{"created":"2024-09-20T04:34:10.170695+00:00","id":2000134,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"af4f8b38-355b-49fb-b39b-07f9c1170921"},"_deposit":{"created_by":16,"id":"2000134","owners":[16],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"2000134"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:grips.repo.nii.ac.jp:02000134","sets":["1:1712910681242"]},"author_link":[],"control_number":"2000134","item_12_description_22":{"attribute_name":"著者情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"https://www.grips.ac.jp/list/en/facultyinfo/litschig-stephan/","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_12_description_6":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"This paper investigates the extent to which competition for public contracts reduces projectlevel rents and bribe payments to public officials. Water supply and sanitation project contractors for the provincial government of Punjab in Pakistan were interviewed on the condition of anonymity and gave access to 237 project-level construction ledgers. Under collusion, contractors pay about 15 percent of the project budget in kickbacks on average. Under competition for the contract, the winning bid and associated available rents go down by about 11 percentage points. Even under competition, public officials take almost 10 percent of the project budget in bribes.","subitem_description_language":"en","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_12_description_7":{"attribute_name":"内容記述","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"JEL Classification Codes: D73, D78, H41, H83, K42","subitem_description_type":"Other"},{"subitem_description":"We acknowlededge financial support for data collection from the Japanese Society for the Promotion of Science (Kakenhi 25101002, \"Emerging State Project SONOBE A01 Group\").","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_12_identifier_registration":{"attribute_name":"identifier_registration","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_identifier_reg_text":"10.24545/0002000134","subitem_identifier_reg_type":"JaLC"}]},"item_12_publisher_12":{"attribute_name":"item_12_publisher_12","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"GRIPS Policy Research Center","subitem_publisher_language":"en"}]},"item_12_text_10":{"attribute_name":"item_12_text_10","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"2024-09"}]},"item_12_text_5":{"attribute_name":"著者所属","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"National Accountability Bureau of Pakistan"},{"subitem_text_value":"政策研究大学院大学 / National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies"}]},"item_12_version_type_19":{"attribute_name":"出版タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_version_resource":"http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa","subitem_version_type":"AM"}]},"item_1693541285410":{"attribute_name":"bibliographic_information","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2024-09-20","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicVolumeNumber":"24-10","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"GRIPS Discussion Papers","bibliographic_titleLang":"en"}]}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"AAMER, Shahid","creatorNameLang":"en"}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"LITSCHIG, Stephan","creatorNameLang":"en"}]}]},"item_files":{"attribute_name":"ファイル情報","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"accessrole":"open_access","date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2024-09-20"}],"filename":"DP24-10.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"843.8 KB"}],"format":"application/pdf","mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"label":"DP24-10.pdf","url":"https://grips.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/2000134/files/DP24-10.pdf"},"version_id":"6b4899f0-d272-4a77-8092-782b057455ef"}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"Rents","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"competition","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"corruption","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"bribery","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"public works","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"item_resource_type","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"technical report","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh"}]},"item_title":"The Effect of Competition on Corruption: Evidence from Contractors' Internal Records","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"The Effect of Competition on Corruption: Evidence from Contractors' Internal Records","subitem_title_language":"en"}]},"item_type_id":"12","owner":"16","path":["1712910681242"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"PubDate","attribute_value":"2024-09-20"},"publish_date":"2024-09-20","publish_status":"0","recid":"2000134","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["The Effect of Competition on Corruption: Evidence from Contractors' Internal Records"],"weko_creator_id":"16","weko_shared_id":-1},"updated":"2024-09-20T04:40:43.044077+00:00"}