Guidelines and the 2015 Security Legislation, Japan's defense policy-making procedures remained constrained by the legacy of the environment shaped by socialist and communist factions. For instance, the need to revise the 1978 Defense Guidelines was acknowledged by both the United States and Japan, particularly after the 1993-94 North Korean nuclear crisis. However, the revision had to be postponed until 1997 due to public uproar, partly fueled by socialist and communist factions, triggered by the Okinawa rape incident in 1995. This delay was attributed to the lack of an appropriate political environment for Japanese policymakers

¹⁸⁴ Karl W. Eikenberry, "The Japanese Defense Debate: A Growing Consensus," *Parameters* 12, no.1 (1982): 69-78.

¹⁸⁵ Kanehara Nobukatsu, interviewed by author, Tokyo, August 2, 2023.

to proceed with the Defense Guidelines revisions.¹⁸⁶

In summary, the “invisible constraints” established by Japanese socialist and communist factions were important factors that defense decision-makers in Japan had to continually consider throughout the post-war period.¹⁸⁷ Therefore, the strength and vocal opposition of socialist and communist factions did indeed influence Japan’s security contributions to South Korea, both during the Cold War and the post-Cold War era.

¹⁸⁶ Akiyama Masahiro, email message to author, June 21, 2023. Mr. Akiyama emphasized that the pivotal factor behind the 1997 revision of the Guidelines was the revelation of North Korea’s nuclear development, with the aim of enhancing the effectiveness of US-Japan defense cooperation. He further noted that although the discussions on revising the defense Guidelines began in 1995, the vulnerability of the US-Japan alliance itself became apparent following the Okinawa rape incident in the same year. Consequently, the primary focus shifted towards maintaining and strengthening the alliance. Additionally, the negotiations pertaining to the reorganization, consolidation, and reduction of US military bases in Okinawa took precedence as critical issues. Consequently, the discussions on revising the Guidelines were postponed until 1997.

¹⁸⁷ Soeya Yoshihide, interviewed by author, Tokyo, December 12, 2023.

Chapter 2: The Korean War

2.1. Introduction

The Korean War (1950-1953) heightened Japan's strategic significance due to its geographical proximity to the Korean peninsula. Additionally, Japan's extensive knowledge of the Korean peninsula, acquired primarily during the colonial era, was deemed crucial expertise for the US forces. Given the challenges faced by the South Korean forces against the superior firepower of the North Korean forces, combined with the substantial reduction of US military arms after World War II, Japanese support became essential. During the Korean War, Japan provided bases that served as launching pads and training grounds for the UN and South Korean forces. Japanese minesweepers were deployed to clear the waters around the Korean peninsula, enabling UN ships to operate effectively. Japan also accommodated troops and materials from the US mainland, and its transportation system, including railways and ports, played a vital role in supporting the war efforts. To address the heavy attrition of armaments suffered by US forces, especially in the early phase of the war, Japanese factories revitalized and effectively repaired/upgraded leftover military platforms, retuning them to the frontlines. Beginning in 1952, Japanese manufacturers were granted permission to produce weapons and ammunition, which were subsequently shipped to the Korean peninsula. In addition to material support, substantial medical services were provided, with Japanese doctors and nurses offering treatment to the wounded in rear hospitals of the UN. Moreover, although unofficially, Japanese volunteers actively fought against the communist forces. Overall, Japan's contributions during the Korean War were extensively and indispensable. While such support was inevitable due to Japan's occupation until 1952, the Japanese government, led by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, proactively implemented measures to secure favorable terms regarding the San Francisco Treaty and prevent any adverse political and security implications from spilling over from the Korean peninsula.

2.2. US and Japanese Decision-Making Process

2.2.1. US Decision to Use Japan as an Operational Hub

Within two weeks after the outbreak of the Korean War,¹⁸⁸ the Yoshida cabinet decided to support the US war fighting efforts: this included measures to allow Japanese commercial ships to transport materials to South Korea, enabling overtime work for port

¹⁸⁸ July 4, 1950.

laborers, and etc.¹⁸⁹ In August 1950, Japanese government firmly declared its position on the Korean War through a Ministry of Foreign Affairs document titled “The Korean War and Our Stance.”¹⁹⁰ The document made it clear that the only way for Japan to ensure its security and construct a peaceful democratic country was to cooperate with the Western camp—that are United Nations member states, spearheaded by the United States—in the Cold War context. Based on such stance, the Japanese government decided to openly support the UN forces.¹⁹¹ Meanwhile, the United States Army Forces in the Far East,¹⁹² which was organized as an occupying force after Japan’s surrender in August 1945, substantially reduced its size by early 1950, the year when the Korean War broke out.¹⁹³ After reaching its peak at around 300,000 in January 1947, the size of the United States Army forces in the Far East was reduced to 120,000 by June 1949.¹⁹⁴ In short, the size of the United States Army forces in the Far east was drastically reduced by June 1950 and thus the US forces’ readiness in terms of manpower and military platforms was inadequate—or unprepared—for an all-out war.¹⁹⁵ The Korean War broke out under such circumstances, and therefore the United States had to fully utilize Japan as operation base to compensate for such insufficiency. Most of the US forces from the US mainland were initially sent to Japan, received the necessary training and resupply, and were dispatched to the Korean peninsula.¹⁹⁶ In addition, the UN forces as well as Korean troops received military training in Japan.¹⁹⁷ Naturally, Japan’s role as a launching pad necessitated the UN forces to utilize numerous bases situated in Japanese territory—especially for the US forces: as of January 1953, there were 733 US bases scattered around Japan.¹⁹⁸ Robert Murphy, who served as US ambassador to Japan during the Korean War,

¹⁸⁹ Onuma Hisao 大沼久夫, *Chōsen sensō to nippon* 朝鮮戦争と日本 [The Korean War and Japan] (Tokyo: Shinkansha, 2006), 135.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid, 136.

¹⁹¹ Akagi Kanji 赤木完爾, “Chōsen sensō: nippon e no shōgeki to yoha” 朝鮮戦争: 日本への衝撃と余波 [The Korean war: Impact and Aftermath on Japan], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 6.

¹⁹² The United States Army Forces in the Far East, or AFFE, was regrouped and renamed as the United State Army Japan (or USARJ) in 1957.

¹⁹³ Omori Minoru 大森實, *Kōwa no daishō* 講和の代償 [The Price of Peace Treaty] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1981), 63.

¹⁹⁴ During the onset of the Korean War, the Eighth Army stationed in Japan comprised a total of around 45,000 personnel, encompassing both combat troops and supporting units.

¹⁹⁵ John R. Brinkerhoff, “The American Strategy of Unpreparedness,” *Strategic Review* 22, no. 1 (1994): 35.

¹⁹⁶ Yamasaki Shizuo 山崎静雄, *Shijitsu de kataru chōsen sensō kyōryoku no zenyō* 史実で語る朝鮮戦争協力の全容 [The Complete History Regarding the Korean War Cooperation] (Tokyo: Honnoizumisa, 1998), 35.

¹⁹⁷ Nam Ki-jeong, *Kicikwukkaury thansayng ilponi chilun hankwukcencayng* [The Birth of a Base-State: Japan’s Korean War] (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2016), 121.

¹⁹⁸ Nishimura Hideki 西村秀樹, *Chōsen sensō ni sansen shita nippon* 朝鮮戦争に「参戦」した日本 [Japan’s Participation in the Korean War] (Tokyo: San-ichi publishing Co., 2019), 153.

pointed out that the war in the Korean peninsula transformed the Japanese archipelago into a gigantic supply depot and that the United States could not have conducted the war without Japan's logistics and operational support.¹⁹⁹ The United States conducted large-scale air operation—these included bombing operation, air-to-air combat, as well as close air support mission—transportation support, and military exercises using the US military bases in Japan during the Korean War, under the assumption that North Korea's military activities would be confined within the Korean peninsula: Stalin was reluctant to expand the Korean War and concerned with the possibility of a direct military conflict between the two superpowers.²⁰⁰ Furthermore, Japanese minesweepers—under the supervision of the UN forces—cleared major Korean ports.²⁰¹

Thanks to aforementioned contributions, air superiority was secured over the airspace of the Korean peninsula, enemy ground targets were destroyed, necessary materials were supplied to the front lines, and sea routes for the UN naval vessels were secured. In a nutshell, Japan provided crucial rear area support during the Korean War.

2.2.2. Japan's Decision to Support US War Effort

Although it was inevitable that Japan had to provide its territory as a launching pad for the US forces during the Korean War—since Japan was under US occupation—Japan had its own practical reasons to cooperate with the United States.

Firstly, Yoshida believed that the US troop presence was necessary to deter communist expansion in the Far East. Furthermore, the Korean peninsula was regarded as being closely tied to Japan's security. Despite Japan's withdrawal from the continent after World War II, the perspective of perceiving the Korean peninsula as vital from a Japanese security standpoint was still upheld in the post-War Japan. For instance, during May 1946, the Peace Treaty Research Council of Japan's Foreign Ministry out forth a recommendation, emphasizing the need for Japan to anticipate support from the Allied Powers due to the significant impact that the security of Korea would have directly on Japan.²⁰² In that context,

¹⁹⁹ Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (London: Collins, 1964), 424.

²⁰⁰ Jian Chen, *The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the Korean War* (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1992), 27.

²⁰¹ Rajan Menon, "The Once and Future Superpower," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 53, no. 1 (1997): 31.

²⁰² Shoji Junichiro 庄司潤一郎, "Chōsen sensō to nippon: aidentiti, anzen hoshō o meguru jirenma" 朝鮮戦争と日本: アイデンティティ、安全保障をめぐるジレンマ [The Korean War and Japan: Identity and Security Dilemma], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 141-153.

one of the key ways for Japan to ensure UN victory against the communist, apart from dispatching its own forces to the war front—was to provide bases to the UN forces, consisted mostly of the US forces. Due to Japan’s geographical proximity to the Korean peninsula—for instance, Task Force Smith²⁰³ was airlifted from Itazuke Air Base to Busan, which is roughly 217 kilometers—such bases were strategically invaluable for the United States. Initially sending the available US asset—Task Force Smith—in Japan, the United States was able to gauge the enemy’s might and recalibrate the necessary backup. Meanwhile, bombers and naval vessels frequently moved back and forth—Japan and the Korean peninsula—and secured air and maritime dominance in the early phase of the conflict. Furthermore, UN forces and South Korean troops received military training in bases within Japan: troops were able to hone their skills and enhance their warfighting capability. Meanwhile, the long distance from the US mainland to the Far East region necessitated Japan being a huge supply depot. Bearing in mind that the communist side—China and North Korea—had the advantage in terms of manpower, the UN forces had to balance it through other resources. In that sense, numerous supply depots situated in Japan enabled the UN forces to keep up the fight. During the Korean War, 76 percent of the entire war materials were shipped from Japan to Korea.²⁰⁴ In addition, Japan’s ports and transportation enabled these war materials—and personnel—to reach the destination. What connected these US bases in Japan, supply depots and numerous other facilities scattered around in Japan to Japanese ports near the Korean peninsula was the utilization of Japanese national railways. Once troops and materials are assembled, ships²⁰⁵ operated by Japanese crews transported such items to the key Korean ports including Busan, Gunsan, and Incheon. Meanwhile, Japan’s medical support allowed the UN forces to have the effective treatment and lower the fatality.

Secondly, contribution to the United States war efforts was likely to help Japan having a favorable term for the 1951 San Francisco Treaty. Yoshida’s intention to achieve such goal was witnessed by other high-ranking officials like Okubo Takeo.²⁰⁶ To be sure, Yoshida did his utmost not to directly involve Japan in the Korean conflict.²⁰⁷ For example,

²⁰³ Task Force Smith was a US Army infantry unit that was composed of units from the US First Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, the 24th Infantry Division.

²⁰⁴ James A. Huston, *Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War* (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1989), 119.

²⁰⁵ LST (Landing Ship, Tank).

²⁰⁶ Okubo Takeo 大久保武雄, *Uminari no hibi 海鳴りの日々 [A Day When the Sea Ripples]* (Tokyo: Kaiyō mondai kenkyū kai, 1978), 231.

²⁰⁷ United States Congress House Committee on International Relations, *U.S.-Japan Relations and American Interests in Asia: Hearings Before the Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade, and Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress,*

Yoshida flatly rejected the idea of sending Japanese “volunteers” to the Korean peninsula for combat.²⁰⁸ However, he knew that Japan was under US occupation and it might have been extremely difficult to decline the US request for Japan’s support. Thus, within the given leeway, Yoshida promised to fully support the UN efforts as concretized through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs document titled “The Korean War and Our Stance.”²⁰⁹ In line with such stance, Yoshida granted even the most direct way of Japanese involvement—sending Japanese minesweepers to the Korean waters—when the US demanded for such assistance. To attain the political goal of signing the San Francisco treaty in the most advantages term, Yoshida complied with US’ request, except for dispatching Japanese “volunteers” to the combat zone. When faced with burdensome demand, like assigning Japanese minesweepers run by former Japanese Navy crews to US naval operations, Yoshida improvised ways to proceed—by maintaining low profile or keeping the existence of such contribution a secret—rather than refusing it.²¹⁰ Eventually, Japan attained relatively favorable terms concerning the San Francisco Treaty.²¹¹

Thirdly, proactively supplying materials to the UN forces was necessary to boost up the Japanese economy.²¹² The “special demand” that was triggered by the Korean War was far from negligible and was considered as a “gift” to Japan.²¹³ When the Korean War broke out, Japanese leaders—include the Finance Minister Ikeda Hayato—predicted that substantial US expenditures would be spent in Japan, and it would eventually trigger an economic boom.²¹⁴ Such prediction turn out to be accurate. Between 1949 and the first half of 1950, Japanese economy was muddling through a deflationary phase, due to the implementation of

First Session, October 25 and 30, 1995 Volume 4 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 124.

²⁰⁸ Roger Dingman, “The Dagger and the Gift: The Impact of the Korean War on Japan,” *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 2, no.1 (1993): 29-55.

²⁰⁹ Yamasaki Shizuo 山崎静雄, *Shijitsu de kataru chōsen sensō kyōryoku no zenyō* 史実で語る朝鮮戦争協力の全容 [The Complete History Regarding the Korean War Cooperation] (Tokyo: Honnoizumisya, 1998), 42-45. Shoji Junichiro 庄司潤一郎, “Chōsen sensō to nippon: aidentiti, anzen hoshō o meguru jirenma” 朝鮮戦争と日本: アイデンティティ、安全保障をめぐるジレンマ [The Korean War and Japan: Identity and Security Dilemma], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 141-153.

²¹⁰ Okubo Takeo 大久保武雄, *Uminari no hibi* 海鳴りの日々 [A Day When the Sea Ripples] (Tokyo: Kaiyō mondai kenkyū kai, 1978), 209.

²¹¹ Victor D. Cha, *Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2018), 139.

²¹² Okita Saburo, “Japan’s Economy and the Korean War,” *Far Eastern Survey* 20, no.14 (1951): 141-144.

²¹³ Roger Dingman, “The Dagger and the Gift: The Impact of the Korean War on Japan,” *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 2, no.1 (1993): 29-55.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*

the Economic Stabilization Program that was imposed by the United States.²¹⁵ However, Japan’s annual GNP growth marked more than 10 percent in a consecutive manner during the Korean War period (1950-1953).²¹⁶ Such performance is not unrelated to massive US expenditures during the same timeframe. From 1950 to 1954, the United States spent roughly three billion dollars (2.97 billion dollars) in Japan in purchasing war related goods and services (see Table 2): the amount is equivalent to approximately 60 percent of the total funds that the United States infused into the non-communist European countries during the time.²¹⁷ Although the economic benefits of the “Special Demand” was not equally distributed within the Japanese economy—for instance, farmers and small businesses did not fared well during the time—but it is an undisputable fact that the Japanese economy, as a whole, experienced considerable improvement.²¹⁸

Table 2. Special Demand and US aid to Japan (1950 to 1954)²¹⁹

(Unit: million USD)

Year	Special Demand	US aid to Japan
1950	153.6	360.3
1951	624.2	155.3
1952	787.7	5.4
1953	803.2	-
1954	602.3	-
1950 to 1954 / Sum	2,971.0	521.0

Fourthly, the risk of entrapment—Soviet invasion of Japan triggered by Japan’s logistics and operational support to the US war efforts —was relatively low. To be sure, there were attempts by domestic communists to sabotage the Yoshida cabinet. For instance, the Japan Communist Party disseminated rumors of an upcoming revolution that would result in the establishment of a people’s government while the secretary of the Japanese Communist Party,²²⁰ predicted that the Yoshida cabinet would be overthrown by September 1949.²²¹ The Japanese government promptly clamped down communist movements and secured domestic

²¹⁵ Okita Saburo, “Japan’s Economy and the Korean War,” *Far Eastern Survey* 20, no.14 (1951): 141-144.

²¹⁶ Roger Dingman, “The Dagger and the Gift: The Impact of the Korean War on Japan,” *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 2, no.1 (1993): 29-55.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ Okita Saburo, “Japan’s Economy and the Korean War,” *Far Eastern Survey* 20, no.14 (1951): 141-144.

²¹⁹ Imura Kiyoko 井村喜代子, *Gendai nippon ron* 現代日本經濟論 [Contemporary Japanese Economics] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1994), 102.

²²⁰ Tokuda Kyuichi.

²²¹ Wada Haruki, *A Korean War: An International History* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 33.

stability,²²² while any indication of Soviet's direct military intervention in the Korean conflict—and the probability of embarking on a landing operation against Japan—was absent. To be sure, the Soviet troop presence in the Far East region was far from negligible. Yet the Japanese leadership believed that the best way to deter such potential threat was to fully cooperate with the United States and the United Nations. In other words, defending South Korea from communist forces was in line with the defense of Japan.²²³ Such assessment turned out to be accurate. As a matter of fact, Stalin had been extremely reluctant to support Kim Il-sung's plan for an all-out war against South Korea. Due to the possibility that the United States intervened in the Korean conflict and military escalation would ensue, Stalin initially opposed North Korea's war plan.²²⁴ Stalin's concern remained throughout the war. To avoid unnecessary escalation with the United States, Stalin sent only pilots to North Korea and these pilots were instructed not to fly over territory occupied by the enemy.²²⁵ Given these factors, it could be said that Japan's proactive security contribution during the Korean War was a reasonable and rational decision made by the Japanese decision makers.

To be sure, Japan's contribution had a price tag. While many Japanese workers were recruited and utilized in various fields—for example, transporting UN soldiers in between Japan and the Korean peninsula, supplying war materials to the UN forces, loading/unloading war materials in major Japanese ports—during the Korean War, these Japanese were subject to accidents.²²⁶ Although there are no officially confirmed figure of the total Japanese killed in the Korean War,²²⁷ it is estimated that in the initial six months of the Korean War (June 1950 to January 1951), 381 of the Japanese workers were either dead or injured (53 dead, 328 injured).²²⁸ In addition, Japanese casualties inflicted during the minesweeping operation in the Korean waters is nine (one dead, eight injured): one ship was sunk at Wonsan and other one was run aground in Gunsan.²²⁹

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Onuma Hisao 大沼久夫, *Chōsen sensō to nippon* 朝鮮戦争と日本 [The Korean War and Japan] (Tokyo: Shinkansha, 2006), 136.

²²⁴ Wada Haruki, *A Korean War: An International History* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 39.

²²⁵ Kathryn Weatherby, *Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New evidence from Russian Archives* (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1993), 28.

²²⁶ Onuma Hisao 大沼久夫, *Chōsen sensō to nippon* 朝鮮戦争と日本 [The Korean War and Japan] (Tokyo: Shinkansha, 2006), 109.

²²⁷ Tessa Morris-Suzuki, "Post-War Warriors: Japanese Combatants in the Korean War," *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 10, no.1 (2012): 1-19.

²²⁸ Occupation Forces Procurement History Committee, 占領軍調達史編さん委員会, *Senryōgun chōtatsushi* 占領軍調達史 [Procurement History of the Occupation Forces] (Tokyo: Research Division, General Affairs Department, Procurement Agency, 1956), 576.

²²⁹ Maritime Staff Office Defense Department 海上幕僚監部防衛部編, "Kimitsu chōsen dōran tokubetsu sōkaishi" 機密 朝鮮動乱特別掃海史 [Confidential: The History of the

2.3. Bases

2.3.1. Ground Operations

Facing 60,000 North Korean troops armed with Soviet tanks, the South Korean troops withdrew to the southernmost part of the Peninsula at the initial stage of the Korean War.²³⁰ The UN Security Council resolution, which was adopted on June 27, called the member states of the United Nations to provide necessary assistance to South Korea in order to repel the invaders and restore peace and security in the region.²³¹ Side by side with the UN resolution, US President Harry S. Truman granted Douglas MacArthur—as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers²³²—to freely utilize the US forces stationed in Japan for the defense of South Korea.²³³ As a follow up measure, MacArthur dispatched his available troops from Japan—the 24th Infantry Division, or Task Force Smith—to the Korean peninsula. Task Force Smith was airlifted to Pusan, using the Itazuke Air Base—which served as the Air Force headquarter for air operation during the Korean War—in northern Kyushu.²³⁴

As the war began in the Korean peninsula, the Japanese military bases served as a training venue for the UN forces—mostly comprised of US troops—as well as the South Korean troops.²³⁵ Most of the US reinforcements from the US mainland were initially sent to Japan for military training and transported to the Korean peninsula via Moji port, Shimonoseki.²³⁶ Side by side with basic military training, new equipment training was held in Japan. Newly rolled out tanks—M-46, M-47, and T41E1 Walker Bulldog tanks—were first sent to Japan for the crews/mechanics to get used to these platforms and then shipped to the Korean peninsula.²³⁷

Meanwhile, South Korean soldiers were sent from the Korean peninsula to Fuji

Special Minesweeping Units During the Korean War], (Kaijō bakuryōkanbu bōeibu, 1961), 116.

²³⁰ Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (London: Collins, 1964), 424.

²³¹ James R. Arnold, and Roberta Wiener, *Understanding U.S. Military Conflicts Through Primary Sources [4 Volumes]* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2015), 425.

²³² The acronym SCAP, which stands for Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, is used to refer to the highest military authority in post-World War II Japan.

²³³ William Manchester, *American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964* (New York: Back Bay Books, 1979), 506.

²³⁴ William M. Leary, *Anything, Anywhere, Anytime Combat Cargo in the Korean War* (Pennsylvania: DIANE Publishing Company, 2008), 1. The 24th Infantry Division was deployed in Kokura and Kita-Kumamoto, which were relatively close to the Korean peninsula. This distance between Kokura and Pusan is approximately 219 kilometers, while the distance between Kita-Kumamoto and Pusan is about 296 kilometers.

²³⁵ Edward A. Olsen, *U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity a Neo-Internationalist View* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), 75.

²³⁶ Yamasaki Shizuo 山崎静雄, *Shijitsu de kataru chōsen sensō kyōryoku no zenyō* 史実で語る朝鮮戦争協力の全容 [The Complete History Regarding the Korean War Cooperation] (Tokyo: Honnoizumisyā, 1998), 35.

²³⁷ Steve E. Dietrich, “In-Theater Armored Force Modernization,” *Military Review* 73, no. 10 (1993): 38-39.

Training camp using the Yokohama port.²³⁸ In August 1950, McArthur ordered General Walton H. Walker to dispatch 8,000 South Korean recruits to Japan.²³⁹ In total, 8,637 South Korean recruits were sent to Japan and was assigned to support the US 7th Infantry Division.²⁴⁰ During mid-August, 1950 they were sent to East Fuji training area.²⁴¹ Within the timeframe of three weeks, these recruits had to learn basic skills—including rifle practice and rudimentary field sanitation—since these South Korean men were ineffective and untrained as soldiers.²⁴² In US military bases in Japan, South Korean recruits were equipped with US military uniforms and M-1 rifles.²⁴³ After conducting the military training, these troops were redeployed to the frontlines—from September 7 to 8, 1950—via Yokohama port.²⁴⁴ When the 7th US Infantry Division conducted the Incheon landing operation in September 1950, at least 35 percent of the 7th US Infantry Division was comprised of South Korean soldiers that were trained in Japan.²⁴⁵ These South Korean soldier became the first installments of the Korean Augmentation to the US Army (KATUSA).²⁴⁶ Apart from the foot soldiers, South Korean military officers also enrolled in training programs in Japan.²⁴⁷ Led by Colonel Shin Eung-kyun, 33 South Korean army officers received their training in Japan in 1950: nine in 1st Cavalry Division, eight in Sendai, eight in Osaka, and eight in Fukuoka.²⁴⁸ Meanwhile, hundreds of ethnic Koreans who joined the pro-Seoul Korean Residents Union in Japan as

²³⁸ Ishmaru Yasuzo, “The Korean War and Japanese Ports: Support for the UN Forces and Its Influences,” *NIDS Security Reports*, no. 8 (2007): 55-70.

²³⁹ Edward H. Simmons, *Over the Seawall: U.S. Marines at Incheon* (Washington D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2000), 10.

²⁴⁰ Moon Kwan-hyun, “6·25 jeonjaeng si katusa jedowa yuen chamjeon budaeroui hwakdae” [A Study on the KATUSA in the Korean War], *Military History*, no. 69 (2008): 191-224. During the course of the Korean War, additional South Korean recruits who were designated to support US troops, known as KATUSA (Korean Augmentation to United States Army), underwent training in South Korea under the guidance of US military instructors.

²⁴¹ Ishmaru Yasuzo, “The Korean War and Japanese Ports: Support for the UN Forces and Its Influences,” *NIDS Security Reports*, no. 8 (2007): 55-70. Wada Haruki, *The Korean War: An International History* (Blue Ridge Summit: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2018), 143.

²⁴² Edward H. Simmons, *Over the Seawall: U.S. Marines at Incheon* (Washington D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2000), 10.

²⁴³ *Korean War Legacy Foundation*, <https://koreanwarlegacy.org/interviews/chong-rae-sok/> (accessed January 13, 2023).

²⁴⁴ Ishmaru Yasuzo, “The Korean War and Japanese Ports: Support for the UN Forces and Its Influences,” *NIDS Security Reports*, no. 8 (2007): 55-70.

²⁴⁵ Moon Kwan-hyun, “6·25 jeonjaeng si katusa jedowa yuen chamjeon budaeroui hwakdae” [A Study on the KATUSA in the Korean War], *Military History*, no. 69 (2008): 191-224. In different source, the figure is suggested as 45 percent. *Eighth Army*, <https://8tharmy.korea.army.mil/ncoa/kta.asp> (accessed January 13, 2023).

²⁴⁶ Edward H. Simmons, *Over the Seawall: U.S. Marines at Incheon* (Washington D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2000), 10.

²⁴⁷ Sasaki Harutaka 佐々木春隆, *Chōsen sensō kankoku hen chū* 朝鮮戦争：韓国篇中 [The Korean War: Korean Part Volume 2] (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1976), 101.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.* These 33 officers consist of 1st Cavalry Division, the 7th Division, the 25th Division, and the 24th Division.

volunteer combatants were also trained in US bases in Japan from August to October 1950.²⁴⁹

The bulk of the UN soldiers who received their training in Japan were the Americans. During the Korean War the US forces utilized numerous training camps including Shimamatsu (Hokkaido prefecture), Ojojihara (Miyagi prefecture), Somagahara (Gunma prefecture), East-Fuji (Shizuoka prefecture), Aibano (Shiga prefecture), Shinodayama (Osaka prefecture), Hijudai (Oita prefecture), and Oyanohara (Kumamoto prefecture).²⁵⁰ At the largest US training ground in Ojojihara situated in northeast Japan, US military comprised of army, artillery, and communication units conducted comprehensive exercises.²⁵¹ Established in September 1950, East-Fuji Training Area contained four camps and many ammunition storages and accommodated the 1st Cavalry Division.²⁵² Meanwhile, the US troops used Hijudai Training Area as their final training place due to the site's geographical proximity to the Korean peninsula: from Hijudai Training Area to Busan is less than 315 kilometers.²⁵³ Similarly to the Hijudai Training Area, Oyanohara Training Area functioned as an important training venue during the Korean War thanks to its short distance to the Korean peninsula: from Oyanohara Training Area to Busan is 320 kilometers.²⁵⁴ Aibano Training Area served as a target range for US artillery and air units.²⁵⁵

2.3.2. Air Operations

Japan's airfield was massively utilized for air operation.²⁵⁶ Although US Far East Command had roughly 400 combat aircraft in Japan, Guam, and the Philippines, the largest portion— was deployed at Japan.²⁵⁷ When the Korean War broke out, the US Far East Air Force had 1,072 aircrafts (73 B-26 bombers, 27 B-29 bombers, 504 F-80 fighters, and 42 F-

²⁴⁹ Tessa Morris-Suzuki, "Post-War Warriors: Japanese Combatants in the Korean War," *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 10, no.1 (2012): 1-19.

²⁵⁰ Yamasaki Shizuo 山崎静雄, *Shijitsu de kataru chōsen sensō kyōryoku no zenyō* 史実で語る朝鮮戦争協力の全容 [The Complete History Regarding the Korean War Cooperation] (Tokyo: Honnoizumisya, 1998), 35.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Ground Self-Defense Force Fuji School Special Task Force 陸上自衛隊富士学校特科会, *Nippon hōheishi: jeitai hōhei kako genzai mirai* 日本砲兵史: 自衛隊砲兵過去現在未来 [Japanese Artillery History: Self-Defense Force Artillery Units' Past, Present, and Future] (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1980), 742.

²⁵⁶ Such function included aircraft maintenance—resupply and repair—and medical support.

²⁵⁷ Wayne Thompson and Bernard C. Nalty, *Within Limits: The US Air Force and the Korean War* (Washington D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1996), 4. During that period, Japan hosted a deployment of eight squadrons of F-80 fighter aircraft, two squadrons of B-26 light bombers, three squadrons of F-82 fighters, and one squadron of F-51 fighters from the Royal Australian Air Force.

82 fighters) at its disposal,²⁵⁸ which were dispatched from bases in Japan to the Korean peninsula.

US fighter jets were directly dispatched from 15 Japanese bases to the Korean peninsula.²⁵⁹ Fighter jets were mainly dispatched from bases in Kyushu:²⁶⁰ since the distance between northern Kyushu and Pusan was approximately 220 kilometers, fighters launched from Japan could reach the Korean peninsula within a short period of time: it is a flight distance that a F-86 Sabre jets could cover within fifteen minutes.²⁶¹ In addition, the maximum flight radius for US fighter jets using auxiliary fuel tanks was slightly longer than the distance between northern Kyushu and Seoul.²⁶² In total, the US Air Force launched 729,800 sorties from their bases in Japan, which served as a crucial launching pad for operations directed towards the Korean peninsula throughout the duration of the Korean War.²⁶³

Meanwhile, heavy bombers—the B-29 bombers—were dispatched from air bases such as Yokota, Tachikawa, Itami and Kadena.²⁶⁴ From these bases, B-29s conducted extensive conventional bombing campaigns in the Korean peninsula (both in South Korean and North Korean territories) during the Korean War.²⁶⁵ These B-29s were utilized during the entirety of the Korean War. Two days after the outbreak of the Korean War, President Truman sanctioned the use of US air forces in action. That same day, all available B-29s in

²⁵⁸ Yamasaki Shizuo 山崎静雄, *Shijitsu de kataru chōsen sensō kyōryoku no zenyō* 史実で語る朝鮮戦争協力の全容 [The Complete History Regarding the Korean War Cooperation] (Tokyo: Honnoizumisya, 1998), 36.

²⁵⁹ Nishimura Hideki 西村秀樹, *Chōsen sensō ni sansen shita nippon* 朝鮮戦争に「参戦」した日本 [Japan's Participation in the Korean War] (Tokyo: San-ichi publishing Co., 2019), 151-152. Shoji Junichiro 庄司潤一郎, “Chōsen sensō to nippon no taiō (zoku): yamaguchi ken o jirei toshite” 朝鮮戦争と日本の対応 (続) : 山口県を事例として [The Korean War and Japan's Response (Continued): The Case of Yamaguchi Prefecture], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 168-186.

²⁶⁰ Bases such as Ashiya, Itasuke and Tsuiki were located in the Kyushu region.

²⁶¹ The calculation is derived from the top speed of the F-86 Sabre, which is around 1,100 kilometers per hour.

²⁶² Yamasaki Shizuo 山崎静雄, *Shijitsu de kataru chōsen sensō kyōryoku no zenyō* 史実で語る朝鮮戦争協力の全容 [The Complete History Regarding the Korean War Cooperation] (Tokyo: Honnoizumisya, 1998), 37. The distance between Kita-Kyushu and Seoul is roughly 539 kilometers.

²⁶³ Shoji Junichiro 庄司潤一郎, “Chōsen sensō to nippon no taiō (zoku): yamaguchi ken o jirei toshite” 朝鮮戦争と日本の対応 (続) : 山口県を事例として [The Korean War and Japan's Response (Continued): The Case of Yamaguchi Prefecture], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 168-186.

²⁶⁴ Yamasaki Shizuo 山崎静雄, *Shijitsu de kataru chōsen sensō kyōryoku no zenyō* 史実で語る朝鮮戦争協力の全容 [The Complete History Regarding the Korean War Cooperation] (Tokyo: Honnoizumisya, 1998), 199-200.

²⁶⁵ B. Chance Saltzman and Thomas R. Searle, *Introduction to the United States Air Force* (Alabama: Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, 2001), 128.

the Far East were relocated to Kadena Air Base.²⁶⁶ Eventually on July 28, 1950, four B-29s were sent to Korean peninsula from Kadena Air Base as the first installments.²⁶⁷ In the initial months of the war, B-29s took off from Japan and destroyed military targets mainly located in North Korea.²⁶⁸ Yet once these targets were neutralized within a few months after the outbreak of war, the B-29's primary task was switched to supporting UN units on the ground.²⁶⁹ Thanks to the air dominance of the UN forces in the initial phase of the war, B-29 conducted daylight bombing operations; although the existence of North Korean anti-aircraft guns was nuisance to the pilots, high altitude bombing allowed negligible damage. However, when the Soviet MiG-15 jets were introduced in the war front in November as well as the intervention of the Chinese air force, B-29s switched to nighttime operations until the Armistice Agreement was signed on 1953, due to the increasing risk involved.²⁷⁰ In the course of the Korean War, the US Air Force, operating from their bases in Japan, conducted bombing operations that resulted in a total of 476,000 tons of bombs dropped.²⁷¹

Speaking of logistics, the United States faced with a number of logistic issues concerning aircraft. For instance, fighter jets (F-51s) and light bombers (B-26s) that were sent from the US continent to Japan were subject to corrosive elements—sea air and salt water—while shipping long distance.²⁷² Therefore, these platforms had to be taken care of before being deployed to the combat zone.²⁷³ Furthermore, the introduction of new types of aircraft (for example, the F-86s) compounded logistic issue since it was difficult to predict the amount the expendable spare parts based on past track record.²⁷⁴ Although logistics for B-29s had relatively less demanding—since B-29s were introduced during World War II and were already stationed in places like Japanese mainland, Okinawa, and Guam that were not far from the Korean peninsula—in comparison to other smaller aircraft like F-80 jets, B-29s had

²⁶⁶ Air Force History and Museums Program, *Steadfast and Courageous: FEAF Bomber Command and the Air War in Korea, 1950-1953* (Washington D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2000), 4.

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

²⁶⁸ Robert A. Mann, *The B-29 Superfortress Chronology, 1934-1960* (California: McFarland, 2009), 1.

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

²⁷⁰ Clayton K. S. Chun, *Aerospace Power in the Twenty-First Century: A Basic Primer* (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, 2001), 138.

²⁷¹ Shoji Junichiro 庄司潤一郎, "Chōsen sensō to nippon no taiō (zoku): yamaguchi ken o jirei toshite" 朝鮮戦争と日本の対応 (続) : 山口県を事例として [The Korean War and Japan's Response (Continued): The Case of Yamaguchi Prefecture], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS 戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 168-186.

²⁷² William W. Suit, "USAF Logistics in the Korean War," *Air Power History* 49, no. 1 (2002): 46-59.

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

many difficult logistics issues.²⁷⁵ As for the munition and other war materials for B-29s, they were first transported from the US mainland to Japan, and stored in numerous ammunition and supply depots. These war materials were transported from depots to the airfields by Japanese railways. Eventually, B-29 bombers were sent to the Korean peninsula, replenished with bombs and other supplies. Typically, the B-29 bombers flew an average of 30 to 40 planes a day from Japan, carrying bombs ranging from 100 to 1,000 pounds on each mission.²⁷⁶ While Kadena airbase was the biggest launching pad for B-29 bombers in Okinawa, the largest base in the Japanese mainland was the Tachikawa airbase in Tokyo: the latter was used by the former Japanese army air force but was converted into an all-weather base to allow the take-off and landing of B-29 bombers and large transport aircraft.²⁷⁷ The Tachikawa base operated bombers and large transport aircraft in conjunction with various ammunition and supply depots.²⁷⁸ Bombs were transported by truck from nearby ammunition stores and supply depots to Tachikawa. Likewise, napalm, which was manufactured in Tokyo was also gathered in Tachikawa.²⁷⁹




Figure 8. Bomber Pilots Being Briefed on North Korean Targets in Yokota Air Base²⁸⁰

Fatal accidents occurred due to the numerous air operations that were conducted during the Korean War. A B-29 crashed near Tachikawa base, killed 15 people, and damaged almost everything within 1,000 meters of its radius including 100 houses in 1951; a B-29

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Nishimura Hideki 西村秀樹, *Chōsen sensō ni sansen shita nippon* 朝鮮戦争に「参戦」した日本 [Japan's Participation in the Korean War] (Tokyo: San-ichi publishing Co., 2019), 152.

²⁷⁷ Lee Jong-pan, "Hankwukcencayngsi ilponuy hwupangiwen" [Japan's Rear Support During the Korean War], *Military History*, no. 46 (2002): 255-298.

²⁷⁸ Ibid. Most notable ammunition depots include Yokota, Chofu, Iruma, and Tama ammunition depots.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Source: The United States Air Force.

crashed in Saitama prefecture, causing 4 Japanese civilian death in 1952;²⁸¹ in the same year, another B-29 crashed in Yui Village, Tokyo.²⁸² In addition, US cargo planes—the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron—were dispatched from Ashiya Air Base in southern Japan. Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Phil Cage, the ‘Kyushu Gypsies’—nickname of the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron—bore the brunt of transportation task from southern Japan to the Pusan perimeter during the early phases of the Korean War.²⁸³

2.3.3. Naval Operations

Throughout the Korean War, Japanese ports—including Sasebo, Yokosuka, and Yokohama—were utilized by the US Navy for various military operation: this includes naval bombardment, naval blockade, maritime escort, amphibious landing, and maritime transportation. As of June 1950, just before the outbreak of the war in the Korean peninsula, there were only 22 naval vessels—five ships under Task Force 90 and 17 minesweepers under Task Force 96—allocated to the US Navy’s operations in the Far East.²⁸⁴ Once the North Korean military crossed the 38th parallel, additional naval vessels were sent from the ports of US mainland and assembled in Japan. Until the Incheon landing operation took place in September 1950, MacArthur ordered destroyers and cruiser stationed in Japanese ports to conduct naval bombardments around the shores of the Korean peninsula: alongside with other naval vessels, heavy cruiser *Helena* for example, shelled enemy troops, armored vehicles, supply trucks, and etc.²⁸⁵ MacArthur also conveyed his orders to Admiral James H. Doyle to ship 25th and 27th Infantry Divisions to Pusan and escort these transportation ships in July 1950 while the UN and South Korean ground troops were keep retreating to the South-eastern part of the Korean peninsula: these US divisions were dispatched from Kobe port.²⁸⁶ Shortly thereafter, MacArthur decided to further dispatch the First Cavalry Division at Pohang on

²⁸¹ Nishimura Hideki 西村秀樹, *Chōsen sensō ni sansen shita nippon* 朝鮮戦争に「参戦」した日本 [Japan’s Participation in the Korean War] (Tokyo: San-ichi publishing Co., 2019), 152. In the Saitama prefecture accident, 17 peoples—4 Japanese civilians and 13 B-29 crew members—were killed.

²⁸² *Asahi Shimbun*, August 7, 1952.

²⁸³ William M. Leary, *Anything, Anywhere, Anytime Combat Cargo in the Korean War* (Pennsylvania: DIANE Publishing Company, 2008), 2.

²⁸⁴ Tanaka Akira 田中明, “Chōsen sensō niokeru kōhō shien nikansuru ichi kōsatsu: nigawa jōriku sakusen ni shōten o atete” 朝鮮戦争における後方支援に関する一考察: 仁川上陸作戦に焦点を当てて [A Study on Logistics Support During the Korean War: Focusing on the Incheon Landing Operation], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 68-79.

²⁸⁵ Curtis A. Utz, *Assault from the Sea: The Amphibious Landing at Inchon* (Washington D.C.: Naval Historical Center, Dept. of the Navy, 2000), 15.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 16.

July 18 1950.²⁸⁷ While this amphibious operations was staged from Yokosuka—utilizing roughly 70 ships—it contributed in reinforcing the Pusan Perimeter.²⁸⁸ Shortly after, the Incheon landing operation was implemented by using approximately 230 ships²⁸⁹ while bulk of these naval vessels were dispatched from the ports of Kobe and Yokohama led by Admiral Doyle.²⁹⁰ Side by side with the amphibious landing operation, naval vessels provided firepower by shelling enemy target.²⁹¹ For example, destroyer *Gurke* dispatched from Yokohama participated in the gunfire strikes during the Incheon landing and enabled the first wave of the US marines to secure Wolmi-Do (see Figure 9).²⁹²




Figure 9. Plan for Incheon Landing Operation²⁹³

²⁸⁷ Ishmaru Yasuzo, “The Korean War and Japanese Ports: Support for the UN Forces and Its Influences,” *NIDS Security Reports*, no. 8 (2007): 55-70.

²⁸⁸ Gordon L. Rottman, *Korean War Order of Battle: United States, United Nations, and Communist Ground, Naval, and Air Forces, 1950-1953* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 94.

²⁸⁹ Edward H. Simmons, *Over the Seawall: U.S. Marines at Incheon* (Washington D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2000), 25.

²⁹⁰ Curtis A. Utz, *Assault from the Sea: The Amphibious Landing at Incheon* (Washington D.C.: Naval Historical Center, Dept. of the Navy, 2000), 26.

²⁹¹ Edward H. Simmons, *Over the Seawall: U.S. Marines at Incheon* (Washington D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2000), 24.

²⁹² James L. Mooney, *Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships* (Washington D.C.: Navy Dept., Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval History Division, 1959), 189.

²⁹³ Edward H. Simmons, *Over the Seawall: U.S. Marines at Incheon* (Washington D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2000), 20.

Once the UN forces took control South of the 38th parallel, MacArthur conducted amphibious landing operation at Wonsan in October 1950. While approximately 200 ships were assigned, the operation was staged from Sasebo: in this case, operation was also staged from Incheon and Pusan since half of the Korean peninsula was secured by the UN forces at this juncture.²⁹⁴ Similar to the Incheon landing operation, naval assets conducted pre-landing shelling at Wonsan to support the landing operation.²⁹⁵ While intervention of the Chinese People's volunteer Army in late October 1950 again pushed back the UN forces to the South,²⁹⁶ Task Group 95.2 conducted the naval blockade of Wonsan from February 1951 to July 1953: and one of the frequently use port was Sasebo.²⁹⁷ Thanks to these naval operations the UN forces was able to maintain sea dominance around the shores of the Korean peninsula throughout the Korean War.²⁹⁸ Throughout the duration of the Korean War, the US Marine Corps and the US Navy, deployed from Japanese ports, collectively deployed approximately 220,000 tons of bombs.²⁹⁹

2.4. Operational Support

2.4.1. Minesweeping

Although the US Navy Pacific Fleet had around 500 minesweepers at its peak during World War II, the size was drastically reduced by May 1946 due to postwar demobilization and cuts in military budgets. As of 1946, US minesweepers consisted of two destroyer minesweepers, two minesweepers, 21 wooden motor minesweepers, and two minesweeping boats.³⁰⁰ Eventually, in 1947, the Mine Force Pacific Fleet Command was dissolved by Chief

²⁹⁴ Gordon L. Rottman, *Korean War Order of Battle: United States, United Nations, and Communist Ground, Naval, and Air Forces, 1950-1953* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 94.

²⁹⁵ Richard C. Knott, *Attack from the Sky: Naval Air Operations in the Korean War* (Washington D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 2004), 23.

²⁹⁶ Donald W. Boose, Jr., "Perspectives on the Korean War," *Parameters* 32, no. 1 (2002): 118-123.

²⁹⁷ Edward J. Marolda, *Ready Seapower: A History of the US Seventh fleet* (Washington D.C.: Naval History & Heritage Command, Department of the Navy, 2012), 31.

²⁹⁸ United States Congress House Committee on Armed Services, *National Policy Objectives and the Adequacy of Our Current Navy Forces: Hearing Before the Sea Power and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress, Second Session, November 13, December 3, and 20, 1979* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), 5.

²⁹⁹ Shoji Junichiro 庄司潤一郎, "Chōsen sensō to nippon no taiō (zoku): yamaguchi ken o jirei toshite" 朝鮮戦争と日本の対応 (続) : 山口県を事例として [The Korean War and Japan's Response (Continued): The Case of Yamaguchi Prefecture], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 168-186.

³⁰⁰ Suzuki Hidetaka 鈴木英隆, "Chōsen kaiki ni shutsugeki shita nippon tokubetsu sōkai tai: sono hikari to kage" 朝鮮海域に出撃した日本特別掃海隊: その光と影 [The Japanese Special Minesweeping Corps that Set Sail in the Korean Waters: The Light and Shadow], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日

of Naval Operations Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz.³⁰¹ And when the Korean War broke out, the 7th Fleet minesweeping force under the Commander of US Naval Forces Far East, Vice Admiral Charles Turner Joy's disposal consisted of six wooden motor minesweepers and four steel-hulled Admirable-class minesweepers, which was insufficient for major minesweeping operation.³⁰²

While the US minesweeping capability was drastically reduced during the late 1940s, Japan was able to retain its skill. On September 3 1945, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers ordered the Imperial General Headquarters to prepare Japanese minesweepers and to conduct its operation in and around Japanese waters.³⁰³ Shortly thereafter, the minesweeping department, consisting of 10,000 personnel from the old Imperial Navy with 348 minesweepers, was newly established by the Military Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of the Navy.³⁰⁴

Japanese minesweeper crews were able to hone their skills since they had to conduct large scale minesweeping operations, sea mines that were laid around Japanese coastline against the allied powers during World War II were numerous. With the assistance of the United States, 350 Japanese vessels, spearhead by Captain Tamura Kyuzo, swept the coastal waters around Japan, starting in September 1945.³⁰⁵ The Japanese auxiliary motor minesweepers were inarguably one of the most capable minesweeper fleet in the world at that juncture.³⁰⁶ Although the South Korean navy had several minesweepers at the time, consist largely of ex-Japanese minesweepers and ex-US auxiliary motor minesweepers, South Korea's minesweeping capability—in terms of the quality of the platform and the crew's

本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 12-32. In this Chapter, acronyms of the different types of minesweepers are all spelled out, based on the Ship Abbreviations & Symbols stipulated in the Naval history & Heritage Command. For instance, YMS is Auxiliary Motor Minesweeper, DMS is Destroyer Mine Sweeper, AM is Minesweeper, AMS is Motor Minesweeper, MSB is Minesweeping Boat, and MS is a Motor Ship.

³⁰¹ Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, *The Sea War in Korea* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1957), 126.

³⁰² Tamara M. Melia, *"Damn the Torpedoes": A Short History of U.S. Naval Mine Countermeasures* (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, Dep. of the Navy, 1991), 70.

³⁰³ United States Department of the Army, *Reports of General MacArthur* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 143.

³⁰⁴ Defense Agency Maritime Staff Office 防衛庁海上幕僚監部, *Kōro kei reki shi 航路啓發史* [History of Shipping Routes Development] (Tokyo: Defense Agency Maritime Staff Office Defense Department, 1961), 4.

³⁰⁵ Tamara M. Melia, *"Damn the Torpedoes": A Short History of U.S. Naval Mine Countermeasures* (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, Dep. of the Navy, 1991), 64.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 74.

level of experience—was inadequate for large scale minesweeping operation.³⁰⁷

Once the Korean War broke out, North Korea started to place sea mines around its major ports in order to prevent UN naval vessels from approaching North Korean shores. In July 1950, Soviet-made mines were transported from Vladivostok to the south by a railway on the sea coast of Japan: it was the Soviet Union's plan to place sea mines both east and western shores of North Korea where UN landing operation was expected.³⁰⁸ Since then, about 4,000 mines had been laid in Wonsan and Nampo by August. The mines were then transported from Nampo to Haeju, Incheon, Gunsan, and Mokpo.³⁰⁹ Destroyer *USS McKean* first discovered North Korean sea mines³¹⁰ near Nampo—located approximately 90 miles northwest from Incheon—and thus it was necessary for the UN forces to clear these sea mines.³¹¹ Yet as noted earlier, US Navy minesweepers were not sufficient for the task: there has been no major minesweeping operation since the end of the Second World War, and there was also a shortage of troops that had mine warfare experience. To compensate the shortage, Admiral Burke asked the Japanese to send 20 minesweepers to the seas near Wonsan.³¹²

Although the Japanese constitution introduced by the GHQ in 1947 did not enable Japan to be involved in war except when Japan is directly attacked,³¹³ and therefore minesweeping operation would actually be categorized as a combat operation,³¹⁴ Yoshida decided to accept Burke's request, pointing out that “the policy of the Japanese government is to cooperate with United Nations' forces.”³¹⁵ This is to conform with the contents of the

³⁰⁷ James A. Field and Ernest M. Miller, *History of United States Naval Operations: Korea* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O., 1962), 36.

³⁰⁸ Kim Yun-mi, “Hangukjeonjaenggi yuengunui wonsan sangryukjakjeongwa cheolsujakjeoneul tonghae bon haesangsusong” [Sea Transportation Seen Through the UN Forces' Amphibious Landing and Evacuation Operations in Wonsan During the Korean War], *The Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, no.1 (2022): 1-28.

³⁰⁹ Suzuki Hidetaka 鈴木英隆, “Chōsen kaiki ni shutsugeki shita nippon tokubetsu sōkai tai: sono hikari to kage” 朝鮮海域に出撃した日本特別掃海隊: その光と影 [The Japanese Special Minesweeping Corps that Set Sail in the Korean Waters: The Light and Shadow], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 12-32.

³¹⁰ Drifting mine.

³¹¹ Ishimaru Yasuzo 石丸安蔵, “Chōsen sensō ji no kiraisen de nippon ga uketa eikyō” 朝鮮戦争時の機雷戦で日本が受けた影響 [The Impact of Mine Warfare on Japan During the Korean War], *NIDS Burifingu Memo* NIDS ブリーフィング・メモ 2 (2018): 1-4.

³¹² Thomas B. Buell, *Naval Leadership in Korea: The first Six Months* (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 2002), 35. The Commander of the Naval Command Far East issued an order to assemble a flotilla comprising three minesweepers, seven motor minesweepers, two destroyer minesweeper, four frigates, and eight additional Japanese minesweeping and miscellaneous vessels.

³¹³ *Ibid.*, 34.

³¹⁴ Hiroshi Masuda, *MacArthur in Asia the General and His Staff in the Philippines, Japan, and Korea* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2012), 256.

³¹⁵ Wada Haruki and Frank Baldwin, *The Korean War and International History* (Lanham: Rowman &

document titled “The Korean War and Our Stance,” released by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in August 1950.³¹⁶ Yet, Yoshida had practical reasons to fully cooperate with the United States since he was hoping that such contribution might enhance the chance to have favorable terms concerning the San Francisco treaty.

Under Yoshida’s order, the special minesweeping operation was kept secret since Japan was in a “delicate position internationally.”³¹⁷ To coordinate with the United States counterpart, Tamura Kyuzo—he was inarguably considered as one of the best experts (having served as a former Japan imperial naval officer, Tamura Kyuzo participated in a minesweeping operation under US occupation on August 1945, and had amassed significant experience by the time the Korean War erupted) it comes to minesweeping task³¹⁸—was appointed as the Commander, and the Japanese minesweepers were soon assembled at Moji.³¹⁹

In a nutshell, 46 Japanese minesweeping vessels,³²⁰ one guinea pig ship,³²¹ and 1,200 former Japanese Navy personnel were assigned—from early October to mid-December 1950—to Wonsan, Incheon, Nampo, and Gunsan for minesweeping operation, to support the UN troop’s operation in the Korean peninsula.³²² As a result, 327 kilometers of sea route and more than 607 square kilometers of harbor were swept, disposing of 28 mines (20 mines and 8 mines in the west coast and east coast, respectively).³²³ During the operation, one

Littlefield, 2018), 138.

³¹⁶ Onuma Hisao 大沼久夫, *Chōsen sensō to nippon* 朝鮮戦争と日本 [The Korean War and Japan] (Tokyo: Shinkansha, 2006), 136.

³¹⁷ Wada Haruki and Frank Baldwin, *The Korean War and International History* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 138.

³¹⁸ Thomas B. Buell, *Naval Leadership in Korea: The First Six Months* (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 2002), 35.

³¹⁹ Suzuki Hidetaka 鈴木英隆, “Chōsen kaiki ni shutsugeki shita nippon tokubetsu sōkaitai: sono hikari to kage” 朝鮮海域に出撃した日本特別掃海隊: その光と影 [The Japanese Special Minesweeping Corps that Set Sail in the Korean Waters: The Light and Shadow], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 12-32.

³²⁰ The Japanese minesweeper units were also referred to as special minesweeper unit.

³²¹ It is a type of trial ship. The primary task of a guinea pig ship is to ensure the safety of following vessels.

³²² Suzuki Hidetaka 鈴木英隆, “Chōsen kaiki ni shutsugeki shita nippon tokubetsu sōkaitai: sono hikari to kage” 朝鮮海域に出撃した日本特別掃海隊: その光と影 [The Japanese Special Minesweeping Corps that Set Sail in the Korean Waters: The Light and Shadow], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 12-32.

³²³ Maritime Staff Office Defense Department 海上幕僚監部防衛部編, “*Kimitsu chōsen dōran tokubetsu sōkaishi*” 機密 朝鮮動乱特別掃海史 [Confidential: The History of the Special Minesweeping Units During the Korean War], (Kaijō bakuryōkanbu bōeibu, 1961), 98. Other source mentions that 27 sea mines in total were disposed. Suzuki Hidetaka 鈴木英隆,

minesweeper was killed, and 18 others suffered serious and minor injuries.³²⁴

2.4.2. Minesweeping Operation in the Eastern Side of the Korean Peninsula: Wonsan

Momentarily after the Incheon landing operation, MacArthur ordered General Almond to embark upon a landing operation at the eastern coast of North Korea in Wonsan³²⁵ (see Figure 10). The primary objective was to prevent the withdrawal of North Korean troops.³²⁶ The importance of minesweeping further increased; large-scale Wonsan landing operations required safe sea passage along the coasts in order to ensure logistics. Given the shortage of US Navy's minesweeping assets at that juncture, Japanese expertise and the sheer volume of Japanese minesweeping vessels were considered as an indispensable asset. While most of the US Navy minesweepers were withdrawn from the region, Japan had 78 minesweepers.³²⁷

“Chōsen kaiki ni shutsugeki shita nippon tokubetsu sōkaitai: sono hikari to kage” 朝鮮海域に出撃した日本特別掃海隊: その光と影 [The Japanese Special Minesweeping Corps that Set Sail in the Korean Waters: The Light and Shadow], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 12-32.

³²⁴ Suzuki Hidetaka 鈴木英隆, “Chōsen kaiki ni shutsugeki shita nippon tokubetsu sōkaitai: sono hikari to kage” 朝鮮海域に出撃した日本特別掃海隊: その光と影 [The Japanese Special Minesweeping Corps that Set Sail in the Korean Waters: The Light and Shadow], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 12-32.

³²⁵ Joseph H. Alexander, *Battle of the Barricades: U.S. Marines in the Recapture of Seoul* (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2000), 50.

³²⁶ Thomas B. Buell, *Naval Leadership in Korea: The First Six Months* (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 2002), 32.

³²⁷ Suzuki Hidetaka 鈴木英隆, “Chōsen kaiki ni shutsugeki shita nippon tokubetsu sōkaitai: sono hikari to kage” 朝鮮海域に出撃した日本特別掃海隊: その光と影 [The Japanese Special Minesweeping Corps that Set Sail in the Korean Waters: The Light and Shadow], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 12-32.




Figure 10. Korean Peninsula and Wonsan³²⁸

Fully aware of Japan’s minesweeping capability, Burke³²⁹ ordered Director Okubo Takeo in October 1950 to assign Japanese minesweepers to the US 7th Fleet.³³⁰ Although initially he objected McArthur’s Wonsan landing operation, Burke soon changed his mind and explained the necessity of the Wonsan amphibious operation to the Japanese counterparts.³³¹ The North Korean sea mines were more than a mere nuisance since there were notable casualties at that juncture; from September 26 to October 2, one US minesweeper was sunk while four US destroyer and South Korean minesweepers suffered heavy damage.³³² To compensate for the loss of US minesweeping capability, Joy issued an

³²⁸ Kim Suk-kyoon, “Korean Peninsula Maritime Issues,” *Ocean Development and International Law* 41, no. 2 (2010): 166-185.

³²⁹ At the time, Burke was deputy chief of staff to the Commander of Naval Forces Far East.

³³⁰ Wada Haruki and Frank Baldwin, *The Korean War and International History* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 138. Eventually, the Japanese minesweepers joined the 7th Fleet’s operations unit on October 1950.

³³¹ Robert F. Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea: 1950-1953* (Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1983), 202.

³³² Suzuki Hidetaka 鈴木英隆, “Chōsen kaiki ni shutsugeki shita nippon tokubetsu sōkaitai: sono hikari to kage” 朝鮮海域に出撃した日本特別掃海隊: その光と影 [The Japanese Special Minesweeping Corps that Set Sail in the Korean Waters: The Light and Shadow], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 12-32.

order to assemble Japanese minesweepers on October 4.³³³ As a result, Japanese minesweeper flotilla—consisting of one flagship, four patrol ships, and ten minesweepers—was assembled at Shimonoseki on October 6, 1950, and prepared to set sail towards the Korean peninsula.³³⁴

At first, the crews of the Japanese minesweepers voice their apprehension. When Tamura Kyuzo conveyed the orders to his crew members, they vehemently opposed the deployment due to the inherent uncertainties and risks associated with the minesweeping mission in Korean waters.³³⁵ As an illustration, the crew members of MS06 went as far as disembarking from the ship and even issued threats of refusing to comply with the order. Command Ariyama Mikio of MS06 openly conveyed his discontent, expressing his disapproval of Japan's reengagement in a war scenario and the potential endangerment of his crew members.³³⁶ Other crews pointed out that they had not volunteered for minesweeping operation in the Korean waters and that their status were basically public servants, not military personnel.³³⁷ Given the anti-war sentiment among the Japanese at the time—it was barely five years after the end of the World War II such reaction was not surprising. Furthermore, the inherent danger of the mission was far from hypothetical: by September 1950, North Korean sea mines blew up a US minesweeper, *Magpie*, and damaged four destroyers—*Collett*, *Lyman K. Swenson*, *Brush*, and *Mansfield*.³³⁸

In order to motivate the Japanese crews, Joy³³⁹ issued instructions to the Japanese Ministry of Transportation, stipulating that personnel assigned to the mission in Korean waters would receive double pay.³⁴⁰ Upon receiving the directives from Joy, Minister of Transportation Yamazaki Takeshi transmitted the dispatch orders to the Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard.³⁴¹ Concurrently, the Japanese minesweeping units were placed under the

³³³ Okubo Takeo 大久保武雄, *Uminari no hibi 海鳴りの日々* [A Day When the Sea Ripples] (Tokyo: Kaiyō mondai kenkyū kai, 1978), 210-211.

³³⁴ Hiroshi Masuda, *MacArthur in Asia: The General and His Staff in the Philippines, Japan, and Korea* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2012), 256.

³³⁵ Tessa M. Suzuki, *The Korean War in Asia: A Hidden History* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 16.

³³⁶ Ibid, 15-16. Eventually, they accepted the terms and reboarded their ships. Shirouchi Yasunobu 城内康伸, *Shōwa ni jū go nen saigo no senshisha 昭和二十五年 最後の戦死者* [The Final War Casualty of 25th Year of the Showa Era] (Tokyo: Shogakukan, 2013), 60-61. Upon receiving the summons to gather in Shimonoseki, Commander Ariyama Mikio initially believed that the mission would pertain to conducting minesweeping operations in the Tsushima Strait.

³³⁷ Tessa M. Suzuki, *The Korean War in Asia: A Hidden History* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 16.

³³⁸ Gerry van Tonder, *Korean War, Allied Surge Pyongyang Falls, UN Sweep to the Yalu, October 1950* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2019), 50.

³³⁹ He was the Commander Naval Forces, Far East.

³⁴⁰ Maritime Staff Office Defense Department 海上幕僚監部防衛部編, “*kimitsu chōsen dōran tokubetsu sōkaishi*” 機密 朝鮮動乱特別掃海史 [Confidential: The History of the Special Minesweeping Units During the Korean War], (Kaijō bakuryōkanbu bōeibu, 1961), 97.

³⁴¹ Suzuki Hidetaka 鈴木英隆, “Chōsen kaiki ni shutsugeki shita nippon tokubetsu sōkaitai: sono hikari to kage”

command of Lieutenant General Arthur D. Struble, who was leading the 7th Integrated Mission Unit.³⁴² Accompanied by a US guide ship, the Japanese minesweepers reached Wonsan Bay on October 10, 1950.³⁴³

The initial challenge encountered by the Japanese minesweeping unit was the insufficient information required for demining operations, making it difficult to determine the precise sea route. The prevailing assumption was that the North Koreans had likely deployed a substantial quantity of sea mines in and around Wonsan as a preventive measure against amphibious operations.³⁴⁴ As a matter of fact, a staggering number of over 3,000 sea mines were scattered across an area of approximately 400 square miles in and around Wonsan.³⁴⁵ After the initial group of Japanese vessels commenced their minesweeping operations, alongside US and South Korean minesweepers, on October 10,³⁴⁶ a new mission was designated for the Japanese minesweepers on October 11. This new objective entailed pioneering a sea route leading to Yo-do Island (refer to Figure 11).³⁴⁷

朝鮮海域に出撃した日本特別掃海隊: その光と影 [The Japanese Special Minesweeping Corps that Set Sail in the Korean Waters: The Light and Shadow], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013), 12-32.

