{"created":"2023-06-20T15:03:37.268051+00:00","id":1755,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"6510bbf4-be69-452f-a3e8-cfc22f50fc4e"},"_deposit":{"created_by":3,"id":"1755","owners":[3],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"1755"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:grips.repo.nii.ac.jp:00001755","sets":["52:115"]},"author_link":["9045","9044"],"item_10001_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2017-11","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicIssueNumber":"4","bibliographicPageEnd":"1154","bibliographicPageStart":"1117","bibliographicVolumeNumber":"58","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"International Economic Review"}]}]},"item_10001_description_19":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_10001_description_25":{"attribute_name":"著者情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"http://www.grips.ac.jp/list/jp/facultyinfo/porapakkarm-ponpoje/ | http://www.grips.ac.jp/list/jp/facultyinfo/porapakkarm-ponpoje/","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_10001_description_5":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"Should asset testing be used in means-tested programs? These programs target low-income people, but low income can result not only from low productivity but also from low labor supply. We aim to show that in the asymmetric information environment, there is a positive role for asset testing. We focus on Medicaid, one of the largest means-tested programs in the US, and we ask two questions: 1) Does Medicaid distort work incentives? 2) Can asset testing improve the insurance-incentives trade-off of Medicaid? Our tool is a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents that matches many important features of the data. We find that 23% of Medicaid enrollees do not work in order to be eligible. These distortions are costly: if individuals’ productivity was observable and could be used to determine Medicaid eligibility, this results in substantial ex-ante welfare gains. When productivity is unobservable, asset testing is effective in eliminating labor supply distortions, but to minimize saving distortions, asset limits should be different for workers and non-workers. This work-dependent asset testing can produce welfare gains close to the case of observable productivity.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_10001_description_6":{"attribute_name":"内容記述","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"JEL Classification Codes: D52, D91, E21, H53, I13, I18","subitem_description_type":"Other"},{"subitem_description":"This work is supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 15K03505 and GRIPS’ Research Project Grant.","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_10001_identifier_registration":{"attribute_name":"ID登録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_identifier_reg_text":"10.24545/00001743","subitem_identifier_reg_type":"JaLC"}]},"item_10001_publisher_8":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"Wiley (on behalf of the University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University)"}]},"item_10001_relation_14":{"attribute_name":"DOI","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_type":"isVersionOf","subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_id_text":"10.1111/iere.12247","subitem_relation_type_select":"DOI"}}]},"item_10001_rights_15":{"attribute_name":"権利","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_rights":"This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: Work Incentives of Medicaid Beneficiaries and the Role of Asset Testing, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12247. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions."}]},"item_10001_source_id_11":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AA11619502","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_10001_source_id_9":{"attribute_name":"ISSN","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"0020-6598","subitem_source_identifier_type":"ISSN"},{"subitem_source_identifier":"1468-2354","subitem_source_identifier_type":"ISSN"}]},"item_10001_version_type_20":{"attribute_name":"著者版フラグ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_version_resource":"http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa","subitem_version_type":"AM"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"PASHCHENKO, Svetlana"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"9044","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"PORAPAKKARM, Ponpoje"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"9045","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_files":{"attribute_name":"ファイル情報","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"accessrole":"open_date","date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2020-03-05"}],"displaytype":"detail","filename":"Int Econ Rev_58(4)_1117.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"315.5 kB"}],"format":"application/pdf","licensetype":"license_note","mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"label":"Int Econ Rev_58(4)_1117.pdf","url":"https://grips.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/1755/files/Int Econ Rev_58(4)_1117.pdf"},"version_id":"04e4bb06-bfa5-4697-a826-8ff2ef6529f6"}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"means-tested programs","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"health insurance","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Medicaid","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"asset testing","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"general equilibrium","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"life-cycle models","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"journal article","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501"}]},"item_title":"Work Incentives of Medicaid Beneficiaries and the Role of Asset Testing","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Work Incentives of Medicaid Beneficiaries and the Role of Asset Testing"}]},"item_type_id":"10001","owner":"3","path":["115"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2020-03-05"},"publish_date":"2020-03-05","publish_status":"0","recid":"1755","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Work Incentives of Medicaid Beneficiaries and the Role of Asset Testing"],"weko_creator_id":"3","weko_shared_id":3},"updated":"2023-06-20T15:24:13.191859+00:00"}