| Item type |
ディスカッションペーパー / Discussion Paper(1) |
| 公開日 |
2020-04-01 |
| タイトル |
|
|
タイトル |
Intrahousehold Bargaining and Agricultural Technology Adoption : Experimental Evidence from Zambia |
|
言語 |
en |
| 言語 |
|
|
言語 |
eng |
| キーワード |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
Non-unitary model |
| キーワード |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
productive efficiency |
| キーワード |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
gender |
| キーワード |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
targeting |
| キーワード |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
Zambia |
| 資源タイプ |
|
|
資源タイプ |
technical report |
| ID登録 |
|
|
ID登録 (DOI) |
10.24545/00001755 |
|
ID登録タイプ |
JaLC |
| 著者 |
MIURA, Ken
KIJIMA, Yoko
SAKURAI, Takeshi
|
| 著者別名 |
|
|
|
識別子Scheme |
WEKO |
|
|
識別子 |
9114 |
|
|
姓名 |
三浦, 憲 |
|
|
言語 |
ja |
| 著者別名 |
|
|
|
識別子Scheme |
WEKO |
|
|
識別子 |
9115 |
|
|
姓名 |
木島, 陽子 |
|
|
言語 |
ja |
| 著者別名 |
|
|
|
識別子Scheme |
WEKO |
|
|
識別子 |
9116 |
|
|
姓名 |
櫻井, 武司 |
|
|
言語 |
ja |
| 著者所属 |
|
|
値 |
京都大学 / Kyoto University |
| 著者所属 |
|
|
値 |
政策研究大学院大学 / National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies |
| 著者所属 |
|
|
値 |
東京大学 / The University of Tokyo |
| 抄録 |
|
|
内容記述タイプ |
Abstract |
|
内容記述 |
This study examines how technology adoption is determined in an intra-household bargaining process between spouses with different incentives and resource constraints. We develop a noncooperative bargaining model in which individual investments affect not only a household’s total income but also its members’ future bargaining position, which can yield Pareto-inferior outcomes. To test for possible inefficiency, we introduce rice seeds to farmers in rural Zambia and randomly distribute vouchers for transportation from the village to a miller in town to husbands and wives. The results show that the identity of the voucher recipients matters for rice seed take-up when wives choose which crop to grow on suitable plots for rice production. We also find that the voucher given to husbands is effective only when they manage the plots by themselves. Furthermore, intra-household information flows are distorted by the recipients. The heterogeneous effects and incomplete information sharing among spouses provide evidence against efficient resource pooling within the family. We present suggestive evidence that limited commitment to the production plan is a key mechanism behind strategic spousal behavior. Overall, this study highlights the importance of directly targeting individuals with productive resources relevant to a technology. |
| 内容記述 |
|
|
内容記述タイプ |
Other |
|
内容記述 |
This study was financially supported by JSPS KAKENHI No. 16H02733. |
| 発行年 |
|
|
値 |
2020-04 |
| 書誌情報 |
en : GRIPS Discussion Papers
Report No. 20-01,
発行日 2020-04-01
|
| 出版者 |
|
|
出版者 |
GRIPS Policy Research Center |
|
言語 |
en |
| 関連サイト |
|
|
関連タイプ |
isIdenticalTo |
|
|
識別子タイプ |
URI |
|
|
関連識別子 |
https://ideas.repec.org/p/ngi/dpaper/20-01.html |
|
|
関連名称 |
https://ideas.repec.org/p/ngi/dpaper/20-01.html |
| 著者情報 |
|
|
内容記述タイプ |
Other |
|
内容記述 |
http://www.grips.ac.jp/list/jp/facultyinfo/kijima-yoko/ |
| 著者版フラグ |
|
|
出版タイプ |
AM |
|
出版タイプResource |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa |
DP20-01.pdf (820.8 kB)