³⁴² Maritime Staff Office Defense Department 海上幕僚監部防衛部編, “*Kimitsu chōsen dōran tokubetsu sōkaishi*” 機密 朝鮮動乱特別掃海史 [Confidential: The History of the Special Minesweeping Units During the Korean War], (Kaijō bakuryōkanbu bōeibu, 1961), 22.

³⁴³ Suzuki Hidetaka 鈴木英隆, “Chōsen kaiki ni shutsugeki shita nippon tokubetsu sōkaitai: sono hikari to kage” 朝鮮海域に出撃した日本特別掃海隊: その光と影 [The Japanese Special Minesweeping Corps that Set Sail in the Korean Waters: The Light and Shadow], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013), 12-32.

³⁴⁴ Shirouchi Yasunobu 城内康伸, *Shōwa ni jū go nen saigo no senshisha* 昭和二十五年 最後の戦死者 [The Final War Casualty of 25th Year of the Showa Era] (Tokyo: Shogakukan, 2013), 116-117.

³⁴⁵ James M. Caiella and Minoru Genda, *Aircraft Carriers A history of Carrier Aviation and Its Influence on World Events, Volume II: 1946-2006* (Dulles: Potomac Books, 2006), 68.

³⁴⁶ Han Sook et al, *The Korean War Volume 1* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 868.

³⁴⁷ Suzuki Hidetaka 鈴木英隆, “Chōsen kaiki ni shutsugeki shita nippon tokubetsu sōkaitai: sono hikari to kage” 朝鮮海域に出撃した日本特別掃海隊: その光と影 [The Japanese Special Minesweeping Corps that Set Sail in the Korean Waters: The Light and Shadow], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013), 12-32.




Figure 11. The Clearance of Wonsan³⁴⁸

Meanwhile, the US minesweepers suffered heavy damage. While proceeding on course on October 11 to sweep the newly detected sea mines, the lead ship, *Pirate*, was hit by a sea mine and sank within four minutes.³⁴⁹ Soon thereafter, minesweeper *Pledge* was also sunk after being hit by a mine.³⁵⁰ American casualties were severe: 13 were killed and 79 were wounded.³⁵¹ For this reason, minesweeping operation was temporarily suspended after rescuing the survivors. The operation resumed two days later.³⁵²

Japanese also suffered casualties during the Wonsan operation. A Japanese minesweeper, MS14, was destroyed by a mine on October 17. While eighteen were wounded, Chief Steward Nakatani Sakataro was killed.³⁵³ On the day when MS14 was destroyed by a sea mine, an immediate halt to the minesweeping operation was ordered as a temporary measure.³⁵⁴ The incident sparked concerns among Japanese commanders, leading to debates among them.³⁵⁵ Some expressed their reluctance to become involved in America's war,³⁵⁶

³⁴⁸ Map retrieved from the United States Navy homepage.

³⁴⁹ Tamara M. Melia, *"Damn the Torpedoes": A Short History of U.S. Naval Mine Countermeasures* (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, Dep. of the Navy, 1991), 75-76.

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 76. While attempting to rescue survivors from the lead ship *Pirate*, the minesweeper *Pledge* encountered a sea mine, causing the vessel to come to a halt at that location.

³⁵¹ Suzuki Hidetaka 鈴木英隆, "Chōsen kaiki ni shutsugeki shita nippon tokubetsu sōkai tai: sono hikari to kage" 朝鮮海域に出撃した日本特別掃海隊: その光と影 [The Japanese Special Minesweeping Corps that Set Sail in the Korean Waters: The Light and Shadow], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 12-32.

³⁵² *Ibid.*

³⁵³ Wada Haruki and Frank Baldwin, *The Korean War and International History* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 138.

³⁵⁴ Shirouchi Yasunobu 城内康伸, *Shōwa ni jū go nen saigo no senshisha* 昭和二十五年 最後の戦死者 [The Final War Casualty of 25th Year of the Showa Era] (Tokyo: Shogakukan, 2013), 120.

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 149.

and others vehemently insisted on suspending the minesweeping operations due to the inevitability of further accidents.³⁵⁷ Nonetheless, Admiral Allan E. Smith, Commander of Task Force 95, dismissed Japan's suggestion, emphasizing that the scheduled date for the US military landing was approaching rapidly. As a result, he insisted that the minesweeping operation should promptly resume.³⁵⁸ In addition, Smith strictly ordered that three Japanese minesweepers should be put into the harbor within 15 minutes and start receiving water and fuel supplies from the supply ship.³⁵⁹ Eventually, Tamura Kyuzo and his subordinates—three minesweepers in total—decided to return to Japan, defying Smith's orders.³⁶⁰ On October 20, the three ships made their way back to Ganryu-Jima.³⁶¹

Such event created concerns among the US counterpart that the Japanese might not cooperate with the minesweeping operation. As a follow-up measure, Chief Cabinet Secretary Okazaki Katsuo stressed to Okubo that the Japanese government intended to fully cooperate with the UN forces and thus consolidate favorable terms for Japan with respect to the peace treaty.³⁶² In that context, Okubo ordered the Japanese minesweepers to resume their task and assist the US forces.³⁶³ On October 31, Okubo visited Jay and expressed regret that the three minesweepers dispatched to the Korean peninsula had returned to Japan. In response, Jay said that the Japanese minesweepers were working very hard and asked the Japanese to prevent similar incidents—Japanese minesweepers refusing to implement the task and returning home—from happening in the future.³⁶⁴

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

³⁵⁷ Suzuki Hidetaka 鈴木英隆, "Chōsen kaiki ni shutsugeki shita nippon tokubetsu sōkai tai: sono hikari to kage" 朝鮮海域に出撃した日本特別掃海隊: その光と影 [The Japanese Special Minesweeping Corps that Set Sail in the Korean Waters: The Light and Shadow], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013), 12-32.

³⁵⁸ Ibid. Due to the imminent nature of the landing operation, the safety of the minesweepers was not considered a priority.

³⁵⁹ Ibid.

³⁶⁰ At first, Captain Tamura relayed Admiral Smith's orders to his subordinates. However, the captains formulated a counterproposal, which was ultimately rejected by the United States. In protest, the Japanese minesweepers returned to Shimonoseki. Once back, Captain Tamura briefed the Japan Coast Guard on the incident and reviewed the subsequent actions to be taken.

³⁶¹ Shirouchi Yasunobu 城内康伸, *Shōwa ni jū go nen saigo no senshisha* 昭和二十五年 最後の戦死者 [The Final War Casualty of 25th Year of the Showa Era] (Tokyo: Shogakukan, 2013), 158.

³⁶² Okubo Takeo 大久保武雄, *Uminari no hibi* 海鳴りの日々 [A Day When the Sea Ripples] (Tokyo: Kaiyō mondai kenkyū kai, 1978), 231.

³⁶³ Ibid., 230.

³⁶⁴ Suzuki Hidetaka 鈴木英隆, "Chōsen kaiki ni shutsugeki shita nippon tokubetsu sōkai tai: sono hikari to kage" 朝鮮海域に出撃した日本特別掃海隊: その光と影 [The Japanese Special Minesweeping Corps that Set Sail in the Korean waters: The Light and Shadow], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense

2.4.3. Minesweeping Operation in the Western Side: Incheon, Haeju, Nampo, and Gunsan

Momentarily after the successful Incheon landing operation, Eighth US Army advanced north and logistics issues emerged. While 1,500 tons of daily supplies were needed, and only half of them could be transported by rail and truck north of Seoul. Therefore, urgent need for supplies by sea transportation—via west coast of the Korean peninsula—had been noticed.³⁶⁵ Among various locations, Nampo port was the ideal—probably the only port—that could support the military operations of the US Eighth Army, north of the 38th parallel.³⁶⁶ In that context, Japanese minesweepers cleared the coastal sea of the four major ports: Nampo, Haeju, Incheon and Gunsan.³⁶⁷ While Nampo and Haeju is situated in North of the 38th parallel, Incheon is approximately 30 kilometers west from South Korean capital Seoul and Gunsan is located roughly 161 kilometers south from Seoul (see Figure 12).




Figure 12. Four Major Ports in the Western Coast of the Korean Peninsula³⁶⁸

Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 12-32. Regarding the punishment of those held responsible, the Commander of the US Naval Forces, Far East issued a stringent order to remove them from any future minesweeping operations. Consequently, four individuals retired shortly thereafter.

³⁶⁵ Ibid.

³⁶⁶ Donald W. Boose, *Over the Beach: US Army Amphibious Operations in the Korean War* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 226.

³⁶⁷ Suzuki Hidetaka 鈴木英隆, “Chōsen kaiki ni shutsugeki shita nippon tokubetsu sōkai tai: sono hikari to kage” 朝鮮海域に出撃した日本特別掃海隊: その光と影 [The Japanese Special Minesweeping Corps that Set Sail in the Korean Waters: The Light and Shadow], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 12-32.

³⁶⁸ Kim Suk-kyoon, “Korean Peninsula Maritime Issues,” *Ocean Development and International Law* 41, no. 2 (2010): 166-185. In this map, Gunsan is romanized as Kunsan.

Key target areas for minesweeping operation in the western coast were Incheon and Haeju: many islands scattered around in between Incheon and Haeju offered the potential in establishing forward bases for the UN forces.³⁶⁹ In October 1950, Japanese minesweeper unit, consists of five ships, set sail from Shimonoseki and engaged in minesweeping work.³⁷⁰ Under the Commander of the Task Group 95.1 West Coast Blockading and Patrol Group, the Japanese minesweepers cleared 15 sea mines in Incheon. The units departed from Incheon on November 1 and returned to Shimonoseki on November 3.³⁷¹

Meanwhile, the Eighth US Army recaptured Pyongyang on October 21.³⁷² With the progress of the operation toward the western coast, it became an urgent task to make it possible for to use Nampo, where sea mines were densely laid. To tackle this issue, Task Element 95.69 was formed.³⁷³ The Task Element consisting of one destroyer and nine minesweepers,³⁷⁴ one helicopter, and an amphibious ship and the Japanese minesweeping unit—nine motor ships of the Second Minesweeping Unit—was added on November 7.³⁷⁵ The Japanese minesweepers were able to clear two mines until it was announced that the minesweeping of Nampo was completed on November 20.³⁷⁶

Japanese minesweeping operation was also conducted in Gunsan. On July 1950, Soviet sea mines were transported from Vladivostok to the Korean peninsula via train.³⁷⁷ Before the Incheon landing operation, some of these sea mines were placed in Gunsan.³⁷⁸ Although the UN forces secured south of the Korean peninsula by September, the remaining

³⁶⁹ James A. Field and Ernest M. Eller, *History of United States Naval Operations: Korea* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), 320.

³⁷⁰ Suzuki Hidetaka 鈴木英隆, “Chōsen kaiki ni shutsugeki shita nippon tokubetsu sōkaitai: sono hikari to kage” 朝鮮海域に出撃した日本特別掃海隊: その光と影 [The Japanese Special Minesweeping Corps that Set Sail in the Korean Waters: The Light and Shadow], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 12-32.

³⁷¹ Ibid.

³⁷² Robert F. Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 214.

³⁷³ James A. Field and Ernest M. Eller, *History of United States Naval Operations: Korea* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), 238.

³⁷⁴ Two destroyer minesweeper, three motor minesweepers, and four South Korean auxiliary motor minesweepers.

³⁷⁵ Suzuki Hidetaka 鈴木英隆, “Chōsen kaiki ni shutsugeki shita nippon tokubetsu sōkaitai: sono hikari to kage” 朝鮮海域に出撃した日本特別掃海隊: その光と影 [The Japanese Special Minesweeping Corps that Set Sail in the Korean Waters: The Light and Shadow], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 12-32.

³⁷⁶ Ibid.

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

sea mines had to be neutralized. The Hagiwara minesweeping unit³⁷⁹ departed from Shimonoseki on October 17, arrived at Gunsan on October 19, and started minesweeping operations the next day. The unit was incorporated into the Task Group 95.7 South Korean Navy mission—alongside with Task Group 95.1, Task Group 95.7 was the subcomponent of the Task Force 95, which was in charge of blockade and escort operation during the Korean War.³⁸⁰ And under the command of the Korean auxiliary motor minesweepers captain, the Japanese minesweepers engaged in minesweeping operations for 16 days until November 4, clearing three mines in total.³⁸¹ During this operation, one Japanese minesweeper—MS30—was sunk, but there were no casualties.³⁸²

All in all, the Japanese Special Minesweeper Unit participated in minesweeping operation in and around the Korean peninsula—near the ports of Wonsan, Gunsan, Incheon, Haeju, and Nampo—for two months until its disbandment on December 15, 1950.³⁸³ Eventually, the Japanese minesweepers successfully cleared 28 sea mines.³⁸⁴ The following table (Table 3) summaries their activities during the Korean War.

Table 3. Japan’s Minesweeper Operation in the Korean Waters.³⁸⁵

Area of activity	Dispatched units	Number of ships	Period of activity	Activity summary
Wonsan	2nd Minesweeping Unit 3rd Minesweeping Unit 1st Minesweeping Unit	MS x 16 PS x 4	1950.10.11 ~ 1950.12.14	MS14 was sunk during operation (1950.10.7) Disposed 8 mines
Incheon	1st Minesweeping Unit	MS x 16 PS x 4	1950.10.11 ~ 1950.10.31	Engaged in minesweeping operation near Incheon port Disposed 15 mines
Gunsan	4th Minesweeping Unit	MS x 7	1950.10.21 ~ 1950.11.2	Engaged in minesweeping operation near Gunsan port Disposed 3 mines
Nampo	2nd Minesweeping Unit 4th Minesweeping Unit 5th Minesweeping Unit	MS x 13 PS x 1 Other x 1	1950.11.8 ~ 1950.12.14	Engaged in minesweeping operation near Nampo port Disposed 2 mines
Haeju	4th Minesweeping Unit	MS x 4 PS x 1	1950.12.1 ~ 1950.12.6	Engaged in minesweeping operation near Haeju port

³⁷⁹ Seven motor ships of the 4th minesweeping unit.

³⁸⁰ Paul M. Edwards, *The Korean War: A Historical Dictionary* (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2003), 37.

³⁸¹ Suzuki Hidetaka 鈴木英隆, “Chōsen kaiki ni shutsugeki shita nippon tokubetsu sōkai tai: sono hikari to kage” 朝鮮海域に出撃した日本特別掃海隊: その光と影 [The Japanese Special Minesweeping Corps that Set Sail in the Korean Waters: The Light and Shadow], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 12-32.

³⁸² Ibid.

³⁸³ Ibid.

³⁸⁴ Maritime Staff Office Defense Department 海上幕僚監部防衛部編, “*Kimitsu chōsen dōran tokubetsu sōkaishi*” 機密 朝鮮動乱特別掃海史 [Confidential: The History of the Special Minesweeping Units During the Korean War], (Kaijō bakuryōkanbu bōeibu, 1961), 98.

³⁸⁵ Ibid. Minesweeping activities are hereby rearranged into a chronological order.

2.4.4. Participation of Japanese Volunteers

Issues concerning Japanese participation in the Korean War became an international problem when Japanese volunteers³⁸⁶ applied to the Korean Residents Union in Japan while the organization was recruiting new members.³⁸⁷ To be sure, Japan's official policy was to cooperate with the United Nations. But the idea of sending Japanese citizens as a combatant was adamantly opposed by the Japanese political leadership.³⁸⁸ For instance, Yoshida firmly stated in July 1950 that Japan had abandoned the right to conduct belligerence and should not forget that Japan was a peace-loving country.³⁸⁹ In line with Yoshida, MacArthur expressed his reluctance on the idea and was not interested in the senate bills—proposed separately by Democrat Senator Warren G. Magnuson and Democrat Representative William R. Poage—that requested the US military to incorporate Japanese volunteers.³⁹⁰ Apart from the constraint originating from the Japanese constitution, Yoshida expressed his concern that the introduction of Japanese combatants to the Korean peninsula might evoke anti-Americanism—among the South Korean public at large—eventually compromising the UN forces' war fighting efforts.³⁹¹ Not surprisingly, the South Korean government conveyed its reluctance in accepting Japanese combatants in the Korean peninsula.³⁹² To be sure, the United States might have introduced Japanese combatants to the battlefield if necessary since US forces spearheaded the UN forces' war efforts and had operational control of South Korean troops.³⁹³ In fact, the GHQ deliberated on the potential deployment of the National Police Reserve to the Korean peninsula, but ultimately dropped the idea.³⁹⁴ Despite such structural setting that enabled the United States to dictate terms on South Korea, president Rhee—who had strong anti-Japanese sentiment—had the potential to undermine the US

³⁸⁶ These include both the Japanese as well as Korean Japanese volunteers.

³⁸⁷ Ko Young-ja, *6-25 jeonjaenggwa jeonhu ilbon: mijeomryeonggiui ganghwa munjewa dokrip hoebok* [The Korean War and the Post-War Japan: The Issue of Peace Treaty Under US Occupation and the Restoration of Independence] (Seoul: Kyunghee University Press, 2010), 248.

³⁸⁸ Onuma Hisao 大沼久夫, *Chōsen sensō to nippon* 朝鮮戦争と日本 [The Korean War and Japan] (Tokyo: Shinkansha, 2006), 92.

³⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 93.

³⁹⁰ Tessa Morris-Suzuki, "Post-War Warriors: Japanese Combatants in the Korean War," *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 10, no.1 (2012): 1-19.

³⁹¹ Onuma Hisao 大沼久夫, *Chōsen sensō to nippon* 朝鮮戦争と日本 [The Korean War and Japan] (Tokyo: Shinkansha, 2006), 93.

³⁹² Tessa Morris-Suzuki, "Post-War Warriors: Japanese Combatants in the Korean War," *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 10, no.1 (2012): 1-19.

³⁹³ In addition, in July 1950, President Rhee Syng-man handed over the wartime operational control of the South Korean military to MacArthur.

³⁹⁴ Shoji Junichiro 庄司潤一郎, "Chōsen sensō to nippon: aidentiti, anzen hoshō o meguru jirenma" 朝鮮戦争と日本: アイデンティティ、安全保障をめぐるジレンマ [The Korean War and Japan: Identity and Security Dilemma], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 141-153.

endeavor: it is worth mentioning that during the Korean War, Rhee Syng-man unilaterally declared the “Peace Line” and authorized capturing Japanese fishing boats that violated the proclaimed perimeter despite United States efforts to reconcile South Korea and Japan.³⁹⁵ Yet, the prime element which motivated Yoshida not to send Japanese volunteers to the Korean peninsula as combatant was probably based on his focus on Japan’s own post-war recovery and development. After all, Yoshida did not resist MacArthur’s idea of creating a 75,000-men police—the National Police Reserve which was the predecessor of the JGSDF—which might also be a violation of the Japanese constitution, granted the rearmament of Japan, and provided necessary support—both logistic as well as operational—to the US force.³⁹⁶ At any rate, both the United States and the Japanese government officially decided neither to accept nor send Japanese volunteers to the Korean peninsula.³⁹⁷ In that sense, the *Pravda* article—published in late 1950—indicating that as much as 8,000 Japanese were deployed in the Korean war front as combatants is probably not true.³⁹⁸ There is a possibility that the Soviets came up with such figure by calculating the number of Japanese non-combatants who were involved in maritime transportation. For instance, there were 2,000 to 3,000 Japanese crews hired by Japan’s Special Procurement Board and additional 2,000 crews recruited by the SCAJAP.³⁹⁹ These sailors, totaling 4,000 to 5,000, frequented major ports—which includes Wonsan, Incheon, Gunsan, Ulsan, Masan, and Pusan—situated in the Korean peninsula.⁴⁰⁰ In

³⁹⁵ Cheong Sung-hwa, “The Politics of Antagonism: The Case of First Conference for Normalization of Diplomatic Relationships between Japan and South Korea, 1951-1952,” *Asian Perspective* 14, no.2 (1990): 167-193.

³⁹⁶ Roger Dingman, “The Dagger and the Gift: The Impact of the Korean War on Japan,” *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 2, no.1 (1993): 29-55. Eventually in a letter addressed to Prime Minister Yoshida on July 8th, MacArthur issued instructions for the creation of the National Police Reserve consisting of 75,000 personnel to ensure internal security within in Japan, and additionally, he directed an increase of 8,000 personnel in the Maritime Safety Agency. Ishida Kyogo 石田京吾, “senjo nippon no kaijō bōeiryoku seibi 1948-52 nen : kaijō bōei niokeru nichi bei no yakuwari buntan no kigen” 戦後日本の海上防衛力整備（1948-52年）：海上防衛における日米の「役割分担」の起源 [Japan’s Post-War Maritime Defense Buildup (1948-52): Origin of Japan-US Role Sharing in Maritime Defense], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 97-110. Kuzuhara Kazumi 葛原和三, “Chōsen sensō to keisatsu yobitai mai kyokutōgun ga nippon no bōeiryoku keisei ni oyoboshita eikyō nitsuite” 朝鮮戦争と警察予備隊：米極東軍が日本の防衛力形成に及ぼした影響について [The Korean War and the National Police Reserve: The Impact of the US Far East Command on Japan’s Defense Forces Establishment], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 80-96.

³⁹⁷ Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Post-War Warriors: Japanese Combatants in the Korean War,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 10, no.1 (2012): 1-19.

³⁹⁸ Onuma Hisao 大沼久夫, *Chōsen sensō to nippon* 朝鮮戦争と日本 [The Korean War and Japan] (Tokyo: Shinkansha, 2006), 101.

³⁹⁹ *Tokyo Shimbun*, October 24, 2010.

⁴⁰⁰ Onuma Hisao 大沼久夫, *Chōsen sensō to nippon* 朝鮮戦争と日本 [The Korean War and Japan] (Tokyo:

addition, there were approximately one thousand Japanese workers sent to the Korean peninsula to support—primarily load/unload of supplies and repair function—UN and US bases.⁴⁰¹ If the 1,200 crews that served in the minesweeping operation was factored in the equation, the total number would be somewhere in between 6,200 and 7,200.

Nevertheless, some ethnic Japanese—excluding Korean-Japanese diaspora—have participated as ground combatants during the Korean War. These Japanese could be sorted into two categories: 1) former Japanese soldiers who joined the Korean Residents Union in Japan; 2) Japanese employees in the US bases in Japan that ‘illegally’ accompanied their American superiors to the Korean peninsula.

The Korean Residents Union in Japan General Headquarters asked GHQ for support momentarily after the outbreak of the Korean War.⁴⁰² As a principle, GHQ decided not to accept the volunteers due to lack of training and difficulty in transportation.⁴⁰³ Although the original intent was to recruit only ethnic Koreans living in Japan, the Korean Residents Union in Japan had received 150 ethnic Japanese applicants as of late June, 1950.⁴⁰⁴ The Japanese who applied mostly had military experience during the Pacific War: some of the applicants had special skills like flying fighter aircraft.⁴⁰⁵ The prime motivation for these former soldiers to join as a volunteer was economic difficulty in post-World War II Japan: participation in the Korean War was considered as a way out from such an impasse, some confessing that it was better to die on the battlefield rather than committing suicide.⁴⁰⁶

Apart from these types of volunteers, there were Japanese who were picked up by the United States and accompanied to the front lines: these Japanese were working as

Shinkansha, 2006), 111.

⁴⁰¹ Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Post-War Warriors: Japanese Combatants in the Korean War,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 10, no.1 (2012): 1-19.

⁴⁰² Nam Ki-jeong, *Kicikwukkauy thansayng ilponi chilun hankwukcencyng* [The Birth of a Base-State: Japan’s Korean War] (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2016), 221.

⁴⁰³ Ko Young-ja, *6-25 jeonjaenggwa jeonhu ilbon: mijeomryeonggiui ganghwa munjewa dokrip hoebok* [The Korean War and the Post-War Japan: The Issue of Peace Treaty Under US Occupation and the Restoration of Independence] (Seoul: Kyunghee University Press, 2010), 248. However, the GHQ replied that applicants with special skills will be under consideration.

⁴⁰⁴ Nam Ki-jeong, *Kicikwukkauy thansayng ilponi chilun hankwukcencyng* [The Birth of a Base-State: Japan’s Korean War] (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2016), 221. In total, the Korean Residents Union in Japan received 747 applicants, which consisted of 597 Korean-Japanese diasporas and 150 ethnic Japanese. Other sources indicate that the total number of applicants during the entire Korean War period was 644. Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Post-War Warriors: Japanese Combatants in the Korean War,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 10, no.1 (2012): 1-19.

⁴⁰⁵ Ko Young-ja, *6-25 jeonjaenggwa jeonhu ilbon: mijeomryeonggiui ganghwa munjewa dokrip hoebok* [The Korean War and the Post-War Japan: The Issue of Peace Treaty Under US Occupation and the Restoration of Independence] (Seoul: Kyunghee University Press, 2010), 248.

⁴⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 249.

‘houseboys,’ who were employees in the US military bases in Japan. It is confirmed that 60 Japanese traveled to the Korean peninsula during the Korean War and 18 of them participated in the battle.⁴⁰⁷ Most of these 60 Japanese houseboys were sent to Korea around July 1950 and came back to Japan in February 1951.⁴⁰⁸ Among them, one Japanese named K. Takatsu received the Purple Heart after engaging in combat against the Chinese troops.⁴⁰⁹

2.5. Logistic Support

2.5.1. Transportation

Soon after Japan’s surrender in August 1945, the US forces started to construct facilities—including port facilities, signal communications, airdromes, and supply distribution structure—all across Japan, fully utilizing Japanese labor and existing installations.⁴¹⁰ The primary objective of such effort was to accommodate the US occupying forces. More specifically, such facilities were originally designed to serve the two Armies—the Sixth Army and the Eighth Army—when they entered Japan to implement their occupation duties after Japan’s surrender. While the headquarters of the Army Service Command 6, which served the Sixth Army, was situated in Kobe in western Japan, the headquarter of the Army Service Command 8, which served the Eighth Army was in Yokohama in central Japan.⁴¹¹ Eventually the Army Service Command 6 transformed into Kobe Base after the deactivation of the Sixth Army in January 1946, and the Eighth Army changed the Service Command 8 into Japan Logistical Command.⁴¹² Yokohama and Kobe were already established as Japan’s primary ports long before the war, the transport

⁴⁰⁷ “Chōsen sensō “jūgun “nipponjin jūmochi sentō ni 93 sai , omoi kuchibiraki shōgen 朝鮮戦争「従軍」日本人 銃持ち戦闘に 93歳、重い口開き証言” [A 93-year-old Japanese Korean War Participant Testifies About the Gunfight], last modified June 25, 2021, <https://mainichi.jp/articles/20210624/k00/00m/040/202000c>. (accessed November 4, 2021). Meanwhile, other source estimates that the figure is 120. Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Post-War Warriors: Japanese Combatants in the Korean War,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 10, no.1 (2012): 1-19.

⁴⁰⁸ “Chōsen sensō “jūgun “nipponjin jūmochi sentō ni 93 sai , omoi kuchibiraki shōgen 朝鮮戦争「従軍」日本人 銃持ち戦闘に 93歳、重い口開き証言” [A 93-year-old Japanese Korean War Participant Testifies About the Gunfight], last modified June 25, 2021, <https://mainichi.jp/articles/20210624/k00/00m/040/202000c>. (accessed November 4, 2021)

⁴⁰⁹ Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Post-War Warriors: Japanese Combatants in the Korean War,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 10, no.1 (2012): 1-19.

⁴¹⁰ Hugh J. Casey, *Engineers of the Southwest Pacific 1941-45: Reports of Operations – United States Army Forces in the Far East, Southwest Pacific Area Volume 7* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947), 213.

⁴¹¹ Ibid.

⁴¹² James A. Huston, *Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War* (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1989), 148.

capabilities that these two ports could provide were substantial.⁴¹³ Once the Korean War broke out, these ports were utilized as primary bases for both US Navy vessels and Military Sea Transportation Service ships thanks to the adequate facilities that could conduct maintenance, particularly ship repair and ammunition/fuel replenishment.⁴¹⁴ In addition, Kitakyushu ports—Moji port and Kokura port—Shimonoseki port, and Hakata port had huge advantage in terms of transportation efficiency for the US war efforts in Korea due to their geographical proximity to the Korean peninsula.⁴¹⁵ In June 1951, roughly 800,000 different types of items were stockpiled in major depots like Tokyo, Yokohama, and Koshien Ordnance depots and 14 other subdepots across Japan.⁴¹⁶

The war materials transported from Japan to Korea were massive. In the initial year of the Korean War, 750,000 infantry weapons, 26,000 general purpose vehicles, 2,400 artilleries, 787 tanks, and 1,900 other combat vehicles were shipped from Japan to Korea.⁴¹⁷ Between September 1950 to March 1951, 1.61 million tons of army supplies were shipped from Japan to Korea: while the total volume of shipments—summation of materials coming from the US Continent and from Japan to the Korean peninsula—was 2.12 million tons. In other words, 75.9 percent of the army supplies was shipped to the Korean peninsula via Japan.⁴¹⁸ The US Navy admitted that the value of Japan as a rear base was immeasurable.⁴¹⁹ To be sure, there were attempts to resupply directly from the US mainland to the Korean peninsula. However, due to long duration of the shipping time—while the shipping distance from Japan to the Korean peninsula was approximately 600 to 900 miles depending on the location of various ports, ships from US ports had to travel roughly 6,000 to 7,000 miles to reach the Korean peninsula—such efforts turn out to be ineffective, especially during the early phases of the Korean War when the North Korean forces were advancing fast toward the Pusan

⁴¹³ Ishmaru Yasuzo, “The Korean War and Japanese Ports: Support for the UN Forces and Its Influences,” *NIDS Security Reports*, no. 8 (2007): 55-70.

⁴¹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁶ Terrence J. Gough, *US Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War: A Research Approach* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military, U.S. Army, 1987), 70. James A. Huston, *Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War* (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1989), 148. These subdepots consist of the quartermaster depot, engineer depot, signal depot, medical supply depot, and chemical base depot.

⁴¹⁷ James A. Huston, *Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War* (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1989), 173.

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 119.

⁴¹⁹ Tanaka Akira 田中明, “Chōsen sensō niokeru kōhō shien nikansuru ichi kōsatsu: nigawa jōriku sakusen ni shōten o atete” 朝鮮戦争における後方支援に関する一考察: 仁川上陸作戦に焦点を当てて [A Study on Logistics Support During the Korean War: Focusing on the Incheon Landing Operation], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 68-79.

perimeter.⁴²⁰

2.5.2. Maritime Transportation

The outbreak of the Korean War caused many problems for the US military, but among them, transportation capability was one of the most urgent issues. Especially at the beginning of the war, the US military did not have enough ships to transport their soldiers and supplies to the Korean peninsula. To solve this problem, the US military used landing ships—the United States leased these vessels to Japan and they were operated by Japanese crews during the Korean War—and Japanese merchant ships. To further facilitate the transportation of the Eighth Army, Japanese tugs, barges, repair ships and tankers were utilized, apart from the landing ships operated by Japanese crews.⁴²¹

After the surrender of Japan, a ban on the movement of all Japanese ships was ordered, and on 3 September 1945, the GHQ took control of all Japanese vessels that were more than 100 tons of displacement. The Japanese ships were then placed under the command and supervision of the commander of the US Pacific Fleet. Shortly thereafter, the Naval Shipping Control Authority for Japanese Merchant Marine (SCAJAP) was established by the GHQ.⁴²² Japan's overall ship management—operation, modification, repair, and disposal—was handled by SCAJAP which had the responsibility for control of Japanese merchant shipping.⁴²³

Once the Korean War broke out, SCAJAP ships, which were crewed by Japanese and operated under the control of the occupation forces, were organized as US Navy units in Japan as Task Group 96.3. With the outbreak of the Korean War, SCAJAP's 39 LSTs and 12 cargo ships (which included six Japanese ships) were utilized to the fullest extent possible for the purpose of transportation in the Far East.⁴²⁴

⁴²⁰ James A. Huston, *Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War* (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1989), 148.

⁴²¹ *Ibid.*, 143.

⁴²² Ishimaru Yasuzo 石丸安蔵, “Chōsen sensō to nippon no kōwan: kokurengun e no shien to sono eikyō” 朝鮮戦争と日本の港湾：国連軍への支援とその影響 [The Korean War and Japanese Ports: Support for the UN Forces and its Impact], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本：NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 53-67.

⁴²³ Dorothy E. Richard, *United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands: The Postwar Military Government Era, 1945-1947* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1957), 28.

⁴²⁴ Ishimaru Yasuzo 石丸安蔵, “Chōsen sensō to nippon no kakawari: wasuresarareta kaijō yusō” 朝鮮戦争と日本の関わり：忘れ去られた海上輸送 [Japan in Relations with the Korean War: Forgotten Maritime Transport], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本：NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 33-52.

SCAJAP vessels were utilized from the very beginning phase of the war. The first troops were transported to the Korean peninsula by these SCAJAP vessels. As the Korean War progressed the United States started to experience a shortage of LSTs and other amphibious vessels. Under such circumstances, Commander of the Far East Navy assigned Japanese ships—and LSTs run by Japanese crews—to be utilized for maritime transportation. As a result, first batch of SCAJAP ships⁴²⁵ sailed to the Korean peninsula.⁴²⁶ By mid-July 1950, these SCAJAP ships transported the US 24th Division from Japan to the Korean peninsula.⁴²⁷ In addition to troops, SCAJAP ships were responsible for transporting for ammunition and explosives. Before the Incheon Landing operation, the primary destination for these shipments was the port of Pusan.⁴²⁸



Figure 13. Military Equipment Being Loaded Abord LSTs at Sasebo⁴²⁹

⁴²⁵ The initial group of SCAJAP ships comprised LST Q058, Takasago Maru, and Pembina. LST Qo58 was specifically carrying tanks and vehicles, while Takasago Maru accommodated 2,500 troops. Simultaneously, Pembina held a cargo of 3,500 tons of supplies.

⁴²⁶ Ishimaru Yasuzo 石丸安蔵, “Chōsen sensō to nippon no kakawari: wasuresarareta kaijō yusō” 朝鮮戦争と日本の関わり: 忘れ去られた海上輸送 [Japan in Relations with the Korean War: Forgotten Maritime Transport], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 33-52.

⁴²⁷ James A. Field, *History of United States Naval Operations: Korea* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1962), 71. During July 1950, the fleet operated by the SCAJAP (Shipping Control Authority for the Japanese Merchant Marine) composed of 12 freighters and 39 LSTs, which fell under the jurisdiction of Task Group 96.3, proved to be invaluable assets for the United States’ war endeavors.

⁴²⁸ Onuma Hisao 大沼久夫, *Chōsen sensō to nippon* 朝鮮戦争と日本 [The Korean War and Japan] (Tokyo: Shinkansha, 2006), 111.

⁴²⁹ Terrence J. Gough, *US Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War: A Research Approach* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military, U.S. Army, 1987), 84.

SCAJAP vessels played a key role during the Incheon landing operation. Joint Task Force Seven was formed under Admiral Arthur Struble on September 11, 1950 and carried out the Incheon landing operation.⁴³⁰ Meanwhile, the 90th Task Force was established as a subordinate unit under the Joint Task Force Seven. The 90th Task Force had a unit in charge of transportation, which included 17 US LSTs and 30 LSTs under SCAJAP.⁴³¹ As Incheon landing operation was being prepared, the UN troops—this included the 1st Marine Division—and war materials were assembled at Kobe port. When the transportation ships headed toward the Korean peninsula on September 12, the fleet included 30 Japanese LSTs.⁴³²

According to the Pacific Fleet Interim Evaluation Report, the transportation volume reached 79,003 people and 159,687 volume tons of cargo during the Incheon landing operation.⁴³³ From September 14 to 25 during the Incheon landing operation, the Japanese merchant ships that were incorporated under the command of the 90th Task Force were *Fukuju Maru* (freighter, 2,377 ton), *Shonan Maru* (freighter, 2,862 ton), *Fuju Maru* (freighter, 3,628 ton), *Kaiko Maru* (freighter, 2,084 ton), *Hino Maru* (freighter 2,843 ton), and *Senyo Maru* (freighter, 2,882 ton).⁴³⁴ During the Incheon amphibious landing operation, Japanese crews manned roughly one-third of the ships involved in the event.⁴³⁵

Japanese maritime transportation support was also crucial during the Wonsan landing

⁴³⁰ Edward H. Simmons, *Over the Seawall: U.S. Marines at Inchon* (Washington D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2000), 24.

⁴³¹ Ishimaru Yasuzo 石丸安蔵, “Chōsen sensō to nippon no kakawari: wasuresarareta kaijō yusō” 朝鮮戦争と日本の関わり：忘れ去られた海上輸送 [Japan in Relations with the Korean War: Forgotten Maritime Transport], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本：NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 33-52.

⁴³² Ishimaru Yasuzo 石丸安蔵, “Chōsen sensō to nippon no kōwan: kokurengun e no shien to sono eikyō” 朝鮮戦争と日本の港湾：国連軍への支援とその影響 [The Korean War and Japanese Ports: Support for the UN Forces and its Impact], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本：NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 53-67. In relation to the last phase of loading in readiness for the Incheon landing operation, additional sites such as Sasebo and Yokohama ports were employed. For example, the 7th Infantry Division was stationed in Yokohama, while the primary unit of the 7th Fleet, responsible for providing artillery support, assembled in Sasebo for the final preparations.

⁴³³ Ishimaru Yasuzo 石丸安蔵, “Chōsen sensō to nippon no kakawari: wasuresarareta kaijō yusō” 朝鮮戦争と日本の関わり：忘れ去られた海上輸送 [Japan in Relations with the Korean War: Forgotten Maritime Transport], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本：NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 33-52.

⁴³⁴ Ibid. These vessels were cargo ships.

⁴³⁵ Edward A. Olsen, *U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity a Neo-Internationalist View* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), 75.

operation.⁴³⁶ Emboldened by his success at Incheon, MacArthur's next target was Wonsan, which was situated in the eastern coast of the Korean peninsula, 110 miles north of the 38th parallel.⁴³⁷ The procedure of the Wonsan landing operation was very similar to that of the Incheon landing operation. Under the command of the US Navy's Task Force 90, 13 US LSTs and 23 LSTs under SCAJAP were assigned for transportation missions on September 30, 1950.⁴³⁸ And these vessels were deployed during the Wonsan landing operation in October 1950.⁴³⁹ The ships involved in the Wonsan landing operation transported 49,710 people and 161,465 tons of cargo.⁴⁴⁰

SCAJAP ships also conducted transportation missions during the Hungnam evacuation, from November 15 to 24. On November 24, 1950, UN forces launched a Christmas offensive against the Yalu River. The operation was expected to proceed smoothly, but two days later, the Chinese troops embarked on a massive attack in order to push back the UN forces.⁴⁴¹ As a result, the UN forces had to conduct an amphibious landing in reverse, together with massive number of military personnel, Korean refugees, and vehicles.⁴⁴² During the process, 193 vessels in total were utilized in the Hungnam evacuation operation. Thanks to the effort, 17,500 vehicles, 91,000 civilians, 105,000 soldiers, and 350,000 tons of supplies were safely transported to the southern part of the Korean peninsula.⁴⁴³ While the withdrawal was proceeded under Major General James H. Doyle's Task Force 90, 12 US LSTs, 27 LSTs under SCAJAP and seven Japanese merchant ships were assigned for the task.⁴⁴⁴

⁴³⁶ Following the successful Incheon landing operation, the UN forces initiated a counterattack and recaptured Seoul on September 25, 1950. General MacArthur recommended that the North Koreans surrender after the South Korean military crossed the 38th parallel on October 1, but there was no response from the North Korean military. In light of these circumstances, the Wonsan landing operation was formulated.

⁴³⁷ William T. Y'Blood, *Down in the Weeds: Close Air Support in Korea* (Washington D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2002), 19.

⁴³⁸ James A. Field, and Ernest M. Eller, *History of United States Naval Operations* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1962), 224-225.

⁴³⁹ Ishimaru Yasuzo 石丸安蔵, "Chōsen sensō to nippon no kakawari: wasuresarareta kaijō yusō" 朝鮮戦争と日本の関わり: 忘れ去られた海上輸送 [Japan in Relations with the Korean War: Forgotten Maritime Transport], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 33-52.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁴¹ George M. Watson and Jacob Neufeld, *Coalition Air Warfare in the Korean War, 1950-1953* (U.S. Air Force History and Museums Program, 2005), 243.

⁴⁴² Clifford M. Drury et al, *The History of the Chaplain Corps, United States Navy, Volume Six: During the Korean War 27 June 1950-27 June 1954* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), 47.

⁴⁴³ "Remembering," *Sealift* 25, no. 10 (1974): 6-11.

⁴⁴⁴ Ishimaru Yasuzo 石丸安蔵, "Chōsen sensō to nippon no kakawari: wasuresarareta kaijō yusō" 朝鮮戦争と日本の関わり: 忘れ去られた海上輸送 [Japan in Relations with the Korean War: Forgotten Maritime Transport], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 33-52. The seven Japanese ships are Fentress, Malay Maru, Senzan Maru,

All in all, it is estimated that at least 4,000 to 5,000 Japanese crews worked for the transportation operation during the Korean War.⁴⁴⁵ These crews can be divided into two categories: (1) 2,000 recruited by the SCAJAP; (2) 2,000 to 3,000 crew members recruited by Japan's Special Procurement Board.⁴⁴⁶ Due to the inherent risk, Japanese crews who participated in the transportation task received four to five times greater salaries compared to regular shipping task: this condition incentivized former Japanese soldiers and jobless Japanese to volunteer.⁴⁴⁷ Thanks to the familiarity with the terrain, the Japanese crews were more useful than the Americans.⁴⁴⁸

2.5.3. Railway Transportation

The well-developed Japanese national railways proved to be an ideal condition for becoming a transport relay base. With the outbreak of the Korean War, the Civil Transportation Bureau of the General Command and the Third Railroad Transportation Command of the Eighth Army demanded the Japan National Railways (JNR) to cooperate in the Korean War transportation work.⁴⁴⁹ Accordingly, on June 29, 1950, the Director-General of Transportation sent messages to JNR that it was required to be careful not to make any mistakes in delivering orders since emergency measures—such as sudden changes or cancellations of railway schedule—were conducted through phone calls. It was also mentioned that these transportation-related matters should not be disclosed to anyone other than the person concerned.⁴⁵⁰ As a result, Japan's national railways quietly transported US troops from their barracks to training grounds, ammunition from depots to ports, wounded soldiers from ports to hospitals in Japan during the Korean War.⁴⁵¹

Meanwhile, the JNR personnel was deployed in various parts of Japan to carry out

Shinano Maru, Tobato Maru and Yone Yama Maru, and the remaining one is unidentified.

⁴⁴⁵ Onuma Hisao 大沼久夫, *Chōsen sensō to nippon* 朝鮮戦争と日本 [The Korean War and Japan] (Tokyo: Shinkansha, 2006), 111.

⁴⁴⁶ *Tokyo Shimbun*, October 24, 2010. These number exclude the 1,200 personnel engaged in the minesweeping operation and the 1,300 crew members responsible for the loading and unloading of military transport ships within the harbor.

⁴⁴⁷ Onuma Hisao 大沼久夫, *Chōsen sensō to nippon* 朝鮮戦争と日本 [The Korean War and Japan] (Tokyo: Shinkansha, 2006), 111.

⁴⁴⁸ Lee Jong-pan, "Hankwukcencayngsi ilponuy hwupangciwen" [Japan's Rear Support During the Korean War], *Military History*, no. 46 (2002): 255-298.

⁴⁴⁹ Japanese National Railways, 日本国有鉄道 *Tetsudō shūsen shorishi* 鉄道終戦処理史 [History of Railway's Post-War Management] (Tokyo: Taishoshuppan, 1981), 258.

⁴⁵⁰ Yamasaki Shizuo 山崎静雄, *Shijitsu de kataru chōsen sensō kyōryoku no zenyō* 史実で語る朝鮮戦争協力の全容 [The Complete History Regarding the Korean War Cooperation] (Tokyo: Honnoizumisyā, 1998), 113-115.

⁴⁵¹ *Ibid*, 111.

domestic transport operations necessary for the entry of US Eighth Army soldiers who were engaged in occupation missions. From July 1 to 8, 1950, 87 temporary trains were operated from Kanto, Tohoku, Chubu, and Kansai to West Japan, where departure bases such as Sasebo Port, Hakata Port, and Moji Port were concentrated. The number of vehicles used during that period reached 619 passenger cars and 1,816 freight cars.⁴⁵² Within the timeframe of two weeks after the war broke out, the number of temporary trains operated by JNR to solely transport US troops recorded 245, while the number of used passenger cars and freights cars during the same timeframe reached 7,324, and 5,208, respectively. This was the highest record in the history of Japanese military transportation organized by national railways.⁴⁵³

In addition to the transport of UN soldiers—including soldiers from the United Kingdom—national railways were also mobilized for the transport of South Korean troops.⁴⁵⁴ The 32nd Infantry Regiment of the US 7th Division, consisting of South Korean soldiers, was transferred to Japan, received combat training in Japan, and returned to the Korean front. Although the exact number of South Korean troops transported within Japan via JNR is unknown, it can be said that a considerable number of Korean soldiers came to Japan and were trained, given the fact that the US 7th Division incorporated approximately 8,000 Korean troops and 73 passenger cars were transported from nine regions in five days.⁴⁵⁵

2.5.4. Regeneration, Repair, and Upgrade of Military Equipment

Japan was also responsible for the maintenance of combat equipment used in the Korean War. In a nutshell, UN forces' long-term attack operation, supplies, and troop transport during the Korean War would have been disrupted without Japan's industrial potential and the pool of skilled workforce. Despite United States' rapid measures to meet the demand, the required war material was simply enormous, especially during the initial phase

⁴⁵² Ibid, 115.

⁴⁵³ Japanese National Railways, 日本国有鉄道 *Tetsudō shūsen shorishi* 鉄道終戦処理史 [History of Railway's Post-War Management] (Tokyo: Taishoshuppan, 1981), 262. Yamasaki Shizuo 山崎 静雄, *Shijitsu de kataru chōsen sensō kyōryoku no zenyō* 史実で語る朝鮮戦争協力の全容 [The Complete History Regarding the Korean War Cooperation] (Tokyo: Honnoizumisa, 1998), 119.

⁴⁵⁴ Yamasaki Shizuo 山崎静雄, *Shijitsu de kataru chōsen sensō kyōryoku no zenyō* 史実で語る朝鮮戦争協力の全容 [The Complete History Regarding the Korean War Cooperation] (Tokyo: Honnoizumisa, 1998), 119.

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid, 119-122. In addition to troop transportation, the Japanese national railway system was utilized for the conveyance of goods. On June 26, the day following the outbreak of the Korean War, orders were issued for the transportation of ammunition. Fourteen train cars were designated to travel from Rikuzen-Sanno to Hozumi, while twenty-five train cars were assigned from Tanabe to Hozumi. Subsequently, the transport of ammunition commenced from various locations such as Rikuzen-Sanno, Tanabe, Zushi, and Inagi-Naganuma (where the US ammunition depots were situated) to destinations including Hozumi, Ashiya, and Gokura.

of the Korean war. In that sense, the large unused stockpiles of military equipment in Japan—and on the Pacific Islands—was a godsend. Furthermore, Japan’s industrial potential and the large pool of Japanese skilled labor enabled the swift regeneration of such equipment.⁴⁵⁶ Under such circumstances, Operation Rollup—whose objective was to gather the massive leftover war materials which were scattered around the Pacific area and repair these equipment in Japan—was initiated in 1947.⁴⁵⁷ Operation Rollup gained momentum mainly to support the US occupying forces in Japan.⁴⁵⁸ Since the Far East Command did not receive new war materials after the end of the World War II, US occupying forces in Japan were only able to be equipped with necessary weapons, made available by Operation Rollup.⁴⁵⁹ During the process, large amounts of military equipment were collected within Japan and ultimately refurbished with the help of the Japanese workers.⁴⁶⁰ If Operation Rollup had not recovered and regenerated weapons, the US Army divisions dispatched to Korea would have exhausted their combat supplies relatively quickly. Almost 90 percent of the weapons and 75 percent of the mechanical equipment possessed by each division on the day when the war broke out were obtained from regeneration programs.⁴⁶¹ From June to October 1950, the ordinance buildup program—which was initiated in Japan earlier that year—regenerated 15,000 general purpose vehicles, 34,316 fire control equipment (this generally refers to systems or devices designated to assist in aiming and firing weapons with accuracy), 489,000 small arms, 1,418 artillery pieces, and 743 combat vehicles.⁴⁶² In addition, around 63,000 vehicles—non combat vehicles like trucks—alongside large quantities of spare parts had been gathered in storages areas including Kobe, Nagoya, and the Yokohama-Tokyo area by mid-1951.⁴⁶³ To regenerate such massive amount of equipment, 30,000 Japanese workers were assigned as of

⁴⁵⁶ James A. Huston, *Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War* (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1989), 137.

⁴⁵⁷ James Cotton and Ian Neary *the Korean War in History* (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1989), 124.

⁴⁵⁸ Peter S. Kindsvatter, “Operation Rollup: The US Army’s Rebuild Program During the Korean War,” *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 97, no.4 (2007): 187-200.

⁴⁵⁹ James Cotton and Ian Neary *the Korean War in History* (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1989), 124.

⁴⁶⁰ Terrence J. Gough, *US Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War: A Research Approach* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military, U.S. Army, 1987), 59.

⁴⁶¹ Tanaka Akira 田中明, “Chōsen sensō niokeru kōhō shien nikansuru ichi kōsatsu: nigawa jōriku sakusen ni shōten o atete” 朝鮮戦争における後方支援に関する一考察: 仁川上陸作戦に焦点を当てて [A Study on Logistics Support During the Korean War: Focusing on the Incheon Landing Operation], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 68-79.

⁴⁶² James A. Huston, *Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War* (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1989), 137.

⁴⁶³ *Ibid*, 138.

May 1951. To supervise the Japanese personnel, the United States dispatched 850 people: (1) 500 men from the Ordnance Corps; (2) 300 civilians from the Department of the Army, and (3) 50 ordnance officers.⁴⁶⁴

The regeneration project gained momentum with the passage of time. Although less than 3,000 vehicles were rebuilt during the first half of 1950, over 28,000 vehicles were churned out from the production line in the latter half of the same year.⁴⁶⁵ By the end of 1950, over 65 percent of vehicles used in the Korean peninsula were shipped from the rebuilding facilities in Japan.⁴⁶⁶ During the first year of the Korean War, 82 percent of the 1,900 combat vehicles—save tanks—that were sent from Japan to Korea was a result of the ordnance regeneration program.⁴⁶⁷ The number of general-purpose vehicles that were rebuilt in Japan rapidly increased during the second and third year of the Korean War. While the total amount of vehicles produced in Japan, cumulatively from the outbreak of the Korean War, reached 98,831 by May 1951, the figure climbed to roughly 148,000 by June 1953.⁴⁶⁸

The regeneration program was on full swing that by mid-1952, 71 percent of the infantry weapons, 60 percent of the artillery, and 41 percent of the tank that were used in the Korean war front originated from the Japanese rebuilding facilities.⁴⁶⁹ The regeneration project enabled such task to be implemented in a cost saving manner. For instance, had the assemblies and subassemblies were built from the ground up, the estimated total cost would have reached 34 million dollars.⁴⁷⁰ Yet 45,000 assemblies/subassemblies were rebuilt with the price tag of 12 million US dollars, mainly utilizing existing facilities.⁴⁷¹ During the Korean War, damaged tanks were sent from the Korean warfront to Japan, and resent to Korea after conducting repair.⁴⁷² The responsibility of such refurbishment task was assumed by the Base Industrial Group 5 (located in Yokosuka) and Base Industrial Group 9 (located in Sasebo), consisting of large companies like Nippon Automobile, Fuji Motors, Nippon Tire, and Nippon Steel Tubing.⁴⁷³ Side by side with some US Army personnel, approximately 15,000 Japanese workers participated in the regeneration project.⁴⁷⁴ During the first year of

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid, 139.

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid, 176.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid, 139.

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid, 140.

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁷¹ Ibid.

⁴⁷² Ibid.

⁴⁷³ Nam Ki-jeong, *Kicikwukkaury thansayng ilponi chilun hankwukcencayng* [The Birth of a Base-State: Japan's Korean War] (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2016), 120.

⁴⁷⁴ United States Congress House Committee on Armed Services, *House of Representatives on Sundry Legislation*

the Korean War, 45 percent of the 787 tanks that were sent from Japan to Korea was a result of the ordinance regeneration program.⁴⁷⁵

In some cases, weapon systems were modified or upgraded in Japan. Given the available weapons platform at the time—it lacked effective antitank weapons for example—the Eighth Army was no match to the Soviet’s T-34 tanks: such asymmetric feature concerning firepower was obviously displayed during the Battle of Osan.⁴⁷⁶ Although Task Force Smith was able to disable a couple of North Korean tanks,⁴⁷⁷ the US forces could not prevent the North Korean troops from advancing further: Task Force Smith suffered 155 casualties during this combat.⁴⁷⁸ This raised the urgent need for heavy weapons including tanks. Since the transportation of such platforms from the US continent was expected to take a couple of weeks, some unserviceable tanks in Japan had to be regenerated and sent to the war front. Within a month after the Eighth Army asked for medium/heavy tanks, M-4A3 Sherman tanks were sent to Korea.⁴⁷⁹ Before the outbreak of the Korean War, M-4 Sherman tanks were introduced to Japan by two ways. There were M-4 tanks introduced directly by the US Army to Japan immediately after Japan’s surrender to support the US occupation while there were used Sherman tanks gathered and relocated to Japan through Operation Rollup: the latter’s amount was much greater than the former. Thus, M-4 tanks that were regenerated in Japan and sent to the Korean peninsula were the platforms retrieved from the Pacific area after World War II. Meanwhile, the Tokyo Ordnance Depot embarked on an upgrade, replacing the 75mm main canons into high-velocity 75mm canons.⁴⁸⁰ By the same token, M15A1 halftrack’s 37mm guns were replaced by 40mm guns while tank-mounted 105mm howitzer’s maximum elevation angle was extended from 33.5 degrees to 67 degrees.⁴⁸¹

Japanese workers also repaired and upgraded aircraft. While the repair of the F-51 fighter jets were conducted by Kawasaki Aircraft, repair of light reconnaissance aircrafts—

Affecting the Naval and Military Establishments, 1950 Eighty-first Congress, Second Session Volumes 54-67 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951), 3176.

⁴⁷⁵ James A. Huston, *Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War* (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1989), 176.

⁴⁷⁶ Arthur W. Conner, “The Armor Debacle in Korea, 1950: Implications for Today,” *Parameters* 22, no. 1 (1992): 66-76.

⁴⁷⁷ Jerold E. Brown, *Historical Dictionary of the US Army* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), 466.

⁴⁷⁸ Max Hastings, *Korean War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015), 22.

⁴⁷⁹ James A. Huston, *Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War* (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1989), 140. Shortly after that, the remaining tanks in Japan, specifically thirty-one medium tanks equipped with 76mm cannons, were also sent to Korea.

⁴⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸¹ *Ibid.*

for instance, Cessna—were conducted by Showa Aircraft Industry.⁴⁸² Larger aircraft—bombers and cargo planes—like B-26 and C-46 were repaired by Mitsubishi Heavy Industry while the task of carrier aircraft repair was assumed by the NIPPI Corporation (New Japan Aircraft Manufacturing Company).⁴⁸³ Multifarious parts of aircraft—ranging from engine covers, dashboard, auxiliary machinery to telecommunication equipment—were also repaired by Japanese companies. For instance, engines of F-86 fighter jets and T-33 trainer aircrafts were repaired by Kawasaki Aircraft and Mitsubishi Heavy Industry.⁴⁸⁴ In addition, F-80 tank fuel tanks, C-119 tail boom, F-86 wing front slats, and F-86 reconnaissance cameras were either attached or upgraded in the Tachikawa depot which resulted in greater reliability and efficiency.⁴⁸⁵ F-80s and F-84s were able to have inflight refueling capability thanks to the modification.⁴⁸⁶ In Tachikawa Air Base, the newly introduced F-80Cs were prepared for service while the relatively older versions of these aircraft—F-80As and F-80Bs—were refurbished.⁴⁸⁷ Meanwhile, the reduction in air resistance uplifted their altitude limit to 4,000 feet, further increasing the maximum as well as rising speed.⁴⁸⁸ Thanks to the Japanese expertise on aircraft—garnered well before the start of the World War II—such repairs and upgrades were effectively conducted. In addition, most of the aircraft transported by sea from the US mainland was subject to corrosion due to the sea salt, and treatment was a necessity. Japanese workers regenerated these aircraft in an ammunition storage depot that was set up in Kyushu.⁴⁸⁹ Such regeneration of combat aircraft were conducted in various locations.⁴⁹⁰

⁴⁸² Lee Jong-pan, “Hankwukcencayngsi ilponuy hwupangciwen” [Japan’s Rear Support During the Korean War], *Military History*, no. 46 (2002): 255-298.

⁴⁸³ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁵ Tanaka Akira 田中明, “Chōsen sensō niokeru kōhō shien nikansuru ichi kōsatsu: nigawa jōriku sakusen ni shōten o atete” 朝鮮戦争における後方支援に関する一考察: 仁川上陸作戦に焦点を当てて [A Study on Logistics Support During the Korean War: Focusing on the Incheon Landing Operation], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 68-79.

⁴⁸⁶ William W. Suit, “USAF Logistics in the Korean War,” *Air Power History* 49, no. 1 (2002): 46-59.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁸ Tanaka Akira 田中明, “Chōsen sensō niokeru kōhō shien nikansuru ichi kōsatsu: nigawa jōriku sakusen ni shōten o atete” 朝鮮戦争における後方支援に関する一考察: 仁川上陸作戦に焦点を当てて [A Study on Logistics Support During the Korean War: Focusing on the Incheon Landing Operation], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 68-79. The aviation repairs incurred costs of \$1.64 million in 1953 and \$5.59 million in 1954. These figures should not be underestimated, considering that the Japanese Gross National Product for 1951 and 1955 stood at 14.2 billion USD and 22.7 billion USD, respectively (GNP data obtained from the Keizei Joho Center).

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁰ In addition to the depot in Kyushu, aircraft shipped from the United States to Japan underwent regeneration at Tachikawa Air Base and Misawa Air Base on Honshu island, as well as Naha Air Base on Okinawa.

Meanwhile, regeneration was not confined to military equipment: sufficient number of medical supplies were shipped to Korea in the initial phase of the Korean War, thanks to the effective regeneration program conducted by the Japanese workers.⁴⁹¹

2.5.5. Production of General-Purpose Equipment and Military Hardware

Since items supplied through the regeneration program could not meet the massive demand of the UN forces, Japanese factories had to manufacture various types of general purpose as well as military equipment. It should be noted that prior to the onset of the Korean War in May 1947, the United States held a strong appreciation for Japan's industrial potential and recognized its strategic significance within the Cold War context.⁴⁹² It is estimated that the available stock of materials at the outbreak of the Korean War was sufficient to supply troops adequate for peacetime operation for 60 days.⁴⁹³ From the very onset of the Korean War, the Eighth Army was able to receive general purpose equipment—life preservers, carbon tetrachloride, sandbags, pallets, crushed rock, lumber, manila rope, and net clips—from Japan.⁴⁹⁴ Face with North Korean and Chinese offensive in the Korean peninsula, the UN forces' consumption of petroleum products substantially increased and the shortages on gasoline, drum gaskets, and oil drums had to be replenished by Japan. Likewise, Japanese-made wooden boxes were utilized as antipersonnel mines. In addition, Japanese companies manufactured and supplied 50,000 trip flares during the Korean War.⁴⁹⁵

Meanwhile, the Japanese government concluded agreements with the US contracting officers to produce various types of vehicles. From August 1950 to May 1951, these vehicles—in particularly two-and-a-half-ton trucks that numbered over 9,500—were supplied to the South Korean Army.⁴⁹⁶

Most notably, Japan provided substantial quantity of weapons and ammunition for the US troops participating in the Korean War.⁴⁹⁷ Thanks to the GHQ memorandum—which

⁴⁹¹ James A. Huston, *Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War* (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1989), 141.

⁴⁹² Ishida Kyogo 石田京吾, “sengo nippon no kaijō bōeiryoku seibi 1948-52 nen : kaijō bōei niokeru nichu bei no yakuwari buntan no kigen” 戦後日本の海上防衛力整備（1948-52年）：海上防衛における日米の「役割分担」の起源 [Japan's Post-War Maritime Defense Buildup (1948-52): Origin of Japan-US Role Sharing in Maritime Defense], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 97-110.

⁴⁹³ G. Don Taylor, *Logistics Engineering Handbook* (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2008), 1-6.

⁴⁹⁴ James A. Huston, *Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War* (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1989), 143.

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid, 144.

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid, 130.

eased the ban on weapons production—Japan was able to manufacture weapons, starting in 1952.⁴⁹⁸ Specifically, GHQ allowed the production of weapons—including naval vessels and combat aircraft—ammunitions, other military equipment, and its components (parts, assemblies, components designed and produced, especially for use in the production of weapons, ammunition, and other war equipment). Thanks to such measure, Japan was able to operate weapons production facilities under GHQ watch.⁴⁹⁹

Three Japanese companies like Kobe Steel and Nippon Yakin manufactured artilleries, rifles, pistols, ammunitions. As for machine gun production, ten manufacturing companies participated: Japan's monthly production capability on October 1952 was 5,500 7.7mm machine guns, 3,300 12.7mm machine guns, and 2,175 20mm machine guns.⁵⁰⁰ Ten manufacturers were involved in shell production, while five companies manufactured cartridge chambers. When it comes to artillery production, facilities of the old Japanese army were reused.⁵⁰¹ Optical weapons like aimers, anti-aircraft telescopes, and range finders were produced by 23 companies. Meanwhile, the expansive air operation in the Korean peninsula necessitated the US air force to acquire more napalm bombs and fuel tanks. It was the Japan's aviation industry—once dissolved by the GHQ after the World War II—that quickly provided the necessary items.⁵⁰² As of 1952, there were 119 Japanese factories that produced major military equipment including artillery pieces and machine guns.⁵⁰³

2.5.6. Medical Support

Although the wounded soldiers that needed long term care was eventually sent to the United States mainland, they were first evacuated from the Korean peninsula to medical facilities located in Japan.⁵⁰⁴ For example, from battalion aid stations in Korea, wounded soldiers were sent to hospitals in Pusan—these include the 8054th Evacuation Hospital, the

⁴⁹⁸ Maeda Tetsuo, et al, *The Hidden Army: The Untold Story of Japan's Military Forces* (Chicago: Edition Q, 1995), 119.

