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  1. ディスカッション・ペーパー
  2. 2015年度

Us and Them: Experimental evidence on what creates efficiency in choices made by married couples.

https://doi.org/10.24545/00001253
https://doi.org/10.24545/00001253
25efd01f-44a6-4ff3-8b43-afde5bb0375c
名前 / ファイル ライセンス アクション
DP15-10.pdf DP15-10.pdf (871.0 kB)
Item type ディスカッションペーパー / Discussion Paper(1)
公開日 2015-07-06
タイトル
タイトル Us and Them: Experimental evidence on what creates efficiency in choices made by married couples.
言語 en
言語
言語 eng
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 Household choice
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 Public Good Experiment
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 Family
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 Colombia
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 Japan
資源タイプ
資源タイプ technical report
ID登録
ID登録 (DOI) 10.24545/00001253
ID登録タイプ JaLC
著者 LOPEZ, Maria Claudia

× LOPEZ, Maria Claudia

en LOPEZ, Maria Claudia

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MUNRO, Alistair

× MUNRO, Alistair

en MUNRO, Alistair

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TARAZONA-GOMEZ, Marcela

× TARAZONA-GOMEZ, Marcela

en TARAZONA-GOMEZ, Marcela

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著者所属
値 Department of Community Sustainability, Michigan State University, MI USA
著者所属
値 政策研究大学院大学 / National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
著者所属
値 Oxford Policy Management, United Kingdom
抄録
内容記述タイプ Abstract
内容記述 A recurring and puzzling pattern with experiments on intra-household behaviour is the common failure of couples to attain the cooperative solution. Using married couples from a low income area of Bogota, Colombia we conduct an experiment that raises the salience of the family vis-à-vis outsiders. In this experiment husbands and wives play a repeated voluntary contribution game. At the same time each participant plays an identical game with one stranger in the same session. When investments to the common pools are made from separate and non-fungible budgets, most subjects contribute more to the household pool than the stranger pool, but rarely contribute everything to the household even after repetition and opportunities for learning. Efficiency is not obtained. However, when subjects make contributions to the two games from a single budget many individuals converge rapidly on a strategy of investing everything in the household pool and contributing little to the pool with a stranger. Overall the amount invested in some pool rises. Our results are in line with games played with individuals in which in-group cooperation is higher when membership of the group is more salient. They suggest that strengthening family identity may raise intrahousehold cooperation, but at the expense of cooperation of interhousehold cooperation.
内容記述
内容記述タイプ Other
内容記述 JEL Classification Codes: C920, D130, D80
発行年
値 2015-07
書誌情報 en : GRIPS Discussion Papers

Report No. DP15-10, 発行日 2015-07-06
出版者
出版者 GRIPS Policy Research Center
言語 en
関連サイト
関連タイプ isIdenticalTo
識別子タイプ URI
関連識別子 https://ideas.repec.org/p/ngi/dpaper/15-10.html
関連名称 https://ideas.repec.org/p/ngi/dpaper/15-10.html
著者情報
内容記述タイプ Other
内容記述 https://www.grips.ac.jp/list/jp/facultyinfo/munro_alistair/
著者版フラグ
出版タイプ AM
出版タイプResource http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa
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