@techreport{oai:grips.repo.nii.ac.jp:00000999,
 author = {ABDULKADIROGLU, Atila and CHE, Yeon-Koo and YASUDA, Yosuke},
 note = {https://www.grips.ac.jp/list/jp/facultyinfo/yasuda_yosuke/, Truthful revelation of preferences has emerged as a desideratum in the design of school choice programs. Gale-Shapley’s deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof for students but limits their ability to communicate their preference intensities. This results in ex-ante inefficiency when ties at school preferences are broken randomly. We propose a variant of deferred acceptance mechanism which allows students to in uence how they are treated in ties. It maintains truthful revelation of ordinal preferences and supports a greater scope of efficiency., 経済学 / Economics},
 title = {Expanding "Choice" in School Choice}
}