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Judicial Presence and Rent Extraction
https://doi.org/10.24545/00001709
https://doi.org/10.24545/000017098f684f13-5789-4faf-a0ed-a11cc876def5
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
DP19-20.pdf (333.0 kB)
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| Item type | ディスカッションペーパー / Discussion Paper(1) | |||||||||
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| 公開日 | 2019-10-17 | |||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||
| タイトル | Judicial Presence and Rent Extraction | |||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | Institutions | |||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | Judiciary | |||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | Corruption | |||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | Rents | |||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | Local Governments | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||||
| 資源タイプ | technical report | |||||||||
| ID登録 | ||||||||||
| ID登録 (DOI) | 10.24545/00001709 | |||||||||
| ID登録タイプ | JaLC | |||||||||
| 著者 |
LITSCHIG, Stephan
× LITSCHIG, Stephan
× ZAMBONI, Yves
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| 著者所属 | ||||||||||
| 値 | 政策研究大学院大学 / National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies | |||||||||
| 著者所属 | ||||||||||
| 値 | Universidade Federal de Pernambuco | |||||||||
| 抄録 | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | This paper estimates the effect of state judiciary presence on rent extraction in Brazilian local governments. We measure rents as irregularities related to waste or corruption uncovered by central government auditors. The identification strategy is based on an institutional rule of state judiciary branches according to which prosecutors and judges tend to be assigned to the most populous among contiguous counties forming a judiciary district. Our research design exploits this rule by comparing counties that are largest in their district to counties with identical population size from other districts in the same state where they are not the most populous. Instrumental variable estimates suggest that state judiciary presence reduces the share of inspections with irregularities related to waste or corruption by about 10 percent. The effect is concentrated among first-term mayors, suggesting that judicial presence operates through an increased probability of detection and prosecution rather than an increased probability of conviction, which should discipline second-term mayors as well. | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | JEL Classification Codes: D02, D72, D78, H41, H83 | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | This is a revised and extended version of the paper “The Short Arm of the Law: Judicial Institutions and Local Governance in Brazil.” | |||||||||
| 発行年 | ||||||||||
| 値 | 2019-10 | |||||||||
| 書誌情報 |
en : GRIPS Discussion Papers Report No. DP19-20, 発行日 2019-10-17 |
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| 出版者 | ||||||||||
| 出版者 | GRIPS Policy Research Center | |||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||
| 関連サイト | ||||||||||
| 関連タイプ | isIdenticalTo | |||||||||
| 識別子タイプ | URI | |||||||||
| 関連識別子 | https://ideas.repec.org/p/ngi/dpaper/19-20.html | |||||||||
| 関連名称 | https://ideas.repec.org/p/ngi/dpaper/19-20.html | |||||||||
| 著者情報 | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | https://www.grips.ac.jp/list/jp/facultyinfo/litschig-stephan/ | |||||||||
| 著者版フラグ | ||||||||||
| 出版タイプ | AM | |||||||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa | |||||||||