⁴⁹⁹ Nam Ki-jeong, *Kicikwukkaury thansayng ilponi chilun hankwukcencayng* [The Birth of a Base-State: Japan's Korean War] (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2016), 221.

⁵⁰⁰ Tsuji Akira, Arisawa Hiromi, 辻清明, 有沢広巳 *Shiryō 20 nenshi* 資料 戦後20年史 [20 Years of History] (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 1966), 166.

⁵⁰¹ These facilities include the naval shipyard at Sasebo, Kure and Maizuru and arsenal of the 1st Army, the Osaka Army, and the Kokura Army.

⁵⁰² Tsuji Akira, Arisawa Hiromi, 辻清明, 有沢広巳 *Shiryō 20 nenshi* 資料 戦後20年史 [20 Years of History] (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 1966), 166.

⁵⁰³ Nam Ki-jeong, *Kicikwukkaury thansayng ilponi chilun hankwukcencayng* [The Birth of a Base-State: Japan's Korean War] (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2016), 156.

⁵⁰⁴ Robert S. Anderson, *Army Medical Specialist Corps* (Washington D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, 1968), 373.

Swedish Red Cross Hospital, and hospital ships—and then to Korean airfields.⁵⁰⁵ Then they were sent to the 118th Station Hospital Fukuoka and other Army hospitals in Japan either by airlift or maritime transport.⁵⁰⁶ There were 14 United Nations field hospitals in Japan during the Korean War.⁵⁰⁷ At the time, non-Japanese doctors and nurses treated the injured in the UN military field hospitals⁵⁰⁸ since Japan was concerned of being overly involved into the Korean War. However, the GHQ ordered the Japanese government to assign medical personnel for full cooperation.⁵⁰⁹ Soon, Japanese nurses who were affiliated with the Japanese Red Cross in Kyushu prefecture were dispatched to the UN rear hospitals. From prefectures such as Fukuoka, Saga, Oita, Kumamoto, Nagasaki, Miyazaki, and Kagoshima, these Japanese nurses were assigned to the 141st General Hospital.⁵¹⁰ From Kyushu prefecture alone, 54, 25, and 17 nurses were dispatched as the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd installments.⁵¹¹ While the recruitment of these nurses was conducted in a secretive manner, the dispatch of Japanese nurses started in December 1950.⁵¹² In March 1951, the Japanese Red Cross conveyed the message to the nurses that information concerning UN rear hospital—for example, payment and specific assignment—was confidential and should not be disclosed to the outsiders.⁵¹³ Despite the Japanese Red Cross' efforts to maintain low profile on dispatching Japanese nurses to UN rear hospital, Japanese Communist lawmaker Kanda Asano presented the evidence that 63 Japanese nurses were working for the US forces at the House of Representatives Welfare Committee in June 1952.⁵¹⁴ Despite the Japanese concern—expressed by people like Asano Kanda—that medical contribution might engulf Japan into the Korean War, such sentiment did not gain momentum since Japan was under US occupation when the GHQ initially ordered the Japanese Red Cross for full

⁵⁰⁵ Jonathan Hadgraft, *United States Army in the Korean War: The Medic's War* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), 150.

⁵⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 151.

⁵⁰⁷ Yamasaki Shizuo 山崎静雄, *Shijitsu de kataru chōsen sensō kyōryoku no zenyō* 史実で語る朝鮮戦争協力の全容 [The Complete History Regarding the Korean War Cooperation] (Tokyo: Honnoizumisya, 1998), 141.

⁵⁰⁸ The former Japanese navy hospital situated in Kure base served as a general hospital for Commonwealth soldiers, while Fukuoka's former army hospital was reconstructed and designated as the 1st United Nations evacuation hospital.

⁵⁰⁹ Yamasaki Shizuo 山崎静雄, *Shijitsu de kataru chōsen sensō kyōryoku no zenyō* 史実で語る朝鮮戦争協力の全容 [The Complete History Regarding the Korean War Cooperation] (Tokyo: Honnoizumisya, 1998), 142.

⁵¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 149.

⁵¹¹ Takahashi Masako 高橋政子, "Sengo ni ikiteita akagami shōshū — chōsen sensō ni shōshū saretā nisseki kangofu" 戦後に生きていた赤紙召集-朝鮮戦争に召集された日赤看護婦 [Recall of Red Cross Nurses Living After World War II — Japanese Nurse Called for the Sake of the Korean War], *Kangogaku zasshi* 看護学雑誌 51(6) (1987): 574-578.

⁵¹² *Ibid.*

⁵¹³ Yamasaki Shizuo 山崎静雄, *Shijitsu de kataru chōsen sensō kyōryoku no zenyō* 史実で語る朝鮮戦争協力の全容 [The Complete History Regarding the Korean War Cooperation] (Tokyo: Honnoizumisya, 1998), 159.

⁵¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 146.

cooperation.⁵¹⁵

Apart from caring the wounded UN soldiers, Japanese provided blood for the injured Koreans in the Korean peninsula. The first blood installment—equivalent to 70 pounds—were sent from Japan to the 8054th Evacuation Hospital and the 8055th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital, which were located in Korea.⁵¹⁶ By the end of 1950, donors in Japan delivered 22,099 pints of blood, in total, to the Korean peninsula.⁵¹⁷ Since the Japanese blood was genetically different from that of western people, the donated blood was sent to the South Korean troops.⁵¹⁸

Japan's medical support continued throughout the Korean War.⁵¹⁹ But there were issues concerning impartiality, since the wounded were comprised mainly of US and South Korean soldiers, thus Japan's providing of medical services was one-sided towards the UN forces. From the legal perspective, Japan's contribution was "impartial" since neither South Korea nor North Korea was the signatory state of the International Red Cross treaty when the Korean War broke out.⁵²⁰ Furthermore, Japan's proactive international activities was under certain constraint since its sovereignty was not stored restored until the San Francisco treaty was signed in 1951.⁵²¹ Apart from the legal perspective, the US and UK troops were concerned about having medical treatment by Japanese personnel—it has been barely five years after the hostility between the Western countries and Japan was terminated when the Korean War broke out—and requested their respective governments to send hospital staff to Japan.⁵²² However, the massive casualties inflicted by the Korean war front necessitated more doctors and nurses. Japan's medical contribution became a *fait accompli* when McArthur initially ordered the Japanese government to mobilize around 100 Japanese nurses from the Japanese Red Cross.⁵²³ Given the fact that Japan was under the US occupation, it must have been difficult not to conform to the Supreme Commander's order.

⁵¹⁵ Ibid, 142.

⁵¹⁶ Jonathan Hadgraft, *In United States Army in the Korean War: The Medics War* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1987), 154.

⁵¹⁷ Ibid, 155.

⁵¹⁸ Ibid, 154.

⁵¹⁹ Yamasaki Shizuo 山崎静雄, *Shijitsu de kataru chōsen sensō kyōryoku no zenyō* 史実で語る朝鮮戦争協力の全容 [The Complete History Regarding the Korean War Cooperation] (Tokyo: Honnoizumisa, 1998), 147.

⁵²⁰ Ibid, 148.

⁵²¹ Ibid.

⁵²² Ibid, 143-145.

⁵²³ Ibid, 148.

2.6. Evaluation of Japan's Contribution during the Korean War

Japan supported the US' war efforts in a comprehensive manner since Japan executed wide range of activities—maritime transportation, weapons regeneration, weapons production, minesweeping, medical assistance, and so forth—which contained both logistic and operational support. In the following section, I have made an evaluation of each role based on its significance (high, moderate, and negligible) in order to examine the impact of Japan's variety of roles played during the Korean War. The classification of "high" refers to instances where Japan's role was distinctive, with no viable alternatives or very limited options during the Korean War. For example, Japan's crucial involvement in the minesweeping operation is considered "highly" significant because the US navy lacked experienced minesweepers, and Japan's expertise played a critical role in supporting US war efforts in the Korean waters. The categorization of "moderate" pertains to situations where Japan's role could have been undertaken by other countries at the time. An example is Japan providing training camps as military venues for both US and South Korean soldiers. In this scenario, South Korea also served as a training venue for both UN and South Korean and forces. When the Incheon landing operation succeeded and South Korea regained its pre-war territorial size, South Korea operated extensive training facilities for UN and South Korean troops. The classification of "negligible" applies when Japan's role had obvious alternatives and did not significantly contribute to UN's war efforts. For instance, the participation of Japanese volunteers is a documented fact and an intriguing subject for further research. However, the numbers were not substantial and had minimal impact on the situation on the Korean front.

Japan's minesweeping operation (*high*)

Clearing the sea route was necessary since most cargos—consisting of military personnel, weapons, and ammunition, civilians, and so forth—were transported through the waters during the war. Given the fact that the North Koreans laid numerous Soviet mines across major ports and due to the lack of US minesweepers/personnel, Japan's role was neither optional nor supplementary. It should be noted that 70 percent of the entire UN vessels sunk during the first two years of the Korean War was due to North Korean sea mines.⁵²⁴ Equipped with the world-class minesweepers at the time coupled with the expertise accumulated through the actual minesweeping operation after World War II, Japan's

⁵²⁴ Paul M. Edwards, *Small United States and United Nations Warships in the Korean War* (North Carolina: McFarland, 2015), 154.

minesweeping operation secured the major ports—Incheon, Haeju, Nampo, Gunsan, and Wonsan—that was the key supply connection line with the outside world.

Underscoring that the US minesweeping capability in the Pacific Ocean was insufficient—seriously lacking appropriate equipment, let alone the personnel who were experienced in minesweeping operation—at the time when the Korean War occurred, the First Interim Evaluation of the Pacific Fleet confirms that Japanese minesweepers contributed greatly to the success of the US-led minesweeping operation.⁵²⁵ The report explains that together with the US efforts to reactivate its minesweeping capabilities after September 1950, the use of Japanese minesweepers helped in managing North Korean sea mines.⁵²⁶ All in all, the United States was satisfied with the Japanese performance despite the small size of the Japanese minesweepers and the skills of the special minesweeper crew were considered as good.⁵²⁷ The minesweeping operation during the Korean War involved the deployment of 46 Japanese minesweeping vessels, along with one guinea pig ship and a contingent of 1,200 former Japanese Navy personnel.⁵²⁸ By sweeping a vast expanse of 327 kilometers of sea routes and over 607 square kilometers of harbor areas, a total of 28 mines were disposed of during the Korean War. Specifically, 20 mines were cleared from the west coast, while 8 mines were eliminated from the east coast.⁵²⁹

Given the shortage of minesweepers (the United States had 13 minesweepers when the Korean War broke out) securing major ports—Wonsan, Incheon, Haeju, Nampo, and Gunsan—located both in West and Eastern coast of the Korean peninsula might have been

⁵²⁵ *Korean War, U.S. Pacific Fleet Operations: Command in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet Interim Evaluation Report No. 1, Period 25 June to 15 November 1950* (Pearl Harbor, HI: Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, 1959), 11.

⁵²⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁷ Hirama Youichi 平間洋一, “Chōsen senso ni sansen shita nipponjin” 朝鮮戦争に参戦した日本人 [Japanese Who Participated in the Korean War], in *Chōsen sensō* 朝鮮戦争 [Korean War: Volume 3], ed. Rekishigunzō henshūbu (Tokyo: Gakken, 1998), 171.

⁵²⁸ Suzuki Hidetaka 鈴木英隆, “Chōsen kaiki ni shutsugeki shita nippon tokubetsu sōkaitai: sono hikari to kage” 朝鮮海域に出撃した日本特別掃海隊: その光と影 [The Japanese Special Minesweeping Corps that Set Sail in the Korean Waters: The Light and Shadow], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 12-32.

⁵²⁹ Maritime Staff Office Defense Department 海上幕僚監部防衛部編, “*Kimitsu chōsen dōran tokubetsu sōkaishi*” 機密 朝鮮動乱特別掃海史 [Confidential: The History of the Special Minesweeping Units During the Korean War], (Kaijō bakuryōkanbu bōeibu, 1961), 98. According to another source, a total of 27 sea mines were disposed of during that time. Suzuki Hidetaka 鈴木英隆, “Chōsen kaiki ni shutsugeki shita nippon tokubetsu sōkaitai: sono hikari to kage” 朝鮮海域に出撃した日本特別掃海隊: その光と影 [The Japanese Special Minesweeping Corps that Set Sail in the Korean Waters: The Light and Shadow], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本: NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 12-32.

extremely difficult had the Japanese declined to offer their help. It should be noted that railways were cut off while other transportation via land was under serious constraint: coupled with the UN bombing operation which destroyed most of the railways, the mountainous terrain of the Korean peninsula enabled limited alternative passage for transportation. In that context, Japan's utilization of their minesweepers as well as the expertise—garnered mostly through the minesweeping operation conducted in and around the Japanese island in the post-World War II period—was vital in UN's war fighting capability.

Providing US bases as a launching pad (*high*)

Although the initial dispatch of the Task Force Smith ended up in a disaster, this rapid encounter with the North Korean troops gave the US forces to accurately assess the enemy's capability and prepare appropriately. Given the fact that the United States had no war plans centered on the Korean peninsula when the war broke out, prompt dispatchment of the Task force Smith and its engagement with the enemy provided important information to the US war planners.⁵³⁰

Moreover, the air dominance in the Korean War was acquired through the initial air battles conducted between US fighters dispatched from Japan and the North Korean fighter planes. Even while the UN forces, as well as the ROK forces, were cornered to Pusan in the initial three months of the war, US bombers dispatched from Japan projected their firepower to the advancing North Korean forces. Since the North Koreans were devoid of means to strike the Japanese territory, UN forces were able to dispatch troops and other military assets without concern.

Military equipment supply and maintenance (*high*)

Regeneration of weapons enabled the UN forces to keep up their superior firepower against the North Korean forces throughout the war. Especially at the very initial phase of the war, US Army was mostly equipped with weapons that were collected after World War II and later regenerated by the Japanese. While the weapons transportation from the US mainland to the Korean war front took time roughly two weeks, it was mainly the regenerated weapons

⁵³⁰ Glenn D. Paige, *The Korean Decision June 24-30, 1950* (New York: The Free Press, 1968), 128. Furthermore, due to the two weeks of time obtained through the costly sacrifice of Task Force Smith, it is widely regarded as having ensured the subsequent deployment of divisions in advance.

from Japan that the UN forces used in defending the Pusan perimeter. In addition, approximately 65 percent of all vehicles in Korea which transported war materials—such as ammunitions—to the UN forces were regenerated in Japan.⁵³¹ Given the US forces' substantial ammunition depletion ratio, especially during the initial phase of the Korean War—for instance, 9.8 percent of the Eighth Army's automatic rifles were depleted each month, while 12.5 percent of the machine guns were lost—Japan played a crucial role in supplying weapons and ammunitions that were used in the Korean front.⁵³² It is notable that the 75mm recoilless rifle and the 2.36 inch rocket launchers could not destroy North Korea's T-34 tanks in the initial phase of the war.⁵³³ The weapons upgrade in Japan enabled the UN forces to effectively conduct combat against the North Koreans. In the 1950 hearings before committee on Armed Services of the House Representatives, the United States evaluated that “the recovery program has been of immeasurable value in our [the United States] fighting in Korea.”⁵³⁴ Meanwhile, the total cost saved by the weapons regeneration program should factor in not only the expected unit cost for producing similar items, but also the transportation cost covering the distance from the US mainland to the Far East.⁵³⁵

Weapons production (*high*)

The GHQ's decision to lift ban on Japan's weapons production contributed to the UN troops' war capability during the Korean War. Starting from 1952, 119 Japanese companies produced major munitions including rifles, machine guns, artillery shells, anti-aircraft telescopes, range finders, napalm bombs, fuel tanks, and so forth.⁵³⁶

⁵³¹ United States Congress House Committee on Armed Services, *House of Representatives on Sundry Legislation Affecting the Naval and Military Establishments, 1950 Eighty-first Congress, Second Session Volumes 54-67* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951), 3177.

⁵³² James A. Huston, *Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War* (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1989), 130.

⁵³³ Institute for Military History, *6-25jeonjaengsa bukhanui jeonmyeonnamchingwa chogibangeojeontu* [The Korean War History: Full Scale North Korean Invasion and the Initial Battles for Defense] (Seoul: Institute for Military History, Ministry of National Defense, 2005), 51.

⁵³⁴ United States Congress House Committee on Armed Services, *House of Representatives on Sundry Legislation Affecting the Naval and Military Establishments, 1950 Eighty-first Congress, Second Session Volumes 54-67* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951), 3177.

⁵³⁵ James A. Huston, *Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War* (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1989), 139.

⁵³⁶ Nam Ki-jeong, *Kicikwukkaury thansayng ilponi chilun hankwukcencayng* [The Birth of a Base-State: Japan's Korean War] (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2016), 156.

Maritime transportation support (*high*)

Given that most items—troops, civilians, military equipment, and so forth—were transported by sea, Japanese transportation support was very important. Not to mention the paucity of US transportation capability, the Japanese crew's familiarity with the Korean terrain made their cooperation indispensable. Thanks to the post-war repatriation task—which was ordered and authorized by the GHQ—of Japanese citizens from foreign countries, Japanese crews were more than ready to take up the task in the Korean waters. Through LSTs and other miscellaneous cargo ships, Japanese transportation service not only covered the daily demands but the most iconic military operations—the Incheon landing operation, the Wonsan landing operation, and the Hungnam evacuation—during the Korean War. Overall, it is estimated that a minimum of 4,000 to 5,000 Japanese personnel were involved in the transportation operation throughout the Korean War.⁵³⁷ These individuals can be categorized into two groups: (1) Around 2,000 crew members were recruited by the SCAJAP, and (2) approximately 2,000 to 3,000 crew members were enlisted by Japan's Special Procurement Board. If the crew members responsible for loading military transport ships within the harbor, which amounts to roughly 1,300 men, is added, it can be stated that a minimum of 5,300 to 6,300 Japanese personnel contributed to the transportation operation during the Korean War.⁵³⁸

Transportation support via the national railways (*high*)

This function is closely attached with other functions—Japan's military equipment supply and maintain, maritime transportation support, resumption of Japan's weapons production, and UN/ROK troops training in Japanese territory—since the utilization of the Japanese railways enabled all these diverse activities to proceed soundly: transporting troops from training camps or bases in Japan to major ports, transporting ammunition and military platforms from depots and factories to ports were all possible thanks to Japan's national railways. Since bases, depots, factories were scattered around Japan, effective heavily depended upon Japan's national railways. Although other transportations existed—car and trucks for example—it might have been nearly impossible to transport massive amounts of

⁵³⁷ Onuma Hisao 大沼久夫, *Chōsen sensō to nippon* 朝鮮戦争と日本 [The Korean War and Japan] (Tokyo: Shinkansha, 2006), 111.

⁵³⁸ *Tokyo Shimbun*, October 24, 2010.

troops and cargos in a speedily manner without the railways.⁵³⁹ Japanese national railways were fully utilized during the Korean War. Merely two weeks after the war broke out, the number of temporary military trains operated by the national railways to transport US troops surged to 245, the number of used passenger cars and freights cars during the same timeframe reached to 7,324, and 5,208, respectively.⁵⁴⁰

Base as a military training venue (*moderate*)

Training camps in Japan—such as Ojojihara, Hijudai, Oyanohara, Aebano, Higashi-Fuji, and Shomagahara training camp—allowed both the UN and the ROK forces to train, regroup, and refresh. In particular, the replacement training battalion at Sasebo and replacement training center located at Yokohama played an important role during the initial couple of months of the war: training facilities these processed roughly 38,000 US replacements between July to September 1950.⁵⁴¹ These training was critical since many of the US recruits were not physically fit for the mission, and 60 percent of the recruits—through January 1951—were service troops, not specialized for combat.⁵⁴²

Meanwhile, 33 South Korean military officers were trained by the US military's working-level training group in Japan,⁵⁴³ and 8,637 South Korean recruits—they became the origin of Korean Augmentation To the United States Army—received their military training in Japan and was assigned to support the US 7th Infantry Division.⁵⁴⁴ Factoring in that these 8,637 South Korean soldiers—or KATUSA—represented at least 35 percent of the 7th US Infantry Division that conducted Incheon landing operation, it could be said that the training of South Korean recruits in Japan played a role in supporting the US amphibious operation and the subsequent land combats conducted against North Korean troops.⁵⁴⁵

⁵³⁹ Yamasaki Shizuo 山崎静雄, *Shijitsu de kataru chōsen sensō kyōryoku no zenyō* 史実で語る朝鮮戦争協力の全容 [The Complete History Regarding the Korean War Cooperation] (Tokyo: Honnoizumisa, 1998), 111.

⁵⁴⁰ Japanese National Railways, 日本国有鉄道 *Tetsudō shūsen shorishi* 鉄道終戦処理史 [History of Railway's Post-War Management] (Tokyo: Taishoshuppan, 1981), 262.

⁵⁴¹ Terrence J. Gough, *US Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War: A Research Approach* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military, U.S. Army, 1987), 40-41.

⁵⁴² Ibid, 42. Given the rugged, mountainous Korean terrain, US recruits had to go through an appropriate training.

⁵⁴³ Sasaki Harutaka 佐々木春隆, *Chōsen sensō kankoku hen chū* 朝鮮戦争：韓国篇中 [The Korean War: Korean Part Volume 2] (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1976), 101.

⁵⁴⁴ Moon Kwan-hyun, “6·25 jeonjaeng si katusa jedowa yuen chamjeon budaeroui hwakdae” [A Study on the KATUSA in the Korean War], *Military History*, no. 69 (2008): 191-224. During the course of the Korean War, additional groups of South Korean recruits assigned to support US troops, known as KATUSA (Korean Augmentation to the United States Army), underwent training in South Korea under the guidance of US military instructors.

⁵⁴⁵ Ibid. In different source, the figure is suggested as 45 percent. *Eighth Army*,

Medical support (*moderate*)

Although 14 UN hospitals in Japan were serving the wounded, they were initially treated in the field hospitals in Korea (and more critical patients were sent back to the US mainland for further treatment). Furthermore, the number of medical personnel—nurses—from the Japanese Red Cross was not so significant; only 62 nurses were confirmed working for the wounded US troops in 1952.

Participation of Japanese volunteers (*negligible*)

Although some Japanese—former military men—voluntarily took arms and joined the front lines, the number is not so significant. Furthermore, other Japanese civilians who accompanied the US personnel to the Korean peninsula were only around 60 to 120.⁵⁴⁶ All in all, the overall contribution to the UN's warfighting capability was meager at best.

<https://8tharmy.korea.army.mil/ncoa/cta.asp> (accessed January 13, 2023).

⁵⁴⁶ Which is confirmed so far.

Chapter 3: US Forces Japan and US Bases in Japan

3.1. Chapter Summary

The effectiveness of US Forces Japan (USFJ) during a Korean contingency stems from its mobility and proximity to the warzone. While the arrival of reinforcements from the US mainland would provide overwhelming firepower and secure ultimate victory for the US-ROK forces against the aggressors, withstanding the initial North Korean onslaught is critical. Aware that their chances of victory diminish once the reinforcements arrive, the North Korean military would exploit the element of surprise and make concerted efforts to swiftly advance their military objectives. Therefore, the early deployment of USFJ allows for tactical flexibility to reorganize and regroup the US-ROK combined forces, paving the way for the effective introduction of reinforcements in the Korean warfront.

Meanwhile, the US bases in Japan are anticipated to assume a crucial function as a launching platform for deploying troops, military equipment, and other essential war materials, in the event of a failure in a deterrence and North Korea's invasion of South Korea. In particular, the eight United Nations Command rear bases in Japan—three in Okinawa, and bases in the Japanese mainland—which could be used in a relatively unrestricted manner by the US forces, will play a key role during the US reinforcement process in a Korean contingency.⁵⁴⁷ If North Korea embarks upon a large-scale attack—large enough that the US-ROK combined forces cannot repel—the assets in the United Nations Command rear bases will be dispatched to the Korean peninsula and back up the US-ROK combined forces. Therefore, the US bases in Japan cannot be considered as an additional military garrison, but as an integral component of South Korea's defense. All in all, US bases in Japan are significantly important to South Korea's security since the geographical proximity enables the US assets in Japan to be rapidly dispatched to the Korean peninsula in case of contingency. To safeguard the security of US bases, Japan has the capacity to defend against North Korea's guerilla infiltration attempts and intercept ballistic missiles launched by North Korea, thereby providing protective cover to the US bases.

Meanwhile, there are unique attributes concerning US bases in Japan. Okinawa was considered strategically important to South Korea's defense ever since the outbreak of the Korean War. South Korea's reaction in and around the Okinawa reversion negotiation well indicates how crucial US bases in Okinawa were considered by the South Koreans.

⁵⁴⁷ Annual History Report, Headquarters United States Forces Korea (1977), 32.

Meanwhile, the introduction of a prior consultation function in the 1960 US-Japan security treaty raised concern that the United States might not freely use its military assets in case of contingency. However, the 1960 Secret Agreement nullified the prior consultation function, and it is expected that the USFJ would be dispatched to the Korean peninsula in case of a contingency.

3.2. USFJ and Military Bases in Japan

Ever since the United States introduced its troops in Japan as an occupying force momentarily after the Japan's surrender in 1945, the size of the USFJ was intermittently reduced and their bases were reorganized accordingly. During the Korean War (as of 1952), the United States had approximately 3,800 installations—summation of bases and facilities—across Japan,⁵⁴⁸ accommodating more than 200,000 US military personnel. Once the Korean Armistice Treaty was signed in 1953, major withdrawal of US forces from Japan followed throughout the 1950s.⁵⁴⁹ By 1958, The number of USFJ was decreased to 87,000.⁵⁵⁰

Despite such downsizing, US and Japanese leaders had to pursue further troop reductions and base realignment in order to alleviate Japanese anti-base protest.⁵⁵¹ As a result, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke agreed—during the 1957 summit meeting between the two—to withdraw all US ground forces from Japan.⁵⁵² While the US ground troops withdrew from Japan with the passage of time, large number of US troops were still stationed in Japanese mainland—especially the ones stationed in the urban area—were relocated to Okinawa. By the late 1950s, roughly 140 US military installations—most notably the Northern Training Area and Camp Schwab, which were primarily used by the US Marine Corps—were built in Okinawa.⁵⁵³ As a result, US troops on Okinawa increased to 45,000 by 1964 while the number of US troops in mainland Japan was reduced to 40,000.⁵⁵⁴

⁵⁴⁸ The United States Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Hearing, Ninety-First Congress, First [and Second] Sessions* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), 1153.

⁵⁴⁹ Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 195.

⁵⁵⁰ Sheila K. Johnson, *The Japanese Through American Eyes* (California: Stanford University Press, 1991), 76.

⁵⁵¹ Jennifer M. Miller, *Cold War Democracy: The United States and Japan* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2019), 18.

⁵⁵² Saki Dockrill, *Eisenhower's New-Look National Security Policy: 1953-61* (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1996), 205.

⁵⁵³ Jon Mitchell, *Poisoning the Pacific the US military's Secret Dumping of Plutonium, Chemical Weapons, and Agent Orange* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2020), 61.

⁵⁵⁴ Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation* (New York: Oxford

Further troop reduction occurred after the declaration of the 1969 Nixon Doctrine and the 1972 Okinawa reversion.⁵⁵⁵ While the number of troops were reduced between 1960 and 1973, US military bases around big city areas were merged in accordance with the Kanto Plain Consolidation Plan which was implemented during the 1970s.⁵⁵⁶ Spearheaded by the US Air Force, the primary objective of the Kanto Plain Consolidation Plan was to integrate eight US bases located within the Kanto Plain into the Yokota Air Base.⁵⁵⁷ This arrangement proposed to consolidate American bases in the Kanto plain around Tokyo and to redeploy a substantial portion of the forces in question to Okinawa, thus significantly alleviating the anti-base sentiments, especially in and around Tokyo.⁵⁵⁸

After the reduction of US troops in the 1970s, there was no drastic reduction in the number of US troops ever since. Although the US troop size in Asia was reduced after the declaration of the Nixon Doctrine, the troop level of USFJ maintained 45,000 to 48,000 since the mid-1970s to the present day due to its importance.⁵⁵⁹ The end of the Cold War did not entail the substantial downsizing of troop size: as of March 1990, the number of US military and civilian personnel in Japan was around 53,000;⁵⁶⁰ this was equivalent to 45 percent of the US military and civilian personnel in the Pacific theater.⁵⁶¹ Among the military personnel—except for the 89 personnel from Department of Defense agencies—marine corps and the air force had 23,403 and 15,908, respectively, while the navy and the army had 6,237 and 2,146, respectively.⁵⁶² Such trend also applied to the base structure: approximately 75 percent of the entire US military bases in Japan has been situated in Okinawa which has been largely unchanged ever since the Okinawa reversion in 1972 to the 1990s.⁵⁶³

University Press, 1997), 195. The figure—US troops in Japanese mainland—ranges from 34,000 to 40,000.

⁵⁵⁵ History of Headquarters United States Forces, Japan (1973), 4.

⁵⁵⁶ Ibid, 16. For instance, In Kanagawa Prefecture, the US military base—which was 26.974 square kilometers from 49 locations in February 1965—was reduced to 22.701 square kilometers from 27 locations in April 1975, shortly after the restructuring of the US military base around city areas.

⁵⁵⁷ History of Headquarters United States Forces, Japan (1976), 71.

⁵⁵⁸ Kent E. Calder, *Pacific Alliance: Reviving U.S.-Japan Relations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 57.

⁵⁵⁹ Japanese Ministry of Defense. http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1985/w1985_03041.html. “Present day” refers to 2021.

⁵⁶⁰ This figure includes both soldiers and civilian employees.

⁵⁶¹ United States General Accounting Office, *Military Presence: U.S. personnel in the Pacific Theater* (Washington D.C.: GAO, 1991), 49. These personnel refers to the military and civilian personnel that are on foreign soil in the Pacific theater.

⁵⁶² Ibid.

⁵⁶³ Hitoshi Tanaka et al., *Japan-U.S. Security Alliance for the 21st Century: Cornerstone of Democracy, Peace, & Prosperity for Our Future Generations* (Diane Publishing company, 1996), 5. Although the specific number of troops varied over time due to deployments and rotations, but generally speaking, from 1972 to the 1990s, the US troop size in Okinawa remained relatively stable.

3.3. USFJ and South Korea's Defense

3.3.1. The Role of USFJ during a Korean Contingency

Once an all-out war breaks out in Korea, USFJ is expected to be introduced in the Korean peninsula and enhance the war fighting capability of the US-ROK combined forces until the bulk of the US reinforcement is transported from the US mainland to South Korea. USFJ will be deployed to the front lines—which is outside Japan—in accordance with the Article 6 of the 1960 US-Japan Security Treaty which enables the US forces stationed in Japan to “contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East.”

As per the Mitsuya Study entitled “1963 Comprehensive Defense Tabletop Study,” it is outlined that each branch of the USFJ (US Air Force, US Navy, and US Army in Japan) will be deployed to the front lines and provide support operations in response to a Korean contingency.⁵⁶⁴ Firstly, the US Air Force in Japan was tasked with conducting support operations for the Korean front. The specific instructions for the US Air Force in Japan's support operations were as follows: (1) some air assets were to be deployed from Japan to the Korean front as reinforcements; (2) combat operations were to be carried out by aircraft launched from US military air bases in Japan; (3) air reconnaissance were to be conducted across a wide range of areas, including the Korean front and its surroundings, utilizing US air bases in Japan; (4) the US Army and Marine Corps in Japan were to be airlifted and deployed to the Korean front by the Military Air Transportation Service; (5) rear supply of fuel, ammunition, aircraft parts, and other aviation materials was primarily to be carried out by the Military Air Transportation Services, mainly using Iwakuni, Itazuke, Yokosuka, and Sasebo. These support operations by the Military Air Transportation Services benefited not only US Forces Japan but also the South Korean Air Forces.⁵⁶⁵

Secondly, the US Navy in Japan was assigned to carry out support operations concerning the Korean waters.⁵⁶⁶ The instructions for the US naval forces in Japan were as follows: (1) conduct anti-submarine warfare operations and protect marine traffic in the waters under the responsibility of the US Navy commander in Japan; (2) undertake port defense and minesweeping operations in ports and waterways of US naval bases in Japan; (3) deploy minesweepers based in Japan to the Korean waters if required; (4) provide logistical support to the Seventh Fleet; (5) provide logistical support to both the US Navy and the South

⁵⁶⁴ Hayashi Shigeo 林茂夫, *Zenbun mitsuya sakusen kenkyū* 全文・三矢作戦研究 [Full Text, Mitsuya Strategy Study] (Tōkyō: Banseisha, 1979), 95-96.

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁶ Ibid.

Korean Navy; (6) conduct reconnaissance patrols over the Korean peninsula, flying the Naval Air Force⁵⁶⁷ from US military bases in Japan; (7) the Military Sea Transportation Service could carry out operational transportation of personnel and materials.⁵⁶⁸ Also, the US Seventh Fleet⁵⁶⁹ could (1) prevent enemy naval bases' passage, including the Tsushima Strait, and enforce blockades; (2) engage enemy bases through naval artillery and aircraft attacks; (3) perform amphibious operations and provide close air support during landing operations.⁵⁷⁰

Thirdly, the US Army in Japan was to assigned to carry out support operations primarily focused on logistical support for the Korean front. This logistical support entailed: (1) accumulating and storing materials shipped from the US mainland; (2) procuring war materials within Japan; (3) conducting repairs and maintenance on equipment retrieved from the Korean front; (4) sending and dispatching personnel to loading sites in Japan.⁵⁷¹

What makes USFJ effective during a Korean contingency is its mobility, and its proximity from the warzone. Its emphasis on Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps is designed to supplement the USFK, which is heavily Army-oriented. Although the introduction of US reinforcement from the US mainland would provide overwhelming firepower to the US-ROK forces and ensure the ultimate victory against the aggressors, it is critical to withstand the North Korean onslaught in the very initial phase of the war: fully aware that the chances of victory would disappear once the reinforcements arrives from the United States, the North Korean military would take advantage of their surprise attack and try their best effort to advance its military objectives quickly and decisively. Therefore, the early introduction of the USFJ would offer the tactical leeway to reorganize and regroup the US-ROK combined forces and pave the way for the reinforcement to be effectively introduced in the Korean warfront. In that context, close coordination in between USFK and USFJ will be playing as a crucial factor during a contingency. To effectively counter North Korea's probable all-out aggression against South Korea, the command structure and forces disposition of the USFJ has been designed and evolved over the passage of time. To better understand the unique attributes of USFJ, it would be useful to conduct an examination of the similarities as well as dissimilarities in between the USFJ and USFK.

⁵⁶⁷ In Japan, the Naval Air Force operated under the command of the Pacific Air Force, while being operationally controlled by the Seventh Fleet.

⁵⁶⁸ These personnel and materials could include all three branches of the US military.

⁵⁶⁹ Sasebo and Yokosuka were designated as the primary bases for the Seventh Fleet's operations on the Korean front.

⁵⁷⁰ Hayashi Shigeo 林茂夫, *Zenbun mitsuya sakusen kenkyū* 全文・三矢作戦研究 [Full Text, Mitsuya Strategy Study] (Tōkyō: Banseisha, 1979), 95-96.

⁵⁷¹ Ibid.

Firstly, the forces disposition is different. Thanks to the two bilateral security treaty, namely the US-Japan Security Treaty and the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, continuous US troops presence was secured in the Far East, and poised as a counterbalance to threat elements not only against North Korea but Soviet Union and China in the region. Despite the common goal of maintaining peace and security in the Far East, the two bilateral security treaties reflect the peculiarities of the US forces stationed in respective countries. While the US-Japan Security Treaty necessitates the US Forces in Japan not only to protect Japan but also the Korean peninsula, the US-ROK Mutual Defense treaty stipulates the US Forces Korea to function as exclusively as a security guarantor of South Korea's defense.⁵⁷² In other words, US forces in Japan could be deployed outside the territory of Japan, in contrast to the US forces in Korea which had to be immobile due to its trip-wire function.⁵⁷³ Naturally, the USFJ required greater mobility and the power projection capability so that the US Forces in Japan could operate widely outside of Japan. As a result, the US Forces Korea is mainly comprised of the Army, while the USFJ is mainly focused on the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps: thanks to such feature, B-52 bombers in Okinawa conducted long-range bombing operations during the Vietnam War while the US Seventh Fleet—comprised of six aircraft carriers—implemented maritime operation, utilizing port cities of Yokosuka, Sasebo, and Naha as its key bases.⁵⁷⁴ In terms of ground/immobile forces, USFJ and USFK had roughly 20, and 83 percent, respectively. For example, in 1973, USFJ had 24,386 Marine Corps, 17,112 Air Force, 9,311 Army, and 6,132 Navy.⁵⁷⁵ In contrast, USFK had Army 29,599, Air Force 7,190, Navy 254, and Marine corps 41 (see Table 4).⁵⁷⁶ Such attributes enable them to play complementary roles in an emergency. Although the number of troops have changed over the years, the portfolio of the military branches both within USFJ and USFK has been maintained its trend.

⁵⁷² This is possible, thanks to the Article 6 of the 1960 US-Japan Security Treaty.

⁵⁷³ Jeffrey W. Hornung, *Managing the U.S.-Japan Alliance: An Examination of Structural Linkages in the Security Relationship* (Washington D.C.: Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, 2017), 4.

⁵⁷⁴ Kasahara Tokushi et al., *A New Modern History of East Asia* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2017), 336.

⁵⁷⁵ History of Headquarters United States Forces, Japan (1973), 4.

⁵⁷⁶ Annual History Report, Headquarters United States Forces Korea (1973), 11.

Table 4. Forces Disposition of USFJ and USFK (1973)⁵⁷⁷

(Unit: person, percent)

Branch	US Forces Japan	US forces Korea
Army	9,311 (16.4%)	29,599 (79.8%)
Air Force	17,112 (30.1%)	7,190 (19.4%)
Navy	6,132 (10.8%)	254 (0.7%)
Marine Corps	24,386 (42.8%)	41 (0.1%)
Sum	59,941 (100%)	37,084 (100%)

As of 1985, USFJ and USFK had different features when it comes to command structure. While USFJ commander did not have the operational control (OPCON) on the JSDF, the US-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC) was a unified military command which exercised wartime OPCON over the US-ROK combined forces.⁵⁷⁸ In addition, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Command (CINCPAC)—not the USFJ Commander—had the authority to exercise OPCON towards USFJ.⁵⁷⁹ The Commander, US Forces, Japan, directed and supervised the execution of missions and responsibilities assigned to him by the CINCPAC.⁵⁸⁰ In other words, USFJ functioned as the subordinate unified command to CINCPAC.⁵⁸¹ In contrast, USFK commander had a command authority independent from the Pacific Command since the Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command (CINCUNC), and commander-in-chief Combined Forces Command (CINCCFC) was directly responsible to the Joint Chief of Staff.⁵⁸² Given such distinctive attributes, the USFJ and the USFK play a complementary role when it comes to the defense of South Korea. USFJ and USFK maintained—and is maintaining—close coordination for that purpose. Through joint logistical conferences to the refinement of the US reinforcement from the US continent to the Far East, both USFJ and USFK maintained—and is maintaining—close coordination for that

⁵⁷⁷ History of Headquarters United States Forces, Japan (1973), 4. Annual History Report, Headquarters United States Forces Korea (1973), 11.

⁵⁷⁸ Cynthia A. Watson, *Combatant Commands: Origins, Structure, and Engagements* (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2011), 49.

⁵⁷⁹ Jeffrey W. Hornung, *Managing the U.S.-Japan Alliance: An Examination of Structural Linkages in the Security Relationship* (Washington D.C.: Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, 2017), 32.

⁵⁸⁰ History of Headquarters United States Forces, Japan (1976), 1. The Commander of the USFJ has the main duty of focusing on three key aspects: (1) guaranteeing access to military service components during regional contingencies, (2) carrying out joint operations and exercises, and (3) formulating defense plan for Japan. Jeffrey W. Hornung, *Managing the U.S.-Japan Alliance: An Examination of Structural Linkages in the Security Relationship* (Washington D.C.: Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, 2017), 32.

⁵⁸¹ United States Department of the Army, *Operations FM 100-5* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1982), 17-11.

⁵⁸² Jeffrey W. Hornung, *Managing the U.S.-Japan Alliance: An Examination of Structural Linkages in the Security Relationship* (Washington D.C.: Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, 2017), 32. United States Congress House Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1985* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1984), 788.

purpose (see Table 5).

Table 5. Key examples of coordination in between USFJ and USFK.

Event	Activities
1981 Team Sprit field training exercise	USFJ headquarters monitored most of the exercise planning/execution and was obliged to convey information to the US Embassy in Tokyo. ⁵⁸³
1982 Team Spirit field training exercise	USFJ participated in the planning conference for the 1982 team Spirit held in South Korea. ⁵⁸⁴
Forest Blade 83 command post exercise	The USFJ held the Forest Blade 83 exercise to refine the process concerning the reinforcement from the US mainland in case of a contingency in the Far East. Here, the reinforcements from the US mainland refers to the Time Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD). ⁵⁸⁵
1984 Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise	In order to conduct the EDRE (Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise), USFK's A-10 aircrafts were dispatched from Suwon Air Base to Yokota Air Base, while the USFJ conducted the overall coordination of the exercise. The main objective of the exercise was to enhance the coordination regarding convoy clearance ⁵⁸⁶ and aircraft support. ⁵⁸⁷
Other miscellaneous logistical conferences held between USFJ and USFK	

For instance, there were logistics conferences held between USFJ and USFK.⁵⁸⁸ USFK's aircraft were dispatched to Japan to conduct Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise (EDRE).⁵⁸⁹ Furthermore, during the 1981 Team Spirit exercise, USFJ headquarters monitored most of the exercise planning/execution and was obliged to convey information to the US Embassy in Tokyo.⁵⁹⁰ Similarly, USFJ personnel participated in the planning conference for 1982 Team Spirit held in South Korea.⁵⁹¹ In addition, the USFJ held exercises Forest Blade 83 and constantly refined the process concerning the US reinforcement from the mainland—in accordance with the Time Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD)—in

⁵⁸³ History of Headquarters United States Forces, Japan (1981), 22.

⁵⁸⁴ History of Headquarters United States Forces, Japan (1982), 22.

⁵⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 62.

⁵⁸⁶ Convoy clearance refers to the process of ensuring a safe passage for a convoy of vessels through a particular route, often in areas that may be subject to potential hazards or risks.

⁵⁸⁷ History of Headquarters United States Forces, Japan (1984), 17.

⁵⁸⁸ History of Headquarters United States Forces, Japan (1983), 48. Although the item exists in the table of contents—Chapter 4 Logistics, Section IV Interservice Support, Plans, and Programs—the specific details are deleted.

⁵⁸⁹ History of Headquarters United States Forces, Japan (1984), 17.

⁵⁹⁰ History of Headquarters United States Forces, Japan (1981), 22.

⁵⁹¹ *Ibid.*

case of contingency in the Far East.⁵⁹² It is worth mentioning that in 1982, the South Korean foreign ministry underlined that although South Korea cannot expect security cooperation from Japan in a contingency due to the lack of security pact between South Korea and Japan, the US-Japan Security Treaty structure might enable the Japanese to make security contribution vis-à-vis the South Koreans.⁵⁹³ Meanwhile, then USFJ Commander Charles Donnelly hoped for closer security cooperation between South Korea and Japan so that the two countries would be well prepared to fight against the common enemy, the Soviet Union. He emphasized that South Korea and Japan should fight—in coordination with the US forces—against the Soviets if it invades South Korea.⁵⁹⁴ Such arguments were backed up by the close coordination between USFK and USFJ which was firmly developed and constantly being refined.

3.3.2. The Cruciality of USFJ

The US forces in Japan play a vital role for South Korean defense for various reasons, encompassing (1) deterrence, (2) rapid response capability, (3) functioning as a forward operating base, (4) fostering interoperability and coordination with the US-ROK combined forces, and (5) contributing to regional stability.

First, deterrence. The presence of US forces in Japan serves as a deterrence against potential aggression or military adventurism by North Korea. It signals a strong commitment from the United States to the security and defense of its allies in the region, including Japan and South Korea. Second, rapid response capability. Having US forces stationed in Japan provides a strategic advantage in terms of rapid response to any potential conflict on the Korean peninsula. As evidenced by the Korean War, Japan's proximity to Korea allows for quick deployment of troops, equipment, and logistical support in the event of a crisis, which enhances the ability to address contingencies effectively. The key priority in implementing the combined OPLAN 5027 (and 5015, starting from 2015) for a potential war on the Korean peninsula is the early neutralization of the North Korean war command centers and its long-range artillery forces, including multiple rocket launchers, and self-propelled guns. This requires the US-ROK combined forces to utilize air power, long-range missile capabilities, and special operations units. As stated in the annual Prepositioned Integrated Tasking Order (Pre-ITO) published by the US-ROK Combined Forces Command, the highest priority for the

⁵⁹² History of Headquarters United States Forces, Japan (1982), 62.

⁵⁹³ Ibid, 74.

⁵⁹⁴ Ibid.

utilization of air power and long-range missile capabilities is to neutralize the North Korean war command centers and artillery forces. However, the current deployment of air power in the Korean peninsula does not include the essential bomber forces outlined in the Pre-ITO. To implement the Pre-ITO effectively, it is necessary to deploy the bomber force from Japan (and Guam) to the Korean peninsula. Without this deployment, it would be impossible to achieve the strategic objective of neutralizing 70 percent of the North Korean artillery forces within three days, leading to significant limitations in executing the initial OPLAN for the war.⁵⁹⁵ Consequently, the conversion of US military assets deployed in Japan (and Guam) becomes absolutely crucial for the success of the operation. Third, forward operating base. US military bases in Japan, such as Yokosuka and Okinawa, serve as important forward operating bases for US forces in the region. These bases provide critical infrastructure and logistical support for military operations, including airfield, naval facilities, and prepositioned equipment. This infrastructure enables the United States to project power and sustain military operations in the area if needed. Fourth, interoperability and cooperation with US-ROK combined forces. The close proximity of US forces in Japan facilitates enhanced coordination, interoperability, and combined training exercises with the US-ROK combined forces. This collaboration strengthens the collective defense capabilities of the three countries and improves their ability to respond to potential threats effectively. Fifth, regional stability. The presence of US forces in Japan contributes to regional stability by providing reassurance to allies and maintaining a balance of power in the region. It helps deter potential aggression and reduces the likelihood of miscalculations or escalations that could lead to conflict.

Of all these reasons, the paramount function of the US forces in Japan during a Korean contingency is to deploy their available forces to the battlefield and provide support to the US-ROK combined forces in resisting the initial North Korean onslaught until substantial reinforcement from the US mainland can arrive at the location. For that reason, the importance of US forces in Japan during a Korean contingency is intricately linked to various factors such as US policy towards South Korea, the extent of US troop presence in South Korea, North Korea's perception of the security environment, and the overall defense preparedness of the US-ROK combined forces against a full-scale war. In that sense, it could be assumed that USFJ was particularly important during the 1970s. Firstly, the declaration of the Nixon doctrine and the withdrawal of the 7th Infantry Division in 1971 as well as the

⁵⁹⁵ Choi Kyu-sang, email message to author, May 7, 2023.

relocation of the 2nd Infantry Division from the Demilitarized Zone to the rear⁵⁹⁶ did create a security vacuum concerning South Korea's defense. It was merely couple of years after the security crisis of 1968 which demonstrated that South Korea was vulnerable to North Korea's guerrilla infiltration—let alone an all-out war—and South Korea was not able to equip itself with its domestically produced weapons until 1981.⁵⁹⁷ Japanese policymakers also shared concerns about the potential security vacuum on the Korean peninsula. A notable example occurred in 1970 when Nakasone, the head of the Defense Agency at the time, proposed the joint utilization of US bases in Japan by both the United States forces and the JSDF. This suggestion had a similar element to President Park's concept of "self-reliant defense." It came about following the notification that President Nixon planned to withdraw some US ground troops from South Korea.⁵⁹⁸ Although several measures were taken—establishing the US-ROK I Corps, concretizing the OPLAN 5027, Hollingsworth's assurances that the US-ROK forces could repel the North Korean aggression in couple of days, and Park's decision to build numerous concrete barricades along the North Korea's possible routes of invasion—it would have been a daunting task for the US-ROK forces had North Korea conducted an invasion at this juncture.

Moreover, the reunification of Vietnam in 1975 increased the probability of an all-out war in the Korean peninsula. Some interpreted Kim Il-sung's unexpected trip to Beijing in April 1975, shortly before the fall of Saigon, as an indication that the North Koreans, inspired by the communist triumph in Indochina, were searching for backing for a potential military operation of their own.⁵⁹⁹ The South Korean president viewed the unfavorable security situation and the potential for North Korean military provocation with great seriousness.⁶⁰⁰ The recently disclosed Chinese document indicates that Kim Il-sung was preparing an all-out

⁵⁹⁶ The United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Human Rights in South Korea Implication for U.S. Policy: Hearings before the Subcommittees on Asian and Pacific Affairs and on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress, Second Session, July 30, August 5, and December 20, 1974* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1974), 177.

⁵⁹⁷ Between 1974 and 1981, South Korea undertook its initial military buildup program in alignment with its goal of achieving increased self-reliance in national defense. This undertaking is commonly referred to as the first "Yulgok Project."

⁵⁹⁸ Ryu Sun-hee 劉仙姬, *Paku Chonhi no tai nichi tai bei gaikō: reisen henyōki kankoku no seisaku, 1968-1973 nen* 朴正熙の対日対米外交: 冷戦変容期韓国の政策, 1968-1973年 [Park Chung-hee's Diplomacy Towards Japan and the United States: Transformation of South Korea's Policies during the Cold War, 1968-1973] (Tōkyō: Minervashobo, 2012), 88-89.

⁵⁹⁹ Robyn Lim, *The Geopolitics of East Asia* (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2012), 123.

⁶⁰⁰ The United States Senate Committee on International Relations, *Background to the Investigation of Korean-American Relations and Conduct of the Investigation. Listing of Congressional Documents Frequently Cited. Supporting Documents* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1978), 165.

war in 1965 and asked for China's troop dispatch,⁶⁰¹ yet a Korean contingency in the 1970s might have been even more daunting for the South Koreans since the US troops presence in the region was substantially reduced due to the US withdrawal from Vietnam. Although in June 1975, US Defense Secretary James Schlesinger expressed readiness to utilize nuclear weapons as a means of protecting South Korea,⁶⁰² Jimmy E. Carter as a presidential candidate declared in the same year that he would order the withdrawal of all US forces from South Korea.⁶⁰³ Given the security environment, the USFJ might have played a very crucial role had North Korea invaded South Korea during the 1970s. Given the reluctant public opinion for spilling additional American bloods during the period,⁶⁰⁴ the deployment as well as the performance of the USFJ during the initial stages of the Korean contingency might have been also critical in getting the Congress' consent in dispatching the reinforcements from the mainland to the Korean peninsula.

It is noteworthy that South Korea initiated its own weapons production in the 1970s and achieved a qualitative advantage over many of North Korea's weapons systems by the 1990s.⁶⁰⁵ However, defending the South Korean capital, Seoul, which is merely 40 kilometers away from the Demilitarized Zone, against a surprise attack from North Korea has always posed a formidable challenge for South Korea since the signing of the Armistice in 1953.⁶⁰⁶ Let alone whether the US tripwire would function as planned—in other words, guaranteeing the US troops deployment in the Korean peninsula which necessitates the consent of the US Congress—the surety of withstanding the initial North Korean invasion and preventing Seoul from being captured has been constantly debated among the South Koreans: due to South Korea's greater degree of urbanization and centralization centered on Seoul over time, it remains one of the most important security matters to this day.⁶⁰⁷ It is worth mentioning that Lieutenant general James F. Hollingsworth—former commander of the US I Corps—pointed out the only thing that the North Koreans want is the South Korean capital since they could

⁶⁰¹ “Jin Richeng Zongli he Zhongguo zhu Chao Dashi Hao Deqing Jilu,” [Records of Premier Jin Richeng and Chinese Ambassador to Chao, Ambassador Hao Deqing] *Zhongguo Waijiaobu Danganguan* [Declassified Document No.: 106-01480-07].

⁶⁰² Robyn Lim, *The Geopolitics of East Asia* (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2012), 123.

⁶⁰³ Fred Hoffman, “The Role of Intelligence in of President Jimmy Carter's Troop Withdrawal Decisions,” *American Intelligence Journal* 21, no. 1/2 (2002): 57-60.

⁶⁰⁴ Eliot A. Cohen, “Constraints on America's Conduct of Small Wars,” *International Security* 9, no. 2 (1984): 151-181. The 1975 survey results show that the majority of American that favored US military involvement abroad only approved in case of defending Canada.

⁶⁰⁵ Lee Choong-koo, email message to author, April 19, 2023.

⁶⁰⁶ Jack G. Callaway, *Korea: Future Problems, Future Policies* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, Research Directorate, 1977), 59.

⁶⁰⁷ The nuclear progress achieved by North Korea has brought added intricacy to this issue, as it raises the potential of nuclear blackmail against South Korea and/or Japan. Additionally, there is apprehension that North Korea might aim to establish a scenario of nuclear decoupling between the United States and South Korea.

use Seoul as a leverage and would dictate terms on their own advantage.⁶⁰⁸ At any rate, it can be said that the rapid deployment of the USFJ to the Korean peninsula would be even more critical if the US-ROK combined forces could not withstand its position long enough and compromise the protection of Seoul—even partially—in the early phases of the contingency.

Both US and South Korean policymakers were well aware with the importance of defending the Seoul area and came out with some measures soon after the Armistice was signed in 1953. To defend against North Korean military invasion, the US-South Korea combined military exercise—Focus Lens—was initiated in 1954. Focus Lens exercise was continuously conducted during the 1950s and 1960s, having a modest objective of repelling North Korean invasion and reestablishing the demilitarized zone near the ceasefire line.⁶⁰⁹ Under such limited objective, US-ROK combined forces' withdrawal to the Han River and emptying Seoul was also considered as an option: the primary aim of this scenario was to repel the enemy forces back to the northern section of the Korean demilitarized zone while the US reinforcements are introduced in the Korean peninsula.⁶¹⁰

Such defense-oriented planning was eventually changed in 1973 when Lieutenant General Hollingsworth, the newly appointed USFK commander, adopted the forward-defense strategy. It was forward-defense since the ultimate goal of Hollingsworth's strategy was to enter into the North Korean territory after repelling the North Korean invasion of South Korea—within nine days⁶¹¹—in the initial stage of the conflict.⁶¹² Eventually, such forward-defense concept was integrated into Operation Plan 5027 in 1974.⁶¹³

In accordance with Operation Plan 5027, the US and ROK forces conducted combined exercises such as Ulchi-Freedom Guardian,⁶¹⁴ which started in 1976, for the

⁶⁰⁸ Jack G. Callaway, *Korea: Future Problems, Future Policies* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, Research Directorate, 1977), 59.

⁶⁰⁹ “Pokeoseurenjeu, peurideombolteu, timseupiris...hanmiyeonhaphunryeonui yeoksa” [Focus Lens, Freedom Bolt, Team Spirit... History of the US-ROK Combined Exercise], *Hankyoreh*, March 9, 2019.

⁶¹⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹¹ Institute for Military History, *Gukbangpyeonnyeonsa 1971~1975* [Chronicles of Defense History Chronicles: 1971 to 1975] (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2001), 859-860.

⁶¹² Lee Si-woo, *Life on the Edge of the DMZ* (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2008), 145.

⁶¹³ Paik Nak-chung, *The Division System in Crisis: Essays on Contemporary Korea* (Berkeley: Global, Area and International Archive, University of California Press, 2011), 243. The United States and South Korea collaborated on the development of Operation Plan 5027, a comprehensive strategy designed for a full-scale conflict with North Korea. Since its inception in 1974, the plan has undergone periodic revisions and updates, typically occurring every other year. Initially defensive in nature, the 1998 version of the plan introduced the inclusion of preemptive strikes against significant military targets if faced with an imminent North Korean military offensive. It is reported that the 2002 version, influenced by the aftermath of the 9/11 attack, even incorporated a contingency for the assassination of Kim Jong-il.

⁶¹⁴ Until 2008 it was named the Ulchi-Focus Lens (or UFL) exercise.

defense of South Korea.⁶¹⁵ Side by side, US-ROK combined forces have progressively refined the US reinforcement procedure for Korean contingencies.⁶¹⁶ Team Spirit exercise series started in 1976 which included troops from the Continental United States (CONUS) and PACOM bases to back up the US-ROK forces stationed in South Korea.⁶¹⁷ With the passage of time, Operation Plan 5027 was refined and continuously factored in North Korea's developments in terms of conventional weapons systems and military tactics. Coupled with South Korea's introduction of modern weapons—in all branches of the military—and North Korea's out-of-date conventional weapons, US-ROK combined forces' overall edge vis-à-vis North Korea has been presumably enhanced over the years.

In order to enhance the readiness of the US-ROK combined forces, akin to the efforts made by the NATO countries to address the conventional arms disparity with the Warsaw Pact countries by deploying tactical nuclear weapons, US forces in Japan stationed nuclear weapons on Okinawan territory until 1972. Momentarily after the signing of the 1951 US-Security Treaty, the first installment of nukes were deployed in Okinawa: in 1954, F-100 fighters that were armed with hydrogen bomb were placed in Kadena base, Okinawa.⁶¹⁸ In addition, Mace missiles—its warhead was 1.1 megaton that could destroy literally everything within the five-kilometer radius—were deployed to Okinawa in 1961.⁶¹⁹ While the first of four Mace missile sites became operational in 1962, its operational range covered China as well as some parts of the Soviet Union (see Figure 14).⁶²⁰ While Okinawa hosted 19 types of nuclear weapons between 1954 and 1972,⁶²¹ it is presumed that thousands of tactical nuclear weapons may have been deployed in US bases in Okinawa during the same timeframe.⁶²² Although the US withdrew ground based tactical nuclear weapons after the 1972 Okinawa reversion, the presence of the Seventh Fleet—as the primary platform for nuclear retaliation—has been maintained in Japan ever since.⁶²³

⁶¹⁵ The Organization of the Joint Chief of Staff, *United States Military Posture* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1983), 101.

⁶¹⁶ Ibid.

⁶¹⁷ Annual History Report, Headquarters United States Forces Korea (1984), vii.

⁶¹⁸ Jon Mitchell, "Seconds Away from Midnight: U.S. Nuclear Missile Pioneers on Okinawa Break Fifty Year Silence on a Hidden Nuclear Crisis of 1962," *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 10, no. 1 (2012): 1-10.

⁶¹⁹ Ibid.

⁶²⁰ Ibid.

⁶²¹ Ota Masakatsu and Steve Rabson, "US Veterans Reveal 1962 Nuclear Close Call Dodged in Okinawa," *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 13, no. 2 (2015): 1-5.

⁶²² Jon Mitchell, "Seconds Away from Midnight: U.S. Nuclear Missile Pioneers on Okinawa Break Fifty Year Silence on a Hidden Nuclear Crisis of 1962," *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 10, no. 1 (2012): 1-10.

⁶²³ Peter Hayes et al., *Peace and Security in Northeast Asia Nuclear Issue and the Korean Peninsula* (Florence: Taylor and Francis, 2016), 361.




Figure 14.⁶²⁴ Mace Missile Sites in Okinawa, and its Operational Range.

Although it is hard to examine precisely how much of the USFJ’s nuclear weapons contributed to the South Korean defense, a recently disclosed US diplomatic secret document indicates that the United States’ tactical nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea was more than sufficient to deter the North Korean threat.⁶²⁵ If that is the case—the deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons in Okinawa was redundant, particularly when focusing on North Korea as a potential aggressor, as it largely duplicated the capabilities of the tactical nuclear weapons operated by the USFK—it could be said that the presence of the USFJ in bases in Japan served more as a conventional quick response force in case of a Korean contingency, rather than as a nuclear deterrent against North Korea.

3.4. Protecting US Bases

Japan could protect the US bases. If a crisis were to arise in the Korean peninsula, the initial response would involve the combined forces of the United States and South Korea, who would be at the forefront of facing the North Korean military attack. While these combined forces strive to maintain their position, additional support would be sent from US military assets located in Japan to the Korean peninsula. This reinforcement would provide extra firepower to the US-ROK combined forces, allowing them to hold out until further reinforcements arrive from the mainland United States. From the perspective of the US-ROK combined forces, the US bases in Japan are a crucial asset and pose a significant obstacle for the North Koreans. Therefore, safeguarding the US bases in Japan becomes an exceedingly important objective in this context.

⁶²⁴ Jon Mitchell, “Seconds Away from Midnight: U.S. Nuclear Missile Pioneers on Okinawa Break Fifty Year Silence on a Hidden Nuclear Crisis of 1962,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 10, no. 1 (2012): 1-10.

⁶²⁵ “Top U.S. Official Ruled Out Deploying Nuclear Weapons in Okinawa After its Return to Japan in 1972,” *The Japan Times*, December 25, 2019.

