| Item type |
ディスカッションペーパー / Discussion Paper(1) |
| 公開日 |
2010-12-01 |
| タイトル |
|
|
タイトル |
The lion's share. An experimental analysis of polygamy in Northern Nigeria. |
|
言語 |
en |
| 言語 |
|
|
言語 |
eng |
| キーワード |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
Polygyny |
| キーワード |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
Polygamy |
| キーワード |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
Experiment |
| キーワード |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
Household |
| キーワード |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
Nigeria |
| 資源タイプ |
|
|
資源タイプ |
technical report |
| ID登録 |
|
|
ID登録 (DOI) |
10.24545/00001048 |
|
ID登録タイプ |
JaLC |
| 著者 |
MUNRO, Alistair
KEBEDE, Bereket
TARAZONA-GÓMEZ, Marcela
VERSCHOOR, Arjan
|
| 著者所属 |
|
|
値 |
政策研究大学院大学 / National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies |
| 著者所属 |
|
|
値 |
School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia |
| 著者所属 |
|
|
値 |
School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia |
| 著者所属 |
|
|
値 |
School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia |
| 分野 |
|
|
内容記述タイプ |
Other |
|
内容記述 |
経済学 / Economics |
| 抄録 |
|
|
内容記述タイプ |
Abstract |
|
内容記述 |
Using samples of polygamous and non-polygamous households from villages in rural areas south of Kano, Northern Nigeria we test basic theories of household behaviour. Husbands and wives play two variants of a voluntary contributions game in which endowments are private knowledge, but contributions are public. In one variant, the common pool is split equally. In the other treatment the husband allocates the pool (and wives are forewarned of this). Most partners keep back at least half of their endowment from the common pool, but we find no evidence that polygynous households are less efficient than their monogamous counterparts. We also reject a strong form of Bergstrom’s model of polygyny in which all wives receive an equal allocation. In our case, senior wives often receive more from their husbands, no matter what their contribution. Thus the return to contributions is higher for senior wives compared to their junior counterparts. When they control the allocation, polygynous men receive a higher payoff than their monogamous counterparts. We speculate on the implications of this pattern of investment and reward for the sustainability of polygynous institutions. |
| 発行年 |
|
|
値 |
2010-12 |
| 書誌情報 |
en : GRIPS Discussion Papers
Report No. DP10-27,
発行日 2010-12-01
|
| 出版者 |
|
|
出版者 |
GRIPS Policy Research Center |
|
言語 |
en |
| 関連サイト |
|
|
関連タイプ |
isIdenticalTo |
|
|
識別子タイプ |
URI |
|
|
関連識別子 |
https://ideas.repec.org/p/ngi/dpaper/10-27.html |
|
|
関連名称 |
https://ideas.repec.org/p/ngi/dpaper/10-27.html |
| 著者情報 |
|
|
内容記述タイプ |
Other |
|
内容記述 |
https://www.grips.ac.jp/list/jp/facultyinfo/munro_alistair/ |
| 著者版フラグ |
|
|
出版タイプ |
AM |
|
出版タイプResource |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa |
DP10-27.pdf (488.3 kB)
