{"created":"2023-06-20T15:03:26.279279+00:00","id":1517,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"055b9443-2110-456b-ad36-855ee0f7f411"},"_deposit":{"created_by":16,"id":"1517","owners":[16],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"1517"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:grips.repo.nii.ac.jp:00001517","sets":["1:78"]},"author_link":["8228"],"item_12_description_18":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_12_description_22":{"attribute_name":"著者情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"https://www.grips.ac.jp/list/jp/facultyinfo/munro_alistair/","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_12_description_6":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"When the set of possible messages depends on the actual state of the world, optimal incentive schemes to control environmental problems may not always satisfy the revelation principle. As a result, in equilibrium some agents may send false messages, particularly when the information rents in the truth- telling scheme are high. I characterise optimal pollution regulation schemes and produce some numerical examples to show mechanisms which allow some dishonesty in equilibrium may frequently outperform truth-telling schemes.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_12_description_7":{"attribute_name":"内容記述","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"JEL Classification Codes: D82, Q58, H23","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_12_identifier_registration":{"attribute_name":"ID登録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_identifier_reg_text":"10.24545/00001514","subitem_identifier_reg_type":"JaLC"}]},"item_12_publisher_12":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"GRIPS Policy Research Center ","subitem_publisher_language":"en"}]},"item_12_relation_16":{"attribute_name":"関連サイト","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_name":[{"subitem_relation_name_text":"https://ideas.repec.org/p/ngi/dpaper/16-16.html"}],"subitem_relation_type":"isIdenticalTo","subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_id_text":"https://ideas.repec.org/p/ngi/dpaper/16-16.html","subitem_relation_type_select":"URI"}}]},"item_12_text_10":{"attribute_name":"発行年","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"2016-09"}]},"item_12_text_5":{"attribute_name":"著者所属","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"政策研究大学院大学 / National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies"}]},"item_12_version_type_19":{"attribute_name":"著者版フラグ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_version_resource":"http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa","subitem_version_type":"AM"}]},"item_1693541285410":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2016-09-29","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicVolumeNumber":"DP16-16","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"GRIPS Discussion Papers","bibliographic_titleLang":"en"}]}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"MUNRO Alistair","creatorNameLang":"en"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{}]}]},"item_files":{"attribute_name":"ファイル情報","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"accessrole":"open_access","filename":"DP16-16.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"369.0 kB"}],"format":"application/pdf","licensetype":"license_note","mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"label":"DP16-16.pdf","url":"https://grips.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/1517/files/DP16-16.pdf"},"version_id":"a3177978-df67-407d-9aae-98fbe1d40df3"}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"optimal incentives","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"hiding","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"pollution","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"adverse selection","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"technical report"}]},"item_title":"Little Green Lies : Optimal environmental regulation with partially verifiable information","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Little Green Lies : Optimal environmental regulation with partially verifiable information","subitem_title_language":"en"}]},"item_type_id":"12","owner":"16","path":["78"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"PubDate","attribute_value":"2016-09-29"},"publish_date":"2016-09-29","publish_status":"0","recid":"1517","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Little Green Lies : Optimal environmental regulation with partially verifiable information"],"weko_creator_id":"16","weko_shared_id":-1},"updated":"2023-11-20T08:44:54.320928+00:00"}