3.4.1. Functioning as US' Forward Base

Generally speaking, “Korean contingency” includes two categories of events: (1) North Korea’s full-fledged armed attack against South Korea; (2) North Korean regime collapse.⁶²⁶ In the case of North Korea’s all-out military attack, US-ROK combined forces are expected to respond in accordance with the OPLAN 5027, while US-ROK will proceed with OPLAN 5029 when North Korea regime internally collapses.⁶²⁷ Here, the primary focus is given to the all-out war scenario. According to OPLAN 5027, the role of US-ROK combined forces in South Korea is to fend off the North Korean aggression until the US reinforcements join the fray. North Korea’s invasion could take in different shape and form. Therefore, the US reinforcements will either pursue with the Flexible Deterrence Option, Force Module Package, or the TPFDD, depending on how the contingency in the Korean peninsula develops.⁶²⁸ The US reinforcements that can be deployed to the Korean peninsula in case of contingency comprise of roughly 690,000 troops, 160 ships, and 2,000 aircrafts.⁶²⁹ In the initial 90 days, 50 percent of the total US Air Force, 40 percent of the Navy, and 70 percent of the Marine Corps are expected to be deployed to the Korean peninsula as reinforcements.⁶³⁰

Due to the various location of military assets—as well as the various mobilization time—the reinforcement will be conducted in a ‘phased’ manner. While the bulk of the US reinforcement will be dispatched from the US mainland, which is expected to take 90 days, US-ROK combined forces should hold their position. This is one of the reasons why US war scenario predicts that the United States and South Korean forces would prevail in 90 days.⁶³¹ Within 90 days of the conflict, military assets located in the US bases in Japan will be the primary backup forces to help the South Koreans. Within that context, it is noteworthy to

⁶²⁶ Michishita Narushige 道下徳成, and Higashi Akihiko 東清彦, “Chōsenhantō yūji to nippon no taiō” 朝鮮半島有事と日本の対応 [Contingency in the Korean Peninsula and Japan’s Response], in *Chōsenhantō to higashijia* 朝鮮半島と東アジア [Korean Peninsula and East Asia], ed. Tadashi Kimiya 木宮正史 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2015), 179-180.

⁶²⁷ Michishita Narushige 道下徳成, and Yanagisawa Kyoji 柳澤協二, “Yokushiryoku no imi to nippon no bōei seisaku” 抑止力の意味と日本の防衛政策 [Meaning of Deterrence and Japan’s Defense Policy], in *Yokushiryoku o tō — moto seifu kōkan to bōei supesharisutotachi no taiwa* 抑止力を問う—元政府高官と防衛スペシャリスト達の対話 [Talking About Deterrence: Dialogue Between Former Government Officials and Defense Specialists], ed. Yanagisawa Kyoji (Tokyo: Kamogawa Shuppan, 2010), 11-48.

⁶²⁸ 2022 *Defense White Paper* (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2023), 50.

⁶²⁹ Ibid.

⁶³⁰ “Hanbando yusasi jeongaedoeneun mijeonryeogeun” [US Forces Deployed in Case of Contingency on the Korean Peninsula], *DailyNK*, October 13, 2006.

⁶³¹ The United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *The START Treaty: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Second Congress, Second Session Part 1* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), 84.

mention that in a scenario of full-scale war on the Korean peninsula, the ammunition supply of South Korean forces, particularly artillery shells, would be exhausted within a period of 20 to 30 days.⁶³² As mentioned in Chapter 3, the United Nations Command rear is situated in Japan: when the UNC headquarter was relocated from Tokyo to Seoul in July 1957, UNC rear headquarter was established in Zama in order to maintain the provision of the 1954 UN-Japan Status of Forces Agreement.⁶³³ (later in 2007, the UNC rear headquarter was relocated from Zama to Yokota Air Base).⁶³⁴ The 1954 agreement designated seven bases in Japan and enabled the UNC member countries to utilize them.⁶³⁵ Given the primary mission of the UNC rear—to maintain the 1954 Status of Forces agreement in peacetime and support UNC operations during wartime—it is obvious that these bases would be utilized if a contingency occurs in the Korean peninsula.⁶³⁶ In that context, the eight UNC rear bases—Yokosuka Naval Base, Yokota Air Base,⁶³⁷ Camp Zama, Sasebo Naval Base, Kadena Air Base, White Beach, Futenma Marine Corps Air Station—in Japan are crucial for the deterrence and defense of South Korea. Three bases are located within Okinawa—Futenma, Kadena, and White Beach—while Yokosuka, Yokota, Sasebo, and Camp Zama are situated within the Japanese mainland. In that regard, Japan’s foremost contribution to South Korea in case of contingency is playing the role of a forward base.

Once an all-out war breaks out in Korea, the United States would initially use its Second Infantry Division deployed in South Korea, which consist of two brigades, to repel the North Korean onslaught. However, the overall size of the US forces could treble within ten days timeframe by sending the USFJ.⁶³⁸ Since roughly half of the US forces in Japan are stationed in Okinawa, US bases in Okinawa—in particular Futenma, Kadena, and White Beach—would turn into the most dynamic launching pads for the US forces. For instance,

⁶³² Chun In-bum, interviewed by author, Seoul, May 5, 2023. Chun additionally noted that the mentioned figure is a rough estimate and may vary due to the different types of weapons involved. The estimation of ammunition depletion ratio is also subject to change based on various assumptions, such as the intensity of armed conflict and other factors.

⁶³³ Annual History Report, Headquarters United States Forces Korea (1974), 16. The 1954 agreement refers to UN-Japan Status of Forces Agreement.

⁶³⁴ Seth Robson, “Bringing Up the Rear: US Bases in Japan Support UN Command in S. Korea,” *Stars and Stripes*, January 7, 2021.

⁶³⁵ Michishita Narushige, “Signing a Peace Agreement: Issues for Consideration,” *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies* 19, no. 1 (2010): 29-63.

⁶³⁶ Ibid.

⁶³⁷ Annual History Report, Headquarters United States Forces Korea (1975), 17. At first, Fuchu Air Station received certification as a United Nations base, but in 1974, the headquarters of the 5th Air Force was transferred to Yokota Air Base.

⁶³⁸ Victor Cha, *The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future* (New York: Random House, 2012), 218. In a span of ten days, the presence of pre-positioned US forces in Guam and Hawaii will be reinforced to enhance the strength of US forces on the Korean peninsula.

five-round trips of 50 transportation ships could supply a 17,300 troops and heavy military platforms like artillery from Okinawa bases.⁶³⁹ In addition, US naval vessels could ship troops and ammunitions from Japanese ports—naval bases in Yokosuka and Sasebo which serve as the mother ports of the Seventh Fleet—to the Korean peninsula within few hours.⁶⁴⁰

In the case of the Air Force, it is expected that rapid deployment into the Korean peninsula will be possible without much restriction thanks to geographical proximity. In the case of F-15 fighter jets deployed in Okinawa's Kadena Base 18th Aviation Corps, they could reach the Korean peninsula in about an hour.⁶⁴¹ Meanwhile, given the distance, it is estimated that fighters from Iwakuni, Yokota, Atsuki, and Misawa Air Force Base can also reach South Korea within two hours. As a matter of fact, the JASDF base located closest to the Korean peninsula with operational F-15 aircraft is the Nyutabaru base in Miyazaki prefecture. It is estimated that Japanese fighter jets could reach Korean airspace within 30 minutes from that location. Furthermore, the Tsuiki base in Fukuoka prefecture, which also operates F-15 fighter jets, enables a flight time of approximately 15 minutes to reach Korean airspace.⁶⁴² The White Beach Naval Base situated in Okinawa enables the US marines to be dispatched to the Korean peninsula in 30 hours.⁶⁴³ Moreover, the US Air Force Base in Japan may serve as a rear air force base that is advantageous for protection. Based on the function of existing US bases in Japan—both in terms of capability, geographical and other attributes—it is possible to predict their role during a Korean contingency (see Table 6).

⁶³⁹ Kim Tae-hyo, and Brad Glosserman, *The Future of U.S.-Korea-Japan Relations: Balancing Values and Interests* (Washington D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2004), 7.

⁶⁴⁰ Kim Tae-hyo, *Hanmiil anbohyeopryeogui ganeungseonggwa hangye* [Possibility and Limitations of Korea-US-Japan Security Cooperation] (Seoul: The Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, 2003), 16.

⁶⁴¹ Kim Tae-hyo, and Brad Glosserman, *The Future of U.S.-Korea-Japan Relations: Balancing Values and Interests* (Washington D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2004), 6.

⁶⁴² Nagayoshi Takeshi, email message to author, April 17, 2023.

⁶⁴³ Kim Ho-jun, "Hanbando yusasi hubangjeonryeok...juilmigun yeokhal jumok" [Rear Force in Case of a Korean Contingency, Focus on the Role of US Forces Japan], *Yonhap News Agency*, December 4, 2012.

Table 6. US Bases in Japan and its Functions in a Korean contingency⁶⁴⁵

Base	Distance from Seoul⁶⁴⁴	Key functions
Sasebo	548km	Submarine/landing craft's landing operation point for mission in the Korean peninsula, ammunition storage, supply, and communication
Iwakuni	607km	Air support base for landing operations on the Korean peninsula (navy air base) transportation
Zama	1,132km	Army supply, weapons management, medical care, and engineering task
Kamiseya	1,137km	Patrol, reconnaissance task (it serve as a core base for navy intelligence activities)
Atsugi	1,137km	Navy supply, navy maintenance, navy communication
Yokota	1,153km	Air force transportation (reinforcements relay transport base), air force maintenance, medical, communication, and intelligence
Yokohama	1,155km	Military maritime transportation in the Far East region
Yokosuka	1,162km	Navy supply, ship repair, facility construction and management, navy intelligence
Camp Schwab & Camp Hansen	1,237km	Pre-development of emergency response, landing and ground operations, reconnaissance and intelligence, artillery
Makiminato	1,237km	Large supply depot/base
Torii	1,248km	Army special operations and communication
Kadena	1,248km	Strategic bombing and advance deployment of air force reinforcements on the Korean peninsula, airborne control, interception, ammunition storage, air refueling, air rescue, and air patrol
Futenma	1,257km	Transportation and distribution of the marine corps reinforcements on the Korean peninsula

3.4.2. Defense of US Bases

In the event of a military conflict on the Korean peninsula, South Korea would become the primary theater of operations. Recognizing Japan's strategic importance as a launch point for US reinforcements, North Korea would seek to neutralize US bases and

⁶⁴⁴ It is an approximate calculation.

⁶⁴⁵ Asagumo Shinbunsha Editorial Office 朝雲新聞社編集總局, *Heisei 11 nenban bōei handobukku* 平成11年版防衛ハンドブック [Handbook for Defense 1999] (Tōkyō: Asgumo Shinbunsha, 1999), 370-379.

related facilities located in Japan. To undermine these bases, North Korea might employ a combination of the following tactics, either in sequence or simultaneously: (1) launching ballistic missiles; (2) deploying fighter aircraft and/or bombers, and (3) attempting guerrilla infiltration. With an awareness of potential provocations, Japan has been actively enhancing its capabilities, including ballistic defense, air defense, and measures to counter guerrilla infiltration.

Ballistic missile defense

In the event of a full-scale conflict on the Korean peninsula, there is a significant likelihood that North Korea would deploy its missiles towards Japan with the aim of disrupting the coordinated military (as well as non-military) operations of the United States, Japan, and South Korea. In 2017, North Korea's Korean Central News Agency announced that under the watch of Kim Jong-un, Hwasong ballistic missile division has conducted military exercises targeting US bases in Japan.⁶⁴⁶ In that regard, Japan's missile defense structure will be crucial in protecting key US bases in Japan, especially during the contingency in the Korean peninsula. Such efforts would not only reduce the actual damage by intercepting North Korean missiles but also offer strategic advantage to the United States and South Korea by complicating North Korea's decision making concerning the utilization of their finite missiles.

If North Korea launches missiles against Japan or areas around the Japanese island, Japan will respond with the given missile defense system, which is the combination of Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles. SM-3 is a ship-based missile primarily used for ballistic missile defense, while the PAC-3 is a surface-to-air missile system used for air defense against aircraft and tactical ballistic missiles.⁶⁴⁷ As of December 2022 October, Japan's missile defense relies on a fleet of eight Aegis destroyers equipped with SM-3 interceptor missiles, along with an additional 34 PAC-3 missiles.⁶⁴⁸ While Japan's Aegis destroyers equipped with SM-3 interceptors roam the sea, Japan had deployed 34 PAC-3 batteries across 17 facilities throughout the country by 2020.⁶⁴⁹ Both the

⁶⁴⁶ "KCNA Commentary Accuses Japan of its Persecution Mania," *Korean Central News Agency*, March 25, 2017.

⁶⁴⁷ Despite Japan possessing the PAC-2 (Patriot Advanced Capability-2) missile, which shares similar features such as providing air defense against aircraft and tactical ballistic missiles, the more advanced PAC-3 system has been entrusted with Japan's terminal phase ballistic missile interception.

⁶⁴⁸ "Japan to Equip PAC-3s with More Advanced Radar to Counter Hypersonic Weapons," *The Yomiuri Shimbun*, December 12, 2022.

⁶⁴⁹ Ito Yoshitaka, "New Interceptor Missile Installed on Ministry Site in Central Tokyo," *The Asahi Shimbun*, July

SM-3 and PAC-3 missile systems have demonstrated effectiveness in intercepting ballistic missiles. The SM-3 missiles have been extensively tested and has achieved successful intercepts in a range of scenarios, including controlled tests and real-world situations. On the other hand, during the war in Ukraine, the PAC-3 system successfully shot down Kinzhal missile, a Russian hypersonic weapon.⁶⁵⁰ Meanwhile, long-range missiles like Hwasong 15 would be used against the United States, Nodong missiles will be primarily utilized in attacking Japan. Although the estimation of Nodong missiles varies from 200 to 300, simultaneous launches will be constrained by the limited number—around 70 as of 2019—of transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) and the fear of a preemptive strike by the United States and South Korea.⁶⁵¹

Moreover, nuclear-tipped Nodong missiles will be handful due to the finite number of warheads. Factoring in the fact that North Korea will spare some of the nuclear warheads for deterrence purposes, nuclear-tipped missiles that can be used to strike Japan are somewhat small in amount. If some of those missiles do target Japan, it must overcome SM-3 missiles during the midcourse and PAC-3 in the terminal phase. Since two rounds of engagements are guaranteed, existing interceptors will likely defend nuclear-tipped Nodong missiles, which is small in its quantity. Given the recent interception test results it could be said that Japan could successfully defend against North Korean missiles targeting Japanese territories as well as the assets—US, Japanese, and South Korean—located in the areas around Japan.⁶⁵² the United States and Japan successfully conducted their first SM-3 Block IIA interception test on February 2017⁶⁵³ and on November 2022, the JMSDF Japanese successfully conducted the

12, 2020.

⁶⁵⁰ “PAC-3 MSE Was in Testing at Time of Kinzhal Shoot Down,” *Aviation Week*, May 11, 2023.

⁶⁵¹ Inoue Tomotaro, “North Korea Mass Producing Ballistic Missile Transporters: Sources,” *Kyodo News*, December 23, 2019.

⁶⁵² In the case of South Korea concerning missile defense, the biggest challenge is inherent in its geographical proximity to North Korea. Unlike the US and Japan, North Korea has relatively numerous missiles to target South Korea. If nuclear miniaturization goes further ahead, North Korea will possess a lot more missiles to utilize. Apart from such features, there exist two elements that undermine South Korea's effectiveness regarding missile defense: (1) a political constraint—not to be part of the US-led Missile Defense system; (2) North Korea's testing of short-range ballistic missiles that have an eccentric trajectory. The first element strongly influenced the current South Korean missile defense structure. Contemplation of SM-3 missile purchase was aborted due to such reason. As a result, existing missiles are focused on terminal phase interception. Under such constraint, Korea Air and Missiles Defense (KAMD) aims to enhance the existing missile defense capability, not to alter the terminal phase-oriented system. Meanwhile, the second element has added strategic complexities to the South Koreans. Since missiles with eccentric trajectories are hard to be intercepted, PAC-3 and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) will be ineffective even to a few incoming nuclear-tipped missiles.

⁶⁵³ Missile Defense Agency, “US., Japan Successfully Conduct First SM-3 Block IIA Intercept Test,” *US Indo-Pacific Command*, February 6, 2017.

SM-3 Block IIA interception test using the Japanese naval platforms for the first time.⁶⁵⁴ As for the PAC-3, the Lockheed Martin successfully intercepted a tactical ballistic missile on June 2020, using the PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE).⁶⁵⁵ The existence of Japan's missile defense system will complicate North Korea's war planning and asset allocation. The North Koreans would not be sure whether their limited missiles would reach their intended targets. This attribute increases the US-Japan-ROK's deterrence—and defense—against North Korean military provocation.

Air defense

Considering the significant geographical distance separating Japan and North Korea, along with the outdated state of North Korean air units, the likelihood of North Korea employing their fighters and bombers to conduct bombing operation against US bases in Japan appears low. However, in the event that North Korea deploys its air units to Japan, Japan possesses an air defense structure capable of effectively neutralizing any airborne threats that pose a risk to US bases.

With Japan's Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) capability, which involves aircraft like the E-2C Hawkeye and E-3 Sentry, Japan gains the ability to conduct airspace monitoring and identify potential threats. This capability greatly aids in coordinating air defense operations. Supported by these assets, Japan's interceptors, led by a fleet of advanced fighter aircraft such as 34 F-35A/B, 155 F-15J, and 62 F-2A (as of January 2024) are equipped to detect, intercept, and engage any North Korean aircraft that intrude into Japanese airspace.⁶⁵⁶

Simultaneously, Japan would activate its Ground-Based Air Defense System to intercept incoming North Korean aircraft. Japan possesses a variety of surface-to-air missile systems for this purpose. While the Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) would be utilized to intercept both incoming missiles and aircraft, the Type 03 Medium-Range Surface-to-Air Missile would prove effective against aircraft within medium-range. For air defense in urban and coastal areas, the Type 11 Surface-to-Air System, designed to target short-range threats,

⁶⁵⁴ Xavier Vavasseur, "Japanese Maya-Class Destroyers Test-Fire SM-3 Missiles," *Navalnews*, November 21, 2022.

⁶⁵⁵ Rich Abott, "Upgraded PAC-3 MSE Successfully Intercepts Ballistic Missile Target in Flight Test," *Defense Daily*, June 26, 2020.

⁶⁵⁶ These figures exclusively account for combat aircraft. To provide an example, there are 45 F-15DJs and 25 F-2s allocated specifically for training purposes.

would be employed. Additionally, the Type 87 Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun, equipped with 35mm cannons and mounted on a mobile platform, would contribute to short-range air defense by engaging low-altitude aerial targets. These surface-to-air missiles and artillery assets work in tandem to bolster Japan's air defense capabilities.⁶⁵⁷

Defense against guerrilla infiltration

Meanwhile, the JSDF could defend key US bases against North Korean guerrilla attacks. As outlined in an internal report by the Japanese Defense Ministry, known as the “K Peninsula Situation Response Plan,” the Japanese government has identified specific bases that require protection in the event of contingencies. Devised during the 1993-1994 North Korean nuclear crisis,⁶⁵⁸ the internal report layout the following list of Japanese and US bases that are considered as vital, thus requires protection: (1) 15 locations for JGSDF; (2) 14 locations for JMSDF; (3) nine radar sites and nine air defense sites (places that operate Patriot missile batteries) for JASDF; (4) Sasebo base, Iwakuni base, and Akizuki Ammunition Storage, and all bases located in Okinawa for the United States.⁶⁵⁹

Side by side with the JSDF, it is anticipated that Japan Coast Guard will have a role to play in a situation where North Korean armed commandos attempt to infiltrate Japan by sea. If such infiltration happens without prior knowledge by the Japanese government, the Japan Coast Guard would assume the role of law enforcement and implement measures to address the illegal entry while the commandos are at sea. However, once the commandos reach Japanese soil, the responsibility would transition to the Japanese police agencies and the JSDF. If the Japanese government has intelligence indicating that North Korean commandos are planning to infiltrate Japanese soil, the Japan Coast Guard and the JMSDF would coordinate their operations. Cabinet members would communicate and prepare for Maritime Security Operations in accordance with Article 82 of the JSDF Act.⁶⁶⁰

⁶⁵⁷ PLA National Defense University China, *International Strategic Relations and China's National Security: World at the Crossroads* (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2017), 102.

⁶⁵⁸ Michishita Narushige 道下徳成 and Higashi Akihiko 東清彦, “Chōsenhantō yūji to nippon no taiō” 朝鮮半島有事と日本の対応 [Contingency in the Korean Peninsula and Japan's Response], in *Chōsenhantō to higashiajia* 朝鮮半島と東アジア [Korean Peninsula and East Asia], ed. Tadashi Kimiya 木宮正史 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2015), 195.

⁶⁵⁹ Handa Shigeru 半田滋, *Jieitai vs. kitachōsen* 自衛隊 vs. 北朝鮮 [Self-Defense Force vs. North Korea] (Tōkyō: Shichosha, 2003), 47-48.

⁶⁶⁰ Furuya Kentaro, email message to author, April 14, 2023. He further mentioned that in such a situation, where the Japanese government has intelligence suggesting that North Korean commandos are planning to infiltrate Japanese soil, the JMSDF would not be the primary defense force. The Japan Coast Guard would evaluate the situation and assess whether it exceeds their capabilities. Only if deemed necessary, JMSDF would be called upon to provide support.

Furthermore, Japan could also absorb massive refugees from the Korean peninsula and prevent North Korean guerillas—whom are guised as refugees—from instigating these refugees into a mob. Although the Korean contingency does not automatically cause massive refugees due to the attribute of modern warfare—where pinpoint targeting and surgical bombing will carry the day—the Japanese Defense Ministry’s internal report estimates that the second Korean War could create 270,000 refugees—consisting of 50,000 North Korean and 220,000 South Koreans.⁶⁶¹ The report posits that these refugees can turn violent, while North Korean guerillas could sneak into Japan, guised as refugees. To prevent these massive refugees from destabilizing the Japanese society, adequate measures are expected to be taken: for example, in November 2003, Miyagi prefecture conducted an anti-guerilla exercise assuming guerillas infiltrating in Miyagi prefecture damaging important facilities. If North Korean commandos attempt sabotage during a Korean contingency, the Japanese government will respond in accordance with its standard operating procedure.⁶⁶²

The “K Peninsula Situation Response Plan” also discussed about the close coordination in between the police and the JSDF on this matter. Initially, the local police are to handle the refugees depending where these refugees disembark. However, once these refugees turn into a mob armed with smuggled weapons, JSDF could be introduced based on the JSDF Law clause 81, which stipulates the utilization of JSDF for domestic security maintenance.⁶⁶³ By successfully protecting facilities—which includes US bases—from such infiltrations, Japan could contribute in maintaining US’ war capabilities concerning Korean contingency.

3.5. Peculiar Issues Concerning US Bases in Japan

3.5.1. Okinawa

Okinawa during the early phases of the Cold War

Momentarily after the end of the World War II, there was not a consensus on the status of Okinawa among the US decision makers and Okinawa was regarded as a “forgotten

⁶⁶¹ Handa Shigeru 半田滋, *Jieitai vs. kitachōsen* 自衛隊 vs. 北朝鮮 [Self-Defense Force vs. North Korea] (Tōkyō: Shichosha, 2003), 100-114.

⁶⁶² Asahi Shimbun Report Team 朝日新聞「自衛隊50年」取材班, *Jieitai shirarezaru henyō* 自衛隊 知られざる変容 [Unknown Transformation of the Self-Defense Force] (Tōkyō: Asahi Shimbun Company, 2005), 196.

⁶⁶³ Handa Shigeru 半田滋, *Jieitai vs. kitachōsen* 自衛隊 vs. 北朝鮮 [Self-Defense Force vs. North Korea] (Tōkyō: Shichosha, 2003), 108-109.

island.”⁶⁶⁴ However, the outbreak of the Korean War rapidly increased the strategic importance of Okinawa—alongside with Kyushu and western part of Honshu due to its geographical proximity with the Korean peninsula—when it was utilized as a launching pad for the US long range bombers.⁶⁶⁵ Furthermore, Okinawa was considered as an invaluable linking point in the region when it comes to anti-communist military networking among East Asian countries.⁶⁶⁶ In fact, the fortification of Okinawa began well before the outbreak of the Korean War. Since 1945, bases that were used by the former Japanese military were confiscated and utilized by the US military. Furthermore, new bases were built under the instruction of the United Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, starting from 1950 spring.⁶⁶⁷ Basically, Japan had “residual sovereignty” towards Okinawa.⁶⁶⁸ However, the United States governed Okinawa in an exclusive manner in accordance with the Article 3 of the San Francisco Treaty which stipulated that the United States could directly administer Okinawa “so long as conditions of threat and tension exist in the Far East.”⁶⁶⁹ And even after April 1952, when Japan attained its independence, the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands continued to rule, and Okinawa was directly ruled by the United States from 1945 to 1972.⁶⁷⁰

Meanwhile, South Korean President Rhee Syng-man attempted to utilize Okinawa as a cornerstone of anti-communist movement in the Far East region.⁶⁷¹ For example, Rhee exerted his effort to include “Ryukyu representative” in the Anti-Communist Federation.⁶⁷²

⁶⁶⁴ Frank Gibney, “Okinawa: Forgotten Island,” *Time Magazine*, November 28, 1949. Leonard Weiss, “US Military Government on Okinawa,” *Far Eastern Survey* 15, no. 15 (1946): 234-238.

⁶⁶⁵ The United States Congress House Committee on Appropriations, *Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1964 Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Eighty-Seventh Congress, Second Session Volume 43, Part 1* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1962), 70.

⁶⁶⁶ Eckhardt Fuchs et al., *A New Modern History of East Asia* (Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2017), 307. During the Cold War era, Okinawa held significant importance in fostering anti-communist alignment among Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines.

⁶⁶⁷ Masamichi S. Inoue, *Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 42.

⁶⁶⁸ Juan-Hsin Chen, and Beng Huat Chua, *The Inter-Asia Cultural Studies Reader* (Oxfordshire: Taylor & Francis, 2015), 272. Dulles officially referenced the term “residual sovereignty” during the San Francisco Peace Conference in September 1951.

⁶⁶⁹ Robert D. Eldridge and Ira M. Schwartz, *The Return of the Amami Islands: The Reversion Movement and U.S.-Japan Relations* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004), 150.

⁶⁷⁰ Masamichi S. Inoue, *Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 4.

⁶⁷¹ Narita Chihiro 成田千尋, *Okinawa henkan to higashiajia reisen taisei: ryūkyū / okinawa no kizoku kichi mondai no henyō* 沖縄返還と東アジア冷戦体制：琉球/沖縄の帰属・基地問題の変容 [Okinawa Reversion and East Asian Cold War System: Ryukyu/Okinawa Attribution and Transformation of Base Issues] (Tōkyō: Jimbunshoin, 2020), 66.

⁶⁷² Narita Chihiro 成田千尋, *Higashiajia kokusai seiji to okinawa henkan kōshō* 東アジア国際政治と沖縄返還交渉 [East Asian International Politics and the Negotiations on the Okinawa Reversion] from *Ippan zaidan hōjin*

While Rhee attempted to establish the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League in 1954,⁶⁷³ South Korean Ambassador to announced that he wanted the participation of the Ryukyus.⁶⁷⁴

However, in Okinawa, South Korea's promotion of "Ryukyu independence" did not gain momentum. In particular, the Cold War made any political stance on Okinawa, other than the status quo, subversive from the perspective of the United States. In that context, the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Island quelled dissent or opposition to the United States' governance in Okinawa.⁶⁷⁵ However, such heavy-handed approach engendered political backlash, evidenced by the island-wide struggle in 1956.⁶⁷⁶

The island-wide struggle shocked the anti-communist South Korean government and when the negotiations on revising the US-Japan security treaty began, South Korea expressed its interest concerning the Okinawa issue. When Rhee met with the Taiwanese Ambassador to South Korea in February 1959, Rhee stated that Okinawa should maintain independence and not return to Japan.⁶⁷⁷ In November of the same year, President Rhee mentioned that Ryukyu should be independent and Japan should not reoccupy Ryukyu with its "imperialist ambition."⁶⁷⁸

Changes in the situation in East Asia and increasing sentiment for reversion

Meanwhile, reversion movement was expanding in Okinawa: the Okinawan Reversion Council was formed in 1960, and the US intervention in the Vietnam War—for

nippon kokusai seiji gakkai 2021 nendo kenkyū taikai bukai kyōtsū rondai puroguramu 一般財団法人日本国際政治学会 2021年度研究大会 部会・共通論題プログラム [Japan Society for International Political Science 2021 Research Conference Subcommittee/Common Thesis Program], 4-5.

⁶⁷³ Heather M. Stur, *Saigon at War: South Vietnam and the Global Sixties* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 134.

⁶⁷⁴ Narita Chihiro 成田千尋, *Higashiajia kokusai seiji to okinawa henkan kōshō* 東アジア国際政治と沖縄返還交渉 [East Asian International Politics and the Negotiations on the Okinawa Reversion] from *Ippan zaidan hōjin nippon kokusai seiji gakkai 2021 nendo kenkyū taikai bukai kyōtsū rondai puroguramu* 一般財団法人日本国際政治学会 2021年度研究大会 部会・共通論題プログラム [Japan Society for International Political Science 2021 Research Conference Subcommittee/Common Thesis Program], 5.

⁶⁷⁵ Patrick Heinrich, *The Making of Monolingual Japan: Language Ideology and Japanese Modernity* (Bristol: Multilingual Matters, 2012), 100.

⁶⁷⁶ Mire Koikari, *Cold War Encounters in US-Occupied Okinawa: Women, Militarized Domesticity, and Transnationalism in East Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 31.

⁶⁷⁷ Narita Chihiro 成田千尋, *Higashiajia kokusai seiji to okinawa henkan kōshō* 東アジア国際政治と沖縄返還交渉 [East Asian International Politics and the Negotiations on the Okinawa Reversion] from *Ippan zaidan hōjin nippon kokusai seiji gakkai 2021 nendo kenkyū taikai bukai kyōtsū rondai puroguramu* 一般財団法人日本国際政治学会 2021年度研究大会 部会・共通論題プログラム [Japan Society for International Political Science 2021 Research Conference Subcommittee/Common Thesis Program], 6.

⁶⁷⁸ Ibid.

example, B-52s conducted bombing operations in North Vietnam using Kadena Air Base as their launching pad⁶⁷⁹—further increased the demand for the reversion.⁶⁸⁰ Under such circumstances, the reversion movement became intense among the Okinawans.

Such demand was not unnoticed by the Japanese leadership: Prime Minister Sato Eisaku made the Okinawa reversion his biggest political issue by underlining that “without the return of Okinawa to its homeland, the post-war period is not over for Japan.”⁶⁸¹ Sato became the first Japanese Prime Minister to visit Okinawa and embarked on a full-fledge effort to deal with the Okinawa issue.⁶⁸² Under these circumstances, discussions on the return of Okinawa started between the United States and Japan in 1966.⁶⁸³ Despite such efforts, immediate and unconditional return was claimed as the basic prerequisite by the Okinawan people, especially when Yara Chobyō was elected as the Chief Executive—in other words, governor—of Okinawa in 1968.⁶⁸⁴ Instigated by Yara’s calls for immediate and unconditional Okinawa reversion, protestors against US bases caused great concern among the policymakers in Washington.⁶⁸⁵

Okinawa reversion and President Park’s reaction

Meanwhile, South Korea, experienced a security crisis in January 1968—an attempted attack on the Blue House by North Korean special forces occurred on January 21, 1968, and two days later, a security crisis occurred in which North Korea seized the US intelligence ship *Pueblo*—and expressed concerns about the Okinawa reversion and its probable ramifications on the US disposition in the island.⁶⁸⁶ While the US took measures—including

⁶⁷⁹ Eckhardt Fuchs et al., *A New Modern History of East Asia* (Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2017), 336.

⁶⁸⁰ Bernard C. Nalty, *Air War Over South Vietnam, 1968-1975* (Washington D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2000), 242.

⁶⁸¹ Priscilla Clapp, and Morton H. Halperin, *United States-Japanese Relations: The 1970s* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 135.

⁶⁸² Johanna O. Zulueta, *Transnational Identities on Okinawa’s Military Bases: Invisible Armies* (Springer Singapore, 2019), 31.

⁶⁸³ Priscilla Clapp, “Okinawa Reversion: Bureaucratic Interaction in Washington 1966-1969,” *International Relations* 52, (1975): 1-41.

⁶⁸⁴ United States Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, *U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad Hearings Before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Ninety-First Congress* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), 1293.

⁶⁸⁵ Makoto Lokibe, and Robert D. Eldridge, *The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan* (Oxfordshire: Taylor & Francis, 2013), 103.

⁶⁸⁶ Narita Chihiro 成田千尋, *Higashiajia kokusai seiji to okinawa henkan kōshō* 東アジア国際政治と沖縄返還交渉 [East Asian International Politics and the Negotiations on the Okinawa Reversion] from *Ippan zaidan hōjin nippon kokusai seiji gakkai 2021 nendo kenkyū taikai bukai kyōtsū rondai puroguramu* 一般財団法人日本国際

the establishment of the US-ROK Annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) and supporting South Korea's military modernization—to alleviate South Korea's concern,⁶⁸⁷ South Korea proactively proposed plans, such as relocating US bases in Okinawa to Jeju island, to prevent South Korea's defense from deterioration.⁶⁸⁸ Faced with the worsening situation in Vietnam, President Park openly remarked that the US troops should not withdraw from South Vietnam without first reinforcing the South Vietnamese forces. Furthermore, Park emphasized that in order to prevent the communist threat in the Far East, South Korea was willing to provide Jeju island as US' naval and air bases.⁶⁸⁹ President Park also mentioned that whether the US needed to find alternative bases due to Okinawa reversion or seeking a new military base while preserving the current military base in Okinawa, South Korea would offer Jeju Island as US bases.⁶⁹⁰ In terms of the former case, the argument was based on the premise that if Okinawa was returned to Japan, the US bases will be substantially reduced. After that, the Jeju island option was openly discussed in the South Korean parliament, and one of the proponents, Park Bung-bae of the ruling opposition New People's Party said, "If the US military bases in Okinawa are relocated [to Jeju island], the South Korean defense will be strengthened, pressures for the reduction of US bases in Japan [places other than Okinawa] will decrease, and the Japanese government will be able to escape the pressure of domestic public opinion demanding the removal of the US military bases."⁶⁹¹ Approving the Jeju island option, the South Korean government suggested the United States to provide necessary land⁶⁹² and assumed that if the nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Okinawa, deployment of nuclear weapons on Jeju island would be unavoidable.⁶⁹³ Although the South

政治学会 2021年度研究大会 部会・共通論題プログラム [Japan Society for International Political Science 2021 Research Conference Subcommittee/Common Thesis Program], 8-9.

⁶⁸⁷ Annual History Report, Headquarters United States Forces Korea (1983), 59.

⁶⁸⁸ Narita Chihiro 成田千尋, *Higashiajia kokusai seiji to okinawa henkan kōshō* 東アジア国際政治と沖縄返還交渉 [East Asian International Politics and the Negotiations on the Okinawa Reversion] from *Ippan zaidan hōjin nippon kokusai seiji gakkai 2021 nendo kenkyū taikai bukai kyōtsū rondai puroguramu* 一般財団法人日本国際政治学会 2021年度研究大会 部会・共通論題プログラム [Japan Society for International Political Science 2021 Research Conference Subcommittee/Common Thesis Program], 9.

⁶⁸⁹ "Jejudo mi gijiro jegongyongui" [Willing to Provide Jeju Island as US Base], *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, June 2, 1969.

⁶⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁹¹ "3guk gomin hanmok haegyoldoendago" [Three Countries' Problems Will be Substantially Solved], *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, June 18, 1968. Jeju option did not materialize into a concrete plan, as the United States expressed skepticism when the President proposed the idea as early as 1969, a few years before the Okinawa reversion.

⁶⁹² "Misangwon saimingtonwi hangukgwangye cheongmunrok hanbandoui bangwisanghwang puebeullo ihu maikelliseu bogo" [US Senate Symington Committee Hearing Concerning South Korea: Michaelis Report on Defense Status on the Korean Peninsula after Pueblo], *Dong-a Ilbo*, September 22, 1970.

⁶⁹³ "Misangwon saimingtonwi hangukgwangye cheongmunrok haekmugi baechi noui" [US Senate Symington

Korean government publicly suggested that the United States to utilize Jeju island as an alternative for US bases in Okinawa, the United States was unenthusiastic.⁶⁹⁴ The US military pointed out that Jeju island does not have adequate port facilities, and basic water and power facilities. Moreover, it is thought that it would be difficult to handle aircraft due to the strong wind in Jeju.⁶⁹⁵

When the Jeju option was not accepted by the United States—and while the negotiations for the return of Okinawa between the United States and Japan were already in the process—the South Korean government, launched the concept of the Asia Pacific Treaty Organization in 1968⁶⁹⁶ and tried to make the Okinawa reversion an international issue from the context of the defense of Asia.⁶⁹⁷ South Korea's stance on the Okinawa matter at that juncture was well summarized in the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs directives issued in March 1969.⁶⁹⁸ It stated that while North Korea's provocation was expected to be the major challenge in the region, the issue of Okinawa reversion is directly linked to the security of the Far East. It also underlined that since Asia has not established a military system to replace the role of the United States, South Korea wished to participate in the negotiations concerning the Okinawan reversion.⁶⁹⁹ In line with the policy, the South Korean Foreign Minister Choi Kyu-hah handed a memorandum of understanding to the United States in April 1969, which noted that the question of the Ryukyu Islands was more than a matter of

Committee Hearing Concerning South Korea: Discussion on the Deployment of Nuclear Weapons on South Korea], *Dong-a Ilbo*, September 23, 1970.

⁶⁹⁴ Park Seo-Hyung, *Sovereignty and Status in East Asian International Relations: Imagined Hierarchies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 133.

⁶⁹⁵ “Jejudogijie naengdam, mi siseolmibi deung deureo” [US Skeptical on Jeju Base, Due to Lack of Facilities], *The Chosun Ilbo*, June 7, 1969.

⁶⁹⁶ Ryu Sun-hee 劉仙姬, *Paku Chonhi no tai nichi tai bei gaikō: reisen henyōki kankoku no seisaku, 1968-1973 nen* 朴正熙の対日対米外交：冷戦変容期韓国の政策，1968-1973年 [Park Chung-hee's Diplomacy Towards Japan and the United States: Transformation of South Korea's Policies during the Cold War, 1968-1973] (Tōkyō: Minervashobo, 2012), 48-55. In response to the communist threat in the Asia region, the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) was established in 1966. However, President Park expressed a desire to convert ASPAC into a multilateral military alliance similar to NATO. As a result, he proposed the formation of APATO, an acronym for the Asia Pacific Treaty Organization.

⁶⁹⁷ Lee Sang-hyun, “Asiapan NATOgusangui jwajeol: 60nyeondae bakjeonghuijeonggwonui asiataebyeongyangjoyakgigu(APATO)gusangeul jungsimeuro [The Collapse of Asian Version of NATO Idea: Focusing on the APATO Idea of Park Jeonghee Regime During the 60's], *Korean Journal of International Relations, The Korean Association of International Studies* 50, no.5 (2010): 37-60.

⁶⁹⁸ Narita Chihiro 成田千尋, *Higashiajia kokusai seiji to okinawa henkan kōshō* 東アジア国際政治と沖縄返還交渉 [East Asian International Politics and the Negotiations on the Okinawa Reversion] from *Ippan zaidan hōjin nippon kokusai seiji gakkai 2021 nendo kenkyū taikai bukai kyōtsū rondai puroguramu* 一般財団法人日本国際政治学会 2021年度研究大会 部会・共通論題プログラム [Japan Society for International Political Science 2021 Research Conference Subcommittee/Common Thesis Program], 10.

⁶⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

bilateral implications only for the United States and Japan.⁷⁰⁰

However, negotiations between the United States and Japan proceeded with the exclusion of the South Korean government, fearing that such intervention would further stimulate the anti-base movement among the Japanese people.⁷⁰¹ Yet in 1969 Prime Minister Sato acknowledged that South Korea was essential to Japan's security and promised that when requested by the United States to use the bases in Japan—including Okinawa—in a Korean contingency, Tokyo would respond “positively and promptly.”⁷⁰² Such decision was far from negligible since critics of Prime Minister Sato argued that enabling bases in Okinawa to be used for a Korean contingency was an exorbitant price to pay for the Okinawa reversion.⁷⁰³ Given the context, it can be inferred that there was a common understanding among the US, Japan, and South Korea that the strategic function of the US bases in Okinawa should be unimpaired, even after the Okinawa reversion.

Okinawa reversion and North Korea

Meanwhile, the North Koreans interpreted the Okinawa bases as a threat to their own security and argued for the reduction of US bases and the expulsion of nuclear warheads. For example, at the 3rd Asia-Africa Conference held in February 1963, North Korea encouraged the Japanese people to struggle against the continued US occupation of Okinawa by the US forces, and admonished the United States to immediately return Okinawa to Japan and withdraw US military bases.⁷⁰⁴ North Korea also promoted an international movement to designate April 28—the Treaty of San Francisco came into force on April 28, 1952, symbolizing that the Japanese government neglected Okinawa to be administered by the US

⁷⁰⁰ Victor D. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999), 74.

⁷⁰¹ Narita Chihiro 成田千尋, *Higashiajia kokusai seiji to okinawa henkan kōshō* 東アジア国際政治と沖縄返還交渉 [East Asian International Politics and the Negotiations on the Okinawa Reversion] from *Ippan zaidan hōjin nippon kokusai seiji gakkai 2021 nendo kenkyū taikai bukai kyōtsū rondai puroguramu* 一般財団法人日本国際政治学会 2021年度研究大会 部会・共通論題プログラム [Japan Society for International Political Science 2021 Research Conference Subcommittee/Common Thesis Program], 11.

⁷⁰² Kitaoka Shinichi, “The Secret Japan-US Security Pacts: Background and Disclosure,” *Asia-Pacific Review* 17, no. 2 (2010): 10-25.

⁷⁰³ Kim Hong N., “The Sato Government and the Politics of Okinawa Reversion,” *Asian Survey* 13, no. 11 (1973): 1021-1035.

⁷⁰⁴ Narita Chihiro 成田千尋, *Higashiajia kokusai seiji to okinawa henkan kōshō* 東アジア国際政治と沖縄返還交渉 [East Asian International Politics and the Negotiations on the Okinawa Reversion] from *Ippan zaidan hōjin nippon kokusai seiji gakkai 2021 nendo kenkyū taikai bukai kyōtsū rondai puroguramu* 一般財団法人日本国際政治学会 2021年度研究大会 部会・共通論題プログラム [Japan Society for International Political Science 2021 Research Conference Subcommittee/Common Thesis Program], 12.

ever since—as “Okinawa Day.”⁷⁰⁵ Furthermore, the *Rodong Sinmun*—the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of [North] Korea—published an editorial arguing that Okinawa must belong to Japan, and regularly celebrated the “Okinawa Day” until Okinawa was returned.⁷⁰⁶ Eventually, the Okinawa reversion was realized in 1972.⁷⁰⁷ However, contrary to the North Korean objective, the US presence was maintained ever since, and Okinawa continued to play its role as a key launching pad for the US forces in the Far East.

3.5.2. Prior Consultation and the US-Japan Security Treaty

The 1960 Secret Agreement

While the 1951 Security Treaty was subject to intense criticism due to its unequal attributes—one of the contentious features of the 1951 treaty was the provision for the United States to freely use USFJ bases without the consent of the Japanese government which meant higher probability of Japanese entanglement in case of regional military conflict—the pressure for its revision was high throughout the 1950s.⁷⁰⁸ As a result, the concept of “prior consultation” was discussed through an exchange of official letter between Prime Minister Kishi and Secretary of State Herter, and it was added in the 1960 version of the US-Japan Security Treaty.⁷⁰⁹

At first glance, the introduction of prior consultation seemed to provide the Japanese government some degree of control over the United States—since the United States must consult with the Japanese government in advance if USFJ conducts combat operation outside of Japan⁷¹⁰—which was not enjoyed under the 1951 security treaty.⁷¹¹ In short, the prior consultation system was incompatible with the exchanges of notes between Yoshida-Acheson

⁷⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁶ Ibid, 11-12.

⁷⁰⁷ Kono Yasuko 河野康子, *Okinawa henkan to yūji no kaku no sai mochikomi* 沖縄返還と有事の核の再持ち込み [Okinawa Reversion and the Reintroduction of Nuclear Weapons During Contingency] from *Iwayuru “mitsuyaku” mondai nikansuru yūshikisha ūkai hōkokusho* 2010 いわゆる「密約」問題に関する有識者委員会報告書 [2010 Expert Committee Report on the So-Called “Secret Agreement” Issue], 62.

⁷⁰⁸ Kitaoka Shinichi, “The Secret Japan-US Security Pacts: Background and Disclosure,” *Asia-Pacific Review* 17, no. 2 (2010): 10-25.

⁷⁰⁹ Ishii Yurika, *Japanese Maritime Security and Law of the Sea* (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2021), 81-82.

⁷¹⁰ This refers to the control over US weapons, use of bases in Japan, and American dispositions.

⁷¹¹ Lee Dong-jun, “From the Secret “Korean Minute” to the Open “Korea Clause”: The United States and Japan and the Security of the Republic of Korea,” *Asian Perspective* 36, no. 1 (2012): 123-145. John Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Post-War American Alliance System: A Study in the Interaction of Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013), 142.

in September 1951, which highlighted that the US military was free to use the bases in Japan as a member of the UN military in case of an emergency on the Korean peninsula. This caused problem both for the United States and the Japanese government: while the former was concerned of the impairment of US' warfighting capability during a Korean contingency, the latter was worried that any attempt to nullify the prior consultation concept would cause heated debate among the domestic audience.

Three additional elements further complicated the issues concerning the prior consultation system. Firstly, the continuity of basic principle between the 1951 Yoshida-Acheson notes and the 1960 Kishi-Herter Exchange of Notes: the former was in line with the latter since both enabled the USFJ to be utilized in case of a Korean contingency.⁷¹² If both documents agree in principle that USFJ's full commitment is ensured during a Korean contingency, the existence of the prior consultation itself would be a nuisance—or even an obstacle—to the US operation during emergency situations. Secondly, the prior consultation stipulated in the exchange note regarding the implementation of Article 6 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan remained somewhat ambiguous. As can be seen below, the exchange note did not provide detailed definition of the key wording:

Major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States armed forces, major changes in their equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan other than those conducted under Article 5 of the said Treaty, shall be the *subjects of prior consultation* (emphasis added) with the Government of Japan.⁷¹³

As a result, there was no clear consensus between the United States and Japan on what “major changes,” “consultation,” and “military combat operations” of US military equipment in Japan meant. Furthermore, the term “introduction” was differently interpreted by each side.⁷¹⁴ For instance, while US Ambassador to Japan Douglas MacArthur II conveyed his idea in 1960 to the Japanese counterpart that docking naval vessels equipped with nuclear weapons would be not considered as an introduction of nuclear weapons on

⁷¹² John Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Post-War American Alliance System: A Study in the Interaction of Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013), 142.

⁷¹³ Sakamoto Kazuya 坂元一哉, *kaku tōsai kansen no ichiji kikō* 核搭載艦船の一時寄港 [Temporary Port Call of a Nuclear-Armed Ship] from *Iwayuru “mitsuyaku” mondai nikansuru yūshikisha ūnkai hōkokusho* 2010 いわゆる「密約」問題に関する有識者委員会報告書 [2010 Expert Committee Report on the So-Called “Secret Agreement” Issue], 19.

⁷¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 21.

Japanese soil, Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira testified in 1963 that such act is in fact an introduction and thus subjected to prior consultation.⁷¹⁵

Thirdly, the situation became even more complex since the United States clearly expressed that prior consultation would not be equivalent to the exercise of veto rights. In July, 1959, MacArthur II explained to the Japanese leaders that in case of a contingency in the Korean peninsula, US forces should immediately conduct its operation from US bases in Japan.⁷¹⁶ In response, Kishi mentioned that prior consultation was not a veto.⁷¹⁷ Nevertheless, such interpretation caused a problem: regardless of Japan's disagreement, the United States military would carry out its activities—whether it is the changes in the deployment into Japan of US forces, major changes in their equipment, or the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations—without any restraint. In order to assuage the concern among the Japanese public, President Eisenhower mentioned—in a joint statement issued after a summit meeting with Prime Minister Kishi on January 19, 1960—that the US government would respect the prior consultation function stipulated in the Security Treaty.”⁷¹⁸

To tackle such a dilemma—to ensure that the prior consultation function is officially added in the revised treaty and save Japan's face, yet making sure that the US military operation would not be restrained—a secret agreement was made before the 1960 security treaty was formally signed: in June 1959, when negotiations concerning the prior consultation function stipulated on Article 6 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan reached a conclusion between Kishi and Herter, the United States asked Japan to create a secret document so that the US troops could use US bases in Japan immediately without consulting with the Japanese government in the event of an emergency on the Korean peninsula.⁷¹⁹ As a result, the so called Korea Minute was agreed on December

⁷¹⁵ Hattori Ryuji, and Graham Leonard, *Japan and the Origins of the Asia-Pacific Order: Masayoshi Ohira's Diplomacy and Philosophy* (Singapore: Springer, 2022), 34.

⁷¹⁶ Komine Yukinori, *Negotiating the US-Japan Alliance: Japan Confidential* (Oxfordshire: Taylor & Francis, 2016), 30.

⁷¹⁷ Jack Russell, “The Age of Student Unrest and the Tokyo Olympics, 1955-1964,” in *Foreign Correspondents in Japan: Reporting a Half Century of Upheavals, from 1945 to the Present*, ed. Charles Pomeroy (Rutland, VT: C.E. Tuttle, 1998), 122.

⁷¹⁸ *Public papers of the presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower 1960-1961* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), 115.

⁷¹⁹ Haruna Mikio 春名幹男, *Chōsenhantō yūji to jizen kyōgi* 朝鮮半島有事と事前協議 [Prior Consultation and the Korean Contingency] from *Iwayuru “mitsuyaku” mondai nikansuru yūshikisha ōnkaï hōkokusho* 2010 いわゆる「密約」問題に関する有識者委員会報告書 [2010 Expert Committee Report on the So-Called “Secret Agreement” Issue], 50.

23 1959.⁷²⁰ Although it was difficult for the Japanese government to accept the Korea Minute which canceled out the prior consultation function stated in the Kishi-Herter Exchange of Notes, the Japanese acknowledged that there could be an emergency situation that prior consultation would be nonapplicable. In addition, the Japanese decided to accept the US suggestion due to the Korean peninsula's importance on Japan's security.⁷²¹ The outbreak of the Korean War was still a vivid memory, and traditionally, Japanese strategists considered the Korean peninsula as a “dagger pointed at Japan's heart” and maintained a posture that Japan's security would be severely impaired had the Peninsula fall into the hands of hostile powers.⁷²²

In a nutshell, Japan's commitment to the defense of South Korea was unimpaired despite the introduction of the prior consultation, thanks to the Korea Minute. Given the US' utilization of US bases in Japan as a launching pad during the Vietnam War—while B-52 bombers were sent from Okinawa, F-4 Phantom and A-6 Intruder jets were dispatched from Iwakuni, for example—it could be inferred that the prior consultation concept was hardly a constraint for the US military operation.⁷²³ As aforementioned when the United States was officially involved in Vietnam in the 1960s, US military bases in Japan played an important role both for operations and logistical support. During the Vietnam War, the United States freely used its bases in Japan without prior consultation, which clearly showed that the prior consultation between the United States and Japan was a matter of formality. The United States assumed that there was a “tacit understanding for using US bases in combat actions.”⁷²⁴ Furthermore, the US government indicated on several occasions that US would deploy military assets in Japan to Korea in an event of a Korean contingency without prior consultation.⁷²⁵

⁷²⁰ Cho Jin-gu, “Hanmidongmaenggwa miildongmaenge isseoseoui ‘sajeonhyeobui’ui uimiwa silje” [Prior Consultations of the US-ROK Alliance and the US-Japan Alliance: The Meaning and Practice], *Korean Institute for Defense Analysis, Defense Policy* 32, no.3 (2016): 9-41. Shortly after the agreement on the Korea Minute, Japanese Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama communicated Japan's stance to US Ambassador to Japan MacArthur II. According to Japan's position, Japan would grant permission for the use of its facilities and areas by the USFJ under the US Command for urgent combat operations in case of an emergency.

⁷²¹ Haruna Mikio 春名幹男, *Chōsenhantō yūji to jizen kyōgi* 朝鮮半島有事と事前協議 [Prior Consultation and the Korean Contingency] from *Iwayuru “mitsuyaku” mondai nikansuru yūshikisha inkai hōkokusho* 2010 いわゆる「密約」問題に関する有識者委員会報告書 [2010 Expert Committee Report on the So-Called “Secret Agreement” Issue], 51.

⁷²² Euan Graham, *Japan's Sea Lane Security: A Matter of Life and Death?* (Oxfordshire: Taylor & Francis, 2005), 97.

⁷²³ Noriko Shiratori, “GI Resistance and Activism in Iwakuni,” in *The Vietnam War in the Pacific World*, ed. Brian Cuddy, and Fredrik Logevall (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2020), 120.

⁷²⁴ History of Headquarters United States Forces, Japan (1977), 106.

⁷²⁵ “U.S. Confirms USFJ's Contingency Deployment,” *The Korea Herald*, November 17, 2014.

3.6. Evaluation of Japan's Contribution Concerning Logistical Support

The stationing of the USFK and USFJ has generally been considered the guarantor of stability in the Korean peninsula ever since the Armistice Agreement was signed in 1953. In order to examine how important Japan's logistical support is, two issues need to be further discussed: (1) the military balance between US-ROK combined forces and the North Korean military and the (2) probability of all an out war in the Korean peninsula.

Between 1953 and 1973, the size of both USFK and USFJ experienced reductions, while the North Korean military gradually expanded its troop numbers. In light of these circumstances, the OPLAN for the US-ROK combined forces was to retreat south of the Han River and maintain that position until US reinforcements could bolster their rank in the later stages of the war. Although the United States introduced some aggressive elements in the 1973 operation plan, the big picture—initially defending the South Korean capital against North Korea's full-fledged attack and waiting for the US reinforcements to arrive—has not changed much ever since. Despite South Korea's military modernization and its sizeable defense budget—South Korea surpassed that of North Korea in 1972—North Korea has the element of surprise as well as numerical superiority in terms of military platforms and soldiers. To be sure, the US-ROK forces would eventually prevail, once the US reinforcements are fully deployed in the Korean peninsula. However, time is the essence: the bulk of the augment would be coming from the US west coast utilizing maritime transportation, which might take around 90 days. Meanwhile, the US-ROK forces would be running out most of their ammunition—even if the combined forces successfully hold their position, the estimated casualties are far from negligible, not to mention the civilian casualties—within two weeks. Thus, the USFJ and the massive ammunitions stored in the UNC rear bases in Japan would be pivotal in preventing the frontline from moving further south. Although the recent simulation game results indicate that the North Korean troop has a low probability of capturing Seoul, Japan's logistical support—and the timely dispatch of USFJ assets to the Korean peninsula—will undoubtedly provide the US-ROK combined forces the precious opportunity to consolidate their position and prepare to advance towards the 38th parallel.

In other words, the structurization of the defense mechanism that connects USFK & USFJ—through UNC and UNC rear—has been one of the critical components that could respond against the North Korean invasion. Thanks to such attributes, the importance of US bases in Japan has been appreciated both by South Korean and North Korea. When Okinawa

reversion was about to materialize in 1972, the South Korean government was concerned that it might negatively influence the US military disposition in the region and suggested the United States to relocate bases and personnel to Jeju island. Meanwhile, North Korea openly promoted the Okinawan reversion, believing that it might help get rid of USFJ from Okinawa.

Despite the anti-US base sentiments and the introduction of the prior consultation system in the 1960 US-Japan security treaty, the Japanese government found ways to accommodate US troops as well as military platforms by advocating the US-Japan alliance and signing secret agreements that nullified the prior consultation function. Japan's support to the US bases played a crucial part in not only deterring the North Korean military invasion but also as the defense mechanism that would support the US-ROK combined forces throughout the Korean contingency.

The importance and the necessity of Japan's probable contribution during contingency has been confirmed by both South Korean and the US government over the years. The South Korean foreign ministry underlined in 1982 that although South Korea cannot expect security cooperation from Japan in a contingency due to the lack of security pact between South Korea and Japan, the US-Japan Security Treaty structure might enable the Japanese to make security contribution vis-à-vis the South Koreans.⁷²⁶ Meanwhile, then USFJ Commander Charles Donnelly hoped for closer security cooperation between Japan and South Korea so that the two countries would be well prepared to fight against the common enemy, the Soviet Union. He emphasized that Japan and South Korea should fight—in coordination with the US forces—against the Soviets if they invade South Korea.⁷²⁷

⁷²⁶ History of Headquarters United States Forces, Japan (1982), 74.

⁷²⁷ Ibid.

Chapter 4: Financial and Technological Assistance

4.1. Chapter Summary

Shortly after the North Korean provocation in 1968, the United States and South Korea reached a mutual agreement to explore measures for deterring North Korean guerrilla infiltration. They also approached Japan to request assistance in procuring relevant equipment. Although the outcome did not unfold according to the original plan, these initial discussions between the two countries laid the foundation for subsequent economic cooperation in the realm of security. Significantly, Japan's provision of loans and grants, referred to as the "claims fund"⁷²⁸ hereafter, played a pivotal role in the establishment of South Korea's integrated steel mill. During the initial phase, when South Korea faced difficulties in securing funding for the steel mill from the United States and other nations, the claims fund emerged as the key source for financing the construction of the Pohang Steel mill.

Simultaneously, the construction of the integrated steel mill progressed in tandem with South Korea's endeavors in heavy and chemical industrialization, as well as the establishment of the defense industry. President Park Chung-hee regarded the pursuit of heavy and chemical industrialization and the buildup of the defense industry as interconnected objectives. He emphasized that the integrated steel mill held paramount importance in attaining a self-reliant national defense.

Furthermore, during the early 1980s, the South Korean government faced a precarious economic situation and the looming threat from North Korea. To address these challenges, the introduction of Japanese loans under the guise of "security economic cooperation" played a significant role. These loans not only helped the government stabilize the economy but also strengthened the social fabric in response to the North Korean threat. While the majority of the loan was allocated to social infrastructure projects, such as the construction of multipurpose dams, power plants, and the expansion of water supply, the concept of "security economic cooperation" held various security implications. Firstly, it alleviated political pressure stemming from President Chun's legitimacy concerns. Secondly, it fostered a period of positive relations, often referred to as a "honeymoon" phase, between Japan and South

⁷²⁸ The financial resources obtained as a result of the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations were allocated through a fund commonly referred to as the "claims fund." The use of this term was chosen due to the Japanese government's hesitance in employing words such as "compensation" or "reparation." Coupled with the fact that South Korea was not the signatory state of the San Francisco Treaty, countries like Taiwan, India, and the Soviet Union waived any claims for reparation. Hyung-gu Lynn, "Systemic Lock: The Institutionalization of History in Post-1965 South Korea-Japan Relations," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 9, no. 1/2 (2000): 55-84.

Korea. This, in turn, bolstered trilateral security cooperation among the United States, Japan, and South Korea, as well as facilitating direct security coordination between Japan and South Korea. Lastly, the favorable terms of the loan eased constraint on the defense budget and allowed for the timely execution of the military equipment buildup plan scheduled for the 1980s.

4.2. Origin of Economic Cooperation for Security Between South Korea and Japan

The origin of Korea-Japan economic cooperation for security purposes can be traced all the way back to the late 1960s. The security crisis of the 1968—the Blue House raid and the abduction of *Pueblo*—raised great concern among the South Korean leaders. The United States’ response—while asking the South Korean counterparts to refrain from implementing a retaliatory response against North Korea, the United States conducted negotiations with the North Koreans for the release of the captured *Pueblo* sailors—further created frustrations among the South Koreans.⁷²⁹ The problem was compounded by the existing defense mechanism against military contingencies at that time. Although the United States-South Korea combined forces would fully utilize its military might in an all-out-war situation, it was rather uncertain how far the South Korean troops (or the United States-South Korea combined forces) could take the necessary measure against North Korean guerrilla infiltration. To resolve such a security loophole, special envoy Cyrus Vance was sent to South Korea in February 1968 and soon afterwards the US Department of State asked the Japanese to provide anti-guerrilla equipment to South Korea, and the Korean-Japanese governments initiated a secret conversation over this issue.⁷³⁰ To be sure, the United States had the adequate resources to strengthen South Korea’s anti-guerrilla capability. However, Washington was negative in expanding the coverage of the US-Korea mutual security treaty to guerrilla infiltration situation and addressed the necessity of South Korea-Japan cooperation—by jointly hammering out measures against North Korea’s provocation other than all-out war—for the sake of anti-communist efforts in the region.⁷³¹ This became the first occasion of a

⁷²⁹ Michishita Narushige, *Bukhanui byeorangkkeut oegyosa 1966-2013* [The History of North Korea’s Brinkmanship Diplomacy, 1966-2013] (Paju: Hanul Academy, 2014), 73-76.

⁷³⁰ Choi Kyung-won 崔慶原, *Reisenki nichi kan anzen hoshō kankei no keisei* 冷戦期日韓安全保障関係の形成 [The Formation of the Korea-Japan Security Relationship during the Cold War Period] (Tōkyō: Keio University Press, 2014), 37.

⁷³¹ Choi Kyung-won 崔慶原, “Nichi kan anzen hoshō kankei no keisei bundan taiseika no anpo kiki e no taiō, ichi kyū roku hachi nen” 日韓安全保障関係の形成 分断体制下の「安保危機」への対応、一九六八年 [The Formation of the Korea-Japan Security Relationship: Response to the

meaningful, direct security discussion for cooperation between South Korea and Japan.

The South Koreans assured the Japanese that such equipment—ranging from communication devices, speedboats to three-quarter-ton trucks—should only be used against guerilla infiltration, and the United States would back up in accordance with the US-ROK mutual defense treaty during an all-out war situation.⁷³² Yet the delivery of such equipment did not take place. Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry was opposed to the idea and there were conflictual views at the working-level review meeting between relevant Japanese ministries over the possibility of arms exports in light of the Three Principles on Arms Export:⁷³³ adopted in 1967, Japan’s Three Principles on Arms Export was a response to domestic criticism on Japan’s logistical support to US’ war efforts in Vietnam.⁷³⁴ The “Three Principles” policy prohibited Japan from exporting military-related items to the Soviet Bloc and countries that were under UN sanctions or engaged in hostilities.⁷³⁵ It was significant since the Japanese, particularly Prime Minister Sato Eisaku and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wanted to cooperate with South Korea.⁷³⁶ Sato was interested in building up relationship with the South Korean counterpart due to three reasons: (1) the Japan-Korea 1965 normalization pact was signed under his watch;⁷³⁷ (2) as a first Japanese prime minister to visit South Korea in the post-War period, he had working relationship with the South Korean president Park Chung-hee and supervised the implementation of the contents stipulated in the 1965 normalization pact;⁷³⁸ (3) the 1969 Nixon Doctrine unleased the Japanese and South Korea was one of the key countries that could function as a bulwark against communist threat in the region.

