@techreport{oai:grips.repo.nii.ac.jp:00001517,
 author = {MUNRO Alistair},
 note = {https://www.grips.ac.jp/list/jp/facultyinfo/munro_alistair/, When the set of possible messages depends on the actual state of the world, optimal incentive schemes to control environmental problems may not always satisfy the revelation principle. As a result, in equilibrium some agents may send false messages, particularly when the information rents in the truth- telling scheme are high. I characterise optimal pollution regulation schemes and produce some numerical examples to show mechanisms which allow some dishonesty in equilibrium may frequently outperform truth-telling schemes., JEL Classification Codes: D82, Q58, H23},
 title = {Little Green Lies : Optimal environmental regulation with partially verifiable information}
}