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A Structural Estimation Approach to an Asymmetric Auction Model for the Japanese Retail Power Market
https://doi.org/10.24545/00001697
https://doi.org/10.24545/00001697e8fc746c-17d4-4c5b-b298-9a8486c2df02
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
DP19-18.pdf (3.0 MB)
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| Item type | ディスカッションペーパー / Discussion Paper(1) | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2019-09-10 | |||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||
| タイトル | A Structural Estimation Approach to an Asymmetric Auction Model for the Japanese Retail Power Market | |||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | electric power industry | |||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | auction data | |||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | public procurement | |||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | structural estimation | |||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | asymmetric information structure | |||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | competition policy | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||||
| 資源タイプ | technical report | |||||||||
| ID登録 | ||||||||||
| ID登録 (DOI) | 10.24545/00001697 | |||||||||
| ID登録タイプ | JaLC | |||||||||
| 著者 |
TAKAGI, Shingo
× TAKAGI, Shingo
× HOSOE, Nobuhiro
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| 著者別名 | ||||||||||
| 識別子Scheme | WEKO | |||||||||
| 識別子 | 8856 | |||||||||
| 姓名 | 高木, 真吾 | |||||||||
| 言語 | ja | |||||||||
| 著者別名 | ||||||||||
| 識別子Scheme | WEKO | |||||||||
| 識別子 | 8855 | |||||||||
| 姓名 | 細江, 宣裕 | |||||||||
| 言語 | ja | |||||||||
| 著者所属 | ||||||||||
| 値 | 北海道大学 / Hokkaido University | |||||||||
| 著者所属 | ||||||||||
| 値 | 政策研究大学院大学 / National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies | |||||||||
| 抄録 | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | In this paper, we develop a structural auction model and quantify the effects of policy measures aiming to enhance competition in the Japanese retail power market. We employ a theoretical model that incorporates asymmetries between the incumbent and entrants in terms of both the cost and information structures, where the costs of the former are assumed common knowledge, and empirically estimate the structural parameters characterizing their cost distributions using public power procurement data. We then conduct counterfactual simulations to quantify two competition-promoting policy measures: a bid reference program for entrants, and an increase in the number of potential bidders. We take a parametric approach to estimate the structural model successfully in contrast to a nonparametric approach that previous studies took. Our simulation results show that these procompetitive measures would barely increase participation by potential entrants but would elicit more aggressive incumbent bidding behavior. Further, a modest bid-preferential rate would improve welfare and reduce the probability of realizing inefficient allocations associated with a costly winning bidder. | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | JEL Classification Codes: L94, H57, C54 | |||||||||
| 発行年 | ||||||||||
| 値 | 2019-09 | |||||||||
| 書誌情報 |
en : GRIPS Discussion Papers Report No. DP19-18, 発行日 2019-09-10 |
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| 出版者 | ||||||||||
| 出版者 | GRIPS Policy Research Center | |||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||
| 関連サイト | ||||||||||
| 関連タイプ | isIdenticalTo | |||||||||
| 識別子タイプ | URI | |||||||||
| 関連識別子 | https://ideas.repec.org/p/ngi/dpaper/19-18.html | |||||||||
| 関連名称 | https://ideas.repec.org/p/ngi/dpaper/19-18.html | |||||||||
| 著者情報 | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | https://www.grips.ac.jp/list/jp/facultyinfo/hosoe_nobuhiro/ | |||||||||
| 著者版フラグ | ||||||||||
| 出版タイプ | AM | |||||||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa | |||||||||