1968 Security Crisis under the Divided System], *Kokusai seiji* 国際政治 170 (2012): 141-155.

⁷³² Choi Kyung-won 崔慶原, *Reisenki nichi kan anzen hoshō kankei no keisei* 冷戦期日韓安全保障関係の形成 [The Formation of the Korea-Japan Security Relationship during the Cold War Period] (Tōkyō: Keio University Press, 2014), 43.

⁷³³ Choi Kyung-won 崔慶原, “Nichi kan anzen hoshō kankei no keisei bundan taiseika no anpo kiki e no taiō, ichi kyū roku hachi nen” 日韓安全保障関係の形成 分断体制下の「安保危機」への対応、一九六八年 [The Formation of the Korea-Japan Security Relationship: Response to the 1968 Security Crisis under the Divided System], *Kokusai seiji* 国際政治 170 (2012): 141-155.

⁷³⁴ Gregg A. Rubinstein, “Emerging Bonds of US-Japanese Defense Technology Cooperation,” *Strategic Review* 15, no. 1 (1987): 43-51.

⁷³⁵ Ibid.

⁷³⁶ Choi Kyung-won 崔慶原, “Nichi kan anzen hoshō kankei no keisei bundan taiseika no anpo kiki e no taiō, ichi kyū roku hachi nen” 日韓安全保障関係の形成 分断体制下の「安保危機」への対応、一九六八年 [The Formation of the Korea-Japan Security Relationship: Response to the 1968 Security Crisis under the Divided System], *Kokusai seiji* 国際政治 170 (2012): 141-155.

⁷³⁷ *Korea Annual 1966* (Seoul: Hapdong News Agency, 1966), 76.

⁷³⁸ *Korea Annual 1968* (Seoul: Hapdong News Agency, 1968), 131-132.

Furthermore, it indicated that both South Korea and Japan shared their perception that North Korea's guerilla infiltrations were a threat to the security in the region. Under such circumstances, the two countries inserted the sentence, "Ministers of both countries recognize that South Korea's security and prosperity have a significant impact on Japan" to the Joint Statement at the second Korea-Japan Regular Ministerial Meeting in 1968.⁷³⁹ A communized Korean Peninsula, consequence of an all-out war conducted by North Korea or North Korea-China alliance, would remove a buffer zone in between the communist countries—North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union—and Japan, automatically transforming Japan as the front line in the Far East from the perspective of the free world. In that context, economically prosperous and militarily capable South Korea, that could provide security margin to Japan, was a *sine qua non* for the Japanese. In that context, South's security was arguably connected to Japan's security.⁷⁴⁰

Although South Korea has ultimately withdrawn the request for anti-guerrilla equipment, South Korea instead requested for an emergency economic assistance to enhance domestic stability. While the declaration of the Nixon Doctrine and the US-Japan discussion on the Okinawa reversion proceeded, Japan was asked to take greater burden in the region, and in that context, Japan's economic cooperation in implementing the so-called "four core plants plan"⁷⁴¹—consisting of pig iron factory, special steel factory, heavy machinery factory, and shipbuilding factory that would foster the establishment of the defense industry—began in 1970.⁷⁴² Although the four core plants plan was proposed as an agenda at the 4th Korea-Japan Regular Ministerial Meeting in 1970,⁷⁴³ the four core plants plan was officially discarded without any notable achievement—similar to the anti-guerrilla equipment issue—when it became clear that the Plan could not secure cooperation from the Japanese government and the business sector.⁷⁴⁴ After the failure of the four core plants plan, President

⁷³⁹ Park Young-june, "Hangugoegyowa haniranbo gwangyeui byeonyong, 1965~2015" [South Korea's Diplomacy and the Evolution of Korea-Japan Security Relations], *Korean Journal of Japanese Studies*, no.12 (2015): 134-167.

⁷⁴⁰ Roger Dingman, "The Dagger and the Gift: The Impact of the Korean War on Japan," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 2, no. 1 (1993): 29-55.

⁷⁴¹ This English expression is used by Pae-gyun Pak and Jamie Doucette in their book "Developmentalist Cities? Interrogating Urban Developmentalism in East Asia." To be sure, there are alternative ways of expressing the term. For instance, scholars including Hyung-A Kim prefer to use "four great core factories. Yet in this dissertation, I will consistently use the "four core plants plan."

⁷⁴² Nishino, Junya, "Ilbon modereseo hangukjeok hyeoksineuro: 1970nyeondae junghwahakgonggeophwareul dulleossan jeongchaekgwajeong," [From 'Japan Model' to Innovation: South Korean Policymaking Process on Heavy and Chemical Industrialization in the 1970s], in *Detangteuwa bakjeonghui* [Détente and Park Chung Hee], ed. Institute of International Studies Seoul National University (Seoul: Nonhyung, 2011), 167-206.

⁷⁴³ It was held in July 21 to 23, 1970.

⁷⁴⁴ Pak Pae-gyun, and Jamie Doucette, *Developmentalist Cities? Interrogating Urban Developmentalism in East*

Park decided to go for a full-fledged industrialization so that South Korea could manufacture its own weapons.⁷⁴⁵ In addition to building an industrial foundation centered on heavy industry, which is known as the miracle of the Han River, it has also succeeded in building a foundation for manufacturing defense equipment that contributed to enhancing South Korea's defense capability.⁷⁴⁶ And Japan played a key role in constructing the Pohang Steel Mill. The buildup of the integrated steel mill enabled President Park to seriously implement his “Self-Reliant Defense” policy, starting from 1973.⁷⁴⁷ All in all, it can be said that the initial several unsuccessful attempts paved the way for Japan's larger involvement in the economic cooperation for security since continuous discussions between the two countries not only confirmed the necessity of such cooperation but also concretized what Japan could expect from such contributions.

4.3. Construction of the Pohang Steel Mill

4.3.1. The Importance of an Integrated Steel Mill

The first steel mill ever built in the Korean Peninsula dates back to the early 20th century. Spearheaded by Mitsubishi, a steel mill was constructed in Gyeomipo (currently located in North Korea). Side by side with other plants for heavy industry—such as power plants—steel mills were built to the North of the 38th parallel during the Japanese colonial era. Barely three years after the independence in 1945, the two Koreas established their governments, and naturally North Korea was able to utilize the existing steel mills—apart from the steel mill in Gyeonmipo, there were Chongjin Steel Works,⁷⁴⁸ Kangson Steel Works,⁷⁴⁹ and Songjin Steel Complex—at that juncture: these facilities were all built by the

Asia (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 27.

⁷⁴⁵ Rhyu Sang-young, “Bakjeonghuiui junghwahakgonggeopgwa bangwisaneop jeongchaek gujo haengwija modereseo bon jeyakdoen seontaek,” [Heavy and Chemical Industrialization and Defense Industry under Park Chung Hee Regime: A Constrained Choice from the Structure-Agency Model], in *Detangteuwa bakjeonghui* [Détente and Park Chung Hee], ed. Institute of International Studies Seoul National University (Seoul: Nonhyung, 2011), 135-166.

⁷⁴⁶ Ito Kohtaro 伊藤 弘太郎, *Kankoku no bōei sōbihin yushutsu kakudai e no katei* 韓国の防衛装備品輸出拡大への過程 [South Korea's Expansion of Defense Equipment Exports] from *Kōeki zaidan hōjin nichi kan bunka kōryū kikin ferōshipu hōkokusho* 公益財団法人日韓文化交流基金 フェローシップ報告書 [Japan-Korea cultural Exchange Fund Fellowship Report], 1-12.

⁷⁴⁷ Jeong Kyung-ah 鄭敬娥, “Reisenka no kankoku no ‘jishu kokubō’ nikansuru kōsatsu” 冷戦下の韓国の「自主国防」に関する考察 [A Study of the Korean ‘Self-Reliant Defense’ Policy in the Cold-War Era], *Oitadagaku kyōiku fukushi kagakubu kenkyū kiyō* 大分大学教育福祉科学部研究紀要 37 (2015): 59-74.

⁷⁴⁸ In 1951, North Korea changed the name into Kim Chaek Iron & Steel Works.

⁷⁴⁹ It was renamed into Chollima Steel Complex.

Japanese during the colonial era. By the time of the Japanese surrender in August, 1945 roughly 90 percent of the steel and iron were produced in the North Korean province.⁷⁵⁰ The concentration of steel industry in the North Korean province was due to the abundant supply of raw materials in the region: it is not a mere coincidence that mining business in the North Korean province flourished during the colonial era.⁷⁵¹ To catch up with the industrial gap between the two Koreas President Rhee Syng-man attempted to construct a steel mill, starting from the late 1950s.⁷⁵²

Under the Cold War context, the industrial capability gap between the two Koreas was considered as a threat to South Korea, especially during the tenure of President Park. North Korea's reconstruction of the Gyeomipo steel mill—North Korea renamed the facility as Hwanghae Iron and Steel Federation⁷⁵³—in the late 1950s, for example, not only served as a useful tool for propaganda for its regime,⁷⁵⁴ it also paved the way for the development of the heavy industry and successfully achieve its first five-year economic plan (1957-1961).⁷⁵⁵ Meanwhile, a series of events starting from the late 1960s—the Blue House raid incident, the abduction of USS *Pueblo*, the infiltration of armed guerrillas in Uljin and Samcheok, and the withdrawal of the US Seventh Infantry Division from South Korea—heightened the security crisis of the Park administration. It is noteworthy that North Korea's per capita gross national income overwhelmed South Korea at least until the early 1960s.⁷⁵⁶ Furthermore, North Korea's steel production was also ahead of South Korea during the 1960s: While South Korea's steel industry was literally starting from nothing in the 1960s,⁷⁵⁷ North Korea's pig iron production marked 0.85 million ton in 1960, 0.93 million ton in 1961, 1.12 million ton in 1962, 1.16 million ton in 1963, and 1.34 million ton in 1964, thanks to the implementation of

⁷⁵⁰ The United States Department of State, *Economic Aid to the Republic of Korea; ECA Recovery Program for Fiscal Year 1950* (Washington D.C.: The United States Department of State, 1949), 16.

⁷⁵¹ Mizoguchi Toshiyuki, "Economic Growth of Korea Under the Japanese Occupation: Background of Industrialization of Korea 1911-1940," *Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics* 20, no. 1 (1979): 1-19.

⁷⁵² Hong Song-joo, *Chogi gonggeophwa gwajeongeseo hangugui gisurinryeok yangseongjeonryak seontaek* [Selecting South Korea's Technology Manpower Training Strategy in the Initial Industrialization Process] (Daejeon: Korea Technology Innovation Society, 2011), 324.

⁷⁵³ Jung In-ha, *Architecture and Urbanism in Modern Korea* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2014), 45.

⁷⁵⁴ As Park Tae-joon, the founder of POSCO, famously likened iron to the stable food of the industry. In essence, the powerful imagery of a blazing and molten iron serves as a significant symbol, showcasing the growth potential of developing nations through tangible evidence.

⁷⁵⁵ "The Five-Year Plan for People's Economic Development," *Encyclopedia of Korean Culture*, accessed July 16, 2022, <http://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/Contents/Item/E0070247>. South Korea's steel production outpaced that of North Korea only when the second blast furnace of the Pohang Iron and Steel Company was activated in 1973. *A Comparative Study of South and North Korea* (Seoul: National Unification Board, 1988), 109.

⁷⁵⁶ Park Hee-chang, "Buk, 1indang sodeuk 1960 nyeondae hubane imi hanboda jeogeosseul geoseuro chujeong" [North Korea's Per Capita Income is Estimated to have Already Been Lower than that of South Korea in the Late 1960s], *Dong-a Ilbo*, July 27, 2020.

⁷⁵⁷ Chung Cheol-ho and Sa Dong-cheol, "The Korean Steel Industry in Retrospect: Lessons for Developing Countries," *Asian Steel Watch* 4, (December 1972): 80-91.

its “Seven Year Plan” (1961-1970).⁷⁵⁸ Under such dire condition, President Park had to find ways to catch up with the North Korean industrial capability and establish a defense industry that could provide adequate military hardware to the South Korean military. In that context, Park understood that constructing an integrated steel mill was a sine qua non. Although some small-scale steel mill was built prior to Park’s tenure, the existing facilities were old and had insufficient production capability. What Park had in mind was an “integrated mill” that includes all of the following functions: smelting furnace, the steel furnace, the continuous casters, and rolling mills.⁷⁵⁹ In contrast to the existing steel mill, these integrated steel mill had relatively higher import substitution effect—since it was self-reliant—and thus an integrated steel mill was typically considered as priority projects in developing countries.⁷⁶⁰ In addition, the steel industry had a substantial linkage effect that impacts various other industries thus creating a huge ramification to the economy at large.⁷⁶¹ Therefore, it was easy to understand why Park was eager to build an integrated steel mill. But to Park, implication of the steel mill was not confined to the economic sector since the beginning of his tenure. In April 1970, Park underscored that the steel industry occupies an important portion in South Korea’s industrial development and the steel industry is a prerequisite for establishing a defense industry:⁷⁶²

“In fostering industries such as mechanical engineering, shipbuilding, and automobile manufacturing, as well as promoting all construction projects, the steel industry is the most fundamental industry. In addition, in order to promote and develop the defense industry that we are currently attempting, it is essential to prioritize the development of the steel industry.”

4.3.2. Failed Attempts to Secure the Loan

Fully aware with the magnitude of the effort involved—securing adequate amount of capital and technical assistance in particular—in building an integrated mill, Park have initially set a modest goal: building a relatively small-scale steel mill within the framework of

⁷⁵⁸ Joseph Sang-Hoon Chung, “North Korea’s “Seven Year Plan” (1961-70): Economic Performance and Reforms,” *Asian Survey* 12, no. 6 (1972): 527-545.

⁷⁵⁹ Robert P. Rogers, *An Economic History of the American Steel Industry* (London: Routledge, 2013), 4.

⁷⁶⁰ Michael Kidron, *Economic Development in South Asia* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 249.

⁷⁶¹ Choi Dong-young, “Cheolgangsaneobui saneobyongwanhyogwa bunseok” [Analysis of the Industry-Related Effect of the Steel Industry], *POSCO Research Institute* 7, no.1 (2007): 29-45.

⁷⁶² “Pohang Steel Mill Groundbreaking Ceremony,” South Korean Presidential Archives, accessed December 3, 2021, https://www.pa.go.kr/research/contents/speech/index.jsp?spMode=view&catid=c_pa02062&artid=1306149.

the first five-year economic development plan (1962-1966).⁷⁶³ It was a detailed plan⁷⁶⁴ that aimed to build a heavy chemical industrial complex in Ulsan with a small steel mill annually producing 350,000 tons of steel alongside petroleum, chemical, and fertilizer plant.⁷⁶⁵ However, such attempt was not fruitful due to insufficient capital. At first, Park ordered to retrieve illegally amassed funds: after the May 1961 coup d'état, Park established the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction and promulgated the "Act on the Special Measures for the Punishment of Illegal Activities" (Bujeongchukjaecheoribeop) in June, 1961, which aimed to penalize illegal accumulators of property who used their status or power as public officials (and etc.) between July 1953 to May 1961. Yet the amount was smaller than expected and soon the mobilization of domestic capital reached an impasse. Under such circumstances, it was obvious that securing the international capital was the only way to materialize a plan with such scale.

To be sure, Park did contact international lenders. While finding ways to extract funds from the domestic economy, Park approached various international lenders when he took office in 1961. However, such attempt was unsuccessful since South Korea's plan was considered to be too ambitious in the eyes of the foreign observers.⁷⁶⁶ For instance, a project feasibility study conducted as part of a steelworks project in the early 1960s concluded that establishing the steel industry was not a priority given the expected steel demand—which was estimated to be modest—of South Korea in the years ahead.⁷⁶⁷ More specifically, the potential lenders laid out the following reasons why South Korea is not prepared to build an integrated steel mill: (1) South Korea's accumulated capital at that juncture was insufficient to establish a capital-intensive steel industry; (2) South Korea's domestic market size was not large enough to create the necessary economies of scale—thus lowering the cost—concerning the steel industry; (3) given the time consuming gestation period, the return on investment is far from certain; (4) South Korea lacked the expertise as well as the resources to construct an

⁷⁶³ Cho Yoon-je and Kim Joon-kyung, *Credit Policies and the Industrialization of Korea* (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1995), 87.

⁷⁶⁴ Hong Song-joo, *Chogi gonggeophwa gwajeongeseo hangugui gisurinryeok yangseongjeonryak seontaek* [Selecting South Korea's Technology Manpower Training Strategy in the Initial Industrialization Process] (Daejeon: Korea Technology Innovation Society, 2011), 324.

⁷⁶⁵ Lee Min-joo, *Ulsan gonggeopdanji gaebare gwanhan yeongu: iljegangjeomgi hubanbuteo 1960nyeonadaekkaji* [A Study on the Development of Ulsan Industrial Complex: The Latter Half of the Period of Japanese Occupation to 1960s] (Ulsan: Ulsan University, 2008), 46.

⁷⁶⁶ Anthony D'Costa, *The Global Restructuring of the Steel Industry: Innovations, Institutions and Industrial Change* (London: Routledge, 1999), 64.

⁷⁶⁷ In 1970, the Blow-Know survey team from the United States made a forecast of approximately 280,000 tons of steel demand for South Korea, while the DKG survey team from West Germany estimated it to be around 400,000 tons. On the other hand, the Japan Overseas Technology Cooperation Agency, known for its favorable assessment of South Korea's economic growth rate, projected the steel demand for 1971 to be 1.14 million tons.

integrated steel mill.⁷⁶⁸ Such assessment was far from groundless. It must be noted that there were already unsuccessful precedents among other developing countries: India, Mexico, Brazil, and Turkey attempted to establish an integrated steel mill, yet all ended up in failure.⁷⁶⁹ Besides, South Korea had repeatedly attempted to build an integrated steel mill in the 1950s and 1960s—there were at least four attempts in 1958, 1961, twice in 1962—which all turned out to be unsuccessful.⁷⁷⁰ All in all, South Korea had no choice but to rely on foreign capital to build a steel mill while convincing the feasibility of the project to the international investors, which was undoubtedly a daunting task.

It was the feasibility issue that prevented South Korea from securing the necessary funds. Even though the Korea International Steel Association—an international consortium comprised of the United States, United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, and France⁷⁷¹—recognized the feasibility of the project to build a 600,000-ton steel mill and the Korea International Steel Association signed an agreement with the South Korean government in 1967,⁷⁷² the Export-Import Bank of the United States and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development prevented the project from advancing. Based on the assessment that South Korea lacked adequate domestic capital and technology, the Export-Import Bank of the United States decided not to offer loans to South Korea.⁷⁷³ Meanwhile, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development underscored in their Korea Economic Evaluation Report of 1968 that the economic feasibility of South Korea's steel industry was somewhat questionable. As a result, receiving loans from the Korea International Steel Association became an unrealistic option.⁷⁷⁴

The failure to introduce foreign loan through the Korea International Steel Association's alarmed the Park administration. Unlike the previous attempts to secure fund

⁷⁶⁸ Cho Yoon-je and Kim Joon-kyung, *Credit Policies and the Industrialization of Korea* (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1995), 87.

⁷⁶⁹ Park Eul-yong, "Behind POSCO's Success: The Role of Government in Technology Capability Building," In *Manufacturing Competitiveness in Asia: How Internationally Competitive National Firms and Industries Developed in East Asia*, ed. Jomo K. Sundaram (New York: Routledge, 2003), 47.

⁷⁷⁰ POSCO, *Poseuko osipnyeonsa: 1968-2018 [50 Year History of POSCO]* (Pohang: POSCO, 2018), 23-24.

⁷⁷¹ Cho Yoon-je and Kim Joon-kyung, *Credit Policies and the Industrialization of Korea* (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1995), 87.

⁷⁷² Kang Sun-hee 姜先姬, "Kankoku niokeru nippon no keizai kyōryoku – hokō sōgō seitetsusho kensetsu o meguru nichi kan Keizai kyōryoku" 韓国における日本の経済協力—浦項総合製鉄所建設をめぐる日韓経済協力 [Japan's Economic Cooperation in South Korea: Japan-South Korea Economic Cooperation on the Construction of Pohang Steel], *Gendai shakai bunka kenkyū* 現代社会文化研究 21 (2011): 37-54.

⁷⁷³ Anthony D'Costa, *The Global Restructuring of the Steel Industry: Innovations, Institutions and Industrial Change* (London: Routledge, 1999), 64.

⁷⁷⁴ Cho Yoon-je and Kim Joon-kyung, *Credit Policies and the Industrialization of Korea* (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1995), 87.

from international lenders—before the Korea International Steel Association was established, South Korea attempted to introduce funds through West German joint venture, consist of Demag, Krupp, and GHH (Gutehoffnungshütte, Aktienverein für Bergbau und Hüttenbetrieb)⁷⁷⁵—the construction site was finalized while some of the infrastructures were built. Eventually, President Park Chung-hee rushed to explore new sources of funds and decided to use the Japanese “claims fund” as a new source of funds for the construction of the integrated steel mill.

4.3.3. Alternative Funding, the 1965 “Claims Fund”

Ever since the Korea Armistice Agreement was signed in 1953, US aid played a crucial role in the South Korean economy. In the timespan of three decades—1950s to the early 1980s—United States provided more than \$7 billion amount of grants and credits for the sake of South Korean security as well as economic development.⁷⁷⁶ Especially during the 1950s, South Korean economy was literally reliant on the aid coming from the United States.⁷⁷⁷ Not surprisingly, such dependence on the US aid entailed policy frictions between the South Korean and United States governments since the approach in terms of economic development differed between the two countries.⁷⁷⁸ South Korea’s policy options were further restrained since the United States decided to reduce aid with the passage of time—from \$88 million in 1954-1957 to \$38 million in 1958-1960.⁷⁷⁹ Under such circumstances, President Park often disagreed with the United States over economic development plans since his early days in power. In particular, differences in opinion were notable when it came to the promotion of the heavy and chemical industry.⁷⁸⁰ In fact, the greatest challenge in securing foreign capital for the construction of the integrated steel mill was the US opposition, since

⁷⁷⁵ Kim Hyung-a and Clark W. Sorensen, *Reassessing the Park Chung Hee era, 1961-1979: Development, Political Thought, Democracy, and Cultural Influence* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2011), 63. GHH, or Gutehoffnungshütte, Aktienverein für Bergbau und Hüttenbetrieb is the oldest heavy industry firm in Germany. H. Pohl, W. Engels and E. Martin, *German Yearbook on Business History 1983* (Berlin: Springer Berlin, 2013), 125.

⁷⁷⁶ Joe C. Dixon, *The American Military and the Far East: Proceedings of the Ninth Military History Symposium, United States Air Force Academy, 1-3 October 1980* (Colorado Springs: United States Air Force Academy and Office of Air Force History headquarters, 1981), 224. In addition to the grants and credits amounting to \$7 billion, South Korea received approximately \$18 billion from the United States during the Korean War.

⁷⁷⁷ Patrick Watt, *Social Investment and Economic Growth: A Strategy to Eradicate Poverty* (Oxford: Oxfam GB, 2000), 75.

⁷⁷⁸ Edward S. Mason, *The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea* (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1980), 13.

⁷⁷⁹ Shimomura Yasutami and Sato Jin, *The Rise of Asian Donors: Japan’s Impact on the Evolution of Emerging Donors* (Oxfordshire: Taylor & Francis, 2013), 135.

⁷⁸⁰ Jeffrey S. Lantis, *Strategic Cultures and Security Policies in the Asia-Pacific* (London: Routledge, 2020), 116.

the United States was the only country that could actually provide necessary funding.⁷⁸¹ To secure the funds with lesser strings attached, Park reached out to Japan.⁷⁸²

Unlike the US aid, Japanese claims fund—\$300 million of grants, \$200 million in assistance loans, and \$300 million in commercial credits—offered policy autonomy to the Park Chung-hee administration.⁷⁸³ To be sure, the general list of items which the claims fund could be utilized was decided prior to the Pohang steel mill construction plan was mapped out. Furthermore, Japan closely monitored South Korea’s planning of how to utilize the claims fund through bilateral negotiations ever since the 1965 normalization.⁷⁸⁴ Not surprisingly, when the South Korean government initially suggested the idea of utilizing the claims fund in building an integrated steel mill, the Japanese government refused.⁷⁸⁵ More specifically, domestic players within Japan had different stance on this matter. While the steel industry was generally positive of the idea, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was not so eager since the economic feasibility of the Pohang steel mill was questionable. Similarly, the Japanese Finance Ministry thought Japan’s own financial condition was not ripe for such a huge project: the Finance Ministry was concerned that the reallocation of the available funds could entail a shortage of budget.⁷⁸⁶ For that reason, Ohira Masayoshi—the Japanese Minister of International Trade and Industry—opposed South Korea’s suggestion.⁷⁸⁷ In response, Park Tae-joon—appointed as the president of the Pohang Iron and Steel Company when it was launched in April 1968⁷⁸⁸—was dispatched to Japan and met Ohira and underlined the necessity of constructing the Pohang steel mill. Park lay out three points: (1) economic feasibility was not considered as a priority when Japan decided to build the 120,000-ton size Yawata steel mill after the Sino-Japanese War; (2) given the fact that the two Koreas are divided and construction of the Pohang steel mill is closely relevant to

⁷⁸¹ From the standpoint of the United States, the South Koreans’ pursuit of the steel industry is seen as a risky endeavor. Consequently, the US advocated for greater endeavors to develop primary industries, labor-intensive light industries, and to expand social overhead capital.

⁷⁸² Cho Yoon-je and Kim Joon-kyung, *Credit Policies and the Industrialization of Korea* (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1995), 22. The decision made by President Park was also influenced by the United States, who urged Japan to assume a greater burden in the region by providing financial support to South Korea, for instance.

⁷⁸³ Clarence E. Pike, *Japanese Overseas Aid and Investments—their Potential Effects on World and U.S. Farm* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Economic Exports Research Service, 1972), 33.

⁷⁸⁴ Shin Jae-joon, “1965-66nyeon, bakjeonghui jeongbuui cheonggugwonjageum sayonggusanggwa daeilgyoseop” [Korean Government’s Idea of Using Property Claims Against Japan and Negotiation Between Korea and Japan in 1965-66], *Korean Culture*, 87 (2019): 429-467.

⁷⁸⁵ POSCO, *Poseuko osipnyeonsa: 1968-2018* [50 Year History of POSCO] (Pohang: POSCO, 2018), 58.

⁷⁸⁶ Kim Byung-kook and Ezra F. Vogel, *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 333.

⁷⁸⁷ POSCO, *Poseuko osipnyeonsa: 1968-2018* [50 Year History of POSCO] (Pohang: POSCO, 2018), 59.

⁷⁸⁸ Kim Hyung-a and Clark W. Sorensen, *Reassessing the Park Chung Hee Era, 1961-1979: Development, Political Thought, Democracy, and Cultural Influence* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2011), 47.

establishing a self-reliant defense, economic feasibility might not be crucial; (3) since Japan began constructing integrated steel mill when Japan's GNP per capita was around \$50-60, it is not premature for South Korea—GNP per capita was around \$200 at that juncture—to commence the Pohang steel mill project.⁷⁸⁹ According to World Bank statistics, South Korea's GNP per capita of 1968 and 1969 were \$198 and \$243, respectively. Park's effort was successful: not only Ohira changed his initial stance, the Japanese government came up with a near consensus to support South Korea's plan—during the Cabinet meeting held in August 1969—for an integrated steel mill.⁷⁹⁰

Once Japan enabled the South Koreans to utilize the claims fund on Pohang steel mill project, Park Chung-hee administration acquired certain degree of autonomy concerning policy execution of the claims fund. In other words, Japan's decision made the claims fund as the most appropriate source for the construction of the Pohang Steel Mill. For example, US aid was difficult to be utilized in the steel mill construction project since the United States had opposed the plan all along.⁷⁹¹ In contrast, the South Korean government had freedom—from selecting the location to determining the size of the construction plant—since the claims fund was not under the supervision of international entities like the World Bank.⁷⁹²

It was that South Korea approached Japan for the funding of the Pohang Steel mill after the failure of the Korea International Steel Association option became invalid.⁷⁹³ Once Park gave the green light, Kim Jung-ryum—Minister of Commerce and Industry and the Chief of Staff of the Presidential Secretariat⁷⁹⁴—consulted with Ohira—the Japanese Minister of International Trade and Industry.⁷⁹⁵ As a result, Japan approved using the claims fund—\$500 million in grants and loans—in the Pohang steel mill construction.⁷⁹⁶ Eventually, 23.9 percent—approximately \$119 million—of the entire claims fund was used in building up the

⁷⁸⁹ POSCO, *Poseuko osipnyeonsa: 1968-2018* [50 Year History of POSCO] (Pohang: POSCO, 2018), 59.

⁷⁹⁰ Ibid, 59-60.

⁷⁹¹ As previously stated, the true nature of the claims fund went unnoticed at first. The establishment of the claims fund and the construction of an integrated steel mill were initially treated as distinct projects, and the South Korean government's shift in direction was also sudden and unexpected.

⁷⁹² Anthony D'Costa, *The Global Restructuring of the Steel Industry: Innovations, Institutions and Industrial Change* (London: Routledge, 1999), 65.

⁷⁹³ Barbara Stallings and Kim Eun-mee, *Promoting Development: The Political Economy of East Asian Foreign Aid* (Singapore: Palgrave, 2017), 85.

⁷⁹⁴ Kim Hyung-a, *Korea's Development under Park Chung Hee: Rapid Industrialization, 1961-79* (London: Routledge, 2004), 119.

⁷⁹⁵ Kim Jung-ryum, *From Despair to Hope: Economic Policymaking in Korea 1945-1979* (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 2011), 160-161.

⁷⁹⁶ Songok H. Thornton and William H. Thornton, *Development Without Freedom: The Politics of Asian Globalization* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), (Need to check the book version).

Pohang steel mill.⁷⁹⁷

4.3.4. Construction of the Pohang Steel Mill Using the Claims Fund

Although Japan granted the claims funds to be used in constructing the Pohang steel mill and provide technical assistance, the key Japanese domestic actors had somewhat different views on this decision. One of the critical domestic players which influenced Japan's determination to accept the South Korean request were Japanese steel corporations and heavy industrial-plant-producing corporations.⁷⁹⁸ Basically, Japanese companies which consisted of three largest steel companies—Fuji Steel, Yawata Steel, and Nippon Kokan—and five manufacturing companies—Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Mitsubishi Electric, Tokyo Shibaura Electric, Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries, and Hitachi—were generally positive towards the Pohang steel mill buildup plan due to its expected profitability.⁷⁹⁹ The Japanese business firms considered that the buildup project would help Japan to export its own plants to South Korea, and the future market expectation of the South Korean economy would offer good opportunity.⁸⁰⁰

Unlike the Japanese business circle, Japanese bureaucrats were unable to come up with a consensus. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took a positive stance, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry maintained a middle ground, and the Ministry of Finance expressed its opposition.⁸⁰¹ Basically the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' approach was to consider the steel mill buildup project within the context of its effort to strengthen the relationship between South Korea and Japan, rather than as a one-off independent construction project. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also believed that by giving the favor to the Park Chung-hee administration, Japanese efforts—providing governmental loans to the

⁷⁹⁷ Kim Sun-shik, *Daeil jabongisul uijongwa daeil yeokjo* [Dependence on Japanese Capital/Technology and Trade Imbalance between Japan and South Korea] (Seoul: International Economics Institute, 1981), 25.

⁷⁹⁸ Kim Ho-sup, *Policy-making of Japanese Official Development Assistance to the Republic of Korea, 1965-1983* (Michigan: University of Michigan, 1989), 120.

⁷⁹⁹ Rhyu Sang-young, "Bakjeonghuisidae hanil gyeongjegwangyewa pohangjecheol danjeorui gyegie daehan jeongchigyeongjehakjeok jaehaeseok" [Korea-Japan Economic Relations and POSCO in the Era of Park Chung Hee: A Reinterpretation on the Continuity Thesis], *The Korean Association of Contemporary Japanese Studies* 2, no. 33 (2011): 256-285.

⁸⁰⁰ Kim Ho-sup, *Policy-making of Japanese Official Development Assistance to the Republic of Korea, 1965-1983* (Michigan: University of Michigan, 1989), 128-132. Given the intense competition in the US market, leading to political tensions between the United States and Japan, it became crucial for Japan to explore new export markets at that particular point in time. T. David Mason and Abdul M. Turay, *US-Japan Trade Friction: Its Impact on Security Cooperation in the Pacific Basin* (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1991), 38.

⁸⁰¹ Kim Ho-sup, *Policy-making of Japanese Official Development Assistance to the Republic of Korea, 1965-1983* (Michigan: University of Michigan, 1989), 137.

Pohang steel mill project—might be more appreciated by the South Koreans.⁸⁰² Meanwhile, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry had mixed views. Similar to the Japanese business firms, the ministry saw the opportunity to promote export through economic cooperation between the two countries. Yet, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry was adamant that South Korea should focus on basic social infrastructures—for example, highways and railways—and agricultural projects, rather than an integrated steel mill.⁸⁰³ Lastly, the Ministry of Finance contended that there was no reason to specially treat the South Koreans and was concerned of breaking the precedent. Furthermore, the Ministry of Finance argued that in terms of international monetary policy, it would be difficult to support the project which was negatively evaluated by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.⁸⁰⁴

Eventually, the final decision to support the Pohang Steel mill project was made on the ministerial level.⁸⁰⁵ Such decision was possible mainly since the positive stance of the Japanese steel corporations and heavy industrial-plant-producing corporations dispelled the worries concerning the feasibility of the project. Although the western financiers concluded that the project was infeasible, none of the three Japanese government ministries had the expertise to refute the Japanese business firms' optimistic evaluation.⁸⁰⁶ In addition, Nagano Shigeo and Inayama Yoshihiro—the two leaders in the steel industry who had influence not only within the steel industry, but also in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry as well as the ruling Liberal Democratic Party—were crucial in promoting the Pohang steel mill buildup project.⁸⁰⁷

Once the claims fund was designated as a new source of funding, the project began to pick up speed. Spearheaded by Park Tae-joon, the claims funds were used in Pohang steel mill buildup as scheduled. South Korean Economic Planning Board's 1976 "Claim Fund White Paper" indicates that 55.6 percent of the entire claims fund was used in the mining and manufacturing sector; Pohang Steel mill, and its related industries.⁸⁰⁸ Based on this data, it is estimated that approximately 24 percent of the entire claims fund—44.3 percent of the government loans and 10.3 percent of the commercial loans—was used for the Pohang Steel

⁸⁰² Ibid, 137-139.

⁸⁰³ Ibid, 139-141.

⁸⁰⁴ Ibid, 141-144.

⁸⁰⁵ Ibid, 145.

⁸⁰⁶ Ibid, 121.

⁸⁰⁷ Ibid, 121-124.

⁸⁰⁸ "Jeongbuga badeun don jeolban neonge pocheol tuiip" [More than Half of the Money Received by the Government was Invested in Pohang Steel Mill], *JoonhAng Ilbo*, May 4, 2006.

buildup.⁸⁰⁹ Such amount is noteworthy because the South Korean government commenced using the claims fund from 1966 onwards, with annual usage continuing until 1975. When South Korea sought Japanese permission to allocate the claims fund for the construction of the Pohang steel mill in late 1968, approximately 39 percent of the total claims fund had already been expended.⁸¹⁰

Pohang steel mill construction brought immediate results. By the mid-1970s, South Korea's steel production capability of the Pohang Iron and Steel Company increased nearly 30 times, fully meeting the domestic demand and ensuring the high rate of economic growth.⁸¹¹ Thanks to such performance, South Korea's steel production was able to surpass that of North Korea's in the mid-1970s.⁸¹²

4.3.5. Convergence Between the Pohang Steel Mill and the Defense Industry Buildup

While South Korea's military was heavily reliant on the US assistance, North Korea was ahead of South Korea in terms of self-reliance in national defense and the defense industry. North Korea had developed its defense industry with the aim of becoming self-sufficient. Until the early 1960s, the North had to rely on outside military assistance. However, after the successful completion of its first five-year economic plan (1957-1961),⁸¹³ North Korea seemed to have succeeded in paving the way for the development of the heavy industry. Thus, in line with the tenets of the "Party Military Lines"⁸¹⁴ of 1966,⁸¹⁵ North Korea rapidly proceeded with the buildup of its defense industry. Eventually, North Korea was able to produce small arms by the late 1960s. Thanks to the investment in the heavy industrial

⁸⁰⁹ Kim Jong-shik, *Daeil cheonggugwonjageumui hwaryongsarye yeongu* [A Study on the Use of Japanese Claim Fund] (Seoul: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, 2000), 30-31.

⁸¹⁰ Ibid, 22. As an example, in the years 1966, 1967, and 1968, 16.9 percent, 12.4 percent, and 9.2 percent of the claims fund were used, respectively.

⁸¹¹ William T. Hogan, *The POSCO Strategy: A Blueprint for World Steel's Future* (Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2001), 39.

⁸¹² *A Comparative Study of South and North Korea* (Seoul: National Unification Board, 1988), 109.

⁸¹³ "The Five-Year Plan for People's Economic Development," Encyclopedia of Korean Culture, accessed July 16, 2022, <http://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/Contents/Item/E0070247>.

⁸¹⁴ "The Four Military Lines," South Korean Ministry of Unification, accessed February 23, 2022, <https://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/term/viewNkKnwldgDicary.do?pageIndex=1&koreanChrctr=&dicaryId=109>. The key objective of the four military lines, is to arm the entire population, fortify the state, educate every soldier to become a party cadre, and modernize the military.

⁸¹⁵ Kim Bo-mi, "Bukhan 4dae gunsanoseonui wanseonge jungsobunjaengi michin yeonghyang" [Impact of the Sino-Soviet Conflict on North Korea's Self-Reliance in National Defense, 1962-1966], *Korean Journal of International Relations*, 54 no. 3 (2014): 211-245. Although North Korea officially announces that the Four Military Lines was first introduced in 1962, the modernization of its military—one of the four military lines—was adopted in 1966. Thus, it is fair to say that North Korea's Four Military Lines was established in 1966, not 1962.

sector, the North Korean defense industry began to produce simple arms in the late 1960s.⁸¹⁶ Coupled with such industrial superiority vis-à-vis South Korea, and the large military gap between the two Koreas concerning conventional military capability in the 1960s,⁸¹⁷ North Korea escalated the situation by conducting two provocations of the 1968: the Blue House raid and the Pueblo incident. Adding fuel to the fire, the declaration of the Nixon doctrine in 1969 increased Park's anxiety. The US' unilateral notification in 1970 that the Seventh Infantry Division would be withdrawn within a year—such measure was in contrast to Nixon's earlier assurances to Park that the Nixon doctrine would not influence the US force dispositions in the South Korea—made the United States rather unreliable from the perspective of South Korea.⁸¹⁸

To surmount such a difficult situation, Park laid out his view in 1970 that South Korea's future could only be ensured by having a self-reliant national defense capability and should not be dependent on US policies.⁸¹⁹ To be sure, the concept of a “self-reliant national defense” was first introduced by Park in February 1968.⁸²⁰ Yet the objective of the self-reliant national defense introduced in 1970 were substantially updated from the 1968 version, factoring in the various events—which includes the Blue House raid and the Nixon doctrine—that occurred in between the two-years timeframe.⁸²¹ While the key objective of the 1968 version of the self-reliant national defense was to acquire adequate capability against North Korean guerilla attack and limited surprise attack in and around the DMZ and coastlines, the 1970 version posited that the South Korean military should independently be capable enough to counter a full-scale war.⁸²² In the September 1970 speech delivered in the

⁸¹⁶ William J. Taylor, Jr., Cha Young-koo, and John Q. Blodgett, *The Korean Peninsula: Prospects for Arms Reduction Under Global Détente* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), 92.

⁸¹⁷ Kwak Tae-yang, “The Nixon Doctrine and the Yusin Reforms: American Foreign Policy, the Vietnam War, and the Rise of Authoritarianism in Korea 1968-1973,” *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 12, no. 1/2 (2003): 33-57.

⁸¹⁸ Ibid.

⁸¹⁹ Elizabeth Thurbon, *Developmental Mindset: The Revival of Financial Activism in South Korea* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016), 56.

⁸²⁰ Joo Jung-youl, “Bakjeonghui daetongryeongui jajugukbangsasanggwa hyeondaejeok hamui” [Park Chung Hee's Self-Reliant Defense Thought and Modern Implications], *Journal of Military History Studies*, no. 139 (2015): 423-451. Ryu Sun-hee 劉仙姬, *Paku Chonhi no tai nichu tai bei gaikō: reisen henyōki kankoku no seisaku, 1968-1973 nen* 朴正熙の対日対米外交：冷戦変容期韓国の政策，1968-1973年 [Park Chung-hee's Diplomacy Towards Japan and the United States: Transformation of South Korea's Policies during the Cold War, 1968-1973] (Tōkyō: Minervashobo, 2012), 42. In 1967, President Park emphasized the significance of reducing reliance on foreign military assistance and initiating the modernization of the South Korean military, even before the introduction of the concept of “self-reliant national defense” in 1968.

⁸²¹ Joo Jung-youl, “Bakjeonghui daetongryeongui jajugukbangsasanggwa hyeondaejeok hamui” [Park Chung Hee's Self-Reliant Defense Thought and Modern Implications], *Journal of Military History Studies*, no. 139 (2015): 423-451.

⁸²² Ibid, 431-451.

South Korean National Assembly, Park underlined that the South Korean forces should be able to conduct war effectively, based on tactical doctrine and OPLAN established by the South Koreans.⁸²³ He further addressed that South Korea should localize conventional weapons as soon as possible, and economic development is a prerequisite for enhancing the national defense capabilities.⁸²⁴

As an important step to attain the 1970 version of the self-reliant national defense capability, Park contemplated the idea of implementing the “four core plants plan” that could directly boost up the defense equipment production in line of his ultimate goal of achieving a self-reliant defense.⁸²⁵ While the plans for constructing the Pohang steel mill were still ongoing at that juncture—although the idea of establishing the Pohang steel mill was first seriously contemplated in December 1964,⁸²⁶ the first installment of the Pohang steel mill became operational in July 1973⁸²⁷—Park first wanted to produce weapons by establishing plants that were highly relevant to the defense industry. To be sure, South Korea produced weapons before the heavy and chemical industrialization took place in 1973. There were multiple arsenals run by the South Korean government. However, it was mostly limited to small firearms—which includes M1 rifle and M2 carbine—and ammunition.⁸²⁸ The feasibility research was initially conducted by Dr. Harry Choi in November 1969, who was then working as a senior researcher at the Battelle Memorial Institute:⁸²⁹ during the 1960s, Battelle Memorial Institute made contributions in several areas including nuclear energy technology and development of space technology.⁸³⁰ The result of this research, titled, “A Study on the Development of the Korean Machinery Industry,” was reported to Park in May 1969.⁸³¹ Finally, in July 1970, Park ordered the construction of factories—based on the four

⁸²³ Ibid.

⁸²⁴ Elizabeth Thurbon, *Developmental Mindset: The Revival of Financial Activism in South Korea* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016), 56.

⁸²⁵ “The Construction Plans for the Four Core Plants,” National Archives of Korea, accessed March 1, 2022, <https://www.archives.go.kr/next/search/listSubjectDescription.do?id=007283&pageFlag=A&sitePage=1-2-1>.

⁸²⁶ POSCO, *Poseuko osipnyeonsa: 1968-2018* [50 Year History of POSCO] (Pohang: POSCO, 2018), 23-24.

⁸²⁷ Suh Chung-sok, and Tcha Moon-joong, *The Korean Economy at the Crossroads: Triumphs, Difficulties and Triumphs Again* (London: Routledge, 2014), 202.

⁸²⁸ Janne E. Nolan, *Military Industry in Taiwan and South Korea* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), 62.

⁸²⁹ Park Young-goo, “Sadaehaekgongjangsaebui gwajeonggwa seonggyeok, 1969.11-1971.11” [Process and Character of 4 Core Plants Plan, 1969.11-1971.11], *Review of Economic History*, 44 (2008): 81-107.

⁸³⁰ The United States Congress Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, *NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1967: Hearing Before the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, United States Senate, Eighty-Ninth Congress, Second Session, on S. 2909, a Bill to Authorize Appropriations to the National Aeronautical and Space Administration for Research and Development, Construction of Facilities and Administrative Operations; and for Other Purposes, February 28, March 1, 2, 3, and 4, 1966* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1966), 500.

⁸³¹ Park Young-goo, “Sadaehaekgongjangsaebui gwajeonggwa seonggyeok, 1969.11-1971.11” [Process and Character of 4 Core Plants Plan, 1969.11-1971.11], *Review of Economic History*, 44 (2008): 81-107.

core plants plan—capable of producing weapons beyond small arms like pistols and rifles.⁸³² The Economic Planning Board organized a joint working group with the Korea Institute of Science and Technology to establish a factory construction plan. The planned project at this time was called the four core plants plan in that it was a strategic industry to foster the defense industry as a casting ship factory, a special steel factory, a heavy machinery factory, and a shipbuilding factory.⁸³³ Meanwhile, it was presumed that the funds needed for the construction would be covered by the Japanese funding, but cooperation in factory construction for weapons production was contrary to the Japanese government's policy.⁸³⁴ In light of the Japanese government's prohibition on arms export, an overreaction within Japan could interfere with loan negotiations if it was known that the South Koreans would receive a loan for weapons production. Therefore, the loan was requested to the Japanese while the plans for arms product remained strictly confidential. But Japan was reluctant on providing the loans. After the failure of cooperation with Japan, Park approached the United States and Europe, but there was no progress.⁸³⁵

When the four core plants plan failed, Park decided to go for a full-fledged heavy and chemical industrialization: its key objective was to shift the mainstay of economy from light industry to a high value-added heavy industry.⁸³⁶ Notably, the heavy and chemical industrialization was not promoted solely by economic necessity: heavy and chemical industrialization plan included the promotion of self-reliant national defense.⁸³⁷ In other words, Park opted the heavy and chemical industrialization as a solution to multiple economic as well as security challenges—securing domestic support through propping up private businesses and establishing and establishing the defense industry were part of those challenges—that South Korea faced at that juncture.⁸³⁸ Meanwhile, Park believed that a single United States company investing in South Korea would be equivalent to stationing a United States division in South Korea since the United States would make a stronger security

⁸³² Nishino, Junya, "Ilbon modereseo hangukjeok hyeoksineuro: 1970nyeondae junghwahakgonggeophwareul dulleossan jeongchaekgwajeong," [From 'Japan Model' to Innovation: South Korean Policymaking Process on Heavy and Chemical Industrialization in the 1970s], in *Detangteuwa bakjeonghui* [Détente and Park Chung Hee], ed. Institute of International Studies Seoul National University (Seoul: Nonhyung, 2011), 167-206.

⁸³³ Ibid.

⁸³⁴ Ibid.

⁸³⁵ Ibid.

⁸³⁶ Jesus Felipe, *Development and Modern Industrial Policy in Practice: Issues and Country Experiences* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016), 87.

⁸³⁷ Kim Hyung-a, *Korea's Development under Park Chung Hee: Rapid Industrialization, 1961-79* (London: Routledge, 2004), 173.

⁸³⁸ Finn Tarp and John Page, *The Practice of Industrial Policy: Government-Business Coordination in Africa and East Asia* (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2017), 113.

commitment in order to prevent the aggressors from taking over the heavy and chemical industry in case of a North Korean military invasion.⁸³⁹

The heavy chemical industry and the defense industry were promoted as a single package so that both the defense industry and the civilian industry could respond simultaneously in times of emergency and peace: the basic production ratio was set at 70 percent or higher for the civilian item and 30 percent for the defense item, so that the defense items could rapidly increase its production in case of emergency.⁸⁴⁰ To effectively implement the plan, the Defense Industry Bureau of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry was established to oversee all the defense industries.⁸⁴¹

Such interconnectedness between heavy and chemical industry and defense industry was recognized by Park that advancement of the machinery industry, for example, was an important contribution for the defense industry buildup.⁸⁴² In that context, it is not surprising that Oh Won-cheol was in charge of both the defense industry and the heavy and chemical industry as the second chief of economy.⁸⁴³ Oh started his career as an engineer in the 1950s and once he joined the Park administration as a bureaucrat, he defined himself as a “economic development-oriented technocrat.”⁸⁴⁴ Oh underlined that economic development-oriented technocrats should possess adequate engineering skills and economic policies should be established based on such skills.⁸⁴⁵ That is why Oh’s policymaking principles are called the “engineering approach.” Oh conceptualized such approach and utilized the term “impact

⁸³⁹ Rhyu Sang-young, “Bakjeonghuiui junghwahakgonggeopgwa bangwisaneop jeongchaek gujo haengwija modereseo bon jeyakdoen seontaek,” [Heavy and Chemical Industrialization and Defense Industry under Park Chung Hee Regime: A Constrained Choice from the Structure-Agency Model], in *Detangteuwa bakjeonghui* [Détente and Park Chung Hee], ed. Institute of International Studies Seoul National University (Seoul: Nonhyung, 2011), 135-166.

⁸⁴⁰ Choi Sung-bin, Ko Byung-sung, and Lee Ho-suk, “Hanguk bangwisaneobui 40nyeon baljeongwajeonggwa seonggwa” [The Development Process & Achievement of the Korean Defense Industry for Last 40 Years], *The Quarterly Journal of Defense Policy Studies* 26, no.1 (2010): 73-117.

⁸⁴¹ It is notable that the establishment of the defense industry did not fall under the direct supervision of the Ministry of National Defense. the involvement of the Defense Industry Bureau within the Ministry of Commerce and Industry suggests a close coordination between South Korea’s defense industry development and the establishment of the heavy and chemical industry.

⁸⁴² “1977 New Year Press Conference,” South Korean Presidential Archives, accessed December 4, 2021, https://www.pa.go.kr/research/contents/speech/index.jsp?spMode=view&artid=1306539&catid=c_pa02062.

⁸⁴³ Rhyu Sang-young, “Bakjeonghuiui junghwahakgonggeopgwa bangwisaneop jeongchaek gujo haengwija modereseo bon jeyakdoen seontaek,” [Heavy and Chemical Industrialization and Defense Industry under Park Chung Hee Regime: A Constrained Choice from the Structure-Agency Model], in *Detangteuwa bakjeonghui* [Détente and Park Chung Hee], ed. Institute of International Studies Seoul National University (Seoul: Nonhyung, 2011), 135-166.

⁸⁴⁴ Kang Mi-hwa, and Moon Manyong, “Bakjeonghui sidae gwahakgisul ‘jedo guchukja’: choehyeongseopgwa owoncheol” [The institution Builders of Science and Technology during the Park Chung Hee Era: Choi Hyung Sup and O Won-chol], *The Korean Journal for the History of Science* 35, no.1 (2013): 225-244.

⁸⁴⁵ Oh Won-cheol, *Hangukhyeong gyeongjeonseol enjinieoring eopeurochi 7* [Korean Way of Economic Development: Engineering Approach 7] (Seoul: Korea Institute of Economic Policy, 1999), 59.

policy”: the key goal is to select projects that have the greatest impact on the overall economy and then allocate most of the available resources to those projects.⁸⁴⁶ Such unbalanced growth strategy was inevitable, if not ideal, for developing countries like South Korea.⁸⁴⁷ The necessity for such unbalanced growth strategy was shared by Park and Oh. And in that context, Park offered Oh *carte blanche* on the project once the heavy and chemical industrialization was officially set as a national policy.⁸⁴⁸



Figure 15. Oh Won-cheol (Far Right), and President Park (Center)⁸⁴⁹

To foster the defense industry, the South Korean government took various measures. First, it founded the Agency for Defense Development in 1970. The primary task of the Agency was to conduct R&D and produce prototype weapons; once these prototypes were ready for massive production, designated defense companies would churn out these items.⁸⁵⁰ Second, the South Korean government designated 29 companies as “defense companies” (*bangwisaneopche*) in 1972. Those “defense companies” primarily manufactured guns, artilleries, ammunitions, and fuses, and exercised the exclusive right to produce weapons. Such measure protected these companies from unnecessary competition and enabled a stable supply of weapons.⁸⁵¹ Third, the Act on Special Measures for Defense Industry

⁸⁴⁶ Kang Mi-hwa, and Moon Manyong, “Bakjeonghui sidae gwahakgisul ‘jedo guchukja’: choehyeongseopgwa owoncheol” [The institution Builders of Science and Technology during the Park Chung Hee Era: Choi Hyung Sup and O Won-chol], *The Korean Journal for the History of Science* 35, no.1 (2013): 225-244.

⁸⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁴⁸ Kim Hyung-a, *Korea’s Development under Park Chung Hee: Rapid Industrialization, 1961-79* (London: Routledge, 2004), 173.

⁸⁴⁹ Photo retrieved from the Chosun Ilbo.

⁸⁵⁰ Ji Il-yong, and Lee Sang-hyun, “Bangwisaneop hubalgugui chugyeokgwa baljeonpaeon hangukgwa iseuraerui saryeyeongu” [The Patterns of Catch-up and Development in the Latecomer Countries’ Defense Industry: The Case of Korea and Israel], *The Quarterly Journal of Defense Policy Studies* 31, no.1 (2015): 133-170.

⁸⁵¹ Ibid.

(bangwisaneobe gwanhan teukbyeoljochibeop) was enacted in 1973. The purpose of this Act was to ensure the stable procurement of defense goods. To attain the goal, it stipulated various tax cuts and financial support: such as income and corporate tax reduction, exemption of tariffs, and special consumption taxes on raw materials.⁸⁵² Fourth, standards and guidelines for estimating the price of defense products were established in 1974. They aimed to apply the actual wage unit price of the defense companies. This measure guaranteed the protection of defense companies by compensating for actual costs incurred.⁸⁵³ Fifth, as part of President Park's initiatives, he issued an order to establish a specialized high school focused on industrial technology. Consequently, Kumho Technical High School was established in 1972, with the funding sourced from the Japanese claims fund. The rigorous training provided at the school enabled many students to pursue careers as military officers, equipped with the necessary skills to handle technologies, including anti-air missiles.⁸⁵⁴

Such proactive measures spearheaded by the South Korean government helped foster the domestic defense industry in a short period of time. The ability to achieve swift outcomes was facilitated by the exclusive authority of the Blue House in making crucial decisions regarding defense matters.⁸⁵⁵ In addition, President Carter's policy towards South Korea—especially his initial plan to withdraw US Forces Korea entirely—incited President Park to accelerate the investment in heavy industries which was a necessity for a bigger defense industrial program.⁸⁵⁶ Meanwhile, South Korea's major weapons were produced in earnest thanks to the First Yulgok Project that was implemented from 1974 until 1981.⁸⁵⁷ During this seven-year timeframe, approximately 30 percent of South Korea's defense budget—in total, 3.14 trillion won (equivalent to 6.5 billion US dollars based on the 1974 United States dollar to Korean won exchange rate)—was allocated to the Yulgok Project, which was an armed force modernization project.⁸⁵⁸ Yulgok Project was comprehensive in nature and included

⁸⁵² Choi Sung-bin, Ko Byung-sung, and Lee Ho-suk, "Hanguk bangwisaneobui 40nyeon baljeongwajeonggwa seonggwa" [The Development Process & Achievement of the Korean Defense Industry for Last 40 Years], *The Quarterly Journal of Defense Policy Studies* 26, no.1 (2010): 73-117.

⁸⁵³ Ibid.

⁸⁵⁴ Jang Don-hun, interviewed by author, Seoul, April 28, 2023. Subsequently, he joined the Air Force where he assumed responsibility for regional air defense operations, overseeing a range of weapon systems such as Patriot batteries, Nike missiles, and Hawk missiles. Jang emphasized the significance of the skills he acquired during his time at Kumho Technical High School, as they played a critical role in effectively operating and managing these advanced weapons systems.

⁸⁵⁵ Janne E. Nolan, *Military Industry in Taiwan and South Korea* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), 65.

⁸⁵⁶ Ibid, 62-63.

⁸⁵⁷ Richard Bitzinger, *Arming Asia: Technonationalism and Its impact on Local Defense Industries* (Oxfordshire: Taylor & Francis, 2010), 92.

⁸⁵⁸ Moon Chung-in, and Lee Sangkeun, "Military Spending and the Arms Race on the Korean Peninsula," *Asian Perspective* 33, no. 4 (2009): 69-99.

items like strengthening early warning air defense, strengthening aviation and naval forces, reorganizing infantry divisions and replacing weapons and equipment, fostering defense R&D and defense industries, and increasing the artillery firepower.⁸⁵⁹ As a result of the First Yulgok Project, the Army, Navy, and Air Force successfully obtained the majority of the essential weapons needed for their operations. The Defense Management Research Institute's data from 1981 revealed that companies in South Korea's heavy and chemical industry began manufacturing a wide range of defense equipment, including machine guns and armored vehicles, throughout the 1970s. These developments significantly contributed to strengthening the country's defense capabilities.⁸⁶⁰ Thus, it can be said that the South Korean defense industry laid the foundation in connection with the heavy and chemical industry.⁸⁶¹

Given the facts, it can be inferred that aside from the direct impact on the domestic steel demand, the Pohang Steel mill buildup served as the springboard for heavy and chemical industrialization, which began its operation in 1973.⁸⁶² This had significant implication to South Korean security since the defense industry and the self-reliance national defense strategy was pursued inseparably from the establishment of the heavy and chemical industry. The heavy and chemical industrialization had direct ramification on South Korea's weapons production which entailed the following four results: (1) the heavy and chemical industrialization led to significant technological advancements in various field—including electronics, aerospace, and machinery—enabling South Korea to produce advanced military weapons like missiles, and tanks; (2) It provided a solid industrial base for South Korea's military-industrial complex, allowing for more efficient and cost-effective production of weapons and military equipment; (3) Thanks to the heavy and chemical industrialization, South Korea became more self-efficient in producing its military hardware, allowing South Korea to reduce the reliance on foreign defense companies; (4) It enhanced the potential to export its military hardware, functioning as a new source of revenue and helped to established South Korea as a major player in the global defense industry.

Although South Korea's export of military hardware as well as the production of sophisticated weapons like tanks and aircraft took place in the 1980s, the heavy and chemical

⁸⁵⁹ Choi Sung-bin, Ko Byung-sung, and Lee Ho-suk, "Hanguk bangwisaneobui 40nyeon baljeongwajeonggwa seonggwa" [The Development Process & Achievement of the Korean Defense Industry for Last 40 Years], *The Quarterly Journal of Defense Policy Studies* 26, no.1 (2010): 73-117.

⁸⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁸⁶¹ Ibid.

⁸⁶² Suh Chung-sok, and Tcha Moon-joong, *The Korean Economy at the Crossroads: Triumphs, Difficulties and Triumphs Again* (London: Routledge, 2014), 202.

industrialization created immediate results:⁸⁶³ (1) In terms of cannons and large-caliber firearms, South Korea-made rifles and machine guns were developed in 1977 (put into mass production in 1980) while the development of 106mm recoilless guns began in 1973, followed by the development of 155mm howitzers in 1974 (both of these weapons were in the production phase by 1977); (2) The development of various bombs for use in aircraft began in 1975 and they were in the production phase, starting from 1977; (3) Although the South Korea-made main battle tank (the K-1 tank) was produced in the 1980s, South Korean defense industries were able to modify M48 tanks and produce these variations in the 1970s which increased its firepower while South Korean-made armored vehicles were mass produced in 1977; (4) In terms of naval platforms, the first Korean-made destroyer was built domestically and commissioned in 1975, thanks to the development of South Korea's shipbuilding industry; (5) In the missile field, a successful test launch of a South Korean-made missile was conducted in 1978 and the development and production of Korean-made multiple rocket launchers have been underway since 1978.

4.4. South Korea-Japan Economic Cooperation for Security in the 1980s

4.4.1. Calls for Japan's Greater Defense Burden Sharing in the Region

After his inauguration in 1982, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro attempted to strengthen the US-Japan alliance and pursue South Korea-Japan reconciliation for strategic purposes. As a result, Nakasone, decided to provide a total of \$4 billion loan that could boost up infrastructure buildup projects in line with South Korea's fifth five-year economic development plan that was implemented from 1982-1986.⁸⁶⁴

The necessity of South Korea-Japan economic cooperation for security was primarily based on two reasons: the military disparity between the two Koreas, and Japan's free riding concerning the defense in the Far East region. Although South Korea's economic size reached that of North Korea in the mid-1970s⁸⁶⁵ and started to produce major weapons from late 1970s, North Korea was considered as a major threat. For instance, President Chun Doo-hwan underscored that side by side the deployment of the Soviet Far East troops, North Korea's military spending—which was roughly 24 percent of their Gross National Product

⁸⁶³ "Defense Industry," Encyclopedia of Korean Culture, accessed April 20, 2023, <https://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/Article/E0021762>.

⁸⁶⁴ Son Ki-sub, "80nyeondae hanil sin ODA gyeonghyeopchagwaneul dulleossan oegyohyeopsang" [The Meaning and Characteristics of 'Security Economic Aid' Package in Korea-Japan Relations in 1980s], *The Korean Association of Political Science & Communication* 23, no.1 (2020): 83-112.

⁸⁶⁵ Lee Choong-koo, email message to author, April 19, 2023.

(GNP)—was much greater than that of the South Koreans.⁸⁶⁶ Meanwhile, Japan’s defending spending—roughly 1 percent of GNP—was considered exorbitantly small. It is worth mentioning that South Korea spent roughly 6 percent of the GNP on defense during the early 1980s, which was equivalent to 30 percent of South Korean government budget (see table 7).⁸⁶⁷ In that context, Chun argued that Japan was able to relish peace in the post-War era and pursue its economic development while the South Koreans were counterbalancing the communist elements in the forefront, together with the United States. In that sense, Japan was obliged to pay the fair share for the defense of South Korea.⁸⁶⁸

Table 7. Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP (1980-1985).⁸⁶⁹

(Unit: Percent)

Year	South Korea	Japan
1980	5.69	0.91
1981	5.44	0.92
1982	5.49	0.93
1983	4.85	0.95
1984	4.25	0.96
1985	4.24	0.96

The idea that Japan should share greater burden by compensating South Korea was first discussed by former Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei. Momentarily after President Chun was inaugurated, Tanaka met with South Korean Army General Jeong Ho-yong and stated that Japan was required to contribute more economically to South Korea. Tanaka pointed out that two Japanese divisions were stationed in the Korean peninsula during the colonial era, one in Seoul, and the other in North Hamgyeong province. He further highlighted that given the precedent—two divisions being stationed during the colonial period—Japan should

⁸⁶⁶ Chun Doo-hwan, *Jeonduhwan hoegorok. 2 cheongwadae sijeol (1980-1988)* [Memoir of Chun Doo-hwan 2: Blue House Years (1980-1988)] (Seoul: Jajaknamusup, 2017), 295.

