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The Effect of Competition on Corruption: Evidence from Contractors' Internal Records
https://doi.org/10.24545/0002000134
https://doi.org/10.24545/0002000134f389f2ac-d4b7-4322-8b94-47ed018b1953
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
DP24-10.pdf (843.8 KB)
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| Item type | ディスカッションペーパー / Discussion Paper(1) | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2024-09-20 | |||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||
| タイトル | The Effect of Competition on Corruption: Evidence from Contractors' Internal Records | |||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | Rents | |||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | competition | |||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | corruption | |||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | bribery | |||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | public works | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||||
| 資源タイプ | technical report | |||||||||
| ID登録 | ||||||||||
| ID登録 (DOI) | 10.24545/0002000134 | |||||||||
| ID登録タイプ | JaLC | |||||||||
| 著者 |
AAMER, Shahid
× AAMER, Shahid
× LITSCHIG, Stephan
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| 著者所属 | ||||||||||
| 値 | National Accountability Bureau of Pakistan | |||||||||
| 著者所属 | ||||||||||
| 値 | 政策研究大学院大学 / National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies | |||||||||
| 抄録 | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | This paper investigates the extent to which competition for public contracts reduces projectlevel rents and bribe payments to public officials. Water supply and sanitation project contractors for the provincial government of Punjab in Pakistan were interviewed on the condition of anonymity and gave access to 237 project-level construction ledgers. Under collusion, contractors pay about 15 percent of the project budget in kickbacks on average. Under competition for the contract, the winning bid and associated available rents go down by about 11 percentage points. Even under competition, public officials take almost 10 percent of the project budget in bribes. | |||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | JEL Classification Codes: D73, D78, H41, H83, K42 | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | We acknowlededge financial support for data collection from the Japanese Society for the Promotion of Science (Kakenhi 25101002, "Emerging State Project SONOBE A01 Group"). | |||||||||
| 発行年 | ||||||||||
| 値 | 2024-09 | |||||||||
| 書誌情報 |
en : GRIPS Discussion Papers Report No. 24-10, 発行日 2024-09-20 |
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| 出版者 | ||||||||||
| 出版者 | GRIPS Policy Research Center | |||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||
| 著者情報 | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | https://www.grips.ac.jp/list/en/facultyinfo/litschig-stephan/ | |||||||||
| 著者版フラグ | ||||||||||
| 出版タイプ | AM | |||||||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa | |||||||||
