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Work Incentives of Medicaid Beneficiaries and the Role of Asset Testing
https://doi.org/10.24545/00001743
https://doi.org/10.24545/000017436cc47f61-c5f3-4fd4-971b-ce3f989d3a71
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
Int Econ Rev_58(4)_1117.pdf (315.5 kB)
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| Item type | 学術雑誌論文 / Journal Article(1) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2020-03-05 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Work Incentives of Medicaid Beneficiaries and the Role of Asset Testing | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | means-tested programs | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | health insurance | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Medicaid | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | asset testing | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | general equilibrium | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | life-cycle models | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
| 資源タイプ | journal article | |||||
| ID登録 | ||||||
| ID登録 | 10.24545/00001743 | |||||
| ID登録タイプ | JaLC | |||||
| 著者 |
PASHCHENKO, Svetlana
× PASHCHENKO, Svetlana× PORAPAKKARM, Ponpoje |
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| 抄録 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
| 内容記述 | Should asset testing be used in means-tested programs? These programs target low-income people, but low income can result not only from low productivity but also from low labor supply. We aim to show that in the asymmetric information environment, there is a positive role for asset testing. We focus on Medicaid, one of the largest means-tested programs in the US, and we ask two questions: 1) Does Medicaid distort work incentives? 2) Can asset testing improve the insurance-incentives trade-off of Medicaid? Our tool is a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents that matches many important features of the data. We find that 23% of Medicaid enrollees do not work in order to be eligible. These distortions are costly: if individuals’ productivity was observable and could be used to determine Medicaid eligibility, this results in substantial ex-ante welfare gains. When productivity is unobservable, asset testing is effective in eliminating labor supply distortions, but to minimize saving distortions, asset limits should be different for workers and non-workers. This work-dependent asset testing can produce welfare gains close to the case of observable productivity. | |||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | JEL Classification Codes: D52, D91, E21, H53, I13, I18 | |||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | This work is supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 15K03505 and GRIPS’ Research Project Grant. | |||||
| 書誌情報 |
International Economic Review 巻 58, 号 4, p. 1117-1154, 発行日 2017-11 |
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| 出版者 | ||||||
| 出版者 | Wiley (on behalf of the University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University) | |||||
| ISSN | ||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||
| 収録物識別子 | 0020-6598 | |||||
| ISSN | ||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||
| 収録物識別子 | 1468-2354 | |||||
| 書誌レコードID (NCID) | ||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
| 収録物識別子 | AA11619502 | |||||
| DOI | ||||||
| 関連タイプ | isVersionOf | |||||
| 識別子タイプ | DOI | |||||
| 関連識別子 | 10.1111/iere.12247 | |||||
| 権利 | ||||||
| 権利情報 | This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: Work Incentives of Medicaid Beneficiaries and the Role of Asset Testing, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12247. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions. | |||||
| 著者版フラグ | ||||||
| 出版タイプ | AM | |||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa | |||||
| フォーマット | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
| 著者情報 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | http://www.grips.ac.jp/list/jp/facultyinfo/porapakkarm-ponpoje/ | http://www.grips.ac.jp/list/jp/facultyinfo/porapakkarm-ponpoje/ | |||||