⁸⁶⁷ Lee Pil-jung, “Hanguk gukbangyesanui soyowa baebune gwanhan yeongu(1953-hyeonjae)” [A Study on Requirements and Allocations of the ROK’s Defense Budget (1953-Present)], *The Quarterly Journal of Defense Policy Studies* 32, no.3 (2016): 185-224. According to Lee, South Korea’s defense budget/GNP for 1980/81/82 are 5.7 percent, 5.4 percent, and 5.5 percent. Meanwhile, Defense budget/Central government expenditure for 1980/81/82 are 33.7 percent, 28.0 percent, and 30.6 percent.

⁸⁶⁸ Chun Doo-hwan, *Jeonduhwan hoegorok. 2 cheongwadae sijeol (1980-1988)* [Memoir of Chun Doo-hwan 2: Blue House Years (1980-1988)] (Seoul: Jajaknamusup, 2017), 310-311.

⁸⁶⁹ Lee Pil-jung, “Hanguk gukbangyesanui soyowa baebune gwanhan yeongu(1953-hyeonjae)” [A Study on Requirements and Allocations of the ROK’s Defense Budget (1953-Present)], *The Quarterly Journal of Defense Policy Studies* 32, no.3 (2016): 185-224.

provide economic aid to South Korea for the cost “equivalent to that of maintaining two divisions.”⁸⁷⁰ In line with Tanaka’s idea, Chun believed that Japan should contribute South Korea’s defense efforts at least economically, and used the US Army division’s stationing cost—it cost approximately \$1 billion a year to maintain a single United States army division—as a reference in calculating Japan’s burden sharing cost.⁸⁷¹ Eventually, Chun reached a conclusion that \$10 billion is the adequate amount. He calculated that given the precedent during the Japanese colonial era, at least two army divisions should be stationed to defend against outside aggression in the timeframe of five years: \$1 billion x 2 divisions x 5 years = \$10 billion.⁸⁷² In other words, South Korea-Japan economic cooperation was originally contemplated primarily in the context of security considerations.

4.4.2. Japan’s Response and the Negotiating Process

Once the preliminary amount concerning the South Korea-Japan economic cooperation for security was set by President Chun, Foreign Minister Lho Shin-young conveyed the suggested amount—\$6 billion as official development assistance (ODA) loan, and \$4 billion as bank loan—to the Japanese counterpart and underlined Japan’s necessity for greater burden-sharing in terms of Korean defense.⁸⁷³

However, the Japanese government considered the \$10 billion exorbitant. Japanese Foreign Minister Sonoda Sunao responded negatively based on three reasons: (1) the amount requested by the South Korean side is so vast that the public disclosure of the amount would make both the Japanese ruling and the opposition parties difficult, if not impossible, to fully comply; (2) although Japan is well aware that peace and security of the Korean Peninsula is important, Japan’s cooperation in the field of defense and security is prohibited by the constitutional restraint: thus, cooperation with the South Korean counterpart should be

⁸⁷⁰ Hwang Ki-hyung, “Ilboni hangugui anbo yeokhare hyetaegeul bondaneun ‘muimseungcharon’i jegidwaessda” [A “Free-Rider Theory” has been Raised, Claiming that Japan Benefits from South Korea’s Security Role], *Iryoseoul*, April 17, 2020.

⁸⁷¹ Cho Yang-hyun, “Je5gonghwaguk daeroegyowa haniranbogyehyeop anbogyehyeobanui giwone daehan siljeungbunseok” [The Fifth Republic of Korea’s Diplomacy Towards Japan – Empirical Analysis on the Origin of the Korea-Japan Security-Economic Cooperation], *The Korean Association of International Studies* 57, no.2 (2017): 169-205.

⁸⁷² Chun Doo-hwan, *Jeonduhwan hoegorok. 2 cheongwadae sijeol (1980-1988)* [Memoir of Chun Doo-hwan 2: Blue House Years (1980-1988)] (Seoul: Jajaknamusup, 2017), 303.

⁸⁷³ Choi Hee-sik, “Jeonduhwan jeonggwon hui yeoksamunje: 80nyeondae hanil yeoksamunjeui saeroun jeongae” [History Problems Under the Chun Doo Hwan Regime: New Evolution of the History Problem in the 80’s], *Institute of International Affairs, Seoul National University* 28, no.2 (2019): 97-126. Koike Osamu 小池修, *Nichi kan anpo keikyō o meguru nichu bei kan kankei 日韓安保経協をめぐる日米韓関係* [US-Japan-ROK Relations Concerning the Japan-ROK Security Economic Cooperation] (Tōkyō: University of Tokyo, 2012), 28.

centered on non-defense domain; (3) Japan's economic condition is far from ideal: economic growth rate has been recently declining, and domestic tax increases are impossible, since administrative reform to reduce the tax burden on the people is the most important task for the current cabinet.⁸⁷⁴

Although Lho stressed that given South Korea's heavy burden of defense, the requested amount—\$10 billion—is not exorbitant and this would result in compensating for some of the trade deficit with Japan of more than \$20 billion ever since the normalization, South Korea backed down and reduced the requested amount to \$6 billion.⁸⁷⁵ However, Sonoda reiterated his stance that neither the characterization of the aid as “security-related economic cooperation” nor the large-scale aid of \$6 billion could be accepted by Japan.⁸⁷⁶ As a result, Sonoda came up with an economic cooperation package (government and the private sector combined), calculated at around \$4 billion.⁸⁷⁷ Such downsizing process raised heated criticism among the Koreans. Korean media emphasized that Sonoda's attitude and remarks were originating from a sense of Japanese superiority over the Koreans, and assumed that it was grounded on Sonoda's calculation that it would be most effective to provoke the Koreans through prolonging the negotiating process: the more the time elapses, the South Korean negotiators would make greater concessions vis-à-vis the Japanese.⁸⁷⁸ Eventually, the original proposal of \$10 billion was decreased to \$4 billion: ODA loan \$1.85 billion, Japanese Export-Import bank loan \$2.15 billion.⁸⁷⁹ These loans were introduced in the timeframe of seven years with relatively favorable terms for the South Koreans. South Korea was able to acquire loan from Japan at an average interest of six percent (which was long-term, low-interest government loan). It is worth mentioning that when Paul Volcker assumed the position of Chairman of the Federal Reserve in 1979, he implemented a significant upward

⁸⁷⁴ Komoda Mayumi, *Hanil 'anbogyeonghyeop' bunseok: yeoksajeok jeongaewa ironjeok hamui* [Analysis of Korea-Japan Security-Economic Cooperation: Historical Development and Theoretical Implications] (Seoul: Korea University, 2013), 116-117.

⁸⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 122.

⁸⁷⁶ Hwang Byung-ryeol, “Sonoda tto daehangeugeon” [Sonoda again uttered extreme remarks towards South Korea], *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, September 3, 1981. Put simply, there was no agreement reached on loans for defense projects. During the negotiations on economic cooperation for security, Foreign Minister Lho Shin-young acknowledged Japan's constitutional limitations in directly engaging in military cooperation. However, Lho expressed his hopes for Japan to potentially contribute to South Korea's defense by providing a \$6 billion loan. This marked the final instance in which the South Korean government officially addressed security matters in relation to the Japanese loan.

⁸⁷⁷ Komoda Mayumi, *Hanil 'anbogyeonghyeop' bunseok: yeoksajeok jeongaewa ironjeok hamui* [Analysis of Korea-Japan Security-Economic Cooperation: Historical Development and Theoretical Implications] (Seoul: Korea University, 2013), 128.

⁸⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 122.

⁸⁷⁹ Choi Hee-sik, “Jeonduhwan jeonggwon hui yeoksamunje: 80nyeondae hanil yeoksamunjeui saeroun jeongae” [History Problems Under the Chun Doo Hwan Regime: New Evolution of the History Problem in the 80's], *Institute of International Affairs, Seoul National University* 28, no.2 (2019): 97-126.

adjustment of the US key rate.⁸⁸⁰ As we consider the period when economic cooperation for security purpose was being negotiated between Japan and South Korea in 1981 and 1982, the average US federal funds rate stood in the range of approximately 12 to 16 percent. Such favorable terms were the middle ground between the suggestions offered by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance.⁸⁸¹ Meanwhile, not all of the \$4 billion was used thanks to South Korea’s good economic performance during the seven year timeframe: a total of \$ 2.5 billion (63.7 percent of the provided loan) were actually spent.⁸⁸²

Table 8. The Breakdown of the \$4 Billion Loan/Fund

(Unit: Million USD)

Types of Funds	Results	Agreed Amount	Used Amount	Operational support	Unused Amount
Official Development Assistance Loan		1,850	1,850	100.0%	0
Export-Import Bank of Japan Fund & Loan		2,150	698.5	32.5%	1,451.5
Sum		4,000	2,548.5	-	-

4.4.3. The \$4 Billion Loan: Its Attribute and Distribution

The concept of “economic cooperation for security” in the early 1980s originated from South Korea’s security concerns and the necessity of Japan’s burden sharing. Although there were economic reasons for cooperation—President Chun encountered an unprecedented economic crisis soon after his inauguration: the South Korean economy recorded a minus growth of 5.7 percent in 1980, the worst performance ever since the end of the Korean War.⁸⁸³ The preliminary amount (\$10 billion) was calculated primarily in the context of security considerations: Chun clearly conveyed his idea to President Reagan that he would purchase US military platforms like jet fighters and tanks with the loans provided by Japan.⁸⁸⁴

⁸⁸⁰ Andrew H. Bartels, “Volcker’s Revolution at the Fed,” *Challenge* 28, no. 4 (1985): 35-42.

⁸⁸¹ Kim Ho-sup, *Policy-making of Japanese Official Development Assistance to the Republic of Korea, 1965-1983* (Michigan: University of Michigan, 1989), 184. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed relatively better condition than the Ministry of Finance.

⁸⁸² “Korea-Japan Economic Cooperation was the Idea of Sejima,” Chogabje.com, accessed December 6, 2021, http://www.chogabje.com/board/view.asp?C_IDX=9730&C_CC=AC.

⁸⁸³ Frederica M. Bunge, *South Korea, a Country Study* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, 1982), xv. Koike Osamu 小池修, *Nichi kan anpo keikyō o meguru nichu bei kan kankei* 日韓安保経協をめぐる日米韓関係 [US-Japan-ROK Relations Concerning the Japan-ROK Security Economic Cooperation] (Tōkyō: University of Tokyo, 2012), 23. Moreover, President Chun found himself in a precarious situation as his administration faced legitimacy concerns due to its establishment through a military coup during the tumultuous aftermath of the 10.26 incident. It was imperative for him to overcome significant economic challenges and ensure social and regime stability through economic reconstruction. Within this context, the Japanese loan of \$4 billion, even though strictly allocated to non-defense sectors, provided socio-economic stability and indirectly contributed to South Korea’s defense efforts.

⁸⁸⁴ Chun Doo-hwan, *Jeonduhwan hoegorok. 2 cheongwadae sijeol (1980-1988)* [Memoir of Chun Doo-hwan 2: Blue House Years (1980-1988)] (Seoul: Jajaknamusup, 2017), 310-311.

Meanwhile, Japan was also aware that South Korea's suggestion of the \$10 billion was based on security considerations.⁸⁸⁵

However, Japan adamantly opposed the idea of using the loans for South Korea's defense. As Sonoda had suggested to Lho, it was Japan's official stance that cooperation should be strictly confined within the limits of non-defense area due to Japan's constitutional constraints.⁸⁸⁶ To be sure, there were opinions within Japan that the loans should be directly used in shoring up the South Korean defense. For instance, Ito Masayoshi, who served as Japanese Foreign Minister from July 1980 to May 1981, expressed the necessity of Japan's defense burden sharing in accordance with the agreed contents of the 1981 Reagan-Suzuki talks: referring to the word "alliance" in the joint communique, Ito argued that the term included military cooperation since US-Japan relations were based on the mutual security treaty. When his opinion was not accepted—Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko repeatedly underscored that the word "alliance" did not have military implications—Ito and Vice Foreign Minister Takahashi Masuo resigned.⁸⁸⁷ It is understood that Ito's resignation was due to his causing confusion over the wording of the 1981 US-Japan joint communique.⁸⁸⁸ Eventually, the Japanese government decided not to associate economic loans with defense projects since South Korea might repeatedly make similar requests in the future.⁸⁸⁹

Eventually, Lho accepted that the Japanese loan would be exclusively centered on the implementation of the fifth five-year economic development plan (1982-1986) and not be used on military buildup.⁸⁹⁰ South Korea and Japan concurred that the principle of using a yen loan should be implemented by a loan agreement between the two countries, and affirmed that the finalized \$4 billion loans should be used in accordance with the lender's principle of use.⁸⁹¹ In other words, South Korea, a loan-receiving country, was allowed to use the loan only under the management of Japan. As stipulated in "Japan's Overseas Economic

⁸⁸⁵ Kazuo Ogura 小倉和夫, *Hiroku nichi kan 1 chō en shikin 秘録・日韓1兆円資金* [Secret Records: 1 Trillion-Yen Fund between Japan and South Korea] (Tōkyō: Kodansha, 2013), 46-47.

⁸⁸⁶ Komoda Mayumi, *Hanil 'anbogyonghyeop' bunseok: yeoksajeok jeongaewa ironjeok hamui* [Analysis of Korea-Japan Security-Economic Cooperation: Historical Development and Theoretical Implications] (Seoul: Korea University, 2013), 116-117.

⁸⁸⁷ Kim Ho-sup, *Policy-making of Japanese Official Development Assistance to the Republic of Korea, 1965-1983* (Michigan: University of Michigan, 1989), 166.

⁸⁸⁸ "Japan's Foreign Minister Quits in Dispute," *The New York Times*, May 16, 1981.

⁸⁸⁹ Kim Ho-sup, *Policy-making of Japanese Official Development Assistance to the Republic of Korea, 1965-1983* (Michigan: University of Michigan, 1989), 167.

⁸⁹⁰ Lee Chong-sik, *Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), 123.

⁸⁹¹ *Daehanminguk jeongbuwa ilbonguk jeongbuganui '82nyeondo enchagwan doibe gwanhan gakseogyohwan* [Exchanges of Memorandum between South Korean Government and the Japanese Government on the Introduction of the 1982 Loan] (Seoul: Ministry of Government Administration, 1983), 2-3.

Cooperation Fund Introduction and Termination Plan,”⁸⁹² released by South Korea’s Ministry of Finance and Economy in 1989, the loan should be used for the purchase of goods and services necessary for the performance of the designated projects.⁸⁹³ It also clarified that purchasing such goods and services through loans shall be conducted in accordance with the instructions of the Japan Overseas Economic Cooperation Funds.⁸⁹⁴

Although it fell far short of the \$10 billion contemplated by the South Koreans in the first place, \$4 billion was still a sizeable amount. Thanks to the \$4 billion loan, Chun administration was able to build/expand/upgrade infrastructure like dams, metro, and power plants. (see Table 9). Meanwhile, it is worth mentioning that South Korea’s annual defense budget during the early and mid-1980s was less than \$2 billion.⁸⁹⁵ The Japanese loan played a key role in bringing economic stability to South Korea and helped in preparing—thus paying for the cost related to—the 1988 Seoul Olympics.⁸⁹⁶ In short, the economic cooperation for security in the 1980s was conducted not in the form of direct burden sharing in the defense domain—for example, paying South Korea’s defense expenses—but rather through economic and social channels. Yet, considering the fact that money is fungible, the \$4 billion loan provided greater financial leeway for the South Korean government in implementing, say, defense projects (this feature is further discussed in section 4.4.5., “Economic cooperation for security and the Second Yulgok Project”).

⁸⁹² “Japan’s Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) Introduction and Termination Plan,” National Archives of Korea, accessed December 4, 2021, <http://theme.archives.go.kr/viewer/common/archWebViewer.do?bsid=200300123429&dsid=000000000003&gubun=search>.

⁸⁹³ *Daehanminguk jeongbuwa ilbonguk jeongbuganui ‘82nyeondo enchagwan doibe gwanhan gakseogyohwan* [Exchanges of Memorandum between South Korean Government and the Japanese Government on the Introduction of the 1982 Loan] (Seoul: Ministry of Government Administration, 1983), 2-3. It is stipulated in the Article C of the agreement.

⁸⁹⁴ *Ibid.* It is stipulated in the Article D of the agreement.

⁸⁹⁵ Lee Pil-jung, “Hanguk gukbangyesanui soyowa baebune gwanhan yeongu(1953-hyeonjae)” [A Study on Requirements and Allocations of the ROK’s Defense Budget (1953-Present)], *The Quarterly Journal of Defense Policy Studies* 32, no.3 (2016): 185-224. The rough calculation of South Korean defense budget from 1982 to 1986 is as follows: \$1.15 billion (1982), \$1.27 billion (1983), \$1.34 billion (1984), \$1.56 billion (1985), \$1.84 billion (1986). As for the foreign exchange rate, I have applied the KRW/USD average annual exchange rate from 1982 to 1986. The foreign exchange rate data is retrieved from the Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System.

⁸⁹⁶ Mark Borthwick, *Pacific Century: The Emergence of Modern Pacific Asia* (Colorado: Westview Press, 2007), 281.

Table 9. The Project Item list Using Japanese \$4 billion Loan/Fund.⁸⁹⁷

Project item	Amount (billion yen)	Percentage (%)
Sumcheon multipurpose dam	20.4	45.2
Sewage treatment plant in Seoul	11.5	25.5
Water supply expansion	7.8	17.3
Seoul National university pediatrics hospital	5.4	12.0
Total (first loan instalment)	45.1	100.0
Expansion of the sewage treatment	23.0	46.5
Ju-am multi-purpose dam construction	11.1	22.4
Urban water supply expansion	5.1	10.3
Weather equipment modernization	4.2	8.5
Agricultural and fisheries equipment modernization	3.3	6.7
Establishment of the National Center for Health and Safety Research	2.4	4.8
Expansion of the waste disposal facilities	0.4	0.8
Total (second loan instalment)	49.5	100.0
Sewage treatment plant construction	20.1	36.9
Educational facility expansion	15.2	27.9
Medical facility expansion	12.3	22.6
Comprehensive marine research ship construction	4.1	7.5
Science research equipment reinforcement projects	2.7	5.0
Total (third loan instalment)	54.4	100.0
Educational facility expansion	12.1	27.1
Small and medium-sized companies modernization	7.8	17.4
Support for agricultural mechanism	7.8	17.4
Imha multi-purpose dam project	7.0	15.6

⁸⁹⁷ *Daehanminguk jeongbuwa ilbonguk jeongbuganui '82nyeondo enchagwan doibe gwanhan gakseogyohwan* [Exchanges of Memorandum between South Korean Government and the Japanese Government on the Introduction of the 1982 Loan] (Seoul: Ministry of Government Administration, 1983), 2-3. *Daehanminguk jeongbuwa ilbonguk jeongbuganui '83nyeondo enchagwan doibe gwanhan gakseogyohwan* [Exchanges of Memorandum between South Korean Government and the Japanese Government on the Introduction of the 1983 Loan] (Seoul: Ministry of Government Administration, 1984), 1-2. *Daehanminguk jeongbuwa ilbonguk jeongbuganui '84nyeondo enchagwan doibe gwanhan gakseogyohwan* [Exchanges of Memorandum between South Korean Government and the Japanese Government on the Introduction of the 1984 Loan] (Seoul: Ministry of Government Administration, 1985), 1-2. *Daehanminguk jeongbuwa ilbonguk jeongbuganui 85nyeondobun ilbonchagwane gwanhan gyohwangakseo* [A Memorandum of Exchange between the Korean Government and the Japanese Government for 1985 on Japanese Loans] (Seoul: Ministry of Government Administration, 1987), 1-4. *Daehanminguk jeongbuwa ilbonguk jeongbugan je5cha ilbonhaeogyongjehyeopryeokgigeum (OECF) chagwane gwanhan gyohwangakseo* [Exchange of the Memorandum on the 5th Japan Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) Loan between the South Korean Government and the Japanese Government] (Seoul: Ministry of Government Administration, 1988), 1-4. *Daehanminguk jeongbuwa ilbonguk jeongbuganui je6chanyeondo ('87) OECF chagwan doibe gwanhan gakseogyohwa* [Exchanges of the Memorandum between the South Korean Government and the Japanese government on the introduction of OECF loans in the 6th year ('87)] (Seoul: Ministry of Government Administration, 1989), 1-3.

Maintenance of waste disposal facilities	5.4	12.0
Dairy facilities improvement project	3.9	8.7
Introduction of materials for the science museum	0.8	1.8
Total (fourth loan instalment)	44.6	100.0
Expansion of educational facilities	5.9	21.7
Enlargement of hospitals affiliated to private univ.	5.6	20.6
Yongsan River seawall project	4.4	16.3
Ulsan city's urban development project	4.4	16.3
Sewage treatment plant construction project	4.2	15.3
Expansion of laboratory facilities	2.7	9.8
Total (fifth loan instalment)	27.3	100.0
Small and medium-sized enterprises modernization	6.2	81.3
Water supply expansion project in Daejeon city	1.4	18.7
Total (sixth loan instalment)	7.6	100.0
Seoul metro construction project	72.0	72.3
Small and medium-sized companies modernization	11.5	11.6
Mixed feed plant construction project	5.4	5.4
Medical maintenance and expansion project	4.3	4.3
Dairy facility expansion project	2.5	2.5
Expansion of practical equipment for water and transport-related educational institutions	2.2	2.2
Dairy facilities construction project	1.7	1.7
Total (seventh loan instalment)	99.6	100.0

4.4.4. Implication of the economic cooperation for security vis-à-vis South Korean defense

Japan's self-recognition of greater burden sharing for regional security

Although Japan-North Korea relationship was mainly confined to trade and occasional North Korean visits conducted by Japanese leftist politicians during the 1970s,⁸⁹⁸ Japan's was not willing to directly assist South Korea in terms of security. Although there were discussions between South Korea and Japan concerning economic cooperation for security during this period—most notably, Japan providing anti-guerrilla equipment to South Korea and assisting the construction of the four core plants plan—it turned out to be fruitless. To be sure, Prime Minister Sato pointed out in 1969 that “the security of South Korea is essential to Japan's own security,” and Japan is cognizant of the tension in the Korean Peninsula.⁸⁹⁹ However, direct security cooperation between the two countries was not

⁸⁹⁸ Hahn Bae-ho, “Korea-Japan Relations in the 1970s,” *Asian Survey* 20, no. 11 (1980): 1087-1097.

⁸⁹⁹ Ayumi Teraoka 寺岡 亜由美, “Gaiatsu ga hagukumu nichi kan anzen hoshō kyōryoku:

pursued proactively until the early 1980s. However, the necessity of Japan's greater burden sharing in the Far East was recognized both by the United States and South Korea.

Well before the 1980s, the United States was signaling Japan to assume greater responsibility in the security domain. For instance, in August 1975, US Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger criticized Japan for being “too much a passive partner” in security.⁹⁰⁰ That same year, Schlesinger assured South Korean President Park that he would discuss with Japanese Prime Minister Miki Takeo the need for Japan's greater economic assistance to South Korea.⁹⁰¹ Schlesinger went further and suggested that together with the United States, Japan should jointly support South Korea's defense.⁹⁰² Such trend gained momentum when Carter attempted to implement his idea of withdrawing US force from South Korea after his inauguration in January 1977. To fill the security gap that the forces withdrawal might entail, Carter thought of transferring US military hardware to the South Korean military as well as providing military aid to South Korea. However, the US Congress was unfavorable of offering aid after experiencing the Vietnam debacle, and especially when the aftershock of the 1976 “Koreagate” scandal—a lobby effort to reverse Nixon's decision to withdraw US force from South Korea which involved the Korea Central Intelligence Agency—was still present.⁹⁰³ As a result, the Carter administration pushed the Japanese to provide economic aid to South Korea.⁹⁰⁴ Meanwhile, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the resumption of the US-Soviet military competition raised the need for Japan to assume greater division of labor: the US helping South Korea militarily, while Japan assisting the South Korean counterparts economically. For instance, in November 1980, US Defense Secretary Harold Brown conveyed to his Japanese counterparts—a number of former directors of the Japanese Defense Agency—that Japan should offer loans to South Korea that could help modernizing South Korea's military platforms.⁹⁰⁵ In the same year, a comparable request was put forward by Under Secretary of Defense Robert W. Komer. The message was transmitted to Michael J.

2012 nen nichu bei kan gōdō gunji enshū jitsugen no yōin bunseki” 外圧が育む日韓安全保障協力 2012年日米韓合同軍事演習実現の要因分析 [Korea-Japan Security Cooperation Fostered by External Pressure — Factor Analysis of the 2012 US-Korea-Japan Joint Military Exercise], *Seijigaku kenkyū* 政治学研究 49 (2013): 135-171.

⁹⁰⁰ “Schlesinger Chides Japan on Defense,” *The New York Times*, Aug 30, 1975.

⁹⁰¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E-12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 270.

⁹⁰² Lee Chong-sik, *Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), 106.

⁹⁰³ Koike Osamu 小池修, *Nichi kan anpo keikyō o meguru nichu bei kan kankei* 日韓安保経協をめぐる日米韓関係 [US-Japan-ROK Relations Concerning the Japan-ROK Security Economic Cooperation] (Tōkyō: University of Tokyo, 2012), 5-13.

⁹⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁰⁵ Lee Chong-sik, *Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), 106.

Mansfield, the US Ambassador to Japan, who then relayed it to the Japanese counterparts.⁹⁰⁶ Once President Reagan came into office in January 1981, the US' request for Japan's active role became more frequent. On March 1981, US National Security Advisor Richard V. Allen told *Asahi Shimbun* that the United States had high hopes on South Korea as well as the Korean peninsula's stability and stressed that it was also in the interest of Japan. He further underscored that Japan's burden sharing should be fair.⁹⁰⁷ In June 1981, the US mentioned during the US-Japan Security Cooperation Committee meeting that while the United States provide nuclear umbrella for the defense of South Korea, Japan should not only offer bases—as launching pads—for USFJ, but also economically support South Korea in the context of the triangular relationship between the United States, Japan, and South Korea.⁹⁰⁸ Given these developments in the 1970s and early 1980s, it is fair to say that the United States indirectly triggered the South Korea-Japan economic cooperation for security in the 1980s. As a matter of fact, Prime Minister Suzuki stated in the 1981 US-Japan Joint Communiqué that “to secure Japan's defense and peace and stability in the Far East, an appropriate burden sharing between US and Japan is desirable.”⁹⁰⁹ His view was also confirmed by his Foreign Minister: during the interview with the *New York Times* in 1982, Foreign Minister Sakurauchi Yoshio mentioned that Japan “recognize that peace and stability on the Korean peninsula are vital to the peace and stability of East Asia as a whole, including Japan” thus underlining the need to assist South Korea in one way or another.⁹¹⁰ To be sure, it is questionable whether the finalized \$4 billion loan was possible solely through US pressure vis-à-vis Japan.⁹¹¹ Due to the many bilateral defense and economic issues to resolve vis-a-vis Japan, the United States was hardly in a good position to pressure Japan in the early 1980s.⁹¹² Actually when the negotiation between Japan and South Korea proceeded, the United States dissuaded the South Korean government from linking the economic loan to security matters, probably because the

⁹⁰⁶ Koike Osamu 小池修, *Nichi kan anpo keikyō o meguru nichi bei kan kankei* 日韓安保経協をめぐる日米韓関係 [US-Japan-ROK Relations Concerning the Japan-ROK Security Economic Cooperation] (Tōkyō: University of Tokyo, 2012), 18.

⁹⁰⁷ Komoda Mayumi, *Hanil 'anbogyeonghyeop' bunseok: yeoksajeok jeongaewa ironjeok hamui* [Analysis of Korea-Japan Security-Economic Cooperation: Historical Development and Theoretical Implications] (Seoul: Korea University, 2013), 107.

⁹⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁰⁹ Jo Yang-hyeon, “Chun Doo-hwan Administration's Diplomacy Towards Japan: The Origin of the Draft Proposal for the ROK-Japan Security-Economic Cooperation,” *Seoul Journal of Japanese Studies* 4, no. 1 (2018): 221-252.

⁹¹⁰ Henry S. Stokes, “High Japanese Official Bids US Foster China Ties,” *The New York Times*, Jan 13, 1982.

⁹¹¹ Jo Yang-hyeon, “Chun Doo-hwan Administration's Diplomacy Towards Japan: The Origin of the Draft Proposal for the ROK-Japan Security-Economic Cooperation,” *Seoul Journal of Japanese Studies* 4, no. 1 (2018): 221-252.

⁹¹² Lee Chong-sik, *Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), 137.

United States did not want to antagonize Japan by favoring the South Korean stance⁹¹³ since Suzuki opposed to link the Japanese loan to security affairs.⁹¹⁴ Nevertheless, the United States supported in principle for Japan's economic assistance to South Korea.⁹¹⁵

Meanwhile, South Korea openly asked the Japanese for security assistance in the form of economic cooperation for security once Chun became the President in 1980. As mentioned earlier, South Korea's demand was based on the assumption that South Korea's defense efforts contributed to Japan's peace and security and thus Japan should pay the fair share.⁹¹⁶ In response, the Prime Minister Nakasone agreed to provide the loan. Although the finalized \$4 billion loan was not to be used for reinforcing the South Korean defense domain, Nakasone emphasized that maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula was a long-term factor in peace and stability in Japan. Such perception was also reflected in Japan's defense policy: for instance, military threats emanating from both the Soviet Union and North Korea was factored in the Japanese Defense White Papers by the early 1980s.⁹¹⁷ Such series of events is a good example how Japan shared threat perception with South Korea.

Alleviation of the legitimacy issues concerning President Chun

President Chun had legitimacy issues from the very beginning of his term in office: The Fifth Republic—the Chun administration—was established through a military coup amid the chaos caused after the assassination of President Park Chung-hee. Such problem was exacerbated by his heavy-handed measures against the Gwangju uprising, and the weak economy which was heavily impacted by the 1979 Oil Shock. In that sense, it was a necessity for Chun to resolve the legitimacy issue. To achieve the goal, he had to assure the continued economic growth and build a strong defense against North Korea's provocation. As pointed out earlier, the economic cooperation for security enabled South Korea to utilize \$4 billion loan in projects which helped in achieving many of the goals laid out in the fifth five-year

⁹¹³ Isa Duce, *Status Power: Japanese Foreign Policy Making Toward Korea* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 95.

⁹¹⁴ Charles K. Armstrong, *Korea at the Center: Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia* (New York: M.E. Sharpe., 2006), 132.

⁹¹⁵ United States Congress Senate Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983 Nearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Ninety-Seventh Congress, Second Session Issue 29, Parts 1-2* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1982), 185-186. David Arase and Tsuneo Akaha, *The US-Japan Alliance: Balancing Soft and Hard Power in East Asia* (Hoboken: Taylor & Francis, 2013), 39.

⁹¹⁶ Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan's Security Agenda: Military, Economic, and Environmental Dimensions* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 154.

⁹¹⁷ Michael J. Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 115.

economic development plan. Meanwhile, Chun thought that strengthening relationship, with both the United States and Japan, was the most effective way of defending South Korea against North Korean provocation. It is obvious that Reagan's personal traits played a great part in relieving Chun's legitimacy issue: unlike Carter, Reagan assured that the human rights issues would not be a stumbling block in concerning the relationship between the United States and the South Korea and officially invited Chun to the White House momentarily before the launch of the Fifth Republic.⁹¹⁸ In addition, the Reagan administration asked Japan to provide loans to South Korea, hoping that such measure might stabilize Chun's regime.⁹¹⁹ Meanwhile, strengthening the missing link of the tripartite through South Korea-Japan economic cooperation for security was also a crucial factor in fending off possible North Korean aggression during the 1980s. It is worth mentioning that although Chun had the incentive to exploit the North Korean threat to cancel off his legitimacy problems North Korea was undoubtedly an existential threat for South Korea at that juncture: the assassination attempt on Chun—North Korean special operatives detonating a time bomb in Rangoon, killing 17 of Chun's entourage—for example, was an overt threat vis-à-vis South Korea's national security.⁹²⁰ Although the Chun's legitimacy has not been fully resolved during his rule, such incident helped enhancing Chun's domestic position to some degree.⁹²¹ In addition, thanks to the progressive economic growth during Chun's tenure, major policies—including South Korea-Japan economic cooperation for security—implemented during the fifth republic was not opposed by the South Korean people despite Chun's legitimacy issues.⁹²²

4.4.5. Economic Cooperation for Security and the Second Yulgok Project

As pointed out earlier, the loans acquired through the economic cooperation for security were strictly utilized in social and economic projects. But considering the fact that such introduction of loans offered the leeway for the South Korean government to allocate more budget to the defense sector—without seriously burdening the non-defense sector—it is worth examining what could have been done with the \$2.55 billion (the amount of loan

⁹¹⁸ Kim Sung-chull, *Partnership Within Hierarchy: The Evolving East Asian Security Triangle* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2017), 127.

⁹¹⁹ David Arase and Tsuneo Akaha, *The US-Japan Alliance Balancing Soft and Hard Power in East Asia* (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2013), 39.

⁹²⁰ Park Kyung-ae and Kim Tal-chung, *Korean Security Dynamism in Transition* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 31.

⁹²¹ Lee Chae-jin, "South Korea in 1983: Crisis Management and Political Legitimacy," *Asian Survey* 24, no. 1 (1984): 112-121.

⁹²² Kihl Young-whan, *Transforming Korean Politics Democracy, Reform, and Culture* (London England: Routledge, 2015), 81.

actually been introduced) as defense buildup. In that context, comparing the loan amount with the defense spending on the South Korean Force Improvement Plan—especially the Second Yulgok Project—in the 1980s would help clarify the implications of Japan’s economic assistance on South Korea’s security.

South Korea’s first military build-up plan—the First Yulgok Project (1974-1981)—was initiated in 1974 to bridge the power gap between the two Koreas. Military ‘reinforcement’ is generally the same concept as building military power, but its primary goal is to improve combat capability.⁹²³ With the enactment of the Defense Tax Act in 1974, the South Korean military stepped up its efforts to maximize its integrated power. The South Korean military established the First Force Improvement Plan, also known as the Yulgok Project, on the foundation of the South Korean military modernization plan.

In the 1980s, its follow-up projects—the Second Yulgok Project (1982-1986) and the Third Yulgok Project (1987-1992)—were implemented.⁹²⁴ The Second Yulgok Project was established to urgently resolve the power gap between the two Koreas. To minimize defense weakness/vulnerability by the 1988 Seoul Olympics, the direction of the business was to supplement defense forces and lay the foundation for independent deterrence, with the army increasing its initial response capability and strengthening the defense forces around the metropolitan area, while the Navy focused on increasing combat ships and guided missile forces, and the Air Force introducing new aircraft and guided missile forces.⁹²⁵ In terms of cumulative amount, 5,238 billion South Korean won was invested during the Second Yulgok Project.⁹²⁶

Within the scope of the Second Yulgok Project, one of the key initiatives was the K-1 main battle tank project. While the platform of the Air Force and Navy possessed certain advantages over North Korean equipment, enabling the US-ROK combined forces to counter aggressive aerial and naval actions, the primary defense of South Korea against North Korean

⁹²³ The main goal of the Yulgok Project was to lay a strong foundation for self-reliant national defense capabilities in the 21st century, with a specific focus on deterring North Korea and developing long-term national security strategies. This project aimed to achieve its objective through the early localization of essential weapons, establishing a framework for advanced defense science and technology, enhancing technology-intensive structures, and optimizing integrated combat effectiveness by promoting balanced development across diverse military functions and battlefield operations.

⁹²⁴ Nam Sung-wook et al, *South Korea’s 70-year Endeavor for Foreign Policy, National Defense and Unification* (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 16.

⁹²⁵ Defense Acquisition Program Administration, *Bangwisaeopgaeron* [Introduction to Defense Projects] (Seoul: Defense Acquisition Program Administration, 2008), 16-17.

⁹²⁶ Nam Sung-wook et al, *South Korea’s 70-year Endeavor for Foreign Policy, National Defense and Unification* (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 235.

tanks, primarily consisting of T-55 and T-62 models at that time, relied on M-48A1, M-48A2C, and M-60 tanks, which were considered somewhat inferior. In fact, when the South Koreans started to produce the indigenous K-1 tank in the 1980s, North Korea produced its own tanks in the 1970s. In that perspective, it was not a far-fetched assessment that North Korea's defense industry was roughly ten years ahead of South Korea's.⁹²⁷ Factoring in mind that North Korea's aggressive maneuvers will likely be conducted through land warfare, penetrating Seoul in the initial phase of an all-out war, President Park made the decision to develop a South Korean tank in 1975.⁹²⁸ As a result, in 1977, the Ministry of National Defense attempted to manufacture—licensed production—the M-60 tank, which was considered to be the United States' most modern tank at that time.⁹²⁹ To this end, the South Korean government signed a memorandum of understanding with the United States government in 1978 to develop Korean tanks (Republic of Korea Indigenous Tank), and the development of Korean tanks began in earnest. The Korean Tank Project was included in the Second Yulgok Project, began mass production in 1985, and the tank entered service two years later.⁹³⁰



Figure 16. South Korea's K1 Tank.⁹³¹

Applying the Bank of Korea statistics Korean won/US dollar foreign exchange rate,⁹³² the 2,647 billion won—budget allocated exclusively for the Army within the Second Yulgok Project—can be converted into roughly \$3,256 million. Separating other Army projects like armored vehicle development, the budget allocated for the K-1 main battle tank roughly

⁹²⁷ Kim Jung-ik, *The Future of the US-Republic of Korea Military Relationship* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 95.

⁹²⁸ Suh Jae-jung, *Power, Interest, and Identity in Military Alliances* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 83.

⁹²⁹ Ibid.

⁹³⁰ Jeremy Black, *Tank Warfare* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2020), 170.

⁹³¹ Photo retrieved from Hyundai Rotem.

⁹³² The source is the Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System. Averaging the KRW/USD annual exchange rate from 1982 to 1986—the entire project years of the Yulgok Project—the KRW/USD is 813.1.

converges with the \$2,549 million, which was the introduced loan under the security cooperation. It is worth mentioning that even after the implementation of the Second Yulgok Project, South Korea's overall military capability was considered inferior in comparison to North Korea. Applying the power index comparison methodology introduced by the Center for Army Analysis,⁹³³ South Korean military's conventional power was estimated to be 65 percent compared to North Korea, and the US-ROK combined forces, including the USFK, was estimated to be maintained at 70 percent, as of the end of 1988 which is one year after the completion of the Second Yulgok Project and the very year that K-1 tanks were deployed in the field.⁹³⁴ Although South Korea's annual defense budget and annual investment for defense buildup surpassed that of North Korea in 1978 and 1986 respectively, substantial capability gap existed even during the late 1980s. The 1988 South Korean defense white paper points out that such gap would unlikely be bridged anytime soon:

The biggest reason for the military gap vis-à-vis North Korea is that South Korea has been 12 years behind North Korea by pushing for a force improvement project since 1974, while North Korea has already adopted the "Four Military Lines" in 1962⁹³⁵ [party military lines] and had continued to increase its military power for 25 years to date. In addition, North Korea spends 24 percent of GNP for military expenditure, while South Korea spends 5-6 percent of its GNP. More importantly, North Korea can invest 48 percent of its military expenditures for its force improvement due to the characteristics of the communist system, while South Korea has no choice but to maintain within 20-40 percent range, restrained by its democratic system.⁹³⁶

The capability gap between the two Koreas was starkest when it comes to ground forces, tank specifically. As of 1988, North Korea had 3,500 tanks consisting of T-54/55/59/62 while South Korea possessed 1,500 tanks.⁹³⁷ Thanks to such numerical superiority, large-scale North Korean tank units, which were diversely organized into corps, division, and brigades were deployed at the deep den of the main offensive axis, allowing

⁹³³ The Center for Army Analysis, or CAA is a field operating agency of the Chief of Staff Army, an analysis organization that supports Headquarters, Department of the Army, and Army Command (ACOMs).

⁹³⁴ *1988 Defense White Paper* (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 1988), 151-152.

⁹³⁵ Despite North Korea's official announcement claiming the introduction of the Four Military Lines in 1962, it is important to note that the modernization of its military, which is one of the four military lines, was actually adopted in 1966. Therefore, it is accurate that North Korea's Four Military Lines were established in 1966 rather than 1962.

⁹³⁶ *1988 Defense White Paper* (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 1988), 152.

⁹³⁷ *Ibid*, 149.

them to carry out blitzkrieg in case of an all-out war.⁹³⁸ Problems were added since many of the South Korean tanks were comprised of the first generation tanks like M-47 and M-48A2C, which were subject to aging. In that sense, the introduction of the newly produced K-1 tanks to the field—thanks to the Second Yulgok Project—was one of the crucial instruments in defending against the North Korean mechanized forces. Although it is difficult to figure out how precisely the results of Second Yulgok Project, such as the deployment of K-1 tank to the front line, bridged the military capability gap between the two Koreas, 1988-89 South Korean defense papers explains that “South Korea has anti-tank capabilities against North Korea by reinforcing its power in terms of quality with the possession of the new K-1 tank,”⁹³⁹ and asserts that “among the North Korean tanks, T-34/54/55/59 are pre-1954 model, and in terms of individual performance, K-1 tanks are considered to be relatively superior to North Korean tanks.”⁹⁴⁰ While the Armored Division Equivalent— it is one of the commonly methodology by the United States during the Cold War period when comparing the combat power of the ground forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact⁹⁴¹—between South Korea and North Korean during 1993-94 was 1 and 1.36, respectively, the introduction of 450 K-1 tanks has enhanced 35.9 percent of the South Korea’s heavy tank units calculated in terms of Weighted Unit Values: while the 3,700 North Korean main battle tanks comprised of T-34/54/55/59/62 had 377,400 weighted unit values, South Korea 460 M-47, M-48A5, and K-1 tanks was estimated to have 36,018, 84,645, and 43,335 weighted unit values, respectively.⁹⁴² It indicates that the implementation of the Second Yulgok Project at least prevented the South-North Korean military power gap from being widening, especially among the ground units.

If the \$2,549 million loan had not been acquired through the security economic cooperation, either the size of the Yulgok Project would have been downsized or many of the various social infrastructure buildup—multipurpose dam, hospital, power plant—had to be abandoned (or postponed indefinitely) since money is fungible. On balance, the loan acquired through the security economic cooperation inarguably helped the South Korean government

⁹³⁸ Ibid, 81.

⁹³⁹ *1989 Defense White Paper* (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 1989), 113.

⁹⁴⁰ *1990 Defense White Paper* (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 1990), 179. To be sure, the introduction of the K1 tanks did not effectively negate the numerical advantage of North Korean tanks. The 1990 edition of the Defense White Paper acknowledges that while South Korea’s ground equipment may exhibit relatively superior performance, it will face limitations in countering North Korea’s numerical advantage. As a result, continuous supplementary measures are deemed necessary.

⁹⁴¹ William P. Mako, *U.S. Ground Forces and the Defense of Central Europe* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983), 106.

⁹⁴² Stuart K. Masaki, “The Korean Question: Assessing the Military Balance,” *Security Studies* 4, no. 2 (1994): 365-425.

to implement the Second Yulgok Project—one of the most critical South Korean military modernization and buildup took place during this period—business as scheduled.

4.5. Evaluation of Japan's Contribution Concerning Financial and Technical Assistance

To evaluate the contribution, several issues need to be discussed. For the Pohang steel mill, (1) the relationship between the integrated steel mill and the defense industry buildup; (2) the possibility of establishing a defense industry without the heavy and chemical industrialization in the 1970s, and the (3) alternative source to implement the Pohang steel mill construction plan other than Japan's financial and technical support, should be elaborated. As for the 1980s security economic cooperation funds, it is important to examine whether the South Koreans could have continued their defense projects without Japan's financial support.

As noted earlier, the construction of the Pohang steel mill and the defense industry buildup was inseparable task for President Park Chung-hee. While the situation in Vietnam deteriorated, the implementation of the Nixon doctrine in the early 1970s raised serious concern among South Korean decision-makers. In order to prevent the creation of a security vacuum and Kim Il-sung's miscalculation, Park had to find ways to rapidly promote domestic defense industry. In that context, he pursued the construction of the Pohang steel mill—in line with heavy and chemical industrialization—and ordered the South Korean companies to manufacture basic weapon systems. To be sure, Park's efforts to build South Korea's own steel mill predates the 1969 security crisis as well as the declaration of the Nixon Doctrine.⁹⁴³ However, the series of events in the late 1960s and early 1970s precipitated Park's decision. Since existing civilian factories were utilized in producing defense items—rather than creating separate firms/factories assigned to produce weapons in the name of defense industry buildup—heavy and chemical industrialization had ramifications on both the civilian economy and the defense sector. Meanwhile, the existence of the steel industry—an integrated steel mill, in particular—was one of the key prerequisites for heavy and chemical industrialization. In that sense, the Pohang steel mill buildup was not only critical for economic development, but also for the defense industry which started to manufacture primary weapons systems by the late 1970s.

Had the Pohang steel mill plan been thwarted—and naturally the heavy and chemical

⁹⁴³ Kim Eun-mee, *Big Business, Strong State: Collusion and Conflict in South Korean Development, 1960-1990* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1997), 140.

industrialization could not have been implemented—the establishment of the South Korean defense industry would likely have been delayed for many years. To be sure, South Korea was producing small firearms and ammunitions—by one arsenal run by the South Korean government—prior to the heavy and chemical industrialization in the 1970s. However, the primary weapons were offered by the United States, and there existed a wide gap between the two Koreas in terms of weapons production capability. Even if President Park wanted to promote the defense industry, the weapons category—that could be domestically designed and produced in a massive fashion—would have been severely limited without the heavy and chemical industrialization. There is a possibility that once South Korea’s economic size reached a certain level, say in the 1980s, construction of an integrated steel mill could have been possible through international funding—since international lenders would consider South Korea ripe enough for an integrated mill—or domestic funding. However, South Korea’s primary weapons production capability would be delayed for many years, probably creating numerous problems in catching up with the firepower of North Korea’s convention forces. Furthermore, such a wide margin between the two Koreas could have created a power vacuum and left South Korea vulnerable to North Korean military provocation, especially during the 1970s.

When it comes to an alternative source for financing the Pohang steel mill other than the Japanese government, it could be said that the South Koreans have sought every possible option, especially in the late 1960s. While South Korea’s biggest benefactor, the United States, was skeptical of the integrated steel mill project, it was difficult to find potential candidates who could have provided the necessary loan. South Korea did try to contact a number of developed countries including the United States, West Germany, Great Britain, France, and Italy. When the international consortium—the Korea International Steel Association which comprised these five countries—decided not to fund the Pohang steel mill project, South Korea had literally nowhere to expect the loan. Meanwhile, domestic funding was unthinkable, due to the size of the project: the estimated construction cost was equivalent to South Korea’s annual export volume at the time. Given the skepticism shared among South Korean policymakers—except for President Park and Park Tae-joon—it would have been a Herculean task, to amass an adequate amount of funds from the domestic quarter. Factoring the three elements—close correlations between integrated steel mill and the defense industry, the necessity of heavy and chemical industrialization prior to establishing the defense industry, and Japan being the only available lender at that juncture—Japan’s decision to grant the claims fund to be utilized as the seed money for the Pohang steel mill buildup, in the late

1960s, was *vital* for South Korea's defense.

Meanwhile, the situation in the early 1980s was relatively better than in the late 1960s for South Korea. South Korea's GNP as well as the size of the defense budget surpassed that of North Korea in the mid-1970s, and the First Yulgok Project—which was intended to manufacture basic weapons required by the South Korean Army, Navy, and Air Force—was successfully completed by 1981. From that perspective, it might seem that South Korea could have continued its defense projects—most notably the Second Yulgok Project—without Japan's financial support in the 1980s. However, South Korea was in a vulnerable shape due to several reasons. First of all, President Chun's legitimacy was at stake, especially in the early phase of his tenure. His decision to repress the Gwangju Uprising in 1980 and being indirectly elected as the South Korean president that same year hampered him from consolidating his position. Secondly, the economic crisis in 1980 coupled with the massive flood that swept South Korea questioned the continuity of the decades-long high economic growth that was regarded as a given: ever since president Park Chung-hee took the helm, South Korea consecutively recorded impressive GNP growth rates until Park's death in 1979. Yet due to the second oil shock, South Korea's GNP marked a negative annual growth (-1.6 percent in 1980). Thirdly, North Korea remained an existential threat. During Chun's tenure, there was an assassination attempt against Chun himself (in Burma, 1983), and a civil aircraft explosion incident (somewhere in the air space of Burma, 1987) conducted by a North Korean agent. In addition, North Korea threatened to create a catastrophic flood by collapsing the Innam Dam and inundating the capital of South Korea. Under such circumstances, Chun had to assure continued economic growth, build a strong defense against North Korean threats, and consolidate his leadership by gaining legitimacy.

In that context, Japan's security economic cooperation funds had implications other than its tangible ramification in the economic field. It must be noted that prior to the inauguration of President Reagan, South Korea had a shaky relationship, especially during President Carter's tenure. Although Carter's promise to withdraw US forces from South Korea did not materialize, the frictional relationship between the United States and South Korean leaders in the late 1970s was far from ideal. Yet Reagan restored the relationship—by ensuring that there would be no withdrawal of troops from South Korea and alliance management would not be conducted through the lens of humanitarian criteria—and invited Chun, momentarily after Chun's inaugural as South Korean president. Furthermore, Reagan asked the Japanese for great burden sharing and providing security economic cooperation funds to South Korea, believing that such a decision would strengthen the tripartite security

cooperation and consolidate the free world in the Far East to counter the communist elements in the region. Eventually, the 1980s security economic cooperation fund undoubtedly contributed to strengthening the bond among the tripartite and offered some degree of legitimacy to Chun. Meanwhile, the security economic cooperation fund obviously lessened the financial burden for the multiple economic and defense projects that South Korea implemented during the 1980s. Especially when the hosting of the 1988 Seoul Olympics was decided in 1981, the successful accomplishment of the Fifth Five-Year economic and social development projects—which contained numerous social infrastructure projects—was extremely important for South Korea. While the defense burden was heavy during the early 1980s—approximately 6 percent of the GNP and 30 percent of South Korea’s government budget⁹⁴⁴—Japan’s security economic cooperation fund enabled the Chun administration to simultaneously pursue economic development and defense projects. Thanks to the security economic cooperation fund, South Korea hosted a successful Seoul Olympic, continued the impressive economic growth rate—such steady growth continued until 1997 when the Korean economy faced the IMF crisis—and the fruits of the Second Yulgok Project were reaped—for example, the production of K-1 tanks genuinely helped the South Koreans in adjusting military imbalance concerning ground units vis-à-vis North Korea—in the late 1980s. In that context, Japan’s defense to provide funds in the 1980s was a timely contribution which was *very important* for the South Korean defense.

Concerning Japan’s financial and technological assistance and its spillover effect to South Korea’s defense domain, the following deduction can be drawn. Firstly, the establishment of the Pohang steel mill, funded through claims fund, empowered South Korea to establish a self-reliant defense industry in the early 1970s. Without the construction of the Pohang steel mill during that period, South Korea’s capacity for weapons development would likely have been restricted to small arms, such as rifles and grenades.⁹⁴⁵ Such limitation was particularly evident during the nascent stage of the defense industry, which had limited capabilities as an independent sector. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that creating a few weapon prototypes differs significantly from establishing large-scale factories and recruiting a substantial workforce for mass production. The construction of the Pohang steel mill paved the way for South Korea to initiate comprehensive industrialization from 1973 onwards.

⁹⁴⁴ Lee Pil-jung, “Hanguk gukbangyesanui soyowa baebune gwanhan yeongu(1953-hyeonjae)” [A Study on Requirements and Allocations of the ROK’s Defense Budget (1953-Present)], *The Quarterly Journal of Defense Policy Studies* 32, no.3 (2016): 185-224.

⁹⁴⁵ Kim Young-tae, interviewed by author, Seoul, April 28, 2023.

Thanks to the growth of the heavy chemical industry, the South Korean defense sector gained the ability to manufacture weapons, including mortars, grenades launchers, anti-tank rockets, and howitzers, in substantial quantities. Consequently, the military imbalance between South and North Korea began to diminish in the 1970s. This trend continued throughout the 1980s, contributing significantly to enhancing South Korea's security.

Secondly, the \$4 billion loan in the name of Japan-Korea cooperation for security purposes established a conducive environment for the South Korean government to execute its military modernization and buildup program without hindering the growth of the non-defense sector. If this loan had not been secured through the economic cooperation for security purposes, either scale of the Yulgok Project would have been diminished, or numerous social infrastructure projects—such as multipurpose dams, hospitals, and power plants—would have had to be abandoned or indefinitely postponed. On the whole, the loan obtained through economic cooperation for security purposes undeniably facilitated the South Korean government's successful implementation of the Second Yulgok Project, a pivotal phase in South Korean military modernization and buildup during that era, adhering to the predetermined schedule. If the execution of the Second Yulgok Project had experienced delays or partial implementation, the military imbalance between South and North Korea would not have diminished in the late 1980s.⁹⁴⁶ This, in turn, could have adversely affected subsequent South Korean military modernization and buildup initiatives, including the Third Yulgok Project implemented from 1987 to 1992, that followed the Second Yulgok Project.

⁹⁴⁶ Jang Don-hun, interviewed by author, Seoul, January 12, 2024.

Chapter 5: Operational Support

5.1. Chapter Summary

Japan became operationally committed to the defense of South Korea over time. Combined planning and exercises between the United States and Japan began in the mid-1950s, taking into account potential contingencies in the Korean peninsula. Since the inception of the Coordinated Joint Outline Emergency Plan in 1955, Japanese defense policymakers consistently considered the possibility of a Korean contingency and its potential ramifications. The Mitsuya Study, also known as the 1963 Comprehensive Defense Tabletop Study, utilized a Korean contingency scenario. Furthermore, the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994 during the post-Cold War era served as a catalyst for the United States and Japan to update their security arrangement, and induced Japan to make legislative preparations in anticipation of a Korean contingency. This led to the establishment of the 1997 Defense Guidelines and the enactment of the 1999 Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (SIASJ Law).⁹⁴⁷ Over time, the trend of North Korean nuclear and missile development continued to intensify, leading to significant changes. In 2014, the reinterpretation of Japan's constitution and the subsequent 2015 security legislation enabled Japan to exercise its right of collective self-defense.⁹⁴⁸ By the end of 2015, the JSDF could legally provide substantial operational support in the event of a full-scale war on the Korean peninsula. Given the prevalent reluctance among many South Koreans to see ground presence of JSDF in South Korea, it is unlikely that the JSDF would engage in ground or land combat operations on the Korean peninsula. However, the JSDF could play a significant role in conducting combat operations in the vicinity of the Korean seas, safeguarding US military assets, particularly US bases in Japan. Additionally, there is a possibility that JSDF vessels could participate in minesweeping operations around the Korean peninsula, ensuring the safe landing of US forces in North Korean territory for their operations. While the specific details outlined in OPLAN 5055 remain undisclosed, it is widely speculated that the JSDF will participate in a range of operations, including missile defense and anti-submarine warfare operation. By sharing the burden, the United States can effectively allocate its limited resources during times of war, thereby strengthening its overall combat capabilities. Japan's contribution, particularly in missile defense system aligned with

⁹⁴⁷ The 1999 SIASJ Law made it possible for the JSDF to provide non-combat assistance to the US forces fighting for South Korea in contingencies.

⁹⁴⁸ The 2015 security legislative made it possible for the JSDF to provide combat assistance in addition to the non-combat assistance to the US forces.

the US system, holds significant importance both presently and in the future. Japan's missile defense capabilities act as a deterrent against North Korea's potential attempts at nuclear decoupling. Recognizing the critical role of US bases in Japan for the United States' warfighting capabilities during a Korean contingency, North Korea may likely pose threats to Japan with nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, demanding Japan to distance itself from the conflict on the Korean peninsula. Consequently, Japan's operational support is of utmost importance for the defense of South Korea. Overall, Japan's involvement in various operational aspects serves as a vital component in strengthening the defense capabilities of South Korea and contributes to regional security.

5.2. The Evolution of Japan's Operational Support

5.2.1. The Origin of US-Japan Combined Planning and Exercises

When considering the planning of combined operations between the United States and Japan, the focus often turns to arrangements such as Operation Plans 5051, 5053, and 5055, which were developed during the period spanning the 1980s and 2000s. However, it is worth noting that these examples were not the initial instances of collaboration between the two sides in terms of combined operation planning. As early as 1952, discussions began between the US military and the National Police Reserve, the precursor to the JSDF, regarding joint responses to potential contingencies. Following the official establishment of the JSDF in 1954, the first combined operation plan was formulated. This led to the creation of the Coordinated Joint Outline Emergency Plan (CJOEP) in 1955, marking an important milestone in the combined operational planning between the United States and Japan.⁹⁴⁹ Therefore, while Operation Plans 5051, 5053, and 5055 are frequently discussed, it is important to recognize that collaboration between the United States and Japan in combined operation planning dates back to the early years of the JSDF and has continued to evolve over time. In light of the establishment of the CJOEP, combined training and exercise have taken place between the US military and the JSDF. Notably, extensive combined training between the US Navy and the JMSDF has been ongoing since the 1950s. Moreover, tabletop exercises have been carried out between the US Air Force and the JASDF. To illustrate, the inaugural tabletop exercise, named "Clover," took place in 1956, followed by the implementation of the

⁹⁴⁹ Paul Midford, Robert D. Eldridge, *The Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force: Search for Legitimacy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2017), 165-166.

second exercise, known as “White Ceruse,” in 1957.⁹⁵⁰ To gain deeper insights into the pre-existing combined military planning and exercises between the United States and Japan, prior to the establishment of the 1978 US-Japan Guidelines, it is essential to delve into two aspects: the CJOEP and the tabletop exercises.

Coordinated Joint Outline Emergency Plan

The CJOEP, provisionally sanctioned in January 1955, was formulated as a blueprint to guide formulation of a combined operational strategy for safeguarding Japan. It bore the official designation of the “Combined Integrated Emergency Plan to defend Japan from attacks in the next twelve months.”⁹⁵¹ The identified potential aggressor outlined in the CJOEP encompassed Soviet forces situated in Siberia, communist Chinese forces within China and North Korea, along with the North Korean forces.⁹⁵² The anticipated forms of aggression targeting Japan primarily encompassed air operations to secure air superiority, naval offensives in the vicinity of Japan, aerial bombings targeting Hokkaido and the Northern Honshu region, as well as acts of sabotage and espionage.⁹⁵³ It is worth noting that starting from the early 1950s, there was notable increase in Soviet aircraft incursion into Japanese airspace. Shortly after Japan regained its sovereignty on October 7, 1952, a B-29 bomber was downed by a Soviet jet fighter near Yuri Island. The Soviets claimed that the B-29 had fired at Soviet aircraft and argued that Yuri Island belonged to them based on agreements made in Yalta. The United States argued that Yuri Island fell under Japanese sovereignty and belonged to Japan, but the Soviet Union persisted in asserting its ownership rights. A similar incident occurred on June 13, 1952, when another B-29 was shot down in the Sea of Japan.⁹⁵⁴

⁹⁵⁰ Itayama Mayumi 板山真弓, *Nichi bei dōmei niokeru kyōdō bōei taisei no keisei: jōyaku teiketsu kara “nichi bei bōei kyōryoku no tame no shishin” sakutei made* 日米同盟における共同防衛体制の形成：条約締結から「日米防衛協力のための指針」策定まで [Formation of a Combined Defense System in the US-Japan Alliance: from the Conclusion of the Treaty to the Establishment of the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation] (Tōkyō: Mineruva Shobo, 2020), 58-59.

⁹⁵¹ Ibid, 60.

⁹⁵² Ibid.

⁹⁵³ Ibid.

⁹⁵⁴ Okada Shizue 岡田志津枝, “Sengo nippon no kōkū heiryoku saiken: beikoku no hatashita yakuwari o chūshin toshite” 戦後日本の航空兵力再建：米国の果たした役割を中心として [Post-War Japan’s Air Force Reconstruction: Focusing on the Role of the United States], in *Chōsen sensō to nippon: NIDS senshi tokushū* 朝鮮戦争と日本：NIDS戦史特集 [Korean War and Japan: NIDS War History Special], ed. National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Research Center (Tokyo: Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, 2013). 111-140.

US-Japan combined tabletop exercises

Following the formulation of the CJOEP and associated plans, combined tabletop exercises were conducted involving the US forces and the Japanese SDF.⁹⁵⁵ After the first combined tabletop exercise “Clover” was held in 1956, second exercise “Fuji” was held in 1957. The third exercise “Maple Leaf” was held in 1958 and the following exercise “Green” was conducted in 1960.⁹⁵⁶ In the 1957 Fuji exercise, the scenario posited enemy—presumably the Soviet Army—invading Hokkaido; the enemy invades Wakkanai and Nemuro in Hokkaido, and eventually, the conflict escalates and expands into a worldwide full-scale war.⁹⁵⁷ During the Maple Leaf exercise in 1958, which involved all branches of the SDF, the primary focus was to secure the Japanese defense line while US forces evacuated from Okinawa to the Japanese mainland.⁹⁵⁸ The exercise scenario further envisioned a local invasion, where hostile forces, likely North Korean troops, would invade South Korea, leading to a global conflict involving Japan. The scenario assumed that the enemy army would primarily target Kyushu.⁹⁵⁹ All branches of SDF participated in this tabletop exercises.⁹⁶⁰ Despite the political limitations imposed by the Japanese constitution, US forces Japan aimed to prepare for various contingencies by conducting combined exercises with the SDF.⁹⁶¹

After the tabletop exercise Green was conducted in 1960, Comprehensive Defense Tabletop Study, or Mitsuya Study, was conducted from February to June 1963. Mitsuya Study was a tabletop study presided by the SDF, where a small number of people from the US Forces Japan headquarters participated as observers.⁹⁶² The Mitsuya Study assumed that

⁹⁵⁵ Itayama Mayumi 板山真弓, *Nichi bei dōmei niokeru kyōdō bōei taisei no keisei: jōyaku teiketsu kara “nichi bei bōei kyōryoku no tame no shishin” sakutei made* 日米同盟における共同防衛体制の形成：条約締結から「日米防衛協力のための指針」策定まで [Formation of a Combined Defense System in the US-Japan Alliance: from the Conclusion of the Treaty to the Establishment of the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation] (Tōkyō: Mineruva Shobo, 2020), 69-70.

⁹⁵⁶ Ibid, 70.

⁹⁵⁷ Ibid, 71.

⁹⁵⁸ *Asahi Shimbun*, September 3, 1958.

⁹⁵⁹ Itayama Mayumi 板山真弓, *Nichi bei dōmei niokeru kyōdō bōei taisei no keisei: jōyaku teiketsu kara “nichi bei bōei kyōryoku no tame no shishin” sakutei made* 日米同盟における共同防衛体制の形成：条約締結から「日米防衛協力のための指針」策定まで [Formation of a Combined Defense System in the US-Japan Alliance: from the Conclusion of the Treaty to the Establishment of the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation] (Tōkyō: Mineruva Shobo, 2020), 71.

⁹⁶⁰ Ibid, 70.

⁹⁶¹ National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), *Suzuki Akio O-raru Hisutori-* (Akio Suzuki Oral History) (Tokyo: NIDS, 2011), p. 307.

⁹⁶² Itayama Mayumi 板山真弓, *Nichi bei dōmei niokeru kyōdō bōei taisei no keisei: jōyaku teiketsu kara “nichi bei bōei kyōryoku no tame no shishin” sakutei made* 日米同盟における共同防衛体制の形成：条約締結から「日米防衛協力のための指針」策定まで [Formation of a Combined Defense System in the US-Japan

an armed conflict occurred on the Korean peninsula, which would spread to Japan, followed by a full-scale Soviet landing invasion of Northern Japan.⁹⁶³

5.2.2. The Mitsuya Study

While the establishment of the CJOEP and the follow-up command post exercises and field exercises enhanced the interoperability between the US forces and the JSDF, Japan's emergency planning vis-a-vis Korean Contingency began to develop during the 1960s. Based on the understanding that the Korean peninsula's security was directly related to Japan's national security, the first meeting between South Korea and Japan was held in 1961 in a secretive manner and the defense minister General Song Hyo-chan and the JGSDF Chief General Ichiji Sugita represented the respective countries.⁹⁶⁴ The *Tokyo Shimbun* reported in 1962 that there was an US-Japan plan for military cooperation between South Korea and Japan. The plan allegedly called for (1) blockading the Tsushima Straits jointly by the South Korean and Japanese navies during a contingency; (2) linking South Korean and Japanese air defense systems thus enabling combined air defense activities; (3) conducting maintenance of South Korean naval vessels and aircraft in Japan; (4) military personnel exchange between the two countries and permanently dispatching SDF officials to Seoul.⁹⁶⁵ Shortly after the 1965 South Korea-Japan normalization treaty was signed, South Korean fighter pilots conducted their flight training in Japan.⁹⁶⁶ In addition, the strategic importance of South Korea to Japan was made clear in paragraph four of the 1969 Nixon-Sato statement: Prime Minister Sato stated that "the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security."⁹⁶⁷

Alliance: from the Conclusion of the Treaty to the Establishment of the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation] (Tōkyō: Mineruva Shobo, 2020), 72.

⁹⁶³ Ibid, 75.

⁹⁶⁴ Glenn D. Hook et al., *Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security* (London: Routledge, 2011), 235.

⁹⁶⁵ Herbert P. Bix, "The Security Treaty System and the Japanese Military-Industrial Complex," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 2, no. 2 (1970): 30-53.

⁹⁶⁶ Ibid. While Herbert Bix's article does not explicitly mention it, one can infer that South Korean pilots were likely sent to Japan for flight training, utilizing equipment that was unavailable in their home country. For instance, during the 1950s, South Korean air force pilots were dispatched to US air force bases in Okinawa, where they underwent training utilizing acceleration training device. Baek Yong-joo and Park Chang-Jin, "Hangukgonggun unyeong gasokdonaeseongganghwahunryeonjangbi bigyobunseogeul tonghan gasokdohunryeon peurogeuraem gaebal" [Development of New G Training Program through Comparative Analysis of Acceleration Training Devices in ROK Air Force], *Medical Research Information Center* 60, no.1 (2013): 43-54.

⁹⁶⁷ Ayumi Teraoka 寺岡 亜由美, "Gaiatsu ga hagukumu nichi kan anzen hoshō kyōryoku: 2012 nen nichi bei kan gōdō gunji enshū jitsugen no yōin bunseki" 外圧が育む日韓安全保障協力 2012年日米

Due to the revelation of the Mitsuya Study—officially entitled 1963 Comprehensive Defense Tabletop Study—the possibility of Japan’s direct military intervention in a Korean contingency became public. Literally meaning “three arrows” in Japanese,⁹⁶⁸ Mitsuya Study was conducted under the aegis of General Tanaka Yoshio in the first half of 1963, by the thirty-six representatives of all three services of the SDF and sixteen members of the Joint Staff Council.⁹⁶⁹ The focus of the Mitsuya Study was to lay out viable Japanese responses in contingency situation: South Korea either being attacked by Chinese air force or embracing a full-scale North Korean ground invasion.⁹⁷⁰

Considering the available evidence, such as the potential overthrow of South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem, which could lead to a significant military escalation in Vietnam, and the possibility of Chinese and/or North Korean exploitation by opening a second front on the Korean peninsula, it is probable that the United States deemed it necessary for Japan to develop a plan in response to the potential Korean contingency. Additionally, among the potential attack routes against Japan, which included approaches from Hokkaido, the Korean peninsula, and the Southwest Islands, the most probable one was deemed to be from the Korean peninsula. This assessment was due to the fact that an attack originating from the Korean peninsula left western Japan vulnerable, lacking sufficient defensive depth.⁹⁷¹ As a result, the Japanese Defense Agency devised a workable plan in preparations for a second Korean War.⁹⁷²

The Mitsuya Study encompassed the following main points: (1) Japan would assume a crucial role in the US Far East strategy and act as a strategic base for US military operations; (2) JSDF would engage in joint military exercises alongside US, South Korean, and

韓合同軍事演習実現の要因分析 [Korea-Japan Security Cooperation Fostered by External Pressure — Factor Analysis of the 2012 US-Korea-Japan Joint Military Exercise], *Seijigaku kenkyū* 政治学研究 49 (2013): 135-171.

⁹⁶⁸ Paul Midford, Robert D. Eldridge, *The Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force: Search for Legitimacy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2017), 142. The name “Mitsuya,” which translates to “three arrows” in Japanese, can be explained in three ways regarding its origin: (1) The three arrows represent the three services of the JSDF and suggest that their combined efforts are more effective than each service working independently; (2) the two syllables in “Myitsuya,” “mitsu” and “ya,” represent the numbers “three” and “eight” respectively, symbolizing the “38th” parallel of the Korean peninsula; (3) the Mitsuya Study was conducted during the 38th year of the Showa period.

⁹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 141.

⁹⁷⁰ Koji Murata, “The Origin and Evolution of the Korean-American Alliance: A Japanese Perspective,” Stanford University Asia-Pacific Center, America’s Alliances with Japan and Korea in a Changing Northeast Asia Project Discussion Paper, August 1998, 9.

⁹⁷¹ National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), *O-raru hisutori-: Reisenkino Boueiryokuseibito Doumeiseisaku*, Vol. 2 (Oral History: Defense Force Buildup and Alliance Policy during the Cold War Era, Vol. 2) (Tokyo: NIDS, 2013), pp. 471-472.

⁹⁷² Herbert P. Bix, “The Security Treaty System and the Japanese Military-Industrial Complex,” *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 2, no. 2 (1970): 30-53.

Taiwanese troops; (3) in the event of a crisis in Korea, the JSDF would assist US forces by blockading China's east coast and serving as a reserve force in Japan, Korea, and Manchuria, providing support for US military activities; (4) in the case of a Korean contingency, all aspects, including resource allocation and transportation regulations, would be carried out in coordination with a comprehensive mobilization effort.⁹⁷³ More specifically, Mitsuya Study contains the following seven progressively escalated phases—the original Japanese document uses the word “moves”—concerning Korean contingency and focus of study related to each of these phases.⁹⁷⁴

In Phase 1, a situation arises where an uprising takes place within the South Korean military, leading to the dispatch of certain units of the US Forces Japan, predominantly ground forces, to South Korea with the objective of suppressing the insurrection.⁹⁷⁵ The North Korea activities intensify, creating an unfavorable security environment for Japan.⁹⁷⁶ While the original text of the Mitsuya Study does not explicitly mention it, it can be inferred that the deployment of the US Forces Japan to the Korean peninsula would create a security void in Japan, as there would be fewer military forces available for Japan's defense. Unless the United States fills this security void through reinforcements, most likely from the US mainland, Japan will become more susceptible to external threats such as Soviet landing operation. Additionally, the magnitude of the insurrection can be presumed to be significant since the dispatching of the USFJ implies that it exceeds the capabilities of the US-ROK combined forces. The objective of Phase 1 in the study was for JSDF planners to assess the overall situation, clarify the relationship between the USFJ deployment and the US-Japan security treaty, and explore feasible measures to address the situation.⁹⁷⁷

During Phase 2, the support provided by the North Koreans, to the partial insurrection within the South Korean military shifts from covert to overt, escalating into armed support accompanied by aerial attacks. In response, the US military intervenes and launches a counterattack.⁹⁷⁸ These interconnected events have a ripple effect, further worsening Japan's security environment as the insurrection within the South Korean military evolves into an

⁹⁷³ Matsueda Tsukasa and George E. Moore, “Japan's Shifting Attitudes toward the Military: Mitsuya Kenkyu and the Self-Defense Force,” *Asian Survey* 7, no. 9 (1967): 614-625.

⁹⁷⁴ Hayashi Shigeo 林茂夫, *Zenbun mitsuya sakusen kenkyū* 全文・三矢作戦研究 [Full Text, Mitsuya Strategy Study] (Tōkyō: Banseisha, 1979), 26-27.

⁹⁷⁵ *Ibid.* The original text lacks details regarding which branch of the USFJ (US Forces Japan) is designated to be deployed to South Korea. Additionally, it does not specify the role of USFK (US Forces Korea) during Phase 1.

⁹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

international conflict: As a result of the US intervention in the armed conflict, it created a pathway for the potential activation of Chinese forces to intervene in the Korean peninsula, in accordance with the Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, which was signed in 1961.⁹⁷⁹ Concurrently, the Japanese government presents a plan to conduct ship inspections, likely targeting North Korean vessels, and to counter airspace intrusions, possibly involving Soviet aircraft. The objective of Phase 2 in the study was for JSDF planners to assess the deteriorating security environment and address issues regarding the applicability of the US-Japan security treaty to US activities in the Korean peninsula. Additionally, they were to examine fundamental measures related to the dispatch of the JSDF, establish basic command instructions, and prepare for operations at the Defense Agency level.⁹⁸⁰

During Phase 3, North Korea launches a military invasion and breaches the 38th parallel, leading to a full-scale armed conflict in South Korea. This incursion triggers an escalation of US military activities. Consequently, Japan's security situation worsens, specifically in the western section of the Sea of Japan, as North Korean fighter jets have the capability to reach that area and potentially engage in aerial combat with US and/or South Korean fighter aircraft.⁹⁸¹ This series of events has a ripple effect on Japan's security. The objective of Phase 3 in the study was for JSDF planners to evaluate government-level measures in response to an armed conflict on the Korean peninsula and carefully assess the applicability of the US-Japan security treaty. Additionally, they were tasked with examining the operational preparedness and standby orders of the Defense Agency.⁹⁸²

During Phase 4, the situation in South Korea continues to deteriorate, ultimately leading to an armed attack against Japan, either by sea or air. Although the original text does not specify the potential aggressor, it can be assumed that the Soviet Union would be the most likely candidate, considering North Korea's limited long-range attack capabilities during that time. In this Phase, the US military's activities are primarily focused on the western region of the main island of Japan—Honshu—to repel the aggressors.⁹⁸³ The objective of Phase 4 in the study was for JSDF planners to address matters related to the

⁹⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁹⁸¹ Ibid. The original text of the Mitsuya Study solely indicates a decline in Japan's security environment in the western portion of the Sea of Japan without providing specific details about the events or circumstances occurring in that particular area.

⁹⁸² Ibid.

⁹⁸³ Ibid. The original text of the Mitsuya Study states that the focus of the US military's operations is primarily on the western region of Japan, with the objective of defending against potential aggressors.

deployment of the JSDF in a full-scale war scenario.⁹⁸⁴

During Phase 5, Soviet forces initiate land, sea, and air attacks against western Japan, while simultaneously conducting espionage operations in Hokkaido.⁹⁸⁵ The study also addresses the progress of the war in the Korean peninsula and the activities of the United States. The main objectives of Phase 5 in the study was for SDF planners to analyze the operations of each branch of the JSDF—JGSDF, JMSDF, and JASDF—in the early stages of the armed conflict.⁹⁸⁶

During Phase 6, the potential of a full-scale Soviet invasion on Japan becomes more imminent, The main objective of this Phase in the study was for JSDF planners to analyze strategic developments and associated measures, taking into account the evolving security situation on the Japanese mainland.⁹⁸⁷

During Phase 7, the Soviet Union launches a comprehensive naval and air assault on Japan, culminating in a landing invasion in the northern region, particularly in Hokkaido. The primary objective of this Phase in the study was for JSDF planners to assess the readiness of the JSDF for their initial operations, which involve repelling the Soviet invasion, and to consider the necessary measures for activating these operations.⁹⁸⁸

As shown in the escalation phases, Japan's rear area support—conducting ship inspections at the vicinity of Japan and protecting US bases in Japan for example—would be an inevitable task, in all seven phases, once a Korean contingency occurs.

Against the backdrop of the 1960s when Japanese citizens protested against the unequal US-Japan security treaty⁹⁸⁹ due to fears of Japan being drawn into regional conflicts by the United States, the disclosure of the Mitsuya Study triggered highly unfavorable responses, particularly from the “pacifist” factions within Japan. To alleviate such public uproar, Prime Minister Sato mentioned that the Mitsuya Study was not a government-authorized project and that no part of it would be incorporated into the official defense

⁹⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁸⁵ Within the original text, the aggressor is loosely described as the “communist side.” However, considering the power projection capability at that specific period, it can be inferred that the Soviet forces would be the most probable candidate.

⁹⁸⁶ Hayashi Shigeo 林茂夫, *Zenbun mitsuya sakusen kenkyū* 全文・三矢作戦研究 [Full Text, Mitsuya Strategy Study] (Tōkyō: Banseisha, 1979), 26-27.

⁹⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸⁸ Ibid. The original text lacks details regarding the specific initial operation that the JSDF would undertake or prepare for.

⁹⁸⁹ Nick Kapur, “Mending the “Broken Dialogue”: US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy in the Aftermath of the 1960 Security Treaty Crisis,” *Diplomatic History* 41, no. 3 (2017): 489-517.

plan.⁹⁹⁰ Nevertheless, the contents of the Mitsuya Study were taken into account by both US and Japanese military planners when developing their combined operation plans, namely the “Flying Dragon” formulated between 1964 and 1965, and the “Bull Run” devised in 1966. As an illustration, OPLAN Bull Run outlined for a potential Korean contingency. It explicitly outlined the various roles of the JSDF, including supply and logistics, and provided comprehensive guidance on how the United States and Japan could collaboratively address such emergencies.⁹⁹¹

A significant portion of the population disagreed with the policy change, fearing their country would become involved in international conflicts. Nevertheless, the Sato government maintained that the change did not violate the principles of the peace constitution. Additionally, the Japanese government emphasized that, like any other sovereign nation, Japan has the right to defend itself against external aggression, and the JSDF should be adequately prepared to safeguard the country in any possible scenario.⁹⁹²

5.2.3. Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation (1978)

The Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation, issued in November 1978, represented the outcome of the subcommittee on US-Japan Defense Cooperation’s deliberations.⁹⁹³ In order to clarify how the 1976 National Defense Program Guideline would be implemented in the context of the US-Japan defense cooperation,⁹⁹⁴ the 1978 Guidelines created the foundation for studies on three operational dimensions—prevention of aggression against Japan, response to military attacks on Japan, and cooperation in case of conflict in the Far East which includes the Korean peninsula—alongside with US-Japan combined exercise and intelligence exchange. It is worth mentioning the last operational dimension: the 1978 Guidelines addresses US-Japan cooperation “in the case of situations in the Far East outside of Japan which will have an Important Influence on the security of Japan.”⁹⁹⁵

⁹⁹⁰ However, Prime Minister Sato subsequently expressed that “it is entirely natural for a defense authority to carry out the type of exercise being conducted.”

⁹⁹¹ Paul Midford, Robert D. Eldridge, *The Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force: Search for Legitimacy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2017), 166.

⁹⁹² Matsueda Tsukasa and George E. Moore, “Japan’s Shifting Attitudes Toward the Military: Mitsuya Kenkyu and the Self-Defense Force,” *Asian Survey* 7, no. 9 (1967): 614-625.

⁹⁹³ In 1975, Defense Secretary James Schlesinger and the Director-General of Japan’s Self-Defense Agency, Michita Sakata, reached an agreement to establish a framework for defense cooperation between the United States and Japan under the Security Consultative Committee, specifically the subcommittee on US-Japan Defense Cooperation.

⁹⁹⁴ Patrick M. Cronin, Michael J. Green, *Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Tokyo’s National Defense Program* (Washington D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1994), 15.

⁹⁹⁵ Japanese Ministry of Defense, *The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, 1978*.

The 1978 Guidelines introduced three elements of deterrence: the US nuclear deterrent, US Forces Japan, and Japan's own defense capabilities. Notably, Japan's own defense capability was emphasized. According to the 1978 Guidelines, Japan was tasked with "repelling limited, small-scale aggression" and primarily conducting defense operations within its territory, surrounding waters, and airspace. Simultaneously, the US forces were expected to support the operations of the JSDF and provide additional assistance when the JSDF's capabilities were surpassed by the task at hand.⁹⁹⁶

As for developments in the region affecting the security of Japan, the two sides agreed to conduct studies on the nature and dimension of assistance that Japan, in accordance with its "relevant laws and regulations," could provide to the United States. Operationally, the Guidelines—just like the 1976 National Defense Program Guidelines—focused on the defense of Japan. In the existing Cold War context, an attack by the Soviet Union on Japan's northern island of Hokkaido served as the focus of defense planning.⁹⁹⁷ In that regard, the 1978 Guidelines paved the way for the combined military exercise between the two countries and the development of an operation plan (OPLAN).

5.2.4. US-Japan Combined Military Exercise in the 1980s and OPLAN 5051

Following the establishment of the 1978 Guidelines, the US-Japan combined exercise and training efforts progressed significantly. Initially, these exercises took place within each branch of the JSDF and gradually evolved into comprehensive exercises involving the Ground, Maritime, and Air JSDF, along with the US Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, with the passage time. Ever since the creation of the 1978 Guidelines, there were notable combined exercises: (1) in November 1978, JASDF conducted its first full-scale US-Japan combined aerial exercise;⁹⁹⁸ (2) in February 1980, JMSDF participated in the RIMPAC exercise for the first time;⁹⁹⁹ (3) in October 1981, JGSDF conducted its first US-Japan combined exercise;¹⁰⁰⁰ (4) in June 1984, JMSDF conducted its first US-Japan combined

⁹⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁹⁷ Furthermore, the primary objective of the 1978 Guidelines was to alleviate the workload of the US Seventh Fleet and effectively manage the strategic positions of the Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima straits—chock points—ensuring containment of both Soviet conventional and nuclear submarine fleets.

⁹⁹⁸ Misawa Air Base, "Misawa Air Base Celebrates 70 Years of Bilateral Cooperation," <https://www.misawa.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/773299/misawa-air-base-celebrates-70-years-of-bilateral-cooperation/> (accessed March 19, 2022)

⁹⁹⁹ Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, "History," <https://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/sf/english/history.html> (accessed March 19, 2022)

¹⁰⁰⁰ Paul Midford, Robert D. Eldridge, *The Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force: Search for Legitimacy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2017), 164.

command post exercise.¹⁰⁰¹ Nevertheless it was the US-Japan combined field exercise of 1986 that had the comprehensiveness.¹⁰⁰² The quintessential aspect of the 1986 exercise was to repel the Soviet troops that are landed in Hokkaido with JSDF's might until the US reinforcements arrived from Hawaii. This flow—Soviet landing operation in Hokkaido, JSDF's resistance, followed by US reinforcement—corresponds with the 1978 Guidelines instruction that in principle, “Japan by itself will repel limited, small-scale aggression. When it is difficult to repel aggression alone, Japan will repel it with the cooperation of the United States.”¹⁰⁰³ As discussed in Chapter 2, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 marked the onset of a new phase in the Cold War, extending its reach to the Far East.

OPLAN 5051 should be understood under such context. OPLAN 5051 was devised in 1981, before the exercise of 1986.¹⁰⁰⁴ According to the known facts, OPLAN 5051 posits a scenario that the Soviets being the aggressor—2 divisions conducting landing operation vis-à-vis Hokkaido—and the US providing 2 to 3 divisions to the region as a response.¹⁰⁰⁵ Overall, the OPLAN 5051 and the subsequent series of combined military exercises during the 1980s enhanced the interoperability between the US and Japanese forces, even though Japan did not have military operational role to play in case of a Korean contingency.

5.2.5. Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation (1997)

In 1981, the United States and Japan established a combined operation plan, known as OPLAN 5051, in preparation for a potential Soviet invasion of Hokkaido. Since then, the two countries have continued to enhance their planning capabilities by developing OPLANs that consider different scenarios. At first, the United States and Japan agreed to conduct a study in

¹⁰⁰¹ Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, “History,” <https://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/sf/english/history.html> (accessed March 19, 2022)

¹⁰⁰² To establish a unified countermeasure against a shared danger, Keen Edge 10/86 conducted an exercise to evaluate the compatibility of the US military and Japanese SDF. This extensive operation, involving approximately 13,000 personnel, 100 aircraft, and 20 naval vessels, took place in and around Hokkaido. Additionally, Keen Edge 10/86 integrated US aircraft from bases in South Korea, effectively forging a connection between Japan's defense and that of South Korea through the collaboration alliance with the United States.

¹⁰⁰³ The combined military undertaking during the 1980s marks a notable progression beyond the two existing security frameworks, namely the 1976 NPDG and the 1978 Guidelines. These frameworks were established with the understanding that the United States and the Soviet Union would maintain a state of détente for the foreseeable future.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Gabe Masaaki 我部政明, “Nichi bei dōmei no genkei - yakuwari buntan no mosaku - higashiajia no chīki kyōryoku to anzen hoshō” 日米同盟の原型-役割分担の模索-東アジアの地域協力と安全保障 [The Origin of the Japan-US Alliance — Searching for Burden-Sharing: Regional Cooperation and Security in East Asia], *Kokusai Seiji* 国際政治 135 (2004): 43-59.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Ibid.

the Far East, in January 1982, which in fact was about a war on the Korean peninsula.¹⁰⁰⁶ Yet due to the sensitivity of the issue—since the study contained scenarios using additional bases, facilities, airports, and harbors in Japan as well as laying sea mines in cooperation with the South Koreans—Japanese government, in particular the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was reluctant on pursuing the study.¹⁰⁰⁷ Meanwhile, in the 1980s, the United States prepared a draft plan called OPLAN 5052, which assumed contingency on the Korean peninsula spilling over to Japan.¹⁰⁰⁸ For instance, the inaugural Joint Planning Committee meeting took place on May 30th at the New Sanno Armed Forces Center. The meeting brought together division chiefs from both staffs, along with the Director of Joint Staff and Deputy Commander of USFJ, to deliberate on the development of OPLAN 5052.¹⁰⁰⁹ However, the Japanese side refused to make OPLAN 5052 an agenda, due to politically sensitive issues including massive refugees to deploying sea mines.¹⁰¹⁰ In other words, the Japanese side thought that the internal and external circumstances had not matured to proceed further.¹⁰¹¹

In contrast the unsuccessful attempt to lay out an OPLAN against Korean contingency, OPLAN 5053—which assumed crisis situations emanating from the Middle East—was established in 1995.¹⁰¹² Yet the establishment of OPLAN 5053 was not completely irrelevant to the Korean contingency since war on the Korean peninsula was likely to occur as a result of contingencies in the Middle East: in such a case, US air, naval, and ground forces in the Western Pacific could be diverted to the Indian Ocean, making the defense of Japan difficult.¹⁰¹³

Yet, the emerging challenges to international security that followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the collapse of the Cold War made the 1978 Guidelines somewhat

¹⁰⁰⁶ *Asahi Shimbun*, September 2, 1996.

¹⁰⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰⁸ Fukuda Takeshi 福田毅, “Nichi bei bōei kyōryoku niokeru tsu no tenki: 1978 nen gaidorain kara nichi bei dōmei no henkaku made no dōtei” 日米防衛協力における3つの転機: 1978年ガイドラインから日米同盟の変革までの道程 [Three Turning Points in the US-Japan Security Cooperation: The Journey from the 1978 Guidelines to the Transformation of the US-Japan Alliance], *Reference* レファレンス 7 (2006): 143-172.

¹⁰⁰⁹ History of Headquarters United States Forces, Japan (1985), 31.

¹⁰¹⁰ Fukuda Takeshi 福田毅, “Nichi bei bōei kyōryoku niokeru tsu no tenki: 1978 nen gaidorain kara nichi bei dōmei no henkaku made no dōtei” 日米防衛協力における3つの転機: 1978年ガイドラインから日米同盟の変革までの道程 [Three Turning Points in the US-Japan Security Cooperation: The Journey from the 1978 Guidelines to the Transformation of the US-Japan Alliance], *Reference* レファレンス 7 (2006): 143-172.

¹⁰¹¹ Japanese Modern Historical Manuscripts Association (KINS), ed., *Shiota Akira O-raruhisutori-* (Akira Shiota Oral History) (Tokyo: KINS, 2006), pp. 149-152.

¹⁰¹² *Asahi Shimbun* Report Team 朝日新聞「自衛隊50年」取材班, *Jieitai shirarezaru henyō* 自衛隊 知られざる変容 [Unknown transformation of the Self Defense Force] (Tōkyō: Asahi Shimbun Company, 2005), 194. Handa Shigeru 半田滋, *Jieitai vs. kitachōsen* 自衛隊 vs. 北朝鮮 [Self-Defense Force vs. North Korea] (Tōkyō: Shichosha, 2003), 117.

¹⁰¹³ *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, April 20, 1982.

irrelevant. Due to the constitutional restraint concerning the right of collective self-defense, Japan instead contributed financially—\$13 billion—during the 1991 Gulf War. Irrespective of such efforts, there were opinions that Japan have not met US expectations.¹⁰¹⁴ By this experience, Japan realized that Japan was expected to contribute more than money during an international crisis.¹⁰¹⁵

Simultaneously, developments on the Korean peninsula, such as North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the ensuing nuclear crisis, and the use of provocative language threatening to devastate Seoul, exposed significant deficiencies in the effectiveness of the 1978 Guidelines.¹⁰¹⁶ In response, the Japanese government initiated the studies on the Korean contingency momentarily after North Korea's announcement to withdraw from the NPT in 1993.¹⁰¹⁷ Given the estimated casualties that would be the result of US military intervention in a Korean contingency—52,000 US troops killed and wounded—the US government asked what Japan could do in such emergency on behalf of the Americans.¹⁰¹⁸ When the US Forces Japan submitted a request to the Joint Staff Council of Japan for approximately 1,900 items¹⁰¹⁹ required by US troops in the event of a Korean contingency, the Japanese government encountered challenges in fully meeting the demands due to legal constraints stemming from Japan's constitution, which prioritizes adherence to legal principles.¹⁰²⁰ To put it differently, the United States' endeavors to prepare for a potential armed conflict on the Korean peninsula, which involved using Japanese facilities such as airfields and ports, encountered significant obstacles due to legal limitations imposed by Japan. Such realization engendered serious concern among the United States concerning Japan's role during a Korean contingency and ultimately raised doubt about the survivability

¹⁰¹⁴ Thomas L. Wilborn, *International Politics in Northeast Asia: The China-Japan-United States Strategic Triangle* (Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1996), 33.

¹⁰¹⁵ Paul Midford, Robert D. Eldridge, *The Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force: Search for Legitimacy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2017), 204.

¹⁰¹⁶ Akiyama Masahiro, email message to author, June 21, 2023. Mr. Akiyama emphasized that the pivotal factor behind the 1997 revision of the Guidelines was the revelation of North Korea's nuclear development, with the aim of enhancing the effectiveness of US-Japan defense cooperation. He further noted that although the discussions on revising the defense Guidelines began in 1995, the vulnerability of the US-Japan alliance itself became apparent following the Okinawa rape incident in the same year. Consequently, the primary focus shifted towards maintaining and strengthening the alliance. Additionally, the negotiations pertaining to the reorganization, consolidation, and reduction of US military bases in Okinawa took precedence as critical issues. Consequently, the discussions on revising the Guidelines were postponed until 1997.

¹⁰¹⁷ *Asahi Shimbun*, September 16, 1996. Following North Korea's declaration of withdrawal from the NPT, a joint cabinet meeting, led by Chief Cabinet Secretary Nubuo Ishihara at the time, convened to assess and discuss potential response strategies in the event of a Korean contingency.

¹⁰¹⁸ Funabashi Yoichi, *Alliance Adrift* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), 281-282.

¹⁰¹⁹ Among these requests are provisions such as granting permission for the United States military to utilize Japan's civilian airports. Several of these demands necessitated Japan's activation of its collective self-defense right.

¹⁰²⁰ Funabashi Yoichi, *Alliance Adrift* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), 282-283.

of the US-Japan alliance. As one US Senator expressed discontent with Japan's inaction while American soldiers were being exposed to danger,¹⁰²¹ Secretary of Defense William Perry, reflecting on the situation, remarked that if Japan had remained passive while US troops faced casualties during a Korean contingency, it would have spelled the end of the US-Japan alliance.¹⁰²²

To be sure, the Article 6 of the US-Japan Security Treaty did stipulate that Japan could respond to contingencies in the Far East. However, the 1978 Guidelines only enabled the JSDF to take measures within the boundaries of Japan's self-defense rights—individual, not collective—which would not violate the Japanese constitution.¹⁰²³ To put it differently, the purpose of the 1978 Guidelines was to ensure that the United States and Japan had operational compatibility in the event of a Japanese contingency as stipulated in Article 5 of the US-Japan Security Treaty. However, the 1978 Guidelines did not encompass operational cooperation in the event of a Far East contingency as defined in Article 6 of the security treaty. This issue had been acknowledged as a longstanding challenge within the US-Japan alliance.¹⁰²⁴ For instance, in 1976, while conducting joint research between the United States and Japan at the US Pacific Command in Hawaii, a US general highlighted a significant observation. He pointed out that the US military's OPLAN lacked details on cooperation from Japan, as they were uncertain about the extent of Japan's potential contributions. Moreover, the general emphasized that a more realistic scenario involved the possibility of a conflict erupting in the Far East, near Japan, activating Article 6 of the Treaty between the United States and Japan, rather than Japan facing a direct attack from an external threat, which would invoke Article 5 of the Treaty.¹⁰²⁵ While participating in the discussions, Sato Yukio, the Japanese representative at that time, informally responded to the US counterpart, indicating that if Article 6 of the Treaty was invoked, Japan could potentially contribute approximately 70 percent of what the United States would expect from Japan.¹⁰²⁶ However, it was until 1997 that Japan's role during a contingency in the vicinity was officially deliberated upon and incorporated into the Guidelines. While the United States and South Korea came up with their combined Operation Plan 5027—which would be activated in case of an outbreak

¹⁰²¹ Ibid, 284.

¹⁰²² Jonathan D. Pollack, *Asia Eyes America – Regional Perspectives on US Asia-Pacific Strategy in the Twenty-First Century* (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 2007), 140.

¹⁰²³ Funabashi Yoichi, *Alliance Adrift* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), 283-284.

¹⁰²⁴ Kyoji Yanagisawa, email message to author, July 7, 2023.

¹⁰²⁵ Sato Yukio, *Sashikakerareta Kasa: Beikokuno Kakuyokushiryokuto Nihonno Anzenhoshou* (The Umbrella Extended: US Nuclear Deterrence and the Security of Japan) (Tokyo: Jijitsuushin Shuppankyoku, 2017), 71.

¹⁰²⁶ Ibid, 71-72.

of an all-out war in the Korean peninsula—the US-Japan combined operations plan were not articulated.¹⁰²⁷ This created a significant gap in terms of Japan’s involvement during a crisis on the Korean peninsula. For instance, in the spring of 1994, when approximately 9,000 Japanese citizens residing in South Korea needed evacuation, Japan had to rely on the United States to carry out the evacuation process.¹⁰²⁸

The aforementioned factor served as a strong motivation for the Japanese government to revise its existing regulations. The 1995 National Defense Program Guidelines emphasized the importance of addressing potential contingencies in proximity to Japan. In March 1996, the Research Commission on Security of the Liberal Democracy Party published two works: “The Significance of the US-Japan Security Structure Today” and “Responding to Far East Contingencies.”¹⁰²⁹ These publications specifically addressed contingencies in the proximity of Japan and this approach was then incorporated into the US-Japan Security Declaration of April 1996.¹⁰³⁰ These efforts ultimately led to the revision of the US-Japan Defense Guidelines in 1997.¹⁰³¹ In the 1997 Guidelines, Japan was assigned for a more definitive role concerning “situations in areas surrounding Japan” (SIASJ)—that would have an “Important Influence” on its peace and security—and enabled the rear area support to the US counterpart in a regional contingency.¹⁰³² The inclusion of the “situation in area surrounding Japan” in the 1997 Defense Guidelines broadened the scope of US-Japan defense planning beyond Article 5, which focused on the defense of Japan in specific contingencies. It extended the alliance’s considerations to encompass regional contingencies under Article 6. In essence, the SIASJ Law provided further clarification on Japan’s role and actions in the event of a Korean contingency. Based on the 1997 Guidelines, Japan was anticipated to offer assistance to US forces in the event of a regional contingency, as long as it remained within the confines that did not trigger the activation of the right of collective self-defense.¹⁰³³ This primarily entailed

¹⁰²⁷ Funabashi Yoichi, *Alliance Adrift* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), 284.

¹⁰²⁸ *Ibid.*, 287.

¹⁰²⁹ *Ibid.*, 293.

¹⁰³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰³¹ *Ibid.* Akiyama Masahiro 秋山昌廣, *Moto bōei jimujikan akiyama akira hiroshi kaikoroku: reisen go no anzen hoshō to bōei kōryū*元防衛事務次官 秋山昌廣回顧録：冷戦後の安全保障と防衛交流 [Memoirs of Akiyama Masahiro, Former Vice-Minister of Defense: Post-Cold War Security and Defense Exchange] (Tōkyō: Yoshida Shoten, 2018), 154-155.

¹⁰³² Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, *The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region* (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 1998), 20. Furthermore, the revised Guidelines provided an opportunity to initiate strategic preparations for a potential contingency on the Korean peninsula. This planning was subsequently outlined in the US-Japan combined operation plan, known as Operation Plan 5055.

¹⁰³³ Kyoji Yanagisawa, email message to author, July 7, 2023. During the revision of the 1997 Guidelines, Japan adopted a rationale stating that the activities of the JSDF were limited to non-combat roles such as reconnaissance,

providing logistical support, among other possibilities.¹⁰³⁴ While the 1997 Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation did reference the areas surrounding Japan, their primary focus was on the Korean contingency. Specifically, the key concern revolved around Japan's commitment in the event of a full-scale war erupting on the Korean peninsula.¹⁰³⁵

5.2.6. Law Ensuring Peace and Security in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (1999)¹⁰³⁶

The 1997 Guidelines required Japan to establish domestic legislation in order to effectively fulfill its role providing rear area support to the United States. As a result, the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (SIASJ Law) was enacted in 1999, followed by the Act on Ship Inspection Operations in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan in 2000.¹⁰³⁷ The 1999 SIASJ Law expanded the focus of operational cooperation between the US forces and JSDF beyond Japanese territory to include “situations in areas surrounding Japan” that could create serious influence on Japan if left unchecked.¹⁰³⁸ Although the JSDF was not allowed to directly help in defending the US counterpart by using force, the 1999 SIASJ Law enabled the JSDF to perform a limited rear area support.¹⁰³⁹ In that sense, it was a meaningful step forward for Japan to expand the scope of security cooperation which was outside the territorial areas that were under the jurisdiction of the Japanese government.”¹⁰⁴⁰ Prior to the 1997 Guidelines, Japan was cautious in enacting anything akin to SIASJ law.¹⁰⁴¹ Instead of introducing SIASJ law, Japan undertook legislative overhaul of the JSDF law before 1999. These measures

supply, and transportation, which would take place outside the areas where the US forces was engaged in combat. According to this logic, JSDF activities would not be considered as part of US combat operations. This perspective was considered reasonable by the Japanese, as the US Navy's blockade of the Korean peninsula and its air dominance in an event of a contingency made it highly improbable for North Korean military platforms to reach JSDF assets beyond the blockade line established by the United States.

¹⁰³⁴ Akiyama Masahiro 秋山昌廣, *Moto bōei jimujikan akiyama akira hiroshi kaikoroku: reisen go no anzen hoshō to bōei kōryū* 元防衛事務次官 秋山昌廣回顧録: 冷戦後の安全保障と防衛交流 [Memoirs of Akiyama Masahiro, Former Vice-Minister of Defense: Post-Cold War Security and Defense Exchange] (Tōkyō: Yoshida Shoten, 2018), 161-162.

¹⁰³⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰³⁶ The full name is the “Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan.” Later renamed the Law Concerning Measure to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security (Important Influence Situations Law).

¹⁰³⁷ Katsuhiro Musashi and Robert Eldridge, *The Japan SDF Law — Translation, History, and Analysis* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2019), 7.

¹⁰³⁸ Kazuya Sakamoto, “What is the Strengthened Japan-US Alliance for? Defending and Advancing the Liberal World Order,” in *Postwar Japan: Growth, Security, and Uncertainty Since 1945*, ed. Michael J. Green and Zack Cooper (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2017), 9.

¹⁰³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴¹ *Asahi Shimbun*, August 14, 1981.

could be seen as a stepping stone towards SIASJ law, as they enabled Japan to better support the United States in the event of a Korean contingency.¹⁰⁴²

The following is the Korean contingency simulation and Japan's likely response that a Japanese thinktank laid out in 1999 while the 1997 Guidelines-related laws—including the 1999 situation law—were being enacted. This offer clues how far Japan could operationally support during a Korean contingency at that juncture.¹⁰⁴³

Phase 1. Prior to the SIASJ. Despite the lack of progress in the US-North Korea talks concerning North Korea's nuclear facilities, North Korea proceeded to assemble its missile units near the demilitarized zone. In response, the combined forces of the United States and the Republic of Korea heightened their military readiness. The Japanese government, upon receiving information from the US military, issued orders for the JSDF to be on high alert. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs began devising plans for dispatching JSDF transport planes and escort ships to evacuate over 7,000 Japanese residents in Seoul. However, reaching a final decision was not straightforward, as the feasibility of the evacuation operation hinged on the prevailing security conditions on the ground.

Phase 2. The outbreak of war in the Korean peninsula. In a sudden turn of events, North Korean forces launched rockets and missiles in and around Seoul. This led to widespread chaos and ongoing acts of sabotage, seemingly perpetrated by North Korean guerrillas, throughout various cities. In response, the US-ROK combined forces initiated a counterattack by mobilizing their complete artillery and tank units. The US Navy's task forces were deployed to the Sea of Japan, while the US Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa also set course for the Korean peninsula.

Phase 3. Acknowledgement of the SIASJ. The Japanese Prime Minister made the assessment that the war unfolding in the Korean peninsula would inevitably have a significant impact on Japan, categorizing it as a Situation in Areas Surrounding Japan (SIASJ). Responding to requests from the US military, the Security Council of Japan encompassed rear area support by the JSDF, as well as search and rescue operations in the rear area. While the Diet retrospectively granted

¹⁰⁴² National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), *Natsume Haruo O-raru Hisutori-* (Haruo Natsume Oral History) (Tokyo: GRIPS, 2005), p. 323.

¹⁰⁴³ "Japan's situations law and the Simulation in case of a Korean contingency," National Assembly Library, accessed December 18, 2021, http://nationsworld.kr/cncho/research/japan_data/%C1%D6%BA%AF%BB%E7%C5%C2%B9%FD.htm.

approval due to the emergency nature of the situation, opposition parties vehemently opposed the decision, arguing that the ongoing developments did not meet the criteria for a local governments regarding the utilization of airports and port facilities for rear area support.

Phase 4. Ship inspection.¹⁰⁴⁴ The JMSDF obtained that several ships of unknown nationality had approached the Japanese territorial waters. The UN Security Council has already adopted a resolution condemning North Korea's invasion, and the movement to impose economic sanctions has intensified. Meanwhile, the US military requested the Japanese government to cooperate in ship inspections. However, the JMSDF could not be dispatched since the ship inspection task was deleted from the Guidelines-related laws [this is prior to 2000]. In the waters around Kyushu, ships with a large number of refugees appeared one after another, and tens of thousands of South Korean refugees began to appear on the coasts of the northern regions of Japan. The scene was in disorder as there was a concern that North Korea's armed guerrilla might be disguised as refugees and attempt in infiltrating Japan.

Phase 5. Assistance from local authorities. US military transport aircraft that were reinforced from the US mainland landed at airports in Fukuoka. Located in northern Kyushu, and Komatsu, situated in Honshu facing the Sea of Japan. These aircraft swiftly loaded essential supplies, including weapons and ammunition, before departing for the Korean peninsula. Additionally, injured US soldiers from the battlefield were transported to Japan for medical treatment. They were taken to nearby JSDF hospitals and other healthcare facilities. However, there were instances where certain facilities refused to admit the injured soldiers, leading to significant complications and challenges.

Phase 6. Use of weapons. While conducting rear area support operations at sea, a JSDF's escort vessel was attacked by North Korean guerillas. Despite having regulations on the use of weapons for rear area support, the JSDF hesitated to employ their weapons and consequently came under attack from the North Koreans.

¹⁰⁴⁴ The outcome of this scenario was published in 1999. Subsequently, the enactment of the Act on Ship Inspection Operations in Areas Surrounding Japan in 2000 empowered the JMSDF to carry out ship inspections during similar circumstances. In addition, armed with the detailed provisions outlined in Operation Plan 5055, which addressed the need for heightened vigilance against North Korean espionage vessels, the JMSDF and Japanese Coast Guard were able to deploy their maritime vessels to effectively counter the North Korean ships and implement appropriate measures.

This hesitation stemmed from the application of the Police Duties Execution Act, which limited the use of weapons to self-defense and situations of absolute necessity. Since rear area support activities were only permitted beyond the boundaries of the front lines, the Japanese government had no choice but to suspend the rear area support mission and issue orders for the JSDF to return to Japan. Japan's decision in this regard increased dissatisfaction among the US and raised the question of why Japan did not take any action despite the event impacting Japan's security.

As shown in this simulation, had the Korean contingency occurred in the 1990s, JSDF's proactive rear area support, beyond defending the Japanese island, might have been limited—even with the existence of the 1997 Guidelines—thus not meeting the expectation of the United States. However, it can be assumed that the escalation of the armed conflict—thus widening the battle zone and deployment of the strategic weapons at a certain stage of the war—might have necessitated the JSDF's greater involvement in the conflict. To remedy such a problem, the United States, and Japan took a number of measures after 9/11: (1) establishing Operation Plan 5055; (2) revision of the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation in 2015; (3) the enactment of Japan's security legislation in 2015.

Meanwhile, South Korean military experts have expressed mixed feelings vis-à-vis the enactment of the 1999 SIASJ Law. Although generally acknowledging the necessity for the Japanese to enhance its security cooperation with the United States, Korean experts suspected that the key goal of Japan's legislative efforts was to fully exploit the ambiguity—for instance, the geographical definition of rear area was not specified¹⁰⁴⁵—and provide the legal basis to dispatch the Self Defense-Forces abroad, including the Korean peninsula.¹⁰⁴⁶ Rather than focusing on ineffective measures, such as protesting against the SIASJ Law, Korean experts recommended that both South Korea and Japan should try their best to prevent Korean contingency from happening so that the SIASJ Law would not be invoked in the first place.¹⁰⁴⁷

5.2.7. Concept Plan 5055 and Operation Plan 5055¹⁰⁴⁸

Drafted and signed in 2002,¹⁰⁴⁹ Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 5055 was a US-Japan

¹⁰⁴⁵ Kang Han-koo, "Ilbonui jubyeonsataebeopgwa gwanryeon beopchegye" [Japan's SIASJ Law and Its Related legislation], *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, no.45 (1999): 291-332.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Song Yeong-seon, "Ilbonui sinjichim gwanryeonbeop naeyonggwa uimi" [Contents and Meaning of Laws Related to Japan's New Guidelines], *Defense and Technology*, no.247 (1999): 30-39.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Operation Plan 5055 represents an enhanced iteration of the Concept Plan 5055, outlining specific measures to be taken in contingency situations.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Asahi Shimbun Report Team 朝日新聞「自衛隊50年」取材班, *Jieitai shirarezaru henyō* 自衛隊 知られ

combined concept plan against a North Korea contingency, both providing logistic support to the United States and defending Japan against North Korean guerilla—amounting to a couple hundred—infiltration.¹⁰⁵⁰ Known to be the first Concept Plan signed by the two sides in the post 9/11 era, its prime objective was to concretize the action plans in line with the 1997 US-Japan Defense Guidelines.¹⁰⁵¹

Under the North Korean contingency scenario, CONPLAN 5055 postulated hundreds of North Korean guerillas penetrating the metropolitan area of Japan. Furthermore, the Concept Plan outlined the ways to maintain vigilance against North Korean espionage vessels (the Maritime SDF and Japanese Coast Guard were to deploy their maritime vessels to counter the North Korean ships) while Ground SDF was to guard 135 critical facilities including nuclear plants.¹⁰⁵² In addition, the JMSDF was to secure sea lines of communication that connect Kyushu and the Korean peninsula and execute minesweeping operations both in the high seas and Japanese territorial waters. Last but not least, the JASDF is expected to acquire and distribute information through Airborne Warning and Control System, transport refugees with C-130 transport aircraft, and conduct search and rescue operations towards distressed US personnel.¹⁰⁵³

Originally, when the CONPLAN 5055 was in its development stage, the Japanese SDF tentatively calculated thousands of armed North Korean agents penetrating the Japanese territory; this is in line with North Korea's strategy of projecting guerilla infiltration towards South Korean rear area apart from creating a front line against the US-ROK resistance near the demilitarized zone.¹⁰⁵⁴ Some of those North Korean guerillas may infiltrate Japan during a Korean contingency. It is worth mentioning that the “K Peninsula Situation Response Plan,” a Japanese Defense Ministry's internal report published in 1993, postulated that light infantry

ざる変容 [Unknown Transformation of the Self Defense Force] (Tōkyō: Asahi Shimbun Company, 2005), 192-193.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Ibid, 192.

¹⁰⁵¹ Michishita Narushige 道下徳成, and Higashi Akihiko 東清彦, “Chōsenhantō yūji to nippon no taiō” 朝鮮半島有事と日本の対応 [Contingency in the Korean Peninsula and Japan's Response], in *Chōsenhantō to higashiajia* 朝鮮半島と東アジア [Korean Peninsula and East Asia], ed. Tadashi Kimiya 木宮正史 (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 2015), 196.

¹⁰⁵² Asahi Shimbun Report Team 朝日新聞「自衛隊50年」取材班, *Jieitai shirarezaru henyō* 自衛隊 知られざる変容 [Unknown Transformation of the Self Defense Force] (Tōkyō: Asahi Shimbun Company, 2005), 193.

¹⁰⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Kim Won-bong 金元奉, Mitsufuji Osamu 光藤修, *Saishin chōsenhantō gunji jōhō no zenbō — kitachōsengun kankokugun zai kanbeigun no pawā baransu* 最新朝鮮半島軍事情報の全貌—北朝鮮軍・韓国軍・在韓米軍のパワーバランス [The Whole Picture of the Latest Korean Peninsula Military Information-Power Balance of North Korean Military, South Korean military and the USFK] (Tōkyō: Kodansha, 2000), 38.

brigade—consisting of 10,000 North Korean special forces—could conduct their operation in Japanese soil during a second Korean War.¹⁰⁵⁵ Yet, the estimated size of these North Korean special forces targeting Japan was downsized to a couple hundred—based on the US analysis—and the burden of defense was squarely allocated to the JSDF.¹⁰⁵⁶ Since the JSDF had to prepare for North Korean penetration activities under the new operation plan, a number of JGSDF—around ten regiments—was relocated from Hokkaido to the metropolitan area to guard critical facilities.¹⁰⁵⁷

One of the heated discussion points of the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines was the downsizing of the JGSDF personnel.¹⁰⁵⁸ While the Ministry of Finance, spearheaded by Satsuki Katayama, insisted on the reduction of 40,000 personnel, the JGSDF strongly resisted the idea arguing that the successful anti-guerrilla outlined in CONPLAN 5055 necessitate a sizeable ground troops. The Ministry of Defense also strongly opposed the massive troop reduction, claiming that it took 60,000 South Korean troops 50 days to root out 20 North Korean agents in the 1996 Gangneung submarine infiltration incident.¹⁰⁵⁹ Eventually, the force reduction was limited to 5,000. This incident epitomizes how CONPLAN 5055 was used in shaping the outcome of the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines. Mindful of the CONPLAN 5055, the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines were established. For example, GSDF Central Readiness Force—consisting over 3,000 personnel—was established in 2007 based on the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines: one of the key domestic missions of the GSDF Central Readiness Force is to manage emergencies including hundreds of North Korean guerrilla infiltration into Japan during a Korean contingency.¹⁰⁶⁰ In addition, the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines lay out various events regarding the Korean contingency: direct/indirect support to the US forces, North Korean special forces infiltrating the Japanese islands, and North Korean missile attack towards Japan.

All in all, the key implication of the CONPLAN 5055 can be summed up as follows: enabling the SDF's geographical operation range to be extended to the vicinity of the Korean

¹⁰⁵⁵ Handa Shigeru 半田滋, *Jieitai vs. Kitachōsen* 自衛隊 vs. 北朝鮮 [Self-Defense Force vs. North Korea] (Tōkyō: Shichōsha, 2003), 117.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Asahi Shimbun Report Team 朝日新聞「自衛隊50年」取材班, *Jieitai shirarezaru henyō* 自衛隊 知られざる変容 [Unknown Transformation of the Self Defense Force] (Tōkyō: Asahi Shimbun Company, 2005), 192.

¹⁰⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 194.

¹⁰⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 194.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Central Readiness Force, “Outline of the Central Readiness Force Overview,” https://war.p.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/crf/pa/gallery/sudan/top_english.html (accessed February 24, 2023)

peninsula in case of a contingency. Except for the minesweeping operations during the Korean War, CONPLAN 5055 is the first detailed framework for the SDF to get involved in the second Korean War. After the first North Korean nuclear test in 2006, the United States and Japan started to upgrade the CONPLAN 5055 into an implementable, workable plan, the Operation Plan (OPLAN) 5055.¹⁰⁶¹

OPLAN 5055 has further concretized issues discussed in CONPLAN 5055. Although the full details are not disclosed, it is known that the OPLAN 5055 encompasses in all areas including situational awareness, operation execution, logistics, and command control and divide the contingency into two categories: (1) a SIASJ that does not lead to a direct attack against Japan; (2) an armed attack against Japan. In case of a SIASJ, the United States and Japan have laid out plans including search and rescue of US troops in distress, protection of bases and ports that function as a launching pad for US military operation. In addition, the rear area support activities necessitate the full cooperation of police, local governments, and so forth.¹⁰⁶² Port facilities were designated for the contingency, while specific details for medical support—such as the number of hospitals, beds, and necessary medicines—were laid out. Meanwhile, when it comes to an armed attack against Japan, the United States and Japan factored in the scenario concerning North Korea’s direct ballistic missile attack against Japan and made a detailed burden-sharing between the United States and Japan. In that regard, OPLAN 5055 includes tabletop exercise presuming US-Japan missile defense against incoming North Korean missiles and directly attacking North Korean targets.¹⁰⁶³

5.2.8. Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation (2015)

The 1997 Guidelines had to be revised in 2015 due to several reasons. Firstly, the changing security environment.¹⁰⁶⁴ In particular, tensions had risen with China’s assertiveness over its territorial claims in East China and South China Seas, North Korea continued to provoke others with its nuclear and missile development. The second reason to update the Guidelines is Japan’s revisions of its defense and security policies. Japan’s long-

¹⁰⁶¹ *Asahi Shimbun*, January 4, 2007.

¹⁰⁶² Asahi Shimbun Report Team 朝日新聞「自衛隊50年」取材班, *Jieitai shirarezaru henyō* 自衛隊 知られざる変容 [Unknown Transformation of the Self Defense Force] (Tōkyō: Asahi Shimbun Company, 2005), 194-197. As an example, in 2000, the Defense Agency and the National Public Safety Commission made revisions to pertinent laws, facilitating collaboration between the JSDF and the police to enhance preparedness against potential guerrilla infiltration from North Korea.

¹⁰⁶³ *Asahi Shimbun*, January 4, 2007.

¹⁰⁶⁴ As per the Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC), which unveiled the 2015 Defense Guidelines, the revision of the 1997 Guidelines was prompted by the recognition that the alliance confronts a progressively intricate security landscape.

term national security has been documented for the first time as the National Security Strategy, which was approved by the National Security Council in December 2013.¹⁰⁶⁵

The new Guidelines consistently emphasized the importance of seamless, robust, flexible, and effective cooperation. The 2015 Guidelines introduced the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, which serves the primary purposes of enhancing coordination to a seamless degree between US forces and the Japanese SDF across a broad range of activities, from peacetime to contingencies. Additionally, the Guidelines incorporated the concept of “grey zone contingencies,” referring to conflicts that fall below the threshold of military force but have the potential to escalate into a military conflict more easily.¹⁰⁶⁶

In July 2014, Prime Minister Abe’s Cabinet issued a reinterpretation of Japan’s constitution, enabling the country to exercise the right of collective self-defense. Prior to this reinterpretation, the Japanese SDF were unable to engage in collective self-defense and were limited in their ability to provide defense to US forces unless Japan itself came under direct attack.¹⁰⁶⁷ The concept of collective self-defense was incorporated into the 2015 Guidelines, allowing Japan to provide defense for US forces. To be more precise, the Japanese SDF were granted the ability to exercise collective self-defense rights in areas such as air and missile defense, peacekeeping operations, and the defense of Japan across land, sea, and air. Furthermore, the 2015 Guidelines emphasized enhanced cooperation in the realms of outer space and cyberspace.¹⁰⁶⁸ Meanwhile, the 2015 Guidelines factored in large-scale disaster management between the two forces, obviously influenced by the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami. Although the US-Japan collaboration—Operation Tomodachi—for the 2011 disaster was generally effective,¹⁰⁶⁹ the two countries also learned lessons from the event.

Furthermore, the 2015 Guidelines calls for enhanced coordination in the area of effective arms acquisition, maintenance, research, development, test, and evaluation.¹⁰⁷⁰ Thanks to Japan’s modification on its foreign arms transfer policy, such elements in the Guidelines paved the way for expanded cooperation with the United States. Meanwhile, the

¹⁰⁶⁵ Hiroyuki Sugai, *Japan’s Future Defense Equipment Policy* (Washington D.C.: Brookings, 2016), 10.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Japanese Ministry of Defense, *The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, 2015*.

¹⁰⁶⁷ U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2014), 421.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Japanese Ministry of Defense, *The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, 2015*.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Hajime Araki 荒木肇, *Higashinippon daishinsai to jieitai jieitai wa naze ganbareta ka? 東日本大震災と自衛隊 自衛隊はなぜ頑張れたか?* [Great East Japan Earthquake and the Self-Defense Force: Why Did the SDF Do Their Best?] (Tōkyō: Namiki Shobo, 2012), 11.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Japanese Ministry of Defense, *The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, 2015*. The 2015 Guidelines do not specifically, however, mention a long-range effort to cooperatively work on co-development, co-development, co-production, and co-employment for operational capabilities for future forces.

United States and Japan decided to go for a joint missile defense program.¹⁰⁷¹ This coupled with Japan's exploration on acquiring a strike capability. The official government study on Japan's strike capability—although the main focus was on Japan's independent deterrence capability, so-called “enemy base strike capability” was implied in the study—was authorized by Prime Minister Abe in 2014.¹⁰⁷² With Japan's adjustment in foreign arms transfer principles, together with the argument for a strike capability, the US-Japan alliance could systematically work on long-range operational requirements and capabilities.

Overall, the 2015 Guidelines reinforced the commitment of the United States and Japan to the defense of South Korea.¹⁰⁷³ However, the South Korean government expressed dissatisfaction with the Guidelines. Criticism arose regarding the comprehensive and abstract languages used in the Guidelines, which failed to explicitly reflect the position of the Korean government that Japan should seek prior consent from South Korea if the Japanese SDF were to carry out missions in the vicinity of the Korean peninsula.¹⁰⁷⁴

5.2.9. Japan's Security Legislation (2015)

In July 2014, Prime Minister Abe came up with a Cabinet decision titled “Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect its People.”¹⁰⁷⁵ The revision of the security policy in 2014 granted the SDF increased operational and deployment flexibility within the boundaries allowed by the Japanese constitution.¹⁰⁷⁶

There are two notable features of the 2015 security legislation:

Firstly, SDF's operational area was not confined to “non-combat areas.”¹⁰⁷⁷ Due to such changes, the SDF can respond more proactively to the Korean contingency—for example, the SDF can perform more proactively and extensively vis-à-vis the simulation laid out by the Japanese government back in the late 1990s.

¹⁰⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷² “Tracking Japan's Military Strike Debate,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed March 23, 2021, <https://carnegieendowment.org/programs/asia/japan-military-strike-debate/>.

¹⁰⁷³ Michishita Narushige 道下徳成, and Higashi Akihiko 東清彦, “Chōsenhantō yūji to nippon no taiō” 朝鮮半島有事と日本の対応 [Contingency in the Korean Peninsula and Japan's Response], in *Chōsenhantō to higashiajia* 朝鮮半島と東アジア [Korean Peninsula and East Asia], ed. Tadashi Kimiya 木宮正史 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2015), 197.

¹⁰⁷⁴ “Jawidae jigu eodiseodeun jakjeon, hanguk jugwon jonjunghajiman sajeondongui eodiro?” [JSDF Can Operate Anywhere Around the Globe, But What About Prior Consultation?], *JTBC News*, April 28, 2015.

¹⁰⁷⁵ “Assessing the Impact of Abe Era Security Reforms on Japan-NATO Relations,” The Japan Institute of International Affairs, accessed July 12, 2021, https://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/fellow_report/190527Policy_Brief-Japan_NATO_Security_Cooperation.pdf

¹⁰⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Ibid.

Secondly, the security legislations of 2015 established a legal framework that allows Japan to use weapons in the event of a crisis occurring during an overseas deployment. In simpler terms, Japan is now able to exercise its right to collective self-defense when an armed attack against a foreign country poses a threat to the “survival” of Japan. Specifically, the 2015 security legislation permits the implementation of self-defense measures that are necessary to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people.¹⁰⁷⁸ The Legislation for Peace and Security outlines three conditions under which the use of force for self-defense purposes is permissible, and the concept of “survival” can be inferred from these conditions.¹⁰⁷⁹

“...when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness...”

The aforementioned choice empowered the SDF to exercise their right to collective self-defense. Consequently, the Japanese government presented the New Legislation for Peace and Security, which encompasses the Act of the Development of the Legislation for Peace and Security, to the Diet for endorsement. As a consequence, the legislation received approval in September 2015 and came into effect in March 2016.¹⁰⁸⁰ The legislation enacted in 2015 allowed the SDF to supply ammunition, as well as perform refueling and maintenance operations for aircraft that are ready to engage in combat operations.¹⁰⁸¹ Furthermore, the SDF were granted the authority to carry out ship inspections, including those involving foreign troops, engage in search and rescue operations, and implement other necessary measures aimed at addressing situations that will “have an Important Influence on Japan’s peace and security.”¹⁰⁸²

The legislation enacted in 2015 established the basis for the SDF to carry out their operation beyond the borders of Japan, including the Korean peninsula. As mentioned earlier,

¹⁰⁷⁸ Takezawa Yukiko, “Evolution of Japan’s non-US Centric Security Strategy and European Influence on Japan’s Peace-Building Policy,” In *New Directions in Japan’s Security: Non-U.S. Centric Evolution*, ed. Paul Midford, and Wilhelm Vosse (London: Routledge, 2021), 196.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Michael J. Green, Zack Cooper, *Postwar Japan: Growth, Security, and Uncertainty Since 1945* (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2017), 23.

¹⁰⁸⁰ “Assessing the Impact of Abe Era Security Reforms on Japan-NATO Relations,” The Japan Institute of International Affairs, accessed July 12, 2021, https://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/fellow_report/190527Policy_Brief-Japan_NATO_Security_Cooperation.pdf.

¹⁰⁸¹ “Framework for Activities of the SDF and Others After the Enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security,” Japan Ministry of Defense, accessed July 12, 2021, https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/wp2019/pdf/DOJ2019_2-5-2.pdf.

¹⁰⁸² Ibid.

Japan's Legislation for Peace and Security created opportunities for the SDF to engage in collective self-defense actions, allowing them to employ force beyond the confines of Japan's national defense.¹⁰⁸³ Thanks to this revision, the SDF will be able to protect, for example, US Aegis destroyers that contribute to the defense of South Korea in a "Survival-Threatening Situation." Japan's Ministry of Defense defines a Survival Threatening Situation as "a situation where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as result threatens Japan's survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people's right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness."¹⁰⁸⁴ In this context, it is plausible that even if Japan is not directly attacked by North Korean troops or missiles, Japan could provide protection to US naval vessels if South Korea is under North Korea's attack.

Side by side, the Act on Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Perilous Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan was revised as the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations That Will Have an Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security. An "Important Influence Situation" is defined as situations that have an Important Influence on Japan's peace and security in that it could lead to a direct armed attack against Japan if left unattended.¹⁰⁸⁵ With the implementation of new legislation, the SDF will have the capability to provide support activities to the US forces without being restricted by geographical limitations."¹⁰⁸⁶

Thanks to Japan's security legislation in 2015, SDF's role as well as its operational range has been expanded. If a certain situation is perceived to have an "Important Influence," SDF's rear area support is now possible.¹⁰⁸⁷ Since the 2015 revision allows rear area support activities except where combats are actually being conducted, SDF can execute support activities *near the battlefield* (emphasis added). Not to mention the rear area support activities, that includes ammunition supply and refueling of military platforms, SDF can now use force

¹⁰⁸³ One of the sub-legislations—namely the Armed Attack Situation Response Law—was revised so that Japan can exercise the right of collective self-defense "...not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan."

¹⁰⁸⁴ Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2019* (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Japan, 2019), 248.

¹⁰⁸⁵ The newly enacted legislation removes any geographic restrictions on the operations of the JSDF and broadens Japan's support activities, expending assistance not only to the United States but also to nations that contribute to the defense of Japan.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Noboru Yamaguchi, "Reaffirming US Alliance in the Asia-Pacific: A Japanese Perspective," *Asia Policy*, no. 24 (2017): 13-18.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2019* (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Japan, 2019), 254. According to the 2019 Japanese defense white paper, situations that will have an important influence is defined as a situation "that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security, including situations that, if left unattended, could result in a direct armed attack on Japan."

abroad in a “Survival-Threatening Situation.”

What are the potential implications for a Korean contingency? Under the current legislation, the SDF are authorized to conduct rear area support operations for both US and ROK forces in a situation that has a significant impact—which is an “Important Influence Situation”—on Japan’s security. In the event of a localized armed conflict such as a skirmish that can be handled by South Korea’s defense mechanisms, the rear area support activities may not be activated. However, if North Korea were to attack US vessels, for example, and if the Japanese interpret it as a situation that threatens their survival, the SDF can engage in combat operations based on the right of collective self-defense.

5.2.10. Japan’s Operational Support During Korean Contingency

The JSDF’s operational support for the US forces can be interpreted as Japan’s operational support for South Korea in the sense that it supports US forces’ warfighting efforts in the Korean Peninsula. Concerning the situations in areas surrounding Japan, the United States and Japan have specified the cooperation form into 40 items (see Table 10) in 2014.¹⁰⁸⁸

Table 10. Japan’s Operational Support for US Military Activities¹⁰⁸⁹

Function/field	Examples of cooperation
Use of facilities	1. Use of JSDF facilities, civilian airports, and ports of US aircrafts and ships for the purpose of supply 2. Securing places and storage facilities necessary for the United States to unload personnel and materials at JSDF facilities and private airport and ports 3. Extension of operating hours for US aircrafts and ships to use JSDF facilities and civilian airports and ports 4. The use of airfields by the JSDF by US aircraft 5. Provision of training and exercise sites 6. Construction of offices, accommodations, etc. in US military facilities and areas

¹⁰⁸⁸ “Nichi bei bōei kyōryoku no tame no shishin gaidorain to shūhen jitaihō” [Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation and the Situations Law], *The Asahi Shimbun*, June 16, 2014.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Joint statement US-Japan security consultative committee Completion of the Review of the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation New York, September 23, 1997*. These examples serve as illustrations of the support capabilities. For instance, Japan has the capacity to autonomously carry out the following operations: (1) relief activities; (2) search and rescue missions; (3) evacuations of non-combatants, and (4) efforts to ensure the efficacy of economic sanctions aimed at preserving international peace and stability.

Supplies	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Provision of supplies (excluding weapons and ammunition) and fuel, oil, and lubricant to US aircraft and ships at the JSDF facilities and private airports and ports 2. Provision of supplies (excluding weapons and ammunition) and fuel, oil and lubricant to US military facilities and areas
Transportation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Land, sea, and air transportation of personnel, supplies, and fuel, oil and lubricant in Japan 2. Maritime transportation of personnel, goods, fuel, oil, and lubricant to 3. US ships on high seas 4. Use of vehicles and cranes for transporting personnel, materials, and fuel, maintenance, and lubricating oil
Maintenance	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Provision of repair, maintenance, and repair parts for US aircraft, ships, and vehicles 2. Temporary provision of maintenance materials
Medical support	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Treatment of the injured in Japan 2. Injured transportation in Japan 3. Provision of medicines and sanitary appliances
Guard	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Security of US military facilities and areas 2. Surveillance of sea boundaries around US military facilities and areas 3. Expenses on domestic shipping routes in Japan 4. Exchange of information
Communication	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Securing frequencies (including satellite communication) and providing equipment for communication between related agencies in the US and Japan

These include humanitarian aid towards disaster areas, refugee rescue and transportation, search and rescue activities, and activities to evacuate non-combatants, ship inspections to ensure the effectiveness of economic sanctions. In addition to the provisions for the use of facilities necessary for US military operations, Japan’s support includes supply, transportation, maintenance, hygiene, security, communication, and other issues such as vigilance, minesweeping, and sea and airspace coordination.¹⁰⁹⁰

Given recent developments—the 2015 security legislative measures that enables greater operational latitude to SDF during contingency, SDFs’ enhanced power projection capability backed by the introduction of new military platforms, coupled with North Korea’s development of nuclear-tipped missiles that could target both the United States and Japan—Japan is expected to play relatively more proactive role in the post-2015 period once an all-out war erupts in the Korean peninsula. Apart from protecting US military facilities situated

¹⁰⁹⁰ “Dongbuga gunsajido bakkwinda 美-日 daedeunghan jogeonsoe gunsahyeopryeok” [Northeast Asia’s Military Map Will Change. Military Cooperation Under Equal Conditions Between the United States and Japan], *The Dong-a Ilbo*, September 26, 2009.

in Japan, which is discussed in Chapter 4, Japan could provide the following operational supports: (1) protect US bases located outside of Japan by intercepting North Korean ballistic missiles; (2) send minesweepers in and around North Korean waters; (3) conduct both anti-air and anti-submarine warfare against North Korean submarine and aircrafts; (4) destroy military targets situated inside North Korean territory; (5) protect Maritime Pre-positioning Ship Squadrons; (6) conduct search and rescue operations and ship inspection operations.

Protection of US bases against North Korean ballistic missiles

Japan can attempt to intercept North Korean missiles that are targeting US military facilities—Guam would be the most notable example—in the region. In fact, it is likely that the trajectory of North Korean Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) towards the United States would take it over the North Pole, making Japanese missile defense irrelevant. Yet if Pyongyang fires a missile at Guam or Hawaii, for example, Japan can take meaningful measures against these missiles because these missiles fly over Japan.¹⁰⁹¹

As a pivotal US base in the region that is considered to have growing strategic value,¹⁰⁹² Guam has been officially singled out as a military target by North Korea: back in 2017, North Korea laid out a detailed plan to launch missiles against the waters off the coast of Guam.¹⁰⁹³ To be sure, Guam does have its own countermeasures against North Korean ICBMs: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense batteries has been placed in Guam ever since the 2013 North Korean nuclear experiment.¹⁰⁹⁴ Yet Japan's Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability would offer additional layer of defense that would heighten the chances of intercepting North Korean ICBMs, thus protecting invaluable naval and air assets deployed in Guam. In the same vein, Japan's ballistic missile defense capability could intercept missiles launched against Hawaii. Back in 2009, US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates expressed his concern that North Korea's long-range missiles could potentially reach Hawaii and as a

¹⁰⁹¹ Ogawa Shinichi 小川伸一, and Yanagisawa Kyoji 柳澤協二, "Reisen shūryō go no kaku yokushiryoku no yukue" 冷戦終了後の核抑止力の行方 [Whereabouts of Nuclear Deterrence After the End of the Cold War], in *Yokushiryoku o tō — moto seifu kōkan to bōei supesharisutotachi no taiwa* 抑止力を問う—元政府高官と防衛スペシャリスト達の対話 [Talking About Deterrence: Dialogue Between Former Government Officials and Defense Specialists], ed. Yanagisawa Kyoji (Kyoto: Kamogawa Shuppan, 2010), 51-79.

¹⁰⁹² Hailong Ju, *China's Maritime Power and Strategy: History, National Security and Geopolitics* (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Company, 2015), 118.

¹⁰⁹³ Julian Borger, "North Korea Details Guam Strike Plan and Calls Trump 'Bereft of Reason'," *The Guardian*, Aug 10, 2017.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Matteo Dian, *Evolution of the US-Japan Alliance: The Eagle and the Chrysanthemum* (Oxford: Chandos, 2016), 68.

follow-up measure, he ordered to reinforce the defense of Hawaii.¹⁰⁹⁵ Aside from North Korea's ICBM capability—for example, the estimated range of Hwasong-17 is 15,000 kilometers which is sufficient to strike the US mainland¹⁰⁹⁶—the characteristics of US missile defense structure, which is centered on the protection of the US mainland, might incentivize North Koreans to select Hawaii as a target that has higher chance of penetration and destruction. In that sense, SM-3 Block IIA missiles installed in Maritime SDFs' aegis destroyers could enhance the survivability of US military installations in Hawaii.

Meanwhile, Japan's BMD capability will be helpful in dispelling the concept of nuclear decoupling, instigated by North Korea. Fully aware that US reinforcement would be dispatched from Japan as well as the US mainland during contingency, North Korea has been developing its nuclear and missile capability over the years. Although it is uncertain whether North Korea's nuclear-tipped ICBMs could successfully strike targets located in the United States and Japan—for instance, intercontinental ballistic missile launch conducted on November 2022 was unsuccessful—North Korea's nuclear and missile capability is enhancing with the passage of time.¹⁰⁹⁷ Coupled with the miniaturization of the nuclear warhead itself, efforts to acquire multiple independent re-entry vehicle is expected to increase the number of available delivery vehicles and the nuclear warheads that North Korea could utilize for military or political purposes.¹⁰⁹⁸ Backed by its efforts to buildup nuclear and missile capability, North Korea would likely to drive a wedge between the United States, Japan, and South Korea evoking the concern deriving from the possibility of a nuclear decoupling.¹⁰⁹⁹ For instance, if North Korea threatens the United States or Japan with nuclear attack—assuming that the threat is credible—the United States would hesitate in deploying the reinforcement to the Korean peninsula and Japan might not provide the necessary logistical support to the US forces while North Korea invades South Korea. During the 1980s in Western Europe, there was widespread discussion assuming that if nuclear decoupling occurred with the United States, the likelihood of a conventional attack by the Soviet Union against Western Europe would increase. Similarly, it is likely that a scenario involving nuclear decoupling between the United States and South Korea could heighten the possibility

¹⁰⁹⁵ Ian Jeffries, *North Korea, 2009-2012: A Guide to Economic and Political Developments* (London: Routledge, 2015), 94.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Josh Smith, "Factbox: North Korea's New Hwasong-17 'Monster Missile'," *Reuters*, Nov 19, 2022.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Vann H. Van Diepen, "North Korea Showcases Two Types of ICBMs In November 2022 Tests," *38 North*, Dec 2, 2022.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Anatoly Torkunov, Georgy Toloraya, and Ilya Dyachkov, *Understanding Contemporary Korean from a Russian Perspective: Political and Economic Development Since 2008* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), 170.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Christopher Hill, "North Korea's Real Strategy: Kim Seeks to Decouple the US and South Korea, and Reunify the Peninsula on His Term," *The Japan Times*, Jun 22, 2017.

of North Korea launching a conventional attack against South Korea.¹¹⁰⁰ In that context, Japan's BMD capability would play a critical role: as long as Japan's ballistic missile defense systems are perceived to have a high chance of intercepting North Korean ICBMs—meaning that the North Korean military leadership would be uncertain whether their missiles could successfully strike the intended target—the United States and Japan's willingness to proceed with the operation plan during Korean contingency would be less prone to be impacted by nuclear decoupling.

Dispatching minesweepers inside North Korean waters

Although US and Japanese minesweepers neutralized sea mines in and around Korean waters during the Korean War period, it is estimated that thousands of sea mines are still deployed along North Korean coast: when the South Korean corvette *Cheonan* was sunk in 2010, the South Korean Defense Minister Kim Tae-young initially suspected that the naval vessel was struck by one of those North Korean sea mines.¹¹⁰¹ For that reason, minesweeping operation will be crucial once a war breaks out in Korea. Similar to the Korean War period, clearing the path for the US reinforcement—bulk of these military assets will be transported via sea—would strongly influence the tide of war. Although the details of OPLAN 5055 are unknown, it does stipulate Japanese maritime SDF would conduct minesweeping operations in and around the Korean peninsula as well as the Northern part of Kyushu so that sea transport route could be secured.¹¹⁰² In the post-War era, Japan conducted minesweeping operation two months after the end of the 1991 Gulf War, dispatching four minesweepers and two support ships to the Middle East.¹¹⁰³ Given the performance during the Gulf War—Japanese minesweepers were able to clear mines during their deployment,¹¹⁰⁴ contributing to the overall success of the coalition's efforts to clear the mines—Japan's minesweeping capability is expected to be fully utilized during a Korean contingency and would secure US landing operation in the Korean peninsula.

¹¹⁰⁰ James J. Bonin and Donald E. Stevenson, *Risk Assessment in Setting National Priorities: Advances in Risk Analysis* (New York: Springer, 2013), 141.

¹¹⁰¹ Ian Jeffries, *North Korea, 2009-2012: A Guide to Economic and Political Developments* (London: Routledge, 2013), 179.

¹¹⁰² Asahi Shimbun Report Team 朝日新聞「自衛隊50年」取材班, *Jieitai shirarezaru henyō* 自衛隊 知られざる変容 [Unknown Transformation of the Self Defense Force] (Tōkyō: Asahi Shimbun Company, 2005), 193.

¹¹⁰³ Steven R. Weisman, "Breaking Tradition, Japan Sends Flotilla to Gulf," *The New York Times*, Apr 25, 1991.

¹¹⁰⁴ The exact number of mines that were neutralized by the JMSDF vessels are unknown.

Anti-air, anti-submarine, and anti-ship warfare

Since most of the North Korean air assets are either ineffective or obsolete—except for a handful of fourth generation fighters like MiG-29—North Korea’s threat from the air would mostly associate with missile launch.¹¹⁰⁵ Nevertheless, North Korea might scramble these handful of fighters to fend off, say, US reconnaissance aircraft near North Korean airspace. In that case, Japanese interceptors could provide protection to the US air assets. In addition, it is possible that North Korea could simultaneously dispatch multiple Antonov An-2—accommodating 12 North Korean special forces per plane—towards Japan.¹¹⁰⁶ Japanese fighter jets could be scrambled and shoot down these invaders well before it reaches Japan.

Meanwhile, Japan could conduct anti-submarine warfare against North Korean submarines. Although the chances are low, North Korea—utilizing approximately ten submarines—could attack civilian ships and place sea mines near Japanese ports.¹¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, North Korean submarines could disrupt the sea lines of communication (SLOC) which passes in between Okinawa and Busan.¹¹⁰⁸ Since 75 percent of the US bases in Japan is located in Okinawa and substantial amount of war materials would be transported from Okinawa to Busan during Korean contingency.¹¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, Japan could prevent North Korean submarines from attacking US Navy vessels. In that sense, Japan’s anti-submarine warfare against North Korean submarines will be crucial.

Strike operations against targets in North Korea

On December 2022, Japan’s ruling coalition approved Japan of acquiring capability that could strike enemy bases.¹¹¹⁰ In line with such decision, the Japanese Ministry of Defense is considering the development of 10 types of missiles—which includes various types ranging from hypersonic weapons to glide missiles—while Tomahawk cruise missiles are expected to be introduced from the United States by 2027.¹¹¹¹ Once Japan attains “counterstrike capability,” these missiles could target North Korean missile launchers during contingency. Japan’s counterstrike capability will be somewhat similar to South Korea’s Kill

¹¹⁰⁵ Handa Shigeru 半田滋, *Jieitai vs. Kitachōsen* 自衛隊 vs. 北朝鮮 [Self-Defense Force vs. North Korea] (Tōkyō: Shichōsha, 2003), 180.

¹¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 183.

¹¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 186.

¹¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 187-188.

¹¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹⁰ Mina Pollmann, “Japan’s Ruling Coalition Approves Counterstrike Capability: The Long-Debated Move Comes Alongside Increased Defense Spending Amid Worries about Japan’s Security Environment,” *The Diplomat*, Dec 6, 2022. Ruling coalition refers to the Liberal Democratic Party and the Komeito.

¹¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

Chain concept—a subcomponent of the Three Axis System, which was revitalized by the Yoon Suk-yeol government.¹¹¹² In that sense, Japan’s strike operation—conducted either independently or simultaneously with South Korea and the US forces in South Korea—against North Korea’s ground assets will benefit South Korea by increasing the chances of destroying the target.¹¹¹³

Protection of Maritime Pre-positioning Ship Squadrons

In addition, Japan could also carry out protection operations for US transport ships carrying troops and equipment from the US mainland and Hawaii to the Far East region. But most importantly, the protection of the Maritime Pre-positioning Ship Squadrons—within the concept of “rear area supports”—is crucial in Korean contingency. In comparison to the US reinforcement from the US mainland—in other words, dispatching Armored Brigade Combat Team from the United States to the Korean Peninsula—that would be time-consuming, a prepositioned military equipment floating in and around of Guam could be deployed to South Korea in five days due to its geographical proximity and could head towards South Korea even before an official decision for deployment is made.¹¹¹⁴ The number of US naval forces in South Korea seems small in its size—350 sailors, which is much smaller than the air force. However, the naval port facilities can substantially reinforce the US’ warfighting capabilities on short notice through Maritime Pre-positioning Ship Squadrons.

The Maritime Prepositioning Ships are strategically forward deployed around the world which provide geographical combatant commands with persistent forward presence and rapid crisis response. There exists three Maritime Pre-positioning Squadrons: Maritime Prepositioning Squadron One (which in charge of eastern Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea), Maritime Prepositioning Squadron Two (which in charge of the Indian Ocean), and Maritime Prepositioning Squadron Three (which in charge of the western Pacific Ocean).¹¹¹⁵ As an asset under the US Seventh Fleet, Maritime Prepositioning Squadron Three is usually stationed near Guam and constantly rotating in and around Guam and Okinawa.¹¹¹⁶ As of 2018, the Maritime Prepositioning Squadron Three has 18 ships under its tactical control that

¹¹¹² Bruce W. Bennett, “Japanese ‘Counterstrike’ May Be Good for ROK Security,” *RAND*, Dec 28, 2022.

¹¹¹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹⁴ Michael J. Lostumbo et al., *Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces: An Assessment of Related Costs and Strategic Benefits* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2013), 53.

¹¹¹⁵ James C. Bates, “What Army Logisticians Should Know About the Marine Corps,” *Army Logistician* 35, no. 4 (2003): 11-13.

¹¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

carries prepositioned US military cargo for the US Air Force, the US Army, and the US Marine Corps.¹¹¹⁷ The prepositioned fleet consists of three squadrons continuously floats around the waters of Guam, Diego Garcia, and the Mediterranean. Each of these squadron are capable of supporting and sustaining 17,300 marines and 2,100 naval personnel for 30 days.¹¹¹⁸ Given the massive amounts of military platforms and war materials that it carries (see Table 11), Maritime Prepositioning Squadron Three is expected to play a crucial role in case of a military contingency in the Korean Peninsula, especially in the first weeks of the war: together with the USFJ, Maritime Prepositioning Squadron Three will fill the void until the bulk of the US reinforcements would be dispatched from the US mainland to the Korean peninsula.

Table 11. Lists of War Materials that a Single Maritime Prepositioned Ship Squadron Could Carry¹¹¹⁹

Item	Quantity
Amphibious assault vehicles	105
M1A1 tanks	30
155-millimeter howitzers	30
Five-ton cargo trucks	282
Five-ton dump trucks	42
Cargo/troop carriers (HMMWV)	530
TOW missile launchers	76
Million gallons of cargo fuel	5.2

Ship inspection, rescue and search operations

If Japan determines that it is necessary to carry out search and rescue operations and ship inspection operations—in accordance with the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the Act on Ship Inspection Operations in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan—the Prime Minister of Japan will decide whether to take such measures and the Cabinet Meeting will finally decide the basic plans on countermeasures.

¹¹¹⁷ Military Sealift Command Far East, Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadron Three, “Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadron Conducts Group Sail with Guam Units,” *U.S. Department of Defense*, August 31, 2018.

¹¹¹⁸ Mark E. Gebicke, *Military Prepositioning: Army & Air Force Programs Need to Be Reassessed* (Collingdale: Diane Publishing Company, 1998), 60.

¹¹¹⁹ James C. Bates, “What Army Logisticians Should Know About the Marine Corps,” *Army Logistician* 35, no. 4 (2003): 11-13. The examples presented in Table 11 highlight key instances, but it is important to note that the Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron Three has the capability to transport a wide range of military platforms and war materials beyond those listed.

5.2.11. South Korea's Stance

To be sure, SDF needs the consent of the country where the military conflict arises. South Korea would probably welcome the following activities: (1) Japanese naval and air war operations in the vicinity of North Korean territorial waters; (2) Japan's assistance as a staging area for US forces; (3) SDF transport aircraft using South Korean airports in order to evacuate Japanese citizens.¹¹²⁰ However, South Korea would unlikely to allow the presence of Japanese SDF troops on its soil.¹¹²¹ This involves a complex set of issues: if the US requests Japan to dispatch JSDF aircraft and ships to South Korea to withdraw US citizens and families of the USFK, it will not be easy for the South Korean government to reject them.¹¹²²

The potential for the JSDF to engage in combined operations alongside their US counterparts on South Korean land, sea, and air became a subject of concern, particularly when the 1997 US-Japan Guidelines introduced considerations for the areas surrounding Japan.¹¹²³ In this regard, numerous South Korean military experts have provided assurances that such an occurrence is unlikely to happen. For instance, the 2006 Korea Institute for Defense Analysis report pointed out that JSDF conducting military operations on the Korean peninsula alongside the United States in case of a Korean contingency will simply not going to happen, since JSDF could only provide logistical support to the US forces in Japan to carry out smooth operations. The report added that such speculation—Japan could engage in a combined operation with the United States in an event of an emergency on the Korean peninsula by expanding the role of the JSDF—only raises unnecessary misunderstanding.¹¹²⁴ Furthermore, ever since the enactment of the 1999 SIASJ Law, South Korea has maintained strong stance against the JSDF being dispatched to the Korean peninsula. Momentarily after the 2015 security legislations were passed in the Japanese Diet, South Korean Defense

¹¹²⁰ In such a scenario, close coordination and approval from the South Korean government would be imperative. Additionally, Article 88-2 of the JSDF Law specifies that the JSDF is obliged to adhere to international laws and customs when employing force. Former Japanese Minister of Defense, Nakatani Ken, emphasized that it is inconceivable for the JSDF to operate in the territorial waters of Korea without the consent of the South Korean authorities.

¹¹²¹ “美CRS bunseokgwan ilbonui ‘hanbando chulbyeong eun sangsangmoshal il’ [CRS Analyst “Dispatching Japanese Troops to the Korean Peninsula is Unthinkable], *Yonhap News Agency*, October 30, 2013.

¹¹²² “Ilbon jawidae jubyonguk hubangjiwon myeongmogeuro eolmana hwalgachilkka” [How Far Will the JSDF Move Forward in the Name of Rear Area Support for Neighboring Countries], *Hankook Ilbo*, September 19, 2015.

¹¹²³ Akiyama Masahiro 秋山昌廣, *Moto bōei jimujikan akiyama akira hiroshi kaikoroku: reisen go no anzen hoshō to bōei kōryū* 元防衛事務次官 秋山昌廣回顧録：冷戦後の安全保障と防衛交流 [Memoirs of Akiyama Masahiro, Former Vice-Minister of Defense: Post-Cold War Security and Defense Exchange] (Tōkyō: Yoshida Shoten, 2018), 163-164.

¹¹²⁴ Song Wha-sup and Kim Chang-soo, “Juilmigun jaepyeon choejonghabuie daehan pyeongga” [Evaluation of the Final Agreement on the Reorganization of US Forces Japan], *Northeast Asia Strategic Analysis*, (2006): 1-4.

Minister Han Min-koo assured that the South Korea could prevent JSDF's entry into the Korean peninsula even if it was requested by the United States.¹¹²⁵ Nevertheless, some experts raised concern that the JSDF could operate within the Korean peninsula without South Korea's permission. Since the South Korean wartime OPCON is handed over to the US commander, it could be possible for the US commander to declare war zone (within the Korean peninsula) and the JSDF arriving in that area—by directly asking permission to the Commander of US-ROK Combined Forces Command—for the sake of US-Japan combined operations. In that case, it is doubtful that Japan would comply to South Korea's demand for JSDF's non-entry.¹¹²⁶ Moreover, despite the outcomes of war simulations that favor the US-ROK combined forces in the event of a full-scale military attack from North Korea, there exists a potential scenario where the US-ROK combined forces might struggle to defend Seoul.¹¹²⁷ In such a situation, if the Commander of US Forces Korea deems it strategically and/or tactically vital in countering North Korean aggression, the introduction of the JSDF into South Korean territory would be deemed acceptable by the South Koreans.¹¹²⁸

5.2.12. US-Japan Combined Military Exercises in the Post-Cold War Era

As aforementioned, US-Japan combined military exercises took off earnestly in the early 1980s. Yet it is worth examining how such exercises have evolved with the passage of time and factored in changes like the adoption of the 1997 Guidelines and the SIASJ Law in 1999. Five categories of exercises are worth mentioning: (1) military exercises concerning ballistic missile defense; (2) anti-air warfare exercises; (3) anti-submarine warfare exercises; (4) minesweeping exercises.

Firstly, US and Japan conducted various types of combined military exercises when it comes to ballistic missile defense. Keen Edge exercise is a command post exercise conducted annually since 1986.¹¹²⁹ In Keen Edge 2020, the US Forces Japan and the Japan's Joint Staff tested the interoperability of the Integrated Air and Missile Defense and evaluated how well

¹¹²⁵ “Hanmingu gukbang miguni yocheonghaedo jawidae hanbando jinip mageul su issda” [Defense Minister Han Min-koo, Can Prevent the Self-Defense Force from Entering the Korea Peninsula even if Requested by the United States Military], *Hankook Ilbo*, September 21, 2015.

¹¹²⁶ “Honghyeonik uri oegyoman goripdwaessdaneun jijeok jinachyeo, daemioegyo ganghwahaeya” [Hong Hyun-ik — It is an Overblown Criticism that South Korea is Diplomatically Isolated. Diplomacy with the US Must be Strengthened], *CPBC News*, May 4, 2015.

¹¹²⁷ Cheon Jong-woong, interviewed by author, Seoul, April 27, 2023.

¹¹²⁸ Seo Yoon-won, interviewed by author, Seoul, April 27, 2023.

¹¹²⁹ Cynthia Ann Watson, *Combatant Commands: Origins, Structure, and Engagements* (Westport: Praeger, 2011), 216.

the command works between the two countries in the event of a contingency.¹¹³⁰ Pacific Dragon is a biennial military exercise primarily designed to enhance interoperability in tracking and reporting air and missile targets among the participant countries: the United States, Japan, and South Korea.¹¹³¹ For instance, during the Pacific Dragon exercise in 2020, multinational navies—which includes the US Navy and Japanese Maritime SDF—simulated ballistic missile interceptions.¹¹³² Meanwhile, the US and Japan conducted computer based simulation training. Also known as Fleet Synthetic Training-Joint exercise, both countries focused on testing naval tactics, techniques and procedures against potential regional threats like North Korea in the Resilient Shield exercise.¹¹³³ One of the key aim of the Resilient Shield exercise was to improve data links which would enable the US and Japanese missile defense system to share a common operating picture during contingency.¹¹³⁴ In addition, the US and Japan attempted to integrate army air and missile defense system into the existing ballistic missile defense architecture during the 2020 Keen Sword exercise.¹¹³⁵

Secondly, combined exercises involving anti-air warfare were carried out. Ever since 1986, the US and Japan conducted Keen Sword, a field training exercise, which involved anti-aircraft weapons systems and tactics to defend against simulated air threats.¹¹³⁶ For instance, during the 1999 Keen Sword exercise, around 150 US Air Force and JASDF aircraft participated. In this exercise, the two countries simulated air to air combat with enemy aircrafts that attacked US Navy and JMSDF vessels and applied various air combat as well as air defense tactics. The aircraft of both countries also engaged in simulated air combat which

¹¹³⁰ Raquel Birk, “Japanese ‘Keed Edge 2020 tests 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade’s Ability to ‘Fight Tonight’,” *US Indo-Pacific Command*, Jan 31, 2020.

¹¹³¹ Commander, US Pacific Fleet Public Affairs, “Missile Defense Exercise Pacific Dragon 2022, Concludes Near Hawaii,” *America’s Navy*, Aug 15, 2022. In 1999, Japan and South Korea embarked on their first joint naval exercise. Subsequently, the United States, Japan, and South Korea continued to conduct several trilateral naval exercises in and around the waters of the Korean peninsula, with notable instances occurring in 2012. The signing of the 2014 Trilateral Intelligence-Sharing Arrangement (TISA) further facilitated such exercises. One prominent exercise, Pacific Dragon, focusing on missile warning, took place in 2016, aligning with the Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement. Joint maritime exercises in response to North Korea’s ballistic missiles prompted collaborative actions by the US, Japan, and South Korea. Notably, in October 2017, the three navies conducted trilateral naval exercises in the eastern waters of the Korean peninsula, aimed at enhancing ballistic missile defense capabilities among the participating nations.

¹¹³² Narisawa Kaigo, “For 1st Time in 6 Years, Pacific Dragon Missile Drill Disclosed,” *The Asahi Shimbun*, Aug 17, 2022.

¹¹³³ Rich Abott, “US and Japanese Naval Forces Begin Resilient Shield Exercise,” *Defense Daily*, Feb 25, 2021.

¹¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹³⁵ Raquel Birk, “Keen Sword Redefines Integrated US-Japan Air, Missile Defense,” *US Army*, Nov 10, 2020. Keen Sword is a biennial exercise that includes a range of military training activities, including air-to-air combat, amphibious landings, and ballistic missile defense.

¹¹³⁶ “Keen Sword,” *GolbalSecurity.org*, accessed Mar 21, 2023, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/keen-sword.htm>.

would provide air cover to the JGSDF during 1999 Keen Sword exercise.¹¹³⁷ Cope North, a field training exercise—which is typically held annually at Anderson Air Force Base in Guam—also air operations including air-to-air combat and close air support.¹¹³⁸ Yet unlike Keen Sword exercise—that involves a broad range of military operations—Cope North exercise focuses specifically on air operations.¹¹³⁹ Meanwhile, Japan participated in the Red Flag exercise—a multilateral exercise that includes the participation of US and allied military forces, focused on improving air combat skills and readiness—starting from 2005. During the 2021 Red Flag exercise, US, Japan, and South Korean aircraft participated in a series of commander-directed field training exercises provides joint offensive counter-air, interdiction, close air support, and large force employment training.¹¹⁴⁰

Thirdly, combined exercises focused on anti-submarine warfare were executed. JMSDF has been running naval exercise since 1996 named Annual Exercise (ANNUALEX).¹¹⁴¹ Although the Annual Exercise included various operations including anti-air and cross deck flight operations, anti-submarine warfare was also the key component of the exercise.¹¹⁴² US Navy and JMSDF also conducted anti-submarine warfare exercise in the Keen Sword exercise: similar to the Annual Exercise, Keen Sword is a comprehensive exercise which includes not only anti-submarine warfare, but also amphibious and air operations.¹¹⁴³ The United States and Japan also conducted anti-submarine warfare exercise through Submarine Competition (SUBCOMP). Submarine Competition exercise was primarily designed to assess Japanese submarine crews' ability in conducting various types of anti-submarine warfare using a number of platforms.¹¹⁴⁴ During the 2019 exercise, US Navy sonar technicians from the US Pacific Fleet Navy Data Center embarked on a Japanese submarine and presumably shared insights concerning diesel submarine operations and tactics.¹¹⁴⁵ While both countries biennially conducted anti-submarine warfare exercises in the

¹¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹¹³⁸ Pacific Air Forces Public Affairs, "Australia, Japan, US Stand Up Multinational Task Force for Cope North 23," *Pacific Air Forces*, Jan 27, 2023.

¹¹³⁹ In addition, Keen Sword exercise is conducted bilaterally between the United States and Japan, Cope North exercise is a trilateral exercise that consist of US, Japan, and Australia.

¹¹⁴⁰ Sheila deVera, "Red Flag-Alaska 21-2 Starts," *US Indo-Pacific Command*, Jun 11, 2021.

¹¹⁴¹ Olivia Liao, "Experts Say China's Stance in Indo-Pacific Added Realism to 5-Nation Naval Drill," *Voice of America*, Nov 30, 2021.

¹¹⁴² Ibid.

¹¹⁴³ US Indo-Pacific Command Public Office, "Japan SDF, US Military to Begin Exercise Keen Sword, Oct. 26," *US Indo-Pacific Command*, Oct 25, 2020.

¹¹⁴⁴ Submarine Group Seven Public Affairs Office, "US Submarine Participates in Japan MSDF Submarine Competition," *US Indo-Pacific Command*, Feb 12, 2019.

¹¹⁴⁵ Franz Stefan Gady, "US Navy Attack Sub to Participate in Japanese Anti-Submarine Warfare Drill: A US Navy Submarine Will Participate in the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Submarine Competition this Week,"

RIM of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) since 1980,¹¹⁴⁶ there were also one-shot multilateral exercises centered on anti-submarine warfare.¹¹⁴⁷

Fourth, minesweeping exercise. Apart from the one-off exercises, Exercise Mine Warfare Exercise (MINEX) was the most comprehensive exercise focused on mine warfare: originally designed to improve coordination and interoperability between the US Navy and JMSDF in the area of mine countermeasures it included activities like mine hunting, mine sweeping, and mine neutralization.¹¹⁴⁸ In MINEX, Japan utilized sizeable minesweeping units. For instance, during the 2020 exercise, 19 ships—which consist of various types of minesweepers—from the JMSDF participated in the MINEX.¹¹⁴⁹

5.2.13. US-Japan-ROK Combined Military Exercises in the Post-Cold War Era

In addition to the combined military exercises between the United States and Japan, trilateral exercises involving the United States, Japan, and South Korea have been conducted since 2008. One such example is the Search and Rescue Exercise (SAREX). These exercises became a regular occurrence from 2008 onwards, taking place near Hawaii, and later near Jeju Island in 2011, a year after the ROKS Cheonan sinking incident in 2010.¹¹⁵⁰

In response to North Korea's threat of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and SLBMs, anti-submarine warfare exercises were conducted in the international waters between South Korea and Japan, specifically in the southern waters of Jeju, in April 2017.¹¹⁵¹ Similar anti-submarine warfare exercises occurred in September 2022, where the USS Ronald Reagan, a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier, entered Busan on September 23, and on September 30, the three countries, including the US nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, conducted a combined anti-submarine exercise more than 150 kilometers away from Dokdo/Takeshima in the international waters of the East Sea.¹¹⁵²

The Diplomat, Feb 13, 2019.

¹¹⁴⁶ Fred Hiatt, "Japan Boosts Military Readiness," *The Washington Post*, Aug 11, 1986.

¹¹⁴⁷ Jacob Dirr, "Maritime Forces from Japan, UK, US Practice Submarine Hunting in Philippine Sea," *Commander, US 7th Fleet*, Dec 20, 2018.

¹¹⁴⁸ "US and Japanese Navies Began Mine Warfare Exercise 3JA 2020 Off the Coast of Southwestern Japan," *Navy Recognition*, Nov 20, 2020.

¹¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵⁰ US Third Fleet Public Affairs, "Trilateral Exercise to be Conducted Off Coast of Hawaii," *US Pacific Fleet*, Aug 6, 2012.

¹¹⁵¹ US Seventh Fleet Public Affairs, "U.S., Republic of Korea Navies and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Conduct Anti-Submarine Warfare Exercise" *US Indo-Pacific Command*, Aug 3, 2017.

¹¹⁵² Ziyi Chen, "US, Japan, and South Korea Hold Joint Anti-Submarine Drill Against North Korea," *IR Inside*, Apr 8, 2023.

Furthermore, trilateral military exercises with a focus on tracking ballistic missiles and information sharing took place in February 2023. The exercise involved the US Navy's Arleigh Burke-class Aegis destroyer Barry, the JMSDF's advanced Aegis destroyer Atago, and the South Korean Navy's Aegis destroyer Sejong the Great.¹¹⁵³ Comparable trilateral joint exercises took place in November 2023 in the vicinity of Jeju Island, showcasing the participation of the US aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force's Murasame-class destroyers, and the South Korean Navy's destroyers equipped with the Aegis combat system.¹¹⁵⁴

Meanwhile in October 2023, the three countries conducted their first-ever trilateral aerial exercise, representing a significant step in their efforts to strengthen defense cooperation amidst the increasing missile and nuclear threats posed by North Korea.¹¹⁵⁵

¹¹⁵³ Jesse Johnson, "Japan, South Korea and U.S. Stage Rare Joint Naval Drill After North Korean Launches," *The Japan Times*, Feb 22, 2023.

¹¹⁵⁴ Kim Eun-jung, "S. Korea, U.S., Japan Stage Joint Naval Drills Involving Aircraft Carrier," *Yonhap News Agency*, Nov 26, 2023.

¹¹⁵⁵ Kim Hyung-jin, "South Korea, US and Japan Hold First-Ever Trilateral Aerial Exercise in Face of North Korean Threats," *AP News*, Oct 22, 2023.

Conclusion

On the Three Types of Contributions

This study has identified three categories of Japan's security contribution to South Korea and the overview is illustrated in Figure 17. In Phase I (1950-1953), logistical contributions were high, operational contributions were moderate, and financial and technological contributions were minimal. During Phase II (1954-1968), logistical support declined to a moderate level, operational support became negligible, and financial and technological contributions remained minimal. Phase III (1969-1995) experienced a peak in financial and technological contributions, specifically during 1970 to 1973 and 1982 to 1989, with logistic support and operational support remaining moderate and negligible, respectively. In Phase IV (1996-2014), logistic support became high, operational support remained moderate, and financial and technological contributions became negligible. In Phase V (2015-2023), logistics remained high, operational contributions became high, and financial and technological support remained negligible.




Figure 17: Crucial Events and Trend of Three Types of Contributions

Meanwhile, Japan's strategic choices in providing contributions during different phases were shaped by underlying structural reasons. In Phase I (1950-1953), the Japanese government predominantly opted for logistical support as the primary means of contributing

to South Korea. This decision stemmed from the use of Japan by the United Nations forces, primarily comprised of US forces, as a launching pad and primary supply depot for military operations during the Korean War. Financial and technological support from Japan during this phase was negligible, as the bulk of such aid came from the United States. Additionally, the absence of normalization between Japan and South Korea presented challenges for Japan to offer substantial financial and technological support. While Japan provided operational support by dispatching minesweepers to Korean waters, the country refrained from sending combat units to the Korean Peninsula due to domestic and international constraints. Therefore, Japan's operational support during this phase could be characterized as neither high nor negligible (in other words, moderate).

In Phase II (1954-1968), subsequent to the signing of the Korean Armistice in 1953, Japan's operational support naturally diminished. Despite the normalization of relations between Japan and South Korea in 1965, US aid continued to play a significant role in meeting South Korea's economic needs. Consequently, South Korea did not seek financial and technological support from Japan. Although logistic support decreased in comparison to Phase I, it retained significance among the three types of contributions throughout Phase II. Japan continued to fulfill a crucial role in meeting the requirements of US bases in Japan in the event of a Korean contingency, a commitment ensured by the signing of a secret agreement between the United States and Japan.

During Phase III (1969-1995), levels of logistic and operational support remained largely unchanged from Phase II due to similar conditions. However, South Korea actively sought Japan's financial and technological support for constructing the Pohang steel mill in the late 1960s, as US aid restrictions in heavy industry and a lack of international financing posed challenges to South Korea. In the early 1980s, South Korea requested defense burden sharing but due to domestic political constraints, Japan refrained from providing military hardware and instead offered a \$4 billion loan.

In Phase IV (1996-2014), Japan's financial and technological support diminished as South Korea's economic growth made such contributions unnecessary. Operational support increased from a negligible level in Phase III to a moderate level in Phase IV, primarily due to the 1997 Defense Guidelines and the 1999 Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (SIASJ Law). Logistic support saw a substantial increase, driven by the launch of a North Korean ballistic missile over Japan in 1998, prompting Japan to enhance measures protecting US bases from various threats.

During Phase V (2015-2023), Japan's financial and technological support remained negligible due to South Korea's sound economic growth. However, logistic and operational support increased as the Japanese government implemented additional measures to protect US bases and expanded the role of the JSDF during potential Korean contingencies.

Findings

This study has identified six key findings regarding the reasoning why Japan contributed to the security of South Korea: (1) Japan extended security support to South Korea to win favor from the United States; (2) Japan intensified its security efforts for South Korea in response to a perceived significant North Korean threat; (3) The fear of US abandonment is the third most important determinant influencing Japan's contributions; (4) Japan consistently made security contributions throughout the analyzed timeframe, irrespective of the state of Japan-ROK relations; (5) The strength or vocal opposition of Socialist and Communist factions did influence Japan's security contributions to South Korea.

Findings 1. Japan provided contributions with the aim of garnering favor from the US

Japan extended security contributions to South Korea strategically, particularly when seeking favor from the United States, even if it involved a tradeoff. This tradeoff entailed Japan selectively determining the nature of its contributions, without fully adhering to all of the US' demands and/or expectations.

Significant instances of Japan seeking favor from the United States were particularly pronounced in the early years of the Korean War. This objective was evident in Prime Minister Yoshida's efforts to secure favorable terms for the San Francisco Treaty, a stance observed by high-ranking officials including Director Okubo Takeo. Despite Japan's official policy of cooperation with the United Nations and offering full support to the United States, this cooperation was selective. For instance, Japanese political leaders strongly opposed the idea of allowing Japanese "volunteers" to participate in the Korean War. In July, Yoshida, stated that Japan had renounced the right to engage in belligerent action and emphasized Japan's commitment to peace. In this context, Yoshida instructed that the minesweeping operation be conducted discreetly, with a low-profile approach, and without public knowledge.

Another instance of Japan seeking favor from the United States can be observed in the late 1960s to early 1970s when Japan pursued the return of sovereignty over Okinawa. Prime

Minister Sato recognized the importance of Okinawa's reversion and made it a major political issue, emphasizing that the return of Okinawa to its homeland was crucial to concluding the post-war period for Japan. However, this approach raised concerns in both the United States and South Korea regarding potential limitations on the US forces' use of Okinawa as a launching and logistic pad in the event of a Korean contingency. Eventually, in 1969, Prime Minister Sato acknowledged the significance of South Korea to Japan's security and promised that Tokyo would respond "positively and promptly" to request from the United States to use bases in Japan, including Okinawa, in a Korean contingency. Despite critics in Japan (this group encompasses members of the Socialist Party, including figures like Saburo Eda, as well as residents of Okinawa) arguing that allowing Okinawa's bases to be used in a Korean contingency was too high a price for the reversion, the US presence was maintained, and Okinawa continued to serve as a crucial launching pad for US forces in the Far East.

Considering these two cases, it can be said that Japan provided security contributions to South Korea when Japan aimed to secure favor from the United States, even though it involved a tradeoff. This tradeoff meant that Japan selectively determined the type of contribution it would provide, without fully complying with all of US' demand or expectations. For example, during the Korean War, Yoshida decided to support the US war efforts on the Korean peninsula as a means to negotiate favorable terms in the San Francisco Treaty. However, Yoshida chose not to send Japanese volunteers as combatants and maintained a low profile when dispatching minesweepers to Korean waters. In the case of Okinawa reversion, Japan's ideal outcome would have been the reduction of US military bases and troops, along with the complete withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons, from Okinawa. This would have led to a reduction of Japan's logistic support provided to South Korea compared to what actually happened. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Sato prioritized the Okinawa reversion and reached a compromise by allowing US forces to continue using US forces Japan bases in Okinawa in the post-1972 era. This outcome, of course, contributed to South Korean security, as opposed to the complete or partial withdrawal of US forces and/or the complete or partial relocation of US bases in Okinawa.

Findings 2. Japan offered support when it deemed North Korea's threat to South Korea, grave

Japan increased its security contributions to South Korea in response to a perceived significant North Korean threat. Whenever an incident or development originating from North Korea was deemed detrimental to South Korean security from the Japanese perspective, Japan took measures to help the South Koreans.

During the Korean War, Japan took the threat posed by North Korea to South Korea very seriously. For example, in July 1950, Prime Minister Yoshida expressed during a session of the Japanese Diet that South Korea was currently in chaos, with communist advancing toward Japan's vicinity. Even after signing of the 1953 Armistice Agreement, Japan continued to view the possibility of an all-out war from North Korea against South Korea with great concern. The 1963 Mitsuya Study conducted by JSDF envisaged a full-scale attack by North Korea on South Korea, indicating Japan's genuine belief in the conventional threat posed by North Korea.

This perception persisted from 1969 to 1995, with incidents like the Pueblo abduction and the Blue House raid in 1968 leading Prime Minister Sato to underscore the serious threat to South Korean defense, which was closely related to Japan's national interest. Despite intentions to cooperate with the South Korean government, Japan did not fulfill South Korea's request for counter-guerrilla equipment in 1968, highlighting Japan's adherence to its pacifist constitution and avoidance of direct contributions to South Korea's security.

In the 1970s, under the leadership of Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, Miki Takeo, and Fukuda Takeo, there was a brief period when Japan perceived the North Korean threat against South Korea as not significant. However, there were incidents in the 1970s when Japan viewed North Korea's threat towards South Korea with concern, aligning with Japan's policy of omnidirectional peaceful diplomacy.

Japan modified its perception of the North Korean threat during the 1980s, considering it a serious threat to South Korea. This shift was influenced by discussions initiated by former Prime Minister Tanaka on Japan shouldering a greater burden through economic compensation to South Korea. Tanaka emphasized Japan's recognition of South Korea's efforts in defending against the potential all-out aggression by North Korea.

Following the partial resolution of the first North Korean nuclear crisis through the Agreed Framework in 1994, Japan's perception of the North Korean threat somewhat diminished. However, in Phase V (2015-2023), Japan witnessed a rise in its perception of the North Korean threat to South Korea. While acknowledging North Korea's conventional forces' inferiority to those of the US Forces Korea and South Korea, Japan believes that North Korea's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and missiles presents a grave and immediate risk to South Korea's security, as indicated in the Japanese defense white paper.

Yet, it is worth mentioning that the specific nature of the contribution chosen by the Japanese government evolved over time. For instance, when Yoshida expressed concerns at

the onset of the Korean War, he opted for the highest level of contribution in logistical and operational fields. Conversely, when North Korea attempted to assassinate President Park in 1968, the Japanese did not supply anti-guerrilla weapons but offered financial and technological assistance. This decision facilitated South Korea in establishing the Pohang Steel mill and subsequently pursuing full-scale industrialization. Similarly, during the transition from President Park's assassination to President Chun's assumption of power, and when South Korea was perceived as vulnerable to North Korean provocation, political figures like Tanaka Kakuei emphasized the importance of supporting South Korea, at least through financial and technological assistance. This ultimately led to Japan's decision to provide a \$4 billion fund to South Korea, starting in 1982. Fast forward to when North Korea demonstrated its nuclear capabilities through nuclear tests in the 2000s, Japan became concerned about the implications for South Korean security. Consequently, Japan notably increased its potential capabilities in both operational and logistical fields, revising Defense Guidelines and domestic security legislation in 2015 to better respond in the event of a Korean contingency. It is noteworthy that many sources indicate that, despite individual differences in interpreting the concept of security, there appears to be a near consensus among Japanese leaders in the post-war period that South Korea serves as a strategic buffer to Japan's security. Hence, it is logical that, based on this perspective, supporting South Korea in resisting North Korean provocations and averting a Korean peninsula under communist occupation is of paramount importance.

Findings 3. Japan's contribution remained steadfast despite an increase in US commitment

When the United States' security commitment to South Korea decreased, there was a noticeable upswing in Japan's security contributions to South Korean defense. Nevertheless, Japan's security contribution did not necessarily wane even when the United States increased its security commitment to South Korea.

Concerning Japan's perception of the weakened commitment of the United States to South Korean defense, two significant instances stand out—the declaration of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969 and the inauguration of the US presidency by Carter in 1977. During these events, Japan perceived a diminishing commitment from the United States to South Korean defense. Before the withdrawal of the US Seventh Infantry Division from South Korea in March 1971, based on the Nixon Doctrine, the Japanese government expressed concerns. For example, in July 1970, Prime Minister Sato conveyed to Secretary of State William Rogers that the reduction of US military presence would have a substantial impact, emphasizing the

delicate timing of such a decision. Additionally, on July 13, 1970, Nakasone, the head of the Defense Agency, voiced negative sentiments about the reduction of US military presence in South Korea in the Japanese Diet. Similarly, on July 30, 1970, the Japanese Foreign Ministry requested the United States to reconsider the reduction of USFK. Japanese Ambassador to the United States Shimoda Takeso emphasized that the reduction should not be solely judged by numerical figures and that it could undermine South Korea's psychological confidence. Nevertheless, Japan ultimately accepted the US troop reduction and considered providing economic assistance to South Korea. However, Japan opted not to furnish military hardware, particularly anti-guerrilla weapons, to South Korea.

Similar patterns were observed when Carter became US president in 1977. In March 1977, Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda expressed opposition to the withdrawal of USFK, citing concerns about stability on the Korean peninsula during a discussion with President Carter. However, during Fukuda's meeting with Vice President Walter Mondale that year, Fukuda changed his stance from staunch opposition to a neutral stance, treating the USFK withdrawal as a matter between the United States and South Korea. Fukuda also showed reluctance in offering direct military assistance, such as military hardware, to South Korea. This suggests that while Japan harbored concerns about the US commitment to South Korea in both situations, it favored adhering to the principles of the Yoshida Doctrine and remained hesitant to directly engage in bolstering South Korea's defense sector, for example, by providing military equipment.

Hypothesis 3 aligns well with the late 1960s and 1970s, as during that period, Japan was more inclined to increase its security support for South Korea when it perceived a weaker US defense commitment. However, this alignment is not as strong in the 1980s and 2010s, as Japan's inclination to bolster its security contributions to South Korea did not decrease even when it perceived a strong US defense commitment.

In fact, it was during the Reagan administration in the 1980s, a period when the United States' defense commitment was indisputably at its strongest in modern history, that Japan chose to engage in economic cooperation for security purposes and pledged \$4 billion loan to South Korea. Additionally, Japan's significant enhancement of its potential in the operational and logistical fields took place during the Obama administration in the 2010s, a time when US defense commitment was remained stable; although it may have been as strong as during the Reagan administration, it was nowhere near the level during the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations.

Japan's contribution to security of South Korea did not increase significantly during the Trump Administration, despite its perception that the United States might reduce its defense commitment to South Korea. In April 2018, when President Trump suggested reducing or completely withdrawing the US forces in South Korea, Prime Minister Abe opposed the idea, fearing it would upset the military balance in East Asia. During that time, the Japanese government expressed concern that a significant reduction or complete withdrawal of US forces in South Korea would hinder the US' ability to respond quickly in the event of a Korean contingency. Nonetheless, Japan's perception of US commitment to South Korea during the Trump administration (Phase V: 2015-2023) was characterized as "moderate," as the United States did not diminish its commitment during that period. In contrast, Japan's perception of US commitment to South Korea during the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations was deemed "weak," as it appeared to be a consistent pattern based on Nixon Doctrine rather than just the fleeting decision of a single president.

Findings in this study contradicts Victor Cha's theory, which posits that Japan and South Korea would align less when the United States had a robust defense commitment in the Far East. Victor Cha's claim, proposing that Japan heightened its security contribution to South Korea in response to reduced US security commitment, and conversely, diminished its contributions when the US commitment increased, is consistent with patterns observed in the late 1960s and 1970s. During this era, Japan exhibited a stronger willingness to enhance its security support for South Korea when it perceived a diminished commitment from the United States. However, this correlation is less conspicuous in the 1980s and 2010s, as Japan's propensity to bolster its security contributions to South Korea did not wane, or even increased, even in the presence of a robust US defense commitment during the Reagan and Obama Administrations.

Findings 4. Japan's contribution was largely unaffected by Japan-South Korea relations

Japan's commitment to South Korea's security was not significantly influenced by ups and downs in Japan-South Korea relations although there are some indications that Japan's commitment tends to increase when the relations between Japan and South Korea are positive. It is crucial to highlight, however, that Japan's dedication to security remained largely unchanged, even during periods of strained or unfavorable relations between the two countries.

In Phase I (1950-1953), a period marked by the absence of formal diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea, Japan played a pivotal role in supporting the United States'

war efforts during the Korean War. Notably, this commitment persisted consistently over the three-year duration of the conflict, even in the face of President Rhee's anti-Japanese sentiment, evident in his declaration of the Peace Line, which triggered negative reactions in Japan. Even after Japan regained independence through the signing of the San Francisco Treaty, the Japanese government continued its wholehearted commitment to supporting US forces. This unwavering dedication can be partially attributed to economic benefits arising from the "special demand." The United States engaged in specific acquisitions of war materials and logistical assistance from Japan during the Korean War, positively impacting Japan's economy. Beyond economic considerations, Japan's leadership recognized that safeguarding South Korea from communist aggression was closely intertwined with Japan's own security.

Moving into the post-Korean War era (1954-1961), following the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement until Park Chung-hee assumed power in 1961 and actively sought to improve Japan-ROK relations, interactions between Japan and South Korea were marked by a lack of friendliness. Ongoing discussions related to fisheries and compensation for the colonial era failed to yield substantial results during this period, aligning closely with Phase II (1954-1968). However, this phase also witnessed the establishment of the military structure in the Far East. The US-Japan Security Treaty and the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty were signed in 1951 and 1953, respectively. This strategic arrangement ensured that Japan served as a vital launchpad for both US Forces Japan and reinforcements from the continental United States in the event of an all-out war on the Korean peninsula. With such a defense structure in place, the United States and Japan initiated combined planning and exercises in the mid-1950s, in conjunction with the Coordinated Joint Outline Emergency Plan, preparing for potential military conflicts in the Korean peninsula.

Entering Phase III (1969-1995), several incidents emerged that significantly strained the overall relationship between Japan and South Korea. These included the abduction of Kim Dae-jung in 1973, Moon Se-gwang's assassination attempt on President Park in 1974, and the Japanese textbook issue in 1982. However, Japan continued to make security contributions to South Korea despite temporary strains in public opinion. This phase witnessed significant tangible contributions, including Japan's decision to allow South Koreans to use claims funds to build the Pohang steel mill and providing a \$4 billion loan for economic cooperation for security purposes. Additionally, preparations for a potential Korean contingency progressed discreetly on the Japanese side, with the 1963 Comprehensive Defense Tabletop Study including a scenario focused on such a contingency. As planning

continued, Japan actively explored avenues to enhance combined military exercises with the United States to effectively respond to regional crises, including potential Korean contingencies. The stability observed during Phase III can be attributed to the authoritarian rule in South Korea, effectively suppressing negative public sentiment that could have significantly impacted security cooperation. Presidents Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan, and Roh Tae-woo, all with military backgrounds, had a clear understanding of the security implications for South Korea in relation to Japan, particularly in the context of a potential all-out war situation.

Contrary to the majority of Phase III (1969-1992), the later portion of Phase III (1993-1995) and subsequent phases—Phase IV (1996-2014) and Phase V (2015-2023)—saw public opinion becoming a prominent factor in South Korea due to the democratization process unfolding in the late 1980s. In the early 1990s, when President Kim Young-sam implemented a hostile policy towards Japan, including territorial issues concerning Dokdo/Takeshima, Japan's security contribution appeared to decrease on the surface. However, this period coincided with the United States and Japan adjusting to the changing dynamics of the post-Cold War era, triggered by the collapse of the communist bloc. Despite novel approaches such as the withdrawal of US tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, the initial North Korean nuclear crisis incentivized the United States, Japan, and South Korea to maintain the Cold War defense structure in the Far East.

As a response, Japan implemented measures during Phase IV and Phase V to enhance its ability to contribute to its US counterpart in the event of a Korean contingency. Notable examples of these measures include the 1997 Defense Guidelines and the 1999 SIASJ Law. During Phase IV and V, particularly under the administrations of Presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in, historical issues related to Japan's colonial rule strained the relationship between the two countries. Additionally, attempts were made to pursue an equidistance diplomacy, prioritizing the reconciliation between the two Koreas and taking a step back from tripartite security cooperation. For instance, President Kim Dae-jung opted not to participate in the establishment of the US missile defense in the Far East, contrasting with Japan's eagerness to work in unison with its US counterpart. It is important to note that Japan's potential security contribution concerning a Korean contingency actually increased during Phase IV and Phase V. This was achieved through various measures aimed at enhancing the capabilities of the JSDF and expanding their role, enabling them to provide operational support to US forces in the Korean contingency.

Findings 5. Socialist/Communist factions did influence Japan's contribution to South Korea

The influence and vocal opposition of Socialist and Communist factions did impact Japan's security contributions to South Korea, both during the Cold War and the post-Cold War era. This influence was exerted through "invisible constraints" established by Japanese Socialist and Communist factions, factors that defense decision-makers in Japan had to consistently weigh throughout the post-war period.

Such aspect might not be so obvious on the surface. For example, in 1949, the Communist Party's attempt to sabotage and create chaos, highlighting the alleged incompetence of the Yoshida cabinet, led to a swift government crackdown on communist movements, restoring domestic stability; neither the Japanese Communist Party nor the Japanese Socialist Party could influence Yoshida's decision to fully cooperate with the US war efforts on the Korean peninsula. Similarly, although the 1960 protest may have contributed to Prime Minister Kishi's resignation, the US-Japan Security Treaty was revised as planned. The 1960 secret agreement between the United States and Japan ensured Japan's commitment to providing logistic support in the event of a Korean contingency. Additionally, despite the Japanese Socialist Party's prominence in the Diet during the 1970s, it achieved only minor victories, such as preventing the inclusion of refueling systems on Japanese F-4 Phantom Jets. However, it faced setbacks, notably in 1978 when it couldn't gather enough support to block the introduction of F-15 fighter jets. Similarly, during Socialist party leader Murayama's tenure as Japanese Prime Minister from 1994 to 1996, his defense policies were not significantly different from those of the Liberal Democratic Party.

Despite these events, it is not straightforward to conclude that Japan's security assistance to South Korea remained unaffected by the influence or vocal opposition of socialist and communist factions. For instance, numerous security-related agreements and documents had to be kept confidential during the Cold War era due to prevailing public sentiments influenced by anti-war and pacifist ideologies associated with Socialist and Communist factions. Certain security documents, including the 1960 Secret Agreement, were not disclosed to the public. When their existence was leaked, as seen in the Mitsuya Study, the Prime Minister had to assure the public that it was not a government-sanctioned project and would not be integrated into the official defense plan. While having such contingency plans is not unusual for a sovereign nation, the necessity for secrecy was driven by the prevailing anti-war sentiments.

These tendencies persisted into the post-Cold War era, even as Socialist and Communist factions diminished in influence. Although security agreements and documents were crafted and released to the public during this period, such as the Defense Guidelines and the 2015 Security Legislation, Japan's defense policy-making procedures remained constrained by the legacy of the environment shaped by Socialist and Communist factions. For example, the need to revise the 1978 Defense Guidelines was acknowledged by both the United States and Japan, particularly after the 1993-94 North Korean nuclear crisis. However, the revision had to be postponed until 1997 due to public uproar, partly fueled by Socialist and Communist factions, triggered by the Okinawa rape incident in 1995. This delay was attributed to the lack of an appropriate political environment for Japanese policymakers to proceed with the Defense Guidelines revisions.

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Cho Hyeon-chul: (former) Professor, Joint Forces Military University

Cho Jin-goo, Professor, The Institute for Far Eastern Studies

Choi Gyu-sang, (former) Officer, US-ROK Combined Forces Command

Choi Kyung-won, Associate Professor, Kyushu University

Chun In-bum, (former) Lieutenant General, ROK Army Special Warfare Command

Daniel Fillion, Officer, United States Navy Foreign Area Office

Furuya Kentaro, Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies

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Ito Kohtaro, Senior Research Fellow, The Canon Institute for Global Studies

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Jang Ki-deok, (former) Deputy Director at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses

Jeffrey W. Hornung, Senior Political Scientist, RAND

Jimbo Ken, Professor, Keio University

Kaminotani Hiroshi, (former) Lieutenant General, Japan Air Defense Command Vice Commander

Kanehara Nobukatsu, Executive Director, Sasakawa Peace Foundation

Kawakami Takashi, Officer, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force

Kim Cheol-su, (former) Officer, South Korean Military Logistics Support

Kim Hyung-a, Associate Professor, Australian National University

Kim Ki-jeong, (former) Professor, Korea National Defense University

Kim Young-tae: (former) Senior Researcher, Agency for Defense Development

Kitagawa Keizo, Dean, Strategic Studies Department, JMSDF Command and Staff College

Koga Kei, Associate Professor, Nanyang Technological University

Koyama Akinori, Officer, Maritime Self-Defense Force

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Kwon Tae-whan, President, Korea Defense Diplomacy Association

Lee Byeong-chang, Military Attaché, Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Japan

Lee Choong-koo, Senior Researcher, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses

Lee Myon-woo, Vice President, Sejong Institute

Lim Jae-hwan, Associate Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University

Lyte Holt, Commander, United Nations Commander Rear

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Soeya Yoshihide, (former) Professor, Keio University

Somei Kobayashi, Professor, Nihon University

Song Jae-geun, (former) Officer, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Tokuchi Hideshi, President, Research Institute for Peace and Security

Yanagisawa Kyoji, (former) Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary, Government of Japan

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Yuma Alexander Kuwata, Officer, United States Navy

